The
Coming
Revolution in
Intelligence Analysis
What To Do When Traditional Models Fail
Carmen A. Medina
Editors Note: This article is
designed
to
from decades ago would recog
stiniulale debate.
nize most of what
Written and circulated within
govern inent circles
presented
ation
by
officer
on
2001,
it is
wider audience. CIA
a
Steven Ward joins the
debate with
vIe
in
here for consider
a
coznzIeipoi~zt
a,-ti
case
of the Directorate of
Intelligence change
The great
challenge facing
Directorate of
may
be what is most needed.
ana
Intelligence (DI)
insight to smart
providing
policymakers. Meeting this chal
lenge is hard, but intelligence
officers have long believed that
careful
attention to
craft of
to
to
50-plus
the trade-
to
the information avail
policymakers. During
years, the CIA.
a
On the CIAs
sion
its
we
model that
only successful execu
produce quality intelli
gence analysis. When we fal
tered, we blamed the analysts
(or the collectors), but not the
Office of
Policy Support in
Directorate of Intelligence.
the
the provision of
as
timely,
objective
analysis on the full
gence
intelli
range
of national security threats and
foreign policy
issues
facing
the
o~.it
analytic support that might he
useful
to
a
customer at
time. DI officers
given
analysis
any
provide
that helps officials
through their policy agen
by: addressing dayto-day
work
needed
das
tion to
events;
model.
developments
providing
related background informa
tion; assessing the significance
of developments and warning
apprising
consumers
of
and
near-term
consequences~ and
What if the
signaling potentially dangerous
not
situations in Lhe future.
the
in the
internet
accurate, and
of
serves
public
DI defines its mis
lines the different types of
work that added
believed, evolved
Carmen A. Medlna
most
United States. The website
intelligence analysis
would lead
able
case
needed.
website, the
real
is
value
in the Dls
what is
The Current Model
and managers in the
lysts
comforting, but
change may be
page 29 of this issue.
+ +
Stability is often
comforting, but in the
a typical
analyst does today, from read
ing traffic to preparing finished
intelligence. Stability is often
failing, however, lies
with the analysts hut with
model they are asked to fol
low? Customer needs and
A
preferences are changing rap
idly, as is the environment in
which intelligence analysis
operates. Yet the Dls approach
to analysis has hardly changed
over the years. A DI analyst
that it focuses first
key aspect
ments. In
of this model is
fact,
the
on develop
analysts
work process is structured
around
developments. They
spend the first quarter or more
of their workday reading
23
Future
Analysis
the
through
to
overnight
determine what
is
traffic
new
Analysts today have to
dig deep to surpass the
analytic abilities of theft
customers.
They
Analysts today
have
value in
of informa
an era
report what is new to their col
leagues and superiors and then
tion abundance. The
often
consumer,
munitv. The
be
an
death of
eventthe
world leader
decline of
or
Or it may be
the
a
precipitous
Asian currency.
an
an
gence reporting
of interestfrom
item of intelli
on
a
other type of collec
source,
tion. This basic model has
or
Assumption 3: The CIA and
specifically the Dl have unique
information about what is
happening.
recently,
specific
have greater
which
mining what
to do on any given
day. As a result, the model has
acquired an adcliuonal step
understanding customer feed
back to determine policymaker
interests. This
ever,
new
step, how
merely supplements
the
pivot around which the ana
lytic work turnsidentification
of the
new
Critical,
development.
sometimes
unstated,
assumptions underpin
this
Assumption
need
a
1:
Policymakers
service that tells them
what is going on in the world
or in their particular area of
that the model needs
as
Assumption
need help in determining vliat
an
24
event means
long
as
identify the
unclassified information
sources
85 percent of the
weekly periodicals;
sional networks;
was
to
informal
as
developed during
the 1960s and 1970s and opti
mized
against
the characteristics
of that
period. It was an era
information scarcitytruth
about the worlds
societies
was
a
of
many closed
rare
ity. Communicating
commod
across
hardgoverniiient
leaders rarely talked to each
other on the phone and sum
mits among world leaders
key
had the fastest
ideology
were
was
or
right
incom
to
access
ing intelligence
could
seeing paiticu
count on
policymakers. Today, thanks to
information technology, policy~
makers often readl the
ffic
at
the
same
a
a
raw
time as, if
before, analysts. In
always important
kno\v how far left
lions, such
information and
tnt
driver in international rela
was
nica
email.
