Universal Values, Foreign Money:
The Political Economy of Local Human Rights Organizations
James Ron
Jamesr@umn.edu
Stassen Chair of International Affairs
Humphrey School of Public Affairs & Department of Political Science
University of Minnesota
&
Associated Professor
Center for Economic Research and Teaching, Mexico (CIDE)
Archana Pandya
Managing Editor, OpenGlobalRights
1
Abstract (259 words)
Local human rights organizations (LHROs) are key domestic and transnational actors. They
modify, diffuse, and promote human rights norms, and pressure governments to implement their
international commitments. Although there are now hundreds of LHROs worldwide, most are
funded by international, rather than local, sources. Surveys, however, show substantial popular
support for human rights ideals, as well as strong public trust in LHROs. Why, then, do LHROs
not raise more funds locally? This funding pattern is more easily explained in politically
repressive environments, where potential local donors fear government retaliation. And even in
less repressive contexts, LHROs working with highly stigmatized groups may find publics
unwilling to provide support. Neither of these explanations, however, accounts for LHRO
reliance on international funds in other circumstances. We interviewed 233 LHRO leaders and
key informants from 60 countries, and conducted representative public polls in five countries.
Based on this and other data, we conclude that LHRO funding is shaped by international and
domestic philanthropic logics of appropriateness. International norm entrepreneurs successfully
promoted human rights throughout the development assistance community during the 1990s, and
as a result, Northern donors now supply some nine billion USD annually for human rights
promotion in the global South and East. LHROs in those regions of the world, however, have not
attempted the same kind of philanthropic transformation at the local level. Instead, they have
understandably followed the path of least resistance: international aid. To boost LHROs’ local
fund raising capacity, international donors must provide with new and different incentives, and
help LHROs develop their local fund raising capacities.
2
I. Introduction (word count, including text, notes, and bibliography: 14,959)
According to our polls in three world regions and to surveys by others in 28 countries and
territories (WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008), substantial numbers of people support human rights
ideas and local human rights organizations (LHROs).1 Most LHROs are funded by international,
rather than domestic sources, however. Official funding agencies and private foundations in the
global North are key, devoting over $9 billion USD annually to human rights promotion.2 Thus
while human rights ideas and groups are globally appreciated, their financial base is
geographically constrained. This rights/resource puzzle is what we seek to explain.
This pattern of LHRO fundraising is puzzling because philanthropy, defined as “giving and
sharing beyond the family” (Ilchman, Katz, & Queen, 1998, ix), is integral to all societies and
cultural traditions (Anheier & List, 2005a; Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, 2002;
Bornstein, 2009; Charities Aid Foundation, 2012; Dulany & Winder, 2001a; Ilchman, Katz, &
Queen, 1998b; Sanborn & Portocarrero, 2005a).3 Why don’t LHROS in the global South and
East (former Communist countries) tap into these local traditions?
1
Groups of this kind first appeared in the Americas and Europe during the 1970s, and then spread to other world
regions, often with help from international donors. For details, see (Ball, 2000; Henderson, 2002; Hopgood, 2006;
Keck & Sikkink, 1998b; Laber, 2002; Moyn, 2010; Reimann, 2006; Sundstrom, 2006; Thomas, 2001).
2
In 2012, Official Development Assistance totaled $125.6 billion (Development Cooperation Directorate, 2013), of
which roughly six percent, or about eight billion, went to human rights-related activities (Atwood, 2013). In 2010,
Northern-based private foundations spend over $1 billion USD on human rights (Lawrence & Dobsen, 2013).
Assuming these sums are roughly consistent, the current human rights foreign assistance budget is roughly nine
billion USD.
