Counterpoint
to The
Coming
Intelligence Analysis
Revolution in
Evolution Beats Revolution in
Analysis
Steven H. Ward
Editor.c Note This article
the views
responds
gence analysis
to
on
gence
intelli
in the 2/st
century advanced by Carmen
Med/na
page 23 of this
on
issue.
reporting. She
recommends what she calls
and
dent and neutral
The recommendations pre
tailored
to
sented in Carmen Medinas
specific
needs.
article,
tion in
Constructive selfassessments
are
important
organization, but
Medinas] critique of the
to any
Directorates
current
from
examination to
undeserved
flagellation.
the
The articles
its
Models Fail,
the face of
come across as
solutions in search of
1cm. Her
a
prob
main
description of the
Intelligence (DI)
primary
changes
are
important
any organization,
hut this critique of the Director
ates current practices lapses
flagellation.
to
ways
to
as
as
the basis of any
cessful model of
analysis.
Continuity
brief,
Dls
much discussion
as
description of the Dl
as stagnating in comfortable sta
bility is demonstrably false.
Change
has been
Medina argues that the
model of intelli
analysis is failing to
respond to rapid changes in
consumer needs and prefer
the
its
She contends that the
insufficiently
consumer
on
and is devoting
increasingly
syntheses of intelli
resources
useless
focused
to
a
constant
in recent decades. The Dl has
undergone
gence
Dl is
Stagnation?
feature of life in the Directorate
to
current
ences.
or
Medinas
zations and
In
suc
intelligence
been
her article with the intent
provoke
possible.
and
uncle-
The author
improve the DI for
many years; therefore, the sus
picion arises that she crafted
the
recent
consumers
ments
account many
that the DI has
to
ing
in
our
structive self-assessments
take into
to
having
thoughtfully engaged in seek
serves
and
history
made in the past decade. Con
fails
is well known for
Intelligence.
failing is that
fly in
Agency leadership. This
essay joins the debate by com
menting in general on Meclinas
thesis and defending, in particu
lar, the Dls focus on develop
served
Directorate of
policymakers
contentions
feedback from
Directorate of
from examination
Steven R. Ward
more
The
What To Do When Traditional
of the
practices lapses
Corning Revolu
Intelligence Analysis:
a
revolutionary model that would
shift analysis from a focus on
day-to-day developments to
forward-leaning, conceptual
thinking that is less indepen
numerous
adopted
reorgani
new
approaches to the training of
analysts to improve products
and services. Analysts have
developed closer working rela
tionships with their counterparts
in the Directorate of Opera
tions, other agencies, and the
militay. The past decade, in
particular. has been tife with
change, resulting in greater
29
Counterpoint
Analysis
on
asserting that DI work
procedures need to
change, Medina appears
In
emphasis
mary
on
serving
a
consumers,
pri
our
goal
Medina identifies with her
model for
new
intelligence
soca
emphasis
our
on
issues
stagnation.
what
events mean~an
missed
and crime
probably
while
claims is
power saws, nail guns, laser
consumers
levels,
ranging from
in the
lacking. Now,
we
continue to
experiment with ways to do our
lob and serve our consumers
better, particularly at the Issue
Group level and below. Admit
teclly, sonic analytic tradecraft
I
and management practices at
the office level and above may
appear static, hut the existence
of some weak pockets does not
prevent the continual
new
rise of
ideas for ways to better
serve our consumers
with both
intelligence (coordi
nated, reviewed, and polished
publications) and less formal
asserting
dures need
into
materials, would still recognize
the basic work performed by
homebuilclers and cabi
todays
netmakers. Some tasks~-~~nd
procedures
completed
best
are
in well-established ways. This
that Dl work proce
change, Medina
to
1996. the DI
en
denven t
a
major
re
assumptions may no longer
apply well to some policymak
ers at high levels, but they are
significance.
as
consistent with
processing of infor
tional model
Many Fun
of analysis
the creation of the
preceded
CIA and hold up
ysis
as
intelligence anal
our tools change.
nianv
so-ca lied new
that
assumptions
policymakers already
and
own access to
gencehave
at
around the
Most of the
policy community
know
have their
~rnelli
raw
been in
play
least Robert Gatess
since
tenure
as
Director for Intelli
Deputy
gence (DDI) in the early 1980s.
