Fiscal consolidation: Dr Pangloss meets Mr Keynes Marcus Miller and Lei Zhang 19th June 2013 Debt unsustainability and measure to correct this Variables used may be defined as follows: Parameter Definition b Level of debt/capacity output g Government expenditure/capacity output θ Tax revenue as a fraction of capacity output r Real rate of interest, taken as exogenous γ Rate of capacity growth, taken as exogenous 2 Debt sustainability and government expenditure b B Bond Accumulation π = (π − πΎ)π + π − π π=0 Tax take b0 b* A0 A2 A1 A E r-γ B g* θ g 3 From a point such as A1, where the sum of expenditure and growthadjusted interest charges exceeding the tax base, debt will grow unsustainably unless some action is taken. Such action may include: • reducing expenditure or raising tax rates; • debt reduction via inflation or explicit repudiation; • financial repression, i.e. lowering the rate of interest paid; • increasing the growth rate • a debt equity swap or some combination of the above. 4 Let the plan for fiscal consolidation be to adjust the structural deficit, S, so as to hit a target of δ*, where S is defined as ππ + π − π. Let this target be chosen to be consistent with a debt target of b*; so πΏ ∗ = πΎb*. The baseline model can then be summarised in two equations: FC π = −πΌ π − πΏ ∗ = −πΌ ππ + π − π − πΏ ∗ = −πΌ ππ + π − π ′ BA π = (π − πΎ)π + π − π where π ′ = π + πΏ ∗ . Or in matrix form: −πΌ π = 1 π −πΌπ π πΌπ ′ π − πΎ π + −π 5 Fiscal consolidation with capacity output: the baseline model b B π=0 F r Tax take A A' E b* r-γ π=0 F θ' B g* θ δ* g 6 Different speeds of consolidation 7 Fiscal fatigue defines an upper debt limit b B “Fiscal fatigue” of Barr et al. π=0 b F Tax take r A' A E b* r-γ g π=0 F B g* θ δ* θ' g 8 Fiscal stabilisation works, but with temporary recession b B M Recession B′ π=0 No Recession Higher debt with lower tax take F r C A Tax take at capacity output E b* r-γ M g* π=0 F θ δ* B θ′ g 9 Simulation results which converge to full employment in the long-run With endogenous taxes Non-cyclically adjusted Baseline case 10 Fiscal consolidation with endogenous income and taxation: flattens BB to left of MM so equilibrium shifts up FF. π = π − γ π + π − π + π(π0 −g) −πΌ −πΌπ π π πΌπ ′ = 1−φ π−πΎ + π φπ0 − π π 11 Fiscal consolidation – waiting and hoping b Regime switches B M D Temporary recession No recession π=0 F r Tax take at capacity output A' E' C A E b* X r-γ π=0 M B D g* F θ' θ δ* g 12 Simulations during the period of waiting and hoping With endogenous taxes Non-cyclically adjusted Baseline case 13 b Tightening fiscal policy to hit the debt target, b* B M Recession No Recession B' F F' r Tax take at capacity output E' E b* ED B' M gD g* F θ' B F' θ δ* g 14 Simulations showing the effect of the tightening of structural deficits Non-cyclically adjusted With endogenous taxes Baseline case 15 Fiscal consolidation defeated by high interest rates b U Explosive path of debt F r π=0 B′ π=0 S A E S F U θ δ* θ′ B′ g 16 Failed attempts to stabilise b F M π=0 π=0 B′ π0 Z A S Z b* E S π−πΎ 1−π M g* F θ θ′ δ* g 17 DeLong and Summers: stabilisation delays fiscal consolidation b B M D π=0 C F r A EαΏ½ b** b* E F r-γ M g* π=0 B θ δ* F θ′ θ′′ g 18 Different types of stability bonds Name Euro-bonds “Blue bonds” “Elite” bonds Debt retirement fund Concept Issue of common bonds to replace all debt Issue of common bonds up to 60% of GDP Common bonds only for AAA rated countries New entity that pools all debts above 60% of GDP, issues its own common bonds. Countries have a credible commitment to amortise the debt in a certain time frame 19 BEFORE: Investors holds sovereign bonds - but are prone to switch Private Investors Lucky Sovereigns “Flight to safety” Unlucky Sovereigns Unlucky sovereigns face high spreads 20 AFTER: Stability and growth fund pools sovereign debt - and diversifies types of bond Private Investors Stability bonds Stability and Growth Fund Lucky Sovereigns Growth bonds Unlucky Sovereigns 21 Balance sheet of SPV Assets Sovereign bonds: Liabilities (a) Plain vanilla Euro stability bonds (b) Growth and GDP-linked Equity base 22