Briefing Paper
The Political Economy of Opium in Afghanistan
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contribution of technology to democracy and conflict
resolution. It examines the consequences of
pervasive Information Communications Technology
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state
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1
This briefing paper addresses the relationship between the level of violence and the opium market in
Afghanistan. We first provide an overview of the nature and extent of the Afghan drug trafficking in an
historical perspective. We then offer an economic perspective on the unclear nexus income-violence.
This is followed by a preliminary analysis of the interaction between illegal income and insurgency
activities using monthly time-series data on opium prices, alternative measures of relative income and
the number of security incidents for 15 Afghan provinces over the period 2004-2009. We show that
the parallel between violence and opium cultivation is not so-clear cut. While in many poppy-free
provinces the security conditions are worsening, in areas where poppy cultivation is a main activity,
security is improving. Also the direction of causality remains unclear because violence, and the
absence of law-enforcement, may incentive illegal activities. Opium and violence are not necessarily
intrinsically linked and we need more methodical investigations to assess their multiple interactions.
Overall, we believe that there is a simplified reading of the drugs-Taliban nexus in Afghanistan.
Introduction and background
The magnitude and importance of Afghanistan's opium
Yet, it also generates income outside the rural sector.
economy are unique in global experience. The country
The number of people engaged in the opium trade is
has been devastated by internal wars and external
startling and has been increasing in recent years. In
military intervention for decades. These war years have
Helmand province alone, the estimated number of traders
seen Afghanistan emerging as the global leader in opium
is between 600 and 6,000 (World Bank-UNODC).
production. This is principally explained by the destruction
Between 2003 and 2009, Afghan farmers earned more
wrought by the war, which has resulted in the collapse of
than US$ 6.4 billion from opium poppy cultivation, and
economic infrastructures across the country, relegating
Afghan traffickers approximately US$ 18 billion from local
Afghanistan among the poorest economies in the world
opiate processing and trading. Today, Afghanistan
and at the lowest levels of global human security and
provides 93% of the global supply of opium - and over
development. Despite international external assistance,
90% of the heroin trafficked into the UK - despite
and a long-lasting western military intervention in the
increasing efforts by the international community, and
country, unemployment rates remain alarming and less
ISAF forces, to eradicate the cultivation of poppy.
than 10% of the population have access to basic services
such as electricity. Therefore poverty and economic
The nature and extent of the Afghan drug trafficking have
stagnation, combined with an almost collapsing state,
been always shaped by military factors. Before the
have been driving ordinary citizens to take the risks
outbreak of war - from 1950s to 1970s - Afghanistan was
associated
and
a sort of rentier or "allocation" state, deriving over 40% of
transportation of drugs. Opium is a labour-intensive crop,
its revenue from resources accruing directly from abroad,
particularly suitable for a labour-rich and capital-poor
which were used to create basic infrastructure and a
country. It generates jobs in on-farm casual work (e.g.
police force and army . These revenues included both
weeding and harvesting) and in the non-farm rural sector
foreign aid and sales of natural gas to the USSR (Rubin,
(5.6 jobs per hectare, according to UNODC, 2009a).
1992). The rural community was isolated from the central
Thus, opium sustains the livelihoods of millions of rural
state and dependent on agricultural production. In the
Afghans.
mid-1970s, following the disruption of opium production in
with
the
production,
processing
Iran, poppy production became a significant staple in the
and heroin manufacture was enunciated and the Taliban
country's rural economy. By the late 1970s, poppy was
continued to levy taxes on these activities (Buddenberg &
cultivated in half of the provinces (Goodhand, 2005). In
Byrd, 2007).
