March 2016
ANDREW JOHN SIU
A.J.Siu@warwick.ac.uk
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/ajsiu
+44 7714 528 254
EDUCATION
PhD in Economics, University of Warwick
Supervisors: Andrew Oswald and Robert Akerlof
Examiners: Graham Loomes and Matthias Sutter
MSc in Economics, University of Warwick (with Distinction)
BSc in Mathematics, University of Texas at Austin (with Honors)
2010 – 2016
2009 – 2010
2003 – 2006
RESEARCH FIELDS & INTERESTS
Applied Microeconomics, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Fellow, University of Warwick
Supervising Research in Applied Economics (final year undergraduate)
Leading Seminars in Econometrics (2nd year undergraduate)
Delivering Lecture on Market Structures (1st year undergraduate)
2015 – 2016
Teaching Assistant, University of Warwick
Leading Seminars in Behavioral Economics (summer school),
Econometrics (2nd year undergraduate), Mathematical and Statistical
Techniques (1st year undergraduate), Game Theory (PhD)
2010 – 2015
GRANTS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS
Royal Economic Society Easter Training School
University-wide Award for Teaching Excellence for Postgraduates
- Nominated by students or faculty
- Selected by a penal of judges out of over one hundred nominations
- Awarded with commendation as one of ten recipients
Research Grant from Behavioral Science Global Research Priorities
Warwick Economics Postgraduate Research Fellowship
Hewitt Associates Actuarial Scholarship
Mercer Human Resource Consulting Actuarial Scholarship
Rudd and Wisdom Actuarial Studies Scholarship
C. Mitchell Actuarial Scholarship
April 2016
2014 – 2015
2014 – 2015
2010 – 2013
2005 – 2006
2005 – 2006
2005 – 2006
2004 – 2005
WORKING PAPERS
“Intuition and Deliberation in Giving and Punishment”
“Escalating Anger and Punishments: Testing Theories of Cumulative Anger” (under review)
“A Theory of the Efficiency of Divorce with Interdependent Preferences”
ANDREW JOHN SIU
PAGE 2
WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS
“Intuition and Deliberation in Giving and Punishment”
This paper studies why individuals differ in their tendencies to give altruistically and to
punish norm violators. An online experiment investigates the role of dual systems of
processing information, using a 40-item self-report questionnaire to measure (1) individual
reliance on unconscious, intuitive feelings (Faith in Intuition) and (2) personal tendency to
engage in effortful, deliberate thinking (Need for Cognition). I find that people who think
more deliberately tend to resist the impulse to punish. Moreover, an increase in the cost of
punishing reduces both the punishment frequency and altruistic giving. Lastly, I find that
higher reliance on an intuitive way of processing information is associated with greater
sensitivity of punishment to a cost increase than to a cost decrease. This asymmetry of
sensitivity might be explained by loss aversion.
“Escalating Anger and Punishments: Testing Theories of Cumulative Anger”
This paper studies what motivates people to punish others in an increasingly severe way.
A laboratory experiment uses a multi-round game where asymmetric information is
created so that the repetition of a player’s potentially selfish action might reveal some
private information to the punisher. The experimental design eliminates the motive of
punishing to deter future selfish actions, in order to examine the intrinsic motivation for
punishing. I find that a history of potentially selfish actions, in the absence of a deterrence
motive, can still trigger harsher punishments. This might be due to an accumulation of
anger, because these punishers also report higher levels of anger. Moreover, the data can
distinguish between two competing hypotheses: anger is triggered by a partner’s action
(failing to comply with the norm) or a belief about the partner’s type (selfishness). I find
more support for the former than the latter. This suggests that cumulative anger arises
from an action perceived as truly selfish, rather than an actor perceived as a selfish type.
“A Theory of the Efficiency of Divorce with Interdependent Preferences”
I develop a model of divorce in a setting where each player has a private value of the
marriage and may or may not care about the partner's value. Thus, there is asymmetric
information, and preferences may be interdependent. The first player can initiate the
bargaining process, and the second player can propose to give or demand a transfer, which
is then accepted or rejected by the first player. Rejection ends the marriage, but any
previous decisions might also reveal one's own value of the marriage, which can
additionally affect the partner’s payoffs. I derive equilibrium outcomes and characterize
the welfare consequences of permitting divorce. A well-known theoretical result is that
asymmetric information routinely leads to inefficient bargaining and divorce. I show that
when preferences are sufficiently interdependent, then divorce can be efficient. Thus,
asymmetric information is not a sufficient condition for inefficient divorce; sufficient lack
of care about the partner is also necessary.
SEMINAR & CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
2016 University of Texas Rio Grande Valley; Royal Economic Society PhD Meetings
(Westminster Business School)
2015 Stirling PhD Conference in Behavioral Science (University of Stirling);
Decision Research at Warwick (University of Warwick)
ANDREW JOHN SIU
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RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
“Information, Productivity and Happiness” with Daniel Sgroi and Shi Zhuo
Today people have access to more information than ever before. Even though having
access to more information usually improves decision making, there is a cost in terms of
attention and cognitive resources to process information. Thus, one important question is:
when does giving people more information benefit their productivity and happiness, and
when is it harmful? We will design and run an experiment to examine the impact of
providing additional relevant and useful information on productivity, as measured by
reading comprehension. When there is time pressure, the additional information might hurt
people whose attention and cognitive resources are divided.
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
American Economic Association, Royal Economic Society
SKILLS AND QUALIFICATIONS
Statistical Software: Stata, R, SAS, Excel
Experimental Software: Z-Tree, Qualtrics
Actuarial Qualifications: Exam P (Probability), Exam FM (Financial Mathematics),
Exam C (Construction & Evaluation of Actuarial Models)
Languages: English (fluent), Chinese (native), Spanish (basic)
WORK EXPERIENCE
Teaching Fellow, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
2015 – Present
Teaching Assistant, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
2010 – 2015
Campus Outreach Associate, Church in Dallas, TX, USA
2008 – 2009
Trainee/Mentor, Living Stream Bible Truth and Church Service Training
2006 – 2008
Actuarial Intern, Texas Department of Insurance, TX, USA
Autumn 2005
REFERENCES
Prof. Andrew Oswald (Supervisor)
University of Warwick
+442476 523 032
A.J.Oswald@warwick.ac.uk
Dr. Robert Akerlof (Supervisor)
University of Warwick
+442476 123 423
R.Akerlof@warwick.ac.uk
Dr. Daniel Sgroi (Research)
University of Warwick
+442476 575 557
Daniel.Sgroi@warwick.ac.uk
Prof. Jeremy Smith (Teaching)
University of Warwick
+442476 523 336
Jeremy.Smith@warwick.ac.uk
CITIZENSHIP: United States