School of Public Policy Working Paper Series: ISSN 1479-9472
Working Paper 6
Moving in the Other Direction?
The Impact of Domestic Party System Change on Italian MEPs
Amie Kreppel
Center for European Studies and Department of Political Science
University of Florida
The support of UCL Friends Programme is gratefully acknowledged.
School of Public Policy
University College London
The Rubin Building
29/30 Tavistock Square
London WC1H 9QU, UK
Tel 020 7679 4999, Fax 020 7679 4969
Email spp@ucl.ac.uk
www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/
Date: January 2004
Moving in the Other Direction?
The Impact of Domestic Party System Change on Italian MEPs
Amie Kreppel
Center for European Studies & Department of Political Science
University of Florida
kreppel@polisci.ufl.edu
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Workshop on the Europeanization of Italy,
th
th
19 – 20 June, 2003 Fiesole, Italy. The author thanks the participants and organizers of that
workshop for their comments and Amy Cosan for excellent research assistance. All errors remain
the sole responsibility of the author.
Abstract This paper re-examines some of the assumptions of the Europeanization literature by
suggesting that it might be possible for domestic political events to have a direct influence on
supranational political organizations. This possibility is addressed through an analysis of the
impact that the dramatic political reform of the Italian party system in the 1990s had on the
primary home of political party action in the EU, the European Parliament. The goal is to
determine the extent to which the transformation of the Italian political party system impacted the
party system of the EP through an analysis of EP party group voting unity and the additional
impact that these events may have had on the political roles and influence of Italian MEPs within
the EP through an examination of the allocation committee chairmanships and rapporteurships
across time. The results are in many ways counterintuitive and suggest that the norms and rules
that structure the supranational institutions may be hardier and more resistant to shock than
currently assumed.
2
There can be little doubt that the development of the European Union has had a
tremendous impact on the national political life of its member states. The flourishing field of
“Europeanization” literature clearly examines and demonstrates this impact in a wide range of
spheres. This paper seeks to ask a different question, or rather to reverse the question to a certain
extent to ask whether, or to what extent, political changes in the national sphere affect the
European political arena. Although some aspects of this relationship are quite clear (for example
changes in national leadership have had profound effects on EU integration broadly) others
remain less studied and far less obvious.1
This paper seeks to examine the potential effects of domestic political change on
European level institutions more closely through an analysis of the behaviour of Italian Members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) before and after the reforms and political upheavals that
rocked Italy during the1990s. The dramatic transformation of the Italian political scene and, in
particular, the political party system unquestionably reshaped the national Italian political
landscape, but did these changes have any impact at the supranational level? This paper traces the
shifts in the behaviour and roles of Italian MEPs within the European Parliament before and after
the dramatic transformation of the national party system that took place during the 1990s.
While the immediate subject of the paper is the potential changes in the behaviour and
roles of Italian MEPs and the influence of domestic political reforms on supranational actors, the
broader subject addressed is the extent to which “Europeanization” is a one-way street or a
recursive relationship between “Europe” and the member states. This question takes on increased
relevance in light of the future enlargement of the EU to at least ten (if not eventually 13 or more)
1
The most obvious recent examples being the switch from Conservative John Major to Labour’s Tony
Blair in the UK and the shift from the Center-right coalition led for so long by Helmut Kohl to the redgreen (center-left) coalition led by Gerhard Schroeder and Joshka Fischer in Germany.
3
new member states. The domestic politics of the newly democratic countries of Eastern and
Central Europe are markedly different from that of the current member states. Party systems in
particular are more fluid and parties themselves play a substantially reduced role in most cases.
Thus, the impact of party system fluidity and large scale political reform in Italy on Italian MEPs
may be understood in the broader context of EU enlargement as a possible example of potential
future patterns among MEPs from the new accession countries.
In this paper I first examine the question of why we might expect national political events
to impact the supranational level. In other words, this section outlines why we might expect
“Europeanization” to “move in the other direction” focusing, in particular, on the realm of
political party competition and the potential impact on the European Parliament. In the second
section I summarize (very briefly) the political upheaval experienced in Italy during from the late
1980s through the mid 1990s. This will include a more detailed look at the dramatic changes to
the party system as a result of a combination of international events, changing electoral laws and
the corruption scandals of the time. The third section outlines in detail the specific questions
addressed by the data analysis, the data itself and the process of analysis while section four
reports the results and interprets their meaning. In the final concluding section focuses on the
extent to which the lessons of this specific research can be broadly applied or generalized and
what this might mean in terms of EU enlargement.
Moving in the Other Direction?
The increasing focus in recent years on the impact of European integration on the
politics, policies and institutions of the member states of the European Union is understandable
4
given the rapid increase in the overall pace of integration since the late 1980s. Literature on
Europeanization has emphasized, among other things, the impact of EU integration on specific
national policy arenas (for example Radaelli, 1997; Agh, 1999; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002;
Harcourt, 2002; Jorson 2002), institutions (for example Ladrech, 2001, 2002; Cole and Drake,
2000; Cole, 2001; Grabbe, 2001; Hanley, 2002), regions and regionalism (for example Börzel,
1999,2000, 2003; Bentz and Eberlein, 1999) and even political systems as a whole (Ladrech,
1994; Anderson, 2002). Almost universally, however, the focus has been on the impact of the
development of EU level policies, institutions and overall integration on aspects of the member
states’ political systems. The causal arrow has consistently been pointing from the
supranational level down towards the member states, despite frequent recognition of the fact
that national actors may look to the supranational EU level as a potential sphere of action
through which they can indirectly influence domestic outcomes via EU policies (Hix and
Goetz, 2000; Ladrech, 2002; Cole, 2001; Anderson, 2002 amongst others).
Many definitions of Europeanization, however, suggest at least the possibility for a more
recursive relationship between European (EU) and national level political developments, but this
aspect of the EU-member state relationship has, thus far, been under-researched. Ladrech (2002:
391), for example, defines Europeanization by stating that it “has something to do with the
penetration of the European dimension into national political arenas of politics and policy
making,” but despite the fact that he is examining the relationship between Europeanization and
political parties (which operate at the supranational level within the EP), he does not question
whether this relationship might also exist in the opposite direction.
The notion that domestic politics may impact European level decision-making and
outcomes is not, in and of itself, new. The notion is, in fact, an integral concept within the
5
“intergovernmentalist” theoretical framework, which posits national leaders as the primary actors
in the integration process (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). The intergovernmental approach highlights
the possibility for changes in national leadership to have significant short and long term effects on
the process and content of EU integration.2 One need only think about such crucial actors as
Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer, Margret Thatcher, Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl to
realize the positive and negative effects that individual leaders can have on EU integration as a
whole. But while few would dispute that national leadership matters for the future path of the EU,
the potential that substantial changes in national level political structures, and in particular party
systems, might have is less well understood.
This is surprising given the recent deluge of literature on the growing importance of the
European Parliament (EP) and the critical role of parties within it (Kreppel, 1999, 2002; Kreppel
and Hix, 2003; Hix, Noury and Kreppel, 2003; Hix, Noury and Gerard, 2002, Scully, 2000;
Raunio, 1997, 2002). Although some disputes remain over the particulars, there is by now broad
agreement that; a) the powers of the European parliament have grown substantially and almost
inexorably since the Single European Act (SEA) and b) the EP today merits the title of colegislator and acts as a functioning legislative body in most significant policy arenas within the
EU (Tsebelis,1994, 1995; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1997, 2000; Garrett and Tsebelis 2001; Kreppel,
2000, 2002 ; Hix, 1999; Scully, 1997; Shackleton,1998, 2000; Corbett, Jacobs and Schackleton,
2003; etc.). If the EP is a crucial aspect of EU decision making and the political party groups are
the dominant force within it, why shouldn’t we be concerned about the development of those
party groups and in particular the impact that national party system change might have on them?
2
See also some aspects of historical institutionalism such as that presented by Paul Pierson
(199***).
6
To understand the direct relationship between national party systems and the party system
of the European Parliament it is crucial to remember that the party groups of the EP are
fundamentally conglomerations of national level parties. The supranational EP party groups do
not exist at the national level. Elections to the EP are based on nationally derived electoral lists.
