I Say to You Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only
advertisement
I Say to You Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb i 2/23/11 12:27:42 PM Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb ii 2/23/11 12:27:43 PM I Say to You Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya G A B R I E L L E LY N C H The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb iii 2/23/11 12:27:43 PM Gabrielle Lynch is a senior lecturer in Africa and the politics of development in the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the University of Leeds. She was previously a DPhil student at the University of Oxford and then lecturer in imperial and African history at Keele University. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 2011 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 2011. Printed in the United States of America 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 4 5 ISBN-13: 978-0-226-49804-1 (cloth) ISBN-13: 978-0-226-49805-8 (paper) ISBN-10: 0-226-49804-2 (cloth) ISBN-10: 0-226-49805-0 (paper) CIP data to come This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb iv 2/23/11 12:27:43 PM CONTENTS List of Tables 000 Abbreviations, Swahili Terms, and Note on Ethnic Nomenclature Acknowledgments Map 1: Kenya: Provinces and Area of Focus 000 Map 2: Area of Focus: Kalenjin-Dominated Districts INTRODUCTION 000 000 000 / The Nature and Political Salience of Ethnic Identity 000 ONE / Creating a Community: From Nandi Speakers to Kalenjin 000 T WO / Popularizing the Kalenjin: Decolonization and the First Majimbo Debate 000 THREE FOUR / Moi: The Making of an African “Big Man” / Harambee to Nyayo: Control and Patronage in the President’s Backyard 000 FIVE SIX 000 / Democratization and the “Kalenjin Vote,” 1990–2002 000 / Multiparty Politics and the “Ethnic Factor,” 2002–8 000 Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb v 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM Conclusion: Ethnic Politics in Modern Kenya 000 Appendix: Multiparty Election and Referendum Results in Kalenjin-Dominated Constituencies Notes Sources Index 000 000 000 000 Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb vi 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM TA B L E S 4.1 Average annual rates of real economic growth, 1965–92 5.1 Presidential and parliamentary election results, December 1992 5.2 Presidential and parliamentary election results, December 1997 5.3 Presidential and parliamentary election results, December 2002 A.1 Presidential election results, December 1992 A.2 Parliamentary election results, December 1992 A.3 Presidential election results, December 1997 A.4 Parliamentary election results, December 1997 A.5 Presidential election results, December 2002 A.6 Parliamentary election results, December 2002 A.7 Referendum results, November 2005 A.8 Presidential election results, December 2007 A.9 Parliamentary election results, December 2007 A.10 Referendum results, August 2010 Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb vii 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb viii 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM A B B R E V I AT I O N S , S WA H I L I T E R M S , A N D N O T E O N E T H N I C N O M E N C L AT U R E A B B R E V I AT I O N S AAD African Affairs Department ADC African District Council or Agricultural Development Corporation AEM African elected member AHS Alliance High School AIC African Inland Church AIM African Inland Mission AR annual report ASAL Arid and Semi-arid Lands Programme BDIP Baringo District Independent Party CAPU Coast African People’s Union CCM Change the Constitution Movement CDF Constituency Development Fund CPK Church of the Province of Kenya (Anglican) DC district commissioner DDC District Development Committee DFRD District Focus for Rural Development DP Democratic Party EATEC East African Tanning Extract Company ECK Electoral Commission of Kenya EIC Economic Independence Party EMDIP Elgeyo-Marakwet District Independent Party Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb ix 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM x / Abbreviations and Terms FORD Forum for the Restoration of Democracy FORD-A FORD-Asili FORD-K FORD-Kenya FORD-P FORD-People GAP Green African Party GAS Government African School GEMA Gikuyu, Embu Meru Association GSU General Service Unit HR house representative ICC International Criminal Court ICDC Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation IDP internally displaced person KACGC Kalenjin and Allies Central Governing Council KADDU Kenya African Democratic Development Union KADU Kenya African Democratic Union KAF Kenya Air Force KAMATUSA Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu KANU Kenya African National