1978, the communist coup d'état and the Soviet
occupation of the country were accompanied by a
Following the end of the regime, poppy production
continued expansion of poppy cultivation. Opium was
returned to previous levels by 2005. Ever since their
used as a source of funding for the Mujahedeen, an
return as insurgents into southern Afghanistan in 2005,
islamist guerrilla organisation. Along with an increasing
the Taliban - and other anti-government forces - have
production in Pakistan, Afghanistan developed into a
derived enormous profit from the opium trade. In 2007 the
major producer of opium, accounting for more than one-
production peaked at 8,000 metric tons, the highest level
third of the global production by the mid-1980s. After
ever recorded. Today opium is the country's biggest
1992, when the Mujahedeen took Kabul, the local
export and one in seven Afghans is reportedly involved in
warlords fought each other to consolidate their economic
some aspect of the trade, with 6.5% of the population
activities, fragmenting the country in a series of sub-
involved in growing poppy (UNODC, 2009b). In areas
conflicts. The further deterioration of the central authority
such as Helmand, where cultivation is concentrated, this
saw a rapid expansion of cross-border smuggling and the
share rises to a staggering 80%. Although the magnitude
production
the
is subject to debate, the total drug-related funds accruing
disintegration of the country and the dissatisfaction
to insurgents and warlords were estimated at $200- 400
among
"warlordism"
million in 2006-2007 and at $450-600 million between
encouraged the rise of the Taliban. From their stronghold
2005 and 2008 (UNDOC, 2009b). These estimates
in the south, in the Kandahar province, the Taliban
included incomes from four sources: levies on opium
conquered the country. By September 1996 they had
farmers; protection fees on lab processing; transit fees on
captured Afghanistan's capital.
drug convoys; and taxation on imports of chemical
of
the
narcotics.
population
In
the
about
mid-1990s,
greedy
precursors. At the same time, Afghanistan's opiate
The Taliban's relationship with opium has been uneven
economy has moved towards a greater share of refined
over time. When in power, the smuggling network proved
products (at present 2/3 of the raw opium output is turned
to be an important source of revenue for the new regime,
into heroin and morphine compared to 3/4 a few years
which facilitated its export. In 1997 total production was
back). This has allowed the Taliban to tax higher value-
2,700 metric tons, showing a 43% increase over the
added commodities (refined products) and other drug-
previous
related activities.
year,
with
cultivation
spreading
to
new
provinces. Through a direct taxation on farmers (ushr), a
10% "agricultural tax", they generated about $75-100
The relation between the opiate business and the
million per year between 1995 and 2000, to fund a regime
insurgency in southern Afghanistan is amplified by the
without
exchange
role played by tribalism in both drug trafficking and
(Thachuk, 2007). In 1999 the production peaked at 4,500
insurgent networks. The strongest overlap between the
metric
supply
insurgency, tribal networks and the drug trade is found in
(UNODC, 2009a). The most damaging drought in three
the southern and eastern parts of the country, and
decades struck the rural economy, already devastated by
extends into Pakistan's tribal areas across the Afghan
years of conflict. In the summer of 2000 Mullah Omar
border. In Pakistan, the value of the drug trade is
banned opium cultivation, the reasons for which are still
estimated at around US$ 1 billion per year. Although it is
debated - he appealed generically to religious sentiments
a transit region for opiate flows out of Afghanistan, there
to justify the ban. The Taliban decree, (fatwa), reduced
were
the overall production, although the cultivation continued
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan
in areas outside the Taliban reach, particularly the north-
between 2002 and 2008. FATA is also considered a
east provinces. Also, while the opium ban concerned
sanctuary
opium poppy cultivation, no policy toward opium trading
Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani network.
alternative
tons,
sources
three-quarters
of
of
foreign
the
world's
almost
for
no
seizures
in
Pakistan's
extremist/insurgent
groups
Federally
like
the
Much like in Afghanistan, Pakistan-based insurgents
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reportedly levy taxes on licit business and trade in this
Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan benefit from the drug
region.
trade at various points in the value chain and through
several mechanisms. As we said, besides levying taxes
Key conceptual issues and problem areas
on production in Taliban-held areas, they also apply
This briefing paper is concerned with the economic
systematically transit and trade levies that derive from
analysis of the opium-violence nexus.