Policymakers today also read
raw intelligence reports on a
regular basis. Twenty to thirty
years ago, analysts in the DI
was
events.
commu
profes
official,
I any criuca I cables before
borders and with other govern
unusual
their
and
evolve
tradecraft
well. The Dls
model
to
2: Policvmakers
as
they operate. If reality
changes. then it isa good bet
tionsit
concern.
only
suit the environment in
ments
traclecraft model.
tive. When asked to
con
illustra
are
icals; US newspapers and
Models work
they
in deter
ducted in late 2000
on,
they
respondents picked all four of
the following sources: foreign
newspapers and weekly period
llleat1.
interests of customers must
weight
cus
of the Senior Executive
relied
Dl managers
that the
survey of
to a
Intelligence Bulletin (SEIB)
4: Dl
analysts are
particularly insightful about
what these developments may
Assumption
When Models Fail
have realizer
ways
developments, intelli
gence-related or not The
tomers
decades.
More
more
main
recent
responses
work for
Dls
intelligence
an
has
of staying informed about
situation
signals; imag
ery, human-source, open-
guided the
policymaker,
policymaking corn
new thing
nmy
the
to
add
to
a
survey
SEtB customers
asked,
What other
daily intelligence
not
1998-1999
were
of
sources
rio you read?
Almost one-half of the respon
dents vol ii nteered that they
often read
raw
government would tack. These
traits rio not describe todays
that
environment.
real percentage
raw
offered
tia
as
a
Ific
traffic. Given
was
not
specific choice, the
was
almost
Analysis
Future
certainly higher
than the write-
of
political activity
ber of countries
in responses indicated.
in any
even
num
though
the audience for this type of
Analysts today
deep
surpass the
to
abilities
dig
analytic
have to
of their
customers.
government leaders
and often. US officials
to
allow
to commu
nicate with each other
freely
leaders. This
opposition party
makes it much easier for
makers
to
be their
analyststo
broad
as
A recent
was.
policy-
of
exam
political developments.
trast,
was
covered in
directly
written
questions from
ers.
Only
who
consumers
economic
specialists
or to
niche substantive
tify
where the Agency
not
are
iden
areas
still pro
can
vide unique support. Scientific
and
military analyses are bor
defy easy
derline issues that
solutions. A number of
our
con
particularly
senior customers,
civilian
agencies,
in response to
senior custom
topics
matched what
was
as
their
experts
own
cal topics.
so
techni
on
there is
more
for the
intelligence ana
lyst to provide value-added.
The issue for military analysis,
room
is which agency
the intentions of other govern
ments and decipher what
most on
policymakers
mindscovered political mat
however,
developments may mean. The
DI has probably always under
ters, and many of those
discussed the behavior and atti
ble. This is
foreign leaders, a subcategory of political analysis
that remains of high interest to
senior policymakers.
DI and the Defense Intelli
estimated the
extent to
policymakers serve as their own
analysts. Arguably, policymak
ers
have
never
needed the DI
the
tudes of
which
to
tell them that riots undermine
governments
or
that currency
The
toward non-tradi
move
already
crises shake investor confi
tional issues is
Today, however, they no
longer even need much help
deconflicting signals from other
underway, evidenced by the
creation of specialized Centers
governments.
ons
dence.
with terrorism, weap
proliferation, and narcotics
in
important issue
international relations; it has
no
been
longer
the
replaced by
a
growing list
of non-traditional issues that
tend
to
many of
defy ideological
tion. In the
political analysis
want to
is still
king.
follow the ins and
We
outs
field, occupied
gence Agency,
to the
more
crowded
not
only by
the
but, increasingly
point, by the strong
intelligence centers at the uni
fied military commands. The DI
is still in the process of defin
ing
comparative advantage
its
in
military analysis.
