International Interactions, 30:25–42, 2004
Copyright © Taylor & Francis, Inc.
ISSN: 0305-0629
DOI: 10.1080/03050620490279300
A RESEARCH NOTE: REEXAMINING TRANSNATIONAL
ETHNIC ALLIANCES AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR
KAREN K. PETERSEN
Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University
Nashville, Tennessee, USA
In this paper I explore the relationship between ethnic alliances and foreign policy
behavior through a replication, correction, and modification of previous work on
the subject. After replicating David Davis and Will Moore’s analyses of the relationship between ethnic alliances and foreign policy behavior, I correct and then modify
the original model. With the corrected model, I demonstrate that correcting for errors in data coding improves the original results and eliminates the conflicting results reported by the original authors. Davis and Moore argue that ethnic alliances
have only a marginal impact on the foreign policy behavior (international interactions) of states. After modification of their model using an improved measure of the
foreign policy behavior in a dyad (and improved measures of some of the control
variables), I show that ethnic alliances are important predictors of foreign policy
behavior. Additionally, I find support for the democratic peace proposition. Democratic dyads have better relationships than nondemocratic dyads regardless of the
presence or absence of transnational ethnic alliances. These findings lead me to
conclude that the conflict literature deals with the ethnic components of territorial
disputes needs to be explored in more detail and that foreign policy behavior should
be an integral part of research on militarized conflict.
KEY WORDS: ethnic alliances, foreign policy, democracy, conflict
I. INTRODUCTION
Previous studies of interstate conflict suggest that disputes over territorial issues
are more likely than disputes over other types of issues to escalate to the level of
interstate war (Holsti, 1991; Huth, 1996; Vasquez, 2000). Additionally, some scholReceived for publication 12 July 2002.
I would like to thank Brad Palmquist, James Lee Ray, Katherine Barbieri, Jen Hoef, Joseph Keasler,
and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine alone.
The data for replicating this article can be obtained at http://people.vanderbilt.edu/~karen.k.petersen/.
Address correspondence to Karen K. Petersen, Vanderbilt University, Box 1817 Station B, Nashville,
TN 37235, USA, E-mail: karen.k.petersen@vanderbilt.edu
25
26
K. K. PETERSEN
ars have attempted to disaggregate the concept of territory in order to better understand why territory makes for such a contentious issue. One of the issues that increases the probability that a territorial dispute will escalate to war is the presence of
ethnic alliances. Holsti finds that men “sympathize with those whom they consider
their ethnic, religious, and ideological kin. When these kin are threatened, persecuted, or physically harmed, their benefactors abroad may come to their assistance—
sometimes with armed force” (1991, p. 317). Additionally, Holsti finds that all of the
periods he studied (1648–1989) contained conflicts in which the “sympathy factor”
(ethnic, religious, or ideological bonds) played an important role (1991, p. 317), and
that sympathy issues were a source of conflict in more than twenty percent of the
post-1945 wars (1991, p. 318).
Huth (1996) finds that states are not necessarily more likely to engage in territorial disputes if ethnic ties are present. However, if states with ethnic ties do engage in
a territorial dispute, the dispute is likely to escalate, which supports the assumption
that when ethnic issues and support for national self-determination for an ethnic
group are the issues at stake in a territorial dispute, conflict and violence are more
likely (1996, p. 110).
I approached the task of analyzing Davis and Moore’s (1997) “Ethnicity Matters:
Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior” with the intent to evaluate the measures they generated for usefulness to the study of interstate conflict. In
order to make such determinations, I found it necessary to replicate their work; and,
upon finding some problems, improve upon their analyses. After replicating their
model, I corrected some data coding problems and the results improved. However, I
was not satisfied with the measure that Davis and Moore constructed for foreign
policy behavior, nor with some of the control variables they constructed.
Using the same data as Davis and Moore, I reconstruct their measure and analyze
the relationship using my modified measure of foreign policy behavior and the
corrected control variables. As a result of the corrections and modifications, I demonstrate that the presence of transnational ethnic alliances reduces cooperation and
increases conflict in a dyad, which makes for less cooperative relationships in the
presence of ethnic alliances. Additionally, I find support for the democratic peace
proposition. While democratic dyads are affected by the presence of transnational
ethnic alliances, they have more cooperative relationships overall than nondemocratic dyads. Democracy increases cooperation and reduces conflict within dyads,
making for better relationships in democratic dyads than in nondemocratic dyads.
Finally, I conclude that ethnic ties warrant further study and that the measures that
Davis and Moore generated are useful after they are refined.
In Section II, I give a brief summary of the original article and its conclusions and
show the results of my replication of the original analyses. In Section III, I discuss
the corrections made to the original data and the results obtained from analyses using
the corrected data. Then in Section IV, I modify some of the measures and discuss
the results of the analyses using my modified measures. Finally, I discuss my conclusions regarding the original article, the extensions made herein, the findings, and the
usefulness of the measures constructed.
REEXAMINING ETHNIC ALLIANCES AND FOREIGN POLICY
27
II. SUMMARY OF “ETHNICITY MATTERS”
Case Selection, Assumptions, and Hypotheses
David Davis and William Moore analyze the relationship between transnational
ethnic alliances and the international interactions of states (1997). A transnational
ethnic alliance exists when two states contain members of the same ethnic group (p.
