NSSPI-10-011
WORKSHOP REPORT: INTERNATIONAL
WORKSHOP FOR USERS OF
PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENTS TOOLS
H OSTED BY THE T EXAS A&M U NIVERSITY
S TUDENT C HAPTER OF THE I NSTITUTE OF
N UCLEAR M ATERIALS M ANAGEMENT
F EBRUARY 24-25, 2010
Workshop Organizer:
Adrienne M. LaFleur
Texas A&M University
TAMU Student Chapter President
College Station, TX 77843
Workshop Technical Chairs:
William S. Charlton
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77843
Michael Zentner
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Richland, WA 99352
Report Issued on May 31, 2010
SUMMARY
A wide variety of proliferation assessment approaches have been developed or are currently under
development. These tools are used by different types of analysts for various purposes. Continued discussion
of these tools and approaches is a valuable way not only to drive development but also to help prevent
inconsistent application or misuse of the technologies. A workshop was held at Texas A&M University
February 23-25, 2010 to provide a venue for developers and users to explore these assessment
methodologies, The goal of this workshop was to develop a research agenda that is responsive to the specific
needs of users in regulatory roles. This workshop was organized by the INMM Standing Committee on
Proliferation Assessments and Methodologies and hosted by the Texas A&M University Student Chapter of
INMM. The workshop had 65 participants from a broad range of organizations including academia, national
laboratories, industry, government, and the IAEA.
During the workshop, developers discussed the status of the field and current research. Users discussed the
current and anticipated needs to which assessment and methodology approaches could contribute. The
workshop focused heavily on proliferation resistance methodologies; however, proliferation risk analysis,
material attractiveness, statistical analyses to assess proliferation determinants, and quantitative analysis to
estimate the likelihood a State will proliferate were also discussed. Panel sessions were held to assess the
utility of current tools and identify future needs in a path forward for these approaches.
The results from this workshop identified numerous questions to be answered by current and developing
proliferation resistance methodologies. This is important to ensure that the methods developed will produce
results that meet the needs of the of the intended user group. It is important that we first understand the
decisions that have to be made and the questions that need answers to facilitate the decision making process.
The participants also had two general comments: (1) subjective methods are useful but need to be applied
honestly and transparently and (2) that method developers need to be wary of false quantification (i.e., giving
too much importance to small differences in numbers).
The workshop results identified several areas for future proliferation resistance tool development. These
include:
•
•
•
•
Develop means to effectively communicate results to different audiences via outreach to other
communities to bridge the communication gap and provide a forum for informed information
Develop test cases and “benchmark” standards that can be tested against (prototypic cases and small
systems studies) to help facilitate verification of these methodologies
Perform systems study on expert elicitation
Obtain a better understanding of how proliferation resistance and risk relate to export control
The workshop participants also discussed proliferation risk analysis and identified several areas for future
work including:
•
•
•
•
•
Develop a better understanding of the definition of proliferation risk and all terms used in its
mathematical formulation.
Study the time frame over which an analysis can be reliably performed.
Determine how to fully quantify consequences (esp. beyond material attractiveness).
Determine how proliferation resistance relates to proliferation risk.
Understand the risk of the “Do Nothing” option (i.e., the risk associated with choosing to take no
action or make no decision.
1
This workshop was the first in a series of workshops that will attempt to improve the user group’s
understanding of available tools and perspectives of other user groups, identify specific needs of user groups,
and develop a research agenda and path forward to address those needs.
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.
Purpose .................................................................................................................................................................. 4
2.
Workshop Sponsors ............................................................................................................................................ 5
3.
Workshop Agenda ............................................................................................................................................... 6
3.1.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010 ........................................................................................................... 6
3.2.
Thursday, February 25, 2010............................................................................................................... 7
4.
Participants ............................................................................................................................................................ 8
5.
Key Workshop Results...................................................................................................................................... 10
6.
5.1.
