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Planning for ''Natural'' Disaster:
Unsustainable Development of the
U.S./Mexico Border
Helen lngram 1
Abstract.-Planning is designed to insure that undesirable outcomes do not occur and that decisions are based on knowledge
and reason. However, past planning on the border has been
insensitive to the environment and sustainability. Planning for
agricultural development has been narrowly focused on hydrology and engineering without consideration of impacts on the
natural world. Industrial planning has focused on jobs and economic growth, again without real consideration to impacts on
natural systems. The consequences have been environmental
degradation and threats to human health. More recently NAFTA
has promised to avoid these earlier planning limitations by
expanding economic activities, correcting environmental problems and focusing on sustainability. It remains to be seen whether
the promises made by NAFTA and other planning efforts can be
kept. There are real limits to the water available for growth and
development along the border. To ignore these limits is to guarantee disaster.
INTRODUCTION
Similar to recent years, the winter of 1997-98 in Southern California was
marred by natural disasters. While the earthquakes and fires sometimes
threatening human and wildlife and property did not erupt, the winter
rainstorms and high seas of El Nino flooded houses, swept away beaches
and the parks, playgrounds, and dwellings. High winds felled large eucalyptus trees often upon parked cars and buildings. Once the hillsides in
lovely communities like Laguna Beach were thoroughly soaked, the mud
slides began, and some uphill residents were horrified to witness the
creeping of their front lawn through their downhill neighbors kitchen
door. While treated by the media as a freak of nature-national television
audiences repeatedly were entertained with scenes of gigantic waves
crashing through windows of luxury apartments at Huntington Beachthe reality is that almost every surprise was entirely predictable. As William Cronon observed in his fine essay "In Search of Nature" labeling a
1
Warmington Endowed Chair, School of Social Ecology, University of California at Irvine
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-5. 1998
3
disaster "natural" implies there is nothing we can do about it. It is just the
way things are, and we'd better resign ourselves to the nasty temper of
much maligned Mother Nature. Yet, the worst effects of El Nifio were
visited on the developments expensively planned with beautiful architecture and landscaping that ignored key features of topography and climate.
Beaches are in a constant flux of washing away and rebuilding, often in
different locations. The unstable soils of the low hills once held loosely in
place by native grasses that thrived on winter rains shift easily under the
heavy weight of human dwellings and highways. Most trees in Orange
County are exotic, including the fast growing eucalyptus that quickly
provides shade and the illusion of solidity, yet shatters when subjected to
coastal winds. 2
Transforming terrain has long been a thriving way of life in the greater
American Southwest where since the beginning of the twentieth century
applied hydrology and agricultural engineering have diverted the waters
of the Colorado River first to make cotton and citrus, and now to make
condos cover the deserts of California and Arizona. The accomplishment
of such alterations have taken place under the guise of rational planning
and created an illusion of human capacity to impose not only order upon
the environment but also to alter the environment to conform to human
will. For the most part, large investments of energy and capital so far have
allowed humans mainly to ignore whatever limits may ultimately be
imposed by landform and climate. This is not to be the case, however, in
regard to one area, the U.S./Mexico Border, and one resource, water. The
argument of this paper is that the growing reliance upon water supplies
that simply are not dependably available, even in the relatively near term,
is to invite disaster. Ironically, "rational" planning, purposeful policy, and
infrastructure development have set the course toward practically certain
human and ecological crisis.
GROWTH OF POPULATION ON THE U.S./MEXICO BORDER
The U.S./Mexico border region was home to more than ten million
people in 1995, an increase of two million in only five years. Ninety percent of the border population lives in urban areas, and there are 14 major
sister city pairs along the border stretching from San Diego-Tijuana to
Brownsville/Matamoras. Table 1 provides population growth figures of
border states.
William Cronan, "In Search of Nature:" in Cronan ed. Uncommon Ground: Toward
Reinventing Nature, New York: W. W. Norton and Co, 1995.