172). Their argument is that “transnational ethnic alliances serve as conduits to conflict behavior” (p. 172). Davis and Moore restrict case selection in two ways. First,
they consider only dyads that share a politically relevant international environment.1
Second, the analysis is cross-sectional rather than over time—only dyads in 1978 are
considered.2
Davis and Moore build their argument on two assumptions. First, “states respond
to domestic pressure from groups incorporated into the polity: foreign policy is not
usefully modeled as ‘high politics,’ independent of domestic politics” (p. 173). Second, “members of an ethnic group are concerned with the welfare and condition of
other members of the ethnic group” (p. 173). From the above assumptions, two hypotheses follow and are tested in the article.
H1: The level of conflictual3 relations between two states will be higher if both
states contain group members from the same ethnic group, and one of the co-ethnics
is politically and/or economically privileged in its society, but its brethren in the
other state are not.
H2: High levels of ethnic mobilization within a disadvantaged ethnic group will be
associated with high levels of dyadic conflict. (p. 174)
Davis and Moore test hypotheses 1 and 2 above—with one caveat. “We are interested in determining whether the ethnic composition of dyads influences conflictual
and cooperative behavior, yet we do not believe that the ethnic composition of dyads
is the most critical determinate of such behavior. Rather, we suspect that the ethnic
composition of dyads will have an impact at the margins” (p. 174).
Variables
The dependent variable—international interactions—is a measure of the “complete range of foreign policy interactions [within each dyad], focusing on three interrelated facets of international interactions” (Davis and Moore, p. 175). Therefore,
each hypothesis is tested with three different dependent variables—conflict, cooperation, and net interactions. All three are a product of the COPDAB data set (Azar,
1982).
Conflict includes events ranging from minor verbal discord and threats, to the imposition of political and economic sanctions, to military clashes and war. Cooperation
includes events ranging from meetings of officials and verbal statements of support,
to military and economic agreements, to voluntary unification. Both of these components are also incorporated in the broader measure of net interaction, which rep-
28
K. K. PETERSEN
resents the overall flow of relations from a state to its dyadic partner. (Davis and
Moore, p. 175)
The COPDAB data set contains measures of interactions between countries from
1948 through 1978. Each interaction is scaled with 1–7 as scores of cooperative
events and 9–15 as scores of conflict events (8 is neutral). The scale is then assigned
intensity weights so that a better gauge of the difference between events is available
(Azar, 1982).4 Davis and Moore use the weighted measures to create the three dependent variables used in their analyses. For cooperation, they sum the weighted
value of all of the cooperation events and divide by the total number of cooperation
events. The conflict variable is operationalized in the same manner, and net interactions is a measure of the difference between the average level of conflict and the
average level of cooperation.
Davis and Moore generate measures of transnational ethnic alliances using Gurr’s
Minorities at Risk data (1993). The variable for Advantaged Transnational Ethnic
Alliance (ATEA)—which is used in Tables 1, 3, 5, and 6 below—is a dummy variable that is coded 1 when the ethnic minority in one state is an advantaged ethnic
minority in the other state (Moore, 2000; Davis and Moore, 1997, p. 175). The variable for Politically Active Transnational Ethnic Alliance (PATEA)— used in Tables
2 and 4 below—is generated by multiplying a dummy variable for ethnic linkages by
the target protest level of the minority in country B (Davis and Moore, 1997, p. 176).
Davis and Moore use several control variables in their model. They control for
reciprocity using a measure of the behavior of the target state to the actor (using
COPDAB data). Regime type is also controlled for, but the measure is problematic
(see Section III below). Davis and Moore control for the level of economic development by including a variable that is coded 1 (wealthy) if the actor in the dyad has a
per capita income at least as high as 30 percent of the United States’ per capita income. Relative capability is controlled for by taking the difference between the actor’s
and target’s percentage of total system capabilities. Joint international alliances and
borders (contiguity) are also included as control variables (1997, p. 176–77).
The models used by Davis and Moore are specified using all three dependent variables and both measures of the independent variables. The controls are used
in all models. Methodologically, Davis and Moore chose to use ordinary least squares
(OLS). The dependent variables are scaled and suitable to OLS; and as can be seen
below, I successfully replicated the models using their data. However, I found significant problems with the dependent variables and the control variables that were
used. Before discussing the problems, I will give a brief overview of the findings that
Davis and Moore attribute to their model.
Interpretation of the Original Results
According to Table 1 (the regression of Advantaged Transnational Ethnic Alliances on the foreign policy behavior of states), the presence of an Advantaged
Transnational Ethnic Alliance (ATEA) increases conflict by about 2 weighted points
(Davis and Moore, 1997, p. 179). This increase in conflictual behavior can be seen
both when conflict is the dependent variable and when net interactions is used in-
REEXAMINING ETHNIC ALLIANCES AND FOREIGN POLICY
29
Table 1
Replication Results of Advantaged Transnational Ethnic Alliances Model
Independent Variables
Net Interactions
Cooperation
Conflict
Behavior Received
0.591**
(0.020)
0.693**
(0.017)
0.509**
(0.021)
Advantaged Transnational Ethnic Alliance
-2.342*
(0.995)
0.169
(0.642)
2.652**
(0.819)
Border
0.554
(0.514)
1.064**
(0.335)
0.992*
(0.452)
Joint Democracy
1.494*
(0.714)
0.664
(0.461)
-0.652
(0.584)
Joint Alliance
0.292
(0.238)
0.316*
(0.155)
0.160
(0.196)
Wealth of Actor
0.960*
(0.475)
0.928**
(0.307)
0.103
(0.391)
Power differential
0.010**
(0.004)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.007*
(0.003)
0.622
1.156
1.220
1678
0.38
1678
0.53
1678
0.28
Constant
N
Adjusted R2
The results above are from a replication. The original data for this table can be found on page 179 of
Davis and Moore (1997). **p<0.01; *p<.05; Standard errors in ( ).
stead. A reduction in the value of net interactions implies conflict since net interactions is a measure of the value of net cooperation minus the value of net conflict. The
results, however, are not particularly strong when you consider that the values for the
dependent variables range from 0 to almost 60 for conflict and cooperation, and from
–50 to 31 for the net measure. Paradoxically, ATEA also increases cooperation (although the coefficient does not reach statistical significance). Additionally, the effect
of democracy is less pronounced than some of the international relations literature
might predict.