Identification of Possible Users of Tools and Tool Results ........................................................ 10
5.2.
Adversaries Considered ..................................................................................................................... 10
5.3.
Relationship between Proliferation Risk Analysis, Proliferation Resistance, Nonproliferation
Assessments ......................................................................................................................................... 10
5.4.
Identification of Key Questions that these Methodologies Should be Capable of Answering
................................................................................................................................................................ 12
5.5.
Questions that Should be Answered but Not by these Methodologies ..................................... 13
5.6.
Identification of Future Work for Proliferation Resistance ......................................................... 13
5.7.
Identification of Future Work for Proliferation Risk.................................................................... 14
Quantitative Proliferation Resistance and Proliferation Assessments Bibliography ............................... 15
3
1. PURPOSE
A wide variety of approaches to proliferation assessment and proliferation resistance analysis have been
developed or are currently under development. These tools are used by different types of analysts for various
purposes. The diverse nature of the field may diminish the effectiveness of these tools or result in
inconsistent application or misuse. This workshop was the first in a series focused on proliferation
assessment tools. We define proliferation assessment tools broadly to include proliferation risk and
proliferation resistance analysis as well as studies to understand why states proliferate, develop proliferation
determinants and indicators, and predict proliferation. A partial list of previous and ongoing efforts in this
area is shown in the bibliography later in this report. In this workshop, we focused on proliferation risk
analysis with most presentations detailing proliferation resistance analysis tools and results; however, we also
included methods to quantify material attractiveness and studies to quantify proliferation determinants.
This series of workshops will focus on particular user groups and attempt to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Improve the user group’s understanding of available tools and approaches
Improve the user group’s understanding of the perspective of other user groups
Identify needs of user groups
Develop a research agenda to address those needs
For this first workshop in the series, the purpose of the workshop was to:
1. Provide a summary of the state of this technology and a forum for discussing results and current
developments;
2. Develop a vision for relating proliferation resistance, nonproliferation assessments, and proliferation
risk;
3. Define user needs for these tools (and including regulatory needs); and
4. Discuss directions for future research in this area.
4
2. WORKSHOP SPONSORS
This workshop was made possible due to the generous donations of our sponsor organizations. The
following organizations contributed funds to the workshop for use in paying for logistics and material
supplies:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Sandia National Laboratory
INMM Southwest Chapter
Canberra Albuquerque
We thank these organizations for their generosity and interest in promoting the security and safety of nuclear
energy systems.
5
3. WORKSHOP AGENDA
3.1. Wednesday, February 24, 2010
08:15 – 08:30
08:30 – 08:45
08:45 – 09:15
Registration
Opening Remarks and Welcome from Chairs (Mike Zentner and William Charlton)
Introductions of All Participants
09:15 – 10:15
Opening Plenary Session: Current Role and Future Needs of Proliferation
Assessment Tools (Chair: William Charlton) – Speakers will present the perspectives of
their organization on the role of proliferation assessment tools.
Speakers:
Warren F. Miller, Jr., DOE (represented by Matt Bowen)
Mark Whitney, NNSA (represented by Ed Wonder)
Bruce Moran, IAEA
09:15
09:35
09:55
10:15 – 10:30
Break
10:30 – 12:10
Session I: User Groups Needs & Proliferation Assessment Tools (Chair: William
Charlton) – Panelists will give a set of brief remarks regarding user group needs and how
proliferation assessment tools should meet these needs. This will be followed by moderated
panel discussion. Questions to discuss include: Do results of PR studies meet the needs of
Governmental Officials? How can the results be interpreted, what questions do they answer?
How have the use of PR study results affected safeguards design and operation of nuclear
facilities?
Panelists:
Ed Wonder, DOE/NA-24
Mark Mullen, LANL
Jeremy Whitlock, AECL
Trond Bjornard, INL
Bruce Moran, IAEA
Group Discussion
11:30
12:10 – 13:30
Lunch (GSC Room 101B)
13:30 – 17:30
Session II: Proliferation Assessment Methodologies (Chair: William Charlton) –
Speakers will provide overview of proliferation assessment methodologies and address
questions regarding the needs of user groups and how these tools could contribute.