2
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Table 1. Population Growth on the U.S./Mexico Border
%Change
1980
Area
NA
Binational Border States
NA
U.S. States
Mexican States
NA
5,149,510
Sister Cities
2,662,810
U.S. Cities
Mexican Cities
2,486,700
1990
8,301,000
4,412,000
3,889,000
6,902,590
3,478,490
3,424,100
%Change
1980-90
NA
NA
NA
25%
23%
27%
%Change
1990-95 1990-95 1980-95
10,305,000
24%
NA
5,230,000
16%
NA
5,075,000
23%
NA
8,051,140
14%
56%
3,868,540
10%
31%
4,182,600
18%
41%
Source: EPA, U.S.-Mexico Border XXI Program Framework Document
As the table indicates, the percentages of population increase in this
area is astonishing and growth is even more rapid in Mexico than in the
United States. Further there is no indication of growth abatement in recent
years since the rate between 1990 and 1995 surpasses that of the previous
ten years.
Concentration of population in cities and the attendant problems of
urbanization have drawn the most attention, but territorially, most of the
border remains rural. The rural economy of much of the border is based
upon agriculture which is highly dependent upon irrigation and relatively
sophisticated technology. The Imperial and Mexicali Valleys have historically been big producers of cotton, alfalfa, wheat and sorghum. 3 The lower
Rio Grande Valley in the United States is a source of pecans on the U.S.
side and of alfalfa on the Mexican side. Cattle ranching has been particularly important in the state of Sonora and in recent years the introduction
of bufflegrass and the diversion of water to irrigate this exotic fodder has
introduced increased water demand for ranching. 4
In the spaces between cities and the farms there are ecosystems that
support more than 450 rare or endemic species. In addition there are 85
threatened or endangered species of plants and animals. More than 700
neotropical migratory species, including birds, mammals and insects use
the borderland habitats during their annual migrations. A majority of
species in the border area are dependent upon riparian habitats. Within
the U.S. there are eight national wildlife refuges within twenty-five miles
of the border. In addition there are several national parks and monuments
in the United States on or near the border, including Big Bend National
Park, Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, and protected areas in
Mexico including El Pinacate, Canon Santa Elena and Maderas de Carmen
adjacent to Big Bend, and Laguna Madre de Tamaulipas.
3
Francisco Alba, "Mexico's Northern Border: A Framework of Reference" in Natural
Resources Journal, October, 1992, Volume 22, No.4, October, 1982.
4
Luis Vila, "Acaparan ganaderos el agua en Guaymas: miles of campesinos, en las miseria
par la Sequia, El Financiero," May, 14, 1998, p. 16.
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-5. 1998
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INCIPIENT WATER WARS
The most salient features of the U.S./Mexico region is aridity. Along
most of the border, rainfall is eight inches a year or less. What surface
water is available evaporates quickly under the stress of very high summer temperatures. Surface water resources in the border include two
major river drainages, the Colorado River and the Rio Grande, both of
which flow north to south, and a number of other streams, sometimes
intermittent, many of which flow south to north.
.
In addition to low rainfall, a second notable feature of the desert border
region is enormous variability in water supply, with dramatic swings in
rainfall and runoff. In prehistory, climatic variability was closely associated with viability of human settlement. Long-term tree ring data in the
Rio Grande Basin, for instance, show a pattern in which below average
rainfalls have occurred for as long as 200 years at a stretch. The flowering
of Native American cultures in the Rio Grande Basin from 200 BC to the
nineteenth century took place only during those peak periods of a century
or more when rainfall consistently exceeded the long term mean. Further,
there are very large year to year and seasonal variations in streamflows on
the Rio Grande. 5 There is no reason to believe that the droughts of 1993-96
which were so enormously harmful to Mexican agriculture and precipitated both international conflicts between the states of Texas and Chihuahua and between urban and rural areas in Mexico are unlikely to occur
again. The long-term historical record confirms similar variability on the
Colorado River. Tree-ring reconstructions suggest that over the last 500
years, the lowest 80 year mean at Lee's Ferry is less than 11 million acre
feet which corresponds to a 27% decrease in natural flow compared to the
1906-83 stream gauge record. 6
A third significant feature of water on the border is the critical importance of groundwater supplies. Uncertain surface water sources are
complemented by numerous groundwater basins which feed important
wetlands areas that support biodiversity and the region's natural system.
In the first part of the nineteenth century the major river systems also were
totally allocated and quantification of water rights on minor streams since
then have fully apportioned their waters also. As a consequence, more
recent users have often turned to groundwater as an alternative source.
