WWW.IPPR.ORG
TheNationalSecurityStrategy:
ImplicationsfortheUKintelligencecommunity
AdiscussionpaperfortheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityforthe21stCentury
bySirDavidOmandGCB
VisitingProfessor,DepartmentofWarStudies,King’sCollege,London
February2009
©ippr2009
InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
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ippr|TheNationalSecurityStrategy:ImplicationsfortheUKintelligencecommunity
Aboutippr
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,producing
cutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.Since
1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughour
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WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,
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ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinFebruary2009.©ippr2009
ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity
TheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityisanall-partyCommissionpreparinganindependent
nationalsecuritystrategyfortheUK.Itisco-chairedbyLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLord
AshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon.ThefullCommissionmembershipincludes:
•LordPaddyAshdown,Co-Chair,formerleader •SirChrisFox,formerChiefConstableof
oftheLiberalDemocraticPartyandformer
HighRepresentativeforBosnia.
•LordGeorgeRobertson,Co-Chair,former
SecretaryofStateforDefenceandformer
SecretaryGeneralofNATO.
•DrIanKearns,DeputyChair,DeputyDirector,
ippr.
•SirJeremyGreenstock,Directorofthe
DitchleyFoundationandformerBritish
AmbassadortotheUnitedNations.
•SirDavidOmand,formersecurityand
intelligencecoordinatorintheCabinetOffice
andformerPermanentSecretaryintheHome
Office.
•LordCharlesGuthrie,formerChiefofthe
DefenceStaff.
•LordMartinRees,PresidentoftheRoyal
SocietyandMasterofTrinityCollege,
Cambridge.
NorthamptonshireandformerPresidentof
theAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers.
•ProfessorMichaelClarke,Director,Royal
UnitedServicesInstitute,andProfessorof
DefenceStudiesatKing’sCollegeLondon.
•ProfessorTariqModood,Directorofthe
LeverhulmeProgrammeonMigrationand
Citizenship,BristolUniversity.
•ConstanzeStelzenmüller,Directorofthe
BerlinofficeoftheGermanMarshallFund.
•ProfessorJimNorton,formerchiefexecutive
oftheRadioCommunicationsAgencyand
nowattheInstituteofDirectors.
•IanTaylorMP,ChairoftheConservativeParty
PolicyTask-forceonScience,Technology,
EngineeringandMathematics,Conservative
MPforEsherandWaltonandformerminister
forScienceandTechnologyatthe
DepartmentofTradeandIndustry.
ipprwouldliketothankEDS,RaytheonSystemsLtd,DeLaRueandBoozAllenHamiltonfortheir
generoussupportoftheCommission’sactivities.FormoreinformationontheworkoftheCommission
pleasegotowww.ippr.org/security
Theviewsinthispaperarethoseoftheauthoraloneandarebeingpublishedhereinthehopeof
advancingpublicdebate.TheydonotrepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionpanelortheviewsof
anysponsoringorganisation.
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ippr|TheNationalSecurityStrategy:ImplicationsfortheUKintelligencecommunity
Introduction
On19March2008,GordonBrownpresentedaWhitePapertoParliamentthatservedasthefirst
comprehensiveattempttodistila‘NationalSecurityStrategy’fortheUnitedKingdom(Brown
2008).Thestartingpointforthestrategyistheexistenceofafixedandunwaveringobligationon
thepartofgovernmenttoprotecttheBritishpeopleandtheBritishnationalinterest.However,
thestrategicanalysisthengoesontoassertthatthenatureofthethreatsandtheriskstheUK
faceshavechangedbeyondrecognitioninrecentdecades,soconfoundingalltheoldassumptions
aboutnationaldefenceandinternationalsecurity.
Asthestrategymakesclear,newthreatsdemandnewapproaches.Aradicallyupdatedandmuch
morecoordinatedresponsewascalledforbythePrimeMinisterandsketchedoutintheWhite
Paperinrelationtobothinternationalanddomesticdefenceandsecurityconcerns.Thispolicy
brief,preparedasasubmissiontothecurrentipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21st
Century,seekstoextendthatanalysisintoanexaminationoftheimplicationsoftheNational
SecurityStrategyfortheUKintelligencecommunity.
Thepaperisorganisedintothreelinkedsectionstotrytoanswerthefollowingquestions:
•First,whatarethebigpicturemessagesfromtheNationalSecurityStrategythatthe
membersoftheUKintelligencecommunitymight–andshould–focusonasmostrelevant
totheirwork?
•Second,howmightthefuturedevelopmentoftheworkoftheintelligencecommunity,and
theorganisationofthatcommunity,beinfluencednotjustbythosedemandsbutbythe
challengesofoperatingina21stcenturyenvironmentandwithnewtechnologies?
•Finally,howwillthesedevelopmentsaffectpublicperceptionsandpublictrustinthework
oftheintelligencecommunity?
AlthoughtheanalysisisconfinedtotheBritishexperience,manyofthefactorsidentifiedare
likelytobeequallyrelevanttotheintelligencecommunitiesoftheUK’salliesandpartners.
1.KeymessagestobedrawnfromtheNational
SecurityStrategy
TherehasbeenawidemeasureofagreementamongcommentatorsthattheNationalSecurity
Strategyhasidentifiedthemostsignificantsecurityrisks–threatsandhazards–thattheUKis
likelytofaceinthecomingyears(seeippr2008,KearnsandGude2008).Thethreatfrom
internationalterrorismandfromproliferationofthemeansofcausingmassdisruptionisalready
present.Thereisgeneralrecognitionthatmajorchangeswillflowfromthediffusionofpowerto
therapidlygrowingeconomiesofChinaandIndia.Likewise,thegrowthoftheinfluenceofnonstateactors,betheyterroristorinsurgentgroups,internationalcriminalgangs,global
multinationalsornon-governmentalorganisations,willprofoundlyinfluenceinternationalaffairs.
Governmentsnowhavetolivewiththerapidflowofideasaswellaspeopleandcapital,andto
recognise,forexample,thataspeechorthepublicationofabook,film,newspaper,orevena
cartoon,canhaveimmediateandviolentconsequencesontheothersideoftheworld.Abroadhas
comehome.
Issuessuchasglobalenergyandrawmaterialsecurity,aswellasaccesstowaterandmostrecently
tobasicfoodstaples,willbecomeincreasinglyimportant,particularlyasthestresseslikelytobe
causedbyglobalclimatechangebecomemoreapparent.Somelowprobabilityevents,particularly
weretheytoinvolveterroristuseofweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD),wouldbeso
catastrophicastojustifypreventativeandpreparatorystepsbeingtakennow.Andaffecting
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attitudestotheserisksisthegrowingrealisationthatasoursocietiesbecomemoresophisticated
theybecomepotentiallymorevulnerabletodisruption.Theseareallnowcommonplacesof
modernthinkingaboutpublicsecurityandarewellregisteredontheradarscreensofthe
intelligenceworld.TheywillformthestapledietformuchofthefutureworkoftheJoint
IntelligenceCommittee(JIC).1
Theyearsaheadwillalsoholdsignificantopportunitiesaswellasrisks,particularlyaswebenefit
fromrapidadvancesinfundamentaltechnologies.Therewillbeunexpectedwinnersandlosers
fromglobaldevelopmentsineconomic,socialandpublichealthfieldsaswellasinthetraditional
defenceandsecurityfields.Theoveralloutlookfornationalsecurityisthereforehardtoforecast,
andcertainlyharderthanduringtheColdWareraofEast/Westconfrontation.Thissuggeststhat
fargreaterattentionwillneedtobepaidtobuildingupcomprehensivehorizonscanningandearly
warningsystems.