Table 2 shows the results of the model using Politically Active Transnational Ethnic Alliance (PATEA) as the independent variable (Davis and Moore, 1997, p. 180).
PATEA measures the level of protest activity if there is a minority in the target state
that is also a minority in the actor state. If no such minority exists, then PATEA is
equal to zero. The results in Table 2 are even weaker than those in Table 1. Additionally, both analyses contain variables that increase conflict and cooperation. For example, behavior received (reciprocity), ATEA (PATEA in Table 2), border, joint alli-
30
K. K. PETERSEN
Table 2
Replication Results of Politically Active Transnational Ethnic Alliances
Independent Variables
Net Interactions
Cooperation
Conflict
Behavior Received
0.594**
(0.020)
0.692**
(0.018)
0.507**
(0.021)
Politically Active Transnational
Ethnic Alliance
-0.006
(0.090)
0.090
(0.058)
0.151*
(0.075)
Border
0.512
(0.521)
1.158**
(0.340)
1.185*
(0.434)
Joint Democracy
1.426*
(0.716)
0.633
(0.460)
-0.639
(0.585)
Joint Alliance
0.296
(0.238)
0.311*
(0.155)
0.145
(0.196)
Wealth of Actor
1.020*
(0.477)
0.965**
(0.307)
0.106
(0.393)
Power differential
0.011*
(0.004)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.006
(0.003)
0.504
0.949
0.997
1678
0.37
1678
0.53
1678
0.28
Constant
N
Adjusted R2
The results above are from a replication. The original data for this table can be found on page 180 of
Davis and Moore (1997). **p<.01; *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
ance, and wealth of actor increase conflict and cooperation. Border even reaches
statistical significance in both cases.
Not only do most of the variables have a small impact, some of the findings are
contradictory. Given the findings of Holsti (1991) and Huth (1996) discussed above
as well as the work of Saideman (2001), I expected ethnic alliances to have a more
substantial impact on foreign policy behavior. Saideman’s work is one of the most
comprehensive analyses of the impact of ethnic ties on foreign policy behavior, and
he does in fact find that “ethnic politics influences foreign policy” (2001, pp. 198–
199).6 Additionally, the impact of democracy on foreign policy behavior appears
weaker than the substantial work on the democratic peace would predict. I believe
that measurement problems with the dependent variables and some of the control
variables contribute to the problems with the results. In the following section, I outline my critique of the methodological issues that I feel contribute to the problems
discussed above and present the results of analyses of the same models shown in
REEXAMINING ETHNIC ALLIANCES AND FOREIGN POLICY
31
Tables 1 and 2 using the corrected measures. Finally, in Section IV, I present a modified model that better captures the relationship between transnational ethnic alliances and foreign policy behavior.
III. A METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE AND SOME CORRECTIONS
Variable Measurement
In this section, I will deal with the problems of measurement and rerun the analyses for Tables 1 and 2 (Davis and Moore, 1997, pp. 179–180) with some corrections.7
First, the measure of border is supposed to be a dummy variable, but many observations take on values that are not compatible with such a measure. I took two steps to
correct this problem. First, I recoded some of the missing data that appeared to be
miscoded. Then I created a dummy variable to measure contiguity using the Correlates of War data set (Jones, et al., 1996).9 After removing the missing values and the
other problematic values in the Davis and Moore data, I checked the corrected measure against the Correlates of War measure (a measure I know to be reliable) and the
two measures of contiguity correlated at .98, indicating that I had satisfactorily corrected the Davis and Moore measure.
Second, the measure of democracy has several problems. First, it is an unnecessarily complicated measure. Davis and Moore used Polity II measures (Gurr, et al.,
1989). Polity II contains scores for each state on a scale of 1–10 for democracy and
autocracy—the higher the score, the more democratic or autocratic elements are found
in the state. Polity II also contains a measure for power concentration, which indicates the degree to which power is concentrated in the executive. Davis and Moore
generate a dyadic measure of democracy based on the following formula: [(Democracy–Autocracy) * Power Concentration]. If both states score greater than 30, then
the dyad is scored as democratic.10 In order to fix the measure and rerun the original
analysis, I reset the missing values so that they did not take on –9 as a value and
recalculated the democracy measure still using power concentration.11
Additionally, I reset all of the other missing values so that they did not take on –9
as a value, which was problematic because some of the variables—power differential for example—are used in calculations that result in incorrect values. I made no
other changes to wealth because it is probably safe to assume that those countries for
which economic data were unavailable would not meet the criteria for wealthy outlined above. It is unclear how the international alliance variable is coded, so I left it
unchanged (other than to correct the missing values). I made no changes to the independent variables measuring ethnic alliances.