MEPs once elected on the basis of their national party decide (generally within their delegation,
although individuals may act on their own) which EP party group to join. Alternatively, national
delegations may decide to remain unaffiliated or even work to create a new party group.3 Even
after they have joined a party group the national delegations may continue to exert an
independent influence on the activities of the EP as a whole, and no matter what will exert at least
some influence over their own EP party group (Kreppel, 2002).
As a result significant changes in domestic party systems could potentially directly
influence EU outcomes (policy and other) through the activities of the national party delegations
within the EP. This will be especially true for those countries that have a substantial
representation in the EP since many crucial activities require high vote thresholds and the general
application of the proportionality rule means that size matters.4 Italy, as one of the current “big
states” has 87 members in the EP, a not inconsiderable 14% of the total membership (626).5 It
seems worth investigating therefore, whether the dramatic reforms and party system upheavals in
the 1980s and 1990s in Italy had any impact on the European Parliament and the supranational
3
The rules concerning party group formation are found in the EP’s Rules of Procedure. The most recent
edition of which states that “(1) Members may form themselves into groups according to their political
affinities; (2) A Political Group must comprise Members from more than one Member State” (Rule 29 in
2003 edition).
4
For example all votes under the assent procedure and all votes in the second and third round of the
cooperation and codecision procedures (where the EP has the most power) require at least an absolute
majority of the EPs component members. Given continued high rates of absenteeism this can often translate
into a requirement for a 75% or more vote threshold.
5
This essentially argues that the significance of party system change will be greater in big countries and
that the impact of substantial change in any one country will decrease as the size of the EU (number of
member states) increases (since each country will have a proportionally smaller share of EP members).
7
party system and likewise whether these changes had any subsequent impact on the ability of
Italian MEPs to wield influence within the EP.6
Examining the relationship between the national and supranational political spheres in
this way fundamentally changes the standard question of the Europeanization literature by
reversing the direction of the causal arrow. Instead of focusing solely on the impact that the EU
and the process of European integration may be having on domestic politics, policies and
institutions, it asks what impact significant shifts in the party systems of the member states may
have on EU level institutions and through them policy outcomes. Because the EP is the primary
repository of partisan politics in the EU it is logical to look at the impact of national party system
change on the activities and organization of the supranational party groups that govern most of
the activities within it.
Before moving to examine this influence directly it will be useful to briefly review some
of the momentous changes that have taken in place in Italy since the late 1980s, focusing in
particular on the changes that have taken place within the party system itself.7 Once the basic
transitions that occurred within the party system have been reviewed it will be possible to
delineate the specific questions addressed as well as the method and the results of the analysis
itself.
6
Although this study examines the impact of just one country, it might be possible to imagine other
generalized systemic changes (such as the rise of the new right) across the EU that could similarly have
repercussions at the EU level.
7
This requires leaving aside much of the more complex discussion of the broader effects of the scandals
associated with the tangenti and mani puliti investigations. For a good basic review of these events see
Bufacchi and Burgess, 1997.
8
The Italian Party System in Upheaval
The political upheaval that took place in Italy between 1988 and 1995 can hardly be over
nd
stated. Many have gone so far as to speak of the new Italian 2 Republic suggesting that, in fact,
the Italian political system of today represents a wholly new political entity (see for example
D’Alimonte, 1997; D’Alimonte and Bartolini, 1995, 2002; Bufacchi and Burgess, 1997). While
nd
the changes wrought by the advent of the “2
Republic” were widespread, it is largely
uncontroversial to state that the most far-reaching changes occurred within the party system.
These changes were not, however, solely a function of the political scandals that destabilized Italy
during these years. In fact, at least one significant change took place before the major corruption
scandals began, at least partially due to events in the international arena.
8
Nevertheless, the
dramatic transformation of the party system was linked to the broader political upheaval of the
period, which was due in large part to the dominance of the parties (and the Christian Democrats
in particular) in the post-war years and their subsequent corruption and delegitimization.
Unfortunately, an in-depth analysis of the corruption scandals themselves and their
broader impact on the Italian political system are beyond the scope of this paper, instead, this
section will focus on several key aspects of party system change that took place during this time;
•
•
•
The voluntary dismantling of the Communist Party (Partito Communista, PCI) and creation
of the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratica di Sinistra, PDS).
The implosion of the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) with the
subsequent birth of a number of small parties of the center formed largely around
personalities.
The rise of the center right Forza Italia9 party.
8
This was the name change of the Communist party (Partito Communista Italiana-PCI) into the
Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratic di Sinistra-PDS) which followed from both the events in
Tiananmen Square in 1988 and the fall of the wall in 1989.
9
It is not possible to accurately translate Forza Italia into English and give the sense of the name in Italian.
Prior to the creation of the political party the phrase was most commonly heard at football (soccer) matches
as a rallying cry for the national team.
9
•
The wholesale restructuring of the party system in terms of inter-party relationships as a
result of the reform of the electoral system.
These events, although presented independently above, are clearly interconnected to a greater or
lesser extent.
To understand the full significance of the transformation of the Italian party system it is
necessary to be aware of the omnipresent role that political parties have had in all aspects of life
in Italy during the post-war era. The political system of Italy between 1949 and 1993 was
commonly referred to as a partitocrazia in which political parties, and especially the Christian
Democrats (DC), were able to effectively control the system as a whole (Hine, 1990; Furlong,
199***). Between 1949 and 1993 the DC were never out of power and they controlled the office
of Prime Minister almost continuously (with only a few brief pauses for coalition partners to take
the helm). The uninterrupted concentration of power into the hands of a tightly controlled
hierarchical party system led almost inexorably to corruption. The full extent of the corruption
may never be known, but by March, 1993 over 1000 politicians and businessmen, including at
least two ex-prime ministers were under investigation for acts of corruption. Estimates at the time
suggested that the parties had been extorting between 3.4 billion and 5 billion Lire a year
(Bufacchi and Burgess, 1997).10
The breadth and depth of the political and financial corruption that riddled Italy can
hardly be overstated, and its impact on the political system was vast. The unraveling of the
tangentopoli (bribecity) scandals and the subsequent mani puliti (clean hands) program brought
to light the level of decay within the stagnant Italian system and forced the public to take notice
of level of entrenchment of the existing parties and leaders. This led to public support (and in
some cases demand) for change including electoral reform which was considered crucial to the
10
Exchange rates fluctuated quite a bit over the period but averaged approximately 1,500 Lire per
$1 US Dollar.
10
overall reform process. However, tangentopoli was not the only motivation for change. Even
before the full extent of the corruption of the political class came to light international events
were instigating reform and changing the public mood.
The first signs of the change to come came in 1988 when Achille Occhetto was selected
to lead the Italian Communist Party (PCI). A reformer who was unsatisfied with the role of
outsider historically played by the PCI (despite its status as the second largest party in the
country) Occhetto pushed for wholesale reform of the party. Despite some initial attempts in the
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square tragedy, it was not until the fall of the Berlin wall and the
collapse of the Soviet Bloc that formal progress was made. The process began with a series of
reforms passed by the PCI central committee in late November of 1989. These included a new
name - the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), a new symbol - the oak tree, and a significant
political realignment towards the center-left.11 The reforms caused the hard-core Communist
members to break away and form a new splinter party, the aptly named Rifondazione
Communista (Communist Refoundation). The implementation of the proposed reforms was not
completed until 1991 and failed to lead to much support among voters due to the rise of
factionalism within the party, the slow implementation of reforms, and an unclear party agenda.
In fact, in the following general elections in April 1992 the PDS received just 16.1% of the vote,
down considerably from 1987’s elections in which the PCI received 26.6%.
The transformation of the DC can also be linked, at least in part, to end of the cold war.
Support for the DC began to erode after 1989 as its anti-communist stances, a key aspect of its
platform, became increasingly obsolete. It is impossible to know what the long term effect of the
end of the cold war would have been on the DC because by early 1992 allegations of corruption,
11
There was something of a rapprochement with the Socialist party which was then in Government.