TheUKNationalSecurityStrategydoestrytoidentifyhigh-levelthemesthatshouldhelporganise
thinkingaboutfuturesecurityneeds.Implicitinthestrategyarethreekeyconcepts,discussed
below,thatwillbeparticularlyrelevanttotheworkoftheintelligencecommunityinyearstocome:
•aredefinitionofnationalsecurityinthedirectionofembracingtheideaofhumansecurity
•anendorsementoftheadoptionofanticipatorypoliciestowardsfuturethreats,and
•arecognitionoftheimportanceofnationalresilience,giventheinherentlygreater
vulnerabilitiestodisruptionofmodernnetworkedandinterdependentsocieties.
Aredefinitionofnationalsecurity
PerhapsthemostfundamentalshiftthatistobefoundintheNationalSecurityStrategyisinthe
definitionofnationalsecurityitself.AstheUKWhitePaperputsit,thestatehastraditionallybeen
thefocusofforeign,defenceandsecuritypolicieswhilenationalsecurityhasbeenaboutthe
protectionofthestateanditsvitalinterestsfromattackbyotherstates.Now,theconcepthas
broadenedtocovertheresponsibilityofgovernmenttotacklearangeofthreatstoindividual
citizens,familiesandbusinesses.Governmentshavetomanagetheserisks‘sothatpeoplecango
abouttheirdailylivesfreelyandwithconfidence,inamoresecure,stable,justandprosperous
world’,toquotethebroadsecurityaimoftheUnitedKingdom(CabinetOffice2008:5).
Oneexampleofthisistheprioritythestrategygivestosupportingcommunitiesinresisting
violentextremismandterroristcoercion.Theobjectiveistohavecommunities,bothathomeand
incountriesofinterestabroad,thatarestrongenoughtocounterradicalisationandextremism
andthatarepreparedtocooperatewiththesecurityauthoritiestoofferinformationand
assistance.Evidentlythereistheneedforthesecurityandintelligenceauthoritiestosupportsuch
efforts–andasaconsequencealsotooperateinwaysthatenhancecommunityconfidenceinthe
authoritiesandintheprotectiontheycanofferagainsttheextremists.
Attimestheworkmaybedangerous,carrysignificantrisks,andoverseasitmaywellinvolve
militaryforce,butitisnotconductedinatraditionalbattle-space.Thesecurityandintelligence
capabilitythatisneedediswhatGeneralRupertSmithhascalledtheabilityto‘operateamongthe
people’,includingwhenoperatingoverseaswithpeoplesofverydifferentoutlook,customs,
historyandculture(Smith2005:278).Again,increaseddemandsmustbeexpectedonthe
intelligencecommunitytosupporttherequiredlevelsofunderstandingandtoprovidespecific,
accurateandtimelytargetinginformationthatallowsactiontobetakenwithinacceptablelimitsof
possiblecollateraldamage(thisisdiscussedinthefinalsectionofthispaper).
1.TheJICispartoftheCabinetOfficeandisresponsibleforprovidingMinisterswithcoordinated
interdepartmentalintelligenceassessmentsonarangeofissuesofimmediateandlong-termimportance
tonationalinterests,primarilyinthefieldsofsecurity,defenceandforeignaffairs.TheCommittee
periodicallyscrutinisestheperformanceoftheAgenciesinmeetingthecollectionrequirementsplaced
uponthem.
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AnotherfeatureoftheworlddescribedintheNationalSecurityStrategyistheblurringof
traditionaldividinglines:forexamplebetweendomesticandoverseastheatresofoperations;and
betweentheworldsofintelligence,securityandlawenforcement.Therearepublicexpectations
thatgovernmentwillbeabletoprovidethreatwarningsandadviceonhowriskstoindividualsand
businessescanbeminimisedbothathomeandwhentravellingorworkingoverseas.Andwhen
thingshappentoaffectthecitizenanywhereintheworld,suchasthetragicterroristbombingof
atouristbarinBali,theintelligenceagenciesshouldnotbesurprisedwhenpublicopinion
demandsinquiriesbyoversightcommitteesintotheirwork,intowhattheyknewandwhatthey
mighthavebeenexpectedtoknowthatcouldhaveallowedtheattacktobeanticipated.Thereis
anincreasedchallengeherefortheintelligenceagenciesincreatingasupportiveandinformed
opinionoftheirworkwhilesafeguardingtheirsourcesandmethods,withoutwhicheffectiveness
wouldrapidlydiminish.
Forthosewhomaybeconcernedthattakingsuchahumanviewofnationalsecurityisbroadening
thetermtoomuch,theapplicationofaprincipleofsubsidiaritymayreassure.Authorityand
informationwillneedtobepusheddowntoenablelocalproblemstobetackledatalocallevel,
butatthesametimenationalauthoritiesmustseizetheissuesthathaveinternationaldimensions
(andlocalimpacts),suchasterrorism,narcotics,illegalimmigrationandorganisedcrime.The
nationalintelligenceauthoritieswillbeexpectedtobothensurethatthelocalenforcementlevel–
includingpolice,borderforcesandotherlocalauthorities–havethenecessaryinformation,andto
helpmanagetheinternationaldimensionsofthesedomesticthreats.Theseresponsibilitiesare
likelytoaccentuatetheshiftawayfromthehighlyrestrictive‘needtoknow’cultureofthe
traditionalintelligenceworldtowhatUSDirectorofNationalIntelligence,MikeMcConnell,has
calledthe‘responsibilitytoprovide’,aphrasethatcapturesthespiritofthenewapproachtothe
provisionofintelligenceforthepurposesofpublicprotection(McConnell2007).
Thereconsiderationswill,ofcourse,makeitevenmoreimportantthattheUKAgenciescontinue
todeveloptheirnetworksofcontactswiththeircounterpartsaroundtheworld,reachingwell
outsidethetraditionalcircleof‘closeallies’.
Adoptinganticipatorypolicies
Thesecond‘bigidea’drivingmodernsecuritythinkingfollowslogicallyfromsuchatrainof
thought.Itisthevalueofanticipation,inthepropersenseofthatword.Notjusttobeableto
makepredictivejudgementsabouteventsbuttorealisewhattheworldwouldthenlooklikeand
toidentifyandimplementpoliciesthatwouldreducetherisktosociety,bothbypreventionwhere
thatispossibleandbypreparationwherenot.Riskistheproductofthelikelihoodofanevent,
thevulnerabilitytotheimpactoftheeventandtheeffectsoftheimpactitselfshoulditoccur.
Actinginadvancetoanticipatepotentialtroublecanthushelpinthreeways.Itmaybethat
theintelligencewillallowdisruptionofthethreatoratleastswingtheoddsagainstanattack.It
maybepossibletoacttoreducevulnerabilityonthatthreataxis.Thenthereistheneedforrapid
situationalawarenessasanoperationalthreatsituationdevelops,drawingondeepprior
understandingofthegroupsinvolved,theirmotivations,aimandtechniques.Fromsuch
assessmentshouldflowoperationaldecisionsonalertandwarningstates,deploymentsand
counter-measures,includingscienceandtechnologyprogrammes.Finally,thereisthevalueof
havinglongertermanalysisofterroristcapabilitiesandintentionstoinforminvestmentinthe
‘protect’and‘prepare’strandsoftheGovernment’scounter-terrorismstrategy,itselfakey
componentoftheNationalSecurityStrategy.
