The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis What To Do When Traditional Models Fail Carmen A. Medina Editors Note: This article is designed to from decades ago would recog stiniulale debate. nize most of what Written and circulated within govern inent circles presented ation by officer on 2001, it is wider audience. CIA a Steven Ward joins the debate with vIe in here for consider a coznzIeipoi~zt a,-ti case of the Directorate of Intelligence change The great challenge facing Directorate of may be what is most needed. ana Intelligence (DI) insight to smart providing policymakers. Meeting this chal lenge is hard, but intelligence officers have long believed that careful attention to craft of to to 50-plus the trade- to the information avail policymakers. During years, the CIA. a On the CIAs sion its we model that only successful execu produce quality intelli gence analysis. When we fal tered, we blamed the analysts (or the collectors), but not the Office of Policy Support in Directorate of Intelligence. the the provision of as timely, objective analysis on the full gence intelli range of national security threats and foreign policy issues facing the o~.it analytic support that might he useful to a customer at time. DI officers given analysis any provide that helps officials through their policy agen by: addressing dayto-day work needed das tion to events; model. developments providing related background informa tion; assessing the significance of developments and warning apprising consumers of and near-term consequences~ and What if the signaling potentially dangerous not situations in Lhe future. the in the internet accurate, and of serves public DI defines its mis lines the different types of work that added believed, evolved Carmen A. Medlna most United States. The website intelligence analysis would lead able case needed. website, the real is value in the Dls what is The Current Model and managers in the lysts comforting, but change may be page 29 of this issue. + + Stability is often comforting, but in the a typical analyst does today, from read ing traffic to preparing finished intelligence. Stability is often failing, however, lies with the analysts hut with model they are asked to fol low? Customer needs and A preferences are changing rap idly, as is the environment in which intelligence analysis operates. Yet the Dls approach to analysis has hardly changed over the years. A DI analyst that it focuses first key aspect ments. In of this model is fact, the on develop analysts work process is structured around developments. They spend the first quarter or more of their workday reading 23 Future Analysis the through to overnight determine what is traffic new Analysts today have to dig deep to surpass the analytic abilities of theft customers. They Analysts today have value in of informa an era report what is new to their col leagues and superiors and then tion abundance. The often consumer, munitv. The be an death of eventthe world leader decline of or Or it may be the a precipitous Asian currency. an an gence reporting of interestfrom item of intelli on a other type of collec source, tion. This basic model has or Assumption 3: The CIA and specifically the Dl have unique information about what is happening. recently, specific have greater which mining what to do on any given day. As a result, the model has acquired an adcliuonal step understanding customer feed back to determine policymaker interests. This ever, new step, how merely supplements the pivot around which the ana lytic work turnsidentification of the new Critical, development. sometimes unstated, assumptions underpin this Assumption need a 1: Policymakers service that tells them what is going on in the world or in their particular area of that the model needs as Assumption need help in determining vliat an 24 event means long as identify the unclassified information sources 85 percent of the weekly periodicals; sional networks; was to informal as developed during the 1960s and 1970s and opti mized against the characteristics of that period. It was an era information scarcitytruth about the worlds societies was a of many closed rare ity. Communicating commod across hardgoverniiient leaders rarely talked to each other on the phone and sum mits among world leaders key had the fastest ideology were was or right incom to access ing intelligence could seeing paiticu count on policymakers. Today, thanks to information technology, policy~ makers often readl the ffic at the same a a raw time as, if before, analysts. In always important kno\v how far left lions, such information and tnt driver in international rela was nica email. Policymakers today also read raw intelligence reports on a regular basis. Twenty to thirty years ago, analysts in the DI was events. commu profes official, I any criuca I cables before borders and with other govern unusual their and evolve tradecraft well. The Dls model to 2: Policvmakers as they operate. If reality changes. then it isa good bet tionsit concern. only suit the environment in ments traclecraft model. tive. When asked to con illustra are icals; US newspapers and Models work they in deter ducted in late 2000 on, they respondents picked all