Prior to 1940, groundwater basins in any areas along the border were in
hydrologic equilibrium, that is, water inflow was approximately equal to
5
John Hernandez, "Long term climatic and streamflow Records on the Rio Grande" paper
presented to bi-national conference, "Coping with Scarcity in the Rio Grande/Rio Grande
Drainage Basin: Lessons to be Learned From the Droughts of 1993-1996" Cuernavaca, Morelos,
Mexico, October, 1997.
6
Linda Nash and Peter Gleick, "The Colorado River Basin and Climate Change: The Sensitivity of Streamflow and Water Supply to Variations in Temperature and Precipitation," Pacific
Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security, December, 1993.
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USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-5. 1998
outflow, based on long-term flow conditions. 7 Since then water withdrawal and use has far exceeded recharge and degraded water quality
resulting in significant effects upon the resource. There are areas on the
border where aquifers have reached critical levels. It is estimated, for
example, that the Hueco Bolson, upon which both the cities of El Paso and
Juarez depend, has no more than twenty more years of usable supply.
Groundwater overdraft each year is nearly two million acre feet in Southern California and the Mexicali Valley. 8 Such overdraft is far from sustainable.
Because of its dependence on only two major water systems with huge
drainage basins, the border is acutely at risk from human induced climate
change. Looking only at the Colorado River, one widely cited study of
general scenarios based on general circulation models of climate suggests
that certain aspects of the hydrology and water supply system of the river
are extremely sensitive to climate change that could occur over the next
several decades. Not only are significant changes of runoff possible, but
the ability of existing water supply systems to mitigate the worst effects
are limited. Reservoir storage lessens impacts for only a short period of time.
An increase in temperature of only 2 degrees, with no change in precipitation would cause mean annual runoff in the Colorado Basin to decline by
4 to 12 percent. Further, under conditions of long-term flow reduction
salinity increases dramatically. 9 Such a completely plausible change would
dramatically affect water reservoir storage, water deliveries and water
quality on the lower Colorado River shared with Mexico and would likely
precipitate international tension, not to mention human crises.
Even without considering such a troubling future, there is sufficient
current water conflict to signal future problems. Cities are having to look
outside their adjacent areas and river basins to find new supplies, and
rural farmers are seeing an essential ingredient to their livelihood drained
off to quench the thirst of cities. Shared aquifers are being depleted with
both nations realizing that what supplies they do not capture will be
sucked up and used on the other side. The winners and losers in the
struggle vary over time and from place to place, but consistently the
natural world of flora and fauna is bearing the brunt of shortages. Riparian areas are disappearing, and with them the loss of many species dependent upon wet habitat. Streams, once flowing much of the year, have dried
up with insufficient water to feed the trees and shrubs which once traced
them like lifelines through the desert. The largest natural springs in the
7
Anderson and others, "Geohydrology and Water Resources of Alluvial Basins in
South-Central Arizona and Parts of Adjoining States:" U.S. Geological Survey Professional
Paper 1406-B, 1972.
8 Jason Morrison, Sandra Pastel, Peter Gleick, Sustainable Use of Water in the Colorado
Basin, San Francisco: The Pacific Institute, November, 1996.
9 Nash and Gleick.
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-5. 1998
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border region, Quitobaquito, within the Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument, and the endangered desert pupfish found there is at risk.
Nearly all the Mexican land adjacent to the Monument is undergoing
intensive agricultural development and urbanization. Groundwater
pumping from the Sonoyta river basin has resulted in dropping the water
table sufficiently to threaten the spring. In addition, biocide drift from
aerial spraying of crops are threatening rare plants and insects. 10 Further,
the water quality upon which natural species depend has become degraded. For example, high levels of pesticides and increased concentrations of salts and selenium in the Salton Sea are resulting in deaths of
ducks and other bird species and the malformation of offspring.
PLANS PAVE THE WAY FOR PROBLEMS
The present water conflict is the direct result of rational, discipline
based planning based on narrowly focused goals and instrumental reasoning. Goals changed over time, but in each case water was treated as a
property, product or commodity, not an integral part of the natural system
in a desert where scarcity is the rule and strategies to limit water use and
survive periodic droughts are essential.
