Title: Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?

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Title:
Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action
Short Title:
Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
Keywords:
unilateral action; public opinion; presidential power; survey experiment
Authors: 
Dino P. Christenson
[email protected]
232 Bay State Rd.
Boston, MA 02215
Douglas L. Kriner
[email protected]
232 Bay State Rd.
Boston, MA 02215
Forthcoming in the American Journal of Political Science
* Authors’ names are listed alphabetically.
Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for
Unilateral Action
Abstract: The formal institutional constraints that Congress and the courts impose on
presidential unilateral action are feeble. As a result, recent scholarship suggests that public
opinion may be the strongest check against executive overreach. However, little is known about
how the public assesses unilateral action. Through a series of five survey experiments embedded
on nationally representative surveys, we examine the extent to which Americans evaluate
unilateral action based on constitutional, partisan, and policy concerns. We find that Americans
do not instinctively reject unilateral action as a threat to our system of checks and balances, but
instead evaluate unilateral action in terms of whether it accords or conflicts with their partisan
and policy preference priors. Our results suggest that the public constraint on presidential
unilateral action is far from automatic. Rather, the strength and scope of this check is a variable
product of political contestation in the public sphere.
Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all
analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse
within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DSDNX6
Word Count: 8,706
At least since Schlesinger (1973), scholars and critics alike have charged that the
rise of the unilateral presidency threatens our constitutional system of checks and
balances. While the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were initially a unifying
force, President Bush’s bold assertions of unilateral power both at home and abroad
quickly raised concerns that the pendulum of power had swung too far toward the
presidency (e.g. Pfiffner 2008). Offering scant resistance to such threats has been a
largely “invisible” Congress (Rudalevige 2005), one unwilling or unable to restore the
balance of power.
Individual members of Congress have occasionally decried alleged abuses of
executive power. In announcing his intention to sue President Obama, Speaker Boehner
lambasted the president’s penchant for unilateralism: “This is the President violating the
Constitution, violating his oath of office, and frankly, not upholding the rule of law.”1
Yet, while members of Congress can loudly object to the rise of presidential
unilateralism, the legislature appears institutionally all but powerless to stop it. The
collective action dilemma inherent in mobilizing 535 discrete members to the common
call of institutional defense (Moe 1994), coupled with a legislative process that is riddled
with super-majoritarian requirements (Krehbiel 1998) and transaction costs (Epstein and
O’Halloran 1999) all but preclude Congress from successfully overturning that which the
executive has wrought unilaterally (Moe and Howell 1999; Howell 2003).
The federal courts do occasionally chastise presidents for pushing the bounds of
their unilateral power too far. However, such rulings are rare (see Howell 2003, 152154). For example, in a series of mid-2000s cases the Supreme Court struck down
1
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/28/politics/boehner-obama-immigration-lawsuit/
1
various unilateral actions by the Bush administration concerning the treatment of
detainees in the war on terror. However, on virtually every other question the courts have
been silent. This inactivity in the face of extraordinary claims of executive power shows
the stark limits of the judicial check.
Because the institutional constraints on unilateral action are weak, public opinion
may be the strongest potential check on excessive presidential use of unilateral power.
Within the realm of military affairs, several recent works have argued that public opinion
– and the capacity of Congress to influence it – can impose a significant, if far from
uniform constraint on the strategic calculations of the commander in chief (Howell and
Pevehouse 2007; Berinsky 2009; Kriner 2010). Similarly, a provocative argument in the
legal literature posits that public opinion is now the strongest safeguard against the
accumulation of unilateral presidential power in a post-Madisonian Republic (e.g. Posner
and Vermeule 2010; Goldsmith 2012). Emphasizing the central role of public opinion,
Posner and Vermeule (2010, 209) conclude: “as long as the public informs itself and
maintains a skeptical attitude toward the motivations of government officials, the
executive can operate effectively only by proving over and over that it deserves the
public’s trust.”
However, the public and how it assesses unilateral action is missing from most
accounts of the unilateral presidency (though see Christenson and Kriner 2015). Public
opinion does not feature in standard game theoretic models of unilateral power (Howell
2003; Chiou and Rothenberg 2013). Some empirical studies have suggested that the level
of presidential approval may affect the frequency with which the president issues
executive orders. However, the direction of the relationship is unclear and the empirical
2
evidence mixed (Krause and Cohen 1997; Deering and Maltzman 1999; Mayer 2001;
Fine and Warber 2012). An important exception to this lacuna is recent research by
Reeves and Rogowski (2016), which offers considerable support for the notion that
public opinion provides a strong constraint on the unilateral president. Across a series of
surveys, Reeves and Rogowski find super-majorities of Americans opposing presidents’
use of their unilateral toolkit to effect policy change. If generalizable, these results
suggest that the constraints placed by public opinion on the unilateral presidency are
great indeed.
To pave the groundwork for deeper theorizing into whether and how the public
may constrain unilateral executive power, we identify the factors that shape how the
public evaluates unilateral action. We explore three possibilities. First, constitutional
concerns may render many Americans innately skeptical of presidential unilateralism
because it appears to threaten our system of checks and balances. Second, citizens may
instead use partisan cues to assess unilateral action. Citizens support unilateral action
when the president is a member of their political party, and oppose it when the incumbent
heads the partisan opposition. Finally, Americans may evaluate unilateral action
according to whether it concurs with their policy preferences. Citizens support unilateral
actions that move policy closer toward their preferences and oppose those that fail to do
so.
We test these competing hypotheses using data from five survey experiments
embedded on three nationally representative online surveys. The experiments probe the
dynamics of public support for unilateral action both in the abstract and in concrete cases,
which vary widely in terms of substantive focus, scope, and degree of polarization. The
3
range of experiments employed allows us to estimate causal treatment effects that are
externally valid and generalizable across policy issues. In sharp contrast to prior research
(Reeves and Rogowski 2016), we find little evidence of a public inherently skeptical of
unilateral action. Rather, partisan forces and policy preferences, not constitutional
concerns, dominate most Americans’ evaluative calculus, a finding that is consistent with
literatures emphasizing the intense polarization of our contemporary polity (e.g.
Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus 2013). Our results suggest that the public constraint
on unilateral action is neither as strong nor as automatic as suggested by extant research,
which has important implications for inter-branch politics.
The Public and Unilateral Action
In a discussion of a hypothetical inter-branch constitutional showdown, Posner
and Vermeule (2010, 77-78) argue that the public, not the judiciary, is now the primary
arbiter: “through the mysterious process by which public opinion forms, the public will
throw its weight behind one branch or the other, and the branch that receives public
support will prevail.” We ask through what “mysterious process” does the public
evaluate contested claims of unilateral authority? While this question has received scant
direct attention, previous literatures on public opinion formation suggest three factors that
may influence how Americans assess unilateral action.
Constitutional Concerns
The Supreme Court has ruled that a range of presidential unilateral initiatives,
when exercised pursuant to proper authority, are constitutional and have the force of law
4
(Howell 2003, 19-21). However, the strength of the legal grounds on which presidents
justify their unilateral directives varies widely across cases and over time (Bailey and
Rottinghaus 2014). Thus when evaluating unilateral action, Americans may consider the
extent to which it threatens to upset the balance of powers across the branches.
Research has long demonstrated that most Americans lack basic political
information (see, e.g., Campbell et al 1960; delli Carpini and Keeter 1997). However,
checks and balances is a cornerstone of American civics, and recent polling evidence
suggests that support for this core constitutional principle remains strong. Polls
consistently show widespread concern that the president is becoming too powerful and
that super-majorities are reticent to entrust greater power to the president.2 For example,
in a 2008 poll only 29% of Americans said they would favor giving more power to the
president, even if it would strengthen national security or the performance of the
economy.3 When queried about unilateral action specifically, significant majorities
worry about the expansion of presidential power. In a December 2014 poll, 68% of
Americans said that they were very or somewhat concerned “that Barack Obama's use of
executive orders and acting without Congressional approval may be permanently altering
our country's system of checks and balances.”4
2
2007 Constitution and Governance Issues Survey. Survey by PublicInterestPolling.com,
August 20 - August 26, 2007. USPARKER.07PIP.R01.
3
Survey by Associated Press, National Constitution Center. Methodology: Conducted by
Abt SRBI, August 22 - August 29, 2008. USAP.091508.R08B
4
Survey by Fox News, December 7 - December 9, 2014. USASFOX.121014.R25.
5
Indeed, in the most relevant prior analysis of public attitudes toward unilateral
action, Reeves and Rogowski (2016) find strong evidence of general skepticism toward
unilateral action. Across a series of four waves of the American Panel Study they find
that support for unilateral action was low and remarkably stable over time. In each wave
fewer than 30% of Americans supported acting unilaterally to change policy without
congressional action. Moreover, they find that attitudes toward the rule of law are
important predictors of support for executive action. The more a citizen is committed to
the objective rule of law, the less supportive he or she is of presidential unilateral action,
which cuts against constitutional mores.
If concerns about checks and balances shape assessments of unilateral action we
would expect to see three patterns in public opinion. First, because many Americans fear
that a strengthened presidency will upset the constitutional balance of power, baseline
support for unilateral action should be low across a range of settings, both in more
abstract questions about support for the use of unilateral tools in general and in more
concrete questions about specific unilateral actions in contemporary politics. Second,
when primed to consider the threat unilateral action poses to checks and balances, support
for unilateral action should fall further still. Finally, when asked to consider unilateral
action in policy realms where presidents possess stronger claims of constitutional
authority to act unilaterally – for example in foreign policy (Ramsay 2007) – the public
should be more willing to support unilateral action.
