Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah The water & sanitation scenario in Indian Metropolitan Cities: Resources and management in Delhi, Calcutta, Chennai, Mumbai Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Glossary AVAS BCM BMC BOT CBO CCW Chennai CGWA CGWB CMC CMDA CMWDA CMWSSB CSE DDA DWB GoI HUDCO IDFC INTACH LIC Lpcd MGD MIDS MOUAE Mumbai NGO NIUA NRW NSDF NTU OECF PHED PSP RGI RPI SEWA SPARC STP WAMP WTP YUVA : Association for Voluntary Action and Services : Billion Cubic Metre : Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation : Built-operate-transfer : Community-based Organisation : Citizens for Clean Waterways : Official name of (formerly) Madras : Central Ground Water Authority : Central Ground Water Board : Calcutta Municipal Corporation : Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority : Calcutta Metropolitan Water Development Agency : Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewage Board : Centre for Science and Environment : Delhi Development Authority : Delhi Water Board : Government of India : Housing and Urban Development Corporation : Infrastructure Development and Finance Corporation : Indian National Trust for Arts and Cultural Heritage : Life Insurance Corporation of India : litres per capita per day : Million Gallons per day : Madras Institute of Development Studies : Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment : Official name of Bombay : Non-governmental Organisation : National Institute of Urban Affairs : Non Revenue Water : National Slum Dwellers Federation : Nephelometric Turbidity Units : Overseas Economic Development Fund : Public Health Engineering Department : Private Sector Participation : Registrar General of India : Retail Price Index : Self Employed Women’s Association : Society for the Promotion of Area Centre : Sewage Treatment Plant : Water Management Programme : Wastewater Treatment Plant : Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah The water & sanitation scenario in Indian Metropolitan Cities: Resources and management in Delhi, Calcutta, Chennai, Mumbai Introduction Like other infrastructure in India, the urban water supply and sanitation sector (UWSS) is at a crossroads. Faced with an increased demand and growing pollution problems, Indian cities are not able to provide services that are adequate, neither quantitavely nor qualitatively. Indeed, new investments are required as well as a change in management of the sector, to be able to ensure supply for all as far as water is concerned, and to fill the gap as far as sewerage and sanitation is concerned. This paper aims at a focused review of the sector for urban India on some aspects that seemed relevant for analysis, and further relies on four case studies (Calcutta, Chennai, Delhi and Mumbai). Each case study illustrates the demonstrations carried out in the paper and are later detailed in a separate section at the end of the first part. Though the paper reviews the urban water and sanitation scenario in metropolitan cities, it chooses to leave aside some questions such as the use of performance indicators of the water boards/corporations to assess supply efficiency or questions regarding demand analysis. On the contrary, it focuses on the institutional and organisational structure of the service providers by looking at the level of technical and managerial decentralisation reached in the four cities (section 1), on the question of property rights and the debate on usage conflicts in order to fill the gap for the future demand (section 2). The third section revisits the question of reforms that were launched in the 1990s for all infrastructure sectors and demonstrate that in the UWSS, the term of reform does not reflect a reality where only marginal changes are introduced. The fourth and fifth sections concentrate on two directions the sector could look at for changes: the development of conservation based strategy and the need for a more participative approach by involving the civil society. This would mean a paradigm shift for the sector. Indeed, demand side solutions are rarely considered and the problem of water supply is mostly addressed by the supply angle. I. Water supply and sanitation in Urban India 1. Water supply and sanitation in urban India: status of the sector and analysis of the various organisational structures 1.1. Water supply and sanitation in urban India: a profile Rapid growth of urban population has been the characteristic of Indian urbanisation. The rate of urbanisation in India has remained comparatively higher than its South Asian counterpart. Service delivery of water supply has not been able to match the needs of the increasing urban population. In none of the South Asian countries, water is provided for the whole urban population. According to Pernia and Stella (1997), Bangladesh is the closest to provide water to all in urban areas while other countries have overall provided services to at least 85% of the population. What appears clearly, though, is the fact that the sanitation sector lags behind with no country providing services to even 80% of the total population. These information do not reflect the ground reality, with quality of water supplied being poor in most of the countries. However, a majority of urban population seems to have evolved their own mechanism to gain access to water, not necessarily potable. These differences are, however, not so considerable taking into account the difficulty to measure access, especially in the Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah sanitation and sewerage sector. Indeed, if we take the Indian example, even though 300 urban centres have a sewerage system, only 70 of them have treatment facilities and 28% of the urban households are connected to the public sewerage system (NCAER, 1996). As far as sanitation is concerned, according to the Census of India 64% of the households have access to toilet facilities (COI, 1993). Aggregated data are usually provided by government agencies and it is difficult for international organisations to criticise them. These data, therefore, end up being compiled in international development reports. However, it is nowadays acknowledged that reliability of data in the UWSS sector is weak and that there is a lack of common definition to assess the sector progress as well as absence of time line analysis (UNCHS, 2001). Whatsoever, all available figures point to the fact that access to all of adequate facilities, especially sanitation and sewerage system is far from being achieved. Table 1. Urban Population with Access to Potable Water and Sanitation in South Asia: 1990-95 (in Percentage) Countries Population Having Access to ‘Potable’ Water Sanitation Bangladesh 99 75 Bhutan - - India 85 70 90 (a) 50 (a) Nepal 90 70 Pakistan 96 62 Sri Lanka 87 67 Source: Pernia and Stella, 1997:7-8 (a) Source : GOI (1999) The Indian urban population has increased more than 10 times, since the turn of the century and more than five times, since Independence in 1947. The decadal growth rate of urban population remained fairly steady at 40 per cent (Annexure. 1). The reasons for urban growth rate have been largely attributed to natural increase in urban population, rural-urban migration and reclassification or declassification of urban zone (Annexure.2). Of the various reasons ascribed, the natural increase has been dominant since 1961, followed by rural-urban migration and reclassification. The recent fall in rural-urban migration might have been in response to higher income in rural areas, increasing unemployment and poor quality of urban services. The increasing urbanisation has led to deterioration in the physical environment and quality of life in urban areas, widening the gap between demand and supply of essential services and infrastructure. With about one-third of the total Indian population living in urban centres contributing about 60 per cent of the country’s national income adequate provisioning of water supply and sanitation remains a formidable challenge. Institutional Responsibilities of Water Supply and Sanitation Institutional responsibilities for water supply and sanitation are highly fragmented, which complicates access. Besides the public health engineering agencies of the State governments, state-level parastatal Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah agencies, city level water supply and sewerage boards and local governments, a number of unregulated private companies (formally or informally) are involved in the sector. Furthermore, these arrangements differ across states. Institutional responsibility for water has been divided between the State and the Centre as per the Seventh Schedule in the Constitution of India. The Centre is equipped with River Boards Act - 1956 and Inter-state Water Dispute Act - 1956. These Acts have merely been supportive in promoting large-scale multi-purpose projects and in strengthening State control of water resources, rather facilitating integrated water management through river basin approach. With the exception of these, all matters relating to water supplies, sanitation, irrigation, canal drainage, storage and power (subject to Article 56 of the constitutions) rests with the State. The State is expected to fulfill water supply and sanitation services through (i) their own departments, (ii) State level boards and corporations, (iii) statutory and non-statutory bodies at the city level, and (iv) urban local bodies. In most states, the concerned state departments, such as Public Health Engineering Department (PHED), the Public Works Department (PWD), the Urban Development Department and the Department of Local Selfgovernment, through their divisional and district offices carry out the capital works. In a few states, like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, the responsibilities are vested with the respective Water Supply and Sewerage Boards. These Boards take up projects on behalf of the state government (which plans) and sometimes (like in Karnataka) involves in wholesale of water to municipal bodies (Mathur, 1998). The distribution of water, maintenance of the capital assets and collection of water charges and taxes lies with the respective local self-government. Some of the major metros (Delhi, Chennai, Hyderabad and Bangalore) have separate boards to handle augmentation of water supply, operation and maintenance of the distribution system and collection of water and sewerage taxes. As far as Calcutta is concerned, there is a separate authority for development of new schemes only. In cities where Boards do not exist, the responsibility for maintaining the capital assets, and collecting water taxes and charges lies with the urban local bodies or urban municipalities. These agencies are expected to implement the decisions taken at the state or at the centre, and remain at the mercy of the political decision-making. This has an adverse effect on the municipal services, as they do not have adequate funds to mobilise revenue and have to depend extensively on the state. The compartmentalised and hierarchical administrative set-up, unclear divisions of responsibilities dealing with common issues coupled with political patronage, heavy subsidisation of water; slack enforcement of pollution control and regulation laws has been the feature of urban governance in India. In other words, India shows a fractured institutional set-up. Since the end of the 1980s, there have been a number of policy announcements to address the growing water crisis. The National Water Policy-1987 and the draft policy-2001 are notable among them1. The significance of these policies lie in its recognition for an integrated approach towards managing water crisis and also over the importance of other stakeholders in the process. Further, it calls respective states to set-up river basin organisation. However, it is worth underlining some significant changes made in the NWP – 2001. The actual question according to that will be to see how far this policy translates or not into action. First, the notion of management of water resources is an integral part of the new water policy compared to the previous one that focused mostly on planning and development. Second, it mentions the need to take into account environmental concerns, socio-economic aspects as well as rehabilitation issues in the development of new water resources. It also makes a reference to the need for a participative approach, which is an addition to the 1987 policy. It has also added two paragraphs on private sector participation and performance improvement, which highlights, despite few reforms in the urban sector (see other sections) an evolution in the perception of how the sector should be evolving. 1 The National Water Policies are the major texts providing inspiration for State Water Policies, central policy guidelines. The aim of this paper is not to detail all the policies/guidelines issued in the last 10 years and we shall here only concentrate on the National Water Policies. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah The policy, both the former and the latter, recognises an integrated approach, but does not specify how one prioritises needs to selectively complement diverse users across different levels of the basin and sectors for integration of activities to emerge. In addition, the policy is still on the lines favouring large scale projects, in spite of the fact the Policy recognises the past failures. What makes these policy statements practically naïve is its inability to provide precise direction for legislative and institutional measures to solve growing water crisis, especially the availability of potable drinking water for an integrated approach. The 73rd and 74th Amendment of the Indian Constitution are also important landmarks for the sector as they attempt a beginning as far as strengthening the process of democratic decentralisation and local institutions like municipalities is concerned. The outstanding feature of these amendments lies in its recognition of municipalities as fully representative institutions vital for planning economic development and poverty alleviation, the need for greater flexibility in fiscal management and the need for greater involvement of people and private sector in urban water provision (Mathur, 1999:38). However, this small beginning needs to be matched by corresponding changes of their instrumentalities in terms of its structuring, accountability and exit policy (Datta, 1999:106). The decade of the 1990s has stressed the importance of the private sector participation in developing countries due to scarce availability of water resources, increasing competitive demands, inefficient management of urban distribution systems and investment constraints in these countries. Though long term contracts, such as concessions or BOTs are being emphasised by multilateral agencies, in India., the latter (especially the World Bank), however, tend to think that long term contracts are not feasible. They would prefer a phased approach beginning with service or management contracts. However, as we shall see later in the paper, this form of private sector participation is not yet gearing up. On the contrary, put in perspective with the public supply, and more precisely with the gaps of service provision, small scale providers have come in. So, better than privatisation, the terms of “entry of private players” is more correct. For instance, private companies are widely involved in supplying water through tankers, supplying bottled water, providing piped water supply, roof-top rainwater harvesting and recycling waste water in urban region, like in Chennai, Rajkot, Kolkata and Mumbai. What is of concern is that these sectors are largely unregulated and remain informal in nature. Additionally, these market-based institutions become disadvantageous in providing services to the disadvantaged sections of society, and in safeguarding the environment. Recent emergence of bottled water across the country is a case in point. The buyers for these products are mostly that of urban middle and upper class (UNDP-World Bank, 1999). Moreover, these private sectors exploit ground water sources creating environmental hazards and therefore negative externalities within the city limit and in the suburbs. Despite these concerns, the entry of these private players, if regulated (see other sections), could bring in some improvement to the status of the sector. Financial Status for Water Supply and Sanitation The financial responsibility for maintaining capital assets and collecting water charges rests with the local urban bodies (or by the Water Boards when they exist), in many cases they are financially weak. Urban local bodies receive revenue from internal and external sources (TARU, 1998). The former includes the statutory levies such as tax sources (e.g. water tax, drainage tax) and non-tax sources, which are known as user charges or utility charges (e.g. water charges, drainage charges, meter rent, fines, penalties, etc.). The external sources include loans and grants from the state government and also from overseas agencies. The revenue under internal and external sources are classified as current and capital. The current revenue includes water tax, sewerage tax, sewerage and water charges, and grants and subsidies received from government. The capital revenue consists of work based deposits by consumers, connection charges collected from consumers, loans and capital grants from state/central government. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah There has been a significant increase in planned allocation in the country's Five-Year Plans over the years. From a modest plan investment of Rs. 430 million in the First-Five-Year-Plan (1951-56) the allocation has increased to Rs. 59,823 million in the Eighth-Five-Year-Plan (1992-97) (Table. 2). More striking has been the rise over the successive plan periods in the plan outlays for rural water supply, especially after the Fifth Five-Year Plans. While the plan proportion for urban water supply have been maintained at about 1.2-1.3 per cent, notwithstanding the fact that the urban population has risen from 62.4 million in 1951 to 306.9 million in 2001 (with decrease notable after 1990s). It is proposed that by the end of the Ninth Five Year plan the entire urban population will be provided with safe drinking water with a planned expenditure of Rs. 263 billion (Rs. 26,301 crores), with states' contributing 56 per cent and the Centre and the Municipalities/beneficiaries contributing 34 and 10 per cent respectively (GoI, 1999:73). Table 2. Plan Outlays on Water Supply and Sanitation in India (current prices) Plan Period Plan Outlays ( Rs in millions) RWSS Percentage Public Sector outlay UWSS Percentage Total of Public Amount sector outlay 1951-56 (1st Plan) 60 0.18 430 1.28 490 1956-61 (2nd Plan) 280 0.42 440 0.65 720 163.3 0.19 893.7 1.04 1057 Three Annual Plans NA (1966-69) N.A. NA N.A. 1064.2 1969-74 (4th Plan) 1550 0.98 2820 1.77 4370 1974-79 (5th Plan) 4812.4 1.22 5494.4 1.40 10306.8 Annual 2322.9 1.85 1979.3 1.58 4302.2 22803.2 2.34 17666.8 1.81 40470 1985-90 (7 Plan) 35556.7 1.98 29657.5 1.65 65224.7 2 Annual (1990-92) 27059.2 1.97 17213.7 1.26 44272.9 1992-97 (8th Plan) 107287.9 2.47 59822.8 1.38 1671110.3 N.A N.A 117000 N.A N.A rd 1961-66 (3 Plan) 1980-85 (6th Plan) th th 1997-2001(9 Plan) Source: GoI, 1999:67 & for the Ninth Plan (World Bank, 1999). Though the financial assistance for Urban Water Supply and Sanitation has increased over the years, the urban institutions have not been able to recover the cost for maintaining the capital assets. The per capita revenue and expenditure (1993-94) for selected cities indicates huge deficits in many of the cities, excepting Vishakhapatnam city, which has larger composition of industrial consumers being charged at a relatively higher rate (Fig. 1). The cumulative effect of centralised management and inadequate powers has led to serious of bottlenecks in the development of urban water supply and sanitation sector. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah In addition to the planned allocation, external assistance of USD 2,300 million was provided by international funding agencies for urban sector. The World Bank and the Overseas Economic Development Fund (OEDF) of Japan alone provided over 70 per cent of this total assistance (TARU, 1999:24). Further, over 53 per cent (USD 1,223) of the total urban sector assistance were given to urban water supply and sanitation (If aggregated for all infrastructure funding –not only water-, external sources represent 7% of total expenditures, according to NIUA, 1997). Private sector participation can play an effective role in making a financially viable water supply, but this requires prominent role of the state. Many a times private sectors involvement has been far from optimal. The contribution of institutional finance [like, Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) and others], to invest in the water supply and sanitation sector has been low. Many of these institutions have begun to rely on the market-based approach for the service delivery. HUDCO, one of the largest financial institutions for urban sector has sanctioned about 36 and 7 per cent of its cumulative loans for urban infrastructure towards water supply sector and sewerage and drainage for a total amount of Rs. 8085 crores. Other expenditures towards sanitation are taken into account like basic sanitation schemes (www.hudco.org). Recent entry of Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) is expected to further enhance the resource flow in the urban sector. In the previous six to seven years, other sources of funds were sought by cities and urban authorities through the issuing of bonds. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was the first one, with a State guarantee, to issue municipal bonds to finance a project to extend water supply and sewerage facilities. In 1998, the municipal bonds were issued and were a success both with public and private investors. The large source of revenues from octroi explains the credibility of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. Other cities have followed in the steps of the AMC (among them Bangalore, Nasik). However, the development of municipal bonds has not been up to expectations generated and an assessment of the quality of development project planned through these bond issues should be carried out The potential of private sector participation to increase water supply and sewerage coverage as well as improving effciency is considered by many as one of the options to improve the situation for Indian cities. Many projects failed (see section 3.2 for detailed analysis) or face delays that limit the ability to assess the role large private operators could play. However, the case of the Tirupur Municipality is interesting and deserves to be analysed here. Tirupur is a large business centre in Tamil Nadu. It is the first cotton knitwear producer in India and account for 20% of India’s garment exports. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Tirupur Exporter Association (TEA) approached the State Government as the water supply was highly inadequate with a supply limited to one to two hours and most users relying on water tankers and groundwater. The Tamil Nadu Corporation for Industrial Infrastructure Development (TACID), which was set up in 1993 to provide infrastructure to industrial areas agreed on the plan but did not have sufficient financial means to support the Tirupur Area Development Project and then asked ILFS (Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services) to prepare a feasibility report on the possibility of going ahead with the project on a commercial format. At this stage, the Tirupur municipality was not yet involved. Once the feasibility report got submitted, the question of raising the funds for the project arose and led in 1995 to the creation of the New Tirupur Area Development Corporation Limited (NTADCL) with equity from the government of Tamil Nadu, ILFS and of the private operator selected through a tendering process to execute the works. As early as December 1994, tender invitation was launched to invite operators for the project that include increasing treated piped supply, a sewerage system for the municipality and on site sanitation facilities for slum areas. The Tirupur private sector participation has been discussed for many years. In 1999, apparently the contract with the private operator had been finalised and financial closure of the project was imminent (Zérah and Llorente, 1999). However, the foundation stone of the project was laid on June 20, 2002 (Janakaranjan, 2002) and the project should be completed within six years. The detailed description of the process and transaction highlights the delays that face most projects involving Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah private sector participation. In most cases, projects are called off. In the case of Tirupur, it would be, indeed, interesting, to analyse further the cost of delays and the cost of the transaction itself that must have increased overtime as well as whether the project will finally fit the requirements. There are other questions pertaining to the Tirupur project. The main one concerns pollution issues and waste water. The Tirupur industries’pollution impact is important and the project will indeed in some way aggravate the situation with larger amount of water but inadequate waste water treatment facilities (Janakaranjan, 2002). This issue is an important one and appears to be a strong problem in large concessions in Jakarta (Indonesia) and Manila (Philippines) where sewerage system expansion is not as rapid as the water supply one. On the other hand, one has to follow in the Tirupur example the impact on poorer households as the price will rise as well as the way the project is regulated. The regulation structure put in place, where some of the proponents of the project are also part of the regulation structure leaves doubt as far as regarding the possibility to monitor effectively the performance of the private operator. These questions would need to be carefully looked at in other projects involving private sector participation. Private companies, largely multinationals, who promise huge investment are reluctant to invest and risk their own capital. This coupled with weak regulation, existence of corruption and inadequate information for regulators and consumers has been some of the constraints in private sector involvement as a formal institution. The State should evolve regulatory mechanisms to utilise the private sector to attract investment. In fact, the crucial role of the state is to be vigilant and ensure equity and sustainability. This requires an institutional approach to the growing water scarcity in urban sector, where the institutions devolve powers to local institutions and co-ordinate among different sectors. Status of Water Supply and Sanitation The proportion of population having access to safe drinking water has increased considerably over the period of time, as a result of conscious policy efforts to improve the availability of water supply and sanitation. The improvement has been significant with 90% of the urban population provided with water supply in 1997 from 75 percent in 1981 (GoI, 1999). In terms of sanitation only about 50 percent coverage is reported. However, the coverage has not been uniform across the states (Table. 3). Table. 3 Access to Water Supply in Urban Areas (Status as on 1997) Population provided with Water Supply (in % age) States High: More than 85 per cent Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal Medium: Between 75 and 85 per cent. Bihar, Goa, Manipur, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Tripura Low: Less than 75 per cent Assam, Kerala, Mizoram, Orissa, Sikkim Source: GoI. 1999:136. In terms of per capita availability in class I cities (urban centres having more than 1,00,000 population) (Table 4) as per the latest figures, water shortage was reported to be more acute in eastern Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah coastal states, while the larger states were able to meet the 125 litres per capita per day (lpcd) requirement fairly. Table. 4 Water Availability in Class I Cities (1988) Per Capita water availability States High: Over 160 lpcd Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi, Chandigarh, Pondicherry. Medium: Between 120160 lpcd Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, West Bengal Low: Less than 120 lpcd Haryana, Karnataka, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura Source: Compiled from TARU (1999:7) and MIDS (1995:7) An assessment of the water supply status in Class I cities indicate about 37 per cent of them receiving less than 100 litres of per capita water supply, followed by 31 per cent between 100-145 lpcd and, rest 32 per cent more than 145 lpcd. The water shortage appears to be more acute in the Class I cities of Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu, where the water availability in 56 to 68 per cent of these cities receives less than 100 lpcd of water. In contrast, the water availability in 84 of Class I cities in Orissa receives more than 200 lpcd. The situation is much more grim in case of the increasing Class II towns (population size ranging between 50,000 to 1 lakh) with 80 per cent of the towns receiving less than 140 lpcd. A detailed analysis of the state-wise break-up indicates that 21 to 30 per cent of the Class II towns in the states of Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Gujarat receive less than 40 lpcd of water. In terms of per capita availability across the metros, the availability varies from 76 lpcd in Chennai to 307 lpcd in Kanpur. The average population coverage is said on an average to be 93 per cent with a per capita supply of 190 litres per capita per day, which almost compares to consumption levels in developed countries (Table.5).However, this seems to be on a higher side and hide discrepancies. Table 5. Status of Public Water Supply in Metropolitan Cities (1988) Name of the Metropolitan city. Population (in million) Per capita Water Supply (lpcd) Population coverage (in percentage) Mumbai 10.33 207.8 99 Delhi 7.46 258.0 96 Calcutta 4.53 226.7 95 Chennai 3.88 75.8 85 Bangalore 3.82 113.9 100 Hyderabad 2.70 241.6 100 Ahmedabad 2.61 200.1 90 Kanpur 1.77 307.0 75 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Nagpur 1.54 206.5 75 Pune 1.52 169.8 78 Jaipur 1.35 155.5 80 Lucknow 1.05 262.3 100 Total in Metros 42.63 189.4 93 Source: Central Pollution Control Board, 1990. An independent survey (MIDS, 1995 and ADB, 1997) across the major metros (Mumbai, Delhi, Calcutta and Chennai) indicates the coverage being less than 70 lpcd and the water availability ranging from 3 hours per day in Chennai to 10 hours in Calcutta during 1991 (Table. 6). Interestingly, coverage seems to have increased in Delhi and Chennai to about 90 per cent, while tariff structure has not shown any significant improvement in the decade. Further wide variations have been noted within metros (see Box.1) with diverse economic and habitation conditions. In addition, the study throws more light on the efficiency of water supply: unaccounted water; unit production cost, operating ratio and per capita cost of operation and management. It especially reflects the respective physical conditions in which the different cities are: Calcutta having easily accessible water through the Hooghly River, while Chennai is in a scarcity scenario that reflects on production costs and daily water availability. However, as far as operational efficiency is concerned, Mumbai, Delhi and Chennai are operating with an efficiency which remains in the same range, if one looks at unaccounted water or maintenance, while Calcutta is far less efficient. Trends can as well be examined, with a sharp worsening in the receivables for Mumbai. However, since the focus of the paper is not on these aspects, we will not detail this study further. Table.6 Service and Efficiency Indicators for the Major Metropolitan Cities Mumbai Calcutta Delhi Chennai Service Indicators 1991 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 1991 1997 Service Coverage (in %) N.A. 100 64 66 69 86 48 97 5 10 10 7 3.5 3 4 2.7 1.5 0.5 1.4 1.6 N.A. 11.4 24 18 36 50 30 26 N.A. 20 Unit Production Cost (Rs./ 1.1 Cubic metre) 2.4 1 1.2 0.6 1.7 2.9 8.5 Operating Ratio 0.6 1.08 1.11 5.25 0.81 1.48 1.57 0.94 Receivable 2.5 19.7 2 1.5 NA 4.5 9.5 5.8 33.3 16.2 17.1 8.9 21.4 38.7 25.9 1358 84.30 25 98.80 355 85.9 675 Water Availability hours per day) (in 5 Average Tariff (Rs. Per 2.1 cubic metre) Efficiency Indicators Unaccounted Water (%) Accounts (months) Staff per 1000 Connection 61 Average O&M cost per 90.25 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah person (in Rs.) Source: MIDS (1995:4) Source: ADB (1997) Box. 1 Unequal Distribution of Water in NCT- Delhi An independent survey reveals that areas like Jorbagh, Chanakyapuri, and so on receive about 300 mld, while the slum dwellers who comprise 40 per cent of the cities population, receive only 75 mld (CSE, 1998). According to Delhi Jal Board (DJB), the consumers in urban zones who are on the planned water supply network consume about 96 per cent of the water produced, while their rural counterpart consumes four per cent (Sanjeev, 1997). It is estimated that about 30 per cent of the slum population have legal access to about 7.5 per cent of Delhi’s water. In an arbitrary classification on the nature of water supply, the city is classified into five zones (Susheela, et.al., 1996). Zone 1- Availability of treated water in the tap for 24 hours of the day; Zone 2 - Rationed water is available for a total of six hours per day; Zone 3 - As water supply is inadequate, tube well water is mixed with the Municipal supply and supply for few hours; Zone 4 - Areas totally depending on the tube well water, that is not tested, in addition with hand pumps; and, Zone 5 - There is no organised water supply. The access to sanitation facilities for urban households has remained just about 48 per cent (GoI, 1999:136). Coverage of all urban population to sanitation facility is far from being achieved. In Punjab and West Bengal more than 70 per cent of the urban households have access to sanitation facilities, in comparison to Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and Tamil Nadu where less than 60 per cent of the households have access to sanitation facilities (TARU, 1999). 