11
the failure to reform the political and public systems, and the inability to counteract Italy’s
economic crisis and organized crime has all begun to weigh heavily on the party. The beginning
th
of the end can be traced back to February 17 , 1992 when Mario Chiesa, a middle-ranking
Socialist party member, was arrested for taking a bribe of £3000. Eventually many other Milan
officials were implicated. This marked the beginning of the Tangentopoli scandal which would
eventually come to implicate a large number of the DC’s past and current leadership.
The general elections of April, 1992 gave a clear indication of the trouble the government
parties, and especially the DC, were in. The outgoing 4-party coalition led by the DC barely
retained a majority of Senate and Chamber seats, but its combined share of the vote fell below the
50% threshold. For the first time in its history, the DC did not get at least 30% of the vote.
Following the wide-spread delegitimization of the DC due to the continued growth of the
corruption scandals and allegations against its members and leaders the new head of the party
announced in July 1993, at the DC Assembly in Rome, that he would rehabilitate the DC by
renaming it the Italian Popular Party (PPI) and redefining its goals and internal organization. The
attempt to save the DC as a united entity by giving it a new name failed, and by early 1994, the
DC had split into four groups: (1) The PPI, as had been promised in July, (2) The Christian
Democratic Center (CCD), a more conservative party, (3) The Pact for Italy (PI), based on liberal
democratic reform, and (4) The Social Christians (C-S), a more clearly center-left oriented
group.12 The fractionalization of the DC continued in early 1995 when the new PPI split in two,
12
At the same time the Socialist PSI, also suffering from intense involvement in the corruption scandals,
likewise split into three parties. Given the small size of the PSI to begin with (averaging around 8%) this
effectively marked the end of the Socialists as a significant independent political force in Italy.
12
followed less than a year later by the creation of the Rinovamento Italiano (a centrist party) and
the creation in early 1998 of the Unione Democratica per la Repubblica (UDR) led by expresident Cossiga (a former member of the DC). After over 45 years of uninterrupted power the
DC effectively internally combusted between 1993 and 1998 leaving in its wake a flotilla of
small, often unstable and poorly organized parties with little or no hope of reacquiring the
previous glory of the DC.
The very public disintegration of the DC left a huge vacuum in the Italian political
system, one that would be filled through the creation of a wholly new party both in form and
content. The history of the development of the Forza Italia party, led by media magnate Silvio
Berlusconi is relatively short. In the wake of the corruption scandals and the electoral reforms
that were being proposed Berlusconi began to create his own politically oriented network in
1993.13 In early 1994, during the run up to the general elections Berlusconi challenged the
moderate forces to join together to combat the parties from the left stating that if they failed to
do so he would enter the election at the head of the new Forza Italia. Immediately following
this was the effective dissolution of the DC. Not surprisingly Berlusconi took this as a sign
that the center and moderate parties were incapable of joining together to fight the left, so he
officially entered the political fray at the head of the new Forza Italia party.
13
The initial creation of the Forza Italia was initiated as an advertising campaign in which billboards and
promotional paraphernalia such as stickers and pens were distributed across most of Italy, but without
specifying what exactly the “Forza Italia” was. Since this is also the rallying cry of the national
football/soccer squad it was in no way immediately clear that this was to become a political party.
13
In perhaps the most astonishing political success story in post war Europe, Berlusconi
was able to lead the center-right to victory in the 1994 elections through a clever electoral
coalition strategy. The 1994 elections were the first with the new electoral system (below)
which meant that 75% of the seats were allocated in single member districts. Given the
fractionalization of the Italian party system this effectively required like-minded parties to
join forces and create electoral coalitions. Berlusconi’s Forza Italia formed coalitions with the
regionalist Northern League in the north and with the far right National Alliance (AN) in the
south.14 This was a daring strategy, which proved successful only in the short term. The
rightist alliance won 42.9% of the national vote, but there was friction between the Northern
League and the AN, due to the difference in their philosophies and the AN’s still questionable
historical ties. In the end the new Government was short lived and new elections had to be
called in 1996. But the change wrought was fundamental.
The 1994 elections marked the complete transformation of the Italian party system.
The old key parties of the past, the DC, PCI and even the PSI were gone or mere shells of
what they had been. Instead new parties (such as the Northern League and the Forza Italia) or
significantly reformed parties (such as the PDS and the AN) were the primary parties. The
largest party in the country was wholly new and had been created just months before the
election. Unlike the DC and PCI the new parties had almost no social penetration, weak
14
The National Alliance (Allianza Nationale) was the new name of the Italian Socialist Movement (MSI)
which was the historical descendent of the old fascist party. The name change (as with the PCI previously)
was an attempt by the party’s leadership to gain legitimacy and cut ties with the past. Because of its
extremist heritage the MSI (like the PCI) had never served in Government and as a result was largely free
of the taint if the tangentopoli scandals.
14
historical ties and in many cases were based more on personalities that party ideology
(Newell, 2000; Bufacchi and Burgess, 1997).
The large scale reform of the electoral system itself was also a key facet of this transition.
The existing electoral system has been one of the most proportional in existence. With relatively
large electoral districts and a national college of the remainders even small geographically
dispersed parties were able to win seats in the legislature. At times as many as twenty-two parties
held seats in the lower chamber. No party ever won a clear majority and the largest parties (the
DC and PCI) while ideologically distinct, did not effectively represent two possible poles around
which coalitions could form. Although the PCI had formally shed it ties to the Soviet Union after
the death of Stalin it was still generally considered to be “anti-systemic” and therefore
illegitimate. Fear of PCI participation in government was so great that in the 1970s even the
unofficial support of the PCI for the government (during the “Historic Compromise”) led directly
to an increase in domestic terrorism. The result was that the DC was left as the sole focus of
Government formation and in fact was the largest party in every coalition during the pre-war
period until its demise.
Many viewed the electoral system as the root of Italy’s political problems. Broad
coalitions were incapable of effective decision-making, there was little real alternative to the DC
based Governments (despite the ineffectiveness) and the system served to re-elect the same
people repeatedly leading to entrenched interests (and eventually corruption).15 The first attempts
15
One of the more extreme cases is Guilio Andreotti, an ex-leader of the DC and 8-time prime minister
who served in every Government from 1959-1992 and was later indicted (though acquitted) of accomplice
to murder in conjunction with several mafia organized homicides.
15
at reform took place in 1988 when a referendum was overwhelming passed to reduce the number
of voter preferences that could be expressed from four to just one.16 The broad support for the
reform (despite the opposition of several Government parties) was perhaps the first indication of
the readiness of the public for change.
Following the discovery of the corruption scandals, many of which were linked to
campaign finance, there was a movement to move towards more radical electoral system reform,
including the introduction of a majoritarian system with single member districts. In July 1992 a
bicameral commission on electoral reform was created, however progress was slow and
compromise difficult to achieve. Small parties risked extinction under a purely majoritarian
system and were unlikely to vote in favor, while the larger parties wanted to create a bonus
system that would further benefit the larger parties and ensure an absolute majority victory.
Because of the inability of the legislative commission to act it was decided to present the voters
with the decision and a referendum on the issue was scheduled for April 1993. The proposed
electoral reform stipulated that 75% of the Senate’s (and later, also the Chamber’s) seats would
be allocated through the single member districts and the remaining 25% through proportional
representation. The referendum was overwhelmingly passed with an average turnout of 77%.17 In
June, 1993 the results of the referendum were officially adopted by the legislature with the
addition of a 4% threshold for the proportional seats.
16
It had come to light that in many cases preference votes were being bought by candidates to insure their
own election, especially in the mafia controlled areas of the south.
17
In reality there were eight separate referenda on the ballot including party finance reform, the abolition of
several cabinet ministries and several other less critical topics On the whole, however, electoral reform was
the most critical.
16
The general elections of March 1994 were the first with the new electoral system. The
right-wing alliance (above) was the winner, obtaining a majority of seats in the lower chamber
and falling just three short of one in the Senate. The center-left ‘Progressive Alliance’ did not fair
so well, due primarily to the internal squabbling and the inability to appeal to voters both on the
left and right. The new laws had a significant impact on the overall results of the election. There
was, as was to be expected with the introduction of an even partially majoritarian system, a high
level of distortion between the percentage of votes won and the percentage of seats gained. For
example, the Right coalition won 42.9% of the votes, but 58.1% of the seats. However, the new
system failed to live up to expectations by providing an overall reduction in the number of parties
and a clear governing majority. The number overall number of parliamentary parties did not
change significantly and the large parties were somewhat less large than in the past. In effect this
was the opposite of the desired outcome.