Partisan Cues
6
As an alternative to more abstract constitutional evaluations, we explore whether
partisan cues may be the guiding force shaping public assessments of unilateral executive
action.5 A long literature stemming from considerations of information processing
(Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Zaller 1992) has
argued that heuristics—i.e., cues or cognitive shortcuts—allow the public to make
reasonable choices despite lacking the relevant information (Mondak 1993b; Popkin
1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, Shaffner and Streb 2002). Perhaps the most
commonly relied on heuristic in American politics is partisanship (Rahn 1993). Even
having little to no information about a candidate or issue, the public can rely on this
simple identification to vote correctly (Lau and Redlawsk 1997), to process and recall
information (Lodge and Hamill 1986), and generally to form opinions when there is a
need for cognitive efficiency (Mondak 1993a, 1993b).
Evaluating unilateral action requires a level of political information that many if
not most Americans are unlikely to possess or acquire. As a result, many Americans may
rely on partisan cues to determine where they stand.6 Moreover, it is important to note
5
For a discussion of partisan forces and policy preferences at the elite level, see
Supporting Information (SI).
6
An alternative literature argues that Americans engage in partisan motivated reasoning
when processing new information and incorporating it into their political judgments (e.g.
Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2002; Petersen et al. 2013). Following Druckman,
Peterson, and Slothuus (2013, 59), we acknowledge that partisanship could influence
assessments of unilateral action through both pathways and that discriminating between
them is exceedingly difficult. While we believe our experiments show evidence
7
that the intense polarization of the contemporary polity along partisan lines should only
intensify the influence of partisanship on political judgments of unilateral action
(Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Petersen et al. 2013). If Americans
predominantly rely on partisan cues when assessing unilateral action, then citizens will
generally support unilateral action when taken by a co-partisan president and oppose
unilateral action when initiated by the standard bearer of the opposition party.
Policy Preferences
Finally, Americans may also evaluate presidential unilateral action on its policy
merits. Much opinion scholarship has long minimized the importance of policy concerns
in opinion formation. When the two conflict – which is increasingly rare in an era of
partisan sorting (Levendusky 2009) – citizens rely on the simpler partisan cues and
ignore policy information when forming their political judgments (Rahn 1993; Cohen
2003). Recent studies have challenged this perspective and demonstrated that citizens are
also responsive to policy information when making political assessments (Arceneaux
2008; Bullock 2011; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014). We test whether Americans
evaluate unilateral action at least in part based on its policy consequences. If so, then
citizens will support unilateral action that moves policy closer to their preferences, and
they will oppose unilateral action that moves policy further away from their preferences.
Justification Experiment
consistent with both motivated reasoning and heuristics, we focus here on the simpler
partisan cues explanation, which is consistent with our results across all five experiments.
8
We test the relative explanatory power of these three factors through a series of
experiments on nationally representative surveys. Experiments one, three, and four were
embedded on the 2014 CCES. Experiments two and five were embedded on separate
follow-up surveys conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix.7
The first experiment assesses the influence of constitutional concerns and partisan
forces on support for unilateral action by examining whether public support is contingent
on whether or not congressional inaction is offered as a justification for executive action.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Subjects in the control group
received the following prompt: “President Obama has aggressively used unilateral
executive power to pursue his priorities in both foreign and domestic policy.” These
subjects received no additional information. Before receiving this same prompt, subjects
in the justification treatment were given information about congressional inaction as a
justification for presidential unilateral action. These subjects were first told: “The current
Congress has been one of the most obstructionist on record and is near historic lows in
terms of its legislative productivity. Congress has failed to act on many of the most
important issues facing the country.” To make the justification argument explicit, these
subjects were then told: “As a result of this congressional inaction, President Obama has
aggressively used unilateral executive power to pursue his priorities in both foreign and
domestic policy.” All subjects were then asked the same question, which was adapted
from a January 2014 ABC/Washington Post poll: “Presidents have the power in some
7
For sample demographics, placement of experimental modules, and additional details,
see the SI.
9
cases to bypass Congress and take action by executive order to accomplish their
administration’s goals. Do you support or oppose this approach?”8
If Americans’ assessments of unilateral action are significantly influenced by
constitutional concerns about checks and balances, we would expect to see two patterns.
First, support for unilateral action should be low across both conditions. As the question
wording makes clear, unilateral action allows presidents to bypass Congress, which
directly invokes concerns about checks and balances observed in polling data about
presidential power in the abstract. Second, the justification treatment should not increase
support for unilateral action. If anything, the justification treatment may decrease support
for unilateral action because it makes the president’s decision to sidestep Congress even
more explicit. The treatment clearly states that the president did not act unilaterally with
Congress’ tacit consent. Rather, with his initiatives stalled in Congress, President Obama
acted to implement those policies by executive fiat. Because unilateral action in this
treatment is in direct defiance of Congress, the challenge to checks and balances is even
starker.
8
Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, January 20 - January 23, 2014.
USABCWP.012614.R12. The dependent variable in this and each subsequent experiment
(except for the Partisan Source experiment) was measured on a four-point likert scale.
We collapsed the strongly support and somewhat support categories to construct a
measure of the percentage of Americans supporting the president’s unilateral action,
which is the most politically relevant quantity that is emphasized in media reports. For
additional discussion, see the SI.
10
Alternatively, if partisan forces dominate how citizens assess unilateral action, we
should see two different patterns. First, partisan affiliation should predict support for
Obama’s unilateral course. Second, partisanship should moderate the influence of the
justification treatment. Republicans should be unresponsive to the justification of
congressional inaction. After all, this treatment reminds them that by acting unilaterally
President Obama was flouting the will of a Republican-controlled Congress.9 Democrats,
by contrast, possessed strong partisan predispositions to back the president’s unilateral
actions, regardless of whether or not congressional inaction is cited as a justification.
This should mute any influence of the justification treatment on support for the president.
Instead, the effects of the justification treatment should be strongest for
independents who lack strong partisan priors (Zaller 1992; Lebo and Cassino 2007). For
independents, the constitutional concerns raised by the justification treatment could lower
support. Alternately, if the average independent prioritizes breaking the gridlock in
Washington over a strict adherence to checks and balances, then the justification
treatment could increase support for unilateral action among independents.
A superficial examination of the data casts significant doubt on the hypothesis
derived from previous research that constitutional concerns will lead super-majorities of
Americans to oppose unilateral executive action. In the control group, only a narrow
majority opposed a unilateral approach with 48% supporting or strongly supporting it
(Reeves and Rogowski 2016). In the congressional inaction justification treatment,
9
Republicans controlled the House in the 113th Congress and gained control of the
Senate in the 2014 elections.
11
support rose with 56% of respondents backing a unilateral approach.10 Both the
relatively high levels of public support for unilateral action in the abstract and the
increase in support observed in the justification treatment over the control group baseline
are inconsistent with the hypothesis that constitutional concerns will render most
Americans inherently unwilling to back unilateral action.
To probe further, we constructed a pair of logistic regression models. The
dependent variable is coded 1 for subjects who strongly supported or supported a
unilateral approach. The key independent variables are the justification treatment and its
interaction with partisan dummy variables.11 The model also controls for each subject’s
partisanship, gender, educational attainment, age, and race. Results are presented in
Table 1.
<< Table 1 About Here >>
Model 1 shows that the estimated effect of the congressional obstruction
justification treatment on support for unilateral executive action was positive, but the
coefficient misses conventional thresholds of statistical significance. However, if
Americans rely heavily on partisan cues to assess unilateral action, then the effects of the
10
Additional summary statistics and differences in means tests for this and every
subsequent experiment are provided in the SI.
11
Subjects who “leaned” toward either party are coded as partisans. The results are
robust to treating these subjects as independents. See SI.
12
justification treatment should be most prominent among independents.12 To test this
hypothesis, model 2 includes interactions of the justification treatment with the
Democratic and Republican dummy variables. The main effect – i.e., the effect for
subjects who did not affiliate with either the Democratic or Republican parties – is
positive and statistically significant. By contrast, both partisan interaction variables are
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the justification treatment had either
no or a much smaller effect on Democrats and Republican respondents than it did on
those who were not affiliated with either major party. This is consistent with the partisan
cues hypothesis.
Figure 1 illustrates the size of the justification treatment effect for each partisan
subgroup. The median independent in the control group had only a .19 predicted
probability of backing presidents taking a unilateral approach.13 However, the
justification treatment more than doubled the predicted probability of the median
independent supporting unilateral action, increasing it to .47. Far from worrying that
executive initiative threatened the constitutional system of checks and balances, most
12
Alternately, in the SI we examine whether the justification treatment effect is
moderated by political knowledge. We find that partisanship, not political knowledge, is
the key moderating variable.
13
In Figures 1-5, we examine the effect of each factor on the probability of supporting
unilateral action while holding all other variables constant at their median values. In each
experiment, the median subject was a white female, between 47 and 50 years of age
(depending on survey; see SI for demographics), who had attended some college.
13
independents were more willing to support unilateral action when told that it broke
gridlock on Capitol Hill than they were in the absence of such justification.
With Obama in the White House, the median Republican was highly unlikely to
support presidents acting unilaterally to achieve their policy goals in both the control
group and in the justification treatment. Similarly and consistent with partisan cuetaking, Democrats had little qualms about backing presidential unilateral action in 2014.
The justification treatment did little to increase the probability of the median Democrat
supporting unilateral action from its already high level.
<< Figure 1 About Here >>
The justification module suggests that most Americans evaluate unilateral action
through partisan-tinted glasses. Independents, who lack strong partisan priors, responded
to the justification of congressional action by becoming more supportive of unilateral
action as a means to break legislative gridlock. Partisans were not influenced by the
justification treatment. The data is inconsistent with the hypothesis that most Americans
instinctively recoil against unilateral action on constitutional grounds. Instead, subjects’
strong reliance on partisan cues when assessing unilateral action echoes the dynamics of
opinion formation observed in other polarized contexts (Levendusky 2009).