four of the following sources: foreign newspapers and weekly period llleat1. interests of customers must weight cus of the Senior Executive relied Dl managers that the survey of to a Intelligence Bulletin (SEIB) 4: Dl analysts are particularly insightful about what these developments may Assumption When Models Fail have realizer ways developments, intelli gence-related or not The tomers decades. More more main recent responses work for Dls intelligence an has of staying informed about situation signals; imag ery, human-source, open- guided the policymaker, policymaking corn new thing nmy the to add to a survey SEtB customers asked, What other daily intelligence not 1998-1999 were of sources rio you read? Almost one-half of the respon dents vol ii nteered that they often read raw government would tack. These traits rio not describe todays that environment. real percentage raw offered tia as a Ific traffic. Given was not specific choice, the was almost Analysis Future certainly higher than the write- of political activity ber of countries in responses indicated. in any even num though the audience for this type of Analysts today deep surpass the to abilities dig analytic have to of their customers. government leaders and often. US officials to allow to commu nicate with each other freely leaders. This opposition party makes it much easier for makers to be their analyststo broad as A recent was. policy- of exam political developments. trast, was covered in directly written questions from ers. Only who consumers economic specialists or to niche substantive tify where the Agency not are iden areas still pro can vide unique support. Scientific and military analyses are bor defy easy derline issues that solutions. A number of our con particularly senior customers, civilian agencies, in response to senior custom topics matched what was as their experts own cal topics. so techni on there is more for the intelligence ana lyst to provide value-added. The issue for military analysis, room is which agency the intentions of other govern ments and decipher what most on policymakers mindscovered political mat however, developments may mean. The DI has probably always under ters, and many of those discussed the behavior and atti ble. This is foreign leaders, a subcategory of political analysis that remains of high interest to senior policymakers. DI and the Defense Intelli estimated the extent to policymakers serve as their own analysts. Arguably, policymak ers have never needed the DI the tudes of which to tell them that riots undermine governments or that currency The toward non-tradi move already crises shake investor confi tional issues is Today, however, they no longer even need much help deconflicting signals from other underway, evidenced by the creation of specialized Centers governments. ons dence. with terrorism, weap proliferation, and narcotics in important issue international relations; it has no been longer the replaced by a growing list of non-traditional issues that tend to many of defy ideological tion. In the political analysis want to is still king. follow the ins and We outs field, occupied gence Agency, to the more crowded not only by the but, increasingly point, by the strong intelligence centers at the uni fied military commands. The DI is still in the process of defin ing comparative advantage its in military analysis. gies with Analysis a emerging realities. in some other conven provide value-added, but, like political tional that Fits the New Analysis Environment flagship products political analysis bias. We need to do a better job aligning our publishing strate areas can the still challenge than before. Economic faces DI, however, now a our still reflect analysis, defini primarily responsi too ical orientation of governments is should be to deal and crime. Nonetheless, Analysts today have to reach beyond political analysis, an area in which it is particu larly hard to provide value topolicymakers. The ideolog in cannot serve memos about one-third of presumably into In much wider variety of a those memoswhose own gain insights it as study articles in the SEIB, for issues talk even once is not ple, revealed that 70 percent dealt mostly with analysis of Modern communication tech nologies and evolving diplomatic practices now analysis serve is So, how does the DI, one, do an era or any intelligence analysis in of information abun dance, wellconnected policymakers, and non:tradi~ tional issues? First, we need assumptions: new greater analysis daunting competition from the open-source world and those analysts need either to New Assumption the time, good policymakers sense in their 1: Most of have of what is going areas of a on concern. 