A growing
drug trafficking across southern and western Afghanistan
economic literature on civil conflict has demonstrated that
since 2005 (UNODC, 2009a). The drugs trade pays for
insurgencies have the capability of exploiting drug money
soldiers, weapons and protection, and is also a source of
for funding, such as the FARC in Colombia. In this
patronage. Even though Taliban insurgents levy taxes on
respect, Afghanistan is not an exception. ISAF forces
all other forms of trade and agriculture, opiates are the
consider opium eradication a "`strategic threat"' for the
highest-value product on the market. By providing
2
while the UN finds "`a strong link
protection to farmers and traffickers (e.g. preventing
between insecurity and opium cultivation"' (UNODC,
interdiction and eradication efforts), they delegitimize the
2009b). On the other side, a recent report from the
central government and reconsolidate the political
Centre for International Cooperation, NYU, concludes
influence in areas under their control.
long-term security
that counternarcotics policy in the context of a weak state
like Afghanistan is likely to aggravate rather than alleviate
The economic theory on conflict suggests two opposite
insurgency, corruption, and criminal violence 3. Certainly,
relations between income and violence. The first branch
the country's drug economy generates several hundred
suggests that wage and income shocks increase the
million dollars per year into criminal activities. Conflict and
incentives for peace through the reduction of labour
illicit economic activities have been always intertwined.
supplied to conflict activities. The higher the returns to
Instability has an impact on the narco-industry, while
(legal) productive activities relative to the returns to
money-laundering and collusion with government officials
fighting activities, the higher the amount of citizens' time
undermine the security environment. This strong link is
devoted
both a cause and a consequence of the inability of the
According to a second branch, the contest model, the
central government to effectively control the country's
greater the national wealth, the greater the effort devoted
"`borderlands"'. Since 2004, the nexus of drugs and
to fighting relative to production (Hirshleifer, 1995;
insurgency has become stronger, and, as a result, the
Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007). The nexus between
transnational threat posed by Afghanistan's opium has
income and violence is not so clear cut also in the
become more acute. But it is very difficult to distinguish
empirical evidence. While Besley et al. (2008) show that
among terrorist movements, insurgencies and organized
positive
crime (linked to the drug trade or otherwise), since their
commodities make civil war more likely,
tactics and funding sources are increasingly similar. As a
Ciccone (2010) find that a civil war is more likely in those
label, “AGE”, or Anti-Government Elements brings under
Sub-Saharan countries where the value of export
one umbrella a complex mixture of groups and shifting
commodities is decreasing. However, the cross-country
alliances. This mix includes warlords, tribal leaders,
analysis has a number of severe shortcomings, and
religious
jihadists,
should be regarded with caution. A number of studies on
Pakistani/Afghan
Colombian conflict and the nexus between drugs and
Taliban and criminal organizations. The most devoted
violence finds a positive effect of coca production on
insurgents - those who want to take over the government
conflict (e.g. Angrist & Kugler, 2008).
leaders
(mullahs),
mercenaries/semi-private
foreign
militias,
to
peaceful
price
shocks
activities
to
(Grossman,
imported
and
1991).
exported
Bruckner &
and expel ISAF troops - associate themselves with the
Taliban or Al-Qaeda. Defining the borders between the
The link between income and violence is among the most
ideologically-driven Taliban and the criminal groups in the
robust in the empirical literature, but both the sign and the
opium business is beyond the scope of this briefing
direction of causality remain serious concerns. The recent
paper. Yet, most of the violent events are usually
literature
attributed to the Taliban-led insurgency.
identification problem, in a search for exogenous
has
focused
on
addressing
the
causal
measures. In 2006, UNODC published a study on the
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socio- economic and psychological factors influencing the
„greed‟ effect on lootable resources (Collier & Hoeffler,
variations of opium poppy cultivation the country
2004): violence might be over the opium cultivation and
(UNODC, 2006). The main motivations for opium
controlling the plantation can finance the insurgency. In
cultivation were 1) a lack of rule of law; 2) insecurity; 3)
practice, the narcotic trade seems to be crucial in
lack of employment; 4) lack of water and agricultural
supporting Anti-Government Elements.
infrastructure; 5) provision of basic needs and 6) external
pressure from traffickers and traders. Therefore we
According to a number of sources and reports by the
should not only question the ability of the Taliban-led
UNODC, extortion fund AGE through two forms of local-
insurgency to finance war expenditures through the drug
levied taxes: ushr, a 10% tax on agricultural products and
economy. A more careful and thorough investigation
zakata, a 2.5% wealth tax applied to traders (Kalfon et. al,
should examine whether the (perceived) lack of security
2005). The 2007 Afghanistan Opium Survey says that
makes illegal activities more profitable.