Two Presidencies Experiment
The preceding experiment informed subjects that President Obama had acted
unilaterally to pursue his priorities in both domestic and foreign policy. While scholars
still debate the precise constitutional distribution of power across the branches in foreign
affairs, most concede that Article II grants the president greater basis for independent
14
action in the international arena than in the domestic policy realm. More generally, an
extensive literature on the two presidencies suggests that presidents have greater leverage
and leeway in foreign policy than in domestic affairs (e.g., Canes-Wrone, Howell, and
Lewis 2008). Indeed, Wildavsky’s (1966, 9-10) original formulation of the thesis
suggests that it may be driven, in part, because the public looks to the president for
leadership in foreign affairs. Because presidents possess greater institutional prerogatives
as commander in chief, if constitutional concerns influence Americans’ assessment of
unilateral action we would expect the public to be more supportive of unilateral action in
foreign affairs (Reeves and Rogowski 2016).
To examine whether support for unilateral action is indeed higher in foreign
policy, we conducted a new experiment on a follow-up survey that randomly assigned
subjects to one of two groups. All subjects were told: “Presidents have the power in
some cases to bypass Congress and take action by executive order to accomplish their
administrations’ goals.” Those in the control group were then asked: “Do you support or
oppose presidents taking this approach in domestic and social policy?” Subjects in the
foreign policy treatment group were asked: “Do you support or oppose presidents taking
this approach in foreign and military policy?”
We found no evidence that Americans are more willing to support unilateral
action in the international realm than in the domestic sphere. In the aggregate, 53.2% of
subjects in the control group supported the president taking a unilateral approach in the
domestic policy realm. In the treatment group, 53.4% of subjects backed the president
taking a unilateral approach in military and foreign affairs.
15
The logistic regressions presented in Table 2 show that partisanship was the
predominant driver of variation in subjects’ responses. Although President Obama was
never named in our experiment, support for unilateral action divided significantly along
partisan lines. Using predicted probabilities calculated from simulations, Figure 2 shows
that the median Democrat was almost certain to support unilateral action, while the
median Republican was almost certain to oppose a unilateral approach. Finally, the
second model in Table 2 shows that the issue area – whether subjects were asked about
foreign versus domestic policy – had no influence on support for unilateral action among
any partisan subgroup.
<< Table 2 About Here >>
<< Figure 2 About Here >>
Partisan Source Experiment
We further explore the power of partisan cues to shape support for unilateral
action by experimentally manipulating the elite source of the unilateral action. The
preceding experiments either directly referenced President Obama or were conducted
during his administration, and it is therefore plausible that our findings are specific to his
presidency. To address generalizability concerns, we now examine whether the
partisanship of the president drives support for unilateral action. Comparing across
presidents, however, is no easy task. Republican and Democratic presidents often use
their unilateral toolkit to pursue very different types of policy change. As a result, it is
difficult to discern the relative influence of partisan forces and policy preferences on
support for unilateral action. However, the great continuity in foreign policy executive
actions from George W. Bush to Obama (Glennon 2015) allows us to explore with strong
16
control whether partisan forces lead many Americans to support unilateral action when it
is attributed to a co-partisan president and to oppose it when the very same policies are
attributed to an opposition party president.
Subjects in this experiment were randomly assigned to one of two treatment
groups. Those in the first group received the following prompt: “President Obama has
used a variety of instruments, such as executive orders and national security decision
directives, to unilaterally expand his power in the war on terror. For example, these
unilateral actions have significantly increased electronic surveillance both at home and
abroad.” The concrete example focused on electronic surveillance because both
Presidents Obama and Bush presided over dramatic increases in National Security
Agency eavesdropping and data collection programs. In both administrations, revelations
of expanded spying caused an uproar and attracted significant media attention. Subjects
in this group were then asked the following question adapted from a 2006 Gallup poll:
“Do you think the Obama administration – has gone too far, has been about right, or has
not gone far enough – in expanding the power of the presidency and executive branch to
combat terrorism?”14 Subjects in the second treatment group received an identical
prompt and question. The only modification was that the prompt and question referenced
President Bush rather than President Obama.15
14
The only modification to the Gallup question was the addition of “to combat
terrorism.” Survey by Gallup Organization, June 1 - June 4, 2006.
USGALLUP.200621.Q11.
15
Simple past tense was also used instead of the present perfect.
17
Given the serious constitutional questions raised by both presidents’ unilateral
actions in the war on terror, we might expect strong majorities to believe that both had
gone too far in expanding presidential power. However, this was not the case. Only a
minority of Americans, 42% and 44%, respectively, believed that Obama or Bush had
gone too far.
To examine the extent to which partisan forces can explain varying reactions to
presidential unilateral action in the war on terror, we estimated a pair of logit models.
The independent variables of interest are an indicator for the Bush treatment and the
interaction of this treatment with dummy variables identifying Democratic and
Republican respondents. We again controlled for each subject’s partisanship, gender,
educational attainment, age, and race. Table 3 presents the results.
The first model of Table 3 shows that, on the whole, there was no significant
difference in support for unilateral action across the Bush and Obama treatments. This is
precisely what partisan cues would predict as different partisans should react to the same
treatment in diametrically opposite ways.
<< Table 3 About Here >>
Model 2 includes the partisan interactions. The coefficient for the main effect is
substantively small and statistically insignificant. Among independent subjects not
affiliated with either of the two major parties, whether the question referenced Bush or
Obama had no influence on the probability of a respondent backing presidential unilateral
actions in the war on terror. By contrast, among Republicans receiving the Bush
treatment significantly lowered the probability of believing that the president had gone
too far. Among Democrats, the Bush treatment had the opposite effect, significantly
18
increasing the probability of believing the president had gone too far unilaterally. This
partisan split was strong, despite the considerable similarities in the two presidents’
unilateral policies in the war on terror and despite the fact that the two treatments
explicitly referenced the same concrete example.
Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude of the effects. The median Republican in the
Obama treatment group had a very high probability, .65, of replying that the president
had expanded presidential power excessively. By contrast, all else being equal, the same
median Republican in the Bush treatment group had less than a .20 probability of
believing that the Bush administration had acted too brazenly in expanding presidential
power. Among Democrats, we see a similar, but opposite pattern. In the Obama
treatment, the median Democrat was very unlikely to believe that Obama had pushed his
unilateral authority too far. However, in the Bush treatment, the median Democrat had
roughly a 50/50 chance of responding that the Bush administration had gone too far in
expanding presidential power in the context of the war on terror. Considering the
vociferous Democratic opposition to the unilateral initiatives of the “imperial” Bush
presidency in the late 2000s, this relatively low retrospective figure suggests that a
significant share of Democrats may recognize the similarities in the two presidents’
conduct of the war on terror.16 Nevertheless, despite the two presidents pursuing
virtually identical policies, Democrats were three times more likely to judge that Bush
had gone too far in expanding the powers of the presidency unilaterally than has Obama.
Finally, among independents we observed no significant differences across the
two treatment groups. The median independent was unlikely to believe that either
16
In the June 2006 Gallup survey, 74% of Democrats said Bush had gone too far.
19
president had expanded presidential power too far through his unilateral actions in the
war on terror. Given the questionable constitutionality of both presidents’ actions, this
result among Americans without a partisan stake in the fight is another blow to the
hypothesis that constitutional concerns and support for the rule of law drive Americans’
assessments of unilateral action.
<< Figure 3 About Here >>
Means vs. Ends Experiments
Thus far, we have found little evidence that constitutional concerns circumscribe
support for unilateral action; rather, partisan cues dominate most Americans’ assessments
of the unilateral presidency. In the final two experiments, we ask whether citizens care at
all about the means, or only the ends of the policymaking process. This new focus also
allows us to examine directly the influence of policy preferences on support for unilateral
action. Accordingly, we conducted a pair of experiments to examine whether the means
through which the president pursues a policy objective – through unilateral action or
legislation – affects support for the president’s efforts. We do so across two different
policy issues to ensure that the results do not depend on the degree of general support for
or polarization on a particular issue.
Student Loans Experiment
Our first experiment examines support for a unilateral action that is limited in
scope and non-polarizing: reducing student loan debt. Subjects were randomly assigned
to one of two treatment groups. Subjects in the first group were told: “President Barack
20
Obama has publicly backed legislation in Congress that would cap student loan payments
at 10% of a borrower’s income, and forgive any remaining debt after 20 years.” Subjects
in the second treatment group learned of the same White House policy initiative;
however, in this treatment Obama pursued his policy goal through unilateral action.
Subjects in this treatment were told: “President Barack Obama has issued an executive
order to unilaterally cap student loan payments at 10% of a borrower’s income, and
forgive any remaining debt after 20 years.”17 The real world nature of our case, chosen to
alleviate concerns about external validity, required us to introduce some asymmetry into
the two treatments. It is at least possible that if our first treatment read that President
Obama had secured congressional passage for his legislation to cap student loan
payments, support for his actions would be even higher. However, we believe that any
increase in support would be modest. For example, research by Grimmer, Westwood,
and Messing (2014) shows that voters give members of Congress as much credit for
proposing legislation to bring dollars to their districts as they do for actually securing
legislation with the funds. All subjects were then asked the same question: “Do you
support or oppose President Obama’s efforts to lower student loan payments?” This
question wording was chosen because it applies equally well to both the legislative and
unilateral action pathways.
17
Of course, executive orders are not the only option in the president’s unilateral toolkit
(Rottinghaus and Maier 2007; Lowande 2014). However, given the null results for the
executive order treatment in both experiments, we think it highly unlikely that the public
would respond differently to unilateral action through other instruments.
21
Does acting unilaterally decrease support for a policy initiative from a higher
baseline level when the president pursues the same policy objective through the standard
legislative process? Or are public attitudes almost exclusively a function of citizens’
partisan predispositions and policy preferences? To answer these questions, we estimated
a logistic regression model. The independent variable of interest is a dummy variable
identifying assignment to the executive order treatment. To account for the role of
partisan forces, we again include partisan dummies for Republicans and Democrats. To
account for policy preferences, we exploited a question included earlier on the CCES that
asked: “Do you or does anyone in your household have student loan debt?” Just under
30% of subjects answered this question in the affirmative. Because these subjects would
benefit directly from the policy, we argue that many will have a strong predisposition to
support it. Finally, the model includes all of the control variables from the preceding
analyses. Table 4 presents the results.