25 Future Analysis Analysts concentrate must on ideas, inteffigence. not Assumption 2: Policymakers frequently understand Neu the direct consequences of events and their immediate New and Assumption 3: particularly lacks unique inft)rmation about developments, especially in the political and economic spheres Raw intelligence is ubiquitous and can get to policymakers before it reaches the analysts. New Assumption 4: Policy makers need the greatest help understanding nontraditional intelligence issues. There is still a market for political analysis and certainly for related leader ship analysis, hut to be successful in traditional the Dl must insights areas generate unique Analysts analysts, particularly those involved in political work, the focus would shift from tracking develop ments in their particular accounts to addressing the spe cific, hard questions of optimized against these assumptions would understand developments, but only current as the necessary foundation for its real contribution to policy Analysts would specialize in complex analysis of the most difficult problems. makers. They would focus cymakers hardest on the poli questions. Their goals would include iden tifving new opportunities for policymaking and warning first of cliscontinuities that could spell stronger Links between analysts and mean cal terms? Flow would 26 in practi the than a will even more regional Customers are actually experts. at letting us know pretty good what issues keep them up at night; we have to stop dismiss need ing these questions as either too hard or not intelligence-related. To free analysts work, dcemphasize products that largely describe what has just happened. This will need will he hard customers do this because there sho ucts, which to to want are such are prod seen as convenient, free goods. But if relatively painless experi our last year with the ence elimination of the Economic custon~ers. Intelligence Weekly, a decadesold publication that reviewed economic developments, is any ideas, must concentrate on intelligence. not Because the Dl has oly over no monop the dissemination oF intelligence reporting, synthesiz ing it for others is a poor investment of its time and tal This particularly applies to political and economic analy sis; policymakers do in fact often need help deciphering ent. technical reports as proliferation on such issues and informa (ion warfare. In many substantive serve fields, the the Dl can policymaker by the hard questions and to develop more reliable trying ways of identifying guide, policymaker demand for such products is shallow at best. Analysts must think beyond finished intelligence. Analysts are schooled in the and need to pro ci u cc valida ted, finished mean intelligencefinished has it that been carefully ing considered, officially reviewed, coordinated with colleagues, and sent cover tackling What does this to unconven ideas, perhaps cies to create best danger. tional we policymakers. An analyst, for example, would often start her day by reviewing feedback and tasking from customers, instead of first reading the morning traf fic. We need to use technology and a network of highcaliber representatives at policy agen Analysts A Dl must focus on the customer. For many well relatively understood problems. into well, keen critical need thinkers open The CIA the DIoften issues. the Dl will practice of intelligence analysis change? significance. understanding emerging To rio this kind of work such out under official The main products problem often pace with events or with information sources. keep officers who deal with is that cannot even frequently customersincluding Future those who carry the Pies/dents Dc/li Brie/to the most senior The Old officialsreport that many products short of finished intel ligence often satisfy the needs These include policyniakers. of annotated quick intelligence, raw specific to answers ques tions, infornial trip reports, and memoranda of conversation. intelligence analysts Too many and managers remain fixated formal products makers even of the real scoop most events is now on exchanged and telephone in calls. Our adherence to the Intuitive Concrete/Reality-based Linear/Trend-based Metaphor-rich Complex Expert-based Humble, Inclusive, Diverse Hierarchical Collaborative P recede nt-ha secl Precedent-shattering \XTors t-ca se/Warning- focused Opportunistic/Optimistic Imagerich Text-based C us tome r-d riven/Policy Detached/Neutral relevant makes the DI wary of such ing little in the way of finished intelligence, and they are lot of time a individual tasks that recognized of the adapters other collaborative venues.1 Their focus must look to Analysts Centers the long enough on a DI career ser vice panel, you will still hear some say managers analysts or on new as early model. customer speaks to the future. at tran something right. the of like old analysis intelligence professional. We pnde our selves on carefully basing our judgments on fact, on our expertise, on our ability to warn, and on our neutrality. Sonic might argue that these are clearly the analytic qualities that qualities familiar are to any persist under any sce nario, regardless of whether must our Now for needs we of customers. Something Completely Heretical the Crime and the box rewritten. The look have addressed the that certain in the Counterterror ism Center very requirements. collaborative work, and less formal products models. If you sit as meet completely sition might The doing specific customer needs. Instead of being perceived as outside should be and rooms doing produc not are the DI mainstream, the Centers intelligence practices electronic chat are real Dl work. They spending increasingly outdated concept of finished