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RÉGIE DE L'ENERGIE - DOSSIER R-3493-2002 (EN RÉVISION DE R-3401-98)
RÉVISION DE LA CAUSE TARIFAIRE 2001 DE TRANSPORT D'ÉLECTRICITÉ PAR HYDRO-QUÉBEC
CANADA
RÉGIE DE L'ÉNERGIE
Banc de révision
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC
DISTRICT DE MONTRÉAL
DOSSIER R-3493-2002
EN RÉVISION DU DOSSIER R-3401-98
RÉVISION DE LA CAUSE TARIFAIRE 2001
DE TRANSPORT D'ÉLECTRICITÉ
PAR HYDRO-QUÉBEC
(Art. 31, 48, 49, 50, 51 L.R.É.)
HYDRO-QUÉBEC
Demanderesse
-etS.T.O.P. (ci-après "LE GROUPE STOP")
-etSTRATÉGIES ÉNERGÉTIQUES (S.É.)
Intervenants
PIÈCE SÉ-GS-3
Document 1
LE PROJET D'ORDONNANCE RM01-12 DE LA FERC
Extraits
Le 13 septembre 2002
PIÈCE SÉ-GS-3 - DOCUMENT 1
LE PROJET D'ORDONNANCE RM01-12 DE LA FERC
(Extraits)
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Le 31 juillet 2002, la FERC a émis, dans son dossier RM01-12, un projet d'ordonnance proposant un
modèle standard de marché de l'électricité, destiné à remplacer en 2003 l'Ordonnance 888 de 1996 et
d'autres ordonnances connexes. Les extraits qui suivent proviennent de ce projet d'ordonnance.
On constate que le projet d'ordonnance de la FERC s'écarte de façon fondamentale des principes qui
guident l'Ordonnance 888 aux Etats-Unis et, au Québec, la décision D-2002-95 de la Régie de l'énergie.
1.
L'EXCLUSION DE TOUTE PRIORITÉ OU PRÉFÉRENCE À LA CHARGE LOCALE
42. In Standard Market Design, we propose to eliminate the preference for future native load growth. 1
582. The Commission recognizes that it has accepted many changes to the pro forma tariffs of individual
transmission providers that deviate from the pro forma tariff contained in Order No. 888. To the extent these
changes involve bundled retail load or give preference to either native load customers or the transmission
provider's use of its system, we propose to direct the transmission provider to eliminate them. We have revised
the Order No. 888 pro forma tariff to place bundled retail load under the open access transmission tariff, and to
eliminate undue preferences for native load customers and the transmission owner's use of its own system. 2 3
1
FERC, Docket no. RM01-12-000, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access
Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, July 31, 2002, Section III, B, 1 (a), p. 29, parag. 42.
2
Cité dans le texte: The public utility would make the revisions to its currently effective Open Access Transmission Tariff. The
changes to the Order No. 888 tariff are intended to identify the changes that must be made.
3
FERC, Docket no. RM01-12-000, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access
Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, July 31, 2002, Section V, p. 308, parag. 582.
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2.
LA FUSION DES SERVICES EN RÉSEAU INTÉGRÉ ET DE POINT À POINT
C. The New Transmission Service
136. […] we will require Independent Transmission Providers to provide a nondiscriminatory, standard
transmission service to all customers. This new service, Network Access Service, combines features of both
the existing open access transmission services – Network Integration Transmission Service and Point-to-Point
Transmission Service. The Network Access Service is grounded in the flexibility of network integration
transmission service, but adds a measure of reassignability similar to that available under firm Point-to-Point
Transmission Service. Thus, Network Access Service will give all customers the opportunity to have tradable
Congestion Revenue Rights 4 that will expand their transmission options and enhance competition in wholesale
electric markets. It also will result in all transmission services being performed under a single set of rules. 5
3.
LA TARIFICATION AU COÛT MARGINAL LOCAL (LMP)
E. The New Congestion Management System
203. Under Network Access Service, all transmission customers may request transmission service. The
Independent Transmission Provider must honor all valid transmission requests where there is sufficient
capability, i.e., when there is no transmission congestion. However, when there is transmission congestion we
propose to require that all Independent Transmission Providers allocate scarce transmission capability using a
price system. Specifically, we propose to require that all Independent Transmission Providers manage
congestion using a system of LMP and Congestion Revenue Rights. Under LMP, the price to transmit energy
between any receipt point and delivery point reflects the marginal cos t (including the marginal opportunity cost)
of such transmission service, and the price of energy at each location reflects the marginal cost (as reflected in
participants' bids) of producing energy and delivering it to that location. 6
Under LMP, all suppliers selling at a location receive the market clearing price, including those who offer in their
bids to sell for less. Similarly, all buyers purchasing at the location pay the market clearing price, including
those who offer in their bids to purchase at a higher price. 7
4
Cité dans le texte: Congestion Revenue Rights entitle the holder to receive specified congestion revenues in the day -ahead
market. To the extent that a customer's real-time schedule coincides with its day -ahead schedule and its Congestion
Revenue Rights, these rights offer complete protection against uncertain congestion charges.