Finally, Davis and Moore set the dependent variables for interaction (from
COPDAB) at zero if they were missing. This choice can be justified if one assumes
that the COPDAB data set captures the full array of interaction for each dyad. Therefore, I did not modify the dependent variable for the analysis below. However, upon
inspection the measures generated by Davis and Moore appear suspect. For example,
the United States and Canada have a net interactions measure of –12, whereas the
United States and Cuba are rated on the same measure at –4, and the United States
32
-2.342*
(0.995)
0.554
(0.514)
1.494*
(0.714)
0.292
(0.238)
0.960*
(0.475)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.622
-2.573
(1.57)
0.044
(0.812)
1.708
(1.08)
-0.046
(0.315)
0.495
(0.854)
0.017*
(0.007)
1.886
Advantaged Transnational
Ethnic Alliance
Border
Joint Democracy
Joint Alliance
Wealth of Actor
Power differential
Constant
806
0.47
3.801
0.007
(0.004)
0.401
(0.407)
-0.091
(0.150)
0.770
(0.513)
0.200
(0.385)
-0.869
(0.742)
0.676**
(0.026)
(corrected)
Cooperation
1678
0.53
1.156
0.003
(0.003)
0.928**
(0.307)
0.316*
(0.155)
0.664
(0.461)
1.064**
(0.335)
0.169
(0.642)
0.693**
(0.017)
(original)
Cooperation
806
0.32
2.691
-0.010
(0.006)
-0.048
(0.721)
-0.065
(0.267)
-1.184
(0.903)
0.232
(0.687)
2.030
(1.320)
0.561**
(0.029)
Conflict
(corrected)
1678
0.28
1.220
-0.007*
(0.003)
0.103
(0.391)
0.160
(0.196)
-0.652
(0.584)
0.992*
(0.452)
2.652**
(0.819)
0.509**
(0.021)
(original)
Conflict
The uncorrected (original) results from Table 1 above appear to the right of the results from the corrected model. **p<0.01; *p<.05; Standard errors in ( ).
1
The N is reduced in the corrected analyses due to corrections in calculations for the variables (see above). For example, when the democracy or autocracy score for a state
is set to –9, Davis and Moore’s analysis would include that as a value and calculate a democracy score for the dyad—thus leaving it in the analysis. After I made
corrections, a significant number of cases were not included because missing data was correctly indicated.
1678
0.38
0.591**
(0.020)
0.661**
(0.027)
Behavior Received
806
0.45
(original)
(corrected)
N
Adjusted R2
Net Interactions
Net Interactions
Independent
Variables
Table 3
A Corrected Model of Advantaged Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior
33
-0.006
(0.090)
0.512
(0.521)
1.426*
(0.716)
0.296
(0.238)
1.020*
(0.477)
0.011*
(0.004)
0.504
-0.109
(0.148)
-0.126
(0.832)
1.600
(1.08)
-0.033
(0.316)
0.570
(0.854)
0.017*
(0.008)
2.006
Politically Active Transnational
Ethnic Alliance
Border
Joint Democracy
Joint Alliance
Wealth of Actor
Power differential
Constant
806
0.47
3.817
0.007
(0.004)
0.429
(0.406)
-0.086
(0.150)
0.728
(0.512)
0.141
(0.393)
-0.038
(0.069)
0.679**
(0.026)
(corrected)
Cooperation
1678
0.53
0.949
0.004
(0.003)
0.965**
(0.307)
0.311*
(0.155)
0.633
(0.460)
1.158**
(0.340)
0.090
(0.058)
0.692**
(0.018)
(original)
Cooperation
806
0.32
2.438
-0.009
(0.006)
-0.087
(0.720)
-0.078
(0.267)
-1.106
(0.902)
0.442
(0.703)
0.148
(0.125)
0.558**
(0.030)
Conflict
(corrected)
0.997
-0.006
(0.003)
0.106
(0.393)
0.145
(0.196)
-0.639
(0.585)
1.185*
(0.434)
0.151*
(0.075)
0.507**
(0.021)
(original)
Conflict
1678
0.28
The uncorrected (original) results from Table 2 above appear to the right of the results from the corrected model. **p<0.01; *p<.05; Standard errors in ( ).
1678
0.37
0.594**
(0.020)
0.663**
(0.027)
Behavior Received
806
0.45
(original)
(corrected)
N
Adjusted R2
Net Interactions
Net Interactions
Independent
Variables
Table 4
A Corrected Model of Politically Active Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior
34
K. K. PETERSEN
and the Soviet Union score a –5, indicating that the United States had a less conflictual
relationship with both the Soviet Union and Cuba than with Canada. There are other
examples that draw the operationalization of the dependent variables into question.
While I did not correct these measures for the model below, I did do so for the modified model in Section IV by generating a better measure that more accurately reflects
the overall relationship between the two states in the dyad.
Corrected Models
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the corrections discussed above. Correcting the
model does affect the results in several ways. First, only the behavior received variable consistently maintains statistical significance at the .05 level or better. The coefficients for the border and wealth variables are reduced by more than half in all cases
and change signs in some. The coefficient for democracy is stronger in all cases and
close to reaching statistical significance at the .10 level in most cases. The coefficients for ethnic alliances (ATEA and PATEA) fail to improve dramatically in the
corrected models (although changing signs in some cases) and in both cases do not
come close to reaching statistical significance.
However, some of the contradictory results from the original model are improved.
For example, the ethnic alliance variables (as well as wealth) no longer increase both
cooperation and conflict. However, the coefficients for behavior received, border,
and joint alliance either increase or decrease both conflict and cooperation simultaneously. I will demonstrate below that the problems with the corrected model result
from the construction of some of the measures used—most notably foreign policy
behavior and democracy. For the modified model below I generate better measures
and obtain improved results.