In the five years between 1989 and 1994 the entire Italian political system was
transformed. The elite that had governed Italy for nearly half a century were thoroughly
delegitimized and many were under investigation for corruption or worse. The main political
parties of the post-war era had disappeared, either by fragmenting into numerous splinter groups
or through internal reform and reinvention. In their place were a new kind of party based more on
personality than ideology and with weak ties to society as a whole. The system of extreme
electoral proportionality had been replaced by one based primarily on majoritarian principals. By
1994 a coalition of new and reformed parties of the far right was in power and the old DC and
PCI were no where to be found. The changes wrought in these five years endured bringing in a
center-left coalition in 1996 and a return of the Berlusconi coalition in the late 1990s (finally
achieving the log sought after alternation in power). The question is what significance, if any, did
17
these profound changes in the party system of Italy have on European Parliament, the focal point
of partisan activity in the EU? Did the transformation of the Italian party system have any impact
of the supranational party system of the EP or the role of the Italian representatives within it?
What Kind of Change?
The impact of the transformation of the domestic political party system might be
expected to manifest itself in two arenas and in two directions as graphically demonstrated in
Figure 1. The first direction reflects the influence that Italian MEPS can exert at the supranational
level. In this direction the first arena is the EP as a whole, and in particular the EP party system
(quadrant A). Here we might expect that changes in the relative balance of power between parties
in the domestic arena would affect the EP party system since elections to the EP are organized
around national parties. Thus, shifts in electoral fortunes and the creation or dissolution of
political parties at the national level potentially impacts the relative size of the supranational
groups in the EP, which consist of national party delegations. In this context the changes in the
Italian party system might have influenced the balance of power between party groups depending
on which groups the new parties joined (if any) and which party groups lost members as a result
of old Italian parties effectively disappearing.
Because EP elections are independent from
national elections these changes can only occur following the former which occur every five
years and are therefore less able to directly mirror national change on an annual basis. Thus only
membership shifts in 1994 and 1999 can be analyzed.
18
Figure 1: Arenas of Potential Change
The second arena in which the changes in the domestic sphere may have a significant
impact is within the party groups themselves (quadrant B). Since each EP party group is made up
of a number of national party delegations there is always some level of internal ideological
variation. As the EP has grown and the party groups have assumed members from a broader
spectrum of national parties this internal variation has tended to increase. However, it is not
necessary for the EU to expand for internal party group diversity to increase. Changes within
existing member states can also lead to increased internal party group diversity if new parties are
created that differ from the existing EP party groups and yet seek membership within them.18
The clearest evidence of increased internal party group diversity would be a reduction in voting
unity within the EP party groups. Given the frequent requirement for absolute majority threshold
a reduction in the cohesion of either of the two largest parties could hinder the ability of the EP to
act effectively and reduce its ability to bargain with the other EU institutions. In fact, some
evidence suggests that the EP as a whole is significantly less influential within the legislative
process when it suffers from internal divisions (Kreppel, 2002).
18
It might be expected that new parties that differed substantially from existing groups would simply prefer
to form their own group or remain independent, however resources in the EP are allocated on the basis of
group membership and more benefits accrue to larger party groups, often leading to the effective
marginalization of small groups (Kreppel, 2000, 2002, 2003). In addition, the Rules of Procedure require
that all groups consist of members from at least two member states and require a higher number of
members if only two states are represented making it more difficult to simply form a new group
independently (Rule 29, Rules of Procedure, 2003).
19
The impact of changes in the internal unity of party groups with substantial Italian
membership will be examined here through an analysis of roll-call votes. Of particular interest
will be a comparison between the internal unity of the European Peoples’ Party (EPP) and the
Party of European Socialists (PES) before and after Italian party system changes as these two
groups were the most directly impacted by the changes in the Italian domestic sphere described
above and are also arguably the most significant groups in the EP. The EPP initially was the
group of the DC and later (after initially being refused) became the group of the Forza Europa
delegation. Likewise, the PES was influenced by the transformation of the PCI into the PDS,
which eventually opted to join the PES where its predecessor had not (remaining in small
variously named coalitions of the far left). In both of these cases the addition of the new national
Italian party delegation led to an expansion of the ideological spectrum included within the group
and potentially to a decrease in party group unity as a result.19
Both of the above questions reflect the potential impact that the transformation of the
Italian party system might have had on the EP party system and the party groups themselves.
There is also the possibility that the influence and role of Italian MEPs also underwent a change.
In particular, it is possible that the instability of the new national parties, the resulting high rate of
turnover among Italian MEPs (especially in the 1994 EP elections), and the unclear status of the
Forza Italia members led to the marginalization of Italian MEPs within the organizational
structure of the EP leading to a decrease in the ability of Italian MEPs to effect decision-making
in the EP as a whole (quadrant C).20 The extent to which this occurred can be measured by
19
It is true that prior to 1995 the EPP had a large Italian component with the participation of the DC. However, the DC was much
more centrally located ideologically within the EPP than the new Forza Europa members, which tend to be more right wing and have
no historical link with the church. Traditionally the EPP had been a largely Christian Democratic group and in fact this was its original
name prior to direct elections.
20
It is important to note that this would effectively mean that the “new structure of opportunities” for national actors to affect
domestic policies via participation in EU institutions and influence over EU level policy-making as described by Hix and Goetz would
be limited within the EP.
20
examining the representation of Italian MEPs in significant positions within the EP both before
and after the shift at the national level including specifically the allocation of rapporteurships and
committee chairmanships which are the key ‘prizes’ that can be broadly distributed among MEPs.
A similar situation may have occurred within the party groups themselves and this can also be
measured by examining the leadership role of Italian members within the largest groups (EPP and
PES) across time (quadrant D).
Each of these analyses measures the extent to which changes to the Italian party system at
the national level directly or indirectly impacted the party system and organization of the
European Parliament. Also included is an analysis of how these changes affected the role of
Italian MEPs within the EP and, thus, their potential to effectively influence outcomes (policy or
other). The fundamental point of the analyses is to determine the extent to which significant
changes at the national level in the domestic political realm have an effect on supranational
politics. For the purposes of space conservation only quadrants B and C will be fully analyzed
here with quadrants A and D remaining for future research.21
Changes in MEP Behaviour and Group Unity
To measure the extent to which the changes at the national level among Italy’s parties
influenced the internal unity of the EP party groups I analyzed voting patterns (during roll call
votes) across the period.22 In particular I traced the similarity of voting patterns between Italian
21
Overall B and C seem to be the most significant aspects of possible change and include an example of
both arenas and both directions suggested by the general theoretical framework. Future revisions will
incorporate quadrants A and D.
22
The basic roll call vote data used for this paper was generously made available by Simon Hix, Abdul
Noury and Gerard Roland. A full analysis of the entire dataset of over 10,000 votes can be found in Hix,
Noury, Gerard, 2003.
21
MEPs and those of their respective party groups as well as the general agreement between all
Italians and the EP as a whole.23 The focus of the analysis is on those part groups which
experienced the greatest changes. This includes the EPP and PES throughout the period and the
Communist and Left Coalition groups during the period through 1992 and the small party
groups of the right including the Forza Europa (FE) group during the post 1994 period.24 The
primary goal is to determine the extent to which the voting behaviour of Italian MEPs changed
as a result of the party system changes happening at the national level.
To this end I selected six different years to chart the evolution of voting behaviour among
Italian MEPs. Using 1984 as a base year since this predated any of the changes discussed above.
The second year selected in 1988 which marked the beginning of the political earthquake in Italy.
