Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences
ISSN 2039-2117 (online)
ISSN 2039-9340 (print)
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy
Vol 5 No 10
June 2014
Political Economy of Violence: Interpreting the Nigerian Boko Haram
Alafuro Epelle (Ph.D)
Department of Political Science, Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, Rumuolumeni, Port Harcourt
alafuroepelle@yahoo.com
Iwarimie B. Uranta
Department of Political Science, Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, Rumuolumeni, Port Harcourt
iwarimie@yahoo.com
Doi:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n10p528
Abstract
This paper characterizes the extant Boko Haram phenomenon as a reflection of the very dependent and weak character of the
Nigerian State. Employing the Marxian political economy approach it draws a sharp signal from the manner in which the state’s
indifference to the contradictions of social materialism is generating constant centrifugal forces against its autonomy. It anchors
on a very basic fundamental hypothesis, that Boko Haram is symptomatic of not only a weak state, but also a desperate and
marginalized class whose only source of drawing the state’s attention is through organized violence. We argue further that,
what is described as Boko Haram in an empirical form is merely a coincidence between serious private accumulation of the
state’s GDP and lack of Focused Civil Empowerment (FCE). Consequently, the study recommends, inter-alia, the
accommodation of the lumpen -proletarian Boko Haram membership in the state economic planning machinery together with a
decentralization or restructuring of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to critically monitor the
appropriation of Local Government councils’ allocations to ensure a domestication of human capacity development at the rural
level, thus making Boko Haram members less susceptible to violence and more sympathetic to peace.
Keywords: State, Boko Haram, Political Economy, violence, development.
1. Introduction
In contemporary Nigeria it is commonplace for scholars to draw from the dependent character of the State to explain
away the manner in which the civil society is becoming highly restive and confrontational to the former expressing their
discontent and disenchantment with the ugly state of things in the country by carrying arms and explosives and
destroying lives and properties.
We argue in this work that this ugly scenario can significantly be located within the capitalist mode of social
reproduction in which many who are dissatisfied struggle with their existential condition individually and/or collectively,
under all kinds of identities such as class, ethnic or clan groups, religious groups and ideologies to change, or at least
improve their position (Ogban-Iyam, 2005:22). The basic contention of this work therefore is that, although some other
factors as religion and ethnicity may contribute in underpinning the violence, the nature and character of the Nigerian
state is a major factor in the emergence of the deepening politico-religious violence in the northern part of the country
described popularly as Boko Haram.
To ensure an orderly presentation, six major sections follow this introduction; they are: conceptual clarification;
theoretical framework, politics of Boko Haram; its political economy dimensions; implications for national security and
development; the conclusion and recommendations form the final part of the paper.
2. Conceptual Clarification
2.1 Violence
This is a physical form of conflict intended to hurt or kill somebody. Conflict can exist between or among individuals,
ethnic or other social groups without resort to physical force; but when physical force is applied, it becomes violent.
Although this conceptual clarification needs to be properly made especially for intellectual purpose, the two concepts
(conflict and violence) would be interchangeably used in this paper.
Ogban-Iyam (2005:4), made a relevant input from which we can draw a summary. To him:
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Conflicts assume violent character when physical force is exerted for purposes of violating, damaging or abusing. Most
conflicts and violence are social in character as human beings pursue their survival and security needs with other
human beings particularly when these needs are not or cannot be met simultaneously for all concerned.
The state in performing its historical role often employs violence to contain the constant reactions of the
marginalized and alienated class.
2.2 Boko Haram
This is often seen as a Nigerian islamic group which seeks the imposition of Sharia law in the Northern states of the
country. Having presently an undefined structure and chain of command, the official Arabic name of the group is
Jama’ata Ahlis Sunna Lidda Awatiwal Jihad, which in English means “people committed to the propagation of the
prophet’s teaching and Jihad”. It became known internationally following sectarian violence in Nigeria in 2009, but
residents of Maiduguri where it was formed in 2002 dubbed it “Boko Haram”. Loosely translated from the local Hausa
language it means “western education is forbidden”. Residents, it was said, gave it the name because of its strong
opposition to western education-which it sees as corrupting the Muslims. Boko Haram, derived from Hausa word “Boko”
means “animist” and the Arabic word “Haram” means sin or forbidden (see Google search Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia 2011).