Speakers:
Chuck Bathke, LANL
Bob Bari, BNL
Mike Zentner, PNNL
Break
H.L. Chang, KAERI
Mike Golay, MIT
Man-Sung Yim, North Carolina State University
Sunil Chirayath, TAMU
Group Discussion
13:30
13:55
14:20
14:45
15:05
15:30
15:55
16:20
16:40
17:30 – 18:00
18:30 – 21:30
Summary and Concluding Remarks
Banquet at the Messina Hof Winery
6
3.2. Thursday, February 25, 2010
08:30 –08:45
Opening Remarks (Mike Zentner and William Charlton)
08:45 –11:30
Session III: Path Forward to Meet User Needs (Chair: Mike Zentner) – Panelists give a
set of brief remarks (5-10 minutes) regarding areas of research needed to improve
proliferation assessment tools. This will be followed by moderated panel discussion.
Questions to discuss include: Are we looking in the right areas? Are the results really usable
as they are? What areas do we need more work on and why?
Panelists:
Chris Way, Cornell University
Bart Ebbinghaus, LLNL
Bob Bari, BNL
William Charlton, TAMU
Break
Group Discussion
10:00
10:15
11:30 – 12:15
12:15 – 14:00
Lunch (GSC Room 101B)
Facility tours of either Nuclear Science Center or Disaster City (Buses will take participants
to tour location and back to GSC.)
14:00 – 16:00
14:00
14:30
15:15
Session IV: Development of Research Agenda for Path Forward (Chair: Mike Zentner)
Chairs will present draft results of workshop
Group Discussion
Review consensus on research agenda and path forward
15:30 – 17:00
Summary and Closeout
Electronic copies of all workshop presentations are available at http://nsspi.tamu.edu/INMM.
7
4. PARTICIPANTS
The participants convened for the workshop included experts in nuclear energy, nuclear nonproliferation,
nuclear security, nuclear safeguards, radiation safety, radiation detection, reactor design, and international
affairs experts. The participants represented a wide range of organizations including national laboratories,
industry, academia, and government institutions. A vast array of experience and knowledge was represented
by this group. The workshop included sixty-seven registered participants. The demographics of those
participants by institution were as follows: 43% national laboratories, 6% industry, 42% academia, and 9%
government. The academic participants included 14 students from five universities.
A detailed list of the registered workshop participants is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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12.
13.
14.
15.
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23.
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25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Aimee Anderson, Texas A&M University
Robert Bari, Brookhaven National Laboratory
James Barnes, Boeing Company
Charles Bathke, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Trond Bjornard, Idaho National Laboratory
Matthew Bowen, US Department of Energy
Brian Boyer, Los Alamos National Laboratory
David Boyle, Texas A&M University
Sarah Case, National Academy of Sciences
Nandan Chandregowda, Texas A&M University
Hong-Lae Chang, KAERI
William Charlton, Texas A&M University
Sunil Chirayath, Texas A&M University
Benjamin Cipiti, Sandia National Laboratories
Garill Coles, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Tatyana Colgan, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Matthew Duchene, University of Illinois
Stacey Eaton, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Bartley Ebbinghaus, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Jessica Feener, Texas A&M University
Robert Finch, Sandia National Laboratories
David Ford, Texas A&M University
Claudio Gariazzo, Texas A&M University
Natasha Glazener, University of New Mexico
Braden Goddard, Texas A&M University
Mike Goff, Idaho National Laboratory
Michael Golay, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jeffrey Hausaman, Texas A&M University
Charles Hermann, Texas A&M University
Elena Hushbeck, Argonne National Laboratory
Leslie Jardine, Lawrence Livermore National Lab Retired
Joe Justina, Texas A&M University
Jungmin Kang, Johns Hopkins University
Adrienne LaFleur, Texas A&M University
John LeJeune, Canberra
Hector Lorenzana, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Craig Marianno, Texas A&M University
Thomas Messer, B&W Pantex
James Miller, Texas A&M University
Stephen Mladineo, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
8
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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53.