We will use
almost all the farmers in the Southern and Western
monthly opium prices at the farm gate level to see
regions pay the ushr. Between 2005 and 2008, the total
whether they display a common pattern. Moreover, prices
estimated farm-gate value of opium produced by those
adjusted by the level of cultivation are used as a critical
regions was US$ 2 billion. That means approximately
determinant of the provincial distribution of revenues.
US$ 200 million paid as ushr by farmers.4 Taliban also
levy taxes on laboratories producing morphine and heroin
Notwithstanding the role of the security conditions in
(UNDOC, 2009a). To what extent is regional instability
determining the incentives for illegal cultivations, the
and insurgency fuelled by the Afghan opiate industry?
survey also stresses the role of agriculture - and
livelihood in general - as an important element underlying
Since 2004, there has been tangible progress in the
the choice between legal and illegal cultivation. This
increasing number of poppy-free provinces, decreasing
substitution effect and opportunity-cost calculation are
opium poppy cultivation, and greater regional counter-
also at play when choosing between peaceful activities
narcotics cooperation, especially in the last three years.
(e.g. farming, either legal or illegal) and insurgency.
In 2004, poppy cultivation was observed in 30 provinces
Hence, the effect of income on violence may be less clear
(out of 34) and occupied 131,000 hectares. In 2009,
cut than usually hypothesized. Therefore, we rely on a
opium poppy was cultivated in 14 provinces, and
micro-level data analysis to identify a possible common
production decreased by 6 % (123,000 ha) compared to
trend between the revenue generated by different
2004.
occupational choices and the degree of violence.
cultivation increased in the southern and western regions
Comparing
2004
and
2009,
opium
poppy
and decreased in all the other regions. The production
Evidence and Analysis
has further concentrated and consolidated in the
southwestern provinces of Afghanistan, which now
As we said, the theoretical literature on economic
conditions and warfare highlights the role of the illegal
returns in the decision to fight: an increase in the return to
crime increases the labour supplied to criminals,
therefore increasing the level of violence. Thus, the
opportunity-cost effect is a main factor motivating civil
wars. The theory is supported by empirical evidence of
the link between criminal activities and economic
conditions also in non-war environments (Hidalgo et al.
2011).
produce 90% of the national production compare to 50%
few years ago. So despite an increase in „poppy free‟
provinces and a slight reduction in the overall crop
production, the opium problem remains massive, and
exacerbated by its concentration in areas where the
Taliban are strong. At the same time there has been a
notable extension of the area under insurgent control,
particularly along the restive Pashtun tribal belt on the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border (see Figure 1).
In principle individuals can choose between
opium cultivation, legal activities (e.g. wheat and cereal
production, sheep-farming) or joining an anti-government
group (e.g. Taliban, insurgency linked to Al-Qaeda or
non-ideological organized crime). Theoretically, there is
also a strong revenue-appropriation mechanism or
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Firstly, they fail to consider the magnitude of opium
cultivation per province. In the period 2004-2009, 80 % of
the opium was produced in six Afghan provinces
(Helmand, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Badakshan, Uruzgan
and Farah). Badakshan and Nangarhar aside, the bulk of
the production took place in only four provinces in
southern Afghanistan. And almost half of all opium was
produced in Helmand province. The next provinces in
order of importance were Kandahar and Nangarhar (see
Figure 3).
Figure 1: The Afghan Insurgent Front.
Source: RAND Corporation
By most measures, insecurity in Afghanistan has
dramatically increased in the last 7 years. This is primarily
a result of the insurgency's growing strength. The Afghan
National Army, the Afghan National Police and ISAF
forces are the most frequent targets, but there have also
Figure 3: Provincial distribution of opium cultivation (percentage).