3
As used here, “philanthropy” refers to all forms of monetized and non-monetized giving and sharing. Others
differentiate between “charity,” in the sense of immediate relief for acute suffering, and “philanthropy,” in the sense
of a long-term commitment to promoting the public good through engagement with key social problems (Anheier &
List, 2005b; Daly, 2011)
3
Drawing on our Human Rights Perception Polls in three world regions and five countries, and on
face-to-face interviews with key informants in 60 countries, we offer several explanations. The
first two are commonsensical: In politically authoritarian countries, LHROs understandably
struggle to raise much money locally because they, and their potential donors, fear government
retaliation. In less repressive contexts, moreover, LHROs working with highly stigmatized
populations, such as sex workers, LGBTQ communities, or manual scavengers,4 will also find it
hard to raise much local money. Why, however, do LHROs working in less repressive contexts,
and with less stigmatized populations, also rely so heavily on foreign aid?
Our explanation for this rights/resources puzzle focuses on philanthropic “logics of
appropriateness,” (March & Olsen, 1989, 2009), socially ingrained habits (Graybiel, 2008), path
dependency (Pierson, 2000), and the unanticipated incentives of international aid (Easterly,
2006; Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom, & Shivakumar, 2005a; McGinnis, 2007a). Although local
philanthropic agents (Therkelsen, 2011) could, in theory, capitalize on public support for human
rights ideas and groups, they have not. Until now, they have preferred, rationally and
understandably, to follow the path of least resistance, which has lead them towards international,
rather than local, money.
International money for human rights work is a recent invention. During the early years of the
human rights movement – the 1970s and 1980s - few bilateral or multilateral development
assistance providers funded human rights work (Keck & Sikkink, 1998a). In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, however, transnational human rights “norm entrepreneurs” (C. Carpenter, 2014)
4
For the challenges of raising money with sex workers, see JR Mumbai key informant interview, January 31, 2006;
with LGBTQ populations, see (Nkom, 2013b); and with manual scavengers, see (Human Rights Watch, 2014) and
JR Mumbai key informant interview, January 26, 2006.
4
successfully put the international development community through a “rights-based” revolution,
mainstreaming human rights principles across most donor agencies, as well as most of the
international development NGOs that serve as North-South conduits (Atwood, 2013; Cornwall &
Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Kindornay, Ron, & Carpenter, 2012; Nelson & Dorsey, 2007; Schmitz,
2012; Uvin, 2007). Following this conceptual and funding revolution, Northern-based donors
and international NGOs became the first point of call for Southern LHROs. Unlike potential
local donors, internationals require no human rights “vernacularization” or “indigenization”
(McGinnis, 2007a; Merry, 2006b, 2006c), and operate routinized mechanisms for receiving and
processing human rights funding applications. LHROs must work hard to gain access to these
international funds, of course, and there is never sufficient money for all; LHROs, like other
NGOs, are always “scrambling” for survival (Cooley & Ron, 2002a). Still, the point is this: The
international system is conceptually and bureaucratically primed to fund LHROs, while local
donors are not. As a result, LHROs naturally and rationally gravitate towards international
sources, even when operating in countries that are not highly repressive, or when working with
populations that are not heavily stigmatized.
Our analysis contributes to existing scholarship in several ways. First, we intervene in a unique
fashion in the long standing debate over the universality of human rights (Cambridge & York,
2000; Cobbah, 1987; Cole, 2006; Donnelly, 1982, 2007; Franck, 2001; Howard & Donnelly,
1986; Huntington, 1996; Mutua, 1996, 2001; Panikkar, 1982). Some of the most salient global
human rights cleavages are philanthropic routines, we argue, rather than civilizational or cultural
values. Publics worldwide are often sympathetic to human rights ideas and groups, but their
philanthropic habits have not adjusted accordingly.
5
Second, we contribute to scholarship on the organizational dynamics of transnational civil
society (Berkovitch & Gordon, 2008; Bob, 2001; C. Carpenter, 2014; Cooley & Ron, 2002b;
Henderson, 2003; A. Murdie, 2014; Prakash & Gugerty, 2011; Reimann, 2006; Sell & Prakash,
2004; Siméant, 2005; Stroup, 2012; Sundstrom, 2005; Wong, 2012). Liberal norms are not
untethered philosophies, but are rather embedded in, and shaped by, the organizational forms
they inhabit. All organizations have resource requirements, opportunities, and constraints
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), and so do all liberal ideas. Principled activism on human rights and
other agendas is not reducible to these dynamics, but they cannot be ignored.