Again, the degree of applica
tion Ins varied over time, but
they
solid
to
even as
are
referring
not new,
whether
to our current
the l~resiclent
tomer
or
as
our
focus
on
First Cus
longstanding
engagement with lower-level
Old and New
Assumptions
Medinas
breakdown of various
assumptions about
is
Dl trade-
and
craft into old
See pp
organization. which entailed combining
Ihe
several office-level conipOncnus. convert
ing division-level units into Issue Groups.
and caihng stihordinare branches. teams-
Analysis
30
the
to
intelli
gence partners. The old
new
unconvincing.2
assump
policyniakers. To the Dls
credit, it has constantly striven
to
21-25 of Carmen Medinas
Goniirig Revolu
ion
in
in Ii
ile/Iigci
icc
to use
the
against the goals
implicit in these assumptions by
the changes made over the past
term,
decade.
call for certain
ana
article.
trite II ge net
What To Do Wlicn
r-~htional
Models Fail, in this issue (vol 46, no 3) of
Sit tcI,cs
itself,
optimize
authors
The authors
tn late
foreign
understand
None of the four old
penter from centuries ago,
Branch and the Congress
military and
about events, understand their
categories
car
a
serves,
the Executive
Caesar would recognize and
DI
than the contention that
that the Dl
still valid For
the DI,
approaches
analyst from decades
would
recognize our work
ago
processes today. This should he
no more surprising, however,
the wide variety of
account
handling of intelli
which, it ts
gence by
fair
to say, George
probably
\Vashington and possibly Julius
includes the
clamental aspects of what
Medina describes as the tracli
processes with stagnation. To
underscore her point that not
enough has changed ,~she writes
a
by
construction
new
military operations.
appears to confuse continuity
and reliance on fundamental
that
amazed
mation used for statecraft and
products and services.
In
and
the proper
finished
he clis
as
and narcotics), which Medina
21st century,
a
outmoded,
outright
although the degree of their
applicability may be changing.
Her critique also fails to take
the
(counterterrorism,
proliferation,
policymakers need
update them on
developments and that the Dl
has unique insights to tell them
lied nontraditional
counter
tionstliat
service to
continuity.. .with
in
the future. We have steadily
increased
confuse
to
that
lysts to specialize in complex
analysis of the most difficult
problems seems to ignore
Counterpoint on Analysis
The suggestions that
Medina presents as
heretical
efforts along this line that
signal
the DI has
such
already undertaken,
Douglas
MacEachins
advocacy of
tured argumenra don
Iinchpin analysis
the
to he
a
mix
of the current best
struc
through
or
in the DI.
practices
Analytic
in-depth work
age creative
thinking
analysis,
methods
tainty,
to
uses
deal with
too
encour
and
various
uncer
opportunity
and
Our
success, or
US
lack
Pusi
policy.
thereof, in
intelligence analysis carefully
developed during the last half
of the twentieth century
and his company
sents
heretical
as
tors, to he
a
mix of the
positive adjectives
proposed
As for Medinas
tion that
given
to
recommenda
attention he
more
non-traditional intelli
can only
gence issues,
remark that the Counterterrorist
one
Center
recently
celebrated its
current
model
21st
to
to
century
the traditional
bold,
complex,
pre
cedent-shattering versus
cautious, hierarchical,
pre
reflect
cedent-basedmay
desirable areas of growth for
the Directorate, but acids noth
ing substantial to the case for
abandoning our current model,
Not
the
Microstrategv chief
a
multibillion
his wealth
collapse alter
accounting practices took
the luster off his vision of how
to
best practices in the DI. Assign
nioclel than
analysis.
descrip
practice.
aire, then watched
had
seem, when
of dramatic
the
exclusive a
The
suggestions that Medina pre
debate, hut the concepts
new nor
3
it
as
Rise and Fall of Michael
Savior,
these fields may he open to
21st century
ran
who became
more
neither
is
sounds,
ago, The 1%~is/af#igton
a series of articles on
fundamental characteristics of
ing
are
long
The
stripped
which identifies levers
analysis,
for manipulation by
it
as
good
as
increasingly unconvincing
strengthen the Directorates cus
alternative
tomer locus through
which
alteiing policyniaker needs
The) echo much
the new economy
thinking
has been put into
on
to
of
environment
callv
that,
cre
nuiltifaceted issues. Jack Davis
and others have led efforts
since the late 1980s
nev
a
information abundance mdi
of
Service to pro
Senior
about
are overstated.
of the
ation two )earsago
mote
stripped
descriptors,
DDI
as
seem, when
of dramatic
handle the
environment
new
of information abundance,
series reminds
us
that
The
untested
theories, especially when pre
sented iii glowing terms to
excite the imagination of inves
tors
and managers, often
promise
more
delivered
practice,
and
than
he
can
than,
more
in
The
anyone wants.