The very first electoral system reform (the abolition of preferences) was being voted on by
referendum. The third year is 1990 which immediately follows the initial decision by the PCI to
change its name to PDS and undergo thorough internal reforms (which eventually lead to the split
and the creation of the splinter Communist reformation party (Rifondazione Communista). The
fourth year selected, 1992, follows on the actual creation of the PDS and its active attempts to
join the ranks of European Socialists (rather than Communists). The last two years selected (1995
and 1999) focus instead on the dissolution of the DC and the rise of the Forza Italia after the
corruption scandals and electoral reform of the early to mid 1990s. The year 1999 is divided in to
two groups one just before the elections and one just after.
23
In general the overall cohesion of the EP is quite high leading to very high overall levels of voting unity.
See Hix, Noury and Roland, 2003.
24
The base roll call vote data groups a number of the smaller right-wing/conservative parties together
including the Progressive European Democrats (DEP), European Democratic Alliance (RDE), Union for
Europe (UPE) Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN) and the Forza Europe (FE). The Italian members used
in this analysis are all Forza Italia members.
22
Tables 1-6 below report the correlation coefficients for the various years.25 In each case
100 votes were analyzed (for a total of 700 roll call votes) and the correlation coefficients were
determined on the basis of “yes” and “no” votes.26 Since the goal was to compare the behaviour
of the Italian members to the other members of their EP party groups and the EP as a whole I
divided the party groups into the Italian members and the rest of the group minus the Italian
members. The same was done for the EP as a whole. The main aspects to focus on are the
correlation coefficients between the Italian Members and their EP party groups as well those with
their future party group (i.e. the correspondence between PCI MEPs and those of the PES Group
or the Forza Italia Members and the EPP group). It is also possible to get a sense of the overall
influence of national identity on voting behaviour via the correlation coefficients between Italian
members of different party groups.
In 1984 (Table 1) the DC and PCI were the undisputed leaders at the national level. The
Italian socialists, although still a small party, were increasing in importance within the governing
coalition. The Italians were a large component within both the EPP and the Communist groups
and a much smaller delegation within the PES. Overall the DC members tended to vote
overwhelmingly with the other members of the EPP group (correlation coefficient of .911) while
the PSI and PCI members voted substantially less often with their groups (.665 and a striking
.367 for the Communists). Interestingly even at this stage the Italian Communists voted more
frequently with the PES than they did with other Communists (correlation coefficient of .578).27
25
There were a total of 200 votes used for 1999, 100 during the first six months before the EP elections and
100 in the second six months after the elections.
26
There were a statistically insignificant number of formal votes of “abstention” which were not included
in this analysis. Absent members were counted as missing data points and not included.
27
This is most likely due to the relatively moderate stance of the Italian Communists who since the 1960
had been “Euro-Communist” while the other members of the EP Communist group such as the French
Communists tended to be much more extremist.
23
Table 1: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity 1984
1984
Ital
EPP
Ital EPP
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
Ital COM
COM-Ital
Ital All
All-Ital
1
0.911
0.715
0.334
0.626
0.080
0.900
0.795
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
1
0.568
0.275
0.474
-0.033
0.764
0.828
1
0.665
0.827
0.205
0.906
0.710
1
0.578
0.275
0.524
0.665
Ital
COM
COMItal
1
0.367
0.883
0.623
1
0.216
0.160
Ital All
All-Ital
1
0.794
1
Although change is being discussed nothing formal has occurred by early 1988 (Table 2)
and as a result is not surprising that the patterns of voting unity are largely the same. There is a
reduction in the level of agreement between the Italian members of the EPP and the rest, but the
overall level of agreement remains quite high (.858). The Italian Socialists and Communists also
vote more frequently with their EP party groups but still not at the same level as the DC (.705 and
. 669 respectively).28 Similarities in voting between the Italian Communists and the PES increase
slightly to .623 (previously .578). It is notable that this is much higher than the correlation
coefficient of .436 between the PES and the non-Italian Communists.
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity 1988
1988
Ital
EPP
Ital EPP
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
Ital COM
COM-Ital
Ital All
All-Ital
1
0.858
0.270
0.092
0.142
-0.031
0.706
0.633
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
1
0.224
0.117
0.084
-0.039
0.570
0.715
1
0.705
0.618
0.375
0.675
0.622
1
0.623
0.436
0.527
0.740
28
Ital
COM
1
0.669
0.787
0.533
COMItal
1
0.451
0.321
Ital All
All-Ital
1
0.777
Part of the reason for the increase for the PCI maybe the decline of the French Communists at the polls
and the inclusion of members from the new member states of Greece, Spain and Portugal.
24
1
Despite the significant changes taking place in the PCI during 1989 and 1990 within the
EP very little changed (Table 3). The DC members of the EPP still voted largely with the group
as a whole (correlation coefficient of .877). The tendency of the PCI/PDS to vote with their new
party group increased but this is most likely due to their preponderance within the new group
(18/24 members or 75%). The overall tendency to also vote with the PES continued at about the
same level (.630 versus .623 previously) while the tendency of the Italian Socialists to vote with
the PES as a whole continued to increase (from .705 to .782).
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity 1990
1990
Ital
EPP
Ital EPP
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
Ital LC
LC-Ital
Ital All
All-Ital
1
0.877
0.472
0.324
0.247
0.151
0.704
0.665
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
1
0.413
0.353
0.163
0.091
0.572
0.711
1
0.782
0.682
0.574
0.824
0.773
1
0.630
0.545
0.670
0.878
Ital LC
1
0.741
0.815
0.553
LC-Ital
1
0.617
0.614
Ital All
1
0.793
All-Ital
1
By 1992 (Table 4) the transformation of the PCI into the PDS was complete and the
corruption scandals were quickly destabilizing the government and the DC and PSI as cohesive
parties. However, despite these events, the composition of the EP remained unchanged since the
1989 elections (since the two are distinct). As a result there was no immediate impact on the
relative strength of the various Italian delegations or the parties they joined. However there is a
notable increase in the tendency of the Italian PDS members to vote with the PES group (.712)
rather than their own Left Coalition (.551). By and large the both the DC and PSI delegations
25
maintain their previous behaviour with a small increase in voting similarity between the Italian
PSI and the PES as a whole (from .782 to .808).
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity 1992
1992
Ital
EPP
Ital EPP
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
Ital LC
LC-Ital
Ital All
All-Ital
1
0.875
0.342
0.378
0.273
0.092
0.697
0.676
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
1
0.419
0.448
0.283
0.193
0.652
0.779
1
0.808
0.667
0.579
0.739
0.745
1
0.712
0.580
0.749
0.889
Ital LC
1
0.551
0.841
0.647
LC-Ital
1
0.526
0.499
Ital All
All-Ital
1
0.855
1
The changes at the national level in 1994 (Table 5) were quite radical. The birth of the socalled Second Republic witnessed the dissolution of the DC and the rise of the Forza Italia, and
even though the 1994 EP election closely followed the transitional national elections the changes
in the behaviour of Italian MEPs were less dramatic. On the left the PDS had now officially
joined the PES. The result was a significant increase in the tendency of the PDS members to vote
with the PES (from .712 in 1992 when they were in the LC to .899). This suggests that despite the
potential increase to the ideological diversity that the members of the PDS might have
represented the tendency was for them to conform to the group as a whole.29 The EPP members
managed to maintain their previously high levels of voting unity with the group, despite the fact
that the 16 Italian members now came from six different national parties. The biggest change of
course is the addition of the strong right-wing Italian contingent and in particular the 26
representatives of the new Forza Italia. This group had a very low voting correlation both with
other MEPs of the far right and the EPP, which it had aspirations to join (just .401 and .494
29
It is possible that the PDS members were able to convince the other members of the PES to vote as they
wished but given their small number (just 19 out of 198 total members or less than 10%) this seems
unlikely to be true generally.
26
respectively).