intelligence is what informal Aggressive/Bold/Courageous Fact-based Narcotics Center world informal enmils as Cautious/Careful recent a Embassy knows, US Century Analysis 21si work. As own anyone who has done a policy- as further away from move them in their tour at on Analysis Analysis Perhaps not. To really hell) pol icymakers, we may sm;lrt The need ished five 10 escape the intelligence \cars ago by carol currently leading he rtnersltip. Fri lures I a sively sis an In on new mode Dumaine. would produce of line, 10 Dl officer a for exte a inrellige nec in a ann submission intelligent e unfinished interact c, mu I, an irusied i consumers policymakers continue to to officer Ii di need raise the standards for intelli analysis. we may need change more than just our ly mielligenceall tieral ne. As gence nierd isciplina ry fabric of spe corn ribut ions a ad a-a il able 2-i hours a inc as ion a day than elecironic discussion database, inhouse ci al Li a who has written 1996. for example, on more Dirccioraies Global she noted thai the future it oi fin consira tots highlighted was assumptions and to to adopt new habits of new ways of our practices, new thinking, and communicating analysis. work habits. The fundamental characteristics of intelligence- an~~l~~sis, fully developed during care the last To tell thing know, half of the twentieth century, to may in fact need go to he a policyniaker he does we not have take risks in to print to some already he prepared our thinking, to with new, 27 Future Analysis Neutrality cannot be justify analytic celibacy and used to adventurous analytic lines before anyone else. This is disengagement not do nor jump to best, an analyst will occasion ally lean forward, when in fact she steps ahead of the on policymaker his difficult to generate ideas when you have close new stay the facts. New ideas are to to often intuitive, based on one stray bits of information that coalesce into new insight. or two Analysts not only are to ties for no handbooks have to develop their also have agerswill The most controversial tral in favor of tailoring greater to customer needs. Some critics have already that focus in customer our years is recent eroding customer on nity, the less neutral trend come, in analysis. Unfortunately, are smart easily this for themselves. The lysts do ana real value increasingly will lie in Identifying discontinul ties that shatter precedents and trends. Analysts are tifying what work in ever, more what in the teach 28 a often is not good at iden likely to given situation; how policymakers interested in can usually figuring out are work. While courses Intelligence Community analysts how to warn, more we care, should, the select that we an policymaking the sense in as we have impact commu we that on cus analyze are most rele policymakers. Analysts understandably are confused by this new direction. They were taught, they say, to produce intelligence analysis that focuses on events and developments, not customers. It is not their job vant to to worry about whether it has integrity must that he in our willing anal to or not or the State Department and that are not compatible with the goals of policymakers. But we should not pretend that integrity and neutrality are the same thing or that they are dependent on each other. Neutrality implies customer and mystical ability to parse the truth completely free from bias or prejudice. Integ rity, on the other hand, rests on professional standards and the willingness to provide the most complete answer to a cus tomers not the question, even he answer if it is wants to hear. used to and Neutrality cannot be justify analytic celibacy disengagement tomer. If impact. from the forced to cus choose between analytic detachment This is the most significant siy uncomfortable are some near topics based those aspects that course, distance from the be we tomer interests and we our irrelevance. We need, of for the Pentagon and neutrality are compatible; hut truth they are not completely. and then project ing them onto the future. This is recent events who our focus Being completely neutral and independent in the future, how ever, may only gain us things assert that foreign policy observers often compensated for lack of infor mation with ideologically based assertions. Intelligence analysts correctly tried not to do thatthey were reliably objective yslswe their The most arecan noted man to trust it. values bred century analysts will need to become less independent and neu Analysts today spend consider able time identifying patterns in policymakers conten detachment from policymak ing. The usual answer is to in the 21~ century will intuition, theyand and on identify new opportuni poiicyniakers. tion may be that 21 basis. regular a there how strive to he several must are of the Cold War, when conclusions, consider all sources, coordinate with colleagues At your jews significant ideologi Analytic detachment in and neutrality he conservative: to lacking cal conflict. the customer. always our current style. Almost everything an analyst learns teaches her from and difficult consequence of work ing in an information-rich era and impact on policymaking, the 21s1 century analyst choose the latter. must