Ideologically, Boko Haram equally opposes not only western education but western culture and modern science.
Consequently, the group forbids the wearing of shirts and pants and the act of voting in elections.
Sani (2011) has described Boko Haram as an Islamic sect which broke out from the Islamic Almajiri school (which
forbids western education) found largely in the northwestern part of Nigeria. The Boko Haram group began as Sahaba
group in 1995. The main leader of the group then was one Abubakar Lawan who later left for the University of Medina to
study; when he left, the older clerics conceded the leadership to Mallam Muhammed Yusuf, who was young and versatile.
But immediately Yusuf took over, the doctrine of the sect changed; he abandoned the older clerics and came up with
Boko Haram. On international links, available information indicates that the group emanated from an orthodox teaching
slightly resembling that of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Adele (2011:58) has indicated that the sect is being allegedly sponsored by some northern politicians, having
about 1.5 million followers and believes that banking, taxation and jurisprudence in the country are completely infidel.
They also believe that western education was unislamic as it propagates the opposite of what Allah and his prophet,
Mohammed, had ordained.
3. Theoretical Framework
This work is anchored on the hypothesis that those who sponsor and/or are sponsored to participate in Boko Haram
activities do so for ultimate material reason. Based on this premise, we have decided to employ the Marxian Political
Economy approach as a framework for analysis. This method is materialistic and demands that relations of production be
studied in the process of their emergence, development, demise and their replacement by other relations of production.
The theory further enables us to take account of the systematic interactions of the different superstructural elements of
society, especially the political, social, and belief systems and their implications for the objective character of the
economy (Okodudu, 2010:206). This, as Marx himself asserts, is because the mode of production of material life
conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general (Lenin: 1978). Ake (1981) clarifies this further.
According to him, the material condition of man is what determines the nature of the political system (Ake, 1981:1-2). In
his words:
Once we understand what the material assets and constraints of a society are, how the society produces goods to meet
its material needs, how the goods are distributed, and what types of social relations arise from the organization of
production, we have come a long way to understanding the culture of that society, its laws, its religious system, its
political system and even its modes of thought. (Ake, 1981:1-2)
In essence, the political economy approach investigates the materialistic aspect of dialectics, its resultant conflicts
and crisis and its effect on the socio-political lives of members of a society. It is a method which gives primacy to material
conditions (particularly economic factors) in the explanation of social life. It portrays the dynamic character of reality;
gives insight to the dynamics of the social world; profers a comprehensive view of society while treating problems
concretely rather than abstractly (Ake, 1981:5-7). Ekekwe (2009:17) adds further:
… if we want to understand social activity and society from the point of view of political economy, we must first of all
“atomize” them into their different elements. In other words, we must first breakdown society into its smallest units
which, obviously, are the individual human beings … To live he must produce the means to life. It is for purposes of
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individual and social maintenance and reproduction that productive activity assumes the very high degree of importance
assigned to it. When these basic sources of material maintenance are lacking man, especially within the marginalized
class, is bound to adopt a confrontation method (class struggle) to survive.
Conflict resolution scholars argue that conflict has an ontological basis in human needs and that it is the denial of
these needs that makes resolvable differences to degenerate into armed violence or armed conflict.
Within this context it is expressly easy to understand the nature and character of the violence currently being
experienced and described in the Northern part of Nigeria as Boko Haram.
4. The Politics of Boko Haram
Okei-Odumakin (2011:51) is of the opinion that “Government has been slow and indecisive on the issue of Boko Haram”.