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity 1995
1995
Ital EPP
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
Ital right*
right-Ital
Ital All
All-Ital
Ital EPP
1
0.855
0.362
0.311
0.511
0.445
0.703
0.620
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
Ital right
right-Ital
1
0.368
0.357
0.494
0.490
0.647
0.732
1
0.899
0.563
0.343
0.794
0.811
1
0.455
0.331
0.690
0.876
1
0.401
0.880
0.579
1
0.496
0.533
Ital All
1
0.823
All-Ital
1
*see footnote 18
By early 1999 (Table 6) the Italian party system had basically stabilized around two
poles, one centered on the PDS and the other around the Forza Italia.30 The new political system
was largely consolidated including the successful alternation of power between the left and the
right. Within the EP, however, there were significant changes in the voting tendencies of the
Forza Italia EP Members. Although still not formally part of the EPP, the Forza Italia delegation
had been actively pursuing membership. This led to a dramatic increase in its tendency to vote
with the EPP (up to .775) and a still further reduction in its tendency to vote with the other party
groups of the far right (down to just .206). This is similar, albeit more rapid, to what occurred
prior to the PDS’ integration into the PES a six years earlier. The other main Italian delegations
continued to vote cohesively with their groups (with the EPP delegation reaching an all time high
correlation of .935 and the PDS group within the PES dropping slightly to .888).
30
The majoritarian nature of 75% of the seats in the legislature had led to electoral coalition of like minded
parties which then run a single candidate for the first-past-the post seats.
27
Table 6: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity 1999 (IV Legislature)
1999
Ital EPP
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
Ital EPP
1
0.935
0.592
0.599
0.843
0.199
0.885
0.852
Ital right*
right-Ital
Ital All
All-Ital
EPP-Ital
Ital PES
PES-Ital
Ital right
right-Ital
1
0.497
0.510
0.775
0.190
0.786
0.809
1
0.888
0.544
-0.026
0.843
0.812
1
0.476
0.020
0.762
0.888
1
0.206
0.857
0.709
1
0.157
0.223
Ital All
All-Ital
1
0.909
1
*see footnote 18
The tendency of the Forza Italia MEPs to vote with the EPP increased still further after
the 1999 EP elections and their formal incorporation into the newly renamed EPP-ED (Table 6a).
Overall the correlation coefficient for the entire Italian delegation fell slightly to .897 from its
previous high. More significant though is the voting pattern of just the Forza Italia members
(consisting of 23 of the total 35 Italian members of the EPP-ED), which was nearly equal at .891
(compared to the .775 just six months earlier). This is also the pattern for the PDS which once
again increase their tendency to vote with the PES (to their all time high of .939).
Table 6a: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity 1999 (V Legislature)
1999 (V)
Ital EPPED
Ital EPPED
EPP-EDItal
Ital PES
PES-Ital
Ital
Right
Right-Ital
Ital All
All-Ital
FI
EPP
1
EPP-EDItal
0.897
1
Ital PES
0.362
0.235
1
PES-Ital
0.321
0.203
0.939
1
Ital Right
Right-Ital
0.628
0.288
0.579
0.359
0.367
-0.092
0.307
-0.138
1
0.557
1
Ital All
0.863
0.746
0.745
0.682
0.707
0.208
1
All-Ital
0.753
0.754
0.750
0.763
0.579
0.180 0.922
1
FI EPP
0.993
0.891
0.332
0.289
0.626
0.318 0.838
0.724
* The Italian right here does not include the Forza Italia Members (who joined the EPP) but only the
AN and the Lega Nord which are within the Technical Group of Independents (TGI) and the Union of
European Nations (UEN).
28
1
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this analysis is how little actually changed in the
behaviour of Italian MEPs despite the radical transformations occurring at the national level.
On the whole the Italian delegations have voted loyally with their EP party groups and this
tendency has grown consistently across time. What is most notable is the tendency of the
Italian delegations to begin to vote with other party groups when they had a long-term goal
of joining that group. This trend is evident over the long run for the PCI/PDS and in a much
more condensed way for the Forza Italia delegation. In both cases these delegations strayed
from previous voting patterns (in the case of the Forza Italia quite dramatically) to pursue a
voting strategy much more in line with the two largest party groups. Furthermore, once they
joined these groups formally they continued the trend achieving extremely high unity with
their new party groups.
It is not hard to understand why the Italian delegations might want to join the two largest
groups in the EP. Since direct elections the EPP and the PES have between them controlled
between 54% and 66% of the seats. Within the EP benefits and resources such as committee
chairmanships and rapporteurships are allocated based on party group size, using the D’Hondt
method (which tends to over compensate the largest parties). As a result Members are most likely
to be able to act effectively and wield real influence only if they are within one of the two largest
party groups. What is surprising is the extent to which the Italian members seem to have assumed
the goals of their new party groups. Given the large size of the EPP and PES the Italian
delegations were never able to usurp the party groups’ decision-making process. In fact, in neither
case were the Italians the largest national delegation. So the trend of high voting unity is most
likely not the result of the Italian delegation having radically adjusted the voting patterns of the
group as a whole (more than 150 members from fourteen countries in both cases), but rather
represents a real change in the behaviour of the Italians themselves.
29
This is important because it suggests that, contrary to initial expectations, we do not
witness national changes impacting the supranational level (beyond the short term). Instead what
occurs is, in fact, much more in line with the standard Europeanization literature. The norms and
rules at the supranational level appear to effectively impose adaptation and change upon the
domestic actors. The result is that, despite the radical events that occurred at the national level in
Italy and the complete transformation of the party system, very little changed in terms of the
behaviour of the Italian delegation within the EP after an initial transition period. This helps to
explain the distinct absence of significant change that we see in terms of the roles of the Italian
members within the EP as a whole (quadrant C).
Changes to the Roles and Influence of Italian MEPs
Most activities within the EP are organized on the basis of the party groups (Hix, 2000;
Kreppel, 2002). Positions of relative influence such as the committee chairmanships and
rapporteurships are distributed amongst the party groups proportionally using the D’Hondt
method. In this process each party group is allocated “points” which it can then spend to “buy”
various positions. Each role or task within the EP is assigned a “price” in points. For example not
all rapporteurships are the same, some may be “free” requiring no use of points others may be
worth 1, 2 or more points (Corbett et al, 2003; Kreppel, 2002).
To investigate the extent to which political change at the national level impacted the
influence of the Italian MEPs I collected information on the allocation of rapporteurships under
the cooperation (SYN) and codecision (COD) procedures between 1990 and 2001.31 The EP is
able to exert direct legislative influence only under these two procedures so they are clearly the
31
Information on Rapporteurs was taken directly from the European Parliament’s web site (legislative
observatory) and was current as of June 23, 2003.
30
most crucial and represent a growing percentage of the overall workload of the EP.32 I also
examine the allocation of committee chairmanships from 1979-2003.33 The data are organized by
year for rapporteurships and legislative term for committee chairmanships. Specific information
is reported only for the big four countries (which all have an equal number of MEPs) to insure
comparability. Information on rapporteurships is reported in Tables 7 (raw numbers), 7a
(percentages) and 8 (distribution by party group) while the data on chairmanship allocations in
reported in Tables 9 (raw numbers), 9a (percentages) and 10 (distribution by party group).
The results regarding rapporteurships are unclear to say the least (Tables 7 and 7a). There
does not appear to be any correlation between events at the national level, or changes in party
group membership at the EP level and the yearly distribution of rapporteurships. Italians received
their highest number of rapporteurships in 1995, 1996 and 2000, but these years are not
particularly significant otherwise.34 There is no noticeable impact of the formal accession of the
PDS to the PES group in 1993, nor does the formal adhesion of the Forza Italia group in 1999
appear to have much impact, although this may account for the rise in 2000 when the Italian EPP
members receive four rapporteurships (Table 8). As is to be expected members of the two largest
groups receive the lion share of Italy’s rapporteurships (21 out of 35 or 60%). The greater number
allocated to members of the EPP, especially after 1994 (and the break-up of the DC) is surprising,
32
The cooperation procedure was introduced by the Single European Act in 1987 and the codecision
procedure was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (later reformed by the Amsterdam Treaty in
1999). The cooperation procedure has by and large been replaced by the codecision procedure in most
realms by the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. For more details see Corbett et al, 2003.
33
Committee chair positions (like all EP hierarchy positions) are appointed for 2 ½ year terms so there is
one change in the middle of each five year legislative session. Data on committee chairmanships is taken
from Corbett, Shackleton and Jacobs, 2003.
34
These were also the highest levels proportionally except for 1990 when the receipt of just 1 report out of
a scarce 9 total meant that the Italians received just over 11% of the available reports.