Making the Deserts Bloom
Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century both the U.S. and Mexican
governments turned their attention to irrigation in deserts with rich soils
and long growing seasons. So called reclamation policies accepted legal
definitions of water as property of individuals and nations. Large scale
engineering works moved water like a raw material through production
processes. Prevailing water law and politics ruled that not to use water
was to lose it. There was a fierce competition among the two nations and
among subnational regions to put water to work through dams, diversions,
reservoirs and irrigation projects as rapidly as possible so as to lay claim
to it. A 1944 treaty on Colorado and Rio Grande waters divided them like
slicing loaves of bread, ignoring the systemic characteristics of water and
the many unintended consequences associated with storage and diversion.
But once rights were secure, government planners moved quickly to
divert water from its natural course to create agricultural wealth.
The development of the Imperial Valley was the largest of many such
projects. With less than three inches of rainfall per year and summer
temperatures ranging to 120 degrees, the area would seem unsuitable for
intensive development were it not for bureaucratic and engineering ingeU.S. Department of Interior, National Park Service, Organ Pipe Cactus Statement for
Management, September, 1994.
10
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nuity combined with constituency pressure and Congressional log rolling.11 While the early diversion of Colorado River water into the valley
was private and involved as many as 160,00 acres by 1909, the enterprise
might well have gone the way of gold rush miners had it not been for the
help of federal reclamation planners and engineers. Beginning with federal emergency rescue help when the project's headgate in Mexico failed
resulting in the diversion of the whole river into the Valley, the enterprise
was beset by troubles that only large federal subsidies and engineering
expertise could resolve. The Bureau of Reclamation accommodated the
needs of the Valley through the erection of a series of dams, diversions
and canals. Originally intended for small farmers, the 160 acre limita.tion
built into reclamation law was never observed in practice, and later was
all but abandoned. For more than a quarter of a century the Imperial
Valley has provided bountiful harvest of fodder, food and fiber and not a
few great individual and corporate fortunes. Today, like other water users
on the border, the Imperial Valley is feeling the pressures of over exploitation. One source of pressure comes from environment. The so called Bono
Bill, passed after the death of Congressman Sonny Bono, mandates that
the salinity levels in the Salton Sea not be allowed to increase. Since agriculture is the major contributor to salinity increase, it may well have to
foot the bill for preventive measures. Another source of pressure comes
from urban competition for water resources. The City of San Diego, the
last in line for the over appropriated Colorado River, has been pressuring
the Imperial Valley to sell irrigation water to the City, agreeing to pay for
lining canals and other conservation measures which could keep agriculturalists in business while using less water. Unfortunately, the lining of the
All American Canal will put a stop to fugitive flows to groundwater
sources upon which farmers in the Mexicali Valley depend. The Mexicali
Valley is an irrigated agricultural development in Mexico of approximately the same size but of lesser productivity than the Imperial Valley. It
is reasonable to expect the Mexicans to react strongly to the loss of this
long established water source even if it is outside the treaty obligations.
Border Industrialization
Just as the spread of agriculture in arid borderlands was the result of
purposeful governmental planning and policy, so, too, has been urban
development. While the U.S. Government has fueled urban growth
through the location of military installations, and funding of water and
highway projects throughout the West, the main impetus for urban development on the border has come from the Mexican government. The Border Industrialization Program was the brainchild of economic planners
11
Phillip Fradkin, A River No More, Knopf, New York, 1984.
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:'• ..
:·,
and experts in international trade. Designed to generate jobs in Mexico
Border Cities through the establishment of assembly plants, or
maquiladoras, the program initially enjoyed a modest success. Beginning
in 1983, stimulated by simplified regulations and lower water costs in
dollar terms brought by devalued Mexican currency, the industry saw
increases that averaged 14.4% a year in numbers of workers and nearly
11% of numbers of new plants each year for the next ten years. In 1993,
there were 2, 170 plants employing 540,930 workers. 12 The economic
importance of the Maquila program to Mexico can not be overemphasized. This sector of the economy continued to grow even during the latest
economic downturn. As well as providing a source of employment for·
Mexico's huge population just entering the workforce, the program is a
source of hard currency badly needed in repaying the Mexican debt.