AnotherpriorityidentifiedintheStrategy(althoughnotdescribedintheseterms)inrelationto
theoverseastheatresthatarelikelytobeofenhancedconcernintheyearstocomeisa
‘responsibilitytoprevent’.TheStrategycallsfortheUKtoworkmorecloselywithitsalliesand
partnerstousepowerandinfluenceresponsiblyinwhathasbecomeahighlyinterdependent
world.Pickingupontheearlierthemeofanticipation,thiswouldincludeearlyengagementwith
nationsworkingtopreventstatefailure,toinhibitconflict,tohelpstabiliseregionsinconflictand
toprovideconditionswheredevelopmentcanprogress.Thereisalsoincreasedrecognitionofthe
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importanceoftacklingthecausesofviolentextremismandsupportingfragilestatesin
strengtheningtheirgovernanceandpromotingeconomicdevelopment.The‘tool-box’therefore
needstocontainthefullrangeofinstrumentsrangingfromaidanddevelopmentassistanceto
militaryintervention.
Asfarastheintelligencecommunityisconcernedmuchofthisisveryfamiliar,butitmustbe
expectedthattherewillbeadditional,anddemanding,requirementsforstrategicintelligence
appreciationgoingwellbeyondthemilitarydomain.Theintelligenceworldisstillgrapplingwith
howbesttosupportcivilefforts,includingconnectingwithnon-governmentalorganisationsand
theprivatesectorsecuritycompaniesworkingintroubledareas,intermsoftheirincreasing
demandsforintelligencesupportaswellastheirownspecialisedknowledgeandexperiencethat
canprovidefreshinsights.
Asalreadynoted,theseanticipatoryapproacheswillrequiretheintelligenceagenciestoengagein
morehorizonscanningandearlywarningactivity.TheNationalSecurityStrategyisclearthat
securityistobeconsideredbothinrelationtofuturethreatsandfuturehazards(thatis,risks
arisingfromnaturalcausesratherthanhostilehumandesign).Howbesttoorganisehorizon
scanninginthefutureisanopenquestion.Woulditbebetter,assomenationsaredoing,tobuild
upontheestablishedprocessesofintelligenceassessmentandwarningindicatorsthathavelong
existedinthedefenceandsecurityfield(forexamplethroughtheJIC),ortorunaparallelcivil
horizonscanningprocesslinkedmorecloselytotheJICprocess?Therearemanysubjectswhere
open,oratleast,non-secretsourceswillbesufficient,buttherewillremainthreatsforwhich
secretintelligencewillbeneededandcanhaveuniquevalue.Thegreatestaddedvalueofthe
secretpartofintelligencecomes,ofcourse,fromthefactthatformanyofthetopicsofmost
pressinginterestthereareactivemeasuresbeingemployeddesignedtohideordisguisethe
informationbeingsought.Thatwillparticularlybethecasewhereanaggressiveopponentis
deliberatelytryingtoconcealhisintentions.
Thesefeaturesoffuturenationalsecurityworkwillnotjustgenerategreaterpressureforsecret
intelligence.Governmentcanalsobeexpectedtowanttheabilitytopre-emptthreatsbyauthorising
covertactions.Suchsecretagencyhasinthepastrangedfromdisruptionoperationsagainst
proliferators,terroristsanddrugsmugglerstoback-channelcontactandnegotiationincircumstances
wheregovernmentscannotaffordtobeseentobedirectlyengaged.Thesearelikelytobeeven
morevaluablecapabilitiesinthefutureworlddescribedintheNationalSecurityStrategy.
Buildingnationalresiliencearoundariskmanagementapproach
Thejustificationfortheadoptionofananticipatoryapproachresidesinthenatureoftherisksto
oursocietiesthemselves,andflowsfromarecognitionthatadvancedsocietiesaremorevulnerable
todisruptionastheybecomemorenetworkedandIT-dependent.
Evenrelativelysmall-scaleattackscanleadtosignificantcascadingfailuresininterconnected
networkedsystems.Inthefuturesuchattacksmaywellbedeliveredthroughcyberspace.A
requirementsetoutintheNationalSecurityStrategyisthereforetobuildupnationalresilience,
definedastheabilityofsocietytowithstanddisruptionandtobeabletobouncebackintoshape
asquicklyaspossible.Suchconsiderationsemphasisethevalueofimprovedstrategicforesight
andadequateforewarningofstrategicdevelopmentsinthelevelortypeofthreatfacingour
societies,suchasanticipatingthespreadofchemical,biological,radiologicalorcyber-attack
technology.Evenwhenthethreatcannotbeeliminated,aswasthecasewiththethreatof
terroristattacksonUKtransportinfrastructure,itshouldbepossiblewithgoodintelligence
assessmenttoactinadvancesothattheeffectsofanattackcanbemitigated.Theliveexercise
heldontheLondonUnderground,thankfullybeforethebombingattacksin2005,illustratesthis.
Intelligenceassessmentsonsuchmatters–andwearetalkinghereabouthumanjudgementswith
alltheirpotentialflaws–couldwellhavemajorstrategicsignificanceforgovernment.
IntheUnitedKingdom,theMI5SecurityServicehassetuptheCentrefortheProtectionof
NationalInfrastructure(CPNI)toofferadviceonphysicalandpersonnelsecurityfortheoperators
ofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure(CNI):theessentialservicessuchaspower,
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telecommunicationsandfinancewithoutwhichtheeconomycannotfunction,andwhicharenow
largelyrunbytheprivatesector.TheCPNIalsobringstogetherexpertisefromwithinMI5andthe
policeandfromtheGovernmentCommunicationsHeadquarters(GCHQ)andtheUKSignal
Intelligence(orSigint)agency,toadvisegovernmentandindustryoncyber-securityandto
investigateattacksandintrusions,animportantdevelopingrolefortheintelligencecommunity.
Suchactivitiesmaketheworkingsoftheintelligencecommunitymuchmorevisiblethantheyever
wereduringtheColdWartoawiderrangeofstakeholdersacrossgovernment,andinprivate
industry,commerce,localgovernmentandemergencyservices.
Inthiscontexttheimportanceofreinforcingthepsychologicaldimensionofnationalresilience
needsemphasis,thatis,bolsteringthefortitudeshownbyordinarypeopleworkingthrough
periodsofuncertaintyanddisruptionandkeepingnormallifegoing.HowtheGovernmentusesits
intelligenceincommunicatinganaccurate,alertingbutnotalarmingassessmentofthesituation
tothepubliciscrucial,andasseenintherun-uptotheIraqwarmaynotbeeasytoachieve.As
notedabove,therearepublic–andquitepossiblyunrealistic– expectationstobemetthat
governmentwillbeabletoprovidethreatwarningsandadviceonhowriskstoindividualsand
businessescanbeminimised.Theintelligencecommunitywillhavetotakecarethatgovernment
doesnotoversellthedegreeofcertaintythatanyintelligence-basedwarningsystemcanprovide.
Promotingtheideaofriskmanagementwasidentifiedearlierasakeyaspectofnationalsecurity
strategy,andthatappliesnotleastintheintelligenceworld.
Ifgovernmentfollowsthelogicbehindthesethreeideas–citizenfocus,anticipationandresilience–
thentherewillbeanumberofimplicationsforthewaythattheintelligencecommunityorganisesand
conductsitswork.Inadditiontotheeffectofnationalsecuritypolicies,theintelligenceworldisalso
subjecttoprofoundchangesintechnology(andtotheuseoftechnologybyitstargets).Thenext
sectionconsidersthesefactorstogethertolookafreshatthecycleofintelligenceactivityasitmay
developoverthenextfewyears,fromsettingrequirementstodeliveringproduct.