31
but on its own, not a substantial enough finding to allow us to draw any general conclusions.
Table 7: Rapporteurship distribution among the big four 1990-2001(SYN and COD)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Total
1
0
1
0
7
9
1
3
0
8
4
16
2
5
1
2
9
19
3
4
0
5
18
30
6
10
3
11
16
46
5
14
7
10
26
62
6
13
7
4
16
46
5
16
4
8
19
52
3
13
2
14
33
65
2
6
1
3
22
34
0
16
7
13
38
74
2
4
2
5
22
35
36
104
35
83
230
488
France
Germany
Italy
UK
Other
Total
Table 7a: Rapporteurship distribution among the big four 1990-2001 in % (SYN and
COD)
Average
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
France
11.1%
6.3%
10.5%
10.0%
13.0%
8.1%
13.0%
9.6%
4.6%
5.9%
0.0%
5.7%
8%
Germany
0.0%
11.1%
18.8%
0.0%
26.3%
5.3%
13.3%
0.0%
21.7%
6.5%
22.6%
11.3%
28.3%
15.2%
30.8%
7.7%
20.0%
3.1%
17.6%
2.9%
21.6%
9.5%
11.4%
5.7%
19%
7%
0.0%
50.0%
10.5%
16.7%
23.9%
16.1%
8.7%
15.4%
21.5%
8.8%
17.6%
14.3%
17%
77.8%
25.0%
47.4%
60.0%
34.8%
41.9%
34.8%
36.5%
50.8%
64.7%
51.4%
62.9%
49%
Italy
UK
Other
Overall, what is perhaps most notable is the very low number of rapporteurships allocated
to Italians regardless of the year (never more than 15.2%) while other countries such as Germany
and the UK average 19% and 17% respectively (Italy averages only 7%, coming in last behind
even France with 8%). On the whole Italian and French members also suffer from low turn out
rates while German and UK members tend to have the highest attendance rates and this may be a
deciding factor when deciding who to give a Rapporteurship (Kreppel 2002, Hix Noury and
Gerard, 2003).
Table 8: Party Group Allocation among Italian Rapporteurs 1990-2001(SYN and COD)
GUE/NGL
EPP
PES
ELDR
FE
UPE
TDI
Other
Total
1990
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1992
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1993
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1994
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
3
1995
0
1
2
1
1
0
0
2
7
32
1996
0
2
1
1
0
2
0
1
7
1997
0
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
4
1998
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
1999
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
2000
0
4
0
0
0
0
2
1
7
2001
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Total
1
13
8
2
2
3
2
4
35
On the other hand Italians do much better in winning committee chairmanships (Table 8).
In fact, across all five legislative terms Italian members have secured as many or more committee
chairmanships as members from any other country. However there is very little change over time
that can be tied to national events. Although there is a decline in the overall percent of
chairmanships obtained from the first to the third legislature (Table 9a) this has more to do with
EU enlargement and the need to distribute the positions among a larger number of MEPs over all,
than any effects from domestic political change.35 In fact, similar patterns of decrease are evident
among the French, German and UK delegations as well.
Table 9: Committee Chairmanships 1979-2004*
France
Germany
Italy
UK
Other
Total
I
6
8
9
6
6
35
II
5
7
8
7
11
38
III
5
6
7
7
19
44
IV
5
6
8
6
18
43
V
3
7
7
6
12
35
Total
24
34
39
32
66
195
*each 2 ½ year term is counted individually since this represents a reappointment
Table 9a: Committee Chairmanships 1979-2004 (percentages)*
France
Germany
Italy
UK
Other
I
17.1%
22.9%
25.7%
17.1%
17.1%
II
13.2%
18.4%
21.1%
18.4%
28.9%
III
11.4%
13.6%
15.9%
15.9%
43.2%
IV
11.6%
14.0%
18.6%
14.0%
41.9%
V
8.6%
20.0%
20.0%
17.1%
34.3%
Average
12.4%
17.8%
20.3%
16.5%
33.1%
*each 2 ½ year term is counted individually since this represents a reappointment
35
There were 410 MEPs in the first directly elected Parliament in 1979. That number grew to 434 in 1984
(accession of Greece) and 518 in 1986 (Spain and Portugal). The numbers increased again to 567 in 1990
with German unification and the addition of MEPs from Eastern Germany and finally in 1995 to its current
626 members as a result of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.
33
The distribution of Italian committee chairmanships among the party groups is also
remarkably consistent with the only change being a distinct reduction in the number of
chairmanship positions going to the Italian members of the Communist/Left coalition group in the
run-up to the PDS joining the PES (Table 10). However, there is no subsequent increase in the
number of chairs allocated to Italian members of the PES after 1993 (when the PDS joined).
There does not appear to any clear impact of the rise of the Forza Italia or the functional end of
the DC. Although the Forza Europa group within the EP was never allocated a chairmanship on
its own the Italian EPP members (be they DC, post DC parties or Forza Italia members) received
four chairmanship posts per legislature from 1989 on.
Table 10: Party Group Allocation among Italian Chairs*
COM/LC
EPP
PES
ELDR
Total
I
3
4
2
0
9
II
4
2
2
0
8
III
1
4
2
0
7
IV
2
4
2
0
8
V
0
4
2
1
7
Total
10
18
10
1
39
*each 2 ½ year term is counted individually since this represents a reappointment
Thus, once again we are left with the fact that the dramatic changes that occurred at the
national level and the wholesale restructuring of the Italian party system seem to have had little to
no effect on the role of Italian MEPs within the EP itself. Both before and after these changes at
the national level Italian MEPs received comparatively few rapporteurships and the ones they did
receive were largely allocated to members of the EPP and PES. Although on the whole Italian
members were much more successful in obtaining committee chairmanships (relative to other
national representatives) there was once again no pattern of change over time that can be clearly
linked to the political transformations experienced at the national level.36 The question of course
36
Although why the Italian members should be so successful in obtaining committee chairmanship posts
and so unsuccessful in receiving rapporteurships is an interesting question, it is one which falls outside the
scope of this paper and will remain an enigma for someone to attempt to solve at a later date.
34
is why? And what does this singular lack of impact, combined with the similar absence of
significant change in MEP voting behaviour mean both for the Europeanization literature and for
the future of the EU more generally?
Conclusions: Is it a One-way Street?
The impression we are left with is that despite the truly foundational reforms in the
Italian political party system that took place in the 1990s very little changed either in the
behaviour of Italian MEPs (in terms of voting) or their relative access to position of influence
within the EP. Across the period analyzed Italian MEPs tended to vote with their party groups
and this tendency increased over time with the sole exception of the Forza Italia members right
after the 1994 elections who often failed to vote with the other members of the extreme right in
the EP. When Italian national party delegations aspired to join one of the two large party groups
they began to vote like them and continued to vote with them at high levels after formally joining.
Historically Italians have received below their fair chair of rapporteurships, but more than their
fair share of committee chairmanships. The changes in the domestic political sphere appear to
have had little or no influence on these overall trends. Nor have they impacted he distribution of
these benefits significantly beyond a decrease in the numbers of positions given to the far left
(given the move of the PDS to the more center-left PES). Overall the changes that have occurred
have been either temporary, minimal or both. This is somewhat surprising given the depth of the
change that occurred at the national level and the critical role played by the party groups in the
EP.
35
There are some possible explanations, which are important in light of both future
enlargements and the general debate about Europeanization. The first is simply that no matter
how significant the changes were at the national level they would not significantly affect the EP
because in the end the 14% of MEPs made up by the Italian delegation is simply not significant
enough to instigate broad change. It is likely that had these reforms taken place back in the 1970s,
before enlargement when the Italian delegation accounted for a much larger percent of the whole
EP, that the implications (especially for the EPP) would have been more significant. This does
suggest that as the EU continues to enlarge and each individual country makes up a smaller
percentage of the overall membership of the EP, changes at the national level will become
increasingly less important. While this explanation may be partially accurate, it is unsatisfactory
in explaining why the Italian MEPs themselves did not change their behaviour, especially
following the 1994 or 1999 elections.37
A more interesting interpretation of the results of this analysis is based not on size,
but rather on the impact of institutionalization and norms. The EP is a well developed
legislature with and extensive network of formal and informal norms and rules. Some, like the
broad application of the D’Hondt method (between and within the party groups) limit the
ability of actors within the EP to react strongly to changes within national delegations. Others,
like the emphasis on consensus building and broad pro-integrationist coalitions, counteract
strong variation in ideology that may be much more significant at the national level. In fact,
within the EP as a whole there is an extremely high level of consensus (see the correlation
coefficients between Ital All and EP-Ital in tables 1-6) and the EPP and the PES also tend to
37
It is understandable that during the July 1989- June1994 period since there was no change in the actual
membership of the EP despite the changes at the national level since these elections are wholly
independent.