1.2. General Overview on institutional and organisational structures Let us present the various institutional reforms at stake in the Indian Metros. Briefly, let us specify that ‘technical centralisation’ will refer to the type of technical model: centralised through a piped system, and ‘technical decentralisation’, to local groundwater, or local surface water based schemes. Technical centralisation ultimately refers to the internal technical model adopted by the organism in charge. Conversely, as far as internal management is considered, the word delegation will be preferred, including for internal delegation of an activity to a private contractor. In management, decentralisation will then refer to the share of administrative responsibilities between the State and the Municipality. The general picture: different kinds of administrations and administrative contexts Among cities, and independently from the physical situation, the nature of the concerned administration in charge of water can vary from a mono-technical (centralised) agency with principally a mono-output oriented objective (water supply), strongly embedded in the State/Municipal sphere, to a rather autonomous agency, evenly focusing on different issues and aiming at a managerial delegation, and making attempts for decentralised techniques. In other words, and using the four cities studied in this paper as examples on a scale, this ranges from a Calcutta-like situation, surprisingly Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah both politically centralised and unclear in terms of administrative responsibility, to a Chennai-like solution, where institutional and organisational innovations are worth being exemplified. Calcutta As far as water supply is concerned, the CMC can be analysed as a technical agency, relying and internally structured on a technically centralised piped system. It is oriented on political outputs in water distribution, and not in water resource management, in commercial or cost management, and in solid waste disposal and sanitation management. It can be argued that this absence of focus over these issues comes from the political oriented and piped-based nature of this administration. Indeed, issues on pollution or on indirect costs of inefficient management, or on indirect savings through support of the informal sector are mostly non visible, especially in a structure that favours technical reporting in place of cost-based information. In spite of over costs generated through this policy, the situation remains sustainable for the CMC provided the financial confusion that intertwines it to CMDA and CMWSA. In other words, political arbitrage has till now perpetuated the system, under a scope of fictitious and incomplete political decentralisation from the State to the Municipality. Clear decision-making and financial links – in other words property rights – should be established and implemented between those State agencies and the water activity of the CMC. Given the present situation, where the agencies showing the highest status of governance belong to the state, the recommendation should be to transfer the operation of the distribution to CMWSA. Under the scope of the 73rd and 74th amendments of the Constitution, this is however difficult. The solution is then to emulate the example of what happens elsewhere in the power sector: separating the operation and the supply (commercial aspects), the latter being transferred to CMWSA. Even in the present tariff situation, savings on water would be realised, thus savings on the CMWSA, and ultimately CMDA budgets. These savings could be dedicated to sanitation. Similarly, decentralised schemes (community-based ponds or ground sources under regulation for water harvesting for instance) should be supported. Chennai Chennai can well exemplify the levels managerial decentralisation can reach within the Indian administrative frame. No doubt that, relying on tax property collection and government support (or government-routed support) for its schemes, the CMWSSB is still mostly structured around procedures (technical and administrative) and not yet around services. As a matter of fact, providing full sanitation, inspite of a tax collected for the purpose, is not looked up as a compulsion. Similarly, dwelling upon the water scarcity situation, the Board has de facto given up on satisfying and supplying a part of the population, or rather a segment of the consumption. But, whatever the pragmatic reasons of impossibility to face the demand through a centralised technical system, the Board has had the courage to promote some more decentralised resources. Internally, this did mean that the Headquarters have promoted over their technical and engineering officers such a less centralised model. But the Board has also gone beyond that, by promoting an internal delegation of power as well as a better service interface as far as complaints monitoring is concerned. What should be remembered is that, whatever the contextual situation in terms of resource and perhaps human resource at the top of the board, and in spite of the fact that the outsourcing has been mostly decided on a human resource policy basis, the institutional aspects matter. It can be argued that, compared to the Corporation form, the Board form, with a more clear-cut budget and allocation from resources to expenditures, allow a better isolation and identification of the tasks, rights and duties of the organisation. Likewise, the integration of the supply activity and the planning and maintenance, brings some clarity in the establishment and management of control rights over the assets. And, last but not the least, a sound definition of enforceable and reasonably sustainable (at least in the short run) tariffs, ends up bringing Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah this soundness in decision-making. This better definition and delineation of the very perimeter of the institution thus allows focusing on the margins of this perimeter, considering what are the most suitable policies in terms of outsourcing. It shall be noted that, in the distribution aspects, the outsourcing concerns the operation side, and not the supply activity (included commercial and so on). Thus, the proper integration between control rights and financial rights remains, for a better incentive in decision-making. In other words, compared to Calcutta, clear and joint allocation of control and cash flow rights contribute to define sound property rights. Within that framework, marginal optimising solutions are envisaged, but keeping this very integration intact. Mumbai Mumbai is an interesting in-between case as far as institutional arrangements are concerned. Compared to Calcutta, the institutional responsibility over the different aspects of the water planning, building, and management are much more concentrated, allowing a higher clarity and incentives in the management. But, for such, the allocation of financial resource to expenditures is still mediated through the political inter-sectoral arbitration of the corporation. Thus, both the incentives and margins of action that are available in the Chennai case cannot be reached. This lack of financial intra-sectoral routing certainly contributes to an extent to the difficulties in clarifying links and relationships between independent private partners and a department that is embedded into a multi-sectoral organisation submitted to political arbitrage over these multiple sectors. Delhi Delhi is also an interesting in between case. Like in Chennai, water and sewerage services are supplied through a Board that can call for private sector and that is supposed to be financially autonomous. Likewise as in the case of Chennai this reform has not led the Board to shift away from political interference in the appointment of members of the Board as well as in decisions regarding the tariff structure. However, contrary to the Chennai case, the Board still functions as a very centralised technical agency and not much improvement in the commercial management of the distribution system has happened. There has been some involvement of the private sector, indeed once again ( like in the case of Chennai), mostly because of lack of internal funds to support some development projects. To conclude, as far as water supply is concerned, based on pragmatic experiences, the solution to promote is certainly one of an autonomous Board-like structure keeping both the cash-flow and control rights over the planning, building and supplying of the water. In other words, keeping a clear allocation of funds for the management of the activity, and then orienting the internal organisation towards an integrated approach of this activity. To be sustainable, this assumes a proper tariff structure. From this ‘ideal’ allocation of control, joint strategies of outsourcing of the operation cum local entrepreneurs’ capacity building can be thought of. Similarly, local strategies of integrated management of the resource can be better achieved, since the Board would at the same time be the promoter or facilitator and the direct benefitor of this. The example of Chennai is worth being advertised, despite the fact that such measures occurred in a context of lowering the human resource and of mere inability to ensure the full demand. But the second learning is that, from this ‘ideal solution’, a pragmatic approach should also integrate the present situation. If it is possible to imagine that a Board could be constituted – even with some financial transfers to balance the loss for the corporation – from the hydraulic department in Mumbai, this does not seem relevant to do so in Calcutta. Indeed, in the latter case, the State-led organisations perform better. Then, a concentration of control and cash flow rights has still to be reached, but this is hard imagining that it can be at the city level in a first step. Indeed, in the case of Calcutta, the tariff issue is striking as the next subsection shows. Beyond organisational efficiency, the financial support of the State Government is still needed in Calcutta. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Tariff regime and its impact on the various users Even though, the four cities have various tariff regimes and structure, they share common features, among them: large cross-subsidies among type of users that are not economically sound, substantial connection fees that have an averse impact on low-income communities and the dependence on political decisions. In Calcutta, there are no water charges (neither volumetric charges as connections are unmetered and neither charges related to an estimated consumption). Revenues for the sector come from a share of the property tax. This is common practice in India and it is also the case in Mumbai and Chennai. A question linked with property tax is often the low rate of collection (50% in Calcutta) and the non reassessment on a regular basis of the property value. Therefore, in Calcutta, even more than in the other two cities, the charges for water are, at least for domestic consumers, far from recovering the costs. In Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai, volumetric tariff structure is applied. In all the cases, there are large cross-subsidies among the various types of users. Industrial establishments pay five and 10 times more in Mumbai and Chennai respectively than domestic consumers. This is explained by the need to recover costs of production but bears the risk to face an exit policy by these large users. Especially, when groundwater sources are available, the increase of water charges for industrial users is not a solution to increase revenues. The experience of Bangalore where large industries have exited the system underlines the risk of such a strong cross-subsidisation. In Chennai as well as in Delhi, the tariff structure is built as an increasing block tariff. This is, once again, a common feature of tariff structures in India. Such structure, as it has been demonstrated in many studies have an averse effect on users with a low consumption. It mostly disadvantages poor households, especially where metered connections are shared and joint usage pushes costs up in to the top end of the price range. Indeed, the inbuilt “lifeline” tariff, designed to serve the poor, defeats its purpose when the majority of the poor do not have individual connections. Another common factor in the three cities concerns the policy towards connection fees and as such reflects a general tendency in all Indian cities. Connection fees are expensive: Rs. 650 for a house drainage connection in Calcutta, Rs. 3000 to 5000 for a water connection in Mumbai and Rs. 2000 for water and Rs. 3500 for sewerage in Chennai. In addition, even though Chennai has simplified the procedures, it is usually very complicated to get a new connection. In Mumbai, one requires a non objection certificate (NOC), a building certificate and then a drainage clearance. Substantial connection fees are mostly demanded in order to compensate for low tariff and insufficient revenues. It is clearly the policy promoted by domestic financing institutions such as HUDCO. However, with regards to the low-income communities, such a policy raises apprehensions. In most cases, poor households can afford to pay monthly charges. But, on the contrary, they are unable to disburse large sums, even in instalments. At the same time, the complexity of the procedures acts as a strong disincentive. To sum up, the tariff regime in the four cities embody the typical range of tariff structure in Indian cities (and to a large extent in other developing countries) (Boland, 2000). Despite their differences, in the three cases, the tariff structure does not reflect the cost to produce water (neither average cost, neither marginal cost) and is submitted to political decisions for its revision. Most of the time, a change in tariff means a marginal increase in order to reflect the increase of the electricity cost.. In not a single instance, it is linked to a strong political decision to revise the tariff regime or to link water charges to cost of production (refer to Moench & Janakarajan, 2002). The usual procedure is a proposal for tariff increase proposed by the Water boards/departments and that need to be approved by the elected councillors. It might take years for tariff increase to be approved due to populism and strong vote banks. In that context, no policy can be sustainable on the long run, and the subsidies to the poor are (i) not credible, and even (ii) adverse to the poor. Indeed, since the subsidies suppose the connection, they Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah result not only in not benefiting the poor directly, but also in precluding them to be connected to the system. Any sound structural reform should hence target the relatively well-off sections of the users first. Target not in the usual sense of deriving cross-subsidies from them, but in developing a sustainable cost-integrated approach, namely an approach based on recovering the costs, but also on lowering them through re-use of water. This would be all the more feasible in Chennai, given the scarcity of water and the institutional arrangements already existing, and could serve as an example for the other Metros. Then the issue of supplying the poor is less stringent (in the present situation, they anyway consume a lesser part of the water), and can be solved through direct subsidies on actual tariffs. Respective strategies for outsourcing and collaboration with the private Let us detail here some organisational and institutional innovations that have been put in force in Chennai. These are outsourcing of operation, internal delegation of powers, and the articulating with a private water market (Moench & Janakarajan, 2002). Since these have already been dealt within the Chennai section of the report, we will here rather analyse which specificity they bring into the classical administrative organisation of the sector, and what are their limits in the proposed framework of combining the control and cash flow rights under a sound tariff policy. The decision to go for internal delegation of power can only be applauded and supported, and studies at present engaged should focus on the optimal level for such a delegation. The Chennai Metro Water Board policy to involve the private sector in the water management (water treatment plant and sewerage boosting stations) has undoubtedly contributed to generate a capacity-building for local Indian entrepreneurs, as well as to financial savings. By retaining the control of the supply through the piped system, it has managed to retain its control over the activity. Such actions should then be promoted, but they have however not contributed to create a general impetus, neither for an integrated, nor a local management of the resource. These actions should be complemented with more efforts in examining the pros and cons and feasibility of a balance between the technically integrated (piped) system, and some more local sources. Namely, segregation of uses through (i) local recycling (since the consuming surveys show that the demand for the water of the board in Chennai is usage-specific), (ii) maintenance of existing ground water resources that are the only way presently to fulfil the demand (irrespective of the location of the Indian city), (iii) even envisage some more traditional water cycles like the usage of water ponds (still in use in peripheral Calcutta for instance). On the latter issue, some further studies are worth on analysing what could be the proper share of usage of groundwater in the centers of cities, and a pond system at their peripheries. This falls in the more general need to consider more the demand-side solutions, and not only the supply-side. Supplying water through lorries is another measure. Despite the laudative perception of this measure by the water sector (WSP, 1999), some elements of temperance should be provided. It is definitely more expensive than a piped system and, compared to it, can be reasonably thought of only in a scenario of clearly differentiated uses of water (lorries ensuring the drinkable water part, and the piped water then necessitating less treatment), and not like in the present situation on a mere geographic and quantitative vision. Again, it shall be recalled that this system has not been seriously economically assessed in comparison to local recycling or to maintaining local resources. These limits are notwithstanding the traffic, the road accidents and pollution impact in the cities. In fact, the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board has requested the Water Board to check the speed limits imposed on the tankers as well as reducing pollution levels. In April 2002, therefore, the Water Board has issued tenders for lower and more eco-friendly lorries (The Hindu, 21/7/2002). In other words, as a systemic measure, it still has to be properly and unarguably assessed. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah 2. Growing Competing Demands in Urban India 2.1. Meeting the needs: future water demand India's urban population that comprise about 306.9 million (30% of the total population) is projected to increase to 659 million by the year 2015, an addition of about 300 million. Several projections have been made to predict future water requirement for this growing population. Two prominent projections are notable, the United Nations Urbanisation Projections (UN) and the more reliable projections from the Technical Group on Populations Projections of the Registrar General of India (RGI). The United Nations’urbanisation projections indicate a slow growth between 1990 and 2000. However, a rapid acceleration follows thereafter. On the other hand, the Technical Group on Populations Projections (RGI) indicates a slower pace, due to declining average annual fertility rate in urban areas (Table.7). Table. 7 Percentage of India's Urban Population Mode Note: Urban Population as Percentage to Total Population 1991 2000 2010 2015 2025 2050 UN 25.72 28.6 33.8 41.3 45.2 61.4 RGI 25.72 28.46 31.66 33.3 37 48 a. 1991 Census figure as reported in the Eighth Five Year Plan. b. Extrapolated from 1996-2016. c. Extrapolated figures only. Using declining trend in quinquennial rate of growth. Source: GoI, 1999:17 The UN has computed a medium variant projection taking into consideration increasing rural opportunities, high cost of living and deteriorating conditions of municipal services (Table. 8). The relative share of Population in different class of cities indicate rapid growth of class I and Class IV-VI cities by 2050 (Table. 9). Table. 8 Medium Variant Projection of Urban Population Medium Variant UN Variant Year 2000 Medium 292 Source: GoI, 1999:18 Year 2010 Year 2025 Year 2050 402 630 1007 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Table. 9 Estimated Urban Population Projection Urban Areas Population size Year Population in millions 2000 2010 2025 2050 Class I >100,000 195 268 378 503 Class II & III 20,000 – 100,000 68 94 157.5 252 Class IVVI <20,000 29 40 94.5 252 292 402 630 1007 Total Source: Peoples Science Institute, Dehradun, (undated: 7) The demand for water vary depending on the characteristics of the community, the commercial and industrial activities, and a host of other factors, such as climate, technology, costs, conservation needs, etc. This further complicates in evolving water supply norms for the urban cities. The norms vary for urban regions from 100 to 200 lpcd. A conservative estimate as per the Indian Standard Code (IS: 1172: 1983) the per capita water supply to be at 135 lpcd (Table. 10). Based on these standards, the demand by 2050 is expected to be 50 billion cubic metre (BCM) of fresh water. Table. 10 Break-up of Minimum Domestic Water Supply Standard. Use/ Activity Amount (in lpcd) Percentage Drinking 5 4 Cooking 5 4 Bathing 55 41 Cleaning Dishes 10 7 Cleaning House 10 7 Washing Clothes 20 15 Flushing Toilets 30 22 Total 135 100 Source: Sanjeev, 1997:15 Table.11 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Estimated Urban Water Demand Year 2000 2010 2025 2050 Water Demand (billion cubic metres) 14.38 19.81 31 49.6 Source: Saravanan, 1999a:7 Investment requirement for water supply and sanitation highly varies due to inadequate information available on the service coverage levels. Though different estimates are available they are not comparable with one another due to different specifications and standards of services. Further these estimates do not capture the likely increases in real costs of providing water and waste water services. The Working Group on Water Management for domestic, industrial and other uses places an estimate of Rs.263 billion during the Ninth Plan period towards 100 per cent population coverage with safe drinking water. Mehta & Patak estimate a resource gap between annual resource flows (Rs 25 billion) and annual requirements (Rs. 40 billion) to be about Rs. 14 billion a year. These resource gaps are expected to increase if the present pricing policies and municipal taxes continue to prevail (Mehta & Patak, 1996:378). Other estimates place the investment requirement between Rs.34 billion (NIUA, 1997) to Rs.109 billion (MOUAE, 1996) (cited in World Bank, 1999:12) and Rs. 2,000 billion by National Commission Urbanisation (NCU, 1988). These diverse estimates only indicate the investment requirements are far in excess than those allocated through estimated resource flows (Table. 12). Table. 12 Estimates of Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Investment requirements and Resource Flows, Ninth Plan period (Rs. billion in 1996-97 prices) NIUA Ninth Plan Working Group MOUAE (1996) Investment Requirements: Water Supply 89.2 283.9 Sewerage 81.0 259.9 Total 170.2 543.8 Average annual Requirements 34.0 108.7 Estimated Resource Flows: Plan Funds 117.0 Institutional 33.0 Total 150.0 Average annual resource flows 30.0 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Both for investment (where 20 billion Rs are yearly missing) and annual operation (where 4 billion Rs are yearly missing), these estimates show the threat in maintaining the existing levels of services and ensuring that the facilities remain serviceable for their design period. These gaps are unlikely to be met through regular budgetary allocations of the State and the national governments. Filling these gaps require innovative project finance structuring that blend infusion of funds from multilateral and bilateral agencies and by encouraging private sector participation. 2.2. Balancing Competing Uses and Users of Water With the increasing future demand, allocation of water resources is a major question. It concerns both the allocation between irrigation, domestic and industrial needs as well as allocation between various users within a city limit. This section will look at these 2 questions and advocates that allocation of water resources should be based on a better assessment of the economic value of water for the various uses and local decentralised technical and institutional solutions taking into account the different uses of water from various sources should be enhanced within a city limit. The main consumer of water is by far irrigation (around 70%). By 1999-2000, around 95 million hectares were irrigated and production of food grains had reached 208 million tonnes. However, forecasts indicate that foodgrains’ production will have to reach 400 million tonnes by 2025 and irrigation development has to be pursued to reach this objective. With the cities’ development and extension, both the ecological footprint of cities as well as the rural/urban competition for water has become a stark reality. Chennai, which starves for water, especially in summer, exemplifies this competition and we shall focus on this case. Since 2001, the Water Board entered a tripartite agreement with the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and farmers, who supply around 20 million litres per day to the Board. Farmers are paid Rs. 26 per hour and are required to run their borewells for 18 hours a day. This arrangement was possible without large investment due to the already existing conveyance system, as the farmers are located near by existing large borewells used by the Water Board. The electricity expenditures are directly paid by the Water Board to the Electricity Board. The money paid to the farmers is considered by the then Chairman of the Water Board as a “compensation for not raising crops”. But in fact, it is a reliable and easy source of income for the farmers who also sell water to some private water tankers. We can clearly observe a transfer of water from a rural zone to the city. It brings to light that, at least for the farmers concerned (located at the city limits), the economic value of water for irrigation/agricultural purposes is lower than its value as a “saleable product”. This raises the question of the tariffing level for this water (comparison between different uses), but also the social issue of economic redistribution between the equiped farmers and the poorest. An adjusted tariff structure, combined with some redistributive mechanisms should help resolving conflicting use between different uses (rural-urban) and different social segments of the local rural population. This allocation conflict, exhibited in Chennai but also valid for other Indian metros, demonstrates that there is a need to actually measure the actual resource allocation (and its evolution) and to assess the economic value of water for its various uses. This economic approach will have to, however, integrate environmental considerations regarding the depletion and the quality of groundwater and should be aware of political arbitrage in resource allocation that could be linked to the economic and social policies of each State (promotion of industrial development and urbanisation or policies aiming at maintaining a large share of agricultural production). This assessment could therefore lead in a second phase in a reflection on the adequate tools for ensuring this allocation between uses. Allocation of resources will imply the development of allocation mechanisms, through negotiations of quotas for instance or through a clearer definition of property rights (see section below) or the implementation of policy incentives through pricing of water and electricity. The question of the impact of electricity2 subsidies on the actual resource allocation needs to be further studied as they 2 And of water, but somehow to a less extent, as most of the water cost in rural areas is a pumping cost. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah have a double distortion effect: they favour the extensive use of water resources in rural areas; they favour the creation of a market for sale of water from rich farmers to poorer ones. Coordination mechanisms between actors will also have to be implemented either through river basin organisations or through other institutional arrangements. The participation of urban local bodies and municipal corporations should be part of these institutions. At the same time, an increase in the productivity of irrigation could release some amount of water to the cities. The NWP, 2002, considers this an important issue as an added paragraph (para 9.5) to the NWP, 1987, addresses this issue : “Irrigation being the largest consumer of fresh water, the aim should be to get optimal productivity per unit of water. Scientific water management, farm practices and sprinkler and drip system irrigation should be adopted wherever feasible.” However, increasing water resources for cities should not divert them from the main requirement, which is an improvement of management of their water resources (surface and groundwater both in quantitative and qualitative terms) as well as of managing their distribution systems. With regards to the situation within cities, most surveys clearly indicate that households use various sources of water for various purpose. In Chennai, a survey conducted by Economic Perspectives covering 4,500 users show that 85% of the domestic consumers have their own source (borewell or open well; other authors, like Janakarajan, have conducted independent surveys and find a figure of 65%). Only 2% of the households using Metrowater use it for all purposes. Seven percent of the domestic users consume mineral water and 26% use the water tankers of the Board. As far as nondomestic users are concerned, 82% have the metro-water connection, but 75% rely on their own source (mostly borewell). People on public taps/tankers are segregated as such : 56% taps or pumps, 44% on tanks. 44% of the total category use the metrowater for all usages, and 56% use it for drinking and cooking only. 63% of these people feel the supply is insufficient. The usage of the water supplied by the board, is then a differentiated usage. The same can be said of Delhi, where reliance on groundwater approximates 19% of connected households (Zérah, 2000). In slums, reliance on various sources of water for various uses is even more prominent: 82% of the households surveyed were using two sources, 24% are using three sources and only 4.5% are using four sources (Llorente and Zérah, 1999). Due to the limitations of infrastructure facilities, that translate into a long distance to the source and low consumption levels (around 30 lpcd). Variations in service levels are explained partly by the distribution policy of the Water Boards, the geographical conditions and by the political patronage involved in supplying service (especially in low income localities). To cope with the future demand in cities, various lessons need to be drawn from the understanding of the demand pattern. First of all, in areas not yet served in the periphery and in slums, decentralised solutions could be considered as a service option and cost benefit analysis of the options need to be carried out (such as the rainwater harvesting projects currently under development in Dwarka in Delhi). Even more than for water, recycling of waste water and / or primary ecological treatment (as in Calcutta) could ensure recycling and reuse at the local level. Beyond local technical solutions (that also includes simple potabilisation techniques and improvement of actual in-situ sanitation installations), corporations/water boards will have to develop internal competence to work in lowincome communities to ensure quality of water delivered, improvement of service levels and preservation of ground water resources. Water supply as well can partly be thought of being divided into two usages: potable water and remaining. Remaining need not being at potable standards. Since the Indian piped systems, no longer provide a guaranteed norm for potable standards, the centralised system could take charge of the second function. In this case, a cost assessment would be required and comparisons could be drawn from international experiences. A dual system can also be envisaged in the new developing areas at the periphery of the actual piped system. It is likely that the marginal cost of extending the network is higher than in-situ development of local water sources. Analysing further the example previously given on ponds and groundwater sources (this kind of water source can then be accessible through Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah both community based groundwater and/or pond water) or tankers when the former is not available is required Secondly, one can assume that part of the future demand will be ensured by other providers (water tankers and bottled water companies will be among them but the emergence of locally based network operators could emerge in the future). Devising an adequate regulation on quality and environmental control is a first step. But one can imagine further steps towards allocation of service zones with targets in terms of service delivery to these operators that will enable them to provide services in areas not served by the Corporation. This would however need strengthening at the municipal level in contract designing and supervision and would have consequences on the definition of property rights. 2.3. Economic Nature of Rights Over Urban Water This section aims at elaborating more from the point of view of the economic nature of property rights to be granted in the management of water and sanitation. As we have analysed them, urban water supply and sanitation management have been a failure as a public good. Indeed, access to these services has become not only rival in use, due to scarcity, but also de facto socially adverse and excludable. This comes from the huge costs for coping strategies and the social discrimination in the provision of service, shortages and so on, already pointed out in other sections. In this context, we argue that provision of these services can be rendered its social equity and economic efficiency by being considered as urban commons in Indian Metros. Let us articulate (i) the characterising of the property rights and the Common Property Resources (CPRs) relationships at stake, (ii) the governance of the sector, and (iii) the need for setting up coordinated de jure rights on the resource through both channels of local and global actors. Let us for this focus on Calcutta and Chennai as case studies. A resource is in common property whenever it is accessible to all (directly or indirectly) and when its consumption by one substracts to the potential consumption of others (in the reverse case, it is a public good, not a common resource). Ground water extraction and also to a certain extent sanitation and waste disposal are de facto done as a common property resource. Indeed, though not in majority, water supply is still importantly based on common use of ground water (in Delhi, Calcutta, Chennai, though no longer in Mumbai). The operation of borewells is appropriated, but they may be locally the main source for communities. Communities taken as a whole set exploit the ground water under a common resource frame. However, this important part of the supply is often officially negated by planners who want to eradicate this practice, rather than regulating it, especially through safety measures. Similarly, sanitation/waste disposal is taken care of through common practices, with the involvement of NGOs, either directly, or through structuring support for the unorganised sector. In that latter case, waste is considered as a valuable resource by ragpickers communities and a whole parallel economic system develops on the recycling activity. In addition, the two aspects are linked, since anarchic waste disposal in cities themselves lead to ground water pollution, and, in the present institutional arrangements, through the issue of waste, ground water cleanliness is a substractive good. There is a scope for jointly bettering the two aspects (water and waste disposal) through regulatory support. However, the study of water supply and sanitation in Calcutta and Chennai shows the full attempt at administrative appropriation of the sector by the agencies of the State cum Municipalities. More specifically, the nature of the concerned administration can vary. One extreme is a Calcutta-style mono-technical (centralised) agency with principally a mono-output oriented objective (water supply), strongly embedded in the State/Municipal sphere. The other pole is a rather autonomous agency, evenly focusing on different issues and aiming at a managerial delegation like in Chennai (where institutional and organisational innovations are worth being exemplified). But whatever the arrangements between these two levels of administration, an important network of informal activities and local entrepreneurs and individuals is de facto acting, thus enjoying local appropriation of the resource management, i.e. property rights in the economic sense over these CPRs. The mismatch between jurisdictions and reality is patent. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Given the dynamic situation, the governance reform can be based on specific trade-offs between some amount of reform of the public sphere (delegation of power within administrations, actual decentralisation from State) and contracting out. From the two case studies, let us examine the institutional specifics for such a trade-off. The Madras example shows both a relatively better Governance and a technical-cum-managerial solidity of the system that allows capacity building through delegation and contracting out (though the politicisation of such deals is not negligible). Unfortunately, in the Calcutta situation, the need of the time is to make clearer the definition in relationships and rights between the two levels of administrations (on administrative and financial aspects). In that aspect the State-level one seems to be the highest standard in governance terms. Beyond, in a dynamic context of globalisation, this contracting out can happen not only with global firms, but also through the private local entrepreneurs, and through capacity building and the strengthening of the informal sector. The role of the state, it is argued, is to build competence and reduce the power asymmetry in globalisation, including the valorisation and empowerment of informal activities. But in this role it shall not enjoy a monopoly, and both local and global NGOs may be involved through a global/local capacity building. As far as the formal sector is concerned, due to huge infrastructure expenses and low tariffs, it presently shows a net revenue which is largely negative. On the other hand, as far as the informal sector is concerned, investment costs are nil for the public sector, and very marginal as far as social investment is concerned. It also provides a high benefit through cheaper services. Then the social revenue generated from the informal sector is positive. It is difficult to assess any comparison between the formal revenue deficit and the informal social benefit, but it can be imagined that, under some conditions of support for the informal sector, they reach a comparable level. The present contribution of the informal sector shall therefore not be neglected. Let us then examine the possibilities to better the service and the total revenue (financial plus social) of a given structure, respectively from action on the formal and the informal sectors. Since structure is considered as given, there are no strategies of cost reducing that are available. Let us then examine the impact of further public expenses. Since, in the Calcutta situation, the links between planning, development, and operation are so intricate and cleared by administrative decisions in place of use of property rights, there is no straight evidence or direct implication that any increase in the expenses will result in an increase in revenues. Financial revenues will as well be constant, since tariffs are by hypothesis not altered, nor even necessarily in terms of social benefit. Indeed, if not properly maintained or operated in the right areas by the CMC, or not adequately supplied by the CMWSA, a network expenditure made by the CMDA can very well lead to no tangible result, or, say, to a second order result. Similarly in Chennai, the private sector has appropriated the water supply, and the resource itself being severely constrained at the peak season, any expensive measure is not deemed to bring much of water in the piped system. Similarly, for waste disposal, investment can lead to elimination of the problem of cleanliness in town, but at a higher cost than the present informal sector, and by suppressing the social benefit of recycling. One counter argument put in favour of privatisation is the higher cleanliness and thus higher hygiene, leading to less mosquito-borne or water-borne diseases. This is true, but also accessible through some NGO-type projects, as Disha (1996) shows. On first approximation, one can reasonably consider that any infrastructure expenditure of formal sector is a net expenditure in terms of revenue generation. On the other hand, it has been seen that the informal sector is already contributing to the revenue (at least in waste disposal and recycling) and that it needs structuring and support. Without entering into details, this is rather a kind of legal support and limited amount of organisational support, all in all hardly costing anything. These measures equate to creating property rights for the informal sector. This would materialise into production of service worth being equated and valued at alternative services costs. Thus, the net marginal revenue from expenditure in the informal sector is positive. One can consider that there is a multiplicative effect in investing in the informal sector. It should be supported. Besides, if well structured, the informal sector can very well develop and take charge of bigger zones or bigger share in the municipal activity, thus saving operating costs in the short run and public expenditures in the long run. This is what we can call the “coordinated” scenario. In terms of property Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah rights creation, this coordinated system equates to associate the public sector and provides one of the most credible ways to promote public property rights through regulated private property rights. Let us now look what happens if a transfer to global service companies over one zone is thought of. This is what ultimately happened for solid waste in Chennai. Given the economic distortion of costs and the current tariff structure, this can only happen through public subsidies as of now. The global Service Company will change the organisation, so we are no longer at a given organisational structure, but the development of the activity implies that it corresponds to an investment. This investment has to be done quite quickly , and returns are slower. The initial formal revenue remains negative, and becomes even more negative. Besides, under circumstances of non-support and non-coordination with the informal sector, the latter disappear, under combination of legal procedures and regressive subsidies to the Global Service Company. The revenue and service it used to provide becomes nil. At the initial stage, the social welfare and revenue both decrease. If the takeover is successful, then only after a while, the revenue becomes positive again, but nothing is clear on the tariff structure and impacts on economically weaker sections. Indeed, after the stabilisation of this strategy to a permanent positive revenue, the informal sector has disappeared (except if the private sector decides to cooperate with the informal sector, which is, however, to be assessed in the Indian scenario), and the margin available from coordination with the informal has, therefore, vanished. But let us now compare this permanent positive revenue in case of successful privatisation: - first, to a better transitory revenue by implying local entrepreneurs - second, not only to this transitory revenue achieved through local entrepreneurs, but to a long term higher revenue linked with the possibility to maintain the benefits of coordination with the informal sector. For this, let us consider, for the reform of the sector, a more refined strategy, combining the support (and coordination) with the informal sector, with the recourse to local entrepreneurs for pumping stations, which the experience of Chennai has proven to be profitable, as it reduces formal costs. Results are that the informal sector gradually achieves its increasing part of the revenue, while the formal sector reduces its deficit at a given structure by aggregating local entrepreneurs. The experience of Chennai shows that this is not enough to cover the structural financial situation but that there is a high profitability in such measures. Let us now come to what is certainly the best strategy, cumulating all the potential benefits in the reform of the water and waste sector in Indian Metros. It proposes to support and coordinate with the informal sector, and to start with local entrepreneurs as proposed previously. Then, after some time, when all the (limited) possibilities given to the local entrepreneurs and the informal sector have been reached or close to be fulfilled, one can still consider the recourse to a Global Service Company. Coming at this stage only, this presents various advantages. It obviously tackles margins unreachable through limited recourse to local entrepreneurs, since it allows bringing the initial investment necessary to structurally achieve a positive revenue from the formal sector. Furthermore, under a regulatory policy of the State cum Municipality to coordinate with the informal sector (being supported under limited amount of public subsidies and self-sustainable as its structuring equation shows), the gains from the integration of the informal sector are still achievable. Another element supporting this strategy is to be mentioned and considered. Given the administrative structure of water agencies in India, access to information is impossible in the sense that the information they gather is hardly “integrated”. That is, since management of physical quantities is done independently from the management of financial sources, which is rather an administrative clearance process, investors face difficulties in investing in Indian public agencies or negotiating a contract with them (Ruet 2001). Initial recourse to local entrepreneurs de facto generates information and property rights that help analysing the situation of the agency for the potential investor, that is, the Global Service Company. In that context, negotiating such a contract after the involvement of local entrepreneurs is also beneficial to the Service Company, and leads to less uncertainty, therefore to a lesser premium in financing investments, and to more targeted investments. That way, the transitory Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah period, that is, the period that the Company needs for the benefits to cover the costs can be considered as substantially less in that present scenario than in the strategy with direct reform through a Private Company alone. This strategy is thus to be preferred by the Global Company, by the policy makers in the sense they save jobs and provide preliminary (visible) results before privatisation, and for the water agency itself in the sense that its is the strategy that maximises the revenue. 