Reactionary Reform and Radical Restraint
Peter Buisseret1
1
Dan Bernhardt2
Warwick, CAGE
2
Illinois
Motivation
Today’s policy choices affect constraints faced by tomorrow’s policy-makers
Focus of our paper:
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consequences of dynamic policy linkage on incentives for dynamic
compromise
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explore how incentives vary depending on whether initial power-holders
favourable or hostile to long-run change
Our key ingredient:
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those who hold office today uncertain about who will hold power in the
future
Source of Dynamic Linkage: Status Quo
Policies implemented today survive until replaced with a new policy
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institutional (mandatory spending in the USA)
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de facto (e.g. Barnett formula in the UK)
A crucial consequence:
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today’s policy becomes opportunity cost of changing policy in the future
In a world of uncertainty about who will hold power in the future:
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take into account how reform today affects potential for more (or less)
reform in future
Some Motivating Observations
Many real-world examples where contemporary interests cannot explain policy
advocacy:
Examples:
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Reform Act of 1867 in England and Wales
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House of Lords reform 1969 in the UK
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Environmental groups’ opposition to Clean Energy Act 2009 in the US
“Why We Cannot Support This Bill”
Since President Obama is likely to sign the bill with great fanfare,
what will the public take away from this? Will they see it as a “win” that the problem is solved? If so, what will that mean for pushing for
the needed steps later? How will the public be mobilized to push their
Representatives when the official and media message is that this is
“landmark" legislation?
TheClean.org
Our Approach
Construct a game theory model to capture salient features of our examples:
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policy implemented in each of a sequence of periods
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initial status quo (e.g. state of the electoral franchise)
In each period, proposer offers veto player choice between status quo and
alternative:
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if accept, becomes new status quo
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if reject, old status quo stays
In between periods, proposal and veto power may change hands:
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proposer may be right or left
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veto player may be moderate right, centrist or moderate left
Key strategic forces
Short-term interest best served by moving policy close as possible to my ideal:
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subject to gaining agreement of today’s veto player
Long-term interest may be different:
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more Ieftist proposer reforms today, more comfortable her supporters are
with the induced status quo of tomorrow
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this makes it harder to achieve long-term reform
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more rightist proposer reforms today, harder it is for a subsequent left
proposer to implement even more reform
Key predictions
When future proposer-veto player more likely to be aligned, more dynamic
compromise:
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aligned proposer today holds back to generate more favorable
environment tomorrow
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misaligned proposer tries to anticipate by making modest concessions,
today
When future proposer-veto player more likely to be mis-aligned, less dynamic
compromise
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more likely to be grid-lock in the future, which locks in today’s gains
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protects today’s proposer from counter-movement in the future and makes
it harder for her to get even better
Example: Democrats in the US from 2008-2010
The exciting field of political economy
Economics a set of tools for thinking about the world:
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a structured and rigorous way to think about how people do the best they
can in a world where their interests may clash with others
Political Economy a field at the intersection of politics and economics:
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cutting edge theoretical and empirical methods to study real-world
problems
Many important questions for you to address:
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how electoral systems determine the number of viable political parties
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how power-sharing institutions can mitigate ethnic conflict
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why presidentialism may be bad for new democracies