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56.
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66.
67.
Bruce Moran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Mark Mullen, Los Alamos National Laboratory
John Murphy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Paul Murray, AREVA
Christopher Myers, Texas A&M University
Paul Nelson, Texas A&M University
Joseph Pilat, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Pratap Sadasivan, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Saleem Salaymeh, Savannah River National Laboratory
Carolynn Scherer, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Grant Spence, Texas A&M University
Shannon Stacy, Missouri Univ of Science & Technology
Matthew Sternat, Texas A&M University
David Sweeney, Texas A&M University
Ike Therios, Argonne National Laboratory
Daniel Vega, US Department of Energy
Richard Wallace, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Christopher Way, Cornell University
Julia White, Texas A&M University
Jeremy Whitlock, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd
Mark Whitney, National Nuclear Security Administration
Adam Williams, Sandia National Laboratories
Edward Wonder, QinetiQ North America
Andrew Worrall, UK National Nuclear Laboratory
Gregory Wyss, Sandia National Laboratories
Man-Sung Yim, North Carolina State University
Michael Zentner, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
9
5. KEY WORKSHOP RESULTS
Several key points were identified by the workshop participants. In this section, we present the primary results
of the workshop and discuss the key findings.
5.1. Identification of Possible Users of Tools and Tool Results
The workshop participants identified the following groupings as possible users of proliferation assessment
tools and the results from those tools:
1. Government officials (including Energy Ministry officials, Foreign Ministry officials and Legislative
officials responsible for program approvals and funding appropriations, Research and Development
Managers)
2. National licensing and regulatory authorities and export control authorities
3. Intelligence analysts
4. IAEA safeguards authorities and other safeguard inspectorates
5. Industrial designers/producers/vendors
6. Utility owners and operators
7. The Public
It was clear that not all questions are appropriate for all users and that the presentation of results should be
specific to each user group. A brief discussion of which questions were appropriate for which user sets
occurred during the workshop; however, conclusions to this question were not made. It was expressed that
care must be taken in the usage of these analysis tools. Many of the tools presented were suitable for
developing insights into R&D priorities, technology vulnerabilities, and exploitability of various technologies
for proliferation purposes. However, the use of risk analysis to determine risk goals or performance criteria
was deemed a much more daunting task.
5.2. Adversaries Considered
The workshop participants identified a number of potential adversaries:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Host state
Neighboring state (i.e., a state stealing material or technology from another state)
Non-state actor acting alone or in collusion with other non-state actors
Non-state actor aided by a state
State with weak laws that allow black market networks that can enable a non-state actor
State with weak laws that allow black market networks that can enable a state actor
We focused our discussion on the host state and non-state actor adversaries during the workshop, and it was
the general consensus of the workshop participants that these two adversaries were the most appropriate
adversaries to be considered in the use of proliferation assessment tools.
5.3. Relationship between Proliferation Risk Analysis, Proliferation
Resistance, Nonproliferation Assessments
Many of the presentations given at the workshop were focused on proliferation resistance methodologies.
However, there was vibrant discussion at the workshop on proliferation risk and methods for predicting
proliferation. The participants concluded that proliferation resistance methodologies were much more mature
than either proliferation risk analysis or methods for predicting proliferation. Proliferation resistance (both as
a concept and as a quantitative methodology) has been much more heavily studied than either of the other
two areas.
