Illusion and Content
Ian Phillips
University College London
How should the Naïve Realist who eschews representational perceptual content account
for illusions? Bill Brewer has recently proposed that illusions should be treated solely in
terms of post-experiential misjudgement.
In this paper I spell out and criticize this approach focusing on Brewer’s treatment of
relational illusions such as the Muller-Lyer. I argue firstly that his account is illmotivated in that it fails to provide convincing grounds for rejecting the attribution of
Intentional content. I then argue that the account is deeply problematic as it stands.
This leaves two options open: we might either exploit the gap identified in Brewer’s
argument against Intentional content and endorse a partially representational account of
perceptual experience; alternatively, we might look for a different wholly antirepresentational treatment of illusions. I briefly sketch what such an account might look
like.