Union KASA Kenya African Socialist Alliance KASU Kenya African Study Union KATMU Kenya African Transport and Mechanics Union KAU Kenya African Union KCC Kenya Creameries Corporation KDIP Kericho District Independent Party KEDOF Kenya Elections Domestic Observation Forum KENDA Kenya National Democratic Alliance KFA Kenya Farmers Association KHRC Kenya Human Rights Commission KIC Kenya Intelligence Committee KIM Kenya Independence Movement KK Keith Kyle papers KLC Kenya Land Commission KLFA Kenya Land Freedom Army Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb x 2/23/11 12:28:00 PM Abbreviations and Terms / xi KNA Kenya National Archives KNC Kenya National Congress KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human Rights KNP Kenya National Party KNU Kipsigis-Nandi Union KPA Kalenjin Political Alliance KPP Kenya People’s Party KPU Kenya People’s Union KSC Kenya Socialist Congress KSh Kenyan shilling KU Kalenjin Union KVDA Kerio Valley Development Agency LDP Liberal Democratic Party LegCo legislative council LNC local native council LPK Liberal Party of Kenya MLC member of the legislative council MP member of parliament NAD Native Affairs Department NaRC National Rainbow Coalition NCCK National Christian Council of Kenya NCPB National Cereals and Produce Board NDIP Nandi District Independent Party NDP National Development Party NGO nongovernmental organization NKP New Kenya Party NLP National Labour Party NPP National Progressive Party ODM Orange Democratic Movement OP office of the president PA personal assistant PC provincial commissioner PCEA Presbyterian Church of East Africa Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb xi 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM xii / Abbreviations and Terms PICK Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya PNU Party of National Unity PRO Public Records Office (London) PS permanent secretary RBC Regional Boundaries Commission RHL Rhodes House Library (Oxford, UK) RVP Rift Valley Province SBIR Special Branch Intelligence Report SDP Social Democratic Party SDPK Social Democratic Party of Kenya SPK Shirikisho Party of Kenya UDM United Democratic Movement UmmaPPK Umma Patriotic Party of Kenya UPPK United Peoples Party of Kenya WKC West Kalenjin Congress YK’92 Youth for KANU ’92 S WA H I L I T E R M S baraza meeting harambee pull together (self-help development or fund-raiser) magendo black market; corruption; bribery majimboism regionalism mzee elder / old person nyayo footsteps rungu traditional club or truncheon uhuru freedom wananchi the (common) people N O T E O N E T H N I C N O M E N C L AT U R E In each case the most commonly used label is listed first. These labels are used in the text except in the case of direct quotes. Bok Walagu Keiyo Elgeyo Kipsigis Lumbwa Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb xii 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM Abbreviations, Swahili Terms, and Note on Ethnic Nomenclature / xiii Luhya Abaluhya, Luyia, Kavirondo Ogiek Ndorobo Pokot Suk Sengwer Cherangany, Cherangani Terik Nyangori Tugen Kamasia Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb xiii 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb xiv 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM AC K N OW L E D G M E N T S This book is the product of research conducted at the University of Oxford, Keele University, and the University of Leeds. At Oxford I was fortunate enough to be supervised by David Anderson, who has provided continuous encouragement, support, academic guidance, and analytic insights. The vibrant African studies community in Oxford and Leeds provided a stimulating work environment and helped me develop a more general understanding of African history and politics. This includes Gavin Williams, who did much to cultivate my early interest in African politics. The arguments have also benefited from my attendance at a number of seminars and conferences and from feedback received for papers presented therein. In addition, I benefited from excellent feedback, suggestions, and editorial comments from David Anderson, John Lonsdale, Jocelyn Alexander, Adam Ashforth, Stephen Orvis, Susanne Mueller, Nicholas Cheeseman, Michael Molcher, Tania Edwards, Nadine Beckmann, Gerard McCann, Rob Blunt, and Raphu Mustapha. I am also grateful for the financial assistance received over the years from the British Academy, Beit Fund (Oxford), Oxford University Press Surplus Fund, British Institute in Eastern Africa, Royal Historical Society, Department of Politics and International Relations (Oxford), and Balliol College (Oxford). Balliol College served as a continuous source of support, and the British Institute in Eastern Africa served as an excellent base in Nairobi. As a DPhil student I lived