10
Proliferation resistance has a generally agreed upon definition whereas proliferation risk does not have such a
consensus definition. Proliferation resistance is that characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes (a)
the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or (b) misuse of technology by States in order to
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This definition has been used to formulate
several methodologies for quantifying the degree of impediment that exists for a nuclear energy system. A
number of these methods were reported on at the workshop and while some differences existed between the
methods, it was agreed by the workshop participants that the exercising of the methods had led to a
significant understanding of how to characterize proliferation resistance. It was suggested that a set of
benchmark cases should be developed to help facilitate comparison between methodologies and to aid in
developing insights in to proliferation resistance characteristics. It was also acknowledged that having a
method of uncertainty quantification for the assessment tools would be valuable. This would also help to
make users cognizant of the impact of uncertainty on conclusions, and comparisons between evaluations, and
not implying a false precision in the presentation and interpretation of results. The participants were
concerned about presentations in which too much credibility was given to small differences in calculated
values.
A basic formula for proliferation risk (R) was proposed
I
R = ∑ Li P i C i
(1)
i =1
where Li is the probability that an adversary might choose to attempt to proliferate along path i, Pi is the
probability that the adversary will be successful at proliferating without timely detection given that they have
chosen to proliferate along path i, and Ci is the consequence of adversary proliferation without detection
along path i.
It was agreed that proliferation resistance methodologies primarily focused on Pi and that they were
reasonably well developed for calculating some version of that quantity.
The material attractiveness calculations had demonstrated the ability to quantify at least some portion of the
value of Ci but that perhaps they did not include all of the possible consequences of interest to some
stakeholders.
The nonproliferation assessment social science methodologies focused on calculations of Li, but it was agreed
upon that this was likely the least developed of the components of Eq. (1). The workshop participants were
even hesitant to suggest that calculations of Li using any of the approaches studied to date was wise. Those
studies were generally performed to have a better understanding of why states choose to proliferate, not to
act as a predictive tool. The practitioners warned against trying to make point predictions. Social science tools
find patterns of proliferation, and offer insights into which factors appear to have the greatest explanatory
power. These studies typically look at historical data (which is generally sparse) and could be hindered by the
fact that the observed events considered took place under significantly different circumstances. This
complicates comparison and drawing generalized propositions across multiple decades of historical record. It
was agreed that predicting an adversaries likelihood of choosing to proliferate in any given unit of time was
extremely difficult and likely impossible to do with any absolute value. It is of course possible to calculate a
conditional risk by assuming the adversary will choose to proliferate and setting Li=1. There was not a
consensus among the participants on the value in this, and it was determined that more study was needed
before any recommendations could be made. It was agreed upon by the participants that any analysis must
consider the characteristics of the adversary (e.g., country context) in order to provide relevant results. There
are a number fo ways that this threat information could be incorporated into a methodology and that it did
not have to occur through a quantification of Li.
11
The workshop participants only briefly discussed the issue of proliferation occurring over a multi-decade time
frame. It was acknowledged that this significantly complicated this type of risk analysis but no conclusions
were drawn on how to confront this issue. It was left as an area for future study.
5.4. Identification of Key Questions that these Methodologies Should
be Capable of Answering
The participants of the workshop spent considerable time discussing the key questions that proliferation
assessment and proliferation risk methodologies should be capable of answering. These questions naturally
grouped into the following areas:
1. Questions related to the design and operation of nuclear energy systems (NES) and fuel cycle
architectures
2. Questions related to the design and implementation of safeguards systems and other international
commitments.
3. Questions focused on the use of proliferation assessments as one component of a larger decision
process.
An overarching question that was posed is whether we should be studying the concept of proliferation risk or
proliferation resistance as a means to help answer the questions posed below. It was generally agreed upon
that some questions lend themselves better to one concept or the other and that likely both technologies are
needed. This tended to suggest that multiple tools would be needed to answer the broad set of questions
posed below.