This view is corroborated by Archbishop Alaba Job, President Catholic Bishops’ conference of Nigeria, who said at a
recent conference in Abakaliki, Ebonyi state, that the blame” … is with the government, because the State Security
Service (SSS) in the past five years has been monitoring these people. If you go to Borno you will discover that their
headquarters is at Central Railway quarters in Maiduguri”. Little wonder Okei-Odumakin decries a situation whereby
security agencies parade “some haggard looking persons” as Boko Haram suspects and then allow the case to fade off.
In her opinion, this tenuous approach emboldens the militants to regroup and strike again, thus causing crisis.
Okei-Odumakin (2011:51) further indicated that some fundamentalists who were arrested for alleged nefarious
activities under the administration of Obasanjo in 2007 were later released by his successor, late President Umaru
Yar’Adua. That decision was allegedly taken on the assumption that the suspects were actually victims of religious
persecution. Ironically one of them, Muhammad Yusuf, returned to the society to nurture the now dreaded Boko Haram
sect, thus creating crisis for the Yar’Adua administration. In an attempt to clip the wings of the group, the late Yar’Adua,
decided to use the military option to suppress the insurgency.
The military arrested Yusuf, but he was allegedly killed after the military task force handed him over to the police. It
is also alleged that some leaders give the insurgents support, by getting them out of detention so they would not have to
answer for any wrong doing. That is why some people believe that Boko Haram insurgence is more political than religious
(Adeyemo 2011). Archbishop Job puts it this way: “Boko Haram is not totally religious. It is political and those behind
them should be bold enough to talk to us, so that we can tell them where they belong”. Insinuations within political circles
is that some of those who are opposed to Goodluck Jonathan becoming Nigeria’s president are working to ensure that
the man does not have enough comfort in office to be able to think of asking for a second term in 2015 or even to execute
people-oriented developmental projects during his current first tenure. Apologists of this position cite the recent post
presidential elections riots in April 2011 that led to the murder, in cold blood, of many National Youth Service Corps
(NYSC) members and hundreds of other Nigerians in Bauchi, Niger, Borno and Kaduna States by youths protesting the
victory of President Goodluck Jonathan on April 26, 2011. Many still believe that the out-come of this election is the main
cause of the prevailing undeclared war and restlessness in some parts of the North (Tell Oct. 17, 2011:52). Joseph
Waku, the vice chairman of Arewa Consultative Forum, corroborating this said: “Boko Haram is political. It goes back to
what we are saying. Do what the people want” (Tell Nov. 21, 2012:46). An anonymous retired Commodore in the Nigerian
Navy was quoted by Tell magazine (2012:43) as saying: “a few wealthy ones are the people giving support to the
insurgents because terrorism requires a lot of funding”. To him, the elites are supporting them financially with the
objective of using them to destabilize the existing state apparatus.
The State’s lackadaisical attitude to this group can be variously explained. Firstly, at the time the group began to
take root in Nigeria up to 2009, the state has been under the leadership of an Islamic faithful (late president Yar’Adua),
who probably due to the emotional nature of religion refused to tackle the insurgents firmly and decisively. Corroborating
this view Alabi (2007:94) noted that:
In Nigeria, religion has provided a sense of cleavages, classes …. ethnicities and demand for social and economic
advantages of members. Members of a particular religion seem to be more accommodating to their members than to
other groups and, in fact, these religions are in contest for the advantages of their members. In this regard, whenever a
member of their faith occupies a position of influence it is usually seen as an opportunity to advance both individual and
corporate interest.
Besides, most of those in the armed forces are also not immuned to this religious and emotive sentiments which
probably has increased their passion and dampened their zeal in the discharge of their official responsibilities. Media
reports during religious crisis in the northern part of the country sometimes mention cases where non-Muslim civilians
were killed by members of the armed forces while attempting to contain the crisis, thus worsening the situation (Alabi,
2007).
The politics of this phenomenon is further corroborated by the fact that in spite of the arrest and killings by the Joint
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Task Force (JTF), leaders and members of the group are still waxing stronger. Their reinforcement is not only made rapid
by the withdrawal of many northern university students from study between 2004 to 2009 to pay allegiance to Yusuf,
members also had to pay a daily levy of 100 naira to their leader. This provided the basic source of funding for the sect in
addition to surreptitious donations and sponsorship from politicians, government officials and other individuals or
organizations within the country.