DI, like many corporations,
already has a good and useftil
product. \Vhen consultants and
others
come
to us
has
everything
saying that
changed
and
so
15th anniversary and the Crime
and Narcotics Center
was
ated in 1989. Moreover,
analysts
were
cre
Revolution
or
Evolution?
Claims of dramatic shifts in
See the tourpart
series by Mark Leiiio
cEO Sped To the
virch. Microstrategys
The 1Fuh,i;gllm Pus!. p AD 1, 6-9
Br ink.
large systems, ~vhetl~er
5
our
supporting
arms
control and
analyzing arms
transfers long before the term
counterproliferation came into
vogue,
ronment,
a
the envi~
national economy,
US government agency,
always need to he viewed with
or
a
skepticism. Systems do
not change overnight, espe
cially those affected by some of
sonic
Medinas
as
article proposes that
policymakers
continue to
raise the standards for intelli
analysis, ~~e may need to
change more than just our
assumptions and work habits.
completely revamping the
gence
the
more
human
immutable traits of
nature.
Medinas
claims
2002
anuar)
A aim i Ia r exzi
an
iii
pie
internet wehisite
is
ii ~e
case
where
oi P
rice
line,
customers
tor airline uckets
named their own price
clever marketing and
and oilier senices
an ahil cv to sell investors on ii e pious se
of the internet anti the ne\ cconorin al
lowed the compa n~ to rca ch a market cap
ita hi,,a tion until,
iota lxiii /ht
e, i/ire (iS
air/i, ie
ill, is/il / lilt ima tel), Priceli it
Ii ~~iien investors deter
mined that its business model as
not
pi ofitable More recently, a sIe~~ of busi
crashed
ness
ii
to earl
fai luresfl-orlclcons,
Eriron, anti
been traced to tinsounci
t
a
Is
ershave
business, debt, and accounting pictices
hidden vii Iii n wlia t
crc
the ii usin ess press Ia uded as
that
3
Scep
27 otMedinas
arricie
in
this
issue
analysts ant
cii
31 ti uOiia 1)
31
Counterpoint
on
Analysis
No mailer how many
channels of information
the proper response
must we,
exist,
before
investing significant
resources ought to he prove
a
poilcymaker
has
specific
at most two eyes,
rent
two ears, and 24 hours in
it.
thy.
a
today than
was
discussed
of
Analysis
in the late
ever
on
before. As
the Friends
electronic database
l980s, the
DI has
been
losing its comparative
advantage as an information
supplier ever since the White
House Situation Room
was
established under President
data abun
Kennedy. Todays
dance needs
realistically,
however: much of
the information is redundant,
and much of it,
garbage.
to
The DI
useful filter for
Importance of Focusing
Moreover, while concepts and
Developments
ideas that put facts to use are
more valuable than facts alone,
Policymakers
we
he blunt, is
warm
helping policyNo matter how
eyes, two ears,
hours in
No
one
a
and 24
being
not
newdebates
have
raged
in the Directorate about how to
new
ter sene
the
technology to bet
policymaker for
decades The issue about the
right
mix of
policy-linked
opportunity analysis versus
more fact-based
objective anal
ysisnever truly an either/or
more
propositiongoes
back
to
might they not
jealous and aloof
dealing with policy-
when
(secrecy
ued
and
analysts
surprise being
much
by policymakers
interagency battles as by gen
as
erals iii wartime)?
It is not this articles
to
gainsay everything
Perhaps
a
general critique of the article
proof needs
as:
more
be shown that
to
the traditional model has failed
and that
significant change,
a revolution, in the
much less
DI is needed. As I
main
problem
see
it, the
with the tradi
at
least in part,
responds
to
the old
tions laid out
occasionallyalbeit still too
inconsistently or
poorly applied. Medinas
oftenis
officials needed
current on,
110
Studies
ti
Kent-Kendall Debate
Jitet/igence
2 (Summer 19911. pp
37-50
01
assump
Medina: Senior
help keeping
interpreting,
related to g)o
bal terrorism. In any crisis, our
need for intelli
consumers
Historically, the
Dls
first
response has been to establish a
task force to provide a continu
ous
watch
and
to
on
report
twice-daily
developments
on
them in
Situation
once-
Reports.