2.Rethinkingthecycleofintelligenceactivity
Whatismeantherebythe‘intelligencecycle’?DuringtheColdWar,intelligenceactivitytendedto
bediscussedintermofacycleofactivities.Forexample,NATOdevelopedanduseda
characterisationoftheorganisationofintelligenceactivitythatstartedwiththesettingof
requirementsforintelligencecollectionandendedwiththedisseminationofthefinishedproduct
totheintelligencestaffsoftheNATOmilitarycommanders.Suchacycleisgenerallydescribedin
termsofdirection thatsetstherequirementsandprioritiesforintelligenceagencies,whothen
engageincollection ofintelligence,the processingofthatintelligenceandsubjectingittoanalysis
andbringingdifferentlinesofreportingtogetherforall-sourceassessmentandfinallythe
dissemination ofthefinishedintelligenceproduct.Thiswasanessentiallylinearprocess,withuser
feedbackattheendtocurlitroundintoacycle.Differentstaffswereengagedateachstage,and
inmostcasestherewasaclearseparationbetweensingle-sourcerawreportingandall-source
assessment,betweencollectorsandanalysts,andbetweenanalystsandcustomersforthe
intelligence.
Itisstillpossibletolookonintelligenceactivityintheseterms.Buttherealityofwhatstaffinthe
intelligencecommunitydoseemstobeincreasinglydifferentfromwhatthecycleoutlinedabove
mightsuggest.Inapost-modernspirit,therefore,ratherdifferenttermsmaybehelpfulin
describingsomekeycomponentsofthecyclesothatthinkingaboutthedevelopmentstobe
expectedoverthenextfewyearsisnotunconsciouslynarrowedbythefamiliarityofthediscourse,
forexamplethroughusingwordslikecollectionandanalysis.Indeed,thispapersuggeststhatthe
futurecyclethatwillsupporttheNationalSecurityStrategyisreallybestthoughtofasan
interactivenetworkratherthanacycle.
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Figure1:
Traditional
intelligence
cycle
Directing
Accessing
Disseminating
Elucidating
Access
AversionofsuchamodernintelligencecycleisgiveninFigure1above.Itisaloop,butforthe
purposesofdiscussion,letusbreakintoitatthefunctionlabelledAccessing.Theword‘access’rather
thanthemoretraditional‘collection’hasbeensuggested,sinceitcarriesthedoublemeaningof‘that
whichiscapableofbeingreached’and‘thatwhichisapproachableindifferentsenses’.
Themainpointtobestressedhereisthattheintelligencerequirementsofthosedesigningand
implementingmodernnationalsecuritymeasureswillbebasedonthreetypesofinformation:
traditionalsecretsources,opensources,andathirdcategoryofpersonalprotecteddata.
Theheartofsecretintelligenceliesintherecruitmentofhumansourcesandtheinterception(and
wherenecessarydecipherment)ofcommunications.Inadditiontotheoriginalhumanintelligence
(Humint)andsignalintelligence(Sigint)thereisnowsatelliteandphoto-reconnaissance(Imint),radar
andelectronicintelligence(Elint)andmeasurementandsignatureintelligence(Masint).These
categoriesprovidethebasisforrecruitment,skilldevelopmentandorganisationalstructurefor
nationalintelligencecommunities.Nationshavedifferedinwhethersomeoralmostalltheseactivities
havebeenunderthewingofnationaldefence,diplomaticorinteriorministries,butthefundamental
organisationalstructuresbasedonclassictypesofsourceremainsimilar.
However,thevolumeofinformationprovidedbythosesecretsourcesisincreasinglydwarfedbythe
availabilityofopensourcesofinformation(Osint).Beforetheinternetage,Osintprovidedavaluable
cross-checkandsupplementtoall-sourcesecretintelligenceassessment,forexamplethrough
monitoringofoverseasbroadcastsandmedia.Now,vastquantitiesofinformationabouttargetgroups
andcountries,theireconomies,culture,physicalgeographyandsoonareavailablenotjustcentrally
butatanyaccesspointtotheinternet.
Self-regulatinginternettoolssuchasIntellipedia(anadaptationofWikipedia)havefoundapplication,
atleastwithintheUSintelligencecommunity2.Andintelligencetargetsalsousetheinternet,asseen
bytheimaginativeuseofwebsitesbyTakfirijihadiststopromoteradicalisationandrecruitment,
2.Seehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellipedia
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maintaincontactwithinnetworksanddisseminateinformationabouttargets,tacticsandweapons.An
entirelynewbranchofintelligenceworkisthereforehavingtobecreatedtoaccess,monitorand
exploitsuchmaterial.Thisinformationrevolutiondoesnotsupplanttheneedformoretraditional
formsofsecretintelligence,butitisnolongerthepoorrelation.
TothehugechangeshappeningintheworldofOsintmustbeaddedthegrowthofathirdcategory
ofinformationfromwhichintelligencefornationalsecuritymaybederived,onethatmightbelabelled
‘protectedinformation’,orProtint.Thisispersonalinformationaboutindividualthatresidesin
databases,suchasadvancepassengerinformation,airlinebookingsandothertraveldata,passport
andbiometricdata,immigration,identityandborderrecords,criminalrecords,andothergovernmental
andprivatesectordata,includingfinancialandtelephoneandothercommunicationsrecords.Such
informationmaybeheldinnationalrecords,coveredbyDataProtectionlegislation,butitmightalso
beheldoffshorebyothernationsorbyglobalcompanies,andmayormaynotbesubjectto
internationalagreements.Accesstosuchinformation,andinsomecasestheabilitytoapplydata
miningandpatternrecognitionsoftwaretodatabases,mightwellbethekeytoeffectivepre-emption
infutureterroristcases.
Suchsourceshavealwaysbeenaccessibletotraditionallawenforcementseekingevidenceagainsta
namedsuspectalreadyjustifiedbyreasonablesuspicionofhavingcommittedacrime.However,
applicationofmoderndataminingandprocessingtechniquesdoesinvolveexaminationofthe
innocentaswellasthesuspecttoidentifypatternsofinterestforfurtherinvestigation.Obtaining
internationalagreementonthesharingofsuchdatawillbecomeincreasinglyimportantinorderto
ensureaccesstothesevitalsources.Privacyissuesalsoariseoverothersourcesofinformationonthe
movementsandactivitiesofindividuals,revealedbytechnologysuchasCCTVorautomaticnumber
platereaders,againwithfuturepotentialforsmartrecognitionsoftwaretobeappliedtominesuch
dataforintelligenceandlawenforcementpurposes.
Therealmofintelligenceoperationsisofcourseazonetowhichtheethicalrulesthatwemighthope
togovernprivateconductasindividualsinsocietycannotfullyapply.Findingoutotherpeople’s
secretsisgoingtoinvolvebreakingeverydaymoralrules.Sopublictrustintheessential
reasonablenessofUKpolice,securityandintelligenceagencyactivitywillcontinuetobeessential.A
significantchallengesupportingtheNationalSecurityStrategywillbehowtheintelligencecommunity
canaccessthefullrangeofdatarelatingtoindividuals,theirmovements,activitiesandassociationsin
atimely,accurate,proportionateandlegalway,andoneacceptableinademocraticandfreesociety,
includingappropriateoversightandmeansofindependentinvestigationandredressincasesof
allegedabuseofpower.