Third, we contribute to the literature on the unanticipated effects of international aid, which has
shown that even the best intentioned of assistance can generate unforeseen, and occasionally
problematic, results (Belloni, 2007; Chahim & Prakash, 2013; Chandler, 2001; Cooley & Ron,
2002b; Easterly, 2006; Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom, & Shivakumar, 2005b; Henderson, 2003;
Jalali, 2013; Kuperman, 2008; Lischer, 2003; McGinnis, 2007a). Although foreign aid offers a
vital lifeline to LHROS in politically repressive environments, it gives their counterparts in more
liberal environments less incentive to develop their own local fund raising potential.
Fourth, we add a new area of inquiry – philanthropy - to the study of routinized and habitual
behaviors in international relations (M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; C. Carpenter, 2014;
Finnemore, 1996a; Keck & Sikkink, 1998b; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997; Ron,
1997). To date, most scholars have focused on scripted behaviors and “logics of appropriateness”
6
among states, international organizations, and international NGOs (INGOs). In this article, we
extend these logics to the notion of philanthropy, both local and international.
Finally, our analysis helps international policy actors think more creatively about how best to
support LHROs. International donors should focus their support on authoritarian contexts, we
argue, or on LHROs working with heavily stigmatized populations. In most other instances, they
should begin tapering their assistance and provide LHROs with the capacities, and incentives, to
develop their own local fund raising potential.
II. Why Care about LHROs?
International relations scholars should care about the political economy of LHROs because they
play key roles in diffusing and enforcing international rights norms (Brysk, 1993a; Dancy, 2013;
Hafner-Burton & Ron, 2009; Hafner‐Burton, 2013; Keck & Sikkink, 1998b; Landman, 2005;
A. M. Murdie & Davis, 2012; Neumayer, 2005; Risse-Kappen & Sikkink, 1999; Simmons,
2009). Without vigorous civil society support from below, international human rights norms,
treaties and pressures from above will have little impact (M. Anner, 2012; Bob, 2005; Hertel,
2006; Levitt & Merry, 2009a; Merry, 2006c; Tarrow, 2005). LHROs are the international human
rights regime’s most basic building blocks.
In addition, research on other NGO types in the global South and East suggests that excessive
reliance on foreign aid can weaken, distort, or divide local civil society (Henderson, 2002; Jalali,
2013; Sundstrom, 2005; Uvin, 1998). When groups raise resources locally, by contrast, they may
7
have a better shot at strengthening ties to local constituents, deepening local accountability, and
reflecting local priorities. The more rights groups mobilize resources locally, the more likely
they are to avoid the problems or arrogance, irrelevance, or other-dependence identified by
critical human rights scholars (Englund, 2006; Hopgood, 2013; Mutua, 1994, 1997; Okafor,
2006). Local money is no panacea, of course, but it can boost LHROs’ chances of avoiding the
most common foreign aid pitfalls.
Finally, we care because excessive reliance on foreign aid renders local rights NGOs vulnerable
to government crackdowns and changing international donor tastes. Since 1993, over 45
countries have passed laws restricting foreign transfers to domestically registered NGOs, and
more state crackdowns are in the offing (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014; Christensen &
Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy, Ron, & Prakash, 2015). A global pushback against international
assistance to local NGOs is well underway, and rights groups, due to their political salience, are
under particular threat. To survive, LHROs must learn how to better generate local resources
when politically feasible.
III. The Research Gap
Despite the importance of LHROs and their political economy, few scholars have documented or
explained the rights/resource puzzle. In international relations (IR), scholars typically focus on
the human rights behavior of states and major international actors, and are largely uninterested in
the nuts and bolts of LHRO work. And while scholars of development do study such
8
practicalities, human rights - as opposed to poverty alleviation- has traditionally been of less
interest.