IV. A MODIFIED MODEL OF TRANSNATIONAL ETHNIC ALLIANCES
AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR
When attempting to explain the relationship between ethnic ties and foreign policy
behavior, one should keep in mind that neither ethnic ties nor behavior are particularly concrete terms. Nonetheless, the proxy measures that are used are probably
sufficient to gain some insight into this important question. Many recent violent international conflicts have focused on the issues surrounding ethnicity and fragmentation of ethnic groups. Why then do the results above appear so lackluster? Even
after correcting many of the problems with the control variables, the results remain
weak. I do not, however, see this as an indication that ethnic ties are unimportant.
Davis and Moore call the impact “marginal” based on the results in Tables 1 and 2
above and based on the limited number of dyads that actually have the types of
ethnic ties studied (Davis and Moore, 1997, pp. 180–181). I disagree on both counts.
First, I will demonstrate below that the results of the analysis are much more robust
when the variables are constructed with more attention to measurement. Second,
even if the actual number of dyads with the types of ethnic ties studied is low, if they
are particularly conflict prone, then the issue is by default important.
REEXAMINING ETHNIC ALLIANCES AND FOREIGN POLICY
35
Modification of the Construction of Variables
It is my contention that the above measures of foreign policy behavior fail to
accurately represent the foreign policy behavior within a dyad. In order to correct for
the problems, I generated the following measures for each dyad:
Dyadic Cooperation: [[(sum of the weighted values of all cooperation events from
state A to state B) / (total number of events from A to B)] + [(sum of the weighted
values of all cooperation events from state B to state A) / (total number of events
from B to A)]] / 2
Dyadic Conflict: [[(sum of the weighted values of all conflict events from state A to
state B) / (total number of events from A to B)] + [(sum of the weighted values of all
conflict events from state B to state A) / (total number of events from B to A)]] / 2
Dyadic Net Interactions: (Dyadic Cooperation – Dyadic Conflict)
This improved measure accounts for the relative importance of events because cooperation and conflict are considered as a proportion of all events in the dyad. Therefore, more weight is given to the type of behavior that is most common in the dyad.
This measure is an improvement over Davis and Moore’s original measure12 because
in dyads where either conflict or cooperation is prevalent, the above measures will
reflect that. Additionally, the anomalous results generated by using Davis and Moore’s
operationalization (discussed on pages 12–13 above) are corrected with this new
measure. The analyses in Table 5 below uses all three of the above measures as
dependent variables.
In addition to improving the validity of the measure of foreign policy behavior,
the above measures are also truly dyadic measures. They internally account for the
“behavior received” variable used by Davis and Moore and thus allow for a clearer
picture of the relationship between ethnic alliances and foreign policy behavior. Therefore, the behavior received variable is no longer a separate control variable. The
dependent variables reflect the overall behavior within the dyad, which includes behavior from state A to state B and from state B to state A.
The only ethnic alliance variable I model is the dyadic dummy variable for
transnational ethnic alliance, which is scored as one if either state contains a minority that it is advantaged in the other state. My measure for democracy uses Polity II13
and is calculated as follows: (Democracy–Autocracy), if both states in the dyad score
>=5, then the dyad is democratic. I remove the power concentration component used
in Davis and Moore’s democracy measure.15 Power differential still measures the
difference between the capabilities of the states. A positive difference indicates that
the actor is more powerful; a negative difference indicates that the target is more
powerful (with regard to capabilities). Border is still a dummy variable measuring
the absence or presence of a land border in a dyad. Wealth is scored 1 if both members have at least 30 percent of the United States’s income and 0 otherwise. I do not
modify the international alliance variable. There are numerous measures of international alliances,16 and it is not clear which one Davis and Moore used. Because it is
unclear exactly how the alliance variable is constructed, and Davis and Moore do not
theoretically justify its inclusion, and it is consistently not statistically significant, I
dropped it from the modified model.17
36
K. K. PETERSEN
Table 5
Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior
Dyadic Net
Interactions
Dyadic
Cooperation
Dyadic
Conflict
Advantaged Transnational Ethnic Alliance
-6.727**
(1.617)
-3.641**
(0.897)
3.373**
(0.943)
Joint Democratic Dyad
8.424**
(1.127)
4.453**
(0.583)
-3.488**
(0.612)
Power Differential
-0.004
(0.007)
0.001
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
Joint Wealth
-2.250*
(1.001)
-1.407*
(0.492)
0.426
(0.517)
Shared Border
0.940
(0.818)
-0.218
(0.472)
-0.831
(0.496)
Constant
6.330**
(0.554)
11.075**
(0.383)
4.229**
(0.403)
N
Adjusted R2
998
0.07
998
0.07
998
0.04
** p<.001 * p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
A Discussion of the Modified Model
The modified models are configured as follows:
Dyadic Net Interactions=B0 + B1(ATEA) + B2 (Democratic Dyad) + B3 (Power
Differential) + B4 (Wealth of Dyad) + B5 (Border) + e
