Fiscal consolidation: Dr Pangloss meets Mr Keynes Marcus Miller and Lei Zhang 19th June 2013 Debt unsustainability and measure to correct this Variables used may be defined as follows: Parameter Definition b Level of debt/capacity output g Government expenditure/capacity output ΞΈ Tax revenue as a fraction of capacity output r Real rate of interest, taken as exogenous Ξ³ Rate of capacity growth, taken as exogenous 2 Debt sustainability and government expenditure b B Bond Accumulation π = (π β πΎ)π + π β π π=0 Tax take b0 b* A0 A2 A1 A E r-Ξ³ B g* ΞΈ g 3 From a point such as A1, where the sum of expenditure and growthadjusted interest charges exceeding the tax base, debt will grow unsustainably unless some action is taken. Such action may include: β’ reducing expenditure or raising tax rates; β’ debt reduction via inflation or explicit repudiation; β’ financial repression, i.e. lowering the rate of interest paid; β’ increasing the growth rate β’ a debt equity swap or some combination of the above. 4 Let the plan for fiscal consolidation be to adjust the structural deficit, S, so as to hit a target of Ξ΄*, where S is defined as ππ + π β π. Let this target be chosen to be consistent with a debt target of b*; so πΏ β = πΎb*. The baseline model can then be summarised in two equations: FC π = βπΌ π β πΏ β = βπΌ ππ + π β π β πΏ β = βπΌ ππ + π β π β² BA π = (π β πΎ)π + π β π where π β² = π + πΏ β . Or in matrix form: βπΌ π = 1 π βπΌπ π πΌπ β² π β πΎ π + βπ 5 Fiscal consolidation with capacity output: the baseline model b B π=0 F r Tax take A A' E b* r-Ξ³ π=0 F ΞΈ' B g* ΞΈ Ξ΄* g 6 Different speeds of consolidation 7 Fiscal fatigue defines an upper debt limit b B βFiscal fatigueβ of Barr et al. π=0 b F Tax take r A' A E b* r-Ξ³ g π=0 F B g* ΞΈ Ξ΄* ΞΈ' g 8 Fiscal stabilisation works, but with temporary recession b B M Recession Bβ² π=0 No Recession Higher debt with lower tax take F r C A Tax take at capacity output E b* r-Ξ³ M g* π=0 F ΞΈ Ξ΄* B ΞΈβ² g 9 Simulation results which converge to full employment in the long-run With endogenous taxes Non-cyclically adjusted Baseline case 10 Fiscal consolidation with endogenous income and taxation: flattens BB to left of MM so equilibrium shifts up FF. π = π β Ξ³ π + π β π + π(π0 βg) βπΌ βπΌπ π π πΌπ β² = 1βΟ πβπΎ + π Οπ0 β π π 11 Fiscal consolidation β waiting and hoping b Regime switches B M D Temporary recession No recession π=0 F r Tax take at capacity output A' E' C A E b* X r-Ξ³ π=0 M B D g* F ΞΈ' ΞΈ Ξ΄* g 12 Simulations during the period of waiting and hoping With endogenous taxes Non-cyclically adjusted Baseline case 13 b Tightening fiscal policy to hit the debt target, b* B M Recession No Recession B' F F' r Tax take at capacity output E' E b* ED B' M gD g* F ΞΈ' B F' ΞΈ Ξ΄* g 14 Simulations showing the effect of the tightening of structural deficits Non-cyclically adjusted With endogenous taxes Baseline case 15 Fiscal consolidation defeated by high interest rates b U Explosive path of debt F r π=0 Bβ² π=0 S A E S F U ΞΈ Ξ΄* ΞΈβ² Bβ² g 16 Failed attempts to stabilise b F M π=0 π=0 Bβ² π0 Z A S Z b* E S πβπΎ 1βπ M g* F ΞΈ ΞΈβ² Ξ΄* g 17 DeLong and Summers: stabilisation delays fiscal consolidation b B M D π=0 C F r A EαΏ½ b** b* E F r-Ξ³ M g* π=0 B ΞΈ Ξ΄* F ΞΈβ² ΞΈβ²β² g 18 Different types of stability bonds Name Euro-bonds βBlue bondsβ βEliteβ bonds Debt retirement fund Concept Issue of common bonds to replace all debt Issue of common bonds up to 60% of GDP Common bonds only for AAA rated countries New entity that pools all debts above 60% of GDP, issues its own common bonds. Countries have a credible commitment to amortise the debt in a certain time frame 19 BEFORE: Investors holds sovereign bonds - but are prone to switch Private Investors Lucky Sovereigns βFlight to safetyβ Unlucky Sovereigns Unlucky sovereigns face high spreads 20 AFTER: Stability and growth fund pools sovereign debt - and diversifies types of bond Private Investors Stability bonds Stability and Growth Fund Lucky Sovereigns Growth bonds Unlucky Sovereigns 21 Balance sheet of SPV Assets Sovereign bonds: Liabilities (a) Plain vanilla Euro stability bonds (b) Growth and GDP-linked Equity base 22