It is equally regrettable to note that lack of relative autonomy by the Nigerian state has indeed led to its inability to
successfully prosecute and convict top northern politicians implicated in the Boko Haram saga. The nature and character
of the post-colonal state in Nigeria has led many scholars to associate the state with rent seeking, patrimonialism and
prebendalism, thus resulting in its lack of relative autonomy, leading consequently to its inability to successfully prosecute
and convict top northern politicians implicated in the Boko Haram saga. For example Ali Modu Sheriff and Senator Ali
Ndume who have been variously fingered as patrons of the sect are yet to be convicted for any felonious offence (Jega
2002:36, Adeyemo 2011:27).
Mudashiru (2011:14) submits that the only sensible interpretation of this ideology and philosophy is that advocates
of Boko Haram believe that the elites have been able to suppress and oppress them due to their (latter’s) exposure to
western education. Therefore, wiping out western education within their domain is the only path to freedom for their
people, hence the various activities of the sect.
5. Chronicle of Boko-Haram Attacks
S/N
1.
Date
26/7/2009
2.
27/7/2009
3.
4.
29/7/2009
29/7/2009
Nature
All night attack on Dutsen-Tanshi Police
Invasion of Potiskum Divisional Headquarters, Yobe
State.
Confrontation with security men at mamudo village
All night battle with security men at Railway terminals
No. of Deaths
39
Venue
Bauchi
4
Yobe state
33
Scores
Yobe state
Maiduguri, Borno state
5.
07/ 7/ 2010
Jail break, set ablaze Bauchi centre prison
-
Bauchi
6.
08/09/2010
7.
01/10/2010
8.
Jan 2010
9.
2010
10. Dec. 31, 2010
12
4
992
Bauchi
Eagle square Abuja
Dala-Alemderi Maiduguri
Jos
Abuja
11.
Set ablaze Bauchi central prison
Explosion near the eagle square
Bomb strike
Religious rioting; death of Christians
Mogadishu Mammy, Market Bombing
Borno State ANPP Gubernatorial Candidate killed with 4
Jan. 28, 2011
police officers and 12yr. old boy
Grave condition for peace given: resignation of Governor
Feb. 9, 2011
A Sheriff
May 9, 2011 Rejected Amnesty offer, attack on two Islamic scholars
02/03/2011 Attack on DPO’s residence, Rigasa Area
7 (6)
Maiduguri
//
Borno State
2
2
Borno
Kaduna
- Plot of bomb attack
-
Maiduguri
Attack on police station injuring 2 policemen
Bombing of police station
Bombing of INEC office
Killed a Muslim cleric
7
1
Dutsen Tanshi, Bauchi state
Maiduguri
Maiduguri
Maiduguri
12.
13.
14.
15.
29/03/2011
16. April 1, 2011
17. April 9, 2011
18. April 10 2011
19. April 20, 2011
20. April 22, 2011 Jail break, freed 14 prisoners
21.
April 2011
-
Killing of NYSC members
30. Aug. 26, 2011 UN headquarters blown up by suicide car bomber.
31. Oct. 16, 2011
32. Nov. 4, 2011 Attack on police station, churches and banks
531
92 Boko Haram
members arrested
-
Offer of Amnesty
Police treated a bomb
plot in ANPP election
rally
-
15
Bauchi Niger Borno, Kaduna
states
Bauchi
Seen as post election
violence
-
2
Abuja
Conducted investigation
25
5
20
1
21 dead, Dozens
wounded
1
100-150
Maiduguri
Maiduguri
Maiduguri
Suleja Niger State
Maiduguri
North
Conducted investigation
-
22. May 29, 2011 Series of bombings
Bombing of police headquarters targeting police IG. Gen.