a rather nomadic life, and I owe much to the unstinting hospitality of family and friends. Particular mention must go to Steph Wynne-Jones, Mike Monaghan, Rob Blunt, Danielle Walters and her family, Bishop Stephen Kewasis and his family, Claire Medard, and Father Patrick Baraza for their warm hospitality in Kenya or the United States, and to my parents, Daniel and Sarah Horsley, David and Lucy Smith, Geoffrey Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb xv 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM xvi / Acknowledgments Smith, Sarah Longair, Daniel Branch, my sister Catherine and her husband Simon, Ed Hughes, Pete Murphy, and Gregory Yakovlev, who all opened their homes to me and/or my belongings in the United Kingdom. In Kenya, Nicholas Cheeseman, Daniel Branch, Gerard McCann, Rob Blunt, Danielle Walters, Steph Wynne-Jones, Mike Monaghan, Laragh Larson, Dave Eaton, Cecilia Nalelia, Jared Nyamweya, Sarah Muhoya, Claire Medard, Diane Mwako, Bishop Kewasis and his family, Daniel Kandagor, Kipkorir Menjo, Paul Kurgat, Ngengi wa Njuguna, and many others, helped provide a home away from home. Some of my fieldwork was done with Claire Medard, whose research experience was of great help (particularly in the early days), and whose knowledge and understanding of local politics had a great impact on the development of the ideas and arguments of this book. The process of conducting interviews was only made possible by people’s unending willingness to take time out of their day to answer my many questions. In particular I must thank interviewees who agreed to meet with me on several occasions and also Daniel Kandagor, Albert Mshando, Sammy Mbugua, and a litany of others who helped arrange meetings. Final thanks must go to my partner, Michael Molcher, my family, and my friends in Leeds, Oxford, London, Keele, and Kenya, who have provided endless support and light relief. Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb xvi 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM Map 1. Kenya: Provinces and area of focus Source: Bodleian Library, Oxford Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb xvii 2/23/11 12:28:01 PM Map 2. Area of focus: Kalenjin-dominated districts Source: Bodleian Library, Oxford Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb xviii 2/23/11 12:28:02 PM INTRODUCTION The Nature and Political Salience of Ethnic Identity Ethnic identities are often recent constructs, never fixed and unchanging. Nevertheless, they enjoy a seemingly natural or primordial appeal, and their potential to unite and divide depends upon assumed commonalities and differences of history and culture. Ethnic identities also enjoy global recognition through, for example, cultural and peoples’ rights and specially designed institutional frameworks—from the right to national selfdetermination, the rights of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, to consociationalism and ethnic federalism. At the same time, there is understandable concern about the potential for a sense of ethnic difference to endorse, and even demand, violent atrocities against the “other.” This begs a host of questions regarding the origins and salience of ethnic identities: How are ethnic groups formed? How might a collective compartmentalization of “us” and “them” on the basis of an assumed shared past lead to a situation in which politics is cast as “ethnic”? How and when does a sense of ethnic distinction lead to a reality of ethnic competition and violent conflict? In seeking to address these questions, this study analyzes the construction, development, political relevance, and appeal of one ethnic identity over time—the Kalenjin of western Kenya. This choice of approach stems from the idea that a “specifically historical interpretation” can shed light on the origins and continuing appeal of ethnic identities, since “the content of the ethnic message itself will continue to vary from people to people, as the culture brokers craft messages that will resonate with their own clienteles” (Vail 1989, 7, 17). Some— but not all—of the findings are case specific. However, more generally, this book proposes that since ethnic groups are socially constructed and renegotiated over time, historical narratives of collective achievement, migration, injustice, persecution, and associated moral claims are in constant Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb 1 2/23/11 12:28:03 PM 2 / Introduction evolution, producing complex and contested groupings that enjoy greater relevance to local actors. As a consequence, ethnic identities provide politicians with a means to mobilize support and for ordinary people to lay claims and assert rights to space, power, and wealth. The problem is that such “ethnic