Consider this: from 2001 to 2010, a keyword search in four leading development journals –
World Development, Progress in Development Studies, Third World Quarterly, Development
and Change - and in four leading international relations journals - International Organization,
International Studies Quarterly, European Journal of International Relations, and International
Affairs – revealed that only two mentioned the term, “human rights organization,” and its
equivalents,5 in over 2% of their published content.6 The term’s frequency was even lower in top
comparative politics and sociology journals.7 Scholars devoted much attention to NGOs and
human rights, separately, but spend little time studying the NGO/human rights nexus, the LHRO.
To be sure, there is vast scholarship on the determinants and effects of foreign aid (Büthe, Major,
& Souza, 2012; Clist, 2011; Easterly, 2006; Fafchamps & Owens, 2009; Fearon, Humphreys, &
Weinstein, 2009; Fink & Redaelli, 2011; Moyo, 2009; Neumayer, 2003; Reimann, 2006; Sundar,
2010; Uvin, 1998), and much on aid’s impact on NGOs in general (Bebbington & Riddell, 1995;
Bebbington, 2005; Burger & Owens, 2008; Chahim & Prakash, 2013; Hearn, 2007; Henderson,
2003; Jalali, 2013; Petras, 1999; Stiles, 2002; Sundar, 2010; Sundstrom, 2006; Swidler &
Watkins, 2009). There is also a separate literature on Southern non-profits and philanthropy
(Adelman, 2009; Bornstein, 2009; Candland, 2001; Challand, 2008; Dulany & Winder, 2001a,
5
Equivalents: "Human Rights NGO(s)," "human rights NGO(s)," "human rights organization(s)," "Human Rights
Organization(s)," "rights-based NGO(s)," "rights-based organization(s)," and "Rights-based Organization(s)."
6
At 3% and 4% respectively, Development and Change and International Studies Quarterly were outliers.
7
The American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, and British Journal of
Sociology all mentioned these terms in only 1% of their publications, as did Comparative Political Studies and
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. The journals Comparative Politics and World Politics mentioned these
terms not at all, although we could search the former only from 2001 through 2007.
9
2001b; Ilchman et al., 1998a; L. Salamon & Anheier, 1997; Sanborn & Portocarrero, 2005b;
Stone & Sandfort, 2009; Sundar, 2007; Themudo, 2013). Despite all this, however, there is very
little scholarship on the political economy of LHROs in global South and East.
And yet, it is vital to focus on LHROs in particular, rather than on “development NGOs” in
general. LHROs differ because they ground their work in universal values, treaties and norms;
engage in documentation, research, and policy advocacy, at home and abroad; and rarely offer
direct, material services. States, moreover, view LHROs as far more threatening than other
NGOs; the latter provides resources, but the former provides mostly critique. Development and
human rights are drawing closer under the rights-based approach to development, but research on
each sector’s non-governmental infrastructure must remain analytically distinct.
The study of LRHOs also suffers from major gaps in basic data. The World Bank and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance
Committee (OECD-DAC), among others, publish copious data on remittances and official
development assistance, but offer few numbers on human rights-specific financial flows. Very
few donor agencies even use human rights as a reporting category, in part because of political
sensitivities. “These things are best discussed in private,” one donor explained, largely due to
hostile scrutiny from host governments.8 Indeed, we even lack accurate information on the sheer
number of LHROs in specific locales. Although the Union of International Associations
publishes data on formally constituted rights groups with transnational ties, it offers no
information on LHROs without formal cross border linkages.9 And while individual national or
8
9
Author phone interview with international human rights donor, May 31, 2013.
http://www.uia.org.