gies
with
Analysis
a
emerging realities.
in
some
other
conven
provide
value-added, but, like political
tional
that Fits the New
Analysis
Environment
flagship products
political analysis
bias. We need to do a better job
aligning our publishing strate
areas can
the
still
challenge
than before. Economic
faces
DI, however,
now a
our
still reflect
analysis,
defini
primarily responsi
too
ical orientation of governments
is
should be
to deal
and crime. Nonetheless,
Analysts today have to reach
beyond political analysis, an
area in which it is particu
larly hard to provide value
topolicymakers. The ideolog
in
cannot serve
memos
about one-third of
presumably
into
In
much wider variety of
a
those memoswhose
own
gain insights
it
as
study
articles in the SEIB, for
issues
talk
even
once
is not
ple, revealed that 70 percent
dealt mostly with analysis of
Modern communication tech
nologies and evolving
diplomatic practices now
analysis
serve
is
So, how does the DI,
one, do
an era
or
any
intelligence analysis
in
of information abun
dance, wellconnected
policymakers,
and non:tradi~
tional issues? First,
we
need
assumptions:
new
greater
analysis
daunting competition
from
the open-source world and
those analysts need either to
New
Assumption
the time,
good
policymakers
sense
in their
1: Most of
have
of what is going
areas
of
a
on
concern.
25
Future
Analysis
Analysts
concentrate
must
on
ideas,
inteffigence.
not
Assumption 2: Policymakers frequently understand
Neu
the direct consequences of
events and their immediate
New
and
Assumption 3:
particularly
lacks unique inft)rmation about
developments, especially in the
political and economic spheres
Raw intelligence is ubiquitous
and can get to policymakers
before it reaches the analysts.
New
Assumption 4: Policy
makers need the greatest
help
understanding nontraditional
intelligence issues. There is still
a market for political analysis
and certainly for related leader
ship analysis, hut to be
successful in traditional
the Dl
must
insights
areas
generate unique
Analysts
analysts,
particularly those involved in
political work, the focus would
shift from tracking develop
ments in their particular
accounts to addressing the spe
cific, hard questions of
optimized against
these
assumptions would understand
developments, but only
current
as
the
necessary
foundation for
its real contribution to
policy
Analysts would
specialize in complex analysis
of the most difficult problems.
makers.
They would focus
cymakers
hardest
on
the
poli
questions.
Their
goals would include iden
tifving new opportunities for
policymaking
and
warning first
of cliscontinuities that could
spell
stronger Links
between analysts and
mean
cal terms? Flow would
26
in practi
the
than a will
even more
regional
Customers
are actually
experts.
at
letting us know
pretty good
what issues keep them up at
night; we have to stop dismiss
need
ing these questions as either too
hard or not intelligence-related.
To free
analysts
work,
dcemphasize
products that largely describe
what has just happened. This
will need
will he hard
customers
do this
because there
sho
ucts, which
to
to
want
are
such
are
prod
seen as
convenient, free goods. But if
relatively painless experi
our
last year with the
ence
elimination of the Economic
custon~ers.
Intelligence Weekly, a decadesold publication that reviewed
economic developments, is any
ideas,
must concentrate on
intelligence.
not
Because the Dl has
oly
over
no monop
the dissemination oF
intelligence reporting, synthesiz
ing it for others is a poor
investment of its time and tal
This
particularly applies to
political and economic analy
sis; policymakers do in fact
often need help deciphering
ent.
technical reports
as
proliferation
on
such issues
and informa
(ion warfare. In many
substantive
serve
fields, the
the
Dl
can
policymaker by
the hard questions and
to
develop more reliable
trying
ways of
identifying
guide, policymaker demand for
such products is shallow at
best.