politics” encourages a sense of difference and competition between communities, which—in the presence of resentments, elite encouragement, and the absence of institutional brakes or barriers—can erupt into violent confrontation that is legitimized by notions of defense, the “settling” of old scores, and group rights, with some ethnic narratives being more emotive and divisive than others. To simplify further, this book argues that the constructed nature of ethnic identities is the source of ethnicity’s attraction and danger, as selective and interpreted histories are used to unite some and differentiate others in ways that are meaningful, contested, and unstable. The Case Study: Kenya and the Kalenjin Political parties in Kenya tend to be associated with particular ethnic groups, while competitive elections have displayed strong ethnic voting patterns. Kenya’s most recent general election was held in December 2007, when contested results sparked a postelection crisis that left over 1,000 people dead and almost 700,000 displaced within two months (Lynch 2009, 604). Of 1,133 recorded casualties, an estimated 405 were shot by the police, the majority killed by their fellow citizens (Kenya 2008a, 305). In a number of foreign media reports, “poll violence” was portrayed as a battle between members of President Kibaki’s Kikuyu community and those of his opponent Raila Odinga’s Luo community—or Kenya’s “two main tribes” (Somerville 2009). Yet the epicenter was in Rift Valley Province, western Kenya, where neither the Kikuyu nor the Luo predominate. It was here that over half the deaths (KNCHR 2008, 341), the majority of displacement (Lynch 2009), and “iconic moments of the conflict” occurred (D. Anderson and E. Lochery 2008, 328), as Kalenjin participated in targeted attacks against Kikuyu and other selected communities, most notably Kisii and Luhya. Many people were killed in these attacks, and many more were forced to take shelter with friends and relatives or in camps for the internally displaced. The crisis was unexpected. Kenya is widely viewed as a bastion of peace and stability in a volatile region, and campaigns and voting were relatively peaceful, with high voter turnout a testament to democratic commitment. However, while shocking, the high-handed state security response was Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb 2 2/23/11 12:28:03 PM The Nature and Political Salience of Ethnic Identity / 3 compatible with the origins and evolution of local policing (Africa Watch 1991; Hills 2007, 2008; Katumanga 2010) and escalation of extrajudicial killings (KNCHR 2008). In turn, this book will argue that, intercommunal attacks were consistent with ethnic readings of the past and present, mutually incompatible interpretations of social justice, an assumed critical juncture that offered opportunities and heightened fears, high levels of popular political skepticism, institutional decay, a culture of impunity, elite opportunism, and related strategies of action. Most important, despite frequent media references to Kenya’s former existence as a peaceful idyll, this was not the first time that intercommunal conflict had rocked the country. The most significant precursor was the “ethnic clashes” of 1991 to 1993, when an estimated fifteen hundred people were killed and three hundred thousand were displaced in western Kenya (Africa Watch 1993, 1). Most of the violence occurred on cosmopolitan farms in and on the borders of Rift Valley Province, where Kalenjin and Kikuyu emerged as principal perpetrators and victims, respectively. “Ethnic clashes” also erupted in parts of the Rift Valley and at the coast in 1997, while western Kenya has suffered from numerous localized outbursts of intercommunal tension and conflict. At independence the colonial government feared a possible war over land and majimboism (or regionalism) between Kalenjin warriors and former Mau Mau adherents and sympathizers, and local Kikuyu residents. Two common themes emerge: (1) Sides were ethnically delineated, with the Kalenjin cast as principal perpetrators of attacks on Kikuyu neighbors in an ethnically cosmopolitan and agriculturally rich area beset by conflicting claims to land and authority. (2) The eruption of large-scale violence correlated with electoral competition and has been a strategy used and endorsed by political elites to secure control of the center, and by ordinary citizens to gain access to land and other resources and/or as a form of preemptive defense. The label of “Kalenjin” is a recent construct, dating from the midtwentieth century, when it came to embrace a number of subgroups administered as separate “tribes” by the colonial authorities. Groups spanned district and provincial boundaries, the racial settlement zones of