Astheauthorhasarguedelsewhere,itwouldnotbeacompleteanswer,butitwouldhelpifthere
weregreaterrecognitionthatmembersoftheintelligencecommunitydo,aspartoftheireveryday
professionallife,followasetofethicalnormssetfirmlywithintheframeworkofhumanrights(Omand
2006).EventheUnitedNationshasacceptedthevalueofintelligenceincombatingterrorismand
evenaviolentbusinesssuchaswarcanhaveitsethicalguidelines.Thosechargedwiththeoversight
oftheintelligencecommunitywouldbewelladvisedtohaveinmindasetofguidelinessuchasthe
following:
1.Theremustbesufficientsustainablecause.Doesthescaleofpotentialharmtonational
intereststhatistobepreventedjustifydevelopinganddeployingnationalintelligenceassetswith
allthatthatisliabletobringinitstrain?Passingthistestisnotjustaboutgraspingimmediate
advantage;itisalsoaboutensuringthatthedevelopmentanddeploymentofsuchintelligence
capabilityislikelytofurthernationalstrategicobjectivesinthelongerterm.
2.Theremustbeintegrityofmotive. Aretheadvantagessoughtjustifiableintermsofthepublic
good,arethemotivesofallconcernedwhattheyappeartobeandisthereintegritythroughout
theintelligenceprocess?
3.Themethodstobeusedmustbeinproportiontotheseriousnessofthebusinessinhand,
usingonlytheminimumintrusionnecessaryintotheprivateaffairsofothers.
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4.Theremustbeproperauthority. Isthereanauthorisingprocessatasufficientlyseniorlevelwith
accountabilitywithinachainofcommandandappropriateoversight?
5.Theremustbeareasonableprospectofsuccess.Aretherisksofunintendedconsequences,or
ofpoliticalordiplomaticdamageifexposed,acceptable;canthegoldenrule‘dountoothersas
youwouldbedoneby’beapplied?
6.Therecoursetothemethodsofsecretintelligencemustbealast,notafirst,resort inmeeting
theneedforinformation.Istherenoreasonablealternativewayofacquiringtheinformationfrom
lesssensitiveoropensources?
Suchprinciplesshouldapplytohowthethreesourcecategoriesofinformationinputintothe
intelligenceprocessareaccessed.Therewillinevitablybeoverlapbetweentheworkofthoseinvolved
in‘access’andthedomainoftheintelligenceanalyst,whowilloftenbebestplacedtosteerthe
accessinnear-realtime.Itisthereforeprobablethatanewfunctionofaccessormissionmanagement
willbedeveloped:onethatcanaccess,manipulateandcollatetherequiredsetsofinformationusing
themosteffectivesetofsources.Theabilitytoconductintelligenceworkinahostileenvironment
(theColdWarparadigm),behindenemylinesasitwere,willremainanimportantpartofthetotal
picture.Butmuchoftheinformationneeded,forexample,totrackterroristgroups,includingtheir
financing,residesinopensources,ontheinternetandindatabaseswithinourownsocieties,where
thebarrierstoentryfortheintelligenceauthoritiesareofaverydifferentkindandcallforaccess
expertiseofadifferentorder.Totheseaccesschallengesmustbeaddedthedifficultiesofkeepingup
withnewcommunicationstechnology.3
Noristheworldofhumanintelligenceimmunefromthepressuresofnewnationalsecuritythreats.A
significantchallengeforhumintagencies,asdiscussedbyex-ChiefofMI6SirRichardDearlove,isthe
processofadjustingoperationsfromtherecruitmentofasmallnumberofverylong-term‘deep
penetration’agentstothemanyshort-term,oftencasual,sourcesoftheinternationalcounter-terrorist
paradigm(DearloveandQuiggin2006).Thehumintworldalsohastodealincreasinglywiththe
ethicalissuessurroundingtheiractivityagainstnon-statetargetssuchasthosethatarisefromrunning
participatingagentsinsideviolentterroristandnarcoticsgangs.
TheNationalSecurityStrategyarguesthattraditionaldividinglinesareblurring:forexamplebetween
domesticandoverseastheatresofoperations;andbetweentheworldsofintelligenceandlaw
enforcement.Accesstointelligenceforthepurposesofcounter-terrorismillustratesthe
interconnectionsbetweendomesticandoverseastheatres.
Thesought-forintelligencetohelppre-emptterroristnetworkswillcomefromtwodirections:modern,
professionalintelligenceusingallthehumanandtechnicaltradecraftofwhichtheagenciesare
capable;andinformationvolunteeredfromwithinlocalcommunitiesinrejectionoftheextremistsand
theirideology.
Oneobviousneedinsupportofthestrategyistocreatetheabilitytoworkintelligencetargetsacross
thedividebetweennationalandoverseastheatres.Terroristcasesthatarisedomesticallyarelikelyto
havelinkstoextremistcirclesoverseas,andsuchlinkswillhavetobepursuedoverseas.Likewise,
intelligenceoperationsoverseasmaydirectlyilluminateemergingdomesticthreats.Jointoperational
pursuitofcaseswillbecomemorecommon,andthesamepressureswillbefeltbytheUK’s
intelligencealliesandpartners.
Asalreadynoted,modernintelligenceaccesswillofteninvolveintrusivemethodsofsurveillanceand
investigation,acceptingthatinsomerespectsthismayhavetobeattheexpenseofsomeaspectsof
privacyrights.Thisisahardchoice,andgoesagainstcurrentcallstocurbtheso-calledsurveillance
society,butfollowingthelogicthatflowsfromtheNationalSecurityStrategy,itisgreatlypreferable
3.Theseincludevoiceovertheinternetprotocols(VOIP),packetswitchednetworks,andthegeneral
volumeofmoderncommunications,togetherwiththeubiquityofcommerciallyavailablehard
encryption.
11
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totinkeringwiththeruleoflaw,orderogatingfromfundamentalhumanrights.Beingableto
demonstrateproperlegalauthorisationandappropriateoversightoftheuseofsuchintrusive
intelligenceactivitymaybecomeamajorfutureissuefortheintelligencecommunity,ifthepublicat
largeistobeconvincedofthedesirabilityofsuchintelligencecapability.
Encouragingtheprovisionofinformationtotheauthoritieswillinvolvemaintainingcommunity
confidenceintheactionsofthestate,includingintheprotectionprovidedbytheframeworkof
humanrightsandthequalityofjustice.Goodpre-emptiveintelligencereassuresthecommunityby
removingtheextremistsandbydisruptingpotentialattackswithouthavingtofallbackonblunt
discriminatorymeasuresthatalienatemoderatesupportwithinthecommunity,andonwhicheffective
policingandcounter-terrorismdepends.Meansaswellasendswillbeheldtomatterhere.
Elucidation
Nextweturntotheanalyticprocessesthatarecentraltothederivationofmeaningfromthismassof
secret,openandprotectedinformation.InFigure1thispartofthecycleislabelledelucidation since
thatwordhelpfullycarriesthemeaningofthrowinglightuponandexplainingthatwhichisinshadow.
Wehavetorecognisethatmodernnationalsecuritystrategiesplacetwotypesofdemandonthe
intelligencecommunitytoelucidateacomplexworld.Theserepresentforcespullingtheanalytic
communityintwodifferentdirections,withtherecentemphasisonusingintelligenceforthepurpose
ofimmediateaction(forcounter-terrorism,counter-proliferation,narcoticsinterdictionandsoon)
pullingoneway,andtheneedtoprovidestrategicawarenessoflongertermdevelopmentsofwider
securityinterestpullingtheother.However,inbothcasesthetaskistogenerateandtesthypotheses
inordertoprovidethebestexplanationpossibleconsistentwiththeobservedfactsandthedeepest
possibleunderstandingoftheindividuals,groupsandregionsconcerned,theirpeople,language,
customsandmores.