Author's calculation based on records from the UNODC Statistics
and Survey Section
been a substantial number of civilian casualties. In 2008
and 2010, many of Afghanistan's provinces registered a
On the other side, half of the Afghanistan provinces
record number of attacks (Figure 2), ranging from suicide
shows level of violence above the average (see Figure 2).
bombings to coordinated assaults on military compounds
Figure 4 shows a number of relatively insecure provinces,
to kidnapping of government officials and contractors.
such as Ghazni, Paktia and Paktika, with a negligible
Much of the violence occurred in southern Afghanistan
level of opium cultivation as percentage of the total. This
(e.g. Kandahar, Helmand, Zabol), but insecurity has also
should be hardly surprisingly since cultivation is more
spread eastwards, to cover the majority of Afghan
likely to occur in remote areas, where the presence of
provinces, such as Balkh and Faryab.
government and coalition forces is weaker or totally
absent. Thus, the expected punishment decreases. Other
areas, such as Badakhshan, have a steady level of
violence and a decreasing number of insurgency's
attacks. Another point of caution must be attached to the
concept of „poppy-free‟ provinces.
Thanks to the
eradication activities, many provinces show low levels of
poppy cultivation. However, if those provinces currently
experience almost no production, they are not necessarily
free from opium-related activities, especially trafficking
and smuggling as it is the case in the northern and
western border regions, which are crossed by important
heroin smuggling routes. In particular, UNODC estimates
Figure 2: Number of security incidents.
Author's calculation based on records from the Worldwide
Incidents Tracking System, US National Counterterrorism Centre
that every year around 110 tons of heroin are exported to
the European market, about 100 tons to Central Asia (the
majority destined for the Russian Federation), some 25
Although it is commonly assumed that areas of opium
cultivation and insecurity correlate geographically particularly by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
tons to Africa, 15-17 tons the potentially large market in
China, and some 15-20 tons to the USA and Canada.
Heroin is trafficked through the Afghanistan's neighbors,
(UNODC) and by NATO 5- there are many exceptions.
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Pakistan (40%), Iran (30%) and the Central Asian
harvested between April and July. The sap can then be
countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
refined into morphine and heroin. The timing of the price
(25%). The remaining 5% is likely to be smuggled into
drop usually coincides with the opium harvest (UNODC,
India.
2009b). Weather conditions have an impact on yields and
hence on overall supply, therefore influencing the prices;
also, the final consumption demand in OECD markets
can cause changes in prices. Further research will
explore an alternative factor: the interaction between the
illicit nature of opium production and the political situation.
An important question is to what extent increasing
criminalization has induced higher prices through higher
risk premia.
Figure 4: Security incidents and level of cultivation (in
percentage of the total). Source: Author's calculation based on
records from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, USNCC, and
from the UNODC Statistics and Survey Section
Secondly, the overall level of opium revenues in the
Afghan economy is determined mainly by the opium
prices. At the aggregated national level, monthly opium
prices and attacks do not show a similar trend (see
Figure 5, in log to compress the scale of the graph).
Since 2004, there has been a notable increase in the
number of security incidents in Afghanistan in parallel
with a decrease in opium prices. This suggests that there
is a negative correlation between opium prices and
Figure 6: Monthly prices of dry opium at farm-gate level.
Source: UNODC Global Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme, Statistics
and Survey Section
violence, although at this level of aggregation we cannot
Opium cultivation is not the main occupational opportunity
say anything about causation.
in
the
Afghan
economy.
Almost
half
of
Afghan
households depend on income from agriculture, 33% on
non-farm labour, 23% on livestock and 4% on opium
production
(UNDOC,
2009a).
Household
surveys
demonstrate the centrality of wheat and livestock prices
in the economy of the country. The theory mentioned
above would suggest a strong correlation between the
relative income - or the purchasing power - and the level
of violence in Afghanistan's provinces. Wheat is the main
legal crop in rural Afghanistan. It is also a key staple food,
Figure 5: Monthly prices of dry opium collected from farmers
and number of security incidents. Source: Author's calculation based
on records from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, USNCC,
and from the UNODC Statistics and Survey Section
accounting for over half the caloric intake of population
(Persaud, 2010). Many Afghans in rural areas also rely
on diversified livelihood strategies to generate household
As can be seen from Figure 6, opium prices exhibit
income, mainly pastoralism. We look at the ratio between
considerable
and
the price of one day of unskilled labour and 1 kg of wheat
consequently opium prices - has a strong seasonal
to proxy for the purchasing capacity of households relying
component. Opium poppy is an annual crop with a six to
on casual labour as main income; the ratio between the
seven month planting cycle. It is planted between
price of one year old female sheep and 1 kg of wheat as
September and December and flowers approximately
an indicator of the purchasing capacity of those
three months after planting. After the flower's petals fall
households that are mainly reliant on income from
away, the opium, a sap found in the seed capsule, is
livestock (pastoralists); the ratio between labour and
volatility.