These steps have generally
been well receivedand often
vigorously demandedby
traditional
inevitable
consumers
new users
our
and the
among the
military commands and civilian
agencies. Task force activities
do
not
reduce other intelli
gence support. Instead, the
hard
Pack Davis, The
and
developments
trate on
Of I 919
by
assignment of some analysts to
focus on breaking events frees
other analystsoften those with
in-depth expertiseto concen
tional model is that it
See
analysts providing sup
port that,
intent sim
could be summed up
intelligence
gence support is intensified.
val
the
Sherman Kent-Willmoore Ken
dall debate of 1949.
32
nature
more
Medina puts forward.
their needs. This is
harness
article? Human
what it is,
become
ply
day.
disagrees that policyintelligence
to
value of
or
makers benefit from
tailored
a
analysts
to
seeking closer involvement in
the policy process. Can we be
sure that most policymakers
want the proximity proposed in
a
many channels of information
exist, a policvmaker has at most
two
will extend
welcome
on
demands in the wake of 11 Sep
tember 2001 show the enduring
whether
question
policymakers
in
torrent.
to
related ideas from
serves as
makers deal with the infor
mation
have
Medinas
he viewed
to
on
the
argument.
channels of communica
tion
and
events
cur
wrongly focuses
developments at
expense of consumers, how
ever, calls for a strong counter-
Undeniably, the author is cor
rect in asserting that more
information is moving through
more
contention that the
model
35.
the broader picture, the
and direct
questions,
responses
requests
to
policymaker
Counterpoint on Analysis
A focus
on
developments
is fundamental to
inteffigence analysis
I3etween October 2001 and
April 2002, analysts working
Afghanistan were inundated
on
under any conditions in
any century.
in tile
but
shown
part of
to
be
a
information. If,
the essential
successful model of
intelligence analysis. Although
details cannot be provided in an
unclassified article, the demand
for Dl updates and interpreta
tion
was
strong. One
can
argue
sufficiently
that crisis support is
as
Medina says,
analysts require up
hours each day to read through
the overnight traffic, can busy
policymakers cover the same
ubiquitous raw intelligence and
still read domestic and foreign
newspapers and periodicals and
work their professional and
to two
informal information
sources
different from routine support
without any assistance from tile
policymakers that it only
temporarily tips the balance in
favor of a focus on develop
DI
to
the expense of the
provision of more conceptual,
ments at
policy-relevant products.
In my
experience, however, policymaker requests support the
view chat a focus on develop
ments is
fundamental
intelligence analysis
to
tinder any
Intelligence Coin
(IC)
analysts? Raw
munity
or
other
intelligence, especially material
with special controls, is not
widely available to policymak
outside the National Security
Council. Can the many policy
makers who lack
secure
storage
facilities
adequately analyze raw
intelligence reports that they
may see only briefly and recall
help?
policymakers who
Finally,
travel regularly conic tip to
speed easily upon their return?
ma
tion without
some
can
Myth of the Well-Informed
Policymaker
policyknowledgeable
As Medina notes, most
are
about their
read
on
areas
and
are
issues relevant to
well
their
responsibilities. They also are
very busy people, however,
who have
constant
denlandls
their time and attention. In
era
on
an
of information abundance, it
follows that
will
policyrnakers
pressed to review and
synthesize for themselves all of
be hard
the available worthwhile
shift her attention
the
to
\Vhite I-louse briefers and intel
ligence representatives assigned
to various policy agencies
specifically
should be
asked
they rely on factbased, descriptive background
notes that provide details about
how often
events
and their historical
con
questions by
111gblevel policymakers during
their morning briefings. Such
metrics are likely to confirm
that knowledge about develop
text to answer
strong
critical
providing
intelligence support
ments is
to
downtown.
ers
and incorporate related infor
conditions in any century.
makers
to
a
to
another country within her
broad account. The CIAs
essential,
an
necessarily
not
director
a
covering
piobably would welcome
need
region. Tile
resulting highlevel, event
driven current intelligence
was
office,
transnational issues
SEIB article that alerts her
with requests from senior
policymakers to track develop
ments
away from the
For the
exceptional policy-
maker, the
answer to
above
the
he
yes,
likely
help
and probably value the ability
to draw on Dl analysts for
updates. Moreover, while the
questions
but
most are
may
to
need
Director for Near East Affairs at
might not read an arti
IC-supported Senior
Executive Intelligence Brief
(SEIB) except when catching up
on developments while he was
To maintain
credibility,
would he wise
lyst
conversant in
to
an aria
he
as
developments
and disseminated
raw
intelli
the
policymaker being
things undermine a
policyinakers confidence as
rapidly as an analysts lack of
familiarity with widely
gence
as
served. Few
available information about
developments
in countries
and
ongoing pol
icy discussions. Moreover,
issues relevant to
keeping
current on events
pro
vides the foundation for
identifying the cliscontinu ities
in foreign happenings that the
Dl needs to highlight to
the NSC
cle in the
example was provided to lie author
Former Dii ector of Near Easi Affairs at
th~ Nsc and natiches the authors own cx
penence while serving a! die NS~ and cov
7
Tb
by
is
a
ering
global
issues
33
Counterpoint
Analysis
on
young analyst
who has the ability to
It is
policymakers
potential
as
perform at the level
required to support
Medinas proposed
model for analysis.