the White Highlands, and the Kenya-Uganda border. Concentrated in western Kenya, the Kalenjin constitute a decided majority in Bomet, Kericho, Baringo, Koibatek, Keiyo, Marakwet, and West Pokot Districts in Rift Valley Province and Mount Elgon District in Western Province (see map 2). They also constitute a majority in the more ethnically mixed Uasin Gishu District and have a significant presence in Trans Nzoia and Nakuru Districts, Rift Valley Province.1 Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb 3 2/23/11 12:28:03 PM 4 / Introduction The term Kalenjin literally means “I say to you”—a direct reference to the linguistic similarity of its members—although significant differences of dialect lead to talk of Kalenjin language “clusters” (Huntingford 1944, 19–20; Sutton 1976, 25). The catalog of subgroups is also a matter of debate. Those commonly listed are the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen, Keiyo, Marakwet, Sabaot, Pokot (although the latter hold a somewhat peripheral position),2 and Terik (who are sometimes bracketed together with the Nandi [Fedders and Salvadori 1979, 167]). More problematic is the position of Ogiek or Ndorobo— labels used interchangeably for dispersed groups of forest-dwelling huntergatherer communities. Since, while most Ogiek speak a Kalenjin-related dialect, some use Maasai-related dialects (Blackburn 1976, 54–56), which, together with their ethnic history of permanent residence (rather than migration) and forest livelihoods, renders their position within the larger Kalenjin debatable and contested (Lynch 2006b). To confuse the ethnic landscape further, a number of authors suggest a relationship between the Kalenjin and Tatoga in Tanzania (Ehret 1968, 122–23; Huntingford 1953b, 9; Langley 1979, 3; Sutton 1976, 34). Benjamin Kipkorir also lists the Bongom (“now largely absorbed by the Luhyia”) as one of the Kalenjin subgroups (2009, 392) (or alternatively as a subgroup of the Sabaot [1975, 64]), while leaders from several small communities (such as the Enderois, Sengwer, and Mount Elgon Ogiek)—which are commonly regarded as subgroups of Kalenjin subgroups—have come to assert their difference (Lynch 2006b). Some even deny the existence of a Kalenjin community and talk, for example, of “a motley confederation of some eleven Nilotic groups with separate languages and cultural practices” (Ajulu 2002, 266). Well-known Nandi politician Jackson Kibor went further in his declaration that “the Kalenjin groupings were hatched by an individual who wanted to use the groups to ascend to power and gain wealth.”3 The question of “who is Kalenjin” is thus subjective, and differences of opinion are indicative of the complex, ambiguous, and contested nature of ethnic identities. However, for most people within and outside Kenya, the Kalenjin constitute a recognized ethnic group. Moreover, despite their recent progeny, complex makeup, and internal divisions, the community has become one of Kenya’s most united in terms of electoral and referendum voting patterns, while members have acted as key participants in occasions of ethnic violence. Their political significance is further enhanced by the incumbency of Daniel arap Moi (a Tugen from Baringo District) as vice president of Kenya from 1967 to 1978, and president from 1978 to 2002, and by his unsuccessful call for Kalenjin to reelect President Kibaki Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb 4 2/23/11 12:28:04 PM The Nature and Political Salience of Ethnic Identity / 5 in 2007. One point of interest is the way in which Moi’s leadership helped strengthen Kalenjin unity, at the same time as it fostered internal divisions and subgroup nationalisms. Finally, Kalenjin often self-identify as one of Kenya’s smaller “tribes.” Yet, at the time of the 1989 population census, they accounted for approximately 11 percent of the Kenyan population, as compared to the Kikuyu at 21 percent, Luhya at 14 percent, Luo at 12 percent, and Kamba at 11 percent (Kenya 1994, 6–2).4 Moreover, while the 1999 census omitted ethnic data (Kenya 2001), census results from 2009 reveal that the Kalenjin now constitute 14 percent of the population, as compared to the Kikuyu at 17 percent, Luhya at 14 percent, Luo at 10 percent, and Kamba at 10 percent (Kenya 2010). This numerical strength, together with their concentration in and around the cosmopolitan farming lands of the former White Highlands (and overrepresentation of these areas in parliament) means that the community enjoys a strong presence in the country’s politics and can act as an important swing community. Notwithstanding their recent provenance, historical prominence, and political significance, the Kalenjin have attracted little academic attention, and most of the existing