Opium
production
-
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diesel prices to proxy for the cost of non-farm activities,
overdoses, a sub-product of opium. It is therefore
since only 10% of the population has access to
essential to analyse the relation between the opiate
electricity.
6
decreasing
In Figure 7 all our indicators show a
trend
over
the
period
2002-2008,
in
conjunction with increasing insurgents' activities. The
business and insurgency and to indentify a more general
pattern among opium, alternative measures of income
and occupational choices, and violence.
period from 2006 to 2008 witnessed an unprecedented
surge in global agricultural prices, and wheat prices in
This briefing paper has compared the trends in the
Afghanistan followed the global trend. However, since
relative value of different sources of revenues against
2008, the dramatic increase in the number of security
time series data on the level of violence in Afghanistan.
incidents has been accompanied by improving economic
The regional variations in opium cultivation in Afghanistan,
and social conditions. Therefore the overall effect of the
particularly the concentration of cultivation and production in
occupational choices on the level of violence is not
the South and West, and the widespread insecurity in the
obvious. This ambiguous relation between relative
same regions, may suggest a close relationship between
income and the political/military situation prevailing on the
cultivation and the Taliban insurgency. Poppy cultivation in
ground needs to be tested with more sophisticated
Afghanistan is increasingly concentrated in the areas of
empirical techniques, using data disaggregated at the
the country in which security is most fragile, the Taliban is
provincial level.
strongest, and the NATO, UN and Afghan government
presence is weakest. However, using detailed data at
provincial level over a 5-year period, we show that data
on opium prices and violence do not suggest a clear role
of opium in exacerbating violence. Any conclusion is only
tentative because the data collection in a war region is
inevitably subject to many errors of measurement.
Notwithstanding these serious limitations, the quantitative
data available on the opium economy is by no means
insignificant, based on serious and credible efforts at
information collection, primarily by UNODC.
Figure 7: Income and security incidents in Afghanistan.
Author's calculation based on records from Vulnerability Analysis and
Mapping (VAM) Market Data from Afghanistan main cities, World
Food Programme and from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
(WITS), US National Counterterrorism Centre
We also contribute to the debate on civil war and the
nexus income - violence. Most part of the scholarly
research on this topic takes a generic approach, and
does not recognize possible differences across regions
Summary and conclusions
within the same country. We stress the likely presence of
heterogeneity across provinces; this knowledge can
Afghanistan's drug industry is a central issue for the
contribute
country's
and
reconstruction policies. Moreover, understanding how the
development agenda. The country provides over 90% of
returns to crime and violence affect the choice between
global supply of opium, which is the country's biggest
legal and illegal cultivations (i.e. wheat vs. opium) can
export. One in seven Afghans is involved in some aspect
help the government of Afghanistan to provide the right
of
incentives to former combatants to disarm and integrate
the
state-building,
trade.
This
security,
opium
governance,
trade
has
worldwide
consequences. Drugs fund insurgents, criminals and
to
the
implementation
of
suitable
into civilian life.
terrorists in Afghanistan and abroad. Collusion with
corrupt government officials undermines public trust,
We believe that there is another important lesson to be
security, and the law, while money-laundering damages
learned: there is a simplified reading of the income-
the reputation of banks in the Gulf region. Drug addiction
violence, and in Afghanistan of the drugs-Taliban nexus.
and HIV are spreading death along opiate trafficking
The geographic correlation between drugs and Taliban
routes, particularly in Central Asia and Russia. In Europe,
creates the dangerous temptation to merge the war
thousands are predicted to die this year from heroin
against the Taliban and the war on opium. Opium
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production is usually associated with insecurity, conflict
and increasingly anti-government violence in Afghanistan,
yet opium and violence are not intrinsically linked.