Thefirstshiftinemphasisistointelligenceforwhathasbeendescribedas‘action-on’.Thisis
intelligencethatissufficientlyaccurate,preciseandtimelytoallowsomeonetouseitforthepurposes
ofpublicprotection,orinpursuitofatacticalmilitaryobjective.Thatshifthasprofoundimplications
fortheextenttowhichtheintelligencecommunitymustworkasacommunityandthestronger
relationshipswithlawenforcementandhomelandsecuritypolicymakersthatarerequired,alongwith
thewiderrelationshipswithoverseasservices.Ithasimplicationsforachangeinrelationswiththe
media,fortheroleofoversightandforthedegreeofpublicconfidenceintheethicsofthe
intelligencecommunity.
Asalreadynoted,muchofthisworkwillrestonopensourcesofinformation.Oftentheassessments
concernmysteriesrelatingtohowsituationsmaydevelopratherthanthesecretsofwhatalready
exists–theplans,ordersofbattleandequipmenttablesoftheclassicassessmentfunction(whichare
stillneeded,ofcourse,sinceinter-stateconflicthasnotdisappearedwiththeendoftheColdWar).
Thedemandsontheanalystcommunityofsuchworkareveryconsiderable,notleastbecausethe
localplayersthemselvesmaynotfullyunderstandthedynamicsofthesituation.Itwillnotjustbea
questionofwhatanalysts‘know’butwhatthey‘understand’.Moreattentionwillbeneededinfuture
ontraininganalyststothinkandtobeconsciousofthemethodologiestheyareusing,andtheir
pitfalls.Andalargerproportionofthebudgetwillhavetobespentontheactivitiesthatallow
meaningtobederivedfromaccessedintelligenceasagainstthemechanismsofaccessthemselves.
TheUKalreadyhasawellunderstoodmechanismforstrategicintelligenceassessmentintheJIC.The
keycharacteristicoftheJICisthatitsjudgementsarearrivedatindiscussionbetweentheintelligence
professionalsandtheirseniorpolicycustomersfromtheCabinetOffice,ForeignandCommonwealth
Office,MinistryofDefence,HomeOffice,HMTreasury,DepartmentofBusiness,Enterpriseand
RegulatoryReformandelsewhere.Allhavetodiptheirhandsinthebloodofthecollective
judgements,howeverunwelcometheymaybe.Thisaspectis,asfarasisknown,uniquearoundthe
world.Thetaskoftheprofessionalsistokeepjudgementsanchoredtowhattheintelligenceactually
reveals(ordoesnotreveal)andkeepincheckanypredispositionofpolicymakerstoexaggeratethe
situation.Thepolicymakersinturnmustensurethatthejudgementsactuallytrytoaddresstheissues
12
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thatneedansweringratherthanjustthoseonwhichtheirintelligencesourcesarerichest,andhelpthe
professionalscouchanywarningsjustifiedbytheintelligence,withouttheirseemingtoattackthe
policyitselfandthusriskcompromisingtheneutralityoftheJIC.
TheprocessessupportingtheJICandtherange,typeandformofreportingissueshaveevolvedover
theyearsandwillneedtoevolvefurtherinthecourseofapplyinglessonsfrompastexperience,not
leastoverIraqiWMDassessments.Asobservedearlier,itdoesalreadyhaveaformalresponsibilityfor
earlywarning,andcouldthusprovideatleastthebasisofawiderhorizon-scanningeffortinsupport
oftheNationalSecurityStrategyiftheGovernmentsochose.
DebatewillnodoubtcontinueabouttheaddedvaluetoMinistersoutsideatimeofcrisisoftheshort
JICstrategicassessmentswiththeirconsensuskeyjudgements(asrevealed,forexample,intheButler
Report;seeButleretal2004).Incomparison,theUSsystemprovidesmuchmoredetailedNational
IntelligenceEstimates,includingmoredetailandsometimespresentingalternativeviewswherethese
areheldbysomebutnotallmembersoftheUSintelligencecommunity.TheJICoutputmayhaveto
becomeamoremixedonetorespondtothedifferentdemands.However,thereisoneclear
advantagethattheUKsystemhas:itforcessenior,andverybusy,officialstoworkactivelytogetherin
theJIConkeyjudgementsforanafternooneveryweekoftheyear,whichhasgeneratedapoliticalmilitarycommunitythatisuniquelywellinformedabouteachotherandthathashighlevelsofmutual
understandingandtrust.ThatisonereasonwhytheUKhasbeenabletoworkacrossboundarieson
counter-terrorisminwaysthatothernationswiththeirmorecompartmentedtraditionshavenotyet
achieved.
AttheoperationalleveltheUKnowhastheJointTerrorismAnalysisCentre(JTAC).Thisoperatesona
jointmulti-agencybasis,anditsassessmentsareissuedonitsownauthority,underthesupervisionof
theDirectorGeneraloftheSecurityService.JTACisarelativenewcomerincomparisonwiththeJIC,
andfillsagapthatwasopeningupattheoperationallevelfordetailedandtimelycounter-terrorism
(CT)assessment.Othersubjects,suchascounter-proliferation,wouldbenefitfromasimilarapproach,
butthesmallsizeoftheUK’sanalyticcommunityonsuchtopicsmaymakethatimpracticable.To
overcomethisdifficulty,areasofsecurecyberspacewhereworkinprogresscanbepostedforpeer
discussionbyachosengroupofanalystsareneeded,andotherwaysofformingvirtualanalytical
centresusingadvancedsecuretechnologywillhavetobedeveloped.Allthiscallsforthesortof
changesthatTomFingar,ChairmanoftheUSNationalIntelligenceCouncil,hasrecentlydescribed
undertherubricofanalytictransformation(seeFingar2008).
Internationalintelligencecooperationoncounter-terrorismhasdevelopedconsiderablysincethe
attacksof11September2001.Sharingassessmentsandwarningandalertinginformationislikely
toincreaseinimportanceinyearstocome.Inconsideringtheimplicationsofthis,forexamplein
termsofcooperationataEuropeanlevel,itmaybehelpfultothinkoftheintelligencecommunity
servingthreelevelsofgovernment:thesearetheclassicdistinctionsbetweenworkingatthe
strategiclevel,attheoperationallevelandatthetacticallevel,withthedistinguishingfeature
betweenthelevelsbeingthetimehorizonofthecustomersreceivingtheintelligence:
•
TheNationalSecurityStrategycallsforstrengtheningofUN,NATOandEUcapabilities
anddecision-making.Atthestrategiclevel,thiswillrequirenationstoshareassessments
toguidepolicymaking,forexampleonfutureprotectiveorbordersecuritymeasures,on
collectivemeasuresoncriminaljusticeinformingjudgementsovertrade-offsbetweencivil
libertiesandsecurity,orontrade-offsbetweendataprotectionandprivacyandthe
effectivenessofintelligence-gathering.Nationalsecurityissueswillneedtobebackedby
policiesataEuropeanlevel,andtheseareonlylikelytofollowifthereisshared
appreciationofthepotentialrisksthataretobemanaged.Forinstance,theUKhasbeen
activealreadyinbuildinguptheEUJointSituationCentresothatnationscansharetheir
strategicassessmentstoinformdebateintheCouncilofMinistersandthushelpa
consensustoemergeattheEuropeanlevel.Thepressurewillgrowformoreintelligencebasedassessmentstobesharedinthisway.
13
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•Attheoperationallevel,aninternationaldemandislikelytoremainforsharingoftimelyallsourceanalysistosupportoperationaldecision-making(inthewaythatJTACdoes).Itis
encouragingthatanumberofcountriesarecreatingtheirowninter-agencymechanismsfor
operationalthreatassessment,eventhoughtheexactgeometrywillvaryfromcountryto
country.Whatmattersisthatmechanismsdevelopoverthenextfewyearsthatwillhelp
nationstoactconsistentlywhenfacedwiththesamethreat,anexamplebeingthenatureof
warningstotravellersincountriesaffectedbyterrorismornaturaldisaster.