The principle driving force for bringing maquilas to the border has been
the low cost of Mexican labor, roughly one-eighth of that in the U.S. However, the low costs of plant sites is also important. Maquilas have paid
little or nothing for the additional infrastructure burdens upon schools,
highways, and water supplies caused by their operations and the workers
they attract to the border. Further, up until the passage of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the enforcement of environmental regulations was relatively lax.
Just as reclamation plans and policies have had unintended and very
negative side effects particularly adverse to water quantity and quality,
border industrialization has resulted in additional serious problems. The
population explosion of border cities quickly out paced infrastructure
development, particularly that related to water supply and sewerage
treatment. The colonies that burgeoned particularly on the Mexican side of
the border usually had no dependable water service. In many cities almost
a third of the residents in 1990 did not have uninterrupted, convenient
water supplies. While water was piped to spigots in some neighborhoods,
many residents depended on water trucked into houses several times a
week where often it was stored in uncovered and unsanitary barrels.
Sewerage was handled even more poorly than water. Broken sewer pipes
in ancient water systems combined with leaky water supply pipes with
low pressure contributed to the contamination of the water supply. Raw
sewerage was spilled into streams and ran down roads and streams creating very serious health hazards. Since the direction of flow in a number of
urban water courses is south to north, contaminated water flowed across
the border to jeopardize U.S. as well as Mexican citizens. Public attention
to the poor state of environmental protection was drawn to the border as a
12
Paul Ganster, "The U.S. Border Region" in Paul Ganster, Alan Sweedler, James Scott, Wolf
Dieter-eberwein, Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America, San Diego, San
Diego State University Press, 1997, p. 243-44).
10
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-5. 1998
result of the free trade agreement. National newspapers like the Christian
Science Monitor and the New York Times ran series of stories labeling the
U.S.-Mexico border an environmental war zone. 13
NAFTA Side Agreement Planning
The border side agreements were the conditions added to NAFTA by
the Clinton Administration to make the accord more acceptable to labor
and environmentalists. While the agreements have had many beneficial
effects for the border, including much larger funding for border projects
directed to many federal and state agencies and the initiation of many new
environmental programs, my main argument is that their failure to address sustainable water supply questions while encouraging the further
expansion of water use on the border is a perpetuation of planning and
policy that lead toward environmental disaster.
The environmental side agreements included the creation of a pair of
new institutions, the Border Environment Cooperation Commission or
BECC and the North American Development Bank or NADBank. The
purposes of these institutions is to review, certify and fund border infrastructure
projects. While other institutions had previously existed with much of the
same mandate including the International Boundary and Water Commission and the Border Environmental Plan put together by the Environmental Protection Agency and Mexican counterparts, the performance of these
institutions was clearly inadequate for the new circumstances. In particular, the interests of states and people living on the border were poorly
represented, and the funding of projects depended on uncertain national
legislative appropriations processes. BECC in particular represents an
improvement in openness and representativeness in that it has a bi-national
board of directors with ten members, five from each country and decision
making procedures to ensure that the views of states, local communities
and members of the public are taken into account. NADBank has a bi-national
board of six members, and is a good deal less open to public input. However, it is more open than most international development banks to public
participation. Both institutions are jointly funded by the U.S. and Mexico.
From the perspective of avoiding unsustainable development, however,
the most important innovation of the environmental side agreements and
the BECC was the adoption of different evaluation criteria for proposed
projects. The BECC and the NADBank must, according to their rules,
consider the need to conserve, protect, and enhance the environment and
only sustainable projects are supposed to be certified. The economic criteria are also much improved over the politically driven past allocation of
monies. Financing of projects is supposed to depend upon "user-pays"
Helen Ingram, Nancy Laney, and David Guillilan, Divided Water: Bridging the U.S.
Mexico Border, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995.
13
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11
principles through fees paid by the beneficiaries of the projects. Financing
is supposed to come from public and private sectors.
Another improvement of the side agreements is the commitment to community capacity building: Increasingly BECC has realized that an impediment to better water planning and management has been the lack of professional and technical capacity, particularly in smaller border communities.
The institution has devoted staff resources and provided loans to secure
the necessary technical support for communities to prepare project proposals. The level of such support, however, has by no means been adeq~ate.