Analysts must think beyond
finished intelligence. Analysts
are
schooled in the
and
need
to
pro
ci u cc valida ted, finished
mean
intelligencefinished
has
it
that
been
carefully
ing
considered, officially reviewed,
coordinated with colleagues,
and sent
cover
tackling
What does this
to unconven
ideas, perhaps
cies to create
best
danger.
tional
we
policymakers. An analyst, for
example, would often start her
day by reviewing feedback and
tasking from customers, instead
of first reading the morning traf
fic. We need to use technology
and a network of highcaliber
representatives at policy agen
Analysts
A Dl
must focus on the
customer. For many
well
relatively
understood problems.
into
well,
keen critical
need
thinkers open
The CIA
the DIoften
issues.
the Dl will
practice of intelligence analysis
change?
significance.
understanding emerging
To rio this kind of work
such
out
under official
The main
products
problem
often
pace with events or
with information sources.
keep
officers who deal
with
is that
cannot
even
frequently
customersincluding
Future
those who carry the Pies/dents
Dc/li Brie/to the most senior
The Old
officialsreport that many
products short of finished intel
ligence often satisfy the needs
These include
policyniakers.
of
annotated
quick
intelligence,
raw
specific
to
answers
ques
tions, infornial trip reports, and
memoranda of conversation.
intelligence analysts
Too many
and managers remain fixated
formal
products
makers
even
of the real scoop
most
events is
now
on
exchanged
and telephone
in
calls. Our adherence
to
the
Intuitive
Concrete/Reality-based
Linear/Trend-based
Metaphor-rich
Complex
Expert-based
Humble, Inclusive, Diverse
Hierarchical
Collaborative
P recede nt-ha secl
Precedent-shattering
\XTors t-ca se/Warning-
focused
Opportunistic/Optimistic
Imagerich
Text-based
C us tome r-d riven/Policy
Detached/Neutral
relevant
makes the DI wary of such
ing little in the way of finished
intelligence, and they are
lot of time
a
individual tasks that
recognized
of the
adapters
other collaborative venues.1
Their focus
must look to
Analysts
Centers
the
long enough on a DI career ser
vice panel, you will still hear
some
say
managers
analysts
or
on
new
as
early
model.
customer
speaks
to
the future.
at
tran
something
right.
the
of
like
old
analysis
intelligence
professional. We pnde our
selves on carefully basing our
judgments on fact, on our
expertise, on our ability to
warn, and on our neutrality.
Sonic might argue that these are
clearly the analytic qualities that
qualities
familiar
are
to
any
persist under any sce
nario, regardless of whether
must
our
Now for
needs
we
of
customers.
Something Completely
Heretical
the Crime and
the box
rewritten. The
look
have addressed the
that certain
in the Counterterror
ism Center
very
requirements. collaborative
work, and less formal products
models. If you sit
as
meet
completely
sition might
The
doing
specific customer needs. Instead
of being perceived as outside
should be
and
rooms
doing
produc
not
are
the DI mainstream, the Centers
intelligence practices
electronic chat
are
real Dl work. They
spending
increasingly outdated concept
of finished intelligence is what
informal
Aggressive/Bold/Courageous
Fact-based
Narcotics Center
world
informal enmils
as
Cautious/Careful
recent
a
Embassy knows,
US
Century Analysis
21si
work. As
own
anyone who has done
a
policy-
as
further away from
move
them in their
tour at
on
Analysis
Analysis
Perhaps not. To really hell)
pol icymakers, we may
sm;lrt
The need
ished
five
10
escape the
intelligence
\cars
ago
by carol
currently leading he
rtnersltip.
Fri lures I a
sively
sis
an
In
on
new
mode
Dumaine.
would
produce
of
line,
10
Dl officer
a
for
exte a
inrellige nec
in
a
ann
submission
intelligent e
unfinished
interact c,
mu
I,
an
irusied
i
consumers
policymakers
continue to
to
officer
Ii di
need
raise the standards for intelli
analysis. we may need
change more than just our
ly
mielligenceall
tieral ne.
As
gence
nierd isciplina ry fabric of spe
corn ribut ions
a ad a-a il able 2-i hours a
inc as ion a
day
than
elecironic discussion database,
inhouse
ci al Li
a
who has written
1996. for example,
on
more
Dirccioraies Global
she noted thai the future
it
oi fin
consira tots
highlighted
was
assumptions
and
to
to
adopt
new
habits of
new
ways of
our
practices,
new
thinking,
and
communicating
analysis.
work habits.