Certainly in Afghanistan in the past, and currently in other
parts of the country, the drugs trade has not been linked
with such high levels of violence. The intensity of the
conflict in the south may originate in a conjunction
between politically motivated anti-government activity and
local opportunistic opium production and trade that
Buddenberg, D., & Byrd, W.A. 2007. Afghanistan's drug industry:
structure, functioning, dynamics, and implications for counternarcotics policy. United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime.
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil
War. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563-595.
Garfinkel, M.R., & Skaperdas, S. 2007. Economics of conflict: An
overview. Handbook of defense economics, 2, 649-709.
Goodhand, J. 2005. Frontiers and wars: the opium economy in
Afghanistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 5(2), 191-216.
deteriorated in a spiral of violence, in which antigovernment
elements
portray
themselves
as
"`protectors"' of the security of the rural population. But
there are other endemic factors, particularly corruption,
enter into the equation as well. Both government officials
and anti-government elements ended up in second-order
Grossman, H.I. 1991. A general
insurrections. The American Economic
Review, 81(4), 912-921.
equilibrium
model
of
Hidalgo, F.D., Naidu, S., Nichter, S., & Richardson, N. 2011.
Occupational Choices: Economic Determinants of Land
Invasions. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
Forthcoming
conflicts over the extraction of revenues from the opium
trade. This might explain
a conflict-induced opium
Hirshleifer, J. 1995. Anarchy and its Breakdown. The Journal of
Political Economy, 103, 26-52.
production, which in turn drives opium prices. Our
findings
would
recommend
a
more
differentiated
implementation of counter-narcotics vis-a-vis counter-
Kalfon, T., Schaetzen, B., Bennett, A., Dicks-Mireaux, L.,
Fischer, F., & Rooden, R. 2005. Reconstructing Afghanistan.
Reconstructing Afghanistan, 1(1), 1-93.
insurgency.
Notes
1
Financial support from the AXA Research Fund is gratefully
acknowledged
Rubin, B.R. 1992. Political elites in Afghanistan: rentier state
building, rentier state wrecking. International Journal of Middle
East Studies, 24(01), 77-99.
Thachuk, K.L. 2007. Transnational threats: smuggling and
trafficking in arms, drugs, and human life. Praeger Security Intl.
2
See the NATO‟s Support to Counter-Narcotics Efforts in
Afghanistan June 2009 from the NATO Media Operation
Centre
http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/counternarcotics-factsheet.pdf
UNODC. 2006. Socio- Economic and Psychological Assessment
of Fluctuations and Variations of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Key
Provinces in Afghanistan. United Nations, Office on Drugs and
Crime, Vienna.
3
Available online:
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/LeadPagePDF/shermandrugtrafficking.
pdf
4
In the period 2003-2009, UNODC estimated that the total
farm-gate value of the total opium produced in Afghanistan
was almost US$ 6 billion. 2.2 billion went to Helmand farmers
and 874 million to Nangarhar farmers.
5
see NATO's Support to Counter-Narcotics Efforts in
Afghanistan June 2009 from the NATO Media Operation
Centre http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/counternarcotics-factsheet.pdf
UNODC. 2009a. Addiction, Crime and Insurgency The
transnational threat of Afghan opium. United Nations, Office on
Drugs and Crime, Vienna.
UNODC. 2009b. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009. United
Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna.
UNODC. 2010. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010, Winter Rapid
Assessment. United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna.
6
USAID data from
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/afghanistan
Select bibliography
Angrist, J.D., & Kugler, A.D. 2008. Rural Windfall or a New
Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in
Colombia. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2),
191-215.
Besley, T.J., Persson, T., & Street, H. 2008. The Incidence of
Civil War: Theory and Evidence. NBER working paper No.
14585
Bruckner, M., & Ciccone, A. 2010. International Commodity
Prices, Growth and the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The Economic Journal, 120(544), 519-534.
Institute for Democracy & Conflict Resolution – Briefing Paper (IDCR-BP-10/11)
INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IDCR)
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