5
FERC, Docket no. RM01-12-000, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access
Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, July 31, 2002, Section IV, C, pp. 77-78, parag. 136.
6
FERC, Docket no. RM01-12-000, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access
Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, July 31, 2002, Section IV, E, p. 203, parag. 112.
7
FERC, Docket no. RM01-12-000, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access
Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, July 31, 2002, Section IV, E, 1, p. 204, parag. 114, note 118.
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4.
L'ÉLIMINATION DU SERVICE DE TRANSPORT FERME ET SON REMPLACEMENT
PAR L'ACHAT DE DROITS DE CONGESTION AU PRIX DU MARCHÉ
2. Access to Transmission Service
143. Under the existing pro forma tariff, "firm" transmission service implies certainty both with respect to
delivery and price. Once a customer taking firm service under the existing pro forma tariff agrees to pay the
transmission rate and schedules service, it has full assurance that it will be able to transmit power between its
chosen receipt and delivery points without service interruption (absent force majeure or curtailment) and without
being subject to any additional costs (e.g., redispatch). However, there are times when a transmission provider
cannot offer a guarantee of service availability (absent the long-term solution of a customer agreeing to pay for
system expansion). At these times, under the existing pro forma tariff, only non-firm transmission service
(which can be interrupted for economic reasons) 8 is available at the stated maximum rate. Thus, the existing
pro forma transmission service begins with the basic premise of price certainty, but includes a measure of
uncertainty regarding service availability that is resolved only if firm service can be secured. In sum, the
customer is generally assured of the rate it will pay for transmission service, but, unless it has secured firm
transmission service between the specified points, is not necessarily assured that it will receive transmission
service.
144. With Network Access Service, all customers who want physically feasible service will be able to receive
service; however, uncertainty can arise as to the rate paid to receive the service. In addition to the access
charge (which recovers the embedded costs of the transmission system), the customer would be subject to the
cost of congestion between its chosen receipt and delivery points. To achieve certainty with respect to price
and avoid congestion costs, the customer would have to acquire the Congestion Revenue Rights associated
with its specific receipt point-delivery point combination(s). 9 Thus, Network Access Service, coupled with
Congestion Revenue Rights for the desired points, provides the customer with certainty with respect to delivery
and price, comparable to the existing pro forma tariff's firm service.
145. Accordingly, customers desiring service comparable to (but actually more dependable than) existing firm
transmission service would need to acquire Congestion Revenue Rights for their receipt and delivery points and
schedule service between those points in the day-ahead market. 10
8
Cité dans le texte: All services, including firm service, can be curtailed for reliability reasons.
9
Cité dans le texte: Congestion Revenue Rights provide the rights holder with the revenues associated with congestion
between the associated points; thus, any congestion costs it pays are fully offset by these revenues. To the extent the
Congestion Revenue Rights holder opts not to schedule transmission service at those points, it would still receive the
congestion revenues.
10
FERC, Docket no. RM01-12-000, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access
Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, July 31, 2002, Section IV, C, 2, pp. 81-83, parag 143-145.
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6. Designating Resources and Loads
152. The existing pro forma tariff allows a Network Integration Transmission Service customer to designate
resources that the customer owns or has committed to purchase pursuant to an executed, non-interruptible
contract. The transmission provider must then plan and operate its system to be able to provide firm
transmission service from these resources to the customer's load. Under the proposed Standard Market
Design, the reservation of capacity for service is no longer required, since a transmission customer pays the
congestion cost for transmission service. Thus, there is no longer a need for a Network Access Service
customer to designate network resources to get transmission service. While the integration of resources and
loads (including behind-the-meter generation) that occurs under Network Integration Transmission Service will
continue, a Network Access Service customer will now request receipt and delivery points through the dayahead scheduling process and real-time transactions.