23. June 17, 2011
Hafiz. Ringim
24. June 26, 2011 Attack on Beer garden
25. June 27, 2011 Bombings
26. July 03, 2011 Attack on beer garden
27. July 1, 2011 Bombing at All Christian Fellowship centre
28. July 11, 2011 UNIMAID closed down for fear
29. Aug. 12, 2011 The prominent Muslim cleric, Liman Bana, Shot dead
Yola, Adamawa State
State Reaction
Abuja
Conducted investigation
Maiduguri
Damaturu
Conducted investigation
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Dec. 22 – 23,
2011
34. Dec. 25, 2011
35. Jan. 5– 6, 2012
36. April 8, 2012
33.
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy
Boko Haram clash with security forces
68+
Maiduguri/Damaturu
-
Bombing of Catholic church during Christmas mass
Attack on churches and businesses
Bombing of a church on Easter Sunday
45
185
38
Madalla
Kano
Kaduna
Kaduna/Wusasa, Sabon
Gari
Matse Village, Jos
Barkin Ladi & Riyom, Jos
Bauchi
Yobe
Maiduguri
-
37. June 17, 2012 Bombing of three churches
38. July 8, 2012
39. July, 7, 2012
40. Sept. 23, 2012
41. 06/07/2013
42. 18/08/2013
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12-19
Killing of politicians and 50 others
Dozens of people die in village attack
Attack on a church
Attack on GSS Mamado, Potiskum
Attack on Konduga community
52
37
2
40
50
-
Sources: Sani (2011:39-41); Tell (2012:44-45) etc
6. Political Economy of Boko Haram
The fundamental argument of this paper is that the material condition of Boko Haram adherents is the basis of the violent
conflict. The Marxian Political Economy theory states that every social problem has a history and that they derive
essentially from man’s instinct to subsist and reproduce himself. Taking it further, our pattern of politics since the era of
flag independence in October 1960 has remained essentially unchanged: intense contestation for power, brute force,
electoral robbery, and winner-takes-it-all victory. In this bizarre struggle for political power, according to Ake (1981:10),
our leaders employ every available means to get into elective positions.
The elitist Boko Haram whom the president admits exists in his cabinet can be categorized into this. Those who
have no means of getting into political office are sponsored to make the political space unstable, while those who are
occupying political office do their bit to destabilize other leaders in order to up-stage them and take over their coveted
positions.
Dasuki (2012:23) on his part described Boko Haram as a product of lack of socio-economic justice. According to
him:
…what I am saying is that if government does justice at all levels, if government addresses the problem of the people
there would be less social unrest in the society. But instead what do we see everyday? Corruption with impunity.
He went further to opine that “if our leaders are close to the people and are willing to listen, even this problem of
Boko Haram would not have arisen”.
In other words, most of those involved directly in these attacks are materially motivated as they are sustained
economically by their elitist leaders who themselves are also not divorced from ultimate prebendal goals.
The following triangular and equational descriptions will further drive home our argument.
Source: Developed by the Authors
Figure A above shows that a widened Focused Civil Empowerment (FCE) and compressed private accumulation (PA) in
a resource triangle is most likely to produce minimal civil armament (CA) and a strong state (SS) leading to a robust
peace triangle, while conversely;
Figure B shows that a cavalier private accumulation (PA) and a minimal Focused Community Empowerment (FCE)
will produce maximum civil armament (CA) and a weak state (WS) with its negative implication for peace and tranquility in
the society.
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Furthermore;
RA – PA – FCE = Peace
RA + FCE – PA = Peace + Peace Culture
RA + FCE + PA = CA
RA + PA – FCE = CA + Boko Haram
Where;
R A = revenue allocation
FCE = focused civil empowerment
PA = private accumulation
CA = civil armament
SS = strong state
WS = weak state
The above scenario is further confirmed by Jega (2002) who argue that about 67% of Nigerians are decisively
entrapped in conditions of acute poverty. Various factors have inflicted this poverty syndrome on the Nigerian masses.