3. The absence of major institutional and tariff reforms Compared to other utilities (power for instance), there has been no clear direction towards reform in the water and sanitation sector; especially: - there has been no clear incentive at the centre policy level for instance, no drastic move towards PSP by any State or city - the changes are marginal and do not seem to make a real difference. Therefore, the changes we focus on in this section may rather be considered as marginal, or starting points. They however allow analysing what future reforms could ultimately look like. 3.1. Limited change in the four Metros Calcutta 1. The physical and supply situation The water supply is, by and large, and apart pre-monsoon shortages, good in quantity, with a well developed centralised piped system, and relying on a huge source through the Hooghly River. Water supply at present also relies on local ground water for a 20%, but projects are on progress to fully adhere to the centralised piped model. Actually, a mere technical approach based on promoting boosting stations rather leads to overflows and huge wastage. The sanitation facilities are very insufficient, especially for the poor, including in central Calcutta; this is by far not the prior concern of the CMC. Waste disposal cannot be handled by the CMC alone, and the massive recycling informal sector in Calcutta ensures the remaining. This sector, if well structured, is economically fragile, and not supported, despite the savings and added economic value it provides for the CMC and the City as a whole. Lacunas in waste disposal engender severe pollution, health and environmental concerns in various areas of Calcutta, especially in terms of groundwater. Drainage is reasonably good as far as normal drainage is concerned, but far insufficient for storm drainage. Treatment hardly exists. To sum up, in Calcutta, there is no concern for local and technically decentralised solutions: promoting a local recycling and disposal of waste would lower the costs, improve pollution and water loss issues, and hence make the present recourse to ground water sustainable, thus lowering expenditures in new projects. Section D explains why the nature of the CMC and of its institutional arrangements precludes it to do so. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah 2. The tariffs and cost management Services by the CMC are hardly billed and paid, and it is run as a technical and expenditure based administration, aiming at political/ electoral outputs and objectives. Neither for the development of equipment (mostly taken in charge by CMDA and CMWSA), nor for the operation, the costs are a matter: technical and administrative procedures are followed, and the information available to CMC officers for a cost based management is an astonishing poor one anyway. Again the communist ruling of Calcutta may have had a strengthening effect on this. However, this fact can be seen in most of the Indian metros anyhow. 3. The set of institutions: coordination and new arrangements CMC by and large operates a water supply network. It is developed and ultimately financed by the CMDA and CMWSA, which also supplies the treated water. Hence, the system is ultimately financed by the Govt of WB. For which these organisations complain not to have the operational control over the distribution network. Hence, there is a discrepancy between the CMC which owns the control rights over the network, and the State organisations which own the financial rights (understand: bear the financial consequences) linked with a merely technical operation and absence of management properly. Financial links and disputes are actually set up through political ways, at the Secretary level: these bodies can hence be considered as (i) not autonomised, and (ii) improperly articulated. Needless to say that, in this context where the CMC actually externalises the development of its water supply system, in the absence of such organisations in the waste disposal and sanitation fields, it is ultimately less able to tackle with these. In short, these are also perceived as less of a direct political concern. No schemes either for internal delegation of power, or well-contracted outsourcing of activities, or coordination with groups or NGOs are noticeable. This is clearly a lack in the governance of the city of Calcutta, as compared to other Indian Metros. In that respect, the recent loss of power by the Communist party at the city level has contributed to an increase in the discrepancy between the municipality and the State, where the communists remain in power. 4. Alternative services and the poor (NGOs are numerous in Calcutta, but NGOs involved in water as such do not exist. They are rendered of less immediate use through the policy of quantitative availability of the CMC, despite the cost inefficiency and environmental damage it results in.) NGOs are more present in waste recycling and health issues, without noticeable cooperation with the Municipality. The specificity of Calcutta lies, however, in a well structured informal sector in recycling of solid waste and use of waste water for agriculture and fisheries. But this sector, structured on private entrepreneurs, and not NGOs, is not supported in any scheme. Chennai: 1. The physical and supply situation The water supply in Chennai is ensured by the Water Supply & Sewerage Board. Compared to other Indian Metros, the situation is characterised by a structural shortage of resource. The part of ground water is relatively high for the Board water itself, further complemented with a large amount of extraBoard supply (36% of the supply is not rooted through the board). Sewerage and sanitation is relatively poor, despite the fact that the Board gets a good amount of its financing through an afferent Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah tax. In that scarcity context, the board has initiated recycling and re-use experiments, that have to be acknowledged and duly recognised. But it is very surprising that an integrated vision of the resource within a cycle is still not generalised, and that no techno-economic comparisons are made between the long term cost of recycling water and the long-term cost of such high capital intensive projects, such as the Krishna river canal. 2. The tariffs and cost management The Board has managed last year to cover its operational expenses with a surplus (total income of Rs. 207 crores in 1999-2000, for a the total expenditure of Rs.181.5 crores, and a net surplus of Rs. 25.5 crores). However, the capital expenditure still comes from or is rooted through the State Government, raising the issue of the long-term sustainability of the water supply & sanitation in Chennai. More precisely, if the State Government has, from 1997, taken the step not to provide financial support, it goes on serving as a channelling agency for the World Bank loans that it ultimately guarantees. The Board is presently considering an indexation of tariffs on a RPI minus X formula. As of now, the Board is still close to the functioning of an administrative body as far as revenues are concerned. Indeed, a noticeable part of the ‘operational’ revenue (27%) comes from the collected tax, which is rather an administrative prerogative than correlated to any supply or sanitation. As far as financial results are concerned, its importance shall all the more be highlighted, since increase of the tax value explains 64% of the total increase in ‘operational revenue’. Interviewed officers stated that in return of these taxes, " there is no necessity to provide service " and that " they are advances to implement schemes ". However, as far as capital expenses are concerned, in 1999-2000, 165 crores have been granted by the Government, while total loans from the Government amounted to 656 crores, and loans from financial institutions only 129 crores (CMWSSB, 2000). Overall efficiency in collecting taxes is varying yearwise between 80 and 90%, while bills are collected with a level of 80% only, as interviews confirm. To sum up, and as far as water supply is concerned, the board gets more than half of its water operational income from a 40 big consumers only. It can retain them only on the basis of the Ground Water Conservation Act, that is, as a depositary of the public authority. For other consumers, it has, as shown here, an administrative behaviour. Then, the statement made during interviews that " the Board has shown operational profits from 1996 and real profits from 1998 " has to be reexamined in the light of some of the facts that the Board does not supply piped water to all its users, nor provides a large sanitation, although it goes on collecting " taxes ". Indeed, in terms of organisational efficiency, the Twinning arrangement report states that for the year 1999-00, the collection ratio is of 81.5% only. Evolution of the total arrears has been from 161 debtor days in 1996 to 221 in 2000. Anyway, when 75% of the water needs of the city come from outside of the Metro Water Board, no figures related to it only are able to explain fully the water scenario. 3. The set of institutions: coordination and new arrangements CMWSSB has engaged in openings in the private sector, that are innovative in the Indian public sector. It has interestingly taken stock of its past experience and issued some general lessons, that are extensively reproduced here. CMWSSB (2000) states that under limited local availability of capability for large-scale operations, " writing of contract documents is an important area where more expertise is needed; quantification of risks and risk allocation play a major role in response/economics ". But it notes that " on construction and operation contracts as the contractor gains basic operational experience during mandatory operation and maintenance period is in a better position to properly assess the risks ", and concludes by the fact that " areas requiring large manpower input with less complex operations offer greater scope for privatisation and hence economical. " This indeed concurs with the Board’s policy to reduce its staff expenses. It also underlines limitations in the writing of contracts that are well-known by academics and practitioners, such as: the lack of the private sector’s legal responsibility related to accident for environment or living beings, lack of legal provision for compensation for losses due to lesser output, Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah or lack of framework for compensation of losses due to improper quality and as regard as the obligations not met by private operator in respect of labour related issues. 4. Alternative services and the poor In Chennai, the poor population is estimated at one million people, out of which around 400, 000 live in non organised slums. According to surveys, households not relying on piped water, most of them being low-income households have an average income of Rs. 1780 per month. Water in slums is mostly provided with standposts and public fountains or through water tankers contracted out by the Board like other Indian cities. However, the Metrowaterboard has developed some dedicated schemes to the poor household such as the one to provide water to a fishermen settlement. The Metrowaterboard contracted out a private contractor to build, operate and maintain a desalination plant, whose cost of operation and maintenance is very high. This scheme is an ample proof that this kind of project is not sustainable and that the Metrowater board is not yet able to find adequate solutions to improve the situation in poor settlements apart from providing costly engineering answers. Water to slum dwellers is provided free and connection charges can be paid in three instalments. This is typical of tariff policies towards the poor in Indian cities. Cross-subsidies on water charges are high but the question of connection cannot be solved as the entry fee to connect is too high. Exnora appear definitely as the main NGO in Chennai and has both an action in the field as well as some credibility with the Metrowaterboard: (i) it helped in forming committees among the dwellers to organise the water distribution through tankers; (ii) it also carries a strong lobbying action with the Metrowaterboard to build toilets, to rehabilitate storm water drains; (iii) and it is also part of the consumer committee of the Metrowaterboard, as well as the vigilance committee. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Delhi 1. The physical and supply situation The Delhi Water Board was constituted on 2nd April 1998 by an Act that provides extended power and a larger autonomy than previously. The Board can for instance call for private sector participation. The DWB is responsible for the production and distribution of drinking water, treatment and disposal of waste water as well as water quality control, water pollution monitoring in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Overall, water needs to be produced for the overall Delhi National Capital Region whose population, according to the Census 2001 has reached 12.8 million people over an area of 1,483 sq.km. Delhi gets almost 90% of its supply from surface water through the Yamuna river, whose flow is largely diverted upstream in Haryana and Punjab through canals for irrigation purposes. Another quality issue is the deterioration of the Yamuna water quality during its passage into the Delhi Urban Agglomeration. Consequently, the Supreme Court, on 10th April 2001, ordered the Delhi government to clean up the river by 31st March 2001. When the river reaches Delhi, it is tapped in various treatment plants and water production has been multiplied by six since 1961 to reach around 2730 million litres per day produced in the following treatment plants. Despite continuous progress in the overall production figures and an official consumption figure of around 250 lpcd, the level of service in Delhi is inadequate. At the overall level of the city, in 1995, Zérah (2000) calculated that the annual cost of reducing water supply unreliability borne by households (that also includes time opportunity cost) was equal to almost twice the then annual Delhi Water Supply and Sewerage Disposal Undertaking expenditure. Solid waste collection and disposal is under the responsibility of the Municipal Corporation, the New Delhi Municipal Council and the Delhi Cantonment Board in their respective areas3. In 1996, the amount of waste generated was estimated at around 8000 tons per day, out of which around 30% remained uncollected. The main sources of waste generation are households (around 45%), markets and hospitals (around 26%) and industries (around 13%). In this regard, a critical examination of the proposed schemes in water and sanitation in Delhi would need being done. 3 More than ¾ of the National Capital Region population falls under the jurisdiction of the MCD. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah 2. The tariffs and cost management Undoubtedly because Delhi is the Capital city, the level of subsidies are very high and as far as water supply is concerned, the water rates are among, if not, the cheapest water rates in the country. The tariff structure applied in Delhi is typical of tariff structure in India where the industries contribute to a large share of the revenues collected (more than 50%) even though their overall consumption rarely exceeds more than 20% of the total consumption. Secondly, the tariff structure in Delhi has a negative consequence for non metered households, that are mostly located in low-income groups. The Revenue department is in charge of the billing and collection. It is organised into 24 zones. In 1994-95 the total of arrears amounted to Rs 290 million while the billed consumption was Rs 622 million. Arrears are not negligible and as a consequence recovery rate is rather low (66%), especially in rural areas. In 1995, non revenue water was estimated at 60%, a figure close to the level of NRW in other Asian cities. 3. The set of institutions: coordination and new arrangements In many ways, the situation in Delhi is quite complex as it is the National Capital Region and there is often confrontation between the State’s legislators and the Central Government that tries to keep a control over the development of the Capital. First of all, the Delhi Water Board has gained some more autonomy and has the possibility to decide on the introduction of private sector participation and has more freedom to decide on its tariff policy. In reality, it is more complex as its board is constituted by ex-officio members and elected representatives. Therefore, the DWB, like other water boards (see the example of Chennai) actually remains in the government sphere and cannot take major decisions such as tariff restructuring without the approval of the State assembly. Within the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the Slum Wing Department is in charge of squatter settlements, notified slum areas as well as pavement dwellers. The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is in charge of preparing the Delhi Master Plan but it also acts as an implementing agency and is, therefore, responsible for the development of new housing projects in Delhi. The Dwarka housing project, publicised by the DDA for many years, due to its proximity to the airport and its high quality accommodations is supposed to accommodate 1.4 million people. However, there is almost no water and as a consequence a very small number of people have shifted there. This fact indicates a lack of coordination with the DWB. DDA is the planning agency for Delhi but there is also the National Capital Region Board whose role is to develop a comprehensive approach (and a master plan) for the overall National Capital Region (that includes neighbouring towns) and future potential growth towns in Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. The role of the National Capital Region Board should be coordinated with the Delhi administration as it aims (by providing adequate infrastructure and incentives to neighbouring towns) to reduce the influx of migrants to Delhi. However, this Board has not managed to really address issues of the overall region to the forefront. Registration of private boreholes has been made compulsory by the Central Ground Water Authority (that depends directly from the Ministry of Water Resources) and which is another actor on the water scene. The Delhi Pollution Control Board (that depends from the Ministry of Environment and Forest) has also a role to play as far as controlling the waste water disposal from industries is concerned. Another “external” factor plays a role in the Delhi water scenario and this is the Supreme Court that has summoned the Delhi Water Board to build waste water treatment plant to reduce the pollution level in the Yamuna. This is an example of the new role that the highest judiciary authority plays in a sector like the water supply sector. As can be seen from the rapid description of some of the major institutional actors in the water supply and sanitation sector, the situation in Delhi is complex and the lack of coordination (that is quite clear between the DWB and the DDA for instance) leads to situations where the judiciary needs to intervene. Involvement of the private sector in Delhi exist despite a certain number of nonstarter projects. However, most of these projects only concern construction (and to some extent the functioning) of WTP and STP and do not address the real issue of improving the distribution system. The changes in the status of the water provider into a Board has not fundamentally changed the internal organisation Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah of the undertaking and is not sufficient to bring about a real integrated approach to improve water management. Publicised solutions such as the development of rainwater harvesting need to be tested at a significant scale to be considered as viable options for a city as large as Delhi. Such a scheme is under trial to provide water supply for Dwarka. 4. Alternative services and the poor There are various estimates on poverty levels in Delhi. The figure of 1.85 million in the last census is certainly below reality. Data provided by the National Institute of Urban Affairs of around 3.1 million people is more reliable. According to Zérah and Llorente (1999), the average monthly income of households in slums is approximately Rs. 2885, while 7.5% of the household earns less than Rs. 1000 per month and 9% earn more than Rs. 6000 per month. As far as sanitation is concerned, more than half of slum population does not use any kind of toilet facilities. This is the case even when there are facilities available such as a community toilet and bath facilities constructed by Sulabh International. As far as water supply is concerned, to summarise the situation, most of the slum dwellers have to rely on more than one source to fulfill their daily needs. Water’s availability is limited to around 10 to 11 hours a days and most households do complain of low pressure and mostly of long queues. Tovey (1999) estimated the average queue to be around two hours. This leads to consumption levels, at around 30 litres per person a day, below accepted norms and has an impact on the health situation in most slums. Consequently, the cost of water borne by slum dwellers is significant, even though, it mostly consists in a time opportunity cost. Overall, an interesting factor in the slums of Delhi (and of most Indian cities) is the absence of private water sector charging high prices to provide services. As in other Indian cities, the number of NGOs involved in basic amenities and infrastructure provision in Delhi are numerous. They have various roles: a role of contractor for the Corporation such as Sulabh International, a voluntary action provider of services to selected settlements, a lobbying role and a strong opposition role to influence the policies of the Corporation. Sulabh International is internationally famous for the development of various types of low cost sanitation solutions and for the implementation in many Indian cities, but particularly in Delhi of toilet complexes. Other NGOs, like the Centre for Science and Environment is mostly a very powerful lobbying organisation that brought a lot of information in the debate on the pollution of the Yamuna. INTACH, a national trust has had a more constructive interaction with the municipal authorities by proposing alternative plans to improve water resource conservation and waste water disposal. To sum up, Delhi, being the capital, hosts a large number of small NGOs as well as national or international NGOs that do intervene on the “water” debate in Delhi. However, as of today, apart from small NGOs that have a limited action in some of their areas, most of the interactions between the municipal authorities and the other organisations is a conflictual one. More coordination is required at a political level as well as the daily functioning of the DWB, or for that matter of the other municipal departments. Mumbai: 1. The physical and supply situation The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation is responsible for providing water supply, managing and operating the network and billing and collecting revenues to the population of Greater Mumbai (more Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah than 12 million people). The department in charge of these functions is the Hydraulic Engineer’s department. There are around 300,000 water connections in Mumbai. Most of the supply is for domestic purposes (85 %). The non-domestic demand (15 %) has been decreasing over the years in parallel with the decline of water consuming industries (mostly textile and dairies). Water is supplied at the rate of 2980 mld from surface water. Average supply is around 240 to 250 lpcd. However large discrepancies exist according to the type of settlement and the type of connections. Surface water provided to the city by a gravity system is the main characteristic of the supply in Mumbai where groundwater plays no role. Water is supplied on a rotational basis among the 107 distribution zones because of the reservoirs capacity. Intermittent supply is the rule in Mumbai and supply can vary from two to six hours. The main priority, however, regards the sanitation and sewerage situation. The sewerage generated is estimated at 2,500 mld. So far there are 265,000 street connections covering 45% of the population. Less than 20% of the sewerage generated is treated through 2 sewerage treatment plants. To remedy to the actual situation, the World Bank is financing the Mumbai Sewage Disposal Project (US$ 296 million) to improve the health and environment, to build a stronger sewerage infrastructure and to improve sanitation facilities in slums. 2. The tariffs and cost management Consumers have to pay water and sewerage charges when the connection is metered, water and sewerage tax when the connection is not metered and water and sewerage benefit tax for all consumers. Since 1995-1996, the total revenue income has doubled while the expenditure has increased by 1.5 times. All the proposals to separate the water supply and sewerage department and to create a water board have been rejected by the Corporation. In order to improve the cost of recovery (today: 80%), the centralised computerised billing is being decentralised at the ward level. On August 1, 2002, a hike in water charges and water tax should take effect. It has been passed by the general body of the BMC. This hike (from 1.75 to 2.25 Rs. per cubic meter for slum dwellers and from Rs. 3 to 4 for other domestic users) will, according to estimates, bring an additional Rs. 51 crores to the BMC’s revenue (The Times of India, 2002). To sum up, cross-subsidies are the rule as in many other Indian cities as industrial and commercial establishments have to pay much higher rates than domestic connections. However, unlike most of other cities, slum dwellers (in recognised settlements) are considered as customers and have to pay water and sewerage charges and taxes. In any case, the tariff policy is not based on economic principles and no change of tariff structure is thought of. Water supply and sewerage is a good source of revenue in Mumbai but the lack of independence from the Corporation, for instance through a Board, is a constraint towards efficient management. 3. The set of institutions: coordination and new arrangements As far as water supply is concerned, two initiatives are considered by the BMC. The first one concerns the study of the operation and maintenance department. A consultant shall be appointed in the near future to look at the potential rehabilitation of old mains, the creation of a customer grievance cell in one pilot ward, and the evaluation of the functioning of the pumping stations. The second project consists in privatising the operation at the ward level in one pilot zone (the K east ward, near the airport). An international operator should be selected to replace and maintain meters, collect revenues, reduce leakages, provide 24 hours supply. The payment will be made on an incentive basis (on the number of mld saved). However, this project is largely delayed and it reflects the hurdles faced in South Asia to introduce the private sector: (i) there is no credible and consistent political commitment Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah at a high level to ensure the success of projects planned, there is a strong opposition from labour unions (particularly powerful in Mumbai), (iii) there is a misunderstanding about the objectives of the private sector that has not been, in addition, yet to prove that it can reduce costs through efficiency savings, (iv) and the need to restructure tariff that are considerably low. Concerning its internal management, the efficiency of the department of water supply and sewerage is certainly affected from the fact that it cannot be separated from the Corporation. So far, the various proposals to create a Board have been dismissed. In addition, the department has to cope with a large number of employees that tend to be against any new initiatives. Therefore, despite the fact that the MMC is the richest corporation in India, new initiatives and higher level of efficiency remain difficult to achieve. 4. Alternative services and the poor According to the various interviews conducted, the estimate of population living in slums averages 50 to 55% of the population. Standposts are provided in slum settlements prior to 1995. They can be given to a group of households (a minimum of five and a maximum of 15) after the households form a group and nominate one of them as an authorised representative. In Mumbai, there are solid NGOs involved in the water supply and sanitation sector, such as SPARC (Society for the Promotion of Area Centre) and YUVA (Youth for Unity and Volontary Action). To sum up, Mumbai has a large share of its population living in slums or in the streets and the attitude of the Corporation is constrained by resolutions from the Government of Maharashtra that does not recognise new settlements. On the other hand, due to the pressure from the World Bank, the Corporation has started to engage a dialogue with NGOs and slums’ association in order to construct sanitation facilities. This collaboration could be interesting as it involves NGOs that have been working successfully for years in this field. It would therefore be useful in a few months to assess this cooperation. 3.2. Failures of large scale private participation Since the beginning of the reforms launched in 1991 by Narasimha Rao, the focus on infrastructure has been strong, especially in the power, telecommunications and transport sector. In the 1990s, the need for reform as well as the possibility of private sector participation were extensively discussed in, national and international forums and conferences. These discussions involved State agencies, cities decision makers, multilateral agencies and private companies. Because it is a State subject, the Ministry of Urban Development’s involvement was limited to promote changes but did not provide clear guidelines and incentives to States and cities to go ahead. Therefore, the decision to initiate contracts with private companies were left to States and cities in a not so condusive environment from the Centre as well as strong internal political constraints. In an overall context where water is seen as a free good to be provided by the public sector, very few projects were started, most of them fell through and large scale private sector participation in the sector remains to be implemented. Like for the other infrastructure sector, the reasons behind the promotion of large scale private sector participation were based on two main assumptions. First, it could bring in investments and therefore reduce the burden of public investment and second it would bring efficiency and service improvement. In the WSS sector, there is a large gamut of contract types starting from the service contract to the concession contract with in-between options such as the management contract or the BOT (built – operate – transfer) contract for instance. In the concession contract, most of the risks are borne by the private sector that has to make a large investment and which is in charge of the whole distribution system as well as development of new assets. In the case of India, no city had seriously considered the concession format even though it is the one favoured and promoted by large companies. Concessions require many conditions, among them, a long transition period, a strong political will, changes in the Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah legal framework, the setting up of a regulatory framework, an accurate assessment of the value of the existing assets and a tariff restructuring. Transaction costs are high and due to this reason, even multilateral agencies in the recent past encouraged cities to prefer management contract as a first step to involve the private sector. Therefore most cities that attempted to bring in private sector participation, such as Goa, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Pune, chose to opt either for BOTs or construction and management contract. In the BOT format, the private sector is in charge of building the infrastructure, operating it for a period of time (20 to 25 years) and to later transfer it to the municipality. A large number of Indian cities considered the BOT option to develop new sources of water through international funding. However, many of the projects fell through (the main ones were to be in Hyderabad, Goa and Bangalore) due to the lack of political commitment, the very high cost of the water, the lack of clarity in the contract attribution and the lack of clarity in the process to be followed (Mehta, 1999). Especially, the cost-sustainability as far as lowest economic sections of the society are concerned is to be clarified, and taken care of through financing schemes that remain to be designed. In any case, there is an issue with contracts such as BOT. Indeed, they will add additional sources of water in an efficient distribution system without looking at the main issues that are non revenue water, high leakage, lack of commercial management and low revenue generation. As a consequence, BOTs can in fact, except in some cases, have an adverse effect. Among the rare cases where a management contract was envisaged, the case of Pune was for a long time the closest to be concluded but it fell through despite a large interest expressed by many companies and a strong commitment from the Municipal Commissioner (Zérah, 2001). In any case, in most of these projects, the question of the low income households whose ability to pay is limited has not been adequately looked at. It is assumed that more water will directly imply more water for these households. This assumption is most probably wrong as the main issues lie with the distribution system and its ability to reach unconnected households. Let us look in detail at some of the main explanations for the likely failure of PSP in India. First of all, to introduce private sector participation is a risky political decision. It requires, therefore, a sustained and a very credible commitment to carry any project forward. In the case of Pune, for instance, despite the presence of a strong municipal commissioner, the project could not go through. Capacity building among elected representatives, trade unions and other institutions of the civil society needs to be promoted. Experiences from other countries demonstrate the significance of working closely with all the stakeholders and especially to design acceptable packages for the trade unions. Secondly, there is a misunderstanding about the objectives of the private sector that, in addition, yet to prove that it can reduce costs through efficiency savings. This was particularly clear in the case of Pune where strong opposition to the project came from the lobby of local contractors. Large international companies, though, would work with local contractors to reduce their costs once contracts were awarded. Another example of the lack of understanding of some issues regarding PSP was highlighted in the Pune case in the debates around the rate of return. The fact that a private company has to earn money from a contract is not always understood and a larger debate on what can be an acceptable rate of return has to emerge. Thirdly, there are many loopholes in the process to award a contract to private sector companies in India ranging from the lack of experienced consultants, to the lack of transparency in the procedures, especially the design of the criteria to award a contract. The strong controversy in the award of the BOT contract in Bangalore in 1999 is a typical example. Among the criteria of attribution the weightage of the opinion of the head of the Board was as high as 50%. Transparency as well as capacity building among consultants in charge of the transaction process will need to be reinforced. Fourth, the question of tariff and regulation are hurdles to private sector participation. Tariff are low in India and do not reflect the actual cost of production. To improve the system and add additional resources through private sector participation will have an impact both on the tariff levels and the tariff structure. Without addressing this question, no city will be able to design a sustainable contract. Another issue is related to the necessity of setting up a regulatory framework to assess the performance of the private contractor. A lot of emphasis has been put by international agencies on this aspect. It might not be the task of the day to build a heavy regulatory set up and it might be better to start with enough regulatory measures to facilitate the process of the entry of private companies for the Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah cities willing to do it. Otherwise, most projects get delayed because of this issue. Lastly, most of the municipal authorities, either local or metropolitan, are not vested with the powers to directly sign such contracts without seeking permission from their State government, despite the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution. Overall, due to many reasons, there has been as such no experience with the private sector that can be compared to large international contracts, such as the ones in Latin America (Buenos Aires) or South East Asia (Manila, Jakarta). Therefore it is difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that private sector participation would bring in improvement of services in India. It underlines the fact that the much talked about reforms cannot wait for a private sector contract to be awarded and to set an example. Cities need to reform the way they function themselves if they want to ensure better service and generate more revenues. In fact, by initiating internal reforms, they might make a first step towards financial stability and therefore towards the possibility of collaborating with the private sector. 