The fundamental characteristics
of
intelligence- an~~l~~sis,
fully developed during
care
the last
To tell
thing
know,
half of the twentieth century,
to
may in fact need
go
to
he
a
policyniaker
he does
we
not
have
take risks in
to
print
to
some
already
he prepared
our
thinking,
to
with new,
27
Future
Analysis
Neutrality cannot be
justify analytic
celibacy and
used to
adventurous
analytic
lines
before anyone else. This is
disengagement
not
do nor
jump
to
best, an analyst will occasion
ally lean forward, when in fact
she
steps ahead of the
on
policymaker
his difficult to generate
ideas when you have
close
new
stay
the facts. New ideas are
to
to
often intuitive, based
on
one
stray bits of information
that coalesce into new insight.
or two
Analysts
not only
are
to
ties for
no
handbooks
have
to
develop
their
also have
agerswill
The
most
controversial
tral in favor of
tailoring
greater
to customer needs.
Some critics have
already
that
focus in
customer
our
years is
recent
eroding
customer
on
nity, the less neutral
trend
come, in
analysis. Unfortunately,
are smart
easily
this for themselves. The
lysts
do
ana
real value
increasingly will
lie in Identifying discontinul
ties that shatter precedents and
trends.
Analysts are
tifying what
work in
ever,
more
what
in the
teach
28
a
often
is not
good at iden
likely to
given situation; how
policymakers
interested in
can
usually
figuring out
are
work. While
courses
Intelligence Community
analysts how
to
warn,
more we care,
should,
the
select
that
we
an
policymaking
the
sense
in
as we
have
impact
commu
we
that
on cus
analyze
are
most
rele
policymakers. Analysts
understandably are confused by
this new direction. They were
taught, they say, to produce
intelligence analysis that focuses
on events and developments,
not customers. It is not their job
vant to
to
worry about whether
it has
integrity
must
that
he
in
our
willing
anal
to
or not
or
the State
Department and that are not
compatible with the goals of
policymakers. But we should
not pretend that integrity and
neutrality are the same thing or
that they are dependent on
each other. Neutrality implies
customer
and
mystical ability to
parse the truth completely free
from bias or prejudice. Integ
rity, on the other hand, rests on
professional standards and the
willingness to provide the most
complete answer to a cus
tomers
not
the
question,
even
he
answer
if it is
wants to
hear.
used
to
and
Neutrality cannot be
justify analytic celibacy
disengagement
tomer. If
impact.
from the
forced
to
cus
choose
between analytic detachment
This is the
most
significant
siy
uncomfortable
are
some near
topics based
those aspects that
course,
distance from the
be
we
tomer interests and we
our
irrelevance. We need, of
for the Pentagon
and
neutrality are compatible; hut
truth they are not completely.
and then project
ing them onto the future. This is
recent events
who
our
focus
Being completely neutral and
independent in the future, how
ever, may only gain us
things
assert
that
foreign
policy observers often
compensated for lack of infor
mation with ideologically based
assertions. Intelligence
analysts correctly tried not to do
thatthey were reliably
objective
yslswe
their
The
most arecan
noted
man
to trust it.
values bred
century
analysts will need to become
less independent and neu
Analysts today spend consider
able time identifying patterns in
policymakers
conten
detachment from policymak
ing. The usual answer is to
in the 21~ century will
intuition, theyand
and
on
identify new opportuni
poiicyniakers.
tion may be that 21
basis.
regular
a
there
how
strive to he several
must
are
of the Cold War, when
conclusions,
consider all sources, coordinate
with colleagues At
your jews
significant ideologi
Analytic detachment
in
and neutrality
he conservative:
to
lacking
cal conflict.
the customer.
always our current style. Almost
everything an analyst learns
teaches her
from
and
difficult consequence of work
ing in an information-rich era
and
impact
on
policymaking,
the 21s1 century analyst
choose the latter.
must