The real issue seems to me to be whether BECC and NADBank have
been or promise to be effective in bringing level of industrial expansion
and population growth more in line with sustainable levels of water use. If
the answer to the question is not positive, then the side agreements will
turn out to be no more than a rationalization or a half hearted attempt at
planning that will lead to disaster. Following is an assessment of accomplishments and shortcomings.
BECC and NADBank have gotten a slow start. Around 20 projects have
been certified by BECC and less than a quarter of them have been financed
by NADBank. Part of the problem has been staff instability and turn over.
Within two years, there was a complete change in leadership at BECC.
Another problem has been disagreement on the BECC board about its
mission. Not all members have had the same level of commitment to
openness and public participation and sustainability. Another problem has
been the relationship of BECC to NADBank. It is not yet clear if NADBank
can fund projects not certified by BECC and whether NADBank needs
under the law to consider environmental as well as financial sustainability. 14
The commitment to sustainability may be more formal and symbolic
than actual. No project has as yet been turned down on the grounds that it
is environmentally unsustainable. This is the case even though many
projects were planned and designed before the new regulations were put
in place and reflect older, "engineering-fix" ideas about water management.
Sustainable criteria has not led to projects that specifically encourage water
conservation in ways other than water rate increases. BECC has a procedure
in place whereby it certifies projects as simply sustainable or highly sustainable. However, there is no connection between this rating system and
likelihood or priority of funding by NADBank. NADBank's position has
been that BECC' s sustainability criteria are important, but for purposes of
funding, bank directors are most interested in the ability of users to pay
back loans, or financial sustainability. The argument is that the value of
scarce water will be signalled to users through high water rates. While there
is some logic to this argument, financial sustainability and environmental
sustainability may in the long run be at odds. If the pay out of projects
Mark f. Spalding and John J. Audley, Promising Potential for the U.S.-Mexico Border and
for the Future: An Assessment of the BECC/NADBank Institutions," November, 1997.
14
12
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USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-5. 1998
depends upon projected population expansion and economic development,
then infrastructure development becomes one of the forces driving growth.
New industries and new workers need to be attracted to cities if projects are
to be financially successful. Yet, this means increasing water demands pressing
close upon very limited supplies. After all, the increase of population on the
border has continued unabated since the passage of NAFfA. 15 Border infrastructure planning for sustainability begins to look like wishful thinking.
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE
The whole purpose of planning is to avoid the tyranny of the accumulation of many small decisions which may be individually rational but
collectively do not serve public welfare. Planning is supposed to guide
societies to avoid undesirable outcomes and to reach scenarios which have
been chosen on the basis of knowledge and reason. In the past, the planning done on the border has been insensitive to environment and to issues
of sustainability. Plans guiding agricultural development were narrowly
focused on hydrology and irrigation engineering, and failed to take into
account many negative side effects, particularly to the natural world.
Industrial planning initiated in Mexico, and implemented with the collaboration of the United States, suffered from similar myopia. Jobs, economic growth and hard currency materialized as planned but at a cost for
which the border was unprepared. The consequence of rapid urbanization
has been serious environmental degradation and threats to human health
and natural systems. In contrast, environmental planning related to NAFTA
embraced a more inclusive vision. Not only were economic opportunities
to be expanded, but past environmental problems were to be corrected
and future developments were to be guided by criteria of sustainability.
Unfortunately plans may function to provide reassurance that things are
on the right track when in fact they are moving in a dangerous direction.
This paper has argued that unabated urban population growth in an arid
region with limited and uncertain water supplies invites disaster. Human
populations are particularly vulnerable because there are high proportions
of poor, minority and underprivileged people who do not have theresources to take actions to protect themselves. Further, the area has significant ecological resources which will be terribly difficult to protect in trade
offs with human health and welfare. Rich areas like Southern California
may be able to afford to ignore, at least for the present, basic physical and
climatic features of the area and recover from the "disasters" that are the
inevitable consequences. The limitation of water resources, however,
places a firm boundary on human development and population growth
on the U.S./Mexico border going beyond which is to guarantee disaster.
"Public Citizen, NAFTA's Broken Promises: The Border Betrayed." Washington: Public
Citizen's Global Trade Watch, January, 1996.
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