This include unemployment, inflation and corruption especially at the local government councils. The 774 local
governments in Nigeria receive allocations from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. They equally constitute the end point of
the national and state governments’ economic programmes, but many of the local councils lack an institutionalized
economic framework for managing children and youths especially at their formative stages in life through viable social
and economic policies.
This creates mass poverty, frustration and aggression on the long run and serves to condition their minds and
attitudes to susceptibility towards elite and other religious manipulation motivation and mobilization to partake in riots and
reprisal attacks. We argue further that it is within this context that we can locate the character, organization and
development of ethno religious phenomenon like, Boko Haram. This research even traced this morbid poverty situation
back to 2005, providing a porous economic background for the north.
For instance, the living standard survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) for the year 2010
shows that poverty has been on the increase while standard of living has continued to fall. In a report released last
February, the agency found that absolute poverty in the country increased from 54.4 percent in 2004 to 60.9% in 2010
(that is 99milion Nigerians). The report further noted that Northwest and North–east Zones of the country recorded the
highest poverty rates with 70% and 69% respectively in 2010 while the south-west recorded the least at 49.8%. By
Nigerian Bureau of Statistics’ estimation, 61.2% of Nigerians were living below $1 per day; and most of these people are
to be found in the north. The report said poverty and inequality in income distribution has been on a steady increase in
the country since 2003, but by 2011 the situation had worsened.
The table below further supports why a section of northern Nigerian youths may subscribe to Boko Haram
mobilization.
Year
1980
1985
1992
1996
2004
Sector
Urban Rural
%
%
17.2
28.3
37.8
51.4
37.5
46.0
58.2
69.3
43.2
63.3
South south
%
13.2
45.7
40.8
58.2
35.1
South east
%
12.9
30.4
41.0
53.5
26.7
Zone
South west
North central
%
%
13.4
32
38.6
50.8
43.1
46.0
60.9
64.7
43.0
67.0
North east
%
35.6
54.9
54.4
70.1
72.2
North west
%
37.7
52.1
36.5
77.2
71.2
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, NBS (2005)
The situation today (ten years after) would have seriously worsened considering the rapid increase in violence and death
rate especially from Boko Haram activities there.
7. Implication for National Security and Development
The above scenario, as is obvious, has very serious implications for the state’s socio-economic and political
development. Let us consider particularly the following specific variables:
Budget: In response to the parlous security situation in the country, particularly in the North, the sum of N921.9
billion was voted for security in the 2012 federal budget even when this means that other sectors considered critical to the
survival of the economy such as health, electric power, agriculture, education, science and technology and works, among
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others will suffer. For instance, N400.148 billion voted for the education sector is said to be a far cry from the 26 percent
basic minimum recommended by UNESCO. Also, as important as electric power is, the sector got only N161.42 billion,
while agriculture was allocated N78.98 billion. Other sectors got allocations far less than what was allocated to defense
(see Tell, 14 May, 2012:47). Regrettably, this jumbo security vote, which is the highest sectoral allocation even though
the country is not at war, did not yield any substantial dividend as experience that year later showed.
Rapid Death Rate and Loss of Property: The rate at which human lives are lost in the northern part of the country
in recent time has become very worrisome. In fact, almost every week both local and foreign media are awash with
stories about the activities of Boko Haram. For instance, in Maiduguri, bomb explosion has become a daily occurrence
along major roads in the city resulting in an estimated death of 3,000 people together with about 200 churches burnt
alongside other public and private infrastructure since 2009 when the crisis began. Ogunwale (2013:1) captures it further:
The sect members have also claimed responsibility for killing of students and burning of schools. In Borno, no fewer
than 80 classrooms have been burnt, according to Governor Kashim Shetima.
The economic implication of all these, together with others unofficially reported leaves very much to be desired.