Dyadic Cooperation=B0 + B1(ATEA) + B2 (Democratic Dyad) + B3 (Power Differential) + B4 (Wealth of Dyad) + B5 (Border) + e
Dyadic Conflict=B0 + B1(ATEA) + B2 (Democratic Dyad) + B3 (Power Differential) + B4 (Wealth of Dyad) + B5 (Border) + e
As Table 5 shows, a dyad with an Advantaged Transnational Ethnic Alliance18
(ATEA) has on average a more conflictual relationship. The overall score of dyadic
net interactions is reduced by almost 7 points, dyadic conflict is increased, and dyadic cooperation is reduced. Clearly, there is an effect present that is measurably
stronger in the modified analysis than in Davis and Moore’s original analyses, even
in the presence of improved measures of the control variables.19
Border is not significant in any of the modified models, nor is power differential—both of which (contiguity and power) receive significant attention in the literature on militarized interstate conflict. It is plausible that contiguity has less of an
impact on foreign policy behavior than on actual militarized conflict because the
REEXAMINING ETHNIC ALLIANCES AND FOREIGN POLICY
37
Table 6
Predicted Values—ATEAs and Democracy
Dyadic Net
Interactions
Dyadic
Cooperation
Dyadic
Conflict
Base Value†
7.189
(6.44 to 7.96)
10.923
(10.53 to 11.34)
3.723
(3.30 to 4.18)
ATEA Present
0.867
(-2.08 to 4.01)
7.529
(5.86 to 9.25)
6.918
(5.09 to 8.64)
ATEA Absent
7.594
(6.80 to 8.39)
11.141
(10.72 to 11.57)
3.518
(3.09 to 3.97)
14.093
(12.10 to 16.03)
14.562
(13.58 to 15.61)
0.900
(-0.15 to 2.04)
Nondemocratic Dyad
5.650
(4.80 to 6.56)
10.112
(9.65 to 10.55)
4.352
(3.89 to 4.86)
Democratic Dyad
ATEA Present
7.771
(4.16 to 11.21)
11.167
(9.25 to 13.07)
4.095
(1.99 to 6.05)
Democratic Dyad
ATEA Absent
14.497
(12.47 to 16.50)
14.780
(13.78 to 15.83)
0.696
(-0.37 to 1.85)
Nondemocratic Dyad
ATEA Present
-0.673
(-3.67 to 2.36)
6.717
(5.04 to 8.45)
7.548
(5.73 to 9.27)
Nondemocratic Dyad
ATEA Absent
6.054
(5.20 to 6.95)
10.329
(9.84 to 10.80)
4.148
(3.67 to 4.65)
Summary Statistics
Mean (St. Dev.)
Min - Max
7.44 (12.76)
-50 – 31
3.58 (7.34)
0 - 50
11.03 (7.11)
0 - 31
Democratic Dyad
95% Confidence Interval in parentheses. †The base value is the predicted value when all variables are
at their mean.
costs associated with conducting foreign policy over greater distances does not even
come close to rivaling the cost of conducting military operations across distances.
The lack of significance of the power differential variable could also reflect the fact
that foreign policy interactions do not require the material inputs normally associated with military action; therefore, states without a great deal of power can still
engage in foreign policy interactions with states that would overshadow them militarily. Joint wealth decreases cooperation and the net interactions within a dyad, but
does not have a statistically significant impact on conflict. Joint wealth may in fact
decrease cooperation because of the increased potential for a significant amount of
the foreign policy conflict over trade issues in these types of dyads, which supports
arguments made against the liberal peace hypothesis (see Barbieri, 2002).
38
K. K. PETERSEN
The most interesting change, however, is seen with respect to the role of democracy. Both the original and the corrected models indicated that democracy has a weak
influence on foreign policy behavior. In the modified model, democracy has a much
stronger influence. In fact, the effect of democracy ameliorates the effect of an ATEA.
An ATEA reduces dyadic net interactions by about 7 points, and being a democratic
dyad increases dyadic net interactions by more than 8 points. The same relationship
holds for dyadic cooperation and dyadic conflict. Democracy has the opposite effect
of an ATEA—reducing dyadic conflict and increasing dyadic cooperation—in both
cases the effect is stronger than that of an ATEA. In order to better demonstrate the
effects of democracy and ethnic alliances, Table 6 below summarizes the results of a
Monte Carlo simulation technique that generated the predicted values for dyadic net
interactions, dyadic cooperation, and dyadic conflict for cases based on the absence
or presence of an ATEA and democracy in the dyad.20
In Table 6, I show that democratic dyads enjoy considerably better relationships
than nondemocratic dyads, regardless of the presence of ATEAs. For example, the
predicted value of dyadic net interactions for democracies is about 8 points higher
than for nondemocracies with or without an ATEA. Additionally, democracies with
an ATEA have better relations than nondemocracies without an ATEA; and democracies remain over the base levels of dyadic net interactions regardless of the presence
of ATEAs, which lends support to the democratic peace literature.
However, ATEAs do decrease dyadic cooperation and increase dyadic conflict
regardless of the regime type of the dyad. For example, a democratic dyad without
an ATEA has a predicted value for dyadic net interactions of 14.497, and a democratic dyad with an ATEA has a predicted value for dyadic net interactions of 7.771.
Additionally, nondemocratic dyads are strongly affected by the presence of an ATEA,
moving from cooperation to conflict (indicated by the negative predicted value of
dyadic net interactions for nondemocratic dyads with an ATEA). The predicted value
for the dyadic net interactions of a non-democratic dyad without an ATEA is 6.054.
That drops to -0.673 if an ATEA is present. Therefore, ethnic alliances do matter—
even to democratic dyads.
The predicted values for dyadic conflict and dyadic cooperation follow the same
pattern as that of dyadic net interactions. Democratic dyads range from about 11 to
15 on the dyadic cooperation scale and about 0.7 to 4 on the dyadic conflict scale.