10
state governments do sometimes maintain lists of registered NGOs, they do not typically
distinguish between those that are rights-based, and those operating in other sectors. As a result,
we have decent sampling frames for transnational rights groups (Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, &
Nichols, 2012; Smith & Wiest, 2005; Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004) and for domestic NGOs, writ
large (Barr, Fafchamps, & Owens, 2005; Gauri & Galef, 2005). Until now, there are few
comprehensive sampling frames for LHROs operating within national borders.10
Due in part to these data gaps, most NGO-inclined IR scholars have focused on prominent
transnational groups such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, or Human Rights Watch (Clark,
2001; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Hopgood, 2006; Laber, 2002; Neier, 2013; Nelson & Dorsey, 2007;
Power, 2001; Ramos, Ron, & Thoms, 2007; Ron, Ramos, & Rodgers, 2005, 2006; Stroup, 2012;
Wong, 2012). And while other IR scholars regularly refer to the impact of LHRO advocacy, their
outcome of interest is invariably state behavior, international norms, or transnational campaigns,
not the LHROs themselves (M. S. Anner, 2011; Bob, 2005; Brysk, 1993a; Hafner‐Burton,
2013; Hertel, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 1998b). And while scholars in other disciplines do study
LHROs, few have a political economy focus, and even fewer produce replicable, cross-national
research (Allen, 2013; Bouvard, 1994; Englund, 2006; Mutua, 1994). Indeed, the only published
systematic findings on LHRO political economy comes from Israel and Nigeria. Gordon &
Berkovitch (2008) purposively sampled 16 of the 26 LHROs they identified within Israel’s 1967
borders, and discovered that over 90% of their budgets were foreign-sourced.11 Okafor (2006)
purposively sampled 20 of the 100 LHROs he identified within Nigeria, with similar results.
10
For our lists of LHROs in Mexico, Morocco and India, see Appendix A.
The list of 26 Israeli groups included legally registered NGOs within the Israeli Green Line, who defined
“themselves as rights organizations,” and who referred, “in some way to international human rights law in their
work” (Berkovitch & Gordon 2008). Gordon repeated the study in 2012 on an expanded sample of NGOs, and
found similar results (Personal communication with authors).
11
11
Until now, no one has gathered similar information on LHROs elsewhere, or attempted to
explain the resource/rights puzzle cross nationally.
IV. Our Data
We rely on five data sources.
#1) Face-to-face interviews with key informants from 60 Countries, in a transnational
node: From 2006 through 2010, we purposively selected and interviewed 128 key informants
from 60 countries in the global South and East while they attended a human rights training
seminar in Canada. Of these, 64% worked for local NGOs of all types in their home countries,
while the remainder worked in the local offices of international organizations, government
agencies, or universities. All 128 men and women, however, had substantial knowledge of, or
experience with, their country’s non-governmental rights sector. We transcribed these interviews
in full, and coded the transcripts with STATA and NVIVO.12
#2) Face-to-face interviews with LHRO leaders in three countries: Since our purposive
sample was skewed towards individuals with the knowledge, motivation and resources to
successfully attend an international training program,13 we also gathered data from LHRO
leaders in their home countries. We began by building comprehensive lists of LHROs in Rabat
and Casablanca (Morocco), Mumbai (India), Mexico City, and San Cristobal de las Casas
(Mexico), including all legally registered groups that mentioned the word “rights” (in the
12
To conserve resources, we summarized, but did not fully transcribe and code, our 105 interviews with LHRO
leaders in Morocco, India and Mexico (data source #2, below). See Appendix B for details.
13
The Canadian host covered the costs of travel, registration and lodging, but participants needed substantial
resources to learn of the conference, apply, obtain passports and visas, travel, and understand sufficient French or
English.
12
vernacular) in their mission statement or in a list of major activities.14 We chose these cities for
their importance as political, cultural, or financial capitals, and chose San Cristobal because it is
a major hub for rights-based NGOs (Bob, 2005; Inclan, 2012; Olesen, 2005).