<< Table 4 About Here >>
In model 1 the coefficient for the executive order treatment variable is negative,
but substantively small and statistically insignificant. By contrast, coefficients for both
partisan dummies and the student loan debt indicator variable are all in the expected
direction and statistically significant. Figure 4 illustrates the influence of each factor on
the predicted probability of the median respondent supporting the president’s actions to
lower student loan payments.
<< Figure 4 About Here >>
The horizontal line indicates that the median independent had a predicted
probability of backing the president’s efforts of .65. The predicted probability in the
22
executive order treatment is modestly lower; however, the difference is not statistically
significant. Instead, partisanship was the most important predictor of support for
Obama’s actions to lower student loan payments. The median Republican was as likely
to oppose the president as to support him. By contrast, the median Democrat was all but
certain to support the president’s initiative. Finally, policy preferences also influenced
support for Obama’s actions. Subjects from families with student loan debt – our proxy
for policy preference – were significantly more likely to support Obama than were
families without student loan debts, all else being equal.
Finally, models 2 and 3 of Table 4 examine whether the relationship between the
executive order treatment and support for Obama’s student loan efforts was moderated by
partisanship or policy preferences. Model 2 includes the interactions of the executive
order treatment with the Democratic and Republican indicator variables. None of the
coefficients are statistically significant. Across partisan groups, whether Obama pursued
limits on student loan debt repayments by legislation or unilateral action has no
significant influence on the probability of a subject backing the president. Model 3
includes the interaction of the executive order treatment and the student loan debt
indicator variable. The resulting coefficients both for the main effect and for the
interaction are also statistically insignificant. Whether Obama pursued student loan debt
relief legislatively or unilaterally had no effect on either those with student debt or on
those without it.
Immigration Experiment
23
To address concerns about generalizability, our second experiment examines
support for a much broader, high profile, and more polarizing unilateral action: President
Obama’s 2014 memoranda to shield up to five million illegal immigrants from
deportation. Did Obama’s decision to pursue this change unilaterally shape the public’s
evaluation of his actions? Or, would public support for Obama in the immigration arena
have looked similar if he had only pursued his policy agenda legislatively?
To answer this question, we embedded another experiment on a nationally
representative survey conducted by YouGov in April 2015. Subjects were randomly
assigned to one of two groups. Those in the first were told: “President Barack Obama
has publicly backed legislation to give temporary legal status to many undocumented
immigrants.” Subjects in the second treatment group were told of Obama’s unilateral
action to liberalize the nation’s immigration system. Furthermore, to prime any latent
constitutional concerns in this experiment we revised the treatment to emphasize that by
acting unilaterally, Obama had turned his back on the legislative process; subjects were
told: “Rather than seeking new legislation from Congress, President Obama has
unilaterally directed the Department of Homeland Security to give temporary legal status
to many undocumented immigrants.” All subjects were then asked the same question:
“Do you support or oppose President Obama’s efforts to give temporary legal status to
many undocumented immigrants?”
To explore whether unilateral action eroded support for President Obama’s efforts
to liberalize the immigration system, we estimated a logistic regression model similar to
that used in the previous experiment. The independent variable of interest is a dummy
variable identifying assignment to the executive order treatment. To account for the role
24
of partisan forces, we again include partisan dummies for Republicans and Democrats.
As a rough proxy for immigration policy preferences, we include a dummy variable
indicating subjects who identified as Latino. Table 5 presents the results.
<< Table 5 About Here >>
In model 1 the coefficient for the executive order treatment variable is positive
and statistically insignificant. By contrast, coefficients for both partisan dummies and the
Latino indicator variable are all in the expected direction and statistically significant.
Figure 5 illustrates the influence of each factor on the predicted probability of the median
respondent supporting the president’s actions to lower student loan payments. The
horizontal line indicates that the median independent had a predicted probability of
backing the president’s efforts of .26. The predicted probability in the executive order
treatment is slightly higher; however, the difference is not statistically significant.
<< Figure 5 About Here >>
Partisanship was the most important predictor of support for Obama’s actions to
liberalize immigration policy. The median Republican was almost certain to oppose the
president’s course of action. By contrast, the median Democrat was highly likely to back
the president. Finally, all else being equal, Latinos were significantly more supportive of
Obama’s immigration efforts than other subjects; this is consistent with the argument that
policy preferences also shaped support for Obama’s actions.18
18
Re-estimating this model with the interaction of the Latino and Republican dummies
confirms that Latinos of all partisan stripes – including the approximately 20% who
identified as Republicans – were more supportive of Obama’s immigration efforts, all
else being equal.
25
Models 2 and 3 of Table 5 show that the effect of the executive order treatment
was not conditional on any partisan or racial subgroup. Model 2 includes the partisan
interactions; neither coefficient is statistically significant. Democrats backed Obama’s
efforts and Republicans vehemently opposed them, regardless of whether the president
chose a legislative or a unilateral policy course. Similarly, model 3 shows that neither
Latinos nor non-Latinos were affected by the executive order treatment. As in the
student loans experiment, partisan cues and policy preferences, alone, shaped
assessments of Obama’s immigration actions.
Discussion
More than fifteen years ago, Terry Moe and William Howell (1999, 871) argued
that presidential capacity and willingness to act unilaterally to achieve their policy goals
has become the distinguishing feature of the modern presidency. The combination of
ever-increasing polarization, congressional gridlock, and protean policy challenges has
only strengthened the incentives for presidents to rely on their unilateral toolkit. Indeed,
across a range of urgent national priorities from immigration reform to climate change,
unilateral executive action represents the only serious federal response since the 2010
midterms.
And yet, while the desire for action to overcome the institutional malaise in
Washington is understandable, the unfettered expansion of presidential unilateral power
would represent a serious challenge to our constitutional system of checks and balances.
The institutional constraints afforded by Congress and the courts are weak. As a result, a
growing literature has posited that the public may serve as the primary bulwark against
26
presidential aggrandizement (e.g. Baum 2004; Posner and Vermeule 2010). But the
strength and reliability of that democratic constraint critically depends on how Americans
assess unilateral action. Are Americans reticent to support a president who pushes too
aggressively on the bounds of his power and threatens the integrity of our checks and
balances system?
The first two analyses of the micro-foundations of public support for unilateral
action have employed different analytic strategies and reached dramatically different
conclusions. Building on an extensive literature on judicial legitimacy, Reeves and
Rogowski (2016) endeavor to measure public support for unilateral action as exercised by
“the office of the presidency and not any particular president.” Focusing on popular
perceptions of the office and its proper exercise of power, they find strong evidence that
large majorities of Americans oppose unilateral executive action in the abstract, and that
core democratic values, primarily support for the rule of law, are among the main drivers
of this opposition. This evidence suggests that the democratic constraint against
presidential overreach afforded by the public is strong and automatic.
By contrast, our survey experiments, most of which focus on concrete instances of
contemporary unilateral action to maximize external validity, suggest a much weaker and
more conditional public constraint on the unilateral presidency. Instead of instinctively
recoiling against unilateral action as a threat to our constitutional system of checks and
balances, we find that most Americans evaluate unilateral action through the same
partisan cues and policy preferences that they use to make other political judgments. In
our intensely polarized polity the dynamics driving public attitudes toward presidential
use of unilateral power are remarkably similar to those driving public opinion toward
27
other policy actions. Consequently, our results suggest a weaker and more contingent
public constraint on unilateral action.
On the one hand, these two studies paint starkly different pictures of how the
public assesses unilateral action. And yet, from another perspective the two portraits are
at least partially complementary. In the abstract, most Americans appear deeply skeptical
of presidents circumventing Congress and the legislative process to achieve their policy
priorities unilaterally. However, when forced to consider concrete examples of unilateral
action in the contemporary political arena, partisan forces and policy assessments all but
overwhelm these underlying constitutional concerns.19 It seems that in practice
Americans’ partisan demons shout down the better angels of checks and balances they
embrace in the abstract.
This does not imply that the public exercises no check on unilateral action.
However, it does suggest that the constraint of public opinion on the unilateral executive
is not automatic, but a product of political contestation. Future research should endeavor
to integrate these two portraits by examining whether and how other political actors are
able to activate Americans’ underlying constitutional qualms concerning unilateral action
and convince independents and even some presidential co-partisans to oppose a
president’s unilateral policy course. For example, will public opposition rise if members
of Congress or the courts raise constitutional concerns of presidential overreach? Can
members of Congress combat unilateral action on policy grounds and convince enough
19
The sharp differences in public responses to abstract versus specific questions parallels
those observed in other policy areas, such as federal spending (e.g. Jacoby 2000) and
health care (Christenson and Glick 2015).
28
Americans that the unilateral initiative in question is inconsistent with their policy
preferences? Need such criticism be bipartisan, or can objections raised even by the
opposition party shape popular assessments of unilateral action?
Even after ascertaining the conditions under which significant majorities of
Americans will oppose unilateral action, new research is needed to understand precisely
how public opinion influences the unilateral president’s strategic calculus. In rare cases
strong public opposition can even reverse presidential actions. For example, widespread
public opposition to the Bush administration’s authorization of enhanced interrogation
techniques helped entrepreneurs in Congress overcome institutional barriers to pass
legislation banning torture; public pressure also persuaded President Bush to sign the law
(albeit with a signing statement) rather than veto it.20 Public unease over closing the
terror detention camp at Guantanamo buoyed congressional opponents of one of
President Obama’s first executive orders; seven years later, Guantanamo remains open.
Moreover, Howell (2003) has shown that even the judiciary becomes more willing to
challenge the unilateral president when support for the president is low. The widespread
public opposition to President Obama’s 2014 immigration executive actions, stoked by
fierce opposition from congressional Republicans and even some Democrats who
criticized the action on constitutional grounds, may have emboldened the district court to
issue its preliminary injunction, which has thrown the initiative into legalistic limbo.