153. Thus, we believe that the requirement to designate network resources to receive transmission service may
no longer be needed. Further, we note that under the existing pro forma tariff the designation of network
resources was used in addressing long-term resource adequacy concerns and in the planning process
undertaken to ensure that the resources could be integrated. Because we are now proposing a resource
adequacy requirement and a regional planning process to meet these requirements, the requirement to
designate network resources may no longer be needed. (See Section IV.J). We request comment on whether
designating network resources and loads is necessary for Network Access Service, particularly with respect to
performing the integration of resources and loads. 11 Similarly, with respect to the information required to
complete an application for service (Section 2 of the SMD Tariff), is it necessary for the Independent
Transmission Provider to request information beyond the identity of and contact information for the customer,
service term and commencement date, and receipt and delivery points for the requested service? Does the
Independent Transmission Provider need to collect for each service request (but not for each transaction) the
location and characteristics of the generation serving the load, detailed descriptions of the load and the
customer's transmission system and owned generation? 12 13
5.
L'HORIZON DE PLANIFICATION VARIABLE DU RÉSEAU DE TRANSPORT RÉGIONAL
4. Planning Horizon
520. […] The planning horizon for each region is the number of years ahead for which the Independent
Transmission Provider must forecast annually its area's load, as well as the number of years ahead for which
load-serving entities must show that they have adequate resources. For example, the Independent
Transmission Provider could forecast its area's peak load three years from the present and require that each
load-serving entity in its area have acceptable plans today to have enough resources three years from now to
meet the forecast peak with a reserve margin of 12 percent. In this example, the planning horizon is three years
and the reserve level is the minimum 12 percent.
11
Cité dans le texte: The relevant sections of the SMD Tariff are Sections B.3 and B.4. While we believe that they may no
longer be necessary, they remain in the tariff for ease of reference during the proposed rulemaking process. In the Final
Rule, the Commission will determine if these or similar provisions need to be included in the SMD Tariff.
12
Cité dans le texte: See Sections B.2.2.1(iv) and (v), and Sections B.2.2.2(iii) through (vi) of the SMD Tariff.
13
FERC, Docket no. RM01-12-000, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access
Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, July 31, 2002, Section IV, C, 6, pp. 87-88, parag. 152-153.
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521. The choice of the planning horizon affects the lead time for construction and the duration of forward
contracts that can satisfy a resource adequacy requirement. 14 The traditional state-required electric company
planning horizon was 10 to 20 years. The horizons were established when the industry relied on new large
hydroelectric, coal, or nuclear facilities to meet growing load, and these facilities could take 10 or more years to
site and construct. Today, most new resources are planned and developed over a much shorter time frame, in
part because of the reliance on low cost natural gas. However, this planning horizon could change again if
natural gas were no longer the main fuel of choice.
522. Because the planning horizon should be no less than the time frame for developing new resources and
development times vary from region to region, the planning horizon can depend on that region's reliance on
coal, gas, wind, hydropower or new demand-response technology for new supply. This argues for allowing
each region to determine its own appropriate planning horizon.
523. We propose to make the planning horizon a matter for regional choice. Regions should consider several
factors in selecting the planning horizon. Most important, the planning horizon chosen should not be so short
that it fails to motivate and achieve construction of generation and demand response resources in time to avert
a shortage. Greater fuel diversity may be achieved with a longer planning horizon. If the horizon is short, two
years for example, load-serving entities may have an incentive to select resources that can be developed in two
years or less, such as peaking units and some other gas -fired generators. A longer planning horizon allows
time for development of other resources such as coal -fired generation, hydroelectric resources, and some
advanced demand response programs. Load-serving entities in retail choice states would benefit from a
shorter planning horizon because it would reduce their business risk associated with demand forecast error.
Also, they may not want to enter into bilateral contracts for supplies for a time period that is longer than the
duration of their contracts with their customers.
524. We propose to have the Regional State Advisory Committee determine the planning horizon for the region.
The Independent Transmission Provider (including each Independent Transmission Provider in a region with
more than one Independent Transmission Provider) must provide information and support to the Committee, as
requested, to help it to determine the region's planning horizon. We request comment on how to resolve any
lack of consensus within the Committee regarding the appropriate planning horizon. We also ask for comment
on whether the Commission should establish limits on the region's choice of planning horizon, such as at least
three years and no more than five years. 15
14
Cité dans le texte: For example, forward-contracting for supply with one-year contracts that begin today and end after one
year would not satisfy an adequacy requirement with a three-year planning horizon. A one-year contract for the third year
forward would satisfy the goal for that year.
15
FERC, Docket no. RM01-12-000, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access
Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, July 31, 2002, Section IV, J, 4, pp. 276-278, parag. 520-524.
Souligné par nous.
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