Nondemocratic dyads range from about 7 to 10 on the dyadic cooperation scale and
about 4 to 8 on the dyadic conflict scale. Dyads with an ATEA range from about 7 to
12 on the dyadic cooperation scale and about 4 to 8 on the dyadic conflict scale.
Dyads without an ATEA range from about 10 to 15 on the dyadic cooperation scale
and about 0.7 to 4 on the dyadic conflict scale. Therefore, democratic dyads still
enjoy better relationships than nondemocratic dyads with or without the presence of
ethnic alliances.
The least conflictual type of dyad is one that contains two democracies and has no
ATEA. Following this type of dyad in order from least to most conflictual are: a
Democratic Dyad with an ATEA, A non-Democratic Dyad without an ATEA, and a
non-Democratic Dyad with an ATEA. Therefore, democracy helps to ameliorate the
effects of an ATEA, although ATEAs do affect the foreign policy behavior of democratic dyads as well.
REEXAMINING ETHNIC ALLIANCES AND FOREIGN POLICY
39
V. CONCLUSIONS
Tables 5 and 6 indicate that ethnic alliances may not operate at the margins. Ethnic alliances do in fact matter. The results support findings by Saideman (2001) that
suggest that ethnic ties have an important impact of foreign policy. Additionally, the
effect of ethnic ties on foreign policy behavior mirrors the effect of ethnic ties on
conflict behavior and supports previous research done by Huth (1996) and Holsti
(1991) that suggests that ethnic ties play an important role in determining whether
states are able to solve disputes before they lead to militarized conflict, which suggests that foreign policy behavior (or domestic actors/actions) may deserve more
attention from those researching militarized conflict.
Furthermore, the presence of ethnic alliances pushes nondemocratic dyads out of
the realm of cooperation (a positive predicted value for dyadic net interactions) and
into the realm of conflict (a negative predicted value for dyadic net interactions);
whereas a democratic dyad with an ATEA enjoys a better relationship than a
nondemocratic dyad without an ATEA, suggesting that the presence of ethnic alliances is more detrimental to the relations within nondemocratic dyads. Therefore,
the dyadic version of the democratic peace proposition receives considerable
support in the modified analysis of ethnic alliances and foreign policy behavior, suggesting that more needs to be done to understand why democracies are able to
resolve potential ethnic conflict (or why nondemocracies cannot do so); and suggesting that foreign policy behavior and conflict behavior should be studied as mutually
reinforcing events rather than distinct events.
Ethnic alliances are amenable to measure and do warrant further study. Davis and
Moore’s original analysis provides a starting point for considering issues of measurement related to ethnicity and conflict. If we are to understand the nature of militarized conflict and the role that ethnic ties play in exacerbating such conflicts, then
we must build upon the work of scholars whose concerns may lie outside the realm
of interstate conflict, but whose work may also contain contributions that can help us
understand the complex nature of the relationship between issues and conflict. The
above replication and modification of previous work on ethnic ties and foreign policy
behavior is a step in that direction.
Future research should expand upon the above analyses by incorporating measures of ethnic alliances in militarized conflict research—particularly with regard to
territorial issues—and incorporate the role of behaviors that precede militarized conflicts, such as foreign policy behavior. The finding that ethnic alliances and democracy impact foreign policy behavior in ways that are similar to their impact on conflict behavior suggests that most conflict literature may be ignoring an important
first step—foreign policy behavior. Foreign policy behavior may be an important
predictor of the potential for militarized conflict in a dyad. Therefore, this paper
contributes more to the existing literature than simply a methodological critique.
Although in order to examine the potential contributions of Davis and Moore’s work
to the conflict literature, I had to replicate, correct, and modify their analyses, after
doing so, I am able to draw conclusions that have potential applications beyond the
original study.
40
K. K. PETERSEN
NOTES
1. They refer to these as dyads that share a politically relevant international environment (PRIE). “A
state’s PRIE contains all other states with which it is geographically contiguous and all major powers
that are capable of interacting militarily with the focal (or actor) state” (Davis and Moore, 1997, p.
175).
2. The final year of COPDAB data availability is 1978.
3. Davis and Moore use conflict in reference to the foreign policy behavior of states, not militarized
conflict. The dependent variable is international interactions, which measures the levels of foreign
policy cooperation and conflict within a dyad.
4. See Appendix I for the scale used and the weights assigned.
5. In an e-mail correspondence with Will Moore, the variables are described differently. He describes
the dummy variable used for PATEA as “minority in country B is not a minority at risk in country A
(i.e., is a majority).” I was unable to reconstruct this variable using the instructions provided and the
original MAR data. Since I do not alter this variable, nor do I use it in the modified model, I do not
discuss this discrepancy further.
6. However, Saideman is examining foreign policy as it relates to support for ethnic groups—not foreign
policy behavior in general as in this article. Additionally, Saideman is unable to test hypotheses about
the differences in dyads to examine why “some dyadic relationships matter while other do not” because of a lack of data, a problem he anticipates correcting in the future (2001, p. 166 and Ch. 6 fn.
12).
7. In order to make the replication of the original results as extensive as possible, I rebuilt all of the
dependent variables as well as the control variable for reciprocity using COPDAB data (Azar, 1993).
I replicated the democracy measure using Polity II data (Gurr, et al., 1989). Some of the control
variables were checked against other similar measures in order to verify the accuracy of the measurements (border, democracy, power differential).