literature consists of ethnographic (for example. Hollis 1909; Huntingford 1953a, 1953b; Massam 1972; Orchardson 1961; Peristiany 1939) and historical studies (for example, D. Anderson 1993, 2004; Ellis 1976; Gold 1978; Kipkorir 1972, 1973; Matson 1970, 1980; Mwanzi 1977) of particular subgroups. In light of this relative silence and recent political developments, this book analyzes how a sense of “being Kalenjin” was constructed, self-consciously popularized, and adopted, how it coexists with internal divisions and debate but has nevertheless been used as a fulcrum around which to mobilize support, and the implications of ethnonationalist historical narratives and memories for a popular sense of intercommunal difference and competition and potential for violent conflict. Since the aim is to look at how presentations of history and interconnected interpretations of identity inform a sense of difference and competition, and associated processes of political mobilization and support, the history of the Kalenjin is outlined for the ways in which it has shaped political institutions, cultures, and strategies rather than for its historical veracity per se. In turn, the rationality of ethnic construction, mobilization, and support is investigated without the constraints of a strict rational choice theory where individuals maximize expected payoffs in a context where preferences are consistent—in that they can be ranked, and are connected and transitive (D. Green and I. Shapiro 1994). Finally, the book stems from an assumption that—in any context—people are motivated by Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb 5 2/23/11 12:28:04 PM 6 / Introduction rational considerations (for example, of loss and gain) but also by more irrational feelings, such as affection, frustration, anger, and hatred. Unlike much recent political science literature (for example, Chua 2003; Kaufman 2001; Mann 2005; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Petersen 2002; Snyder 2000), this study does not seek to offer a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between democratization and intercommunal violence or provide a model of ethnic violence—although it does have important implications for such an endeavor and occasions of intercommunal violence are discussed and analyzed. Instead, the study focuses on a prior question: namely, the collective narratives and group perceptions that render a particular understanding of belonging and citizenship (and thus difference and competition) meaningful, appealing, and politically significant. The arguments are based on a triangulation of recorded and nonrecorded interviews, participant observations of political meetings and rallies, newspaper articles, government and nongovernment reports, and secondary literature. Over 250 interviews were conducted between September 2004 and August 2009 with a range of actors from current and former cabinet ministers, MPs, top-level civil servants, local councillors, civil society activists, clergy, academics, lawyers, students, businessmen, and farmers in Nairobi, Rift Valley, and Western Provinces. Interviewees ranged in age from their early twenties to almost one hundred. However, while interviews provided critical insight and only a few respondents requested that their comments remain anonymous, direct citation has largely been avoided. This is due to the sensitive and emotive nature of the interview content and current political context, which demands that interview materials be handled with caution. Local Conclusions and General Propositions As noted, this study aims to further our understanding of the processes of ethnic construction and identification, and of political mobilization and support across Kenya and beyond through an analysis of the interaction between presentations of history and interpretations of identity, and local perceptions and elite behavior. The central argument is that—while processes of ethnic construction and negotiation are limited by the need for ethnicity to be rooted in “primordial” discourses of cultural similarity and shared pasts (cf. Lentz and Nugent 2000)—the main motivation for the construction and politicization of a Kalenjin alliance was (and continues to be) a nexus of fear of loss and potential for gain. More important, ethnic notions of morality and assistance, and of shared pasts and justice, Uncorrected Proofs for Review Only C5516.indb 6 2/23/11 12:28:04 PM We hope you have enjoyed this short preview. I say to you: Ethnic politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya by Gabrielle Lynch can be purchased from Amazon here: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Say-You-Ethnic-Politics-Kalenjin/dp/0226498050 Other reputable book sellers are also available.
