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Notes
The Landscape: Chaos in the Littorals
1. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci (New
York: Mentor Books, 1952) p. 55.
2. Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the
Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 1996) p. 10.
3. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993) pp. 22–49.
4. U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Global Threats and Challenges to the United States and Its
Interests Abroad. Statement presented by LtGen Patrick M.
Hughes, U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to the
105th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 February 1977.
5.
Kaplan, p. 8.
6. Crisis: “An incident or situation involving a threat to the
United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions,
or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of
such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that
commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated
to achieve national objectives.” (Joint Pub 1-02)
7. MCIA-1586-001-97, Marine Corps Midrange Threat
Estimate—1997–2007: Finding Order in Chaos (Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, August 1996) p. 1.
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8. Dr. James N. Rosenau, “Fragmegrative Challenges to National Security,” in Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader, ed.
Terry L. Heyns (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1983) pp. 65–82.
9.
MCIA-1586-001-97, p. 11.
10. Ibid., pp. 14–15 and 42–43.
11. Charles William Maynes, “Relearning Intervention,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1995) p. 108.
12. MCIA-1586-001-97, p. 2.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 3.
16. World Resources 1996–97 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996) p. ix.
17. MCIA-1586-001-97, p. 8.
18. World Resources 1996–97, pp. 58–59.
19. Ibid., p. 9.
20. Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (London: Routledge,
1990) p. 31.
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Notes
21. Ibid., p. 46.
22. MCIA-1586-001-97, pp. 1 and 3.
23. World Resources 1996–97, pp. 60–61.
24. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,
France, and the People’s Republic of China—are all declared nuclear powers. India, Pakistan, and Israel are known to possess nuclear weapons. North Korea and Iraq have had confirmed nuclear
weapons production programs, and Iran is suspected of conducting
nuclear weapons research. Politicians in Taiwan have expressed an
interest in developing nuclear weapons, and South Korea had official plans to develop nuclear weapons as late as 1991. South Africa,
Argentina, and Brazil have all renounced their nuclear weapons
programs but have the technological capability to resume them at
any time. Essentially any group with a technological capability
equivalent to that of the United States in the 1960s could design a
nuclear weapon. MCIA-1586-001-97, p. 15.
The Nature of Expeditionary Operations
1. Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988) p. 16.
2. Lowell Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye: The Adventures of Smedley D. Butler (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1933) p. 127.
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3. U.S. President. A National Security Strategy for a New
Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of the President of the United States, May 1997) pp. 14–15.
4. Expedition: “A military operation conducted by an armed
force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.” (Joint
Pub 1-02)
5. Force: “1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon
systems, vehicles, and necessary support, or combination thereof.”
(Joint Pub 1-02)
6. Logistics: “The science of planning and carrying out the
movement and maintenance of forces.” (Joint Pub 1-02)
7. F. G. Hoffman, “Advanced Expeditionary Warfare–2015”
(unpublished draft concept paper, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Studies and Analysis Division, Quantico, VA,
1996).
8. The Marine Corps no longer employs the Marine expeditionary brigade organization. A Marine expeditionary brigade was
roughly one-third the size of a Marine expeditionary force and comprised a permanent command element and units from one of the
standing Marine expeditionary forces. These brigade command elements are no longer in existence.
9. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, Dictionary of
Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966) p. 11.
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Notes
10. This responsibility is assigned to the Marine Corps by
United States Code, Title 10, chapter 503, section 5013, with the
following words: “The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination
with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment used
by landing forces.”
11. Strategic mobility: “The capability to deploy and sustain
military forces worldwide in support of national strategy.” (Joint
Pub 1-02)
12. Sustainability: “The ability to maintain the necessary
level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining
those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to
support military effort.” (Joint Pub 1-02)
Expeditionary Organizations
1. Quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, The
Marine Officer’s Guide (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1977) p. 71.
2. Quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Col., USMC, Retired, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Baltimore, MD:
The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979)
pp. 6–7.
3. Expeditionary force: “An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.” (Joint Pub 1-02)
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4. Landing force: “A task organization of troop units, aviation and ground, assigned to an amphibious assault. It is the highest
troop echelon in the amphibious operation.” (Joint Pub 1-02)
5. “Department of the Navy 1997 Posture Statement,” Marine
Corps Gazette (April 1997) p. 14, excerpt from a report by the
Honorable John H. Dalton, Adm Jay L. Johnson, and Gen Charles
C. Krulak.
6. Fleet Marine Force: “A balanced force of combined arms
comprising land, air, and service elements of the U.S. Marine
Corps. A Fleet Marine Force is an integral part of a U.S. Fleet and
has the status of a type command.” (Joint Pub 1-02)
7. The force that conducted Operation Eastern Exit was at the
time called a “contingency MAGTF,” a term no longer in use.
8. Service component command: “A command consisting of
the Service component commander and all those Service forces,
such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the command, including the support forces, that have
been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a
subordinate unified command or joint task force.” (Joint Pub 1-02)
9. Functional component command: “A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of
military operations to perform particular operational missions that
may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time.”
(Joint Pub 1-02)
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Notes
Expeditionary Concepts
1.
Quoted in Heinl, Victory at High Tide, p. xv.
2. Quoted in Assault From the Sea: Essays on the History of
Amphibious Warfare, ed. Merrill L. Bartlett, LtCol USMC, Retired
(Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1983) p. xi.
3. Operational Maneuver from the Sea, (Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Concepts Division,
1996) PCN 145 000001 00.
4. Amphibious operation: “An attack launched from the sea
by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a
landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.” (Joint Pub 1-02)
5. For the history of Operation Forager, see Henry I. Shaw,
Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive,
History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. III
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Historical
Branch, 1966) pp. 231–585; Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The
U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in
the Pacific (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951) pp.
320–371; and FMFRP 12-109, The Amphibians Came to Conquer:
The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, vol II (September,
1991) pp. 853–968.
6. This case study is taken primarily from Col Charles J.
Quilter, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the I
Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and
143
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Museums Division, 1993). See also J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1992).
7.
Quilter, pp. 73–74.
8.
Ibid., p. 76.
9
Ibid., p. 102.
10. Military operations other than war: “Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military
operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to
complement any combination of the other instruments of national
power and occur before, during, and after war.” (Joint Pub 1-02).
According to Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (June 1995), the 16 types of military operations other than war are: arms control, combatting terrorism, DOD
support
to
counterdrug
operations,
enforcement
of
sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones,
ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance/support
to counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace
operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of
force operations, strikes and raids, and support to insurgency. This
listing of military operations other than war is somewhat misleading in that many of the operations included in this category, for example strikes and raids, clearly fall within the classical definition of
war.
11. The definitive treatment of Operation Eastern Exit is
Adam B. Siegel, Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant Evacuation
144
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Notes
Operation (NEO) from Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1991). See also Adam B.
Siegel, “Lessons Learned From Operation EASTERN EXIT,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, pp. 75–81.
12. Siegel, “Lessons From Operation EASTERN EXIT,” June
1992, p. 77.
13. FMFM 5-1, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations
(October 1993) p. 1-1.
14. This case study is taken primarily from Quilter.
Operation Littoral Chaos
1. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New
York: The Free Press, 1991) p. 2.
145