8. The variable takes on values that are not equal to 0 or 1 in some cases.
9. This measure was set to equal 1 for land contiguity and 0 otherwise. A better measure incorporates
short distances across water as well. The measure used by Davis and Moore could be improved in that
way.
10. Unfortunately, the missing values for democracy and autocracy were set to –9, so when the calculations were performed inaccurate measures were generated. For example, according to Davis and
Moore’s calculations, India is not democratic; and Colombia and Venezuela are more democratic than
the United States. In Polity II (without using Power Concentration), India is a democracy and Venezuela is less democratic than the United States while Columbia achieves the same democracy score as
the United States.
11. Although Davis and Moore exclude missing values when they actually run the analyses, the problem
with the democracy score is not corrected because they include missing values in their initial calculations. I was only able to replicate their analyses by including observations with missing values in the
calculations—despite the replication instructions to the contrary made available with the data. Therefore, if the democracy or autocracy score for a state is missing, it is coded as –9. That score is then
used in the democracy–autocracy calculation, resulting in incorrect values for this and other variables.
12. See description of the original operationalization on page 6 above.
13. I used Polity II so that my modified model would be comparable to Davis and Moore’s original model.
However, given the availability of Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000) and that the updated version
corrects problems with the prior versions rather than just extend the data set, I also ran the analyses in
Tables 5 and 6 using Polity IV data. The results were not substantially different, and the Polity II and
Polity IV measures for the sample correlate at .9424. For anyone interested, the results are available
from the author.
14. Although this is the typical polity measure for democracy in a dyad, the threshold often employed is 6
or greater. I chose 5 as the threshold because even a minimally democratic state should have some
outlet for ethnic minorities to express grievances and, therefore, enjoy a better status, making foreign
policy conflict between states with an ethnic alliance less conflictual. For a discussion of Polity II
scores, see James Lee Ray (1995), Democracy and International Conflict (particularly pages 66–67).
Also, see the note accompanying the Polity 4 update available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/
REEXAMINING ETHNIC ALLIANCES AND FOREIGN POLICY
41
polity/#data.
15. The use of the power concentration index in democracy measures comes from Maoz and Russett
(1993). However, the measure is problematic because when two countries have similar autocracy and
democracy values, the one with the higher level of power concentration will be scored as more democratic even though high levels of power concentration are typically not associated with democracies
(Thompson and Tucker, 1997, p. 447).
16. See Gibler, 2000, for an overview of the relationship between alliances and conflict.
17. Additionally, the literature on the impact of alliances on conflict behavior is far from reaching agreement (see Gibler, 2000).
18. Advantaged Transnational Ethnic Alliances are rather rare, occurring in only about 5 percent of all
cases. However, their impact is still substantial, as the results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate.
19. In order to determine whether my improved dependent variables or improved control variables had
the greater impact, I ran the analyses in Table 5 using each without the other. The results indicated that
both the improved dependent variables and the improved control variables had a significant impact on
the models independently.
20. Predicted values generated using Clarify; Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King (2001).
CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.0 Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University, June 1. http://gking.harvard.edu. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. June 1.
http://gking.harvard.edu. See also, King, et al. (2000).
REFERENCES
Azar, Edward E. (1982). Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB), 1948–1978, 2nd release,
study #7767. Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor,
MI.
Barbieri, Katherine (2002). The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Davis, David R., and William H. Moore (1997). “Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic
Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, pp.
171–184.
Gibler, Douglas M. (2000). “Alliances: Why Some Cause War and Others Cause Peace.” In
John A. Vasquez, ed., What Do We Know About War? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Gurr, Ted Robert, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore (1989). Polity II Handbook. Boulder:
University of Colorado.
Gurr, Ted Robert (1993). Minorities at Risk. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
Holsti, Kalevi J. (1991). Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–
1989, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Huth, Paul K. (1996). Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict,
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Page references are to the paperback
edition, 1998).
Jones, Daniel M., Stuart Bremmer, and J. David Singer (1996) “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns.” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 15, pp. 162–213.
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg (2000). “Making the Most of Statistical
Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation.” American Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 44, pp. 341–355.
Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce M. Russett (1993). “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, pp. 624–38.
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers (2000). Polity IV Project: Dataset Users Manual,
University of Maryland. www.bsos.umd/cidci/inscr/polity.
Moore, Will H. (2000). E-mail correspondence. November 29, 2000.
42
K. K. PETERSEN
Ray, James Lee (1995). Democracy and International Conflict. Columbia: University of South
Carolina.
Saideman, Stephen M. (2001). The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and
International Conflict, New York: Columbia University Press.
Thompson, William R., and Richard Tucker (1997). “A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, pp. 428–454.
Vasquez, John A., ed. (2000). What Do We Know About War?, Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
APPENDIX I: COPDAB INTENSITY SCALE AND WEIGHTS
COPDAB International Scale of Events21
Scale Value
Description
Weight
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
voluntary unification into one nation
major strategic alliance
military, economic, or strategic support
nonmilitary agreement (technical, industry)
cultural or scientific agreement
official verbal support of goals
minor official exchange, minor verbal support
neutral or nonsignificant acts
mild verbal expression of discord
strong verbal expression of hostility
diplomatic–economic hostile actions
political–military hostile action
small scale military acts
limited war acts
extensive war acts (full scale)
92
47
31
27
14
10
6
1
6
16
29
44
50
65
102
21. The scales and weights are condensed from Azar, 1993, pp. 26–37.
CONTRIBUTOR
Karen K. Petersen is a PhD Candidate at Vanderbilt University. Her research focuses on the causes of militarized interstate conflict.