4. Towards conservation-based water supply 4.1. Harvesting India receives about 4200 billion cubic metre (BCM) (about 4000 BCM of rainfall and 200 BCM of water from outside the country) of water. The utilisable potential is about 1122 BCM, of which the present utilisation is only about four per cent of the utilisable volume, thus leaving enough potential to be tapped. To tap these potential, many urban authorities source water from distant locations: Chennai is dependent on Krishna river water from across Andhra Pradesh. Mumbai is facing a similar situation. Delhi has placed its hopes on the storage reservoirs in Himalayas. This has only proved to be expensive, socially and environmentally unsustainable and further, increases conflicts over water within the country such as between Delhi and Haryana, and between Chennai and the farmers of Andhra Pradesh. A conservation-based water supply could augment water by harvesting rainwater, conserving and recycling wastewater wherever possible, and by evolving demand management options for efficient utilisation and distribution of water. Though the approach has been piecemeal in different parts of the country, and few states in recent months are formulating acts to augment urban water supply, there are few states, Delhi and Tamil Nadu, where efforts are already underway towards conservation-based water supply. The situation is less stringent in Maharashtra and West Bengal, hence in Mumbai and Calcutta. Potential of Water Harvesting - Case of Delhi Delhi is one of the pampered cities in the world. It receives about 275 litres per capita per day (lpcd), which is pretty decent than that of the majority of Indian Cities, yet the city faces water crisis. The city receives about 904 million gallons per day (MGD) (4110 million litres per day (mld)) from different sources (Annexure. 2) against the projected requirement of 1002 MGD (4553 mld). Thus, a deficit of 97.5 MGD (444 mld). In addition, there is transit loss of water that is estimated to be about 15 to 18 per cent. In fact, the water actually supplied to the consumer is only 742 MGD (3370 mld). In terms of access to the quantity of water available, the picture is rosy at macro level indicating per capita supply to be around 320 lpcd, with New Delhi Municipal Corporation receiving 388 lpcd, Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Municipal Corporation of Delhi at 206 lpcd and Delhi Cantonment Board at 194 lpcd. However, the ground reality is different, with poor localities getting less access to water, and that too of poor quality. The inadequacy of surface water, both in terms of quality and quantity, has put pressure on ground water resources, which has led to a decline in ground water table in the different parts of the Metro. The average decline in groundwater table during the last decade is about 0.4 metre per year. Further, unplanned developments have disturbed the hydrological balance, leading to a decline in productivity of wells, increasing pumping cost, more energy requirement and more seepage loss from canals. Another hurdle in the development of ground water in Delhi is the brackish nature of water. These all hinder in augmenting water supply to the city (Ref: Box.1). This shortage of water has put pressure on the water supply agencies in Delhi to find potential source of water flowing from the Himalayan region. For instance, the water supply schemes proposed for Delhi from dam projects, indicates that a total value of 805 MGD is proposed to be supplied at a cost of Rs. 2,415 crores (i.e. Rs. 3 crores per a MGD). The cost might overrun if rehabilitation, environmental management and other works are undertaken (Saravanan, 1999b). This has led to interstate political friction in the past and has the potential for serious conflict with the riparian neighbours. This has led to an alarming dependence on the ground water table. Thus, while the demand has been drastically increasing the supply position is not so elastic. With no foreseeable augmentation on raw water supplies through conventional solutions, there is no option other than harnessing water through community-based strategy. Conservation from the local catchments (including roof tops), seasonal floodwaters from local streams will increase water availability, reduce the flood in the city, reduce dependence on the external water supply systems and, in turn, reduce the financial burden of the water supply agencies. This makes eminent sense - ecological, financial and political - in promoting conservation-based water supply systems in urban centres. A rational calculation from the Water Augment Plan of Indian National Trust for Arts and Cultural Heritage (INTACH) indicates that this will enable cent per cent coverage of the population through revival of the Yamuna channel and by promoting rooftop water harvesting. According to the Plan, Delhi has the potential of generating 675 mld and 2205 mld of water through conservation and recycling water. This is more than meeting the projected demand-supply gap within five years at affordable costs. The Plan proposes to augment about 9.8 lakh million litres through conservationbased strategy (Table 13). The estimate of water harvested is only indicative of the volume of water that could be harvested over the ground and allow for recharging ground aquifers, as estimation of the actual quantity of water harvested becomes complex due to loss of water by evaporation and other unavoidable wastages. Though the plan is technocratic in approach and one can question the authencity of the water harvested, the comprehensive assessment of the plan promises to augment water supply. Table 7. Volume of Water Harvested and Recharged (in million litres) Conservation-Based Strategy Drainage Channels Quarry reservoirs Historical Water Bodies Lakes and depressions Volume of Water Estimated Harvested Over Recharge Ground annual 107770 29670 8870 - 350 - 39590 7000 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Checkdams 183 - 7659 4510 11140 30400 Rooftop harvesting 1890 - Ecoparks recycling 803000 - Grand Total 980452 71580 Village Ponds Floodplain reservoirs Source: INTACH. 1999. Blue Print for Water Augmentation in Delhi. INTACH, New Delhi. In addition, the CGWB plans to extract and replenish the ground water to augment the city’s water supply. This is expected to be done from the flood plains of the Yamuna in five zones of the National Capital Territory of Delhi during the lean April- May- June period. The Central Ground Water Authority (CGWA) considers this feasible to de-water and refill the unconfined aquifer group underlying the Yamuna flood plains during the pre-monsoon and monsoon period respectively in view of favourable hydrogeological set-up and available surplus Yamuna flood flows. The Authority estimates that on an average de-watering of four metre thickness in 97 Sq. Km. flood plain area would yield 78000 million litres of ground water (CGWB, 1996:41). It is expected that the scheme would supply Delhi with an additional 900 mld of water and that the first phase of the plan will cost Rs. 25 crores at 1996 price. The plan has been given to Delhi Jal Board, Government of Delhi for implementation in 1999 but the results are not yet known. The importance of rainwater harvesting has also been realised by the President of India, K.R.Narayanan, when he evinced interest to meet his water requirement through rainwater harvesting in his estate. Under his initiation, Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) has set up a team of experts to prepare water-harvesting plans. The plan implemented by the Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) and the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) that has led to raise in the water levels from to 12 metres in two phases and to meet most of the estates water needs, improve ground water quality (where traces of fluoride have been found) and finally reduce Rs.50 lakhs water bill to New Delhi Municipal Corporation (Saravanan, 1999c). The plan was initiated in 1999 by tapping one lakh cubic metres of rainwater annually inside the President's Estate. The techniques adopted have been simple, just blocking and diverting all major drains in the Estate to three dried bore wells dug-up during the British era. In the first year there was a 97 centimetre increase in the groundwater level that further increased by 98 centimetres in 2001 (The Hindu, 2002). This harvested water can be substituted with the existing water supply in the city to meet the growing demand within the Presidents' Estate. Similar plans have been implemented in many public and private institutions. Though there are visible local impacts, in terms of rise in ground water level, there have not been any concrete studies in assessing their socio-economic and environmental impact over a large scale. Pioneering Efforts for Water Supply Options – Case of Chennai Chennai has the lowest per capita water availability out of all the metros in the country. In the absence of perennial rivers, the Metro Water had to exploit ground aquifer to complement water from reservoirs. However in recent years, the Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (CMWSSB) (hereafter referred to as Metro Water), the agency responsible for water supply and sewerage systems in Chennai, is shifting its strategy from extraction-based to conservation-based water supply. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah The Metro faced problem of water scarcity due to ground water depletion and seawater intrusion in the ground aquifers in the last three decades. To overcome the crisis, in 1987, Chennai Metro evolved strategies through water harvesting at two levels: macro and micro level. At the macro level, check dams were constructed along the river basins and floodwaters were injected into ground aquifer though injection wells. Minjur area, north Chennai, was well known for the availability of ground water aquifer in mid 1960’s (CMWSSB, 1999). Excessive extraction of ground water in this region gave way to saline water intrusion from the sea situated a mere three km away in 1963 to nine km in 1987. To overcome this, Metro Water evolved strategies to harvest rainwater on a large scale through check dams along the Araniyar- Korataliyar basin. These checkdams have shown significant results in improving the water table in various observation wells set-up by the Metro Water. To further reduce the sea water intrusion caused by over extraction of ground water, pollution from industries and existence of salt-pans, along the Minjur region of north Chennai, large scale recharging wells were constructed between the coast and Minjur. Floodwater was injected in these wells as a recharge to create a barrier to the salt-water intrusion. These measures have shown significant results in the decrease of Electrical Conductivity values, one of the measure to assess the saline content in the water, from as high as 65000 in 1992 to 46750 micro MHOS/cm in 1998 in Thiruvellavoyal observation well (CMWSSB, undated:45). Learning from the experience in Minjur area of north Chennai, the Metro Water realised the importance of saving the coastal aquifers and other ground water potential zones in and around the city. The Board introduced an Act - The Chennai Metropolitan Area Ground Water (Regulation) Act 27, 1987 - to regulate and control extraction, and use or transportation of ground water. The Act envisages registration of existing wells, regulations for sinking new wells, issuing licenses to extract water for non-domestic use and issue of licenses for transportation through goods vehicle. The Act covers the city and the adjoining 243 villages. The Act has been able to control the private water market, to regulate water extraction and improve the ground water levels (refer. Fig. 2) in the southern aquifers in particular and Chennai city in general. In recent years, in addition to private water suppliers using water tankers, that water is also being supplied through water cans. Where does this water come from is still to be answered. These cans are so popular, that households and commercial companies buy them every day in 10-15 litres water cans. To complement these macro strategies and learning from a number of private sector initiatives, particularly after the 1993 drought in Chennai, Metro Water took initiatives to harvest rainwater at micro level. Metro Water worked out a 'statutory understanding' with Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) and Chennai Corporation whereby Planning Permission applications for specified categories of buildings were to be admitted only if they included a proposal for RWH as suggested by CMWSSB. The regulation requires that while sanctioning water and sewer connections RWH works must have been constructed in all premises having four floors (ground+3) and special buildings. It is stated that since its implementation in 1997, about 500 buildings already have rainwater-harvesting structures. This regulation though marks a beginning towards conservation-based water supply has not been effective. A sample survey of 75 buildings for which approvals had been given in 1997 and 1998 indicate that about two-third of the sampled buildings had not installed any RWH (Vaidyanathan & Saravanan, 2001). This proportion was much higher (80%) in zones with adequate water supply than those well served by Metro water. Buildings, which had installed rainwater-harvesting structures, adopted a variety of designs, but in a third of them the devices were not properly designed and therefore ineffective. What makes the micro-level initiative a non-starter is institutional arrangements to provide incentives or disincentives to regulate and monitor the implementation of conservationbased water supply. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Macro strategies of the State are not new. What is new is adaptive response evolved by private entrepreneurs (corporate builders and companies). Increasing scarcity has also awakened this sector to evolve water supply options and to regulate groundwater through rainwater harvesting and by recycling domestic wastewater to provide access to water for their clients. There are a number of corporate builders (namely Alacrity Foundation, KRG Rainwater Harvesting Company & Raj Paris Builders), who market their housing projects depending on the ability to secure access to water (Table 8) (Fig. 3). The strategy has attracted the attention of people, as the private agencies were able to secure access to water for their clients, co-ordinate future maintenance and monitor of the system and therefore build credibility among the people. Table. 8 Companies Involved in Rainwater Harvesting in Chennai S. No. 1 2 3 4 Companies/ Individuals Ramadies Trust Vasanth Builders Rajparis Civil Constructions KRG Rainwater Harvesting Number of Housing Projects 100 15 150 139 (includes 39 projects in Andhra Pradesh municipalities (14) and 25 municipalities in Gujarat) 5 Dr. Sekar Raghavan 200 6 Mr. D.V. Subramanian 60 7 Alacrity Foundation 450 8 Mr. Venkatraman 54 Source: Personal communication from Mr. J.Saravanan, Coordinator of the National Water Harvesters Network, Tamil Nadu Chapter. What makes the efforts by corporate builders successful is their response at the ‘need of the hour’ and spreading awareness over the importance of conservation based water supply through booklet and pamphlets. These private agencies as well show a great accountability towards their clients.. Alacrity Foundation, one of the leading corporate builders in South India, provides a detailed report on the water quality to their clients and various water harvesting and treatment methods that they have carried out to overcome them. A sample of water quality measurements in one of their reports indicates a systematic improvement in the water quality (Table 9). In addition, these builders provide their own staff for future maintenance of these systems. These private agencies have carried out water harvesting in more than 500 of their buildings in the past few years. Facilitation of the process from the State through incentives and disincentives never existed. Instead, CMWSSB and CMDA have made rainwater-harvesting structure plans compulsory for all building (above 2 floor) plans submitted for approval. However, once the plans are approved, implementation on the ground is far from visible. Many times State tries to institutionalise strategies, that are different from the way they function. Table. 9 Improvement in Water Quality Residential Housing Complex, Chennai Year 1995 1996 1997 June Oct. Nov. May June Aug. Nov. May June TDS 2782 640 1852 1890 - 1780 - - 1660 Yield (kl) 5-6 11 15 4 - 9.3 10 12 10.5 Water level (ft) 19-20 - 21 5.6 Brim 25 17 15 22 Source: Field notes, Alacrity Foundation. 1999. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah In addition to the efforts by Corporate Builders in the city, few residents have also taken a systematic way to harness water in their house (Fig. 4). The effort of Mr. R. Ramani, resident at Korattur region in Chennai, is worth noting (Box.2). In 1994, he constructed water-harvesting structures. Now this has enabled him for a secure access to water supply over the years but also improve the water quality in the ground aquifer (Table. 15). In addition, peoples' movements are emerging in the city to harvest the precious water, through rehabilitating tanks and other storage structures and influencing the government to change their programme to implement them. The ability to perceive the problem and seek institutional support through innovative technological options to access potable water remains the success of Mr. Ramani's effort. Box.2 Crusaders on Water Ramani and his Akash Ganga. Ramani is an ordinary man residing in Korattur township of Chennai, but depletion in groundwater and contamination of industrial pollutants in his residential, and location of his house in the tail-end of the water distribution system has made him evolve a systematic means to harvest rainwater for his domestic need. “When I started constructing, people thought I was mad trying to collect rainwater, but I know it works”, says R.Ramani (Ghosh, 1999). “Now I use the rainwater almost for the whole year and even during the drought period, when my neighbours are on the lookout for water tankers” (Ramani, 1999). Being proud of tapping most of the rainwater in his residential area, he has named his efforts as ‘Akash Ganga.’ He uses a simple technique, collects rooftop water for drinking and household use and utilises the rest for ground water recharge. His rooftop water is collected from a total terraced area of 1100 square feet, in which, water falling in 600 square feet area is used for domestic purpose, while water from the rest of the area is used for gardening and to recharge groundwater (Ramani, 1999). To enable the waterflow, he has resurfaced his roof with Mangalore terrace tiles to generate a mild slope to direct rainwater to the lentil level storage tank that has the capacity of about 2950 litres, with technical guidance from Mr. R. Jeyakumar, a builder. To keep his rooftop water collection free from fungal formation, by consultation with technical expertise, he mixed the waterproof powder with the cement slurry and acrylic-poly-sulphate cement slurry coating. The first rainwater is utilised to wash the entire terrace area and drain them out to the backyard garden. The subsequent water is collected in the lentil level storage tank. The excess water from this tank is collected in synthetic tanks in the first floor for low quality uses within the house and still excess water is diverted to recharge his well. In a year, he says about four to five times the CCT gets filled up (Personal Communication from Ramani , July 9, 1999). The volume of the tank is about 2945 litres, which has been recently increased to 3300 litres. He is fortunate to be in a city, where rain falls almost round the year. During the dry period, tank gets filled up once in three months, while during the rainy period almost every month the tank gets filled. For instance, “The tank got filled up twice in just a weeks time in July 1999, once on 1st and second on 7th July” says Ramani. In fact, there is excess water that he diverts to his recharge pit and sometimes directly to well. A full tank will serve the domestic water need of his four-member family for 33 days. Almost for the whole year he does not depend on government supplied water. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Table. 1 Water harvesting - Improvement in Water Quality (Ramani’s Residence) Sl. No. Parameters Desirable Limit Permissible Limit Quality May 1994* on Quality 12, April 1999** 1 Turbidity (NTU) 5 10 5 2 2. Total Solids (at 500 105 C) 2000 3325 1335 3 pH 6.5-8.5 No relaxation 7 7.1 4 Chlorides 250 1000 989 580 5 Total Hardness 300 600 900 540 6 Iron 0.3 1.0 Nil Trace on 9, *Test results from S&S Industries and Enterprises, Chennai. ** Test Results from Chennai Metro Water Supply and Sewage Board (CMWSSB), Chennai. In recent years, rainwater harvesting has become more a panacea. It is widely understood as mainly rooftop water harvesting and widely promoted by environmental NGOs. The latter calls for promoting rainwater harvesting everywhere on earth and government seems to make massive investment towards promoting environmental governance. Rainwater harvesting basically in-situ conservation of water within the broad spectrum of water management. Furthermore, it cannot be an all-in-all solution to the growing water problems mainly in urban regions. In addition, any estimate4 made on the capacity of rainwater harvesting to serve urban water needs is only hypothetical. Utilising rainwater harvesting as a partial solution to the growing urban population requires more a local action with State facilitating the process. With poor environmental conditions and inadequate monitoring and regulations prevailing in urban regions of developing countries, large scale rainwater harvesting raises many doubts in terms of directly polluting groundwater and also becoming a potential threat to health hazards. Save Lakes Campaign - Hyderabad The importance of lakes and ponds have gained importance in urban centres, in recent years. Hyderabad once had about 532 lakes, tanks and kuntas around the city.. The undulating rocky terrain of Telangana– region has made it easy to collect rainwater through these storage structures. These tanks which played an important role in recharging groundwater and supplying water for the urban people are being destroyed systematically due to rapid urbanisation encroaching the storage structures and channels, and polluting the water. Efforts by a group of people, comprising scientists, local people and fishing community have come together in the name of ‘Save Lakes of Hyderabad’ to protect the lakes in the city. Taking Saroornagar Lake (the biggest fresh water lake in the eastern part of the city) as a pilot project, the group aims to raise awareness on the importance of protecting and conserving these ecosystems. Saroornagar Lake is an important tank system in the city, as it acts as shock absorber by containing the sudden gush of flooding rainwater during heavy rains and provides a major source for livelihood for the fisherman community. The group has been able to mobilise support from 4 From a simple calculation (Thakkar, 1997) to INTACH (INTACH, 1999) attempt to provide water supply to Delhi's growing urban population. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah the government officials. The Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Mr. Chandrababu Naidu has initiated steps to protect and conserve 12 lakes in the city and has also promoted measures for rainwater harvesting to augment water supply in the city. He is expected to constitute a ‘Lake Protection and Information Cell to protect, conserve and develop lakes around the city. 4.2. Sewage water treatment Recycling of wastewater through treatment will also yield major results in a small time frame and economically. With about 12,500 million litres of sewage water per day produced in India and with Delhi accounting for the highest 350 million litres per day (Himanshu, 1997:16). Treatment of wastewater should be given priority by increasing the capacity of the existing treatment plants and to find out innovative options and cost-effective measures for wastewater treatment. ‘Calcutta Metropolitan Water and Sanitation Authority has developed a system of sewage disposal that is among the most efficient and ecologically benign in existence’ (People and Planet, cited in Himanshu, 1997). The well-known project that has been the guiding spirit for the city is the Bandipur project. The project consists of five ponds over an area of 11.48 ha through which the effluent is passed. These effluents are treated through cultivation of fisheries and farmers to cultivate paddy crop use the water from the final tank. The project requires an initial expenditure of 1.6 lakhs per million litres to be treated compared to Rs. 25 lakhs by way of conventional one. Measures have also emerged in other parts of the country to treat sewage water through water hyacinth (as in Sangli district of Maharashtra). The treatment promises to yield 30 tonnes of hyacinth biomass and six tonnes of rich organic manure from 4 hectares of treatment facilities. The Pani Morcha has proposed to treat sewage water to recharge the sewage being pumped into the river Yamuna and use them to recharge the groundwater. In addition, this will provide a minimum flow of water to the river. The plan emerges from the co-operative fishery project in Calcutta and at Mirzapur in Bangladesh as well as oxidation project in Sangli district. The plan of Pani Morcha is to treat the water in a costeffective manner “unlike the power and capital intensive Ganga Action Plan”, says Commander Sureshwar Sinha of Pani Morcha. They plan to treat the water through duckweed and common fish to clean up the toxic water. The plan envisages on an emergency basis to treat about 70 cubic metres per second of water for farmers in west Delhi from Nangloi Plant and in the long term plans to harvest flood water to revive the dead streams. INTACH proposes for convert the existing sewage treatment plants into ecoparks. It is that such recycling can augment about 804 million cubic metre of water at a cost of Rs. 22 lakhs per million cubic metres. 5. Institutional prescriptions for involving the civil society 5.1. A scope for collaboration with NGOs and the informal sector The term of civil society is commonly being used to describe organisations, forums, movements which are neither part of the public sector, the private sector or the trade unions. In this section, we shall consider on the one hand non-governmental and community based organisations (NGOs and CBOs) that undertake development activities, mostly in slums and low-income settlements, and on the other hand non-governmental organisations, civic forums, resident associations, lobbying groups whose role is to participate to the overall debate on service delivery and on lobbying for better services. Both these groups have a role to play and could be better involved. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Most NGOs (and even more CBOs) are locally based and develop their activities in a limited number of settlements in a city which enable them to have an in-depth knowledge of the people’s requirements. In most cases, one charismatic leader is at the head of the organisation and is clearly a driving force behind the actions undertaken and the ability of the NGOs to raise fund. Inspite of differences in their perception of the problems, all NGOs that carried out projects successfully have relied on the support of the community often organised through self help groups (mostly women self help groups). The community contributes to some extent to the financing of the infrastructure, organises the payment for services and manages the functioning of the water supply and sanitation schemes. Many NGOs also involve the users in the design of the infrastructure set-up itself, as the example of AVAS in Bangalore shows (see Box 4). In the last few years, the development of microcredit has played a great role in the sustainability of such schemes. Most of the time, these NGOs also tend to play a lobbying role alone or through network of similar organisations. This is typically the case in Mumbai where SPARC works very closely with the National Slum Dwellers Federation to lobby for resettlement land, access to property for slum dwellers that used to be located along the railway lines and for adequate sanitation schemes. Through their leader, they might have access to the water boards/departments but the interaction remains limited5 and does not lead to actual collaboration in the fields between community workers and employees of water boards/departments. In fact, municipal authorities are not always aware of these initiatives (apart from a specific case like Mumbai, where the Mumbai Sewage Disposal Project brings interaction between the Corporation and SPARC) and have an engineering approach to providing services. Direct cooperation with the communities’ representatives or through the intermediary of NGOs could prove beneficial for all the parties. Especially, corporations/Boards’ possibility to extend services is very limited and is driven by the concept of extending the number of water connections to new areas, which is not feasible in most slum areas. The knowledge that NGOs have on the way to deliver services, especially sanitation in these areas could be optimised if collaboration with the public sector were pursued. Which form should it take and how it should be institutionalised need more thought: One could argue that a specific cell could be dedicated to the service delivery to the lowincome households and relationships with NGOs. However, it is likely that such a cell would not attract the best persons of a public sector undertaking and would have difficulty to be sustainable. We would rather believe that at each decentralised unit of the corporation/board one or two engineers will be trained to work with NGOs and understand the requirements of low-income households. Beyond the projects led by NGOs in the low-income settlements, there is also a large number of forums, civic associations and networks of resident associations that interact with the public sector and have a lobbying role. A famous example is the role of the public affairs centre in Bangalore which regularly conducts large survey on user satisfaction with public services and publish the results in a very large manner (booklet, seminars, meetings where the public servants are invited) (Paul and Sekhar, 2000). In Chennai, the role of the civil society is accepted and is part of various committees: (i) an independent committee of consumers held once every two months and that is constituted of five members; (ii) ward committees meeting held at the ward level held every month and in which the engineer of the ward goes; (iii) a joint council held every three months and headed by the Mayor. Clearly, interests of various NGOs can be different, from NGOs protecting the interest of the poor to resident associations of upper middle class settlement. Therefore, the participation of all segments of the civil society is important to allow water boards/departments to devise long-term policies taking into account all the various interests. The existence of NGOs and lobbying groups that are concerned either by water supply, sanitation or solid waste disposal is a common characteristic in all Indian metrocities. This reflects the thriving role of the civil society in urban India. However, in many ways, despite their numbers and voice, these NGOs still work on the margins of municipal action. Just as public-private partnership are nonstarters in spite of being largely promoted in conferences and policy papers, public-NGOs-civil society 5 In Bangalore, for instance, for the first time, in 2000, the then Chairman of the Board decided to organize a meeting between his Chief Engineers and one or two NGOs, which were unknown to all the Chief Engineers. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah partnership are rarely explored. The only exception might be the city of Ahmedabad where the Municipal Corporation had an agreement with SEWA, a well known NGO (WSP, 1999b). The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation developed the infrastructure and SEWA provided micro-finance to self help groups in the communities. It might be interesting to follow up on the sanitation scheme between Bombay and SPARC and the potential investment of the civil society in Chennai in programmes such as the rain water harvesting issue to assess whether public undertakings and administration are better able to cooperate. This is certainly of importance for improving services, especially in low-income areas where the expertise of NGOs could be used as a mediator between the communities and the engineers of public undertakings, who have never been trained and educated to work in these types of settlements. To conclude, the present situation is rather of an under utilisation of structures that could be developed through a generalisation of micro-credit and a sound coordination between the utilities in charge and the NGOs, presently near to inexistence. Box 4. The action of Association for Voluntary Action and Services in Bangalore Avas has been involved in slum development for around 20 years and is well-known in Bangalore. They undertake community development with a staff of 10 community workers, 20 people involved in the communities and three technical members on the team (they, therefore, can do physical planning, for underground drainage for instance). Some of their projects have been considered as very successful and AVAS also works with some government agencies and can therefore channelise some public funds to develop some projects. Context of their action in a specific slum The slum is constituted of 683 families (3,000 to 4,000 people). The dwellers were previously staying near the airport and were relocated in 1985, in a settlement on private land without infrastructure. The first role of AVAS was to ensure the land rights (they made identification cards of all the families residing in the slums to give to the various authorities) Water Supply There are three borewells with submersible pumps (charity funds). The design and layout of the taps have been done with the participation of the communities. For each tap, there is a two women water committee. These women allocate the number of buckets per family according to the daily supply. There is a water man from the community (paid by the community Rs. 3000) who operate the mini water supply schemes. Toilet facilities There are inadequate municipal toilets. So AVAS has built two more toilets to suit the requirements of the community. Water is supplied to one borewell. For each of the toilet, there is a person from the community who is paid Rs. 900 per month for its maintenance. Solid Waste Management A man carries a cart with dustbins and a bell and collects the solid waste every day. Other activities A school for children; regular community meetings to discuss matters related to community actions or to family/individual problems; a programme to register each family in order to put pressure to the corporation to give official property rights and a saving programme handled by the community in order to pay for all the services and exceptional services decided in common assembly. Contributions of the community Each household pays Rs. 15 per month for maintenance, toilet, water, garbage collection and electricity. Families have contributed free labour for the construction of the toilets- each family provides one day of labour otherwise they have to contribute Rs. 50. From a total of 683 families, they collect money from around 500 to 550 families Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah 5.2 Calcutta Results of a first field visit bring out a paradox in Calcutta: even though there are numerous NGOs, no stronger one works on water issues despite the poor performance of the Corporation. The presence of NGOs is more evident in waste recycling and health issues, without noticeable cooperation with the Municipality. However, as mentioned and elaborated earlier, the specificity of Calcutta lies in its informal sector in solid waste recycling and use of waste water for agriculture and fisheries. Then the core of the problem is in the development of collaboration between the Municipality and the unorganised sector. The Municipality should first legally acknowledge the existence of the ragpickers and integrate in its policy the fact that they provide an economic service as well as economic wealth. The Municipality should even in this sense financially support the structuring of the ragpickers communities, either directly, or through NGOs. Quoting EEF (2000), “the idea of enhancing NGOrole and resident welfare associations in solid waste management system is not to make the municipality a non-functioning entity. Rather, the NGOs and associations should be able to play both a supportive and questioning role and not merely be co-opted. NGOs should in turn realise that the municipality should continue to play a major coordinating role in solid waste management. 