warn
ing signs of political/econornic/
military shifts inimical to US
interests.
The Case for
a rare
Getting
,,
Event-Focused
an
publication under the current or
the proposed analytic models.~
No serious student of intelli
gence analysis can take issue
with the contention that ana
Publication
iterative process of
As the univ IC-coordinated
rent-intelligence product.
SEIB tries
Lu serve a
cur-
with
engaging
on
But is such
a
publication useful? Or is it
superfluous to the policy pro
should understand
asked
ence,
current
developments, hut she seems to
view the recording and track
ing of developments in a
written publication as unwor
thy of the Dls energy and
resources. The SEIB is heavy
with political analysis, the type
of analysis that policyniakers
need least, in her view, because
it
is too
general
policy
tile
carry
memos
~vritten
response
and does
not
relevance of
in cliiect
to consumer
ques
of the
description
its predecessor,
SUBand
National intelligence DalI)
tions. Her
(NID )is
on
the
the mark, hut this
weakness.
necessarily
Because political activity world
wide tends to he more dynamic
is not
a
than economic
ity,
it is
logical
activ
militan
or
that
a
publi
cess.
ally
to
the
policy debatepritnartlv
capturing developments and
recording IC thinking, thus pro
viding a common base of
information. Many policy meet
ings involve large groups of
interested officials, ranging from
those intimately involved with
the
specific
issue under discus
those with broad
sion to
or
able point of reference
events
on
in its focus. To
tion
relevant to (he
light.
daily intelligence publica
seems a
unfair and overlooks the SEIBs
role in prompting many of
reference such
cific
as
requested
memos
policvmaker requests
first place. In fact, we
those
tile
should welcome such
34
spe
is
an
in
pensable
worth
tious
than it
keeping.
attempt
to
recent
increa~eci
reflected
years, the Dls
emphasis
a
on
training
corporate recogni
tion of the need to build
maintain
and
basic tradecraft skills.
Currentintelligence
publica
tiotts, which tend
be event
focused,
are
one
to
of the few
remaining ways for analysts
to
skills and build
develop such
the foundations for creative
wants
If the Directorate
all of its analysts to be
policymakers
questions, it needs to
them
opportunities to learn
give
able
to answer
to trust
their
intuition,
which
lot less dis
might look
an individual senior policy
maker. A general point of
as
In
hard
discussion. Seen in this
eral
higher, but it is still a rare
young analyst who has the abil
it) to perform at the level
required to support Meclinas
proposed model for analysis.
thinking.
secondary responsibilities. The
SF113 serves as a widely avail
the
being
of
tone
quality of new
probably never
been
by
would be gen
not
Dl analysts has
has contended that
often contributed
SEths
criticize it for
excellence. The
analysis presented in the daily
publication has directly affected
a policy decision. More than a
few, however, have observed
that the daily publication has
foreign
cation operating under the
guidelines
and political
one
beyond fin
intelhgence. Thc question
ished
Over the years, I have
pohcymakers about the
no
customer, concentrate on
is how to reach this sege of
of the 5E113/NID. Virtu
salue
the
ideas, and think
focused
broadly
drawing primarily on
intelligence of routine sensitiv
ity. ?vleclina accepts that analysts
raw
aim to focus first
lysts should
policymakers.
the
wide audi
From Here to There
as
the SUB is
even
achieve
objectives
to
as we
more
for the
anibi
The SEIB also has value
record, tu
responding
qoe~.tions and
to
to
a.s
an
taskings
to
brief congres
aiy.st
I and mitii an cu stonlers.
has I een thankful For the
back
through
siona
SEn
inieihgencc
poticymaker
anicies
to
nia
ny
ahilny
recall
an
tn
to
go
note
and speed prepaiations or
these unavoidable diversions from focus
questions, as de
ing on ideas and hard
scriheti h~ Medina
vorthv
events
Counterpoint on Analysis
The evolution of the
Directorate appears to be
of mastering the
details of their accounts and
working well
out
grows
polishing writing
and presenta
seasoned,
analysts can turn from devoting
time to current intelligence to
addressing specific consumer
needs. Current intelligence pre
~ to respond
quickly to policymaker
requests, easing the jump from
the descriptive and general
analysis published in the SEIB
to the more sophisticated think
ing that goes into
and should
be abandoned for
not
speedier
an
cause
alleged speedier
process.
process without better
presented
than that
in
article.