Effect on Investment: This has a dual implication. First, foreign investors are seriously scared away from coming to
invest in Nigeria especially now that the country is almost categorized as a terrorist state. Secondly, these incessant
attacks suffers the economy. Ben Uzor in Business Day (2012:3) states:
A raft bomb attack on telecommunication installation in northern part of Nigeria is taking its toll on the economy. Over 30
Base Transceiver Stations (a critical network infrastructure required in delivering telecoms service) owned by some
major operators such as Airtel, Globalcom, and Etisalat have so far been destroyed. Following this development, critical
sectors such as banking, security and manufacturing, which depend on telecoms for efficiency, have been cut off from
the global economy.
This will be better appreciated when we do a comparative study of investment in this sector before now. For
example, the expansion of telecom facilities in the country increased the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from
$18 billion in 2009 to $25 billion this year. Similarly, small and medium scale business run by non indigenes had been
shut down while their proprietors relocate to other parts of the country, thus putting the northern region at a loss of N25
billion daily due to Boko Haram violence (Tell July 23, 2012:20-21).
Other socio-economic implications include: decrease in the standard of education, migration and de-urbanization,
psychological trauma, deepening of interreligious intolerance and conflict, and of course weakening of the state.
7.1 Impact on Politics
The much clamoured statement by the Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan, that his cabinet has been infiltrated by the
Boko Haram indeed calls for worry. This is confirmed by the way in which the polity has been recently over-heated. The
nomination of Retired General Muhammadu Buhari as a negotiator for the Boko Haram, the allegation against Senator Ali
Ndume of being one of the brains behind Boko Haram, and the fingering of Ali Modu Sheriff, former governor of Borno
state as one of the patrons of the sect, all portend danger for the strength of the state. The weakness of the state is
further explained in its decision to draw up a negotiation on whether granting of amnesty will pacify the sect. All these,
according to Nossiter (2012:37), have the capacity to decline national cohesion and identity, undermine state legitimacy
thus throwing up a considerable loss of confidence on the machinery of government.
8. Conclusion and Recommendations
The violent conflict in Nigeria, particularly in the northern part, has become so highly intensified and indeed Hobbesian
that the people are now living in “perpetual fear of everyone against everyone else”. The situation has even worsened
with the lack of motivation, poverty of integrity, in-fighting within the Nigerian politico-security system and most importantly
the weakened character of the Nigerian state (Akubor 2011:76). The Boko Haram insurgency group is daily acquiring
dastardly innovations in the method of carrying out their activities. Although the Nigerian state has adopted some form of
liberal approach to solving the problem, namely the setting up of the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful
Resolution of Security Challenges in the North, chaired by Alhaji Taminu Turaki (SAN), it has relied heavily on state
violence (e.g state of emergency on Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states). This dual approach is not likely to yield good
result as it lacks an all-inclusive, institutionalized and concrete economic content.
Sequel to the above, the following recommendations have become necessary in this work.
(i) Boko Haram members should be accommodated in the state economic planning process through an allinclusive development-oriented agenda or interventionist platform rather than adopting an elitist approach of
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ISSN 2039-2117 (online)
ISSN 2039-9340 (print)
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy
Vol 5 No 10
June 2014
dealing only with stakeholders.
(ii) The problem of poverty needs to be tackled at its roots – possibly from the village level.
(iii) The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) should be restructured and decentralized to critically
monitor the appropriation of local government councils’ allocations to ensure that resources are deployed to
projects with potentials for human capital development at the rural level.
(iv) Government at all levels should adopt an institutionalized framework of setting up of a Religious Tolerance
Commission while the National Orientation Agency makes it a duty to embark on serious religious tolerance
campaigns through out the country as part their responsibilities.
(v) We equally advocate the entrenchment of the rule of law and good governance in the country as a means of
delivering justice to oppressed members of society who may have formed the bulk of the Boko Haram sect.
Again, civil society groups, community based organizations (CBO), faith based organizations (FBOs) also have to
seriously initiate social engagement, enlightenment and advocacy programmes to change the world-view of the Boko
Haram members.
The intra party conflicts especially within the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) need to be resolved to avoid
using Boko Haram members as weapons against perceived political opponents.
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