In the area of questions related to NES design and operation, the following were deemed to be the key
questions that these tools should be designed to answer:
1. Does this nuclear energy system (NES) provide access to material or technology of significant
interest to a nuclear weapons program?
a. Does the spread of technology have a large impact on proliferation? (i.e., does it matter)
2. Does the design and operation of this NES provide information or develop skills related to sensitive
technologies that could be used in a nuclear weapons program (esp. in terms of breakout)?
a. How can the NES design be optimized to ensure that its operation will minimize the
development of skills or technologies that could be used in a nuclear weapons program?
b. What are the desirable design features that could impede proliferation?
c. Does this result in a new latent threat (e.g., exploitation of technology and know-how)?
d. How can the global nuclear enterprise be designed to minimize proliferation opportunity?
In the area of questions related to the safeguards system and other international commitments, the following
were deemed to be the key questions that these tools should be designed to answer:
1. Are appropriate international commitments (regulations, obligations, and policies) in place that will
provide credible assurance that the NES will continue to be used for peaceful purposes?
2. Is the design of this NES such that it can be safeguarded effectively and efficiently in a safe and
economic fashion, while ensuring early detection and/or delay of diversion or misuse?
a. How can the design and operation of this NES be optimized to ensure that it can be
safeguarded effectively and efficiently in a safe and economic fashion, while ensuring early
detection and/or delay of diversion or misuse?
b. How can the allocation of safeguards resources at a global or State level be optimized?
In the area of questions related to using these methodologies as a component of a larger decision process, the
following were deemed to be the key questions that these tools should be designed to answer:
1. On what do we spend the next dollar to minimize proliferation opportunity?
12
a. When do we spend the next dollar?
2. How can results be effectively presented, explained, defended, and justified?
3. When choosing technology options, can PR assessments be used to assist in making those decisions
(along with economics, sustainability, safety, etc.)?
4. Can PR assessments provide insight into the dynamics between the safeguards official and the
proliferator?
a. If so, how?
The participants also formulated a number of questions that these methodologies might be able to answer but
that the priority for this capability was much lower. These questions included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
How might proliferation assessment tools be used to understand the characteristics of the adversary?
How can the insights provided by a PR assessment be effectively communicated to decision makers?
How can confidence in decisions be assured?
Is there a simpler approach to analyze the problem?
5.5. Questions that
Methodologies
Should
be
Answered
but
Not
by
these
A number of other important questions were identified but these questions would not be answered by any of
the methodologies considered by the workshop participants. These questions included:
1. How much risk is acceptable? What is a tolerable risk? What is the de minimus acceptable risk?
a. Does the current safeguards system perform to your expectations?
b. Does it exceed required performance?
c. Are improvements only of interest when aligned with cost decreases?
2. Are there States willing to accept a less optimal nuclear explosives yield either intentionally or
unintentionally?
a. Are there non-State actors willing to accept a less optimal nuclear explosives yield either
intentionally or unintentionally?
3. What are the PR performance requirements?
a. For example, performance target for safeguards effectiveness and efficiency
5.6. Identification of Future Work for Proliferation Resistance
While proliferation resistance was deemed relatively mature, the participants were able to identify a number of
areas for future efforts that would provide significant benefit. These included:
1. Effectively communicate results to different audiences
a. Is there a better way to express/describe the phrase “proliferation resistance”?
b. Outreach to other communities to bridge communication gap
c. Provide a forum for informed information
d. Enhanced transparency of Expert Elicitation as well as other details of methodologies
2. Test cases and “benchmark” standards that these methodologies can be tested against (prototypic
cases and small systems studies)
a. As a benchmark working group
b. To help facilitate verification of methodologies
c. Can methodologies be validated?
d. Gap analysis and are there better methods?
3. Ability to estimate uncertainties (and sensitivity analysis)
4. Systems Study on Expert Elicitation
5. Better understanding of how proliferation resistance and risk relate to export control
13
5.7. Identification of Future Work for Proliferation Risk
The area of proliferation risk analysis was much less developed than proliferation resistance and a large
number of possible efforts were identified. These include:
1. Definitions of proliferation risk and all terms used in its mathematical formulation
a. What is success?
b. What is failure?
c. What are the undesired consequences?