•Atthetacticallevel,individuallinesofintelligencearegenerallygoingrawtootherintelligence
specialists,todefencestaffsortopolicycustomerswhoarethemselvesexpertandableto
interpretthematerial.Suchinformation-sharingwithalliesandpartnerstosupportcounterterroristoperationsoverseasisendorsedbytheNationalSecurityStrategy.Butsensitive
tacticaldetailsofcurrentoperationsonthegroundareonlygoingtobeexchanged
internationallybetweentheservicesconcernedwherethereexistspriortrustthatoperations–
sourcesandmethods–arenotgoingtobecompromisedbyprecipitateunilateralaction,or
unwisemediabriefing.Ittakestime,andsharedexperiences,tobuildupsuchtrust.TheUKis
fortunateinthatitsownagenciessharerelationshipsoftrustwithmanysisteragenciesona
globalbasis.Theserelationshipsaredevelopinganddeepeningandthattrendwillneedtobe
encouraged,particularlyataEuropeanlevel.TheUKisalsolikelytofacecontinuedinitiatives
fromsomeofitspartnersforintelligenceandsecurityinstitution-buildingataEuropeanlevel.
Atthesametime,theimportanceofmaintainingcloserelationsbetweentraditionallyclose
allieswillnotdiminish,andmayincreaseunderthepressureofnationalsecuritychallenges.
ThereforethewisercoursefortheUKislikelytobetomakeprogressonallthreefrontsset
outaboveinwaysthatrecognisethenatureofthesubjectmatter,andaccommodating
differentnationalconstitutionalandhistoricalexperiences,butwithoutcreatingnew
freestandinginstitutions.
Whatwillnotchangeincomingyearsarethemanywaysinwhichelucidationcanfailtoilluminate.
TherisksofsucherrorstodaymaybethoughttobehigherthanduringtheColdWarsimplybecause
thereismorehumanjudgementtobeappliedinmoderncircumstances,andtheassessmentsmust
inevitablycovermoreofthenatureofmysteriesthansecrets,touseProfessorRVJones’suseful
distinction(Jones1989).Analystshavetobetrainedtobecomeawareofthesepitfalls,and
encouragedtothinkconsciouslyaboutthemethodologiestheyarefollowing.Ateachlevel,getting
insidethemindsoftheadversaryisessential,asisunderstandingtheinfluenceoflanguage,culture
andgeography.Aconsequenceofthenatureofintelligenceworkasitisdescribedhereisthatthere
willberelativelylessinductivereasoning,andrathermorehypothesisformulationandtesting,for
exampleinrelationtothepossibleintentionsofgroupsthatmaynotyetthemselvesknowtheir
potentialcapabilities.
Dissemination
Dissemination describesthepoliciesandprocessesnecessarytogettheintelligenceintothehandsof
thosewhowilluseit,andsometimestothosewhohavenoideathattheyneedtoknoworindeed
mightprefernottoknowtheassessmentsbeingreachedbytheintelligencecommunity.Theword
conveysahelpfulsenseofsowingseedsforlatergermination.
Therearethreepointsinparticularthatshouldbemadeaboutthefuturedevelopmentofthispartof
theintelligencecycle.First,asalreadynoted,theshiftawayfromthehighlyrestrictive‘needtoknow’
culturemustcontinue.Todaydisseminationmustbebothoutwards,includingtopartnersandallies
4.Thevarioussourcesoferror,includingmirror-imaging,transferredjudgementandperseverationhave
beenwidelystudiedinthehistoricalliteratureandinreportssuchasthatoftheButlerInquiry.A
summaryoftheNichollReportintolessonsfrompastJICassessmentfailuresofwasreleasedunderthe
FreedomofInformationActbytheUKCabinetOfficeinOctober2007.
14
ippr|TheNationalSecurityStrategy:ImplicationsfortheUKintelligencecommunity
overseas,anddownwards,wheretheissuesaroundclassification,tear-linereportingandfusion
centres5 arenowwelldiscussedintheliterature(seeforexampleSullivanandWirtz2008).
Secondly,althoughthetraditionalwrittenintelligencereportwillremainthestaple,therequirement
nowisalsoformaps,pictures,biometrics,videoanddataofallkinds.Asupportinginfrastructureof
securebroadbandcommunicationsstretchingoutintothecustomers’spacebecomesessential.
Finally,thecustomercommunity,especiallyinthemilitarycommands,willhavetobeincreasinglyable
torapidlypulltheintelligencematerialneededtogeneratesituationalawarenessandenjoythe
‘Amazon.com’abilitytofindpastproductsandperhapsbetold,asyouarewhenyousearchfora
bookonAmazon,whichotherproductsprevioususersofthatitemalsofounduseful.
Action-on
Atthispointanewfeatureisaddedintothecycle(showninFigure2below),drawingontheearlier
discussionofaction-onintelligence.
Figure2:
Intelligencecycle
inthe21st
centurysecurity
environment
Action-on
Directing
User
interaction
Disseminate Elucidating Accessing
Anincreasingefforthashadtobeputintodealingwith‘actionthisday’intelligence(particularly
intheareasofproliferation,terrorism,narcoticsandseriouscrime),asopposedtointelligenceto
informpolicymaking.Armedpolicestormahouseinthesuburbs,armouredvehiclesappearat
theairport,passengersaretoldtheycannottakeliquidsinhand-luggage,bollardsappearin
frontofpublicbuildings,anair-to-surfacemissilefromadronepreciselytargetsavehicleonthe
othersideoftheworld.Theseareallvisiblesignsofintelligencebeingactedon.
DuringtheColdWarsuchusewasnormallycovert,awayfrompublicgaze.Nowitcouldnotbe
morevisible.Thepressureontheintelligencecommunitytoallowitsproducttobeused,
includingincourt,canonlyincrease.Thepressuretoallowpre-emptiveactionwithinthe()geolocationofsuspects(asdescribedinCoram2002).Therequirementtobeabletointegrate
multiplesourcesofintelligenceinrealtimetosupportoperations,whetherathomeorfaroff
theatres,willincrease.Theriskmanagementjudgementsbetweenlonger-termexploitationand
shorttermpublicprotectionwillbecomeharder,aswillthetrade-offsbetweensecurityforthe
sourceandaction-on.Thereareconsiderableimplicationsfortheintelligencecommunity,andits
overseers,insuchdevelopmentsandsoaction-onissuesthereforedeservetheirownplaceinthe
intelligencecycle.
5Anintelligencefusioncentreisacollaborativeeffortoftwoormoreagenciesthatprovideresources,
expertise,and/orinformationtothecentrewiththegoalofmaximisingtheabilitytodetect,prevent,
apprehend,andrespondtocriminalandterroristactivity.
15
ippr|TheNationalSecurityStrategy:ImplicationsfortheUKintelligencecommunity
Direction
LookingbacktoFigure1,thecyclereturnsroundtodirection,thecapacityneededtomanagethe
cycle,includingevaluationofintelligenceprioritiesbasedonareviewofthechangingsecurity
environment.Itisnothardtoseewhatshouldbekeyprioritiesfromthepointofviewofthe
traditionalpoliticalandmilitarycustomers.Butthebroaderdefinitionofsecuritywehavemoved
towardsmeansthattherewillbemorecustomers,coveringawiderrangeofgovernmentalactivity,
thatmaybenefitfromintelligencesupport.Thefuturethreatsidentifiedingeneraltermsinthe
NationalSecurityStrategywillhavetobeturnedintospecificstatementsofintelligencepriorityas
partofthenormalintelligencerequirementsprocess,andregularlyreviewedandupdatedaspart
ofthecycleofintelligenceactivity.
Thedirectingfunctionisalsoneededtoensurethatthepoliciesbeingfollowedbythe
componentsoftheintelligencecommunity,andthebalanceofinvestmentbetweentheir
capabilities,fittheoveralllikelyneedsoftheNationalSecurityStrategyandofexternalpressures
rangingfromtechnologicaladvancestopublicopinion.IntheUK(althoughnotyetinallpartner
countries)thelastfewyearshaveseenthedevelopmentofatleastthebeginningsofthe
necessarydirectingfunctionforthewholenationalintelligencecommunity.
Whatwillbetheresultingshapeofthefutureintelligencecommunity,respondingtoallthe
pressuresthathavebeenidentifiedinthispaper?Willtherebepressuretomergethedomestic
SecurityServiceandtheSecretIntelligenceService?Willtherebepressuretoplaceallthe
supportingtechnologyanddatamanagementinasingletechnicalagency?WilltheUKanalytical
communitybebroughtclosertogether?Mostcommentators,includingthosewithinthe
community,wouldrecognisethatwhattheUKnowhasisafortunateresultoflongexperience
plusquiteanumberofaccidentsofhistory.However,itisnotwhatwouldbedesignedabinitio to
meettheneedsofnationalstrategyinthe21stcentury.Nodoubtintheyearstocomesuch
questionswillcontinuetobeposed,drivenlargelybyconsiderationsofeconomyaswellas
effectiveness.
Theadvantageoforganisingthecommunityaroundtheexistingagenciescouldbeseenas
comparabletothevaluefromhavingretainedthethreefightingservicesintermsofrecruitment,
basictrainingandethos.Thatconsiderationinturnraisestheprospectofthedevelopmentofan
increasingcapacitytoplanandgenerateforceandcapabilitypackagesonajointbasis,astheUK
defenceestablishmentdoes.Anadditionalconsideration,whichmayassumegreaterimportancein
thefuture,isthewideningoftheconceptofthecommunityforthepurposesofplanningof
communications,securityandtechnologicalapplicationsforthethreesecretagencies,andwider
engagementwiththedefenceintelligencestaff,theCabinetOfficeAssessmentsStaffsupporting
theJIC,JTAC,analystsincustomerdepartmentsandintheSeriousOrganisedCrimeAgency,the
MetropolitanPoliceandotherpoliceservices.
Userinteraction
InFigure2theintelligencecycleisrepresentedwithafurtherboxhighlightedasaconnection
betweentheelementsofthecycle,representing userinteraction.Unliketheclassicdescriptionof
thecycle,itisthereforenolongeraloopbutaninteractivenetwork.
Thepointhereistotrytocapturethethoughtthatwhatwillincreasinglyneedtobecreatedare
virtualcommunitiesofusers,analystsandmissionmanagerswithavarietyofaccesspossibilities.
Therewillneedtobegreaterinter-visibilityoftheworkofeachofthesegroups,without
compromisinganalyticindependence.Theneedtorespondtotheterroristthreathasalready
drivensuchchangesinrelationtothatsubject,butthisprocessshoulddevelopmorewidelyacross
thenationalsecurityagenda.Totakeonenationalsecuritypriority,thatofdomesticresilience,
therewillneedtobeoverlappingcirclesofinformationreachingallthewayoutfromthesecret
agenciestothecommercialoperatorsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure.
16
ippr|TheNationalSecurityStrategy:ImplicationsfortheUKintelligencecommunity
3.Theimplicationsofmorevisibleuseofsecret
intelligenceforpublicsecurity
TheNationalSecurityStrategyexplicitlystatesthatitis‘clearlygroundedinasetofcorevalues’
including‘humanrights,theruleoflaw,legitimateandaccountablegovernment,justice,freedom,
toleranceandopportunityforall’(CabinetOffice2008:6).Atthesametime,thestrategydraws
attentiontothewaythatthecurrentjihadistterroristthreathasgrown,andtothestepstakento
generateactionableintelligence,toinvestinelectronicborders,identitycardsandcounter-terrorist
legislationandtoencouragethedevelopmentofliaisonswithawiderangeofcountries(someatleast
thathaveverydifferentsecurityandintelligencetraditionsfromthoseoftheUK).
Lookingahead,itislikelythattherewillcontinuetobeavigorousdebateoverwhetherthemeasures
beingtaken,andtheactivitiesofnotjusttheUKintelligencecommunitybutalsoitsalliesandliaison
partners,areconsistentwiththosecorevalues(seeOborne2006andMueller2006foracomparison
ofUKandUSdebatesontheseissues).Theintelligencecommunitywillcontinuetohavetograpple
withissuesofproportionalityandnecessityoveritsmethods,andovertheusemadeofits
intelligence.Asalreadynoted,theadvancedtechnologynowavailabletotheintelligencecommunity
isparticularlyvaluableinprovidingearlycluestotheexistenceofcovertnetworks,butthevery
effectivenessofthesetechniquesisalreadyrubbingupagainstfeelingsofinvasionofindividual
privacy,andworriesoverthewiderusestowhichsuchinformationmightbeput.
ThepresentBritishpolicyistoacceptinformationfromanysourcethatbearsonourmajorinterests,
atthesametimeastakingallreasonablestepstopromoteUKviewsoveracceptableinterrogation
methodsoverseas.ButwillitcontinuetobesustainableintermsofParliamentaryacceptabilitythatin
returnBritishintelligenceinformationshouldbepassedtoothercountriesifthatinformationmight
leadtoactionbyothersthatwouldnotbeconsideredacceptablebytheUK?Asobservedearlier,
meansmatterhereaswellasends.
4.Conclusion
ThefirstUKNationalSecurityStrategyplacessignificantdemandsontheBritishintelligence
communitythatwillrequirefurtherdevelopmentswithinthatcommunityandinitsrelationshipswith
itscustomers.Futurechallengesfortheintelligenceanalystwillbetwofoldandwillpullinopposing
directions:ontheonehand,applyingthelatestelectronictechnologytoworkevercloserwiththe
usertogenerateactionablepre-emptiveoperationalandtacticalintelligence;ontheother,standing
backfromthepolicyhurly-burlytoprovidedeeplyknowledgeableandgroundedstrategic
assessmentsfromanindependentpositionofprofessionaldetachment.
However,theultimateobjectofintelligencewillremaintoenableactiontobeoptimisedbyreducing
ignorance;andofsecretintelligencetoachievethisobjectinrespectofinformationthatotherswish
toremainhidden.Theprimarypurposeofintelligencewillthereforecontinuetobetogenerate
organisedinformationthatcanbeputtousetoacquirerelativeadvantage.Thefuturemilitary
commanderwillneedmorepreciseintelligencetoenablehisnetwork-centricsystemstofunction,
whilethesecurityservice,policeandborderserviceofficerwillneedmorepre-emptiveintelligenceto
protectthecitizenryfrominternationalterrorismandseriousandorganisedcrime,includingvia
counter-proliferation,andtofrustratetheabilityofterroristgroups,andsomestates,toacquiremeans
ofmassdestruction.Andthepolicymakersstillneedtohaveprofessionalsupporttocollectand
organiseinformationrelevanttothedecisionsandactionsthattheywanttotake,andcrucially,to
somethattheymaynotyetknowtheyneedtotake.Thusitseemsclearthatgovernmentinthe
futureworldsketchedoutintheNationalSecurityStrategy,withthethreatsandrisksitidentifies,will
haveeverybitasmuchneedofsecretintelligenceasinthelasthalf-century.
17
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