Medinas
tional skills. Once
memorandums, cmails.
and
phone responses directly
policymakers.
consumers
well while
analysts
allowing
benefit from the
publications
seen
as
future,
an
not
a
distraction,
Top-
policymakers may not
developments covered
the Economic IntelIi8e,,ce
level
miss the
in
Week!)
or some
of the other
publica
points out;
discontinued serial
tions.
as
Medina
however,
and
most
analysts
branch chiefs
who remember
these types of
publications
regret their passingor
should,
exercise of their tradecraft
Many
would
dare
problem
and,
dream, revive some of
the fun of writing for serial pub
lications, either as part of the
we
intelligence
current
through
the
and other
process
of serial
use
or
flyers
products.
The
as
valued outlets for
exploring
new
floating
analysis. Like cur
ideas and
lines of
intelligence, serial
publications were primarily
descriptive, and thus were also
a great repository of reference
material. It is not beyond our
rent
collective wit in the DI
devise
a
process that
to
serves our
comings
Many
of the short
that Medina lists
the result of this
goals expressed
in The
Coming Revolution in Intelli
gence Analysis are laudable,
but they smack of
unattain
an
perfection, especially when
revolutionary
changes are the solution. The
able
so-called
article distorts
our current
tices and overlooks the
of the DI in
legitimize
an
the
uneven
which
on
effort
to
solutions whose
costs
to
new
advance
unexpected
neglect
abandonment of useful pro
potential
by themselves,
reason to reject a revolutionary
approach to analysis, but they
should impose caution on those
calling for radical change.~ For
dangers~
are
not,
now, the evolution of the
Directorate appears to he work
ing
well and should
abandoned for
not
adopt
than the
Successful change
organization requires
current one.
in any
a dramatic and widely
accepted shift in basic
principles or years of sustained
either
attention
senior
using
to
shaping
processes
cases,
leadership needs to dem
what it truly values by
the full gamut of its abili
ties to proniote and reward the
desired behaviors.
Rather than trying to jumpstart
the process of altering the
be
ture
alleged
with another round of
disruptive changes,
the DI
would be better senreci
by con
improvements at
tinuing
Sonic
Issue Groups
the margins.
to
seek
Richard Beus recently provided a useful
discussion on he osr, and hencflts or var
ious
Sec
an
to
model would
Directorates oflhce-hased cul
and institutional
destabilization. These
be any easier
new
onstrate
could include the
cesses
a
prac
weak founda
a
are
appli
solidify
the corporate foundation of
basic tradecraft skills. This raises
and values. In both
diversity
proposed
model. This is
or
them
Directorate.
doubts that
research and peer and manager
review. Many of us remember
not.
analysis has not been
applied consistently across the
model for
Work
They were a
valuable tool to develop young
analysts through self-directed
they do
argue that the
is that the current
cation and the failure to
tion
if
result in compo
can
choosing different paths.
to
also should he
investment in the
autonomy
nents
our
to
time to other serial
the article is criticiz
ing the Dls office-based
culture, where considerable
The Traditional Model Can
Devoting
heart,
At its
approaches to refor niing intelligence.
Intelligence, Foreigii Aj]ir#s,
Fixing
January-Felniarv
21)02
35
Counterpoint
and
on
Analysis
Teams have shown that his
possible
to
achieve
an
optinml
balance between the attention
they pay
to current
develop
ments and customer
service,
between building analysts skills
and
able
pro~iding timely and valu
responses to policymakers,
and between
maintaining their
analytic integrity and tailoring
support to meet
needs. In short,
needs
36
to
policymakers
we
know what
he done and how
to
it. The
challenge is for
leadership to show
through its actions that to
do
our
senior
achieve the
goals
of
most
ambitious
responsiveness
and rel
evance across
the Directorate
will enforce
high
a
corporate
tradecraft stanctarcl and
our
sotidLfy
foundation of analytic and
managerial
ing,
it
skills
through
opportunity. and
accountability.
train