36
vote together more often than not (Kreppel, 2003; Kreppel and Hix, 2003; Hix et al, 2003).
This norm of compromise and moderation may have many roots (including the need to
present moderate proposals able to win support from the other EU institutions), but the
important aspect for the purposes of this paper is the extent to which new actors within the EP
succumb to it. The evidence presented here suggests that both the PDS and Forza Italia
members changed their behaviour to work with and then within the two largest groups rather
than acting independently (which would have left them largely isolated and ineffective) or
changing the actions of others (which most likely would have been impossible given the
numbers and diversity of the other actors involved.
If this is in fact what occurred it presents a different picture and one much more in
line with standard Europeanization theories. Instead of the national actors affecting change at
the supranational level, they were in fact “Europeanized,” inculcated into the norms and
controlled by the rules that govern activity at the supranational level within the EP. This
suggests a much higher level of resiliency among the EU institutions than might have been
expected given their relative youth and the constant level of change and reform they have
experienced over the past fifty years. It also presents an optimistic alternative for many of the
negative scenarios associated with the enlargement process. Although the expansion to
include ten new member states in May 2004 will be far more traumatic than the changes
wrought by the political upheavals experienced by Italy, the relative ease with which new
members were integrated into the system within the EP in this case perhaps gives us reason to
be optimistic about the incorporation of the new MEPs from Central and Eastern Europe as
well. It is interesting to note in this vein that “observer” members from the acceding countries
37
have been actively participating in the EP since May 2003 to help them learn how the
institutions functions. This can only help the transition and the process of their
“Europeanization.”
38
REFERENCES
Ahg, Attila, 1999, “Europeanization of policy-making in East Central Europe: the Hungarian
approach to EU accession” Journal of European Public Policy vol. 6, no. 5: 839-854.
Anderson, Jeffrey, 2002, “Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity,
1945-2000” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 40, no. 5: 793-822.
Benz, Arthur and Burkard Eberlein, 1999 “The Europeanization of regional policies: patterns
of multilevel governance” Journal of European Public Policy vol. 6, no. 2: 329-348.
Borzel, Tanya, 1999 “Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to
Europeanization in Germany and Spain” Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no.
4: 573-96.
Borzel, Tanya, 2000. “From Competitive Regionalism to Cooperative Federalism: The
Europeanization of the Spanish State of the Autonomies” Publius Vol. 30, no. 2.
Borzel, Tanya, 2002 “Member State Responses to Europeanization” Journal of Common
Market Studies 40, no. 2: 193-214.
Bufacchi, Vittorio and Simon Burgess, 1997. Italy since 1989: Events and interpretations New
York: St. Martin's Press.
Cole, Alstair and Helen Drake, 2000 “The Europeanization of the French polity: continuity,
change and adaptation” Journal of European Public Policy 7, no. 1: 26-43
Cole, Alstair, 2001 “National and Partisan Contexts of Europeanization: The Case of
the French Socialists” Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no 1: 15-36.
th
Corbett, Richard, Michael Shackleton and Francis Jacobs, 2003. The European Parliament (5
Eedition) London: John Harper Publishing.
D’Alimonte, Roberto and Stefano Bartolini, 1995 Plurality competition and party realignment
in Italy: The 1994 parliamentary elections. Florence: European University Institute
(EUI).
D’Alimonte, Roberto and David Nelkin, 1997. Italian politics: The center-left in power
Boulder: Westview Press.
D’Alimonte, Roberto and Stefano Bartolini, 2002, Maggioritario Finalmente?: La Transizione
Elettorale 1994-2001. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Furlong, Paul, 1994 Modern Italy: representation and reform. New York: Routledge.
Garrett, Geoff and George Tsebelis, 2001 The Institutional Foundations of
Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union” International
Organization Vol. 55, no. 2: 357-390.
Grabbe, Heather, 2001 “How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality,
diffusion and diversity” Journal of European Public Policy 8, no. 6: 1013-1031.
Hanley, David 2002 “Christian Democracy and the Paradoxes of Europeanization:
Flexibility, Competition and Collusion” Party Politics Vol. 8, no. 4: 463-481.
Harcourt, Alison 2002 “Engineering Europeanization: the role of the European institutions in
shaping national media regulation” Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 9, no. 5:
736-755.
Hine, David, 1993 Governing Italy: the politics of bargained pluralism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hix, Simon, 1999 The political system of the European Union. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Hix, Simon and Klaus Goetz, 2000 Europeanised politics? European integration and national
political systems. Portland: Frank Cass.
Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland, 2003
Hix, Simon, Amie Kreppel and Abdul Noury, 2003 “The Party System in the European
Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.
41, no. 2: 309-331.
39
Jordon, Andrew, 2003, “The Europeanization of National Government and Policy: A
Departmental Perspective” British Journal of Political Science Vol. 33, no. 2: 261282.
Knill, Christof and Dirk Lehmkuhl, 2002 “The national impact of European Union regulatory
policy: Three Europeanization mechanisms” European Journal of Political Research
41, no. 2: 255-280
Kreppel, Amie and Simon Hix, 2003 “From ‘Grand Coalition’ To Left-Right Confrontation:
Explaining the Shifting Structure of Party Competition in the European Parliament”
Comparative Political Studies Vol. 36, no. 1/2: 75-96.
Kreppel, Amie, 1999 “What Affects the European Parliament’s Legislative Influence? An
Analysis of the Success of EP Amendments” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.
37, no. 3: 521-38.
Kreppel, Amie, 2000 “Rules, Ideology and Coalition Formation in the European Parliament: Past,
Present and Future” European Union Politics Vol. 1, no. 3: 340-362.
Kreppel, Amie, 2002a “Moving Beyond Procedure: An Empirical Analysis of European
Parliament Legislative Influence” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 35, no. 7:
784-813.
Kreppel, Amie, 2002b The European Parliament and Supranational Party
System : a study in institutional development. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Ladrech, Robert, 1994 “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of
France” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, no. 1.
Ladrech, Robert, 2001 “Europeanization and French social democracy” Journal of Southern
Europe and the Balkans Vol. 3, no. 1: 37-47.
Ladrech, Robert, 2002, “Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for
Analysis.” Party Politics 8, no. 4: 389-403
Radaelli, Claudio, 1997 “How Does Europeanization Produce Domestic Policy Change?:
Corporate Tax Policy in Italy and the United Kingdom” Comparative Political Studies.
Vol. 30, no. 5: 553-77.
Raunio, Tapio, 1997. The European perspective: Transnational party groups in the 1989-1994,
European Parliament. Brookfield: Ashgate.
Raunio, Tapio, 2002 “Why European Integration Increases Leadership Autonomy Within
Political Parties” Party Politics Vol. 8, no. 4: 405-422.
Scully, Roger, 2000
Shackleton, Michael, 1998 “The European Parliament's New Committees of Inquiry: Tiger
or Paper Tiger?” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 36, no. 1: 115-31.
Shackleton, Michael, 2000 “The Politics of Codecision” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.
38, no. 2: 325-342.
Tsebelis, George, 1994. “The Power of the European Parliament as Conditional Agenda Setter”
American Political Science Review, Vol 88, no. 1:128-42.
Tsebelis, George, 1995. “Conditional Agenda Setting and Decision Making Inside the European
Parliament” Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 1, no 1: 65-93.
Tsebelis, George and Geoff Garrett, 2000 “Legislative Politics in the European
Union” European Union Politics Vol. 1, no. 1: 9-36.
40