More often, public opinion may influence presidential calculations indirectly, as
presidents anticipate the public’s reaction and forego unilateral action when the expected
political costs exceed the policy benefits. Such calculations appear to have influenced
20
For additional details on each case below, see the SI.
29
both the timing and scope of President Obama’s eventual 2014 immigration actions, and
caused President Obama in 2013 to forego a unilateral strike against the Assad regime in
Syria altogether (Christenson and Kriner 2015). Only by pushing forward in these new
directions can scholars understand fully how the strength of the public constraint on the
unilateral president varies over time and across cases with changes in the overarching
political environment.
30
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34
Figure 1: Effects of Justification Treatment by Partisanship
1
Predicted probability of supporting unilateral action
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
Dem X Justificaiton
Dem X Control
GOP X Justification
GOP X Control
Ind X Justification
0
Ind X Control
0.1
Note: Dots present the predicted probability of the median subject in each partisantreatment subgroup supporting unilateral action (i.e. all other variables set equal to
median). I-bars around each point estimate present 95% confidence intervals obtained
from simulations.
35
Figure 2: Factors Influencing Support for Unilateral Action, Two Presidencies
Experiment
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
Non-white
Age
Education
Male
Democrat
0.1
Republican
0.2
Foreign policy
Predicted probability of supporting unilateral action
0.9
Note: Dots present the point estimate for the effect of each factor on support for unilateral
action for the median independent (i.e. all other variables set equal to median). For
binary variables, the figure plots the effect of increasing that factor from 0 to 1. For
education and age, the figure presents the effect of a two standard deviation increase from
the median value. I-bars around each point estimate present 95% confidence intervals
obtained from simulations. The horizontal line at .39 represents the predicted probability
of the median independent respondent in the domestic policy control group supporting
unilateral action.
36
Figure 3: Effect of Bush Treatment by Partisanship
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
Ind X Bush
Ind X Obama
Dem X Bush
Dem X Obama
0
GOP X Bush
0.1
GOP X Obama
Predicted probability of believing president went too far
0.8
Note: Dots present the predicted probability of the median subject in each partisantreatment subgroup supporting unilateral action (i.e. all other variables set equal to
median). I-bars around each point estimate present 95% confidence intervals obtained
from simulations.
37
Figure 4: Factors Influencing Support for Obama’s Efforts to Lower Student Loan
Payments
Predicted probability of supporting Obama
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Student loan debt
Non-white
Age
Education
Male
Democrat
Republican
0.3
EO treatment
0.4
Note: Dots present the point estimate for the effect of each factor on support for unilateral
action for the median independent (i.e. all other variables set equal to median). For
binary variables, the figure plots the effect of increasing that factor from 0 to 1. For
education and age, the figure presents the effect of a two standard deviation increase from
the median value. I-bars around each point estimate present 95% confidence intervals
obtained from simulations. The horizontal line at .65 represents the predicted probability
of the median independent respondent in the lawmaking treatment group supporting
Obama’s efforts to lower student loan payments.
38
Figure 5: Factors Influencing Support for Obama’s Efforts to Reform Immigration
0.7
Predicted probability of supporting Obama
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
Latino
Age
Education
Male
Democrat
Republican
0
EO treatment
0.1
Note: Dots present the point estimate for the effect of each factor on support for unilateral
action for the median independent (i.e. all other variables set equal to median). For
binary variables, the figure plots the effect of increasing that factor from 0 to 1. For
education and age, the figure presents the effect of a two standard deviation increase from
the median value. I-bars around each point estimate present 95% confidence intervals
obtained from simulations. The horizontal line at .26 represents the predicted probability
of the median independent respondent in the lawmaking treatment group supporting
Obama’s efforts to reform the immigration system.
39
Table 1: Effect of Congressional Justification by Partisanship
Congressional obstruction
(1)
(2)
0.30
(0.24)
-1.22**
(0.35)
1.74**
(0.28)
-0.11
(0.25)
0.05
(0.08)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.69*
(0.29)
-0.27
(0.60)
1.36**
(0.50)
-1.79*
(0.72)
-1.26*
(0.60)
-0.21
(0.52)
2.51**
(0.46)
-0.06
(0.25)
0.03
(0.08)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.78**
(0.30)
-0.83
(0.69)
440
440
Congressional obstruction X Republican
Congressional obstruction X Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Constant
Observations
Note: Models are logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
40
Table 2: Two Presidencies Experiment and Support for Unilateral Action
Foreign policy
(1)
(2)
-0.06
(0.15)
-1.07**
(0.20)
1.74**
(0.19)
0.02
(0.16)
0.02
(0.05)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.58**
(0.18)
0.81*
(0.33)
0.04
(0.28)
0.10
(0.39)
-0.32
(0.37)
-1.11**
(0.28)
1.90**
(0.27)
0.02
(0.16)
0.02
(0.05)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.58**
(0.18)
0.75*
(0.35)
1,000
1,000
Foreign policy X Republican
Foreign policy X Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Constant
Observations
Note: Models are logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
41
Table 3: Bush vs. Obama and Beliefs that Unilateral Action Has Gone Too Far
Bush treatment
(1)
(2)
-0.05
(0.20)
0.18
(0.28)
-0.18
(0.27)
0.46*
(0.20)
0.28**
(0.07)
0.01
(0.01)
0.31
(0.26)
-2.31**
(0.49)
0.23
(0.43)
-2.35**
(0.57)
1.36*
(0.56)
1.37**
(0.42)
-0.98*
(0.41)
0.57*
(0.22)
0.31**
(0.08)
0.01
(0.01)
0.35
(0.27)
-2.66**
(0.56)
445
445
Bush treatment X Republican
Bush treatment X Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Constant
Observations
Note: Models are logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
42
Table 4: Effect of Policy Instrument on Support for Student Loan Relief
Executive order treatment
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.15
(0.17)
-0.32
(0.33)
0.38
(0.41)
-0.08
(0.50)
-0.19
(0.19)
Executive order X Republican
Executive order X Democrat
Executive order X Loan debt
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Student loan debt
Constant
Observations
-0.63**
(0.21)
1.89**
(0.25)
-0.50**
(0.17)
-0.14*
(0.06)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.34
(0.23)
1.27**
(0.24)
2.45**
(0.40)
-0.83**
(0.31)
1.92**
(0.39)
-0.51**
(0.17)
-0.14*
(0.06)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.34
(0.23)
1.28**
(0.24)
2.56**
(0.45)
0.23
(0.46)
-0.62**
(0.21)
1.89**
(0.26)
-0.50**
(0.17)
-0.15*
(0.06)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.33
(0.23)
1.16**
(0.33)
2.48**
(0.41)
970
970
970
Note: Models are logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
43
Table 5: Effect of Policy Instrument on Support for Immigration Reform
Executive order treatment
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.32
(0.23)
0.11
(0.41)
-0.36
(0.68)
0.53
(0.52)
0.30
(0.24)
Executive order X Republican
Executive order X Democrat
Executive order X Latino
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Latino
Constant
Observations
-1.85**
(0.36)
1.48**
(0.27)
0.56*
(0.23)
0.23**
(0.08)
-0.02**
(0.01)
0.22
(0.29)
1.01*
(0.42)
-0.99*
(0.49)
-1.71**
(0.47)
1.23**
(0.37)
0.56*
(0.24)
0.23**
(0.08)
-0.02**
(0.01)
0.21
(0.30)
0.97*
(0.43)
-0.82
(0.53)
0.23
(0.72)
-1.86**
(0.36)
1.48**
(0.27)
0.56*
(0.23)
0.23**
(0.08)
-0.02**
(0.01)
0.23
(0.29)
0.92
(0.51)
-0.96
(0.50)
486
486
486
Note: Models are logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
44
Online Supporting Information for:
Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action
Dino P. Christenson
[email protected]
232 Bay State Rd.
Boston, MA 02215
Douglas L. Kriner
[email protected]
232 Bay State Rd.
Boston, MA 02214
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
Experimental Order and Sample Demographics
In the text we present results from five survey experiments: the Justification experiment;
the Two Presidencies experiment; the Partisan Source experiment; the Student Loans experiment
and the Immigration experiment. Three of these experiments (Justification; Partisan Source;
Student Loans) were embedded on the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, which
was administered in two waves before and after the November 2014 midterm elections. The
CCES is a national stratified sample survey administered by YouGov/Polimetrix (for more
information on the CCES, see: http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/home). The Student Loans
experiment was embedded on the pre-election wave and was administered to all 1,000 subjects
assigned to our team module (996 completed the experiment). Of the 1,000 subjects originally
assigned to our module, 889 were successfully re-contacted and participated in the post-election
wave. Both the Justification experiment and the Partisan Source experiment were embedded on
the post-election wave. To prevent possible spillover effects, subjects were randomly assigned
to one of the two experimental modules. As a result, 440 subjects completed the Justification
experiment and 445 subjects completed the Partisan Source experiment.
To complement the three experiments embedded on the 2014 CCES, we embedded two
additional experiments on two separate follow-up surveys fielded by YouGov with nationally
representative samples (for more information on YouGov’s sampling process, see:
https://today.yougov.com/about/about-the-yougov-panel/). The first survey containing the Two
Presidencies experiment was fielded by YouGov between April 16-18, 2015. All 1,000 subjects
in this survey were assigned to and completed the Two Presidencies experiment. The second
survey containing the Immigration experiment was fielded by YouGov between April 24-28,
2015. Approximately half of the 1,000 subjects on this follow-up survey were randomly
1
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
assigned to the Immigration experiment; 486 subjects completed the experiment. The
demographic composition of all three survey samples are summarized in SI Table 1.
Additional Motivation for Partisan and Policy Hypotheses
In the text, we argue that partisan forces and policy preferences may shape how
Americans assess unilateral action. We find that both of these forces plainly shape how political
elites respond to unilateral action. Here we provide additional motivation for the partisan and
policy hypotheses by examining the influence of both factors on how elites respond to unilateral
action.
Unsurprisingly, elite responses to unilateral action often fall along partisan lines. Perhaps
most famously, candidate Barack Obama railed against the excessive unilateralism of President
Bush in 2007. “I taught constitutional law for 10 years. I take the Constitution very seriously.
The biggest problems that we’re facing right now have to do with George Bush trying to bring
more and more power into the executive branch and not go through Congress at all. And that is
what I intend to reverse when I become president of the United States.”1 Yet, once in the White
House, President Obama changed his view on both the utility and constitutional fidelity of
unilateral power. For example, on the campaign trail Obama warned: “The president does not
have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that
does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.” 2 And yet, after becoming
commander in chief President Obama unilaterally ordered American troops into battle in Libya
absent any congressional authorization.
1
Jonathan Karl. February 17, 2014. “Obama’s Long Lost Campaign Promise.” ABCNews.com.
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/02/obamas-long-lost-campaign-promise/
2
Obama quoted in David Fahrenthold. “On Debt and Libya, It’s President Obama vs. Senator Obama.” June 22,
2011. Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-debt-and-libya-its-president-obama-vs-senatorobama/2011/06/22/AGhK4AjH_story.html
2
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
In a similar vein, congressional Democrats who railed against the abuses of the Bush
administration largely either backed or remained silent in the aftermath of major unilateral
actions by the Obama administration. Conversely, congressional Republicans who were so
willing to defer to the unitary executive in the Bush years suddenly rediscovered the need for
checks and balances with a Democrat in the White House.
Yet, when presidential actions accord with the opposition’s policy preferences, cries of
excessive unilateralism all but disappear. For example, while congressional Democrats railed
against much of what President Bush accomplished unilaterally, not all of his unilateral
maneuvers met with Democratic opprobrium. When the president moved policy toward the
preferences of many congressional Democrats, congressional pushback was minimal to nonexistent. Congressional Democrats voiced no objections when President Bush issued Executive
Order 13423, which required the federal government to cut its use of oil-derived fuels by 2% and
to increase its use of renewable fuels by 10% per year. Bush’s order forced administrative
agencies to go far beyond the goals established by law in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Yet,
congressional Democrats gave a pass to this assertion of unilateral presidential power, as it
moved policy closer toward their preferences regarding environmental policy. Indeed, while
President Bush signed the order on January 24, 2007, congressional Democrats codified it into
law two years later as part of the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act.
Constructing our Dependent Variables
Complete question wordings for all five experiments are presented in SI Appendix 1. For
four of our five experiments, the dependent variable was measured as the degree of support for
unilateral action on a four-point likert scale. To guard against satisficing we followed
3
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
recommended practice to exclude the middle or neutral category.3 Because the media often
reports the simple percentage supporting a policy or approving of a politician’s course of action,
we collapse the strongly support and somewhat support categories to identify subjects who
support unilateral action. In the tables below, we present the percentage of subjects supporting
unilateral action in each treatment group in each experiment. In the article text, we construct
logistic regression models with this binary dummy variable identifying those who support
unilateral action as the dependent variable. Ordered logistic regressions using the full four-point
likert scale as the dependent variable yield substantively similar results.
As shown in SI Appendix 1, the Partisan Source experiment used a different question
format for the dependent variable. This question, adapted from a June 2006 Gallup poll
(USGALLUP.200621.Q11), asked subjects whether the president in question has “gone too far,
has been about right, or has not gone far enough – in expanding the power of the presidency and
executive branch to combat terrorism.” For this experiment, in the tables below we present the
percentage of subjects replying that the president has “gone too far” across the two treatment
groups. In the article text, we construct a binary dependent variable coded 1 for those who said
the president has “gone too far” and 0 otherwise. We then use logistic regression.
Difference in Means Tests for Each Experiment
3
See Krosnick, Jon A. 1991. “Response Strategies for Coping with the Cognitive Demands of Attitude Measures in
Surveys.” Applied Cognitive Psychology 5: 213-236; Krosnick, Jon A. 1999. “Survey Research.” Annual Review of
Psychology 50: 537-567; Chang, Linchiat and Jon A. Krosnick. 2009. “National Surveys via RDD Telephone
Interviewing Versus the Internet Comparing Sample Representativeness and Response Quality.” Public Opinion
Quarterly 73: 641–678. Kulas, John T. and Alicia A. Stachowski. 2013. “Respondent Rationale for Neither
Agreeing nor Disagreeing: Person and Item Contributors to Middle Category Endorsement Intent on Likert
Personality Indicators.” Journal of Research in Personality 47: 254-262.
4
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
In the article, we report results from logistic regressions that assess the influence of each
experimental treatment (and that interaction of that treatment with partisan and policy/selfinterest variables) on support for unilateral action while controlling for each subject’s
demographic characteristics. However, because subjects are randomly assigned to treatment and
control groups, as an initial assessment for each treatment’s influence on support for unilateral
action we can simply compare the mean levels of support observed across treatment and control
groups in each experiment. SI Tables 2-6 present difference of means tests for each of the five
experiments. Results mirror those obtained from the logistic regressions presented and discussed
in the text.
Robustness Checks on Justification Module
In the Justification experiment, we found that independents who are not affiliated with
either the Democratic or Republican parties were much more likely to support presidents taking
unilateral action to pursue their policy objectives when such action is justified as a response to
congressional obstruction. In the models in the text, we treated subjects who “leaned” toward
either party as partisans. Here, we show that the results are robust to treating “leaners” as
independents.
SI Table 7 replicates the simple difference in means analysis presented in SI Table 2, but
treats “leaners” as independents. Results are virtually identical. The justification treatment did
not increase support for unilateral action among Democrats and Republicans, but it did among
independents (54% in the treatment vs. 32% in the control).
In model 1 of SI Table 8, we replicate the analysis from the text, but treat “leaners” as
independents. Results are virtually identical. For independents identified via this broader
definition, the congressional obstruction justification significantly increased support for
5
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
presidential unilateral action. However, for both Democrats and Republicans the justification
had no effect. The interactions are negative, statistically significant, and larger in magnitude
than the main effect. Model 2 of SI Table 8 replicates the analysis conducted in model 1, but it
drops the nineteen subjects who were “not sure” of their partisan identification from the analysis.
Results are virtually identical to those in model 1. Finally, model 3 replicates the analysis from
the text (i.e. it includes leaners as partisans), but it drops the nineteen subjects who were “not
sure” of their partisan identification. Results are virtually identical to those presented in the text
and to those in models 1 and 2. The congressional obstruction justification increase support for
unilateral action among independents; however, it had little effect on support for unilateral action
among Democratic or Republican respondents.
Controlling for Presidential Approval
In each of our experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to treatment and control
groups. The main advantage of a randomized experiment is the causal leverage it affords.
Randomization helps balance confounders (both observed and unobserved) across groups, which
allows us to attribute differences across groups to the experimental treatments and to reduce the
potential for omitted variable bias in the model results. Even given the obvious benefits of such
a design, as a final robustness check for the three experiments embedded on the 2014 CCES we
re-estimate our analyses controlling for whether or not each subject approved or disapproved of
President Obama’s job performance, (a question which was included on the common content of
the pre-election wave). SI Tables 9-11 re-estimate Tables 1, 3, and 4 from the text while also
controlling for presidential approval. All results remain unchanged. Finally, the last model in SI
Tables 9-11 interacts the experimental treatment variable with the presidential approval
6
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
indicator. We find no evidence that the justification treatment affected support for unilateral
action among those who did (or did not) approve of Obama’s job performance (SI Table 9).
Consistent with our results for partisanship, in SI Table 10 we see that the Bush treatment
significantly increased the probability of a subject who approved of Obama believing that the
president (i.e. Bush) had gone too far in expanding presidential power in the context of the war
on terror. Finally, we found no evidence in the Student Loan experiment that the executive order
treatment affected support for the president’s action among approvers or non-approvers.
Political Knowledge as a Potential Moderating Factor
Across multiple tests and multiple experiments examined in the text, we found little
evidence that constitutional concerns significantly influenced how Americans evaluate unilateral
action. However, it is possible that only the most politically knowledgeable Americans evaluate
unilateral action in part through its constitutional implications for our system of checks and
balances. To test this hypothesis, we used a series of six questions on the 2014 CCES that afford
a measure of political knowledge. These questions include knowledge of which party controlled
the U.S. House of Representatives; which party controlled the U.S. Senate; and the partisan
affiliation of each subject’s home state governor, two U.S. Senators, and local representative in
the U.S. House.4
The Justification experiment provides an initial test of this hypothesis. Because the
Justification treatment explicitly reminds subjects that President Obama is acting unilaterally
4
There were no other factual knowledge questions in the common content of the surveys. While greater variance in
the kinds of political knowledge questions would have been preferable (see, e.g., Luskin, Robert. 1987. “Measuring
Political Sophistication.” American Journal of Political Science 31: 856-899; delli Carpini, Michael, and Scott
Keeter. 1993. “Measuring Political Knowledge: Putting Things First.” American Journal of Political Science 37:
1179-1206.), we are confident that this index taps political knowledge and further discuss the psychometric
properties of the measure below.
7
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
because Congress has chosen not to act (and that he is not acting, for example, pursuant to power
delegated to him by the legislature), the treatment directly raises concerns about checks and
balances. In the sample as a whole, we found no evidence that the justification treatment
lowered support for unilateral action (Table 1). To examine whether the effect of the treatment is
moderated by subjects’ political knowledge, we replicated the baseline model from Table 1 with
our political knowledge measure and its interaction with the variable indicating assignment to the
justification treatment. SI Table 12 presents the results. The coefficients for both the
justification treatment and its interaction with political knowledge are small and statistically
insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient on the un-interacted, main effect political knowledge
variable is also small and statistically insignificant. Thus, we find no evidence that politically
knowledgeable subjects were more or less supportive of unilateral action, on average, than their
less knowledgeable peers. We also find no evidence that politically knowledgeable subjects
responded differently to the justification treatment.
The Student Loans experiment may provide an even cleaner test. In the text, we show
that whether Obama pursued his policy through a legislative path versus a unilateral one had no
discernible effect on public support for his actions. Rather, partisanship and policy preferences
governed the calculation. This result cut against the hypothesis that the public is inherently
skeptical of unilateral action as a strategy for presidents to accomplish their policy objectives.
However, it is possible that politically knowledgeable subjects might be less supportive of
Obama’s course when he pursues his policy unilaterally than when he pursues the same policy
legislatively. To test this hypothesis, SI Table 13 replicates the baseline analysis from Table 4 in
the text, but again includes both the measure of political knowledge and its interaction with the
executive order treatment indicator variable. We find no evidence that political knowledge
8
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
moderates the influence of the executive order treatment. The coefficient on the interaction
variable is very small and statistically insignificant. The coefficient for the main treatment effect
also remains statistically insignificant. Finally, the coefficient for the political knowledge
variable itself is also small and statistically insignificant.
To ensure that the null results on political knowledge were consistent we examined its
psychometric properties and tried alternative constructions. Principal component analysis
(unrotated) shows that the eigenvalues load at 57% on one component and over 70% on two
components; a scree plot of the eigenvalues suggests two components. The first two measures—
who controls the House and Senate—appear more distinct from the others, loading at .61 and .56
on the second component, with all the others loading more heavily on the first. As these
questions are about federal as opposed to state considerations, the dimensions might be drawn
here. We therefore created two new measures of political information, the first with the two
federal questions and the second with the state questions, and entered them into our models as
we have done with the more comprehensive index above—i.e., both directly and as moderators
of the treatment effects. In no case did the results achieve statistical significance for either the
direct or moderating variables. We similarly constructed two principal component scores and
entered them into our models as both direct and treatment moderating variables. Again, all
results were insignificant. In all, we found consistent evidence that the null results on the
treatments are generalizable across the range of political knowledge.
Proxies for Policy Preferences
The Student Loans experiment and Immigration experiment test our hypothesis that
Americans evaluate unilateral action according to whether it accords with their policy
9
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
preferences. To measure subjects’ policy preferences on these issues we use two proxies. In the
first experiment, we use subjects’ answer to a question embedded earlier on the survey asking
whether they or anyone in their family had student loan debt. Subjects who replied yes to this
question stand to benefit materially from governmental action to cap student loan payments in a
way that subjects who do not have student loan debt will not. As a result, we argue that these
subjects are more likely, on average, to have strong predispositions to support a policy that caps
student loan payments. In the second experiment, we use a dummy variable identifying Latinos
as a proxy for underlying support for policies that would liberalize immigration. Recent survey
evidence consistently shows that Latinos are significantly more supportive of immigration
liberalization than non-Latinos.5 Both measures are imperfect proxies for policy preferences.
However, they are both more nuanced than the approach taken by most prior assessments of the
influence of policy preferences on opinion formation, which uses party id as a proxy for policy
preferences and then examines whether Democrats/Republicans respond to liberal/conservative
issue positions on issues such as Medicaid spending and abortion.6
Sources for Discussion
In the concluding section of the article, we mention several cases in which public opinion
was aligned solidly against presidential unilateral action. For example, as Congress debated and
endeavored to pressure President Bush to sign the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, repeated
polls showed strong majorities of the public opposing the use of torture, or what the
administration euphemistically labeled “enhanced interrogation techniques,” even against
5
See, for example: http://www.nationaljournal.com/next-america/newsdesk/hispanics-voice-overwhelming-supportfor-obama-s-actions-on-immigration-20150410
6
Arceneaux, Kevin. 2008. “Can Partisan Cues Diminish Democratic Accountability?” Political Behavior 30: 139160; Bullock, John. 2011. “Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate.” American Political
Science Review 105: 496-515.
10
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
terrorism suspects.7 Similarly, while President Obama campaigned in 2008 on the need to close
the terror detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, more Americans consistently opposed closing
Guantanamo than supported the President’s course of action.8 This initial considerable
ambivalence and even operation to Obama’s executive action by the public fueled considerable
resistance in Congress. This congressional resistance, in turn, appears to have helped grow
opposition to Obama’s executive action even more over time. By 2010 in a Quinnipiac poll just
28% of Americans said that President Obama should close the camp at Guantanamo Bay versus
60% saying no.9 As of 2015, Guantanamo remains open, despite President Obama’s executive
order to close it.
Finally, we briefly mention President Obama’s post-2014 midterm immigration executive
actions. These actions provoked the ire of most congressional Republicans. Moreover, even
several leading Democrats openly criticized the administration’s actions on constitutional
grounds. For example, Missouri Senator Claire McCaskill lamented, “Our immigration system
is broken, and I support a comprehensive plan to fix it, but executive orders aren’t the way to do
it.” West Virginia Democrat Joe Manchin expressed a similar sentiment: “I disagree with the
president’s decision to use executive action to make changes to our immigration system, and I
7
See, for example, ABC News/Washington Post. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Dec, 2005 [survey question].
USABCWP.121905.R41. ABC News/Washington Post [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Aug-18-2015; Cable News Network, USA Today. Gallup/CNN/USA Today
Poll, Nov, 2005 [survey question]. USGALLUP.05NV011.R27. Gallup Organization [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper
Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Aug-18-2015.
8
CBS News/New York Times. CBS News/New York Times Poll, Jan, 2009 [survey question].
USCBSNYT.011609A.R98. CBS News/New York Times [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Aug-18-2015; Gallup Organization. Gallup Poll, Jan, 2009 [survey
question]. USGALLUP.012109.R1. Gallup Organization [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Aug-18-2015; CBS News. CBS News Poll, Nov, 2009 [survey question].
USCBS.111709.R13. CBS News [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL
[distributor], accessed Aug-18-2015.
9
Quinnipiac University Polling Institute. Quinnipiac University Poll, Jan, 2010 [survey question].
USQUINN.011410.R34. Quinnipiac University Polling Institute [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Aug-18-2015.
11
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
disagree with the House’s decision to not even take a vote on the bipartisan Senate legislation
that overwhelmingly passed in June 2013.”10
Immediately after the president announced his executive action, polls showed that 42%
favored his policy shift, versus 46% opposing it.11 The firestorm of congressional criticism
appears to have increased opposition further still. In February 2015, 51% of Americans in
February 2015 said that Obama’s executive action went beyond his authority as president (vs.
only 41% saying it was within his authority).12 By May 2015, only 36% approved of how
Obama was handling immigration vs. 60% who disapproved.13
10
Mark Kikorian. “These Seven Democrats Who Said They Opposed Obama’s Lawless Amnesty Decrees Were
Lying.” National Review, February 3, 2015. http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/397833/these-seven-democratswho-said-they-opposed-obamas-lawless-amnesty-decrees-were-lying
11
Cable News Network. CNN/ORC International Poll, Nov, 2014 [survey question]. USORC.112614.R14. ORC
International [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Aug18-2015.
12
Quinnipiac University Polling Institute. Quinnipiac University Poll, Feb, 2015 [survey question].
USQUINN.030415.R45. Quinnipiac University Polling Institute [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Aug-18-2015.
13
Cable News Network. CNN/ORC International Poll, May, 2015 [survey question]. USORC.060315.R02E. ORC
International [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Aug18-2015. These numbers were down from 44% supporting versus 53% opposing in a November 2014 poll. Cable
News Network. CNN/ORC International Poll, Nov, 2014 [survey question]. USORC.112614.R03D. ORC
International [producer]. Storrs, CT:Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Aug18-2015.
12
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 1: Sample Demographics
Republican
Republican (including leaners)
Democrat
Democrat (including leaners)
Male
Education
Age
White
Black
Latino
Income
N
2014 CCES
22%
32%
37%
47%
47%
Some college
50
73%
13%
7%
$60k to $69,999
1,000
4/16-18/15 YouGov
23%
32%
36%
46%
47%
Some college
48
73%
11%
10%
$50k to $59,999
1,000
4/24-28/15 YouGov
23%
33%
37%
45%
46%
Some college
47
71%
11%
12%
$50k to $59,999
1,000
Note: Each cell presents averages, except for education and income, which report medians.
13
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 2: Difference in Means for Justification Experiment
Control
Justification treatment
All
Republicans
Democrats
Independents
48%
(216)
56%
(224)
16%
(73)
12%
(59)
78%
(108)
80%
(116)
23%
(35)
51%
(49)
Note: The difference in means across the treatment and control group for Independents is
statistically significant, p < .01, two-tailed test. No other difference in means is statistically
significant.
14
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 3: Difference in Means for Two Presidencies Experiment
Domestic Policy
Foreign Policy
All
Republicans
Democrats
Independents
53%
(517)
53%
(483)
18%
(170)
20%
(148)
84%
(233)
79%
(227)
43%
(114)
45%
(108)
Note: None of the differences in means across the Domestic Policy and Foreign Policy treatment
groups are statistically significant.
15
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 4: Difference in Means for Partisan Source Experiment
Leaners treated as partisans
Control
Justification treatment
All
Republicans
Democrats
Independents
42%
(220)
44%
(225)
74%
(77)
30%
(82)
20%
(94)
55%
(101)
35%
(49)
43%
(42)
Note: The differences in means across the treatment and control group for Democrats and
Republicans are statistically significant, p < .01, two-tailed test. No other difference in means is
statistically significant.
16
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 5: Difference in Means for Student Loans Experiment
Law
Executive order
All
Republicans
Democrats
Independents
Student loan
debt
No student
loan debt
73%
(493)
71%
(503)
45%
(164)
44%
(157)
93%
(236)
91%
(228)
69%
(93)
66%
(118)
88%
(141)
90%
(138)
66%
(336)
63%
(355)
Note: None of the differences in means across the treatment (executive order) and control (law) groups are statistically significant (p <
.05, two-tailed test).
17
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 6: Difference in Means for Immigration Reform Experiment
Law
Executive order
All
Republicans
Democrats
Independents
Latino
Not Latino
41%
(254)
46%
(232)
11%
(91)
9%
(68)
65%
(114)
76%
(102)
39%
(49)
37%
(62)
58%
(31)
65%
(23)
38%
(223)
44%
(209)
Note: None of the differences in means across the treatment (executive order) and control (law) groups are statistically significant (p <
.05, two-tailed test).
18
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 7: Difference in Means for Justification Experiment, Leaners Treated as
Independents
Control
Justification treatment
All
Republicans
Democrats
Independents
48%
(216)
56%
(224)
15%
(54)
13%
(47)
82%
(89)
79%
(92)
32%
(73)
54%
(85)
Note: The difference in means across the treatment and control group for Independents is
statistically significant, p < .01, two-tailed test. No other difference in means is
statistically significant.
19
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 8: Robustness Check on Justification Module
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.99**
(0.34)
1.01**
(0.37)
1.57**
(0.61)
Congressional obstruction X Republican (no
leaners)
-1.25
-1.24
Congressional obstruction X Democrat (no leaners)
(0.68)
-1.25*
(0.52)
(0.69)
-1.24*
(0.54)
Congressional obstruction
Congressional obstruction X Republican (leaners)
-2.00*
(0.80)
-1.46*
(0.70)
Congressional obstruction X Democrat (leaners)
Republican (no leaners)
-0.84
(0.47)
2.26**
(0.38)
Democrat (no leaners)
-0.87
(0.48)
2.23**
(0.39)
Republican (including leaners)
-0.01
(0.24)
0.01
(0.08)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.74*
(0.30)
-0.29
(0.60)
-0.03
(0.25)
0.04
(0.08)
-0.00
(0.01)
-0.62*
(0.30)
-0.35
(0.64)
-0.05
(0.61)
2.68**
(0.56)
-0.05
(0.26)
0.05
(0.08)
-0.00
(0.01)
-0.66*
(0.31)
-1.13
(0.79)
440
421
421
Democrat (including leaners)
Male
Education
Age
White
Constant
Observations
Note: Model 1 treats “leaners” as independents. Model 2 drops the 19 subjects who were
“not sure” of their partisan identification. Model 3 drops subjects “not sure” of their
partisan identification and treats “leaners” as partisans. Models are logistic regressions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
20
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 9: Justification Experiment Controlling for Presidential Approval
Congressional obstruction
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.37
(0.28)
1.75**
(0.59)
-2.14**
(0.80)
-1.64*
(0.73)
0.75*
(0.38)
Congressional obstruction X Republican
Congressional obstruction X Democrat
Congressional obstruction X Presidential approval
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Presidential approval
Constant
Observations
-0.68
(0.38)
0.94**
(0.35)
0.01
(0.30)
-0.10
(0.09)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.57
(0.34)
2.68**
(0.31)
-0.53
(0.65)
0.56
(0.58)
1.95**
(0.54)
0.07
(0.30)
-0.13
(0.10)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.68
(0.36)
2.70**
(0.32)
-1.26
(0.71)
-0.89
(0.61)
-0.71
(0.39)
0.91*
(0.36)
-0.01
(0.31)
-0.10
(0.09)
-0.00
(0.01)
-0.56
(0.34)
3.16**
(0.47)
-0.77
(0.68)
426
426
426
Note: Models are logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
21
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 10: Partisan Source Experiment Controlling for Presidential Approval
Bush treatment
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.12
(0.20)
0.04
(0.44)
-2.12**
(0.58)
1.46**
(0.56)
-1.46**
(0.28)
Bush treatment X Republican
Bush treatment X Democrat
Bush treatment X Approve Obama
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Approve Obama
Constant
Observations
-0.14
(0.30)
0.02
(0.30)
0.42*
(0.21)
0.27**
(0.07)
0.01
(0.01)
0.10
(0.27)
-0.81**
(0.29)
-1.73**
(0.52)
0.96*
(0.44)
-0.86*
(0.43)
0.54*
(0.22)
0.30**
(0.08)
0.01
(0.01)
0.15
(0.28)
-0.70*
(0.33)
-2.04**
(0.58)
3.49**
(0.49)
-0.21
(0.33)
0.09
(0.34)
0.49*
(0.22)
0.32**
(0.08)
0.01
(0.01)
0.05
(0.29)
-2.84**
(0.46)
-1.03
(0.59)
428
428
428
Note: Models are logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
22
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 11: Student Loans Experiment Controlling for Presidential Approval
Executive order treatment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.22
(0.18)
-0.30
(0.35)
0.25
(0.43)
-0.22
(0.52)
-0.24
(0.19)
-0.25
(0.20)
Executive order X Republican
Executive order X Democrat
Executive order X Loan debt
0.14
(0.48)
Executive order X Presidential approval
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Presidential approval
Student loan debt
Constant
Observations
-0.33
(0.22)
1.24**
(0.27)
-0.52**
(0.18)
-0.17*
(0.07)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.16
(0.24)
1.49**
(0.26)
1.31**
(0.25)
1.95**
(0.43)
-0.46
(0.32)
1.36**
(0.41)
-0.51**
(0.18)
-0.17*
(0.07)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.16
(0.24)
1.49**
(0.26)
1.32**
(0.25)
2.00**
(0.48)
-0.33
(0.22)
1.24**
(0.27)
-0.51**
(0.18)
-0.17*
(0.07)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.16
(0.24)
1.49**
(0.26)
1.24**
(0.34)
1.97**
(0.44)
0.15
(0.44)
-0.34
(0.22)
1.24**
(0.27)
-0.52**
(0.18)
-0.17*
(0.07)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.16
(0.24)
1.41**
(0.36)
1.30**
(0.25)
1.97**
(0.43)
935
935
935
935
Note: Models are logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
23
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 12: Testing Whether Justification Treatment Effect is Moderated by
Political Knowledge
(1)
Congressional obstruction
Congressional obstruction X Political knowledge
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Political knowledge
Constant
Observations
-0.05
(0.51)
0.09
(0.11)
-1.19**
(0.36)
1.77**
(0.29)
-0.10
(0.26)
0.06
(0.09)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.66*
(0.29)
-0.07
(0.10)
-0.14
(0.64)
440
Note: Model is a logistic regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
24
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Table 13: Testing Whether Executive Order Treatment Effect is Moderated by
Political Knowledge
(1)
Executive order treatment
Executive order treatment X Political knowledge
Republican
Democrat
Male
Education
Age
White
Student loan debt
Political knowledge
Constant
Observations
-0.28
(0.42)
0.03
(0.09)
-0.49*
(0.22)
1.99**
(0.26)
-0.40*
(0.18)
-0.09
(0.07)
-0.02*
(0.01)
-0.32
(0.23)
1.28**
(0.24)
-0.13
(0.07)
2.40**
(0.49)
970
Note: Model is a logistic regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
significance tests are two-tailed.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
25
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
SI Appendix 1
Justification Experiment
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups. All subjects were
then asked the same question.
Control:
President Obama has aggressively used unilateral executive power to pursue his priorities
in both foreign and domestic policy.
Treatment:
The current Congress has been one of the most obstructionist on record and is near
historic lows in terms of its legislative productivity. Congress has failed to act on many
of the most important issues facing the country.
As a result of this congressional inaction, President Obama has aggressively used
unilateral executive power to pursue his priorities in both foreign and domestic policy.
Question:
Presidents have the power in some cases to bypass Congress and take action by executive
order to accomplish their administrations’ goals. Do you support or oppose this
approach?
Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
26
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
Two Presidencies Experiment
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups.
Domestic Policy Treatment:
Presidents have the power in some cases to bypass Congress and take action by executive
order to accomplish their administrations’ goals.
Do you support or oppose presidents taking this approach in foreign and military policy?
Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
Foreign Policy Treatment:
Presidents have the power in some cases to bypass Congress and take action by executive
order to accomplish their administrations’ goals.
Do you support or oppose presidents taking this approach in domestic and social policy?
Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
27
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
Partisan Source Experiment
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups.
Obama Treatment:
President Obama has used a variety of instruments, such as executive orders and national
security decision directives, to unilaterally expand his power in the war on terror. For
example, these unilateral actions have significantly increased electronic surveillance both
at home and abroad.
Do you think the Obama administration – has gone too far, has been about right, or has
not gone far enough – in expanding the power of the presidency and executive branch to
combat terrorism?
Has gone too far
Has been about right
Has not gone far enough
Bush Treatment:
President Bush used a variety of instruments, such as executive orders and national
security decision directives, to unilaterally expand his power in the war on terror. For
example, these unilateral actions significantly increased electronic surveillance both at
home and abroad.
Do you think the Bush administration – went too far, was about right, or did not go far
enough – in expanding the power of the presidency and executive branch to combat
terrorism?
Went too far
Was about right
Did not go far enough
28
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
Means vs. Ends Experiment: Student Loans
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups. All subjects were
then asked the same question.
Legislation Treatment:
President Barack Obama has publicly backed legislation in Congress that would cap
student loan payments at 10% of a borrower’s income, and forgive any remaining debt
after 20 years.
Executive Order Treatment:
President Barack Obama has issued an executive order to unilaterally cap student loan
payments at 10% of a borrower’s income, and forgive any remaining debt after 20 years.
Question:
Do you support or oppose President Obama’s efforts to lower student loan payments?
Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
29
Supporting Information for Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual?
Means vs. Ends Experiment: Immigration
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups. All subjects were
then asked the same question.
Legislation Treatment:
President Barack Obama has publicly backed legislation to give temporary legal status to
many undocumented immigrants
Executive Order Treatment:
Rather than seeking new legislation from Congress, President Obama has unilaterally
directed the Department of Homeland Security to give temporary legal status to many
undocumented immigrants.
Question:
Do you support or oppose President Obama’s efforts to give temporary legal status to
many undocumented immigrants?
Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
30
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