2. What is the time frame?
3. How to quantify consequences?
a. Is material attractiveness a part of this?
4. Proliferation resistance provides a basis for calculating probability of success
a. Need modification to be specific to risk
b. Game methods and others
5. Risk of “Do Nothing” Option
14
6. QUANTITATIVE PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE
ASSESSMENTS BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND
PROLIFERATION
Ahmed, Shahid, and A.A. Husseiny. “Risk Assessment of Alternative Proliferation Routes.” Nuclear Technology.
Vol. 56, pp. 507-515, March 1982.
Bari, R.A., R.S. Denning, J. Eagle, S. McGuire, S.V. Mladineo, C.T. Olinger, J. R. Phillips, G. Rochau, J.
Roglans-Ribas, and R.N. Schock. “Guidelines for Performance of Nonproliferation Assessments.” Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, May 2003.
Bari, Robert A., Per F. Peterson, and Jordin Roglans. “Assessment Methodology Development for
Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of Generation IV Systems.” U.S. National Nuclear Security
Administration and U.S. Department of Energy, November 2003.
Bari, R., L. Cheng, and M. Yue. “Application of Probabilistic Methods to Proliferation Resistance: Misuse,
Diversion, and Abrogation Scenarios.” Brookhaven National Laboratory, September 2005.
Baron, Pascal, Christine Brown, Bruce Kaiser, Bruce Matthews, Takehiko Mukaiyama, Ronald Omberg, Lee
Peddicord, Massimo Salvatores, and Alan Waltar. “An Evaluation of the Proliferation Resistant
Characteristics of Light Water Reactor Fuel with the Potential for Recycle in the United States.” Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, November 2004.
Bennett CA, WM Murphey, and TS Sherr. 1977. Societal Risk Approach to Safeguards Design and
Evaluation. ERDA-7, Energy Research and Development Administration, Washington, D.C.
Blair, D., Y. McMlellan, C. Morrow, P. E. Rexroth, G. E. Rochau, T. T. Sype, and G. D. Wyss. “RiskInformed Proliferation Analysis.” Sandia National Laboratories, 2002.
Blair, D.S., P.E. Rexroth, G.E. Rochau, T.T. Sype, and G.D. Wyss. “A Risk-Based Methodology for Nuclear
Proliferation Decisions (Draft).” Sandia National Laboratories, May 2002.
Blair, Dianne, Yvonne McClellan, Charles Morrow, Paul Rexroth, Gary Rochau and Teresa Sype. “Analysis of
Proliferation Risk Using Risk-Informed Techniques (PowerPoint Presentation).” Sandia National
Laboratories, November 2002.
Blair, D., C. Morrow, P. Rexroth, G. E. Rochau, T. Sype, and G. Wyss. “Analysis of Proliferation Risk Using
Risk-Informed Techniques.” Sandia National Laboratories, January 2003.
Brogli, R., and R.A. Krakowski. “Proliferation and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Towards a Simplified
Recipe to Measure Proliferation Risk.” Paul Scherrer Institute and Los Alamos National Laboratory, June
2001.
Budlong-Sylvester, K.; Thomas, K.E.; Pilat, J.F. “Proliferation Resistance for AFCI.” Los Alamos National
Laboratory. Report no. LA-UR-03-0501, 30 January 2003.
Campbell K, R Einhorn, and M Reiss, Editors. 2004. The Nuclear Tipping Point – Why States Reconsider
Their Nuclear Options. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Charlton, W.S., R.F. LeBouf, C. Gariazzo, D.G. Ford, C. Beard, S. Landsberger, and M. Whitaker,
“Proliferation Resistance Assessment Methodology for Nuclear Fuel Cycles,” Nucl. Tech., 157, pp. 143-156
(2007).
Charlton, WS. 2005. “Multi-Attribute Proliferation Resistance Assessment Methodology Developed for
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