2004 Mansfield Conference, The University of Montana, Missoula
Cliff Edmunds
“The Impact of Globalization on China’s State-Controlled Media”
Talking Points
I.
Brief introduction to the nature of China’s Controlled Media
a. Their purpose is to shape attitudes and promote regime policy, not to
inform or serve as a forum for public debate.
II.
The Impact of Globalization
a. Globalization has accelerated processes already underway as a result of
reform and opening up policies initiated 25 years ago. As in other sectors
of the political system, the market is pitted against political power, the
imperatives of a market economy are pitted against the imperatives of an
authoritarian party-state
b. The impact of globalization on the media is similar to its impact in other
areas--the media are a microcosm of the pressures operating in the broader
society during the transition to a market economy in a Leninist party-state.
It is a complex and dynamic picture, with much ferment, barely controlled
chaos, and many contradictions
c. The party must loosen or relax control over the media in order to realize
its goals of rapid modernization and making China a global player; a
market economy demands the free and accurate flow of information while
WTO gives foreign media access to the Chinese market.
d. Moreover, the party can no longer control information as technology and
the need for information allows greater penetration of society of outside
information and increases the demand for and access to information
e. As the party is compelled to accept sweeping changes, it seeks new means
of control, including control over the media, in order to retain the authority
to govern effectively, keep its monopoly on power, or even to survive.
f. Media reform is also part of the party’s bid to improve its image and
effectiveness by contracting the scope of its direct control over social life,
moving to a less intrusive presence; this is part of the process of relegitimizing the party
g. Media reform is promoted by some reform leaders as part of their agenda
to transform the party into a different type of ruling entity redefining basis
of legitimacy
III.
Models of Change
a. The conventional model of diehard Leninist political leaders, entrenched,
embattled bureaucrats pitted against crusading reformist journalists and
market forces, is way too simplistic
b. The party itself is a driver of media reform and change. It is a complex,
shifting, uncertain, picture, not a simple picture of good guy journalists vs
bad guy political leaders
c. Party leaders have mixed motives and are sharply divided among
themselves on the vision of the future and the appropriate course to
follow, but are united in their commitment to preserve the party
d. Journalists and media managers are also not of one mind, but tend toward
the “liberal” view of a more open media. Many are pushing the envelope,
looking for ways to stretch party guidelines, expand the boundaries,
creating what they call more “space”
IV.
The Rapidly Changing Media Environment: Dynamism Driven by
Market Competition
a. The party has promoted commercialization of the media: Subsidies are
being eliminated and most media now depend on the market—i.e.
advertising and circulation—for revenues
b. This means the media are increasingly geared to reader tastes, are
instituting changes in style and content, are becoming more diversified
and specialized, and are competing with each other for
readership/viewership
c. These reforms have led to the advent of some “non-official” print media
and media that are increasingly willing to challenge the boundaries of
party control
d. The reforms have also prompted discussion in journalistic circles of new
values and concepts that are at odds with the traditional party maxim that
the media are the “mouthpiece” of the party
e. There is increasing professionalization of journalism
V.
The Party’s Response: Strategies of Control
a. The party is seeking new, more sophisticated, less direct, means of
control; it increasingly relies on a post-hoc rather than a pre-emptive
model of control
b. It grants a great deal more “space” for non-political content, allows
discussion of some previously off-limits topics, and even some criticism
of government policy in some media outlets
c. However, the party still strictly controls all “news” and content it deems
politically sensitive. Reporting on such topics is allowed when it serves
regime purposes, such as cracking down on corruption, malfeasance, and
industrial safety.
d. To serve these purposes, there is growing regime tolerance of critical
reporting or “investigative reporting” in specific areas, as well as
economic reporting
e. It has reorganized all media into regional media groups centered on an
official party paper (Jiguan Bao) or anchor television/radio station. While
it has publicly argued an economic rationale for this move, the media
groups provide a powerful new means of political control
f. It exercises control primarily through the power of appointment,
overlapping political and professional roles, licensing authority, and the
power of the purse (ownership)
g. The reforms thus far are a change in degree, not in kind. The party still
allows no genuinely private media
VI.
Conclusions
The party will have increasing difficulty imposing control over the changing
media but the jury is still out on how much this will matter. The question is
whether the political elite can impose enough control to prevent a genuinely
public forum for civil discourse, including dissent from party policy, which would
undercut the party’s ability to shape public opinion and could even prompt a
challenge to party rule.