5. 3 Chennai The case from Chennai illustrate attempts by NGOs and community groups to partner with the State to initiate policy processes, create policies and get them implemented. The first major environmental voluntary initiative was to abate water pollution and restore urban waterways in the city. The initiative called Citizens for Clean Waterways (CCW) was spearheaded by Indian National Trust for Arts and Cultural Heritage (INTACH). The approach was distinctively to build partnership to complement the incapacity of the government and the local authorities and their underutilisation of the shaping and implementing of environmental policies (Tropp, 1998). This was built by exerting pressure on the government to formalise partnership arrangements. Though such an arrangements led to the preparation of an Action Plan for the urban waterways, it merely remained in paper. The partnership could not move beyond this to implement the Action Plan and it gathered dust after being submitted to the State government. The revival of this initiative by EXNORA, a leading NGO in Chennai, under the new name of WAMP (Water Management Programme) was based upon a new strategy by raising the issue through media support. The project was presented from such a perspective that it would be wise for politicians to improve their image via the media to project themselves as being environment friendly (Ibid). To some extent, this kind of bargaining process resulted in improved access to information on the pollution and reports related to these and also place water pollution high on the political agenda, rather implementing them. Exnora clearly emerges as a major NGO in Chennai. First of all, as mentioned earlier, it has a strong lobbying action with the Metrowater Board to build toilets and to rehabilitate storm water drains. Exnora is also part of the consumer committee of the Metrowaterboard, as well as the vigilance committee. Exnora is also involved in water sector and mostly in the solid waste sector. Regarding water supply, in slum settlements, Exnora helped in forming committees among the dwellers to organise the distribution through tankers. These self help groups can be found in 800 areas of the city spread over 3,300 slums (both of small and large size). Regarding solid waste disposal, Exnora trains a large number of people to collect waste at the household level and to dump it at sites where composting activities are carried out. Another initiative highlights the stronger commitment of various types of citizens towards changes. This initiative is a public-private partnership in promoting National Water Harvesters Network- Tamil Nadu Chapter. It formalises the existing informal network between the corporate builders and few Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah enthusiastic civil servants that had led to widespread adoption of the roof-top rainwater harvesting in Chennai and also making them mandatory at various building space. The network emerged at the initiative of the International Conference on Water Harvesting organised by Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi. The initiative attempts to promote rainwater harvesting through the involvement of various stakeholders. The network is led by a Task Force comprising members actively involved in the promotion of rainwater harvesting: (i) corporate builders who had been practising rainwater harvesting on roof-tops of the residential and industrial complex; (ii) civil servants who actively support such initiative, (iii) active citizens/ experts and (iv) the media. Since the formation of the network and the wide media coverage, it has led to emerging rainwater harvesting efforts in many residential, public and industrial complexes (see section 4). 5.4 Delhi In Delhi, a large number of NGOs and lobbying groups are involved in the sector. Some of them are locally based but, Delhi being the capital, many of them have an all India activity, like Sulabh Sauchalya, the Centre for Science and Environment and INTACH for instance. They have various roles: a role of contractor for the Corporation such as Sulabh International, a voluntary action to provide services to selected settlements, a lobbying role and a strong opposition role to influence the policies of the Corporation. We shall only present a limited number to provide examples of the various types of interaction they can have with the MCD. Sulabh International is a typical example of an NGO that collaborates strongly with a corporation. It is an internationally famous organisation for the development of various types of low cost sanitation solutions and for its implementation in many Indian cities, but particularly in toilet complexes of Delhi. Sulabh International gets contract from MCD to implement these complexes and believed in the concept of pay and use for infrastructure. However, cross subsidies are put to place,. Therefore nominal prices are charges in slums to provide services. Despite this, various field studies indicate that households do not rely so much on Sulabh. In fact, in some way, Sulabh’s functioning could be equated with the action of a normal contractor. ACORD (Asian Centre for Organisation Research and Development) is another organisation (a registered society) trying to collaborate on the issues of solid waste management with the MCD in organising the informal sector in waste collection and at source separation. It is also involved in the Yamuna action plan. Many other NGOs got involved, not on the issue of service delivery, but on the question of the Yamuna pollution. The Centre for Science and Environment brought a lot of information in the debate on the pollution of the Yamuna. It got relayed by other NGOs, such as Pani Morcha who filed cases against the Delhi Government regarding the unacceptable pollution level of the river. This led to the already discussed Supreme Court order and the Yamuna clean drive. INTACH, a national trust has had a more constructive interaction with the municipal authorities by proposing alternative plans to improve water resource conservation and waste water disposal. Some of their proposals are today being implemented. To sum up, Delhi hosts a large number of small NGOs as well as national or international NGOs that do intervene on the “water” debate in Delhi. The Centre for Science and Environment is certainly the most famous in India for its many campaigns on rain water harvesting and at the international level for its intervention on all the international treaties related to environment. However, as of today, apart from small NGOs that have a limited action in some of their areas, most of the interactions between the municipal authorities and the other organisations is a conflictual one. More coordination is Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah required at a political level as well as the daily functioning of the DWB, or for that matter of the other municipal departments. 5.5 Mumbai In Bombay, there are solid NGOs involved in the water supply and sanitation sector, such as SPARC (Society for the Promotion of Area Centre) and YUVA (Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action). These two organisations are looking at low cost technology but are mostly involved in organising slum dwellers, mostly women, to operate and maintain the infrastructure, to develop microcredit schemes and to lobby for relocation. SPARC is the most famous one and well known by the Corporation. SPARC has been working for years with the NSDF (National Slum Dwellers Federation) and Mahila Milans. Mahila Milan is a network of women collectives from the communities affiliated, NSDF negotiates and lobbies with the institution for relocation of slum and pavement dwellers and SPARC trains and educates slum dwellers and implement pilot projects in slum settlements. The association of these three organisations have had many successes in Bombay, such as the relocation of a large number of families living near the railway tracks in low-income flats. As far as sanitation is concerned, SPARC has also been doing work for years with women in slums in building toilets that are under the operation and maintenance of the women committee. The links between SPARC and the Corporation exist since at least two decades with the first World Bank projects (Sundaram, 2000) and even more since the last World Bank funded Bombay Sewage Disposal Project. This project contains a slum and sanitation component that includes the construction of community toilets and the collection of night soil to the nearest sewer lines. So far, the project is planning the construction of 170, 000 toilets. There are certain conditions to this programme: it should be demand driven and slum dwellers are to form a community based organisation; slum dwellers should contribute Rs. 100 for operation and maintenance and the money should be deposited in a bank; payments should be made to the sweeper and there should be separate toilets for men and women. This programme concerns only pre 1995 slums. The contract was awarded to SPARC as they have the experience of such schemes and they can also construct the facilities. In some areas, SPARC can also enter a joint venture with some contractors to built the infrastructure. So far, the scheme has just started and it is early to assess its success or not. However, it brings about the beginning of a collaboration between a well known NGO and the Corporation. Mumbai also has a number of associations fighting for measures to improve the quality of life such as fighting for green space (the most famous ones being Citispace and the Bombay Environmental Action Group), air pollution issues et al. A strong initiative was launched in 1999 in the name of Agni (Action for Good Governance and Networking in India). As its name correctly indicates, it is a network of active NGOs, residents’ associations, community based organisations and voluntary institutions amounting to a total of 2000 in Mumbai. The aim of AGNI is to form a link between these groups and mostly to “set governance right”, which they consider that citizens ought to do. The role of AGNI in the last elections was noticeable with an election watch campaign to mobilise citizens to vote, to draft criteria for acceptance of candidates, to organise meetings at the local level with candidates, etc.. Agni certainly reflects the increasing importance of citizen participation in decentralisation of urban governance. However, the Mumbai case also brings about questions left untouched by this paper but that could be further researched. The conflict of interests within the “civil society” is often not considered. In Mumbai, though, the position of NGOs such as Citispace that are lobbying for more green cover and parks is clearly in some cases in total opposition to other NGOs fighting for space to be released for slum rehabilitation. The question, not to say conflict, of “environmental” or “social” development can be perceived extremely differently by the various representatives of the civil society. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Some general recommendations on the civil society with respect to waste disposal Handling and management of solid waste disposal should explicitly, and with financial support, rely on the labour-intensive informal sector. In particular, recourse to international companies for waste disposal should generally be avoided, since the example of Chennai suggests that it is costly because it is capital-intensive. Thus it raises questions on the general affordability for all the city areas. As such, the example of Hyderabad could be considered, where the Corporation also engaged with the private sector. However, unlike Chennai, Hyderabad contracted out small local entrepreneurs, and in areas where NGOs (such as Exnora) had organised household collection through their network, private contractors are collecting waste from the dumping site used by the NGO. This is a potential example of cooperation between the informal sector organised through NGO, small private operators and the Corporation. The existence of a well – if fragile-structured network of informal economic activities in Calcutta, combined with the initial success of an NGO-based experiment in Chennai (later followed by a raise in costs under programme based on international-like management), indicates the promotion of labour-intensive techniques. They should be articulated on and for the poor in the Indian Metros. In terms of transition, this sector is already existing in Metros, and needs mostly to be sustained and strengthened. At present, it is not budgeted at a high level in the Municipalities, and there is no habit of free-collecting of the solid waste. Resident associations as well as local communities are ready (the Chennai experience shows) to pay a reasonable tariff service, since it is in itself funding a viable economic activity (as Calcutta demonstrates). Marginal and targeted subsidies would then only need being catalysts. Conclusion: The share of responsibilities between the State and the Municipality, and how it articulates with a demand-oriented management: decentralisation vs. delegation Water scenarios are city-dependent. If there is a temptation to jointly promote decentralised techniques, decentralised management, and delegation of management, even in some respects to the local private entrepreneurs and communities, one should consider the initial situation, and adopt a more dynamic approach. Indeed, the Chennai example shows both a governance and a technical-cummanagerial solidity of the system that allows capacity-building through delegation and technical decentralisation. Unfortunately, in the Calcutta situation, the need of the time is to make clearer the relationships between the two levels of administrations, and in that aspect the State-level one seems to be the highest standard in governance terms. Hence, based on the sole arguments of short-term costefficiency, a managerial centralisation has to be promoted. This can and has to go along with delegation of managerial power, and technical status quo (slowing down the present course of technical centralisation through progressive abandon of ground water). The classical question of giving water to the private sphere as a concession versus leaving it within the public sphere can be examined in this very framework. Calcutta typifies the example of the classical public Indian type of administrative operation of the water supply and sanitation. There are no credible projects for a large management contract or recourse to the large (international) private water companies. On the contrary, and despite the doubts and hesitations on its possible implementation, Mumbai seems to mostly focus on large international companies supported schemes. Chennai this time is in the intermediary position, as it simultaneously considers local outsourcing for the water supply and sanitation operation, and large private companies as far as waste disposal is concerned. But again questions arise on both the environmental sustainability (without recycling) and the economic sustainability (compared to employment generation and recourse to the informal or NGO sector). The answer on this is not clear-cut, but simply no cost-integrated study has been done. Likewise, in the case of water in Mumbai, a study elaborating on a phased strategy for clarifying the financial intersectoral links, then developing a resource-integrated approach, and only ultimately dealing with a phased out and pragmatic cost-argumented out-sourcing of operation could help in designing a lasting strategy. But unfortunately, it seems that, however ultimately beneficial or costly, decisions and Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah choices mostly rely on un-integrated parameters, like institutional competition, the need to balance a mere impossibility to ensure the supply correctly, or narrow-minded de-staffing policies. To conclude, despite the relative short field work carried out for this paper, it appears clearly that the three case studies chosen reflect various degrees of technical and managerial centralisation. They, somehow, can fit on a theoretical spectrum that goes from an attempt at decentralisation “Chennai”, to a middle path “Mumbai” and to a very centralised model “Calcutta,” even though they share many common features of centralised water boards/departments in India. This raises various issues, both applied and theoretical, that could be further studied in these respective three cities or in any other metropolitan city. The first one relates to the debate on technical centralisation vs. technical decentralisation. So far, the debate is limited to the tenants of technical centralisation, among them mostly engineers of water boards/departments and the other ones that consider that decentralised option such as water tankers, (but mostly rain water harvesting) and the use of local water sources through mini water supply schemes hold the key to service improvement. An applied research on the actual costs for the society (economic and environmental costs) and the potential development of such schemes (identification of actors that can be involved, financing tools required, quality control and monitoring, etc..) could be the first step towards engaging in a fruitful debate. The second major issue deals with the tariff regime (water and sewerage charges, connection fees and various taxes) to be applied. This matter is related to all the other topics: (i) it is linked to the cost of producing and supplying water (and therefore to the best technical alternatives, i.e. the centralised vs. decentralised debate); (ii) it is one of the key hurdle to management delegation (especially when private sector is concerned), (iii) tariff increase, though clearly required to face increasing costs, is being rejected by elected administrators in order to protect the poorer sections of the society, despite ineffective cross subsidies and considerable entry cost to the piped system that do not benefit these poor. So far, studies on tariff reform are mostly concerned with the changes of water charges and most reforms have looked at reducing the number of slabs in increasing block tariffs, linking water charges to electricity charges, reducing cross subsidies from industrial to domestic consumers and at shifting from flat rates to volumetric charges. Tariff reform should be viewed in an integrated manner and many questions should be addressed. Among them: should water charges and water tax coexist? Should water charges reflect average cost or marginal cost? What should be the financial links between the water budget and the city budget? What should be an adequate connection policy? Theoretical research on this whole topic is, so far, missing. A third topic that could be considered for further research deals with the question of the involvement of the civil society through all its forms: forums (such as the Bangalore Agenda Task Force), nongovernmental organisations and communities themselves. In various examples, the paper has underlined the presence and the role of NGOs and the way they can mediate between the operator and the communities. Despite years of programmes in the field, these NGOs are still not working with municipal bodies. Clearly, there is a scope for stronger partnerships between water boards/departments and NGOs and communities so that services reach all the sections of the society. An applied research on such an example of collaboration and on the criteria for replicability would be useful as well as thoughts on how these collaborations could be promoted among metropolitan cities in India, whether the operator of the system is public or private. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Annexes: case studies II. Water supply and sanitation in Calcutta 1. The physical and supply situation in Calcutta Summary The water supply is, by and large, and apart from pre-monsoon shortages, good in quantity, with a well developed centralised piped system, and relying on a huge source through the Hooghly River. Water supply at present also relies on local ground water for 20%, but projects are on progress to fully adhere to the centralised piped model. Actually, a mere technical approach based on promoting boosting stations rather leads to overflows and huge wastage. The sanitation facilities are very insufficient, especially for the poor, including in Central Calcutta; this is by far not the prior concern of the CMC. Waste disposal cannot be handled by the CMC alone, and the massive recycling informal sector in Calcutta ensures the remaining. This sector, if well structured, is economically fragile, and not supported, despite the savings and added economic value it provides for the CMC and the City as a whole. Lacunas in waste disposal engender severe pollution, health and environmental concerns in various areas of Calcutta, especially in terms of groundwater. Drainage is reasonably good as far as normal drainage is concerned, but far insufficient for storm drainage. Treatment hardly exists. To sum up, in Calcutta, there is no concern for local and technically decentralised solutions: promoting a local recycling and disposal of waste would lower the costs, improve pollution and water loss issues, and hence make the present recourse to ground water sustainable, thus lowering expenditures in new projects. Section D explains why the nature of the CMC and of its institutional arrangements precludes it to do so. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation The Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC) is in charge of the sector for Calcutta. It has been set up through the CMC Act, 1980. Calcutta has a 4.5 million population, plus a floating 2 million dailycommuters. The Act came into force in January 1984. It extended the boundaries of Calcutta by including the Municipalities of South Suburban, Garden Reach and Jadavpur within Calcutta. The number of wards of the corporation was raised from 100 to 141. Most significant is the introduction of "Mayor-in-Council", with all the attributes of the Cabinet form of government. The object of the new Act: to make the Corporation more efficient and effective a) To ensure these functions will be decentralised through the Borough Committees; b) To vest executive power to the elected members of the Mayor-in-Council and Borough Committees at the central and local limits to be able to render the best service to the local residents; c) To separate the Corporation totally as a deliberative and policymaking body from the executive functioning. The Corporation has 141 wards, further grouped into 15 boroughs. Each Borough has a Committee consisting of the Ward Councillors. They look after functions such as Water Supply, Drainage, Collection and removal of Solid Waste, Disinfection and Health Immunisation, Bustee Services, Lighting, Repairs of certain categories of roads, Maintenance of parks, Drains and Gullies. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah The Water Supply The CMC has 171,000 house connections in the city, for a total number of connections of 334,000 (source : ADB 1997) and has been supplying 250 MG of water per day (1100 Mld) to the 141 different wards in the city. However, World bank led consultants (2001) show that, if piped supply is 24 hours in Northern Calcutta, many areas in Central have « extreme shortage », while some areas in Southern are only supplied through groundwater (more precisely, 86 wards are supplied through surface water only, 14 through ground water only, and 41 through both systems). By 2001, the volume of treated water supply is expected to go up to 326 MGD, and most of this will be potable drinking water6. Apart from the drinking water, there is an additional 55 MG of unfiltered water for fire fighting, street washing etc7. There are primarily two sources of water in Calcutta: (a) surface Water, and (b) ground Water. The source of the surface water is the River Hooghly. One of the intake points is at Palta, some 30 kms away from Calcutta. At Palta Water Works, 225 MGD of raw water is treated every day and of this about 180 MGD is supplied every day. Another intake point from the River Hooghly is at Garden Reach, from where Calcutta gets 40 MGD of treated water. The deep tube wells and the shallow hand tube wells form the source of the ground water sources, and this source contributes about 30 MGD. Above this, private tube wells procure additional 40 MGD (power operated: 30, and hand operated: 10, source : World Bank led consultants, 2001). Two major projects are under works : 40–MGD capacity treatment project at Palta, and 60–MGD capacity project at Garden Reach. By simply dividing the daily supply into the permanent population of the CMC, IEP (1996) assesses a 250 lpcd water supply, but agrees that « actual availability however can be determined by considering the loss due to wastage and the consumption by day-time commuting population, industries and other establishments ». The actual figure becomes then quite less. Official figure for unaccounted for water stands at 30%, from a study conducted as far back as 1976 by CMDA (IEP, 1996). A World Bank led team of consultants (2001) estimates that transmission losses are 33 MGD, and distribution losses are 10 MGD, while another 10 MGD is lost in stand posts serving the floating population (absence of taps). All together, they conclude with a matching 35% figure, while ADB (1997) gives an estimate of 50%. As far as the network is concerned, during the last five years, approx. 17 kms of old and leaking pipes of small diameters have been replaced. Approximately 150 kms of new pipelines of different diameters have been installed. As well, approximately 35 kms of new 60" diameter pipelines have been installed to reduce the wastage of water. All rights over the subsoil water resources in the Calcutta municipal area are vested with the CMC. At present there are approximately 6000 licensed tubewells and an equal number of unlicensed (these numbers have roughly doubled in last 15 years)8. 30 MGD are drawn from the underground water table. The Palta and Garden Reach projects are intended to provide additional 100 MGD and unauthorised digging of deep tube wells in the city. During the last five years, almost 60-65 reserve mains have been installed, along with three boosting stations (capacity 18 MGD, to be extended with five additional stations for 17.5 MGD within a couple of coming years) to improve the distribution of treated water to many distant wards of the CMC, but some NGOs have declared it has also resulted in constant overflowing of private open-air tanks (resulting in a loss of 10 MGD). Average supply duration is 10 hours. World bank-led consultants (2001) believe that «successful transformation can be made by changing intermittent system to continuous system very quickly if the government authorities decide to take quick action. The cost for such transformation will be willingly borne by the consumers as they generally pay a high coping cost ». This shows how far the CMC has a technical-oriented and not a service-oriented approach. These costs have been estimated by a survey at 6 Source : CMC. The latter, it has to be noted, is supplied through a separate conduit. 8 Source : CMC. 7 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah 1000 Rs yearly for city residents. The same survey has concluded on a willingness to pay for better service by an amount of Rs 68 per month for multi-storey building inhabitants, Rs 44 for other house citizens, and Rs 21 for slum dwellers. Apart from this, the CMC also undertakes the supply of water in tankers to different parts of the city. The rate of charging for supplies through tankers is Rs 300 per trip. The charge is for 3600 liters of water and for carrying a distance up to 8 km. On an average, 225 trips are made daily, supplying 0.8 Mld. From a survey conducted by Disha (1996), one can extrapolate that the poor of Southern Calcutta (poor of Southern Calcutta live for 60% in slums, and 40% on pavement) are mostly supplied through public hand pumps, at 80%, but 20% from private ones. This has to be compared to Central Calcutta, where the huge majority of the poor (80%) is pavement dwellers, 100% supplied through pipelines. In West and East Calcutta, the CMC roughly supplies all the poor, through handpumps in East, and pipes in West. Solid waste The Conservancy Wing of the CMC is directly responsible for the removal, disposal and management of garbage and solid waste. Calcutta produces on an average about 2500 million tons of garbage everyday. Out of this 95% of the waste is disposed off at Dhapa by landfilling, and the balance 5% is distributed between two points at Maheshtala at Garden Reach and at Noapara under the Dumdum municipality. The biomedical wastes are disposed of by a separate sanitary landfilling arrangement with the approval of the West Bengal Pollution Control Board at Dhapa. Almost 85% of the 2500 tons of garbage is collected and disposed off every day, according to CMC. EEF (2000) gives another figures: 3100 tons per day, up to which 70% are collected by the CMC (i.e. 2170 tons per day), 10% by private entrepreneurs, and 20% remain uncollected. The collected garbage in the vats and containers is transported by covered transport vehicles to the disposal grounds at Dhapa. Everyday covered transport vehicles make about 470 trips to dispose the collected garbage at Dhapa. There are also about 40 points in the city where the accumulation is high, and in order to minimise the time of removal, mechanised payloaders are used instead of hand loading. Apart from the above, almost 45% of the total collected garbage is transported by hired lorries. 50% of the garbage is disposed of by the CMC’s disposal infrastructure and about 45% by private organisational means. But EEF (2000) recalls that « some 20% of the garbage remain uncollected daily ». Thus one shall not neglect that if waste disposal is taken care of by the formal sector, the waste recycling is carried out by the informal sector. The IEP (1996) calls it the « two-world system of Calcutta ». Separation of materials takes place both in the city –where some areas are even specialised in this- and outside, at the dumping ground. The figure of 2500 tons per day is then an intermediate figure: it represents less than the actual production of waste, since a part has already been recycled at the dumping stage, but more than the final residu, since recycling again takes place there. Also, there is an interesting system of agriculture at the top of the dumpings, as well as the use of drainage and sewage water in ponds fisheries, informally organised. At the dumping stage, 56% of waste is compostable, 44% is not (IEP, 1996). As far as efficiency in waste disposal is concerned, Giri and Dey (1992) have observed that cost per ton of solid waste disposal is higher by 50% in Calcutta, compared to Mumbai, and that the number of solid waste workers per thousand of population is more than double in Calcutta, compared to average Indian cities9. Cost of solid waste disposal can be roughly segregated into 70% for collection, 25% for transportation, and 5% disposal. According to IEP (1996), municipalities in the Calcutta Metro pay 17% (this is decreasing in relative terms, it used to be around 20%, though 9 More recent figures available unfortunately date back from 1980, as 6.3 per 1000, compared to 2.8 per 1000, available in Giri & Dev (1992). Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah growing in absolute terms) of their revenue for waste disposal, « primarily with manual labour » (around 80%, EEF, 2000), for a staff of 15,000 people working in municipal conservancy systems. Now, manual workers are paid a Rs 4000 a month by the CMC, while non-unionised workers hired by private contractors are paid a Rs.1,500. CMC may be tempted to engage in that private subcontracting, but no clear policy is announced, neither in terms of human resources, nor in terms of cleaning objectives. Compared to recourse to private contracting in pumping stations in the Chennai water board, this Calcutta scheme is not even leading to any capacity-building. This cost for complete cleaning is actually structurally higher but kept low through the work of ragpickers and itinerant traders, as EEF (2000) claims that the CMC « is unable to clean Calcutta completely everyday ». EEF (2000) shows that hundreds of people do this activity, but that its sustainability is questionable. Indeed, as far as itinerant traders and local receivers are concerned, EEF gives emphasis on the discrepancy between « immediate settlement of dues with the suppliers », and « delays in receiving payments from the buyers ». It underlines that « the level of ‘self-exploitation’ seems to be very high amongst the group of entrepreneurs and their family members ». From interviews, another structural issue seems to be the high level of intermediation in that sector. Ultimately, EEF concludes by stating that « the useful work done by the recoverers is not at all reflected in ensuring a sufficient income ». Overall, the CMC needs acquiring a 600 large-scale waste container. The financement would be of about Rs 1.7 billion for a period of 20 years (EEF, 2000). In the southern and eastern edges of the city, recourse to private entrepreneurs has been sought, who charge a Rs 20 per family, monthly. EEF indicates that the ultimate limit for privatising the municipal conservancy service is in the allocation of a part of the property tax to private entrepreneurs. As far as pollution is concerned, IEP (1996) states that « a large number of waterbodies have been lost or are being lost by solid waste dumping and even waterways are being used as dumping sites ». Thus, infiltrations issues arise. Disha (1996) states that, in ragpicking areas in Dhapa, levels of chloride were found ranging between 290mg/l and 415 mg/l, to be compared to the norm of 200. Total dissolved solids have been found up to 1070 mg/l. Reengineering and utilisation of garbage is being (marginally) promoted. A compost plant has been set up by Eastern Organic Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd., with a daily intake capacity of 700 MT. The garbage is delivered to the plant free of cost, and the company pays the CMC 2.5% of its net turnover as royalty per annum. Yet another project for the production of compost is underway, which will utilise about 300 MT of garbage everyday. Sewerage & drainage Almost 80% of the water supplied by the CMC goes into the drains and sewers. The total length of the sewerage & drainage network runs to about 2563 kms. But at the same time, the CMC admits that nearly 50% of the city does not have an underground sewer system. This difference between the two figures underlines the insufficient level of the underground sewerage system in Calcutta, and its spatial and geographical imbalances . In areas not served, mainly sanitary latrines and septic tanks are used. Yearly, the CMC faces a huge deficit over its drainage and sewerage activities, as revenues are estimated at 842 crores in 2001-2002, for 6802 crores expenditure (in 2000-2001: 701 and 5242 respectively)10. 10 Source interviews in CMC : SE drainage. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah 2. The financial position, tariffs and cost management in Calcutta Summary Services by the CMC are hardly billed and paid, and it is run as a technical and expenditure based administration, aiming at political/electoral outputs and objectives. Neither for the development of equipment (mostly taken in charge by CMDA and CMWSA), nor for the operation, the costs are a matter: technical and administrative procedures are followed, and the information available to CMC officers for a cost based management is an astonishingly poor one anyway. Commercial & tariffs There is no organised customer relation in CMC. Only nine officers are specifically dedicated to that, for a number of 1500 complaints monthly (15% stoppage of water, 10 % breakage, 10% contamination). The NGO « Concern for Calcutta » has made an unsuccessful attempt to establish such a service. Metering has been recently installed for 40 industrials (up to a level of 2500 industrial and commercial important consumers), at a Rs 10 per 1000 litres. This brings an annual 6 millions rupees. The « Calcutta water supply management project » is in progress, financed by the World Bank. It consists in installing flow meters at 50 production and pumping stations, installing water meters for 100 large industrials and commercials, and metering all consumers in Ward n° 63. This is a feasibility project in order to shift in the future from payments through property tax to tariffing the water on a volumetric basis. From ADB (1997), financial figures are avilable for water supply only: O&M is 12.0 MUSD yearly, capital expenditures are 4.6 MUSD yearly, the billed amount is 2.3, for an actual revenue of 1.7, that is, a revenue/O&M ratio of 0.14. Some services are charged. For instance total charges for a house drainage connection amount to Rs; 650 . However, CMC is mostly collecting revenues from allocation from the tax property collection, rather than from direct charges for service. It is due to allocate 30% of the property tax to water as well as sewerage and drainage. This is in practice subject to realisation of property tax collection. In recent years, with an efficiency in collection of around 50%, the CMC has been able to allocate the equivalent of 9 to 15% for water and 7 to 10% for sewerage and drainage. Balance has to be given by the State government, for reaching the ‘30% consolidated rate’ (this is actually not fully transferred). Over all its activities, CMC gets 50% of its funding from State Government transfers. Budget for 2001-02 is, in million Rs, 568 as 30% consolidated rate, 246 and 84 respectively for non-tax revenue, while the expenditure are resp. 1078 and 680 for water supply and drainage. Thus, the gap is of Rs 859 million. Under the ongoing World Bank project, metering and increasing of tariffs is scheduled. It is planned to (i) to meter all the industrial and commercial consumers from 2001 to 2003 (25,500 meters, for a capital expense of Rs.143 million), then (ii) to meter all large domestic consumers (multi-storey buildings, for 17,000 meters and Rs 76 million) from 2003 to 2006, then (iii) to meter all other domestic from 2006. If the proposed tariff revision at Rs 3/m3 for domestic and Rs 15/m3 for industrials is followed, this will generate a respective Rs 1471, 144, and 300 million per year starting from the metering date (source: World Bank led consultants, 2001). 3. The set of institutions: coordination and new arrangements in Calcutta Summary CMC by and large operates a water supply network. It is developed and ultimately financed by the CMDA and CMWSA, which also supplies the treated water. Hence, the system is ultimately financed by the Govt of West Bengal. For which these organisations complain not to have the operational Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah control over the distribution network. Hence there is a discrepancy between the CMC which owns the control rights over the network, and the State organisations which own the financial rights (understand: bear the financial consequences) linked with a merely technical operation and absence of management properly speaking. Financial links and disputes are actually set up through political ways, at the Secretary level: these bodies can hence be considered as (i) not autonomised, and (ii) improperly articulated. Needless to say that, in this context where the CMC actually externalises the development of its water supply system, in the absence of such organisations in the waste disposal and sanitation fields, it is ultimately less able to tackle with these. In fine, these are also perceived as less of a direct political concern. No schemes either for internal delegation of power, or well-contracted outsourcing of activities, or coordination with groups or NGOs are noticeable. This is clearly a lack in the governance of the city of Calcutta, as compared to other Indian Metros. Institutional share in responsibilities Different institutions deal with water supply, drainage and sanitation. Beyond the CMC, at the Metro level, the other municipalities, and the CMWSA (Calcutta Metropolitan Water Supply Authority) are concerned. For sewage treatment, CMWSA, but also CMDA (Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority), and the PHEDepartment of the West Bengal Government (GoWB) are involved. CMWSA has been attached, as a department, to CMDA, and both depend from the GoWB. Solid waste disposal is the duty of CMC, CMDA as well as the municipalities. CMDA was wet up in 1970 as well as the Government of West Bengal Chief Minister is his ex-officio Chairman. It is responsible for the building of infrastructure on water supply, sanitation, transport, housing, and urban health for the municipalities of the Calcutta Metropolitan Area, covering a total population of 12 million people (up to which a third depends from CMC directly). Created before the CMC creation Act, 1980, CMDA has inter alia financed the extension of the Calcutta piped system and the treatment plants feeding Calcutta. From early 80’s, decentralised planning has been partly developed, CMDA showing earmarked budgets and remaining responsible for the expenditures, commissioning and building of infrastructure. Officially, the municipalities, hence CMC, are requested to take charge of the O&M expenses. Some examples of CMDA projects can be given : The Calcutta Slum Improvement Programme (CSIP) was designed for a population of about three lakhs slum-dwellers residing in 185 slums in 15 municipal wards of Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC) area, have been completed over a period of seven years. The infrastructure facilities extended to slum beneficiaries in these wards as on March 31, 1999 include 4,62, 807 sq. m. of paved road, 2,456 nos. street lights, 19 deep tubewells, 62,512 m. of water mains, 1,16, 633 m. of drain and 8,473 sanitary latrines. The estimated completion cost of the project stands at Rs. 4,630 lakhs ; Water Supply Augmentation Scheme - Rs.1,125 lakhs ; Calcutta Primary Grid, Phase II - Rs.692 lakhs ; Calcutta Distribution System Upgradation - Rs.1,516 lakhs ; Garden Reach Water Treatment Plant - Rs.1,419 lakhs ; Augmentation of Garden Reach Water Treatment Plant (Phase II) - Rs.5,907 lakhs ; Sewerage and Drainage Projects of Calcutta (cluster) Rs. 393 lakhs (source : CMDA, 1999). Calcutta Metropolitan Water Supply Authority (CMWSA) is the key State institution, founded in 1965, and funded by the Government of West Bengal. It employs 1,200 people and actually supplies part of the treated water to the CMC (Sirampur, 20 MGD, and Garden Reach). It has also, beyond the CMC limits, a rural role, through 160 deep tubewells, selling water to Panchayats (equivalent of 6,000 households), or directly sold to consumers at Rs. 30 per household per month. The total operation costs of the tubewells of CMWSA are Rs. 16 million per year, notwithstanding the maintenance. It recovers 65% of its total costs. But, on the surface water sold to municipalities including the CMC, the results are very bad, since «municipalities do not realise water tax from consumers», interviews show. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah O&M costs are 18 crores yearly, notwithstanding the establishment budget (a large part of it comes from the power bill, regularly paid to WBSEB and CESC, the interviewed officer mentions. As of now, the CMC owes 182 crores (that is the equivalent of nine years arrear payments) to the CMWSA (and other municipalities in the CMDA area, another 35 crores). CMWSA also directly takes charge of bulk consumers in Calcutta. CMWSA projects are directly funded by the GoWB, and dues are simply booked in booking accounts, under political arbitrage. Thus, the delineation between different organisations is mostly moving on political basis, both in financial and operational/administrative responsibilities terms. CMWSA is partly a technical building agency, executing expenditure programmes, and not realising investments (an officer did not understand this term in interviews and asked «what do you mean exactly by ‘investment’?»). This complicates the picture and leads to a dilution in responsibilities that results in inaction as far as costefficiency is concerned. Interviews in CMDA illustrate clearly enough this institutional mess. From the 74th Amendment of the Constitution onwards, local bodies have had their word to say in water supply planning. Projects are decided by municipal planning committees. But then, as far as implementation is concerned, it mostly actually remains in the hands of CMDA, at least for surface water treatment. Indeed, if in groundwater, some municipalities get involved along with CMDA (being in that case contracting out to other builders), in surface water CMDA actually builds the facility. Even, in inter municipal schemes, its Board (mayors of Calcutta, Howrah, Minister in charge, Chief Minister, etc.) appraise the plans and allocate the shares. The choice is then largely resulting from a political combination of centralisation and decentralisation. Moreover, when the infrastructure is built, what happens is that the municipalities (CMC first) do not commit to their duty to take over the facilities and take charge of O&M costs. Some attempts at writing guarantees of taking over have been tried. But they only concern the pipes, and not the treatment plants, further not solving the problems linked with arrears on existing treatment plants. The same is true for sanitation : from 1983, underground pipes have no longer been promoted, replaced with open air drains and onsite septic tanks, making the beneficiaries partly pay, since the city of Calcutta was not. The question is then to know whether operation, and especially commercial operation of these infrastructures, should not be left to CMDA, which already plans, builds and maintains these facilities, free of charge to CMC. 4. Alternative services and the poor in Calcutta Summary NGOs are numerous in Calcutta, but NGOs involved in water as such do not exist, are rendered of less immediate use through the policy of quantitative availability of the CMC, despite the cost inefficiency and environmental damage it results in. NGOs are more present in waste recycling and health issues, without noticeable cooperation with the municipality. The specificity of Calcutta lies however in a well structured informal sector in recycling of solid waste and use of waste water for agriculture and fisheries. But this sector, structured on private entrepreneurs, and not NGOs, is not supported in any scheme. Poverty EIP (1996) stands that « more than a million children live on the streets of different cities in the third world, of which about 10% in Calcutta ». It estimates that the Calcutta Metropolitan Area (CMC and surrounding municipalities) count more than 5,000 slums, for 25% of the population (World Bank led consultants, 2001), that is, 1 million people, and that 52% of the CMC population lives in huts. This population is served through 11,000 stand posts. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Sanitation & health Disha (1996) provides data in a relatively small survey done on the ragpickers population of Calcutta, for whom more than 70% use open field for defecation (even for people from Central Calcutta, this figure is above 40%), and around 20% have access to community latrines. Considering them as broadly representative of the slum dwellers population may give estimates on the sanitation picture in Calcutta. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah III. Water supply and sanitation in Chennai 1. The physical and supply situation in Chennai Summary The water supply in Chennai is ensured by the Water Supply & Sewerage Board, constituted on 1.8.1978 by an Act. Compared to other Indian Metros, the situation is characterised by a structural shortage of resource. The share of ground water is relatively high for the Board water itself, further complemented with a large amount of extra-Board supply (36% of the supply is not rooted through the board). It serves a population of 4.6 million, living in 174 Sq. Kms. It serves 3.10 lakhs «consumers» only, in spite of charging municipal taxes from 4.87 «assessees». 80% of the water is from ground origin, which is the particularity Chennai faces in India, due to scarcity of local surface sources. Treatment capacity is of 620 mld11, and the water actually produced about 480 mld in good monsoon years. Indeed, overall, there is a water resource shortage in the Chennai area. In 1999-2000, due to monsoon failure, the piped water supply had to be reduced from 440 to 250 mld. The official supply figure is 110 lpcd for the connected users. But in 1999-2000, during the months of drought, the Board could maintain piped supply for about 70% of the population only, at the rate of about 55-60 lpcd. The Board’s water only accounts for 64% of the sources. Another 4% comes from private tankers, 10% from community tanks & wells, 21% from in-house wells. Another estimate, for normal months, is that the Metrowater system provides 44% of the consumption. Solid waste management is mostly taken care of by the Chennai Municipal Corporation. Sewerage and sanitation is relatively poor, despite the fact that the Board gets a good amount of its financing through an afferent tax. In that scarcity context, the board has initiated recycling and re-use experiments, that have to be acknowledged and duly recognised. The waste water treatment capacity is of 268 mld, with a network of 119 pumping stations, fed by 2,60,838 sewer connections. Up to now, treatment is of 60% of the Board-water (thus a substantially lesser percentage if one takes into account the non-board supplies), divided in 5% re-used by the industry, 10% re-used by the electrical industry, and 45% put back to rivers, interviews in the sewerage wing of the Board show. The area suffers from the lack of perennial rivers, from a rainfall pattern of a short duration, and from storage capacities that are anyway limited, given the proximity of the seashore that alters the thickness of the aquifer (few meters only). The Board has engaged into leak detection and rectification works, rainwater harvesting (with NGO's, Voluntary Groups and Consumers' Associations), control and regulation of ground water extraction (Ground Water Regulation Act, 1987) and re-use of secondary treated sewage for industrial purposes. But ultimately it is very surprising that an integrated vision of the resource within a cycle is still not generalised, and that no techno-economic comparisons are made between the long term cost of recycling water and the long term cost of such high capital intensive projects, as the Krishna river canal. The Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board was constituted on 1.8.1978 by an Act. It serves a population of 4.6 million, living in 174 Sq. Kms. The operation of the Board has just been realigned under a 'Zonal Distribution Network', into 16 zones, or « sub-system consisting of water distribution station, underground tank/overhead tank, pump house and pumpsets, transmission mains to convey treated water from the water treatment plants to the water distribution station and a network of distribution system » (source : CMWSSB, 2000). It serves 3.10 lakhs «consumers» only, though it charges municipal taxes from 4.87 «assessees». 11 Figures by 1999 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah The Water Supply 80% of the water is from ground origin, which is the particularity Chennai faces in India, due to scarcity of local surface sources. The board enjoys the monopoly of extraction at Manali Hills, both the first ground source and industrial district of Chennai Area. Treatment capacity is of 620 mld12, and the water actually produced is about 480 mld in good monsoon years. Indeed, overall, there is a water resource shortage in the Chennai area. In 1999-2000, due to monsoon failure, the piped water supply had to be reduced from 440 to 250 mld. Piped water is distributed through a 1853 km long pipe system (total length of mains), and has 2,16,000 water connections (1,16,000 in 1978, the figure is of 2,33,000 for 2000, according to the intermediary report of the Twinning Arrangement program, conducted by the Générale Des Eaux). With those not served through the piped system, the total number of consumers is 3,10,000, out of which 10,000 are metered. The total number of distribution stations is 1613, it used to be only six two years ago. Most important sources are at Manali Hills, but the Board also buys a 20 Mld from farmers, under a tripartite agreement between the Water Board, the Electricity Board, and the farmers. Over recent years, plans have addressed to distribute additional water from the Krishna river project (from 1996 the Krishna water is received, and has enhanced by 200 mld the supply). Next development includes the withdrawal of 530 mld of raw water from Chembarambakkam tank treatment and clear water transmission mains from Chembarambakkam treatment plant to the city, to be completed by 2004. Let us detail the tripartite agreement with TNEB (Tamil Nadu Electricity Board) and farmers. Farmers are paid Rs.26 per hour for running by the board, and have to run 18 hours a day for it (producing in each borewell 400 kl/day). The electricity is directly paid by the Water Board to the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, at a rate of 3 Rs/kWh, to be compared to Rs 2 for domestic usage and 75 paise for small domestic usage). But, if this scheme provides easy money to these farmers, as it is often felt in local debates, this also highlights the fact that there is an implicit rural/urban competition for water in the Chennai area : MIDS (1995), states that « water for urban/industrial uses can be obtained by restricting the water used in agriculture ». The statement is not so much of a direct competition than of a better use of the resource, since « irrigation consumes 70-80% of the water resources of the State, even small efficiency improvements will release substantial quantities for non-agricultural uses ». The official supply figure is 110 lpcd for the connected users. But the area faces severe droughts, and in the year 1999-2000, during the months of drought, the Board could maintain piped supply for about 70% of the population only, at the rate of about 55-60 lpcd. For the remaining 30%, water supply had to be temporarily provided through 5500 stationary tanks and also through mobile supply by about 3800 lorry trips per day (35 mld). During the May 2001 drought, interviews have confirmed that the level had dipped down to a 35 lpcd, with one third of the piped streets being actually empty, due to low pressure, and tank supply by the Board has gone up to 50 mld. Groundwater was extensively used, through a total of 5000 pumps, especially for poor and slum dwellers. Beyond the official system, experts quote the figure of additional one third for local, unofficial, ground water extraction. The CMWSSB figures shall however be complemented with the private sources of water. Indeed, the Board’s water only accounts for 64% of the sources. Another 4% comes from private tankers, 10% from community tanks & wells, 21% from in-house wells (WSP, 1999). Another estimate, for normal months, is that the Metrowater system provides 44% of the consumption (Murugappa, 1997, after a survey on 10,000 households). But this figure must rather stand for the domestic part of the all-users segmentation. It is especially worth comparing with sample surveys conducted by the company Economic Perspectives. The survey covers 4,500 users, domestic, non-domestic, or on public taps and hand pumps, or on mobile truck supply. The preliminary results of the survey show that 85% of the 12 13 Figures by 1999 In 2001 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah domestic consumers14 have their own source (71% of them have a bore well, and 28% an open well). 5% of the domestic users use the Metrowater for drinking only, 3% for drinking and cooking, 70% for drinking, cooking and kitchen washing, 19% for these usages plus clothes washing, 2% for all purposes. Seven percent of the domestic users consume mineral water and 26% use the water tankers of the Board. As far as non-domestic users are concerned, 82% have the metro-water connection, but 75% have their own additional source (91% borewell, 8% open well), and 60% are actually piped supplied, of whom only 76% acknowledge a sufficient quantity. People on public taps/tankers15 are segregated as such : 56% taps or pumps, 44% on tanks. 44% of all the surveyed people use the metrowater for all usages, and 56% use it for drinking and cooking only. 63% of these people feel the supply is insufficient. The usage of the water supplied by the board, is then a differentiated usage. Solid waste Solid waste management is mostly taken care of by the Chennai Municipal Corporation. But it is anyway interesting to relate an experiment that has been taking place for a few years, prior to a limited contracting out to the society Onyx. The NGO Exnora had started a scheme, providing job to 3,000 « street beautifiers », approximately covering a 15-20% of the city (source : interviews), each one being paid Rs.1,000 monthly, shared by households in a range between 30 and 100, and additionally earning an average Rs. 500 through their own reselling of segregated waste. At a macro-level, Exnora’s estimations are that the share between organic and inorganic is of 50-50 (with only 10% nonrecyclable). Sewerage & drainage The waste water treatment capacity is of 268 mld, with a network of 119 pumping stations, fed by 2,60,838 sewer connections (2106 km of mains). From 1995, a 180 Crores have been spent in : the construction of 60 new pumping stations; improvements to 56 existing pumping stations; and improvements and expansion of 6 sewage treatment plants. Plans to treat an additional quantity of 264 mld (Rs.615 crores in treatment plants and Rs.640 crores in strengthening the system accordingly) are proposed for the next 10 years. Up to now, treatment is of 60% of the Board-water (thus a substantially lesser percentage if one takes into account the non-board supplies), divided in 5% re-used by the industry, 10% re-used by the electrical industry, and 45% put back to rivers as interviews in the sewerage wing of the Board show. In practice, the survey carried out by Economic perspectives gives a clear idea of the situation : while 100% of their ‘domestic users’ have toilets and 99% a sewer connection, for people connected through public taps and pumps, only 44% have an access to toilets. Up to these 44%, only 44% are connected to sewers, 18% to storm water drains, 33% to septic tanks, and 5% let it out into canals. Water conservation policy The area suffers from the lack of perennial rivers, from a rainfall pattern of a short duration, and from storage capacities that are anyway limited, given the proximity of the seashore that alters the thickness of the aquifer (few meters only), interviews confirm. The Board has engaged into leak detection and rectification works, rainwater harvesting (with NGO's, Voluntary Groups and Consumers' Associations, see Singh, 2001), control and regulation of ground water extraction (based on the Ground Water Regulation Act, 1987 that applies for above 5 HP pumps for commercial purposes ; in practice, there have been no new licenses from 1993, and no renewal from 1997), re-use of secondary treated sewage for industrial purposes. The latter deserves being illustrated. One oil refinery, a fertilizer plant, and a power plant have set up treatment units, supplied at total 60 MLD of secondary sewage effluent by the board. Regarding rainwater harvesting, a survey conducted by Economic Perspectives shows that only 2% of the domestic consumers actually harvest rain water, while 48% 14 15 60% of the domestic users disclose their income, and the average is 5636 Rs monthly. 85% of them disclose their income, with a family income of 1780 Rs. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah declare being keen on implementing, and 17% declare they have no space or money for that. As far as resource conservation is concerned, it shall be noted that the agricultural sector, enjoying free of charge power, sells water for commercial purposes to tankers. Interviewed Metro officers have confirmed that, during drought situations, they do not insist on making the Ground Water Regulation Act applied. In any case, there are loopholes in the Act that reduce its efficiency: penalties are too low to be a deterrent and farmers get free electricity, even though they use the water for commercial purposes. Attempts to reduce leakages have been done in a pilot distribution area, through new taps and non corrosive techniques. Interviewed officers declared it had brought down the leakages from 24% down to 6%, but this measure still has to be generalised and sustained. More substantially, 1.7 lakhs connections up to 3.1 have been recently renewed at a cost of 160 crores. According to the interviews, this very measure has been the principal one in allowing the supply on a daily basis during droughts (during earlier droughts it was on an alternate basis). The economic rationale of this measure, fully supported by the Board, is that, though it does not allow serving more water, it allows to increase the base of the consumers : once the pressure in pipes improved, new connections become feasible. 2. The financial position, tariffs and cost management in Chennai Summary The Board has managed last year to cover its operational expenses with a surplus (total income of Rs. 207 crores in 1999-2000, for a the total expenditure of Rs.181.5 crores, and a net surplus of Rs. 25.5 crores). However, the capital expenditure still come from or are rooted through the State Government, raising the issue of the long term sustainability of the water supply & sanitation in Chennai. More precisely, if the State Government has, from 1997, taken the step not to provide financial support, it goes on rooting the World Bank loans that it ultimately guarantees. The Board is presently considering an indexation of tariffs on a RPI minus X formula. As of now, the Board is still close to the functioning of an administrative body as far as revenues are concerned. Indeed, a noticeable part of the ‘operational’ revenue (27%) comes from the collected tax, which is rather an administrative prerogative than correlated to any supply or sanitation. As far as financial results are concerned, its importance shall all the more be highlighted, since increase of the tax value explains 64% of the total increase in ‘operational revenue’. Interviewed officers stated that in return of these taxes, « there is no necessity to provide service » and that « they are advances to implement schemes ». However, as far as capital expenses are concerned, in 1999-00, 165 crores have been granted by the Government, while total loans from the Government amounted to 656 crores, and loans from financial institutions only 129 crores (CMWSSB, 2000). Overall efficiency in collecting taxes varies year wise between 80 and 90%, while bills are collected with a level of 80% only, interviews show. To sum up, and as far as water supply is concerned, the board gets more than half of its water operational income from 40 big consumers only. It can retain them only on the basis of the Ground Water Conservation Act, that is, as a depositary of the public authority. For other consumers, it has, as shown here, an administrative behaviour. Then, the statement made during interviews that «the Board has shown operational profits from 1996 and real profits from 1998» has to be re-examined in light of the fact that the Board does not supply piped water to all its users, nor provides a large sanitation, though it goes on collecting « taxes ». Indeed, in terms of organisational efficiency, the Twinning arrangement report states that for the year 1999-00, the collection ratio is of 81.5% only16. Evolution of the total arrears has been from 161 debtor days in 1996 to 221 in 2000. Commercial The commercial aspects, in the spirit of the Board, only pertain to their « consumers », who are 3.10 lakhs, though they charge taxes from 4.87 « assessees », actually behaving as a municipal administration. In a situation of recurrent drought, the population is concerned with the ability of the Board to face it. The Board indicates (CMWSSB, 2000) that, from the 1980s, it has been able to decrease cost per capita and per month from 10 to 1.67 Rs, as on 2000’s value. It mentions as a 16 1636 crores billed, 1332 collected, and thus 304 of arrears. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah success that, during 1998-99, totally 1,88,620 complaints were received and redressed, whereas during 1999-2000, total number of complaints received and attended was 1,66,610 only. However, it can also be noticed that (i) investments had been made already by that time, taking into account the structural dimension of droughts, and that (ii) the private supply sector had also by that time quite developed. Compared to Calcutta and Mumbai, various measures were taken in the last few years to better relations with the consumers through improving billing and collection, providing information and through various committees involving other institutions, the elected representatives and the civil society. Until 1997, billing and collection were separate departments. Since 1998, this department was abolished and billing and collection has been merged at the depot level. Therefore, it falls under the responsibility of the depot engineer who has to achieve specific targets. Apparently, this change led to drastic improvement in collection from 60% to 120% (including arrears). In addition, the work culture has changed and the relationship with the consumers has bettered (source : interviews). At each area depot, where bill collection takes places, various leaflets are freely available and provide information related to the overall water and sewerage situation in Chennai17 as well as specific information on the distribution area. This is part of a well thought policy to become closer to one’s consumer that led to the set up of an information cell headed by an Information and Facilitation Officer (IFO). This officer is in charge of external communication (public relation with newspapers, meetings with NGO,…), supervising the complaint cell, developing information leaflets and the citizen’s charter. In addition, there is an area IFO. The IFO works directly under the Executive Director who is in charge of all the other actions of public relations for the Board. Among them are the various committees: (i) an independent committee of consumers held once every two months and that is constituted of five members; (ii) ward committees meeting held at the ward level held every month and in which the engineer of the ward goes; (iii) a joint council held every three months and headed by the Mayor; (iv) an industrial service committee held every three months constituted of three members of the Metrowater Board and three members of the Manali Hills industrial association. This office has also contracted out for 3 years Economics and Perspective to conduct consumer survey on a regular basis for a cost of Rs. 2.4 millions. At the end of the three years, all the consumers of the Board would have been surveyed and their level of satisfaction assessed. All these efforts do not exist in Mumbai and Calcutta and there is no doubt that the Metrowater Board has developed adequate tools to inform its “consumers” about the service rendered. However, this cannot hide the considerable supply problem faced by the Board and therefore cannot be a substitute in terms of satisfaction level. Costs The Board reports the total (operational) cost of water in 1998-99 to be Rs.12.48 per kl18. The Board has calculated, that, at a subsidised flat rate of Rs.50/- per month for 2,37,943 consumers, « assuming an average size of the family to be five, and a supply at the rate of 70-100 lpcd, every household is subsidised to the extent of about Rs. 850/- per year » (source : CMWSSB, 2000). The Board also underlines that « the number of employees per thousand connections which was of the order of 70 during 1986 has drastically came down to 27 during 1998-99 ». Notwithstanding financial charges, revenue expenditure can be split like this : Power & chemicals : 20%, O&M : 11%, drought expenditures : 8%, employees : 45%, hire of water lorries : 16%19. Tariffs The Act specifies that the Board shall levy a water tax and a sewerage tax, which « in the case of water tax shall not be more than twenty per cent and in the case of sewerage tax shall not be more than ten per cent of the assessed annual value of the premises ». The actual is much lower. CMWSSB (1991) 17 Water sources, daily supply, number of connections, revenues and expenditure, etc.. This cost however includes not only the transmission, treatment, distribution, but also the waste disposal, that is not separately taken into account, but for which the costs are simply divided by the total served water. 19 These expenses actually represent 42% of total expenses, and remaining 58% are financial. 18 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah gives respectively a water tax by 1.5% and a sewerage tax by 5.5% of assessed annual value. These are deemed to be paid whatever the users are actually supplied or not, or even whatever the residents are actually in piped network connected (supply and sewerage) zones or not. But the Board also enjoys tariffs. Metered tariffs are, broadly: for domestic : 2.50 Rs/kl for small consumers (less than 10 kl monthly), increasing upto 25 Rs/kl beyond 25 kl. Commercial is billed at 25 Rs/kl upto 400 kl, and 50 Rs beyond. Users of public fountains collectively pay Rs.400/- per fountain per month including maintenance charges, while mobile water supply to slums is charged Rs.4/- per kl. The Board also proposes mobile water supply to its consumers, at Rs.600 for every load upto 12000 litres, or to private tankers, at Rs.30/ kl, at its filling points. Conversely, non-metered tariffs are: Rs.50/-month for an individual house or per flat; Rs.150/- for partly commercial; Rs.200/- month for non-intensive commercial water ; Rs.400/- month for intensive commercial water. From this, it is clear that there are cross-subsidies. Indeed, in terms of quantity of water consumed, the commercial consumers’ share though is only about 16% of the total water supplied, while they contribute about 46% of the Board’s revenue. On the other hand, the domestic consumers though contribute only 40% of Board’s income and continue to consume about 69% of total quantity of water supplied. More than that, only 40 consumers (all located in the Manali Hills area) account for 96% of the amount collected from all commercial consumers (Rs. 7,400 lakhs out of Rs. 7,708 collected in 1999-2000, see table below). It indicates a strong dependence of the Board on this consumers that have to be wooed every year so that they do not exit the municipal system. From water supply rates, a 25% surcharge is generally added for sewerage of this water. Table III-1 : Water supply and sewerage revenues of CMWSSB, in lakhs Rs (source : CMWSSB, 2000) 1999-2000 1998-1999 Domestic metered 868 443 Commercial metered 7708 7683 Others metered 1057 706 Domestic unmetered 1548 1312 Commercial unmetered 887 786 9 5 Sale of Treated Sewer Water 377 345 Mobile Water Supply to Private Customers 359 324 Sewerage Charges 807 688 Water Tax 1114 572 Sewerage Tax 3913 2098 Total 18646 14963 Others unmetered The table shows that the collected tax is, if not the majority, a fair amount in the revenues of the Board (27%). This amount, it shall be recalled, is collected irrespective of whether the supply is actually done or not, and whether the sewerage is actually ensured or not. This part of the revenue is thus Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah closer to the functioning of an administrative body, rather than a corporate entity. The increase of revenue is largely imputable to administrative increase of the tax value (it explains 64% of the total increase). As far as connection charges are concerned, the procedure has been simplified as any civil engineer can approve the demand for a connection. Costs for a new connection, like many other Indian cities, are high: Rs. 2000 for water and Rs. 3500 for sewerage. In the case of low-income households, payments can be made in three instalments. However, this figure is certainly too high to enable poorer households to connect to the system. 3. The set of institutions: coordination and new arrangements in Chennai Summary CMWSSB has engaged in openings to private sector, that are innovative in the Indian public sector. It has interestingly taken stock of its past experience and issued some general lessons, that are extensively reproduced here. CMWSSB (2000) states that under limited local availability of capability for large-scale operations, « writing of contract documents is an important area where more expertise is needed; quantification of risks and risk allocation play a major role in response/economics». But it notices that «on construction and operation contracts as the contractor gains basic operational experience during mandatory operation and maintenance period is in a better position to properly assess the risks », and concludes by the fact that « areas requiring large manpower input with less complex operations offer greater scope for privatisation and hence economical ». This indeed goes along with the Board’s policy to reduce its staff expenses. It also underlines limitations in the writing of contracts that are well known by academics and practitioners, such as: the lack of the private sector’s legal responsibility related to accident for environment or living beings, lack of legal provision for compensation of loss due to lesser output, or lack of framework for compensation for losses due to improper quality and with regards to the obligations not met by private operator in respect of labour related issues. Institutional share in responsibilities Let us examine the autonomy the Board enjoys. It shall be noted first that it remains fully integrated to the Governmental sphere, since : the Chairman of the Board is the Minister in-charge for water supply, and comprises the water supply Secretary to Government, as well as the finance Secretary. It is, however, rooted in the municipal corporation as well, since the Member-Secretary of the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority and the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Chennai are also part of it. To balance these, the Managing Director is appointed for a period of « not less than three years as the Government may determine and the person appointed shall be eligible for reappointment » (source : CMWSSB Act, 1978). Compared to other Boards in the country, it has the facility to go for external loans. It must however seek for the previous sanction of Government for schemes and works, if superior to 10 million of rupees in the case of replacements, reconstruction, and 75 lakhs of rupees in the case of new works including extensions and additions to existing works. As far as these amounts are concerned, the area of discretionary power of the Board is therefore limited to execute externally aided projects, but provided the Government accorded previous sanction, and adopt any maintenance work, irrespective of the cost. Even as far as power to write off irrecoverable amount, the Act specifies that « the Board shall, before writing off such an amount exceeding 25,000 rupees, obtain the sanction of the Government ». Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah The Board as per the Act enjoys the regulation power concerning the manner on which taxes shall be levied, the charges for consumption of water, but with the approval of its Chairman, that is, ultimately, the State Government Minister in charge. New institutional arrangements: so-called ‘privatisation’, or rather outsourcing of operation The Chennai Metro Water Board has involved the private sector by entrusting the operation and maintenance of a water treatment plant (since 1997), water production wells and several sewage pumping stations (this started in 1982 and almost half of the 118 stations are operated by 24 different companies). Interviews in the Board have attested that the policy is merely conducted at the pace of retirements, under a perspective of savings on human resources. However, this has undoubtedly generated a capacity-building for local Indian entrepreneurs and, as the CMWSSB (2000) shows, led to savings. For instance, a 56% savings is achieved on operation and maintenance of well fields; 18.5% on water transport through private lorries; 65% on maintenance of sewage pumping stations; 33% on maintenance of sewerage treatment plant. Only the maintenance of water treatment plant has shown an excess cost by 14.4%. This is done along retiring of the employees of the Board, that used to have 8,300 employees in 1994, and 5,400 in 2001 (with an objective of 4,000 in the mid-term, source : interviews). In practice, the Board goes on paying the expenses, and the private partners’ expenditures are limited to a monthly Rs 2,000 in pumping stations for instance (source : CMWSSB, 2000a). Overall, maintenance has however to be improved. For instance, the Economic Perspective survey points out that 77% of public taps and pumps are collectively maintained by their users, 13% by self users, and only 10% by the Board. CMWSSB has also engaged in a joint venture licensing agreement with a private company for producing and marketing packaged drinking water. The firm constructed the plant and production has started from December 1999, with responsibility on quality remaining with CMWSSB. Delegation of powers and internal management Compared to the Corporation structures in Mumbai or Calcutta, the Board has, in Chennai, initiated or achieved noticeable steps in improving the overall management of the resources. Quite of importance in the general context of Boards in India , the CMWSSB has for two years promoted preventive maintenance, which CMWSSB (2000) declares « has resulted in substantial cost savings as also increased efficiency and productivity ». In practice, the Board has changed many procedures, and formalised them through Memorandums of Understandings, signed with the Area Engineers. The aim of the principal aspect of the MoUs are to fix targets of 80% of collection over the receivables (CMWSSB, 2001). The « financial delegation of power », which is, in actual terms, not a proper delegation in the managerial sense, but rather an administrative delineation of responsibilities that still includes seeking for administrative clearances by the hierarchy, has anyway been modified in 1998. Now, Executive engineers enjoy a Rs. 2 lakhs delegation, and even Assistant Engineers a Rs 5,000. More important, the number of hierarchy levels to actually clear the so-called « delegated decision » has been reduced from three to two (the two steps of estimates and technical sanction have been merged, an officer now only has to directly seek for the « administrative sanction »). The internal delegation of power still remains an administrative and a board-like one, but it is among the highest in a Board structure in India. Internal management also goes with improvement of reporting. The intermediate report of the Twinning Arrangement (Générale des eaux) concludes that « from a compilation of the figures reported by the depots and areas offices during the diagnostic review, it appears that 78% of properties have access to distribution main within the CMWSSB’s area. This compares with the 96% reported in the Annual report ». Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah A study on institutional options is also being carried out by KPMG (through some DFID findings). The rationale of this study is to divide the Board into Strategic Business Units (SBUs). There is a debate within the Board regarding this report, especially concerning billing and collection. KPMG proposes billing and collection to be a separate SBU while the Board policy (see above) has, on the contrary, integrated billing and collection with operation at the ward level. Contracting the Water lorries Supplying water through lorries, though more expensive, has still to be done due to scarcity of the resource, that precludes using the piped system a normal way. It is partly done through contracting annually with 500 owners20 of 750 lorries, grouped in a tankers association, for a total of 5,500 trips a day. Interviews show that, compared to the total production and transportation cost of respectively Rs 6/kl and Rs 2.5 per kl for surface and ground water (and a total of Rs 14 when including distribution and sewerage), the cost of lorries water is of Rs 8 for production plus transportation to the filling point, and then additional Rs 19.5 per kl from the filling points to the final users. This is monitored under a cadre contract, where the trip is paid Rs 176 for a maximum return journey of 16 km per trip21. The lorry owner association takes part in the vigilance committee held every Saturday and train the driver in order to avoid any problems with consumers. Information on the non-members of the association has been collected through an interview of one of the earliest independent and leading lorries owners. They purchase their water from farmers, around 30 km outside the city (despite the Ground Water regulation Act), and pay Rs 50 per load to the farmers, to sell it out between Rs 480 or Rs 500 for large customers (foreign consulates, universities, hospitals, hotels), up to 550 for private residential consumers. There are around 700 to 800 lorries in the city and 150 companies. Out of these 150, 10 are large companies and the remaining ones own only one or two trucks. Apparently, the increase of private water tankers has led to an increase in competition among existing companies but at the same time, due to considerable water scarcity, there is up till now place for all these companies. 4. Alternative services and the poor in Chennai Summary In Chennai, the poor population is estimated at over 1 million people, out of which around 400, 000 live in non organised slums. According to surveys, households not connected to piped water, most of them being low-income households have an average income of Rs. 1780 per month. Water in slums is mostly provided with standposts and public fountains or through water tankers contracted out by the Board like other Indian cities. However, the Metrowaterboard has developed some dedicated schemes to the poor household such as the one to provide water to a fishermen settlement. The Metrowaterboard contracted out a private contractor to build, operate and maintain a desalination plant, whose cost of operation and maintenance is very high. This scheme is an ample proof that this kind of project is not sustainable and that the Metrowater board is not yet able to find adequate solutions to improve the situation in poor settlements apart from providing costly engineering answers. Water to slum dwellers is provided free and connection charges can be paid in three instalments. This is typical of tariff policies towards the poor in Indian cities. Cross-subsidies on water charges are high but the question of connection cannot be solved as the entry fee to connect is too high. 20 The lorries owners association declared that some other 100 owners remain outside, but contract on similar basis. 21 The owner declared that they generally owned lorries before going into this agreement with the Board. They declared per trip costs of 20 Rs insurance and road tax, 15 to 20 Rs for the driver and 7 to 9 Rs for the cleaner. Compared to transportation of edible oils at a rate of 11 Rs / km, they earn more with water if the distance is not at the 16 km maximum. Also, they enjoy regularity in contracting « a seven days business » and an « easy maintenance » since the trips are within the city, and there is « no delay in payment ». Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Exnora definitely appears as the main NGO in Chennai and has both an action in the field as well as some recognisance with the Metrowaterboard.: (i) it helped in forming committees among the dwellers to organise the water distribution through tankers; (ii) it also carries a strong lobbying action with the Metrowaterboard to build toilets, to rehabilitate storm water drains; (iii) and it is also part of the consumer committee of the Metrowaterboard, as well as the vigilance committee. Poverty The poor population is estimated at over one million people (the official figure given by the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board is 1.4 million for 2001, up to a total population of 4.2), out of which around 400,000 live in non organised slums while the others live in settlements developed by the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, set up in 1970 (TNSCB). According to the Economics and Perspective survey, households not supplied through piped water, most of them being low-income households have an average income of Rs. 1780 per month. One of the main issues in rehabilitating the slums comes from the administrative processing of this rehabilitation by the TNSCB. Indeed, prior to rehabilitation, the TNSCB has to administratively ‘notify’ the slum, that is, to acknowledge its official existence. This can be done only for those slums which are not encroachments on other private properties or public lands allotted for other purposes. Practically, only 13% of the slum dwellers are in the housing board or TNSCB land. Another 32% is ‘private’, not segregating between private owned by the slum dwellers and encroachments on private (source: TNSCB). For the remaining parts, the Board cannot legally improve their local situation, but is due to remove them in resettling schemes. Such visited resettlement schemes sometimes show a lesser sanitation facility than some slums where, over time, the dwellers had developed facilities on their own. Moreover, even the Water Board is supposed not to legally provide the connections to these slums, nor to provide fixed sanitation schemes. In practice, the public boards and corporations mix temporary schemes and close eyes on illegal “humanitarian” measures. These measures of course do not appear as such and are integrated in larger programmes. A mark-up can be given from the slum improvement, rehabilitation, urban renewal and repairs programmes of the TNSCB, that have amounted to Rs 2.4 Billion from inception of the Board to 2001, compared to 32.5 Billion Rs for housing programs in the same period. The former programmes have, in total, benefited 760,000 families, while the housing programmes have concerned 160,000 families. A survey conducted in 1977 by the TNSCB mentioned 1202 ‘notified’ slums in then Chennai, housing 1.62 lakh families. The Board has, from then, built 60,000 flats. With migration and the process of notification of previously un-notified slums, in 1996, there remained 993 ‘notified’ slums, for 95,000 families (the Board considers 4.5 persons per family). Estimates by the TNSCB are about 70,000 families in un-notified slums (30,000 in road margins, and 40,000 in river margins). The last notification occurred in 1982 and, from that time, the un-notified slums have remained at best left on their own. Water supply, sanitation and health Water in slums is mostly provided with standposts and public fountains or through water tankers contracted out by the Board (according to Economic and Perspective, the distribution is 56% taps or pumps and 44% tanks). Wells are still used by low-income households. Till 1997, there were water charges to poor households but now water is provided free. Connection charges for low-income groups can be paid in three instalments but as mentioned earlier, this remains too substantial a cost to enable slum dwellers to connect. Regarding sanitation, there is a policy to provide sewer connections in slums. So far, 30,000 connections have been provided through some MLA funds and with the help of the Corporation as it is a government supported project. In the slums developed by TNSCB, the Slum Clearance Board develops itself the infrastructure. In one of the settlement that was visited, the quality of the infrastructure was not satisfactory: standposts were provided without taps, the reason being that water is provided on an intermittent basis. Therefore, in the future, if water is provided on a 24 hour basis, these standposts will be contributing to the wastage of water. As far as economic affordability is concerned, rehabilitated families have to pay a Rs.150 per month rent for 20 years to be granted the final ownership of the flats, for a population the Board Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah estimates having a Rs.1000 to Rs 1400 monthly family income. The Slum Board estimates that 70% of these rehabilitated people have a connection to sewerage, and have an average water supply of 25-30 lpcd. Another example illustrates the lack of sustainable solutions found by these institutions to provide water supply to poor settlement. One specific scheme developed by the Metrowaterboard is to supply water to a fishermen settlement where piped water supply is not within reach. This settlement, called Nochikuppam, is at the end of the Marina beach and water available is brackish and is unfit for drinking purposes. To supply water to this community, the Metrowaterboard contracted out a private contractor to build, operate and maintain a desalination plant. The cost of operation and maintenance of the plant is high as well as the total cost of production (around Rs. 35 per KL)22. In addition, the process that was followed to attribute this contract was not really clear. It is, however, a scheme that the Metrowaterboard considers one of its best action in favour of low-income households despite the cost issue, the small number of people that benefit from this scheme. This scheme is an ample proof that this kind of project is not sustainable to provide water to low-income households. On the contrary, the very high cost of production (Rs. 35 per KL) is a deterrent for any other project of this type. Presence and action of the NGOs The most important NGO in Chennai that is concerned with water supply, sewerage and solid waste disposal is Exnora. It started its operation in Chennai and from then carried out its activities in other cities (especially in southern cities like Hyderabad). Regarding water supply, in slum settlements, Exnora helped in forming committees among the dwellers to organise the distribution through tankers. These self help groups can be found in 800 areas in the city spread over 3,300 slums (both of small and large size). Exnora is, however, mostly well known for its action regarding solid waste disposal. They train a large number of people to collect waste at the household level and to dump it at sites where composting activities are carried out. There is also a strong lobbying action with the Metrowaterboard to build toilets, to rehabilitate storm water drains that are used for sewage. Exnora is also part of the consumer committee of the Metrowaterboard, as well as the vigilance committee. In the consumer committee, they are discussing issues such as frequency of water supply, staff attendance and the Exnora representative in the committee considers that there has been an improvement in the recent past (source: interview). In the vigilance committee, topics discussed vary from the malpractice of the water tankers (no supply provided, driving problems leading to accidents) to illegal tappings and attendance to complaints. Exnora appear definitely as the main NGO in Chennai and has both an action in the field as well as some recognisance with the Metrowaterboard. In Chennai only, the TNSCB is also working with 99 NGOs, for child labour eradication, fire prevention, channelling of UNICEF funds for water supply and sanitation, capacity building, income generation, and waterborne diseases prevention. A separate wing is in charge of this. Through field visits, the general perception has been that officers in this wing are quite committed, but are generally devalorised within the whole organisation, which remains largely technical, administrative, and housing-oriented. 22 However, the cost provided is not necessary reliable as it was unclear as to whether it included or not the cost of electricity. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah IV. Water supply and sanitation in Delhi 1.The physical and supply situation in Delhi Summary Despite progress and development of new water sources and water treatment facilities, the official figure of 250 lpcd provided by the Delhi Water Board does not reflect the reality of service provision where households have to bear high coping costs for a better supply. Waste water treatment and solid waste disposal are also not sufficient. As in Calcutta or Chennai, Delhi’s reliance on groundwater is far from being negligible, especially knowing that a large number of borewells are not registered. The provision of water supply and sewerage are provided through the Board form since 1998 when the then public undertaking (functioning under the Corporation) was transformed indicating a desire to improve the service delivery. The Delhi Jal Board The Delhi Water Board was constituted on 2nd April 1998 by an Act (Government of Delhi, 1998). It replaces the former Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking (DWSSDU, created in 1958) which was a body of the Municipal Corporation and was headed by an Additional Commissioner (Water). The Delhi Water Board Act gives extended power and a larger autonomy than previously. The Board can for instance call for private sector participation. It is constituted by exofficio members and elected representatives. The DWB is responsible for the production and distribution of drinking water, treatment and disposal of waste water as well as water quality control, water pollution monitoring in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Urban) has a population of 9.8 million people that live in an area of 431 sq. km. In addition the Board sells water to the New Delhi Municipal Committee and to the Delhi Cantonment Board. Overall, water needs to be produced for the overall Delhi Union Territory whose population, according to the Census 2001 has reached 12.8 million people over an area of 1,483 sq.km. The Municipal Corporation is divided into nine zones. There are around 1.2 million number of connections (1996 data) and 90% of these connections are domestic ones (domestic consumption represents around 80% of the total water consumption). In addition there are around 18,000 public taps and handpumps operated by the Delhi Water Board. Water Supply Delhi gets almost 90% of its supply from surface water through the Yamuna river, whose flow is largely diverted upstream in Haryana and Punjab through canals for irrigation purposes. Despite interstate agreements and the regular meetings of the Upper Yamuna River Board, there are regular conflicts, especially at the beginning of the summer season, regarding the sharing of water allocated to each State and particularly to Delhi, that has no right on the river. Groundwater represents around 11% of Delhi’s water resources officially, even though pumping of the aquifer by domestic consumers and industries remain a widespread strategy to cope with unreliable supply in Delhi. Some actually estimate that groundwater could represent as much as 50% of the water used in the Capital Region (Rohilla, 1998). Consequently, in the 1990s the water table’s decline ranges from two to eight metres Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah depending on the parts of the city. Likewise, the groundwater quality is deteriorating and there is a saline intrusion and presence of heavy metals, nitrates and fluorides in some areas. Another quality issue is the deterioration of the Yamuna water quality during its passage into the Delhi Urban Agglomeration. This is mostly due to very poor sewage treatment facilities. This question has been raised by a large number of organisations, particularly the Centre for Science and Environment, INTACH and Pani Morcha who filed a Public Interest Litigation against the Delhi Government. Consequently, the Supreme Court, on 10th April 2001, ordered the Delhi government to clean up the river by 31st March 2001. The Delhi government has therefore no choice but to take up this issue by financing a Yamuna cleaning drive that was launched in 2001. When the river reaches Delhi, it is tapped in various treatment plants and water production has been multiplied by six since 1961 to reach around 2730 millions liters per day produced in the following treatment plants: 409 mld are produced in Chandrawal I and II (river Yamuna), Wazirabad I and II (river Yamuna), 908 mld in Haiderpur (Yamuna water coming from the Bhakra Reservoir Storage) 454 mld from the Bhagirathi water treatment plant (upper ganga canal) and only 318 mld from ranney wells. Despite continuous progress in the overall production figures and an official consumption figure of around 250 lpcd (ADB, 1997) the level of service in Delhi is inadequate. Officially, the DWB consider that the water supply gap is within the range of 2000 mld, a considerable figure indeed. However, this figure which, according the Board, is an accurate assessment of the “lack of water” should be under scrutiny considering the high percentage of leakage (at least 30 to 35%), the improvements that could be feasible in the operation and management of the network and in the delivery of services. The level of service in Delhi is inadequate in the city and in any type of settlement. Water supply is intermittent in most of the zones of the municipal corporation and water pressure is low. As a consequence, households have to invest in compensatory strategies that have largely been documented (Zérah, 2000) such as private boreholes or handpumps, electric motors, water filters. The cost of these strategies is as high as 6.5 times the amount paid through bills to the Delhi Jal Board. At the overall level of the city, in 1995, Zérah calculated that the annual cost of reducing water supply unreliability borne by households (that also includes time opportunity cost) was equal to almost twice the annual Delhi Water Supply and Sewerage Disposal Undertaking expenditure. It is very likely that these figures still present an accurate assessment of the impact of lack of adequate services on households. In addition, this figure does not take into account the coping costs borne by slums dwellers. These costs are high (Llorente and Zérah, 2000 and Tovey, 2000). Water consumption levels are low and there are also a lot of qualitative problems in getting water as various sources have to be used and queues, control of access by a small number are problems for most slum families (Haider, 2000). Sanitation & Sewerage and Drainage Sewerage treatment plants in Delhi do not suffice to treat the overall wastewater produced on a daily basis. Due to a Supreme Court order some STPs were rapidly built (certainly at a high cost) but they are not all functioning. In industrial areas, a certain number of Common Effluent Treatment Plants were to be constructed with the contribution of industrialists. However, there is a delay on this and many industrialists are not very satisfied with the situation as they have actually invested money without the infrastructure being built and they are, as of now, not in accordance with the new regulations regarding effluents. Sanitation in low income households is not very well developed despite programmes to provide mobile and fixed toilet complexes in slum dwellings. Surveys conducted in slums demonstrate that half of the slum dwellers do no have access or do not use any type of toilet facilities even if there are Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah available. This has an impact on the health status of the population and explain partly the recurrent outbreak of gastro-enteritis in the summers. Waste water is under the responsibility of the DWB while sanitation falls under the direct responsibility of the MCD indicating the lack of coordination that can occur. Solid Waste Management Solid waste collection and disposal is under the responsibility of the Municipal Corporation, the New Delhi Municipal Council and the Delhi Cantonment Board in their respective areas23. In 1996, the amount of waste generated was estimated at around 8000 tons per day, out of which around 30% remained uncollected. The main sources of waste generation are households (around 45%), markets and hospitals (around 26%) and industries (around 13%). Solid waste is mostly disposed off in low-lying areas at 12 large landfills where environment impact assessment are almost inexistent. There are also two mechanical compost plants (one under the MCD and the other one under the NDMC). In the last few years, in order to improve its collection system that was inadequate (insufficient daily lifting of garbage, bad conditions of dustbins) the MCD is attempting to involve non governmental organisations to liaise between the Corporation and the large informal sector involved in door to door collection of garbage. Delhi is also trying to involve the private sector to produce compost from solid waste. Two plants of 600 tonnes per day (tpd) and 300 tpd capacity producing compost have been put up on build-own-operate (BOO) basis with private partners, Khurana Group and Excel Industries. However, a more thorough study is required to assess the success or failure of these experiences. 2. The financial position, tariffs and cost management in Delhi In Delhi, the actual dependence on loans and grants is comparable to the other cities studied. Tariff structure reflect the importance of cross-subsidies and the pampered situation of Delhi, as tariff are among the lowest in India in spite of the high income of its inhabitants. Improvement has been made towards cost recovery with the computerisation of the billing system but calculations demonstrate the extent of non revenue water in contradiction with most official figures. Summary Tariff policy Certainly because Delhi is the Capital city, the level of subsidies are very high and as far as water supply is concerned, the water rates are among, if not, the cheapest water rates in the country. No increase of tariff was sanctioned from 1989-90 till 1996-97. After the set up of the Delhi Water Board, the rates did increase for most users except for those whose consumption remains below 10 cu m per month. The tariff structure applied in Delhi is typical of tariff structure in India where the industries contribute to a large share of the revenues collected (more than 50%) even though their overall consumption rarely exceeds more than 20% of the total consumption. Secondly, the tariff structure in Delhi has a negative consequence for non metered households, that are mostly located in low-income groups. In this case, the rate is fixed on a monthly basis at Rs. 20 per month (excluding of the surcharge) whether the consumption is low or high. The same household if it had a meter would be paying Rs. 3.5 for a consumption of 10 cu m (excluding of the surcharge). 23 More than ¾ of the National Capital Region population falls under the juridiction of the MCD. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah A very low price of water is theoretically going to push consumption on the higher side, a undesired effect in a situation where “lack of resources” is considered a constraint. It explains the reason why officials in Delhi usually put forward the unreliability of the supply timings as a way to control consumption to compensate for the low price of water. Zérah (2000) demonstrated that this assertion is not valid as there is no correlation between the level of supply and the household consumption. In order to measure the impact of the price of water on the household consumption, Zérah (2000) used the unit cost of water per cu m obtained by incorporating the costs of household strategies. This is a better assessment of the cost borne by the household than the bills paid to the municipality. One can notice that in this case (calculations valid for the year 1995) the unit cost per cu m is much higher (Rs. 3.75) and the correlation between the price and the water consumption is slightly negative. In 2000, the DWB decided to increase the water and connection charges. Water development charges were planned to increase from Rs. 55 per square metre to Rs. 100 per square metre and sewer development charges would go up to Rs. 200 per square metre, from the existing rate of Rs 100 per square metre. It is being made compulsory to apply for both connections together. However, in the case of unauthorised and regularised colonies, sewer lines will be layed before the payment of the development charges. Commercial and billing policy The Revenue department is in charge of the billing and collection. It is organised into 24 zones. In 1994-95 the total arrears amounted to Rs 290 million while the billed consumption was Rs 622 million. Arrears are not negligible and as a consequence recovery rate is rather low (66% - see table below), especially in rural areas. Though, computerised billing, that started to be implemented in 1994, has certainly led to improvement in cost recovery. Table 1 : Recovery rate in Delhi. Zones (in millions Rs.) Arrears Demand Collection Balance Recovery rate Karol Bagh 9 74 73 -10 88,1% West 25 56 58 -23 72,1% Shahdara 23 71 70 -24 74,8% Civil Lines 14 81 67 -28 70,9% Rohini 7 43 41 -8 83,6% City 15 96 98 -14 87,8% Sadar Pahar Ganj 7 36 33 -10 77,6% South 7 54 54 -7 89,0% New Delhi 13 71 73 -11 86,7% Rural 40 31 24 -47 34,2% Head quarter 130 89 69 -151 31,3% Total 290 703 662 -331 66,7% Source : DWSSDU. 1995. This impacts on the non revenue water. According to the DWB, non revenue water is estimated at around 30% (a figure close to the ones provided by the Asian Development Bank). However, in 1995, there is no doubt that this figure is largely underestimated and the result of 60% of non revenue water is certainly closer to the reality (see table 2). This figure, is closer to the level of NRW in other Asian cities, such as Manila (66% at the time of the transfer of management from public sector to private sector) and Jakarta that were actually assessed after the transfer of operation to private operators. As a Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah result, in 1994-95, half of the DWSSDU expenditure were carried out through the loans and grants from the Delhi government, which indicates a strong dependence, in similar lines as what is found in other cities. Table 2. : Estimates of Non Revenue Water. 1994 - 1995. Consumption billed per day by MCD (mld) 1277 Daily supply in the MCD (mld) 2094 % of billed production (DMC) 62% Recovery rate 66% Paid consumption (mld) 843 Non revenue water 40% Source : Zérah (1997). 3. The set of institutions: coordination and new initiatives in Delhi Summary The complexity of institutional arrangements in Delhi is even stronger due to the presence of institutions directly under the central government (Central Ground Water Authority, Delhi Development Authority), the institutions under the State government and the municipal bodies. The high number of institutions involved either in planning, implementing and managing schemes and projects where water and sanitation infrastructure require a high level of coordination is not found in Delhi. For instance, the National Capital Region Board plans the development of water sources for the Capital Region and its surroundings but without much interaction with the planning department of the Delhi Water Board. Such problems lead to inefficiencies and interestingly enough, it has proned the Supreme Court to intervene on matters related to the level of pollution of the Yamuna. The Supreme Court has ordered the Delhi Water Board to address this crucial issue and appears to be playing, to some extent, the role of a decision maker. The Delhi Water Board has engaged with the private sector mainly for construction and operation of treatment plants but has not considered the potential of private operators to improve the management of the distribution system. Institutional share in responsibilities In many ways, the situation in Delhi is quite complex as it is the National Capital Region24 and there is often confrontation between the State’s legislators and the Central Government that tries to keep a control over the development of the Capital. This is even more the case when the State and Central governments are not from the same political parties. Even though the Delhi Water Board is the main institution in charge of production, supply and quality control of water, there are other bodies that also have a role to play regarding the water policy and the management of the resources. First of all, the Delhi Water Board has gained some more autonomy and has the possibility to decide on the introduction of private sector participation and has more freedom to 24 With almost the status of a full fledged State (only the police and the Delhi Development Authority, who develops the Master Plan depend directly from the Central Government via the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah decide on its tariff policy. As a result, the Board is supposed to limit its dependence on the loans and grants from the government. In reality, it is more complex as its board is constituted by ex-officio members and elected representatives. The appointment of members of the Delhi Water Board is not delinked from political compulsions as was demonstrated in 2001 during the electoral period. This actually leads to delays in the functioning of the Board. Similarly, financial independence from the government is not ensured. Therefore, the DWB, like other water boards (see the example of Chennai) actually remains in the government sphere and cannot take major decisions such as tariff restructuring without the approval of the State assembly. Within the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the Slum Wing Department is in charge of squatter settlements, notified slum areas as well as pavement dwellers. This department is in charge of defining policies for this type of habitat even though services, when sanctioned, are to be supplied by the DWB. The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is in charge of preparing the Delhi Master Plan but it also acts as an implementing agency and is therefore responsible for the development of new housing projects in Delhi. The major schemes underway are located in the North and in the West of the city, in Rohini, Dwarka and Narela for 3.4 million inhabitants. In this case, the development of infrastructure is under the responsibility of the DDA and after a period of time it is transferred to the MCD. The well known case of Dwarka is a typical example of lack of adequate planning and of coordination between agencies. The Dwarka housing project, publicised by the DDA for many years, due to its proximity to the airport and its high quality accommodations is supposed to accommodate 1.4 million people. However, there is almost no water and as a consequence a very small number of people have shifted there. This fact indicates a lack of coordination with the DWB. The Delhi Government invited private parties to look at the possibility of providing water supply to the whole of Dwarka through a private contract. However, the approached party did not go ahead due to the lack of information regarding the availability of ground water resources. Recently, the Delhi Government decided to look at the possibility of providing water to this area through rainwater harvesting and a recent project is being supported directly by the Delhi Government. DDA is the planning agency for Delhi but there is also the National Capital Region Board whose role is to develop a comprehensive approach (and a master plan) for the overall National Capital Region (that includes neighbouring towns) and future potential growth towns in Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. The DDA published a Master Plan a few years ago and the NCRB is also devising a master plan. However, discussions between the two institutions are extremely limited. The role of the National Capital Region Board should be coordinated with the Delhi administration as it aims by providing adequate infrastructure and incentives to neighbouring towns to reduce the influx of migrants to Delhi. However, this Board has not managed to really address issues of the overall region to the forefront. Registration of private boreholes has been made compulsory by the Central Ground Water Authority (that depends directly from the Ministry of Water Resources) and which is another actor on the water scene. This authority also promotes strongly, along with the Delhi Water Board, the use of rainwater harvesting. They also conduct surveys on the ground water situation in Delhi. The Delhi Pollution Control Board (that depends on the Ministry of Environment and Forest) also has a role to play as far as controlling the waste water disposal from industries and the follow up of the CETPs (Common Effluent Treatment Plants) that are to be developed in industrial areas. The delays in the setting up of these CETPs are weighing on the waste water situation in Delhi as was mentioned earlier. Another “external” actor plays a role in the Delhi water scenario and this is the Supreme Court that has summoned the Delhi Water Board to build waste water treatment plant to reduce the pollution level in Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah the Yamuna. This is an example of the new role that the highest judiciary authority plays in a sector like the water supply sector. In this case, the DWB had no other option than to act on it and launched a programme of small waste water treatment plant to abide by the court decision. The role of the Supreme court that follows public interest litigation made by the citizens group has certainly influenced the decision to allocate a large budget for the cleaning of the Yamuna. As can be seen from the rapid description of some of the major institutional actors in the water supply and sanitation sector, the situation in Delhi is complex and the lack of coordination (that is quite clear between the DWB and the DDA for instance) leads to situations where the judiciary is required to intervene. New arrangements and the participation of the private sector The DWB and previously the DWSSDU have had initiatives involving the private sector. Zérah (1997) analysed the reasons for the failures of a range of projects that were under discussion through some Indo-French collaboration, such as the SCADA system, the in-situ rehabilitation of sewers and the increase in the yield of the Ranney wells. Apart from the lack of acceptance among the engineers of the then DWSSDU that did not really agree on the project, these failures are also the result of disagreement on technical acceptance as well as financial acceptance. Let us take for instance the project on the in-situ rehabilitation of sewers. One matter of the negotiations was related to the zone in which the pilot project was to be tested. The Delhi Water Board wanted the project to start with one of the toughest zones in Delhi. This was of prime concern to them as problems were acute and needed to be solved. From the company’s point of view, the private company wanted to demonstrate the usefulness of the technology in a zone where risks were lower. Another disagreement concerned the respective responsibilities as far as the cleaning of sewers was concerned. The impossibility to resolve these conflicts led the project to be a non starter. Other projects involving the private sector are underway such as the construction and the maintenance of the Rithala sewerage treatment plant and the recently commissioned Sonia Vihar Treatment Plant. However, most of these projects only concern the production of water or the disposal of waste water and do not have any impact on the overall distribution network. In addition, decisions to involve the private sector were as much linked to compulsions enforced because of the Supreme Court than decisions based on technico-economic analysis. Indeed, the set of deadlines imposed by the Supreme Court to start building wastewater treatment plant were tight. The availability of French assistance to fund some plant’s construction led to the recourse to the private sector as the Board, otherwise, would not have had the possibility on its own fund to start building new treatment plants. Projects were therefore launched because of the availability of international funds and the inability of the Board to finance projects on its own. The transformation of the Delhi Water Supply and Sewerage Undertaking into a Board in 1999 indicates a certain will to make the public undertaking more accountable and more autonomous. However, a simple change of status does not necessarily mean that the functioning of the organisation will improve and be run with a more commercialised approach. Indeed, the DWSSDU was functioning as a very centralised and hierarchical administration and more internal delegation is required to improve its efficiency as well as delinking the functioning of the Board from the political sphere, which is not the case today. There are a certain number of other initiatives that have been initiated mostly by the Delhi Government such as the mandatory development of rainwater harvesting for certain buildings as well as the obligation to register any private borehole to the Central Ground Water Board. To analyse the impact of these measures will require further work. The development of these initiatives can be seen through a double analysis: in a way, it indicates that the Delhi government is aware of the water problems faced by users and try to find buffer solutions to it. However, the delay and the controversies concerning the development of new sources have affected the planning of the DWB which is clearly Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah not efficient enough. Similarly, the real question to be addressed, that is increasing the performance of the actual distribution system through preventive maintenance, leak detection programmes and improved commercial management is left unanswered. To sum up, involvement of the private sector in Delhi exists despite a certain number of non starter projects. However, most of these projects only concern construction (and to some extent the functioning) of WTP and STP and do not address the real issue of improving the distribution system. The changes in the status of the water provider into a Board has not fundamentally changes the internal organisation of the undertaking and is not sufficient to bring about a real integrated approach to improve water management. Publicised solutions such as the development of rainwater harvesting need to be tested at a significant scale to be considered as viable options for a city as large as Delhi. 4. Alternative services and the poor in Delhi Summary There are diverse figures regarding the population living in slums in Delhi but all the surveys conducted in the city demonstrate that the level of service is low and the water consumption is below acceptable levels (around 30 litres per person per day). Solid waste condictions in most poor settlements are abysmal and the access to sanitation facilities is still too low despite the strong presence of NGOs, such as Sulabh, in this sector. NGOs do play a role in Delhi, either by their local actions (such as Sulabh, ACORD for instance) or by their lobbying role to change the policies (for instance INTACH in the promotion of alternatives water sources for the city) and the Centre for Science and Environment that led a campaign to expose the high level of pollution of the Yamuna. Despite a vibrant civil society, collaboration between employees of the Board and action NGOs does not exist and reflect the highly technical oriented approach of the Delhi Water Board. Poverty There are various estimates on poverty levels in Delhi. According to the National Institute of Urban Affairs, the slum population has gone up from 29% in 1981 to 34% in 1991, it means 3.1 million population. The latest data from the Census 2001 assess the slum population at the level of 1.85 million, that is around 19% of the MCD population. This figure is much below the average of 30% that seem to be the norm for the large Indian cities. In this case, a figure close to three million people seem more acceptable. According to Zérah and Llorente (1999), the average monthly income of households in slums is approximately Rs. 2885 , while 7.5% of the household earn less than Rs. 1000 per month and 9% earn more than Rs. 6000 per month. Conditions for water supply and sanitation in slums The level of service provided for the three sectors, water, sanitation and solid waste is not adequate. A large number of surveys in the last twenty years have assessed the evolution of services provided to slum and resettlement colonies. The most recent work conducted (Zérah and Llorente, 1999; Tovey, 1999) arrived at the same conclusion regarding the low level of service: As far as sanitation is concerned, more than half of the slum population does not use any kind of toilet facilities. This is the case even when there are facilities available such as community toilet and bath facilities constructed by Sulabh International. The main reasons are the distance of the facilities, the payment and the lack of cleanliness in a large number of these toilet complexes. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah As far as water supply is concerned, to summarise the situation, most of the slum dwellers have to rely on more than one source to fulfill their daily needs. In selected slums (Llorente and Zérah, 1999), 82% of the households surveyed were using two sources, 24% are using three sources and only 4.5% are using four sources. Water’s availability is limited to around 10 to 11 hours per day and most households do complain of low pressure and mostly of long queues. Tovey (1999) estimated the average queue to be around two hours. This leads to consumption levels, at around 30 litres per person per day, below accepted norms and has an impact on the health situation in most slums. Consequently, the cost of water borne by slum dwellers is significant, even though, it mostly consists of a time opportunity cost. The assessment of monthly cost borne demonstrates that each slum dweller spends the equivalent of Rs. 12 per month and that the time opportunity cost borne equals 13% of their monthly income. Regarding the solid waste management, the in-depth interviews conducted by Haider (2000) in selected slums demonstrate that women, who are responsible for water and solid waste, have no time to dispose the solid waste away from their house and that the municipal authorities rarely clean the interiors of slums and limit their work to the main streets. It once again reflect to some extent the lack of confidence in the public sector. Overall, an interesting factor in the slums of Delhi (and of most Indian cities) is the absence of private water sector charging high prices to provide services. This is partly explained by the presence of free water tankers provided either by the DJB (in summer particularly), by some MLAs (on their special funds) or by charity trusts. Therefore, the main cost borne by households is a time cost. Alternate private suppliers This does not mean that alternative private suppliers have not emerged in Delhi. On the contrary, the emergence of bottled water companies and of private water tankers since the end of the 1980s is very rapid. However, it remains limited to a certain section of the population. Lack of regulation, even though, progress has been done in the last two to three years regarding bottled water testing and quality control, has benefited the emergence of this sector. NGOs, lobbying groups and their interaction with the Corporation As in other Indian cities, the number of NGOs involved in basic amenities and infrastructure provision in Delhi are numerous. They have various roles: the role of a contractor for the Corporation such as Sulabh International, a voluntary action to provide services to selected settlements, a lobbying role and a strong opposition role to influence the policies of the Corporation. The following section will only look at a selected number of NGOs to give examples of the various types of interaction they can have with the MCD. Sulabh International is internationally famous for the development of various types of low cost sanitation solutions and for the implementation in many Indian cities, but particularly in Delhi of toilet complexes. Sulabh International gets contract from MCD to implement these complexes and believed in the concept of pay and use for infrastructure. However, cross subsidies are put in place, therefore nominal prices are charges in slums to provide services. In spite of this, various field studies indicate that households do not rely so much on Sulabh. In fact, in some way, the way Sulabh functions could be equated with the action of a normal contractor. ACORD (Asian Centre for Organisation Research and Development) is another organisation (a registered society) trying to collaborate on the issues of solid waste management with the MCD in organising the informal sector in waste collection and at source separation. It is also involved in the Yamuna action plan. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Other NGOs, like the Centre for Science and Environment is mostly a very powerful lobbying organisation that brought a lot of information in the debate on the pollution of the Yamuna. It got relayed by other NGOs, such as Pani Morcha who filed cases against the Delhi Government regarding the unacceptable pollution level of the river. This led to the already discussed Supreme Court order and the Yamuna clean drive. INTACH, a national trust has had a more constructive interaction with the municipal authorities by proposing alternative plans to improve water resource conservation and waste water disposal. To sum up, Delhi, being the capital, hosts a large number of small NGOs as well as national or international NGOs that do intervene on the “water” debate in Delhi. However, as of today, apart from small NGOs that have a limited action in some of their areas, most of the interactions between the municipal authorities and the other organisations is a conflicting one. More coordination is required at a political level as well as the daily functioning of the DWB, or for that matter of the other municipal departments. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah V. Water supply and sanitation in Mumbai 1. The physical and supply situation in Mumbai Summary In Greater Mumbai, responsibilities for water supply, sewerage and solid waste fall under various departments of the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) and the role of the Municipal Commissioner is pivotal according to Maharashtra municipal laws. Unlike other cities, ground water play no role in Mumbai where water is brought from far which implied a high transportation cost. Mumbai shares with Delhi, the highest level of supply per capita per day (around 240 to 250 lpcd) but large discrepancies in service persist as well as a supply done on a rotational basis. However, the main concern is the abysmal situation regarding sewage and despite being the richest Indian city, only 45% of the population is connected to a sewerage systen and sewerage treatment limited to 20% of the sewerage generated. This situation is trying to be remedied through the implementation of a World Bank financed project. The Brihanmumbai (Greater Mumbai) Municipal Corporation The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC - Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888) is responsible for providing water supply, managing and operating the network, billing and collecting revenue collection from the population of Greater Mumbai (more than 12 million people). In the Water Supply and Sewerage Department, the Hydraulic Engineer’s department who operates under the Deputy Municipal Commissioner (Special Engineering), the Additional Commissioner (Projects) and the Municipal Commissioner is responsible for water supply while three Chief Engineers (sewerage disposal, sewerage operation and Mumbai Sewerage Disposal Project) are concerned with the collection, treatment and disposal of waste water. Other departments such as the water supply project department (development of new sources and conveyance system), account’s department (collection of water charges) and the assessment and collection department (collection of sewerage charges, collection of water and sewerage benefit tax) are working in coordination with the Hydraulic Engineer. The Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 envisages separation of powers between the deliberative and the executive functions making the Municipal Commissioner theoretically an all powerful executive head. Therefore, the role of the Commissioner is stronger than the role of the Mayor, unlike in Calcutta. An important issue, consequently, that confronts the city government is the relationship between the legislative and the policy making bodies on the one side and the executive and the administrative agencies on the other. The Corporation is divided into 24 wards. For each ward, there is an elected ward councillor looking after water supply and sewerage and an assistant engineer working under the Hydraulic Engineer. Water Supply There are around 300,000 water connections in Mumbai. Out of them 80,000 are unmetered in the old city (properties prior to 1964). The distribution among the connections is as follows: 36% in the city, 40% in the western suburbs and 24% in the eastern suburbs. Most of the supply is for domestic purposes (85%). The non domestic demand (15%) has been decreasing over the years in parallel with the decline of water consuming industries (mostly textile and dairies). Water is supplied at the rate of 2980 mld from surface water25. Average supply is around 240 to 250 lpcd. However large discrepancies exist according to the type of settlement and to the type of 25 There were around 5,000 wells in Mumbai that were abandoned because of the intrusion of saline water. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah connections. Mumbai provides individual connections (with or without meters) and standposts connections with meters in slums for a group of 5 households or more (prior to 1995). Surface water provided to the city by a gravity system is the main characteristic of the supply in Mumbai where groundwater plays no role. The water comes from reservoir lakes (Vehar – 68 mld, Tulsi – 18 mld, Tansa – 477 mld, Vaitarna and Upper Vaitarna – 1197 mld) and from river abstraction (Bhatsa – 1365 mld). Apart from the Tulsi and the Vehar lake, all the remaining sources are more than a hundred km away from Mumbai and transport represent a large share of the total cost of production. Water is overall of good quality and cost of treatment is not very high. Other sources of water are to be developed to sustain the growing demand and proposals have been made to construct a new dam. The project has been submitted to the World Bank but has to be first approved by the committee for the construction of dams in Maharashtra. There are four water treatment plants with a total capacity of 2930 mld. The main one is the Bhandup treatment plant with a capacity of 1910 mld. This plant is one of the largest in Asia and has been financed by the World Bank. The length of the transmissions mains is 300 kms. The primary network has a total length of 2,400 kms and comprises 26 reservoirs. Water is supplied on a rotational basis among the 107 distribution zones because of the reservoirs capacity. Intermittent supply is the rule in Mumbai and supply can vary from two to six hours26. According to the BMC, the percentage of leakage is as low as 12% and another 10% of losses is due to theft and unauthorised connections (we shall see later that slums developed after 1995 are not allowed to be provided services). There is a leak detection division (under the Deputy Hydraulic Engineer – Planning and Control –) organised into 615 leak detection zones. However, unlike Chennai, there is no preventive maintenance. As far as quality control is concerned, around 10,000 water samples are collected and analysed everyday. Sanitation & Sewerage The main priority, however, in Mumbai regards the sanitation and sewerage situation. The sewerage generated is estimated at 2,500 mld. So far there are 265,000 street connections covering 45% of the population27. Less than 20% of the sewerage generated is treated through two sewerage treatment plants in Colaba and Worli and through aerated lagoons in Versova. The remaining sewerage is let out in the sea without treatment. To remedy the actual situation, the World Bank is financing the Mumbai Sewage Disposal Project (US$ 296 million) to improve the health and environment, to build a stronger sewerage infrastructure and to improve sanitation facilities in slums. This project has six components: marine outfalls in Worli and Bandra, pumping station at Bandra, aerated lagoons at Ghatkopar and Bhandup, improvement to Ghatkopar influent tunnel, remedial works on the conveyance system and a slum and sanitation scheme. However, the project is facing delays mostly due to slow progress at the Bandra and Worli outfalls and to delays at the Bandra pumping station. One component of this project concerns the provision of sanitation facilities in slums in cooperation with the NGO sector. This was a condition of the project financing from the World Bank. We shall come back later to the sanitation component of this project. 26 Source: BMC. Which represents, according to the Engineer in charge of the Mumbai Sewerage Disposal Project, the percentage of population not living in slums. 27 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah 2. The financial position, tariffs and cost management in Mumbai Summary The financial position of the Corporation is highly dependent, like other towns in Maharashtra, on octroi as well to some extent as on the water budget. Increase in both octroi and water charges are expected to bring a surplus to the municipal budget in 2002 after years of heavy deficits. With regards to tariffs, cross-subsidies are embedded in the Mumbai tariff structure where industries pay a higher rate. However, recognised slum dwellers have to pay for water, a not so common feature in Indian cities. The BMC is attempting to reform the billing and collection system through a decentralisation mechanism in order to improve cost recovery. Tariff policy In Mumbai, consumers have to pay: water and sewerage charges when the connection is metered, water and sewerage tax when the connection is not metered and water and sewerage benefit tax for all consumers. Water charges are as follows (Rs. per cu m): - for domestic consumers: Rs. 1.75 for slums and Rs. 3 for others - for hospitals, halls et al: Rs. 8 - for industrial establishments: Rs. 15 - for commercial establishments and other industries: Rs. 22 - for 3 star hotels: Rs. 35 On August 1, 2002, a hike in water charges and water tax should take effect. It has been passed by the general body of the BMC. This hike (from 1.75 to 2.25 Rs. per cubic meter for slum dwellers and from Rs. 3 to 4 for other domestic users) will, according to estimates, bring an additional Rs. 51 crores to the BMC’s revenue (The Times of India, 2002). Since 1987, domestic rates have been multiplied by five and 10 respectively for slums and others. Other tariff categories have also been increased but to a lower extent (less than three times for commercial establishments for instance). Sewerage charges are equal to 60% of the water charges since April 2000 and have to be paid whether or not they have a connection, a situation similar to the one in Chennai.Water and sewerage charges are collected every four months if the bill amount is below Rs. 3000 and every month otherwise. The bill collection is carried out by the Hydraulic department. Water and sewerage tax is calculated as a percentage of the rateable value of the building for unmetered consumers (respectively 65% and 39% of the rateable value of the building for water and sewage). In many cases, like in many other Indian cities, these rates have not been revised for years. The water and sewerage benefit tax is also based on the rateable value of the building and has to be paid by all the consumers. Both these taxes have been regularly increased since 1987. These taxes are collected every six months by the Assessing and Collecting Department of the Corporation. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Tariff revision needs to be approved by the Standing Committee of the Corporation. Regular increase was approved in order to compensate for the increase of both capital and revenue expenditure. In the year 1999-2000, the total revenue income of the water supply and sewerage department reached Rs. 9712 million while the total expenditure were Rs. 8532 million. Since 1995-1996, the total revenue income has doubled while the expenditure have increased by 1.5 times. In 1973, a separate budget ‘G’ was introduced for water supply and sewerage. This budget represents 20% of the total revenues of the Corporation as against 12% of the expenditure. Water is therefore a good source of revenue for Mumbai. This explains that all the proposals to create a water board have been rejected by the Corporation as the ‘G’ budget and the octroi are the two main sources of revenues of the Corporation. In June 2001, another such proposal was again dismissed and prevents the creation of a more autonomous agency. To sum up, cross-subsidies are the rule as in many other Indian cities as industrial and commercial establishments have to pay much higher rates than domestic connections. However, unlike most of other cities, slum dwellers are considered as customers and have to pay water and sewerages charges and taxes. In any case, the tariff policy is not based on economic principles and no change of tariff structure is thought of. Water supply and sewerage is a good source of revenue in Mumbai but the lack of independence from the Corporation, for instance through a Board, is a constraint towards efficient management. Commercial and billing policy In order to improve the cost of recovery (today: 80%), the centralised computerised billing is being decentralised at the ward level. This new system has just started and is piloted in one of the ward. Since 1984, the billing system was centralised at the Data Processing Unit and 45 days were required to issue a bill. As a consequence the cash flow was not maintained. The first pilot zone started to issue its own billing since January 2001. Apparently, even though expenditure had to be borne (Rs. 10 to 20 million) to train the staff and to buy new material, the experience is positive for various reasons: bills are issued much faster (15 days) which increases the cash flow, it becomes easier to issue connection and to have a follow up, and “every ward is in a position to assess himself”28. The Corporation has also issued a citizen’s charter but this document is not easily available. In Chennai, on the contrary, this citizen’s charter and other documents on each ward are displayed in each payment centre and are a good source of information for any interested consumer. This is not the case in Mumbai. 3. The set of institutions: coordination and new initiatives in Mumbai Summary The large number of institutions both at the State level and the city (or region level) provides a collusion of roles in policy planning and implementation that explains for instance partly the failures of the habitat policy in Mumbai. On the water supply and sanitation sector, initiatives have been launched in the last few years, the main one being the introduction of a private operator in one of the suburban ward. However delays and opposition reflect the difficulty to manage changes in Indian cities despite high profile commitments made as the following one by the Mumbai mayor : “Last year, I recommended that private suppliers should be considered to provide water to some areas. The political support is there both for privatization initiatives and an increase in prices, provided this is linked to an improved water supply for the whole city, rich and poor alike.” (WSP, 2001). Institutional share in responsibilities 28 Source: Interview with the Deputy Hydraulic Engineer in charge of the pilot ward. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Various constraints affect the efficiency of the corporation, both in providing water supply and sewerage and in improving the situation of low-income households. Different institutions are involved at the State and at the city level. Without going into the functions of all of them, we shall mention some examples. At the State level, the government of Maharashtra can play a significant role in financing large infrastructure, such as dams, that need to be approved by the committee for construction of dams. The BMC cannot plan such infrastructure without their approval. The Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority is also financing some schemes through loan assistance. So far, a loan of Rs. 1140 million for the balance works of Third Mumbai Water Supply and Sewerage Project (Mumbai-III) to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai has been given. The MMRDA has also offered financial assistance for the feasibility study and execution of the project of the Greater Mumbai Municipal corporation which involves bringing additional water from Bhatsa to Mumbai. Each institution having different objectives, it can lead to delays. Another example in terms of confusion of roles can be seen when looking at the slum situation. The hydraulic department is in charge of providing water to slums prior to 1995. Indeed, a recent State government resolution declares that slums prior to 1995 are not recognised but should be tolerated. On the contrary, all new settlements built after 1995 are not to receive basic facilities by the BMC. The Deputy City Engineer (Slum Improvement)’s role is mostly an engineering and planning role. He is not concerned by financial plans and financial assistance that can be provided to slum dwellers. This is provided by MHADA (Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority)29. His role for instance in the slum and sanitation programme launched by the Corporation is mainly to prepare the estimates that are later approved by MHADA. He is limited to plan and design building and actually has a limited knowledge of the real situation in slum departments. Too many institutions are dealing with the same type of consumers with a very limited scope in their approach and responsibilities. Another constraint is the resistance faced by the Corporation from its employees and the unions when reforms are thought of. The Corporation employs a large number of employees: 8,000 for water supply and 9,000 for sewerage30. This represent around 11% of the total number of employees of the Corporation, that is 150, 000 people (almost 1% of the Mumbai population). This figure indicates how the BMC is overstaffed and has difficulties to promote reforms and new initiatives (see below). Another hurdle towards an efficient management can be seen at the ward level. Conflicts between the executive arm of the corporation (the Deputy Hydraulic Engineer and the Assistant Engineers) and the elected ward councillors, according to interviews, seem to often occur. New initiatives As far as water supply is concerned, two initiatives are considered by the BMC. The first one concerns the study of the operation and maintenance department. The water supply department plans to appoint a consultant that will look at the potential rehabilitation of old mains, the creation of a customer grievance cell in one pilot ward, and the evaluation of the functioning of the pumping stations. The aim is to improve the level of service at a lower cost. The hydraulic engineer plans to finance it through the savings from ongoing projects of the World Bank. So far, 23 consulting companies were interested, 6 bids were received and five companies passed the first selection stage. The next step should have started in July 2001. The second project consists in privatising the operation at the ward level in one pilot zone (the K eastward, near the airport). This ward manages 19,000 connections31 (around 800,000 people). In this project, an international operator should be selected to replace and maintain meters, collect revenues, reduce leakages, provide 24 hours supply. The payment will be made on an incentive basis (on the 29 Established in 1977, MHADA has been engaged in constructing and selling housing to low and middle income groups. In Mumbai it has constructed about 30,000 housing units. 30 There is another 1,000 employees in the common services department (purchase of materials and transport). 31 In recognized slums (see part 1), connections are given to a minimum group of 5 persons. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah number of mld saved). The contract should be of a five year duration and the operator will have no power to change the tariff. Bids were invited in February 2000 and the contract was to be awarded in July 2000. Despite that international operators did show interest in the project aspect and that it was initiated with the World Bank who was supposed to provide funds, so far the project is delayed. In fact, the World Bank has decided in the beginning of 2001 to back out because of some disagreements with the Corporation. Apparently, according to the last interviews conducted, the Corporation still plans to go ahead with it. This delay, if not failure, is typical of the hurdles faced in South Asia to introduce the private sector: (i) there is no credible and consistent political commitment at a high level to ensure the success of projects planned, there is a strong opposition from labour unions (particularly powerful in Mumbai), (iii) there is a misunderstanding about the objectives of the private sector that has not , yet proven that it can reduce costs through efficiency savings, (iv) and the need to restructure tariffs that are considerably low. All these factors lead to disagreements and cancellations of projects (Pune in Maharastra, Katmandu in Nepal, Karachi in Pakistan among others). To sum up, the department of water supply and sewerage cannot be separated from the Corporation and that certainly affects its efficiency. In addition, it has to cope with a large number of employees that tend to be against any new initiatives. This partly explains the delays in most new initiatives, such as the privatisation on a pilot basis of a ward despite the fact that the BMC is the richest corporation in India. 4. Alternative services and the poor in Mumbai Summary Around half the population of Mumbai live in slums with hard living conditions. Services are provided for recognised slums, otherwise there is no obligation to deliver neither water or sanitation. The presence of active NGOs in Mumbai does not differ from other cities but their lobbying power has led to the implementation of large resettlement schemes. In addition to this, the collaboration between the Corporation and NGOs is gaining ground with the strong involvment of SPARC in the Mumbai Sewage Disposal Project led by the World Bank and by other organisations such as Agni for instance. Poverty According to most studies on poverty, on an average the percentage of the population below the poverty line reaches around 30% in large cities. In Mumbai, the situation is worse and according to the various interviews conducted, the estimate of population living in slums averages 50 to 55% of the population32. No recent detailed survey has been conducted by the municipal authorities. The last assessment of slum population provided by the Deputy City Engineer (Slum Improvement) dates back to a survey conducted in 1991. He estimates that 5.5 to 6 million people live in slums and 1.5 million people are pavement dwellers. According to this survey, 4.4 million people live in slums in 900,000 hutments spread over 1,686 slum pockets on a land area of 12.52 sq. km. However, latest data published by the Census of India (provisional data) confirm this figure as they estimate the population in slums at 5.8 million, that is 49% of the total population. Conditions for water supply and sanitation in slums Standposts are provided in slum settlements prior to 1995. The government of Maharashtra passed a resolution mentioning that pre 1995 slums are not authorised but should be tolerated. This is not the case for the slums built after this date that should be relocated. Standpost connections can be given to a group of households (a minimum of five and a maximum of 15) after the households form a group and nominate one of them as an authorised representative. This person will be responsible for maintenance and payments of water charges to the Corporation. Pavement dwellers are not eligible for standpost connections. 32 However, it should be noticed that in Mumbai the cost of housing is very high. Consequently, many slum dwellers have an income above the poverty line but either cannot afford or find a decent housing. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah NGOs and their interaction with the Corporation In Mumbai, there are solid NGOs involved in the water supply and sanitation sector, such as SPARC (Society for the Promotion of Area Centre) and YUVA (Youth for Unity and Volontary Action). These two organisations are looking at low cost technology but are mostly involved in organising slum dwellers, mostly women, to operate and maintain the infrastructure, to develop microcredit schemes and to lobby for relocation. SPARC is the most famous one and well known by the Corporation. SPARC has been working for years with the NSDF (National Slum Dwellers Federation) and Mahila Milans. Mahila Milan is a network of women collectives from the communities affiliated, NSDF negotiates and lobbies with the institution for relocation of slum and pavement dwellers and SPARC trains and educates slum dwellers and carries out pilot projects in slum settlements. The association of these three organisations have had many successes in Mumbai, such as the relocation of a large number of families living near the railway tracks in low-income flats. As far as sanitation is concerned, SPARC has also been doing work for years with women in slums in building toilets that are under the operation and maintenance of the women committee. The links between SPARC and the Corporation exist since the World Bank funded Mumbai Sewage Disposal Project. As mentioned before, this project contains a slum and sanitation component that includes the construction of community toilets and the collection of night soil to the nearest sewer lines. So far, the project is planning the construction of 170 000 toilets. There are certain conditions to this programme: it should be demand driven and slum dwellers are to form a community based organisation; slum dwellers should contribute Rs. 100 for operation and maintenance and the money should be deposited in a bank; payments should be made to the sweeper and there should be separate toilets for men and women. This program concerns only pre 1995 slums. The contract was awarded to SPARC as they have the experience of such schemes and they can also construct the facilities. In some areas, SPARC can also enter a joint venture with some contractors to build the infrastructure. So far, the scheme has just started and it is still early to assess its success or not. However, it brings about the beginning of a collaboration between a well known NGO and the Corporation. To sum up, Mumbai has a large share of its population living in slums or in the streets and the attitude of the Corporation is constrained by resolutions from the Government of Maharashtra that does not recognise new settlements. On the other hand, due to the pressure of the World Bank, the Corporation has started to engage a dialogue with NGOs and slums’ association in order to construct sanitation facilities. This collaboration could be interesting as it involves NGOs that have been working successfully for years in this field. It would, therefore, be useful in a few months to assess this cooperation. Mumbai has also a number of associations fighting for measures to improve the quality of life such as fighting for green space (the most famous ones being Citispace and the Bombay Environmental Action Group), air pollution issues et al. A strong initiative was launched in 1999 in the name of Agni (Action for Good Governance and Networking in India). As its name correctly indicates, it is a network of active NGOs, residents’ association, community based organisations and voluntary institutions that AGNI estimate at a total of 2000 in Mumbai. The aim of AGNI is to link between these groups and mostly to “set governance right”, which they consider that citizens ought to do. The role of AGNI in the last elections was noticeable with an election watch campaign to mobilise citizens to vote, to draft criteria for acceptance of candidates, to organise meetings at the local level with candidates, etc.. Agni certainly reflects the increasing importance of citizen participation in decentralisation of urban governance. New initiatives are also launched regarding solid waste disposal in which AGNI will get involved as well as the participation of many resident’s association. However, the Mumbai case also brings about questions left untouched by this paper but that could be further researched. The conflict of interests within the “civil society” are often not considered. In Mumbai, though, the position of NGOs such as Citispace that are lobbying for more green cover and Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah parks is clearly in some cases in total opposition to other NGOs fighting for space to be released for slum rehabilitation. The question, not to say conflict, of “environmental” or “social” development can be perceived extremely differently by the various representatives of the civil society. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah General Annexes Annexure. 1 India: Urban Population 1901-1991 India Urban Population (in millions) Percentage of Urban to Total Population Decadal Growth Rate (in Percent) 1901 29.9 10.8 - 1911 25.9 10.3 0.4 1921 28.1 11.2 18.3 1931 33.5 12.0 19.1 1941 44.2 13.9 32.0 1951 62.4 17.3 41.4 1961 78.9 18.0 26.4 1971 109.1 19.9 38.2 1981 159.5 23.3 46.1 1991 217.6 25.7 36.4 2001 306.9 30.5 41.0 Source: http://urbanindia.nic.in/scene.htm Annexure 2 Source of Water for National Capital Territory -Delhi Source of Water Amount of Water [million gallon per day (MGD)] Yamuna 210 Ganga 100 Bhakra Storage 200 Groundwater (government tube wells) 120 Groundwater (private Tubewells) 274 Total 904 Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah References ADB (1997), Second water utilities data book – Asian and Pacific region, edited by Mc Intosh A.C Yniguez C.E, ADB, 1997. 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Centre de Sciences Humaines. New Delhi. 172 p. Zérah, Marie-Hélène, 2000. Water : unreliable supply in Delhi, 168p, Manohar, New Delhi. Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Fig. 3 - Poor ground acquifer & inadequate perennial surface water source. ADAPTIVE RESPONSE Private Initiatives Inefficient State to ensure access to water and sanitation. Innovative low cost Technical Options to conserve water. Availability of roof space in housing societies to harvest water and recycle them. Scarce availability of water. Convergence of interest (between private sector and urban residence) to conserve water towards meeting urban needs. Housing Societies Willingness to pay for water supply. Collective take interest through cooperative societies to manage the system. • • Source: Saravanan, 2001 Institutional Synergy towards assured water supply. Incentive for private sector to market housing complex (Green housing). Private Sector • Ensuring water quality through periodic water quality testing. • Regular maintenance of the technical solutions Occasional paper CSH / Joël Ruet – VS Saravanan – Marie-Hélène Zérah Fig. 4 ADAPTIVE RESPONSE - Individual Initiative - Water Scarcity Depletion of ground water. Water pollution from industrial effluents. Location at tail end of water supply. Catchment area 1100 sq.ft. on rooftop. Channelise rainwater from open ground Seek Institutional Support from Raj Paris Constructions (a Private Builders) for technical options to conserve water. Roof top water stored in 3300 litres capacity tank. Overflow water from rooftops. Water for gardening and recharging groundwater. With minor treatment rainwater used for cooking and drinking purpose. Source: Saravanan, 2001