Taken together, these five locales yielded 187 LHROs, whose eligibility we verified via email,
phone, or personal visit. We selected 105 (56%) for interview, using two different sampling
techniques. In Morocco and Mexico, we divided urban sampling frames into three strata: rightsbased NGOs with hyperlinked websites (identified with Issue-Crawler)15; groups with websites
but no mutual hyperlinks; and groups with no Internet presence. We then sampled proportionally
from, and randomly within, each city and strata. In India, however, we performed simple random
sampling, as the LHROs there had only limited web presence.
As Table 1 demonstrates, each of our fieldwork cities had a significant LHRO population: 56 in
Rabat and Casablanca, 57 in Mumbai; 50 in Mexico City, and 25 in San Cristobal. To these we
add data from Okafor’s (2006) study, which identified 100 Nigerian LHROs, as well as
Berkovitch & Gordon (2008) study, which identified 26 LHROs within Israel’s internationally
recognized boundaries. All five cases, in other words, manifest the phenomenon of interest LHROs - in substantial intensity (Patton, 2001), and are, in that sense, “most similar” to one
another (Seawright & Gerring, 2008)
14
These groups are a subset of non-profits, defined as formally organized entities that are self-governing, separate
from government, and that do not distribute profits. Almost all NGOs in our sample relied at least in part on
volunteers, another important non-profit criterion (L. M. Salamon & Anheier, 1992).
15
Issue-Crawler analyzes virtual connections between websites. For details, see https://www.issuecrawler.net and
(R. C. Carpenter & Jose, 2012).
13
Case
Table 1
Case Attributes: Political Conditions16
Repression
Regime
Total number
(0 to 8 scale;
(-10 to 10 scale;
LHROs
0=most
-10=least open)
repressive)
Mumbai
57
Rabat &
Casablanca
5617
Mexico City &
San Cristobal
7518
Israel
Nigeria
Empowerment
(0 to 14 scale;
0=least
empowered)
9
0
7
-6
4
5
8
3
8
2619
1020
321
122
“Fewer than 100”23
4
2
7
#3) Other published data sources: Table 1 also demonstrates that all five countries had
sufficiently liberal political conditions for rights-based NGOs to function, albeit with important
challenges.24 Regime scores countries’ political openness from -10, or “hereditary monarchy,” to
+ 10, or “full democracy;” only Morocco scored below 4.25 Repression scores states’ propensity
to abuse their citizens’ personal integrity rights on a scale from 0, most abusive, to +8, most
16
Figures for India, Morocco, and Mexico are from 2010, when our fieldwork began. Figures for Nigeria are from
2006, the year Okafor (2006) published his research, and for Israel, 2008, the year Berkovitch and Gordon (2008)
published their work.
17
We identified 35 LHROs in Rabat and 21 in Casablanca.
18
We identified 50 LHROs in Mexico City and 25 in San Cristobal.
19
(Berkovitch & Gordon, 2008), including groups registered within Israel’s 1967 borders only.
20
This “highly democratic” score refers only to the regime obtaining within Israel’s 1967 borders. In the occupied
Palestinian territories, the Israeli military, Palestinian Authority, and Hamas impose more severe restrictions.
21
This “repressive” score is due to Israeli behavior in the occupied Palestinian territories.
22
This “least empowered” score is due to Israeli restrictions in the occupied Palestinian territories.
23
(Okafor, 2006)
24
For overview of the human rights movements in India, Mexico, Morocco, Israel, and Nigeria, see (Gordon &
Berkovitch, 2007; Gordon, 2008; Gudavarthy, 2008; Muñoz, 2009; Okafor, 2006; Slyomovics, 2005b)
25
Polity IV Project, systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
14
respectful;26 India earned the worst score, but its repression is, in fact, highly concentrated
geographically (Beer & Mitchell, 2006). Empowerment scores governments from 0, or no respect
for their citizens’ right to assemble, move, participate in elections, practice their religion, and
engage in free speech, to +14, or full respect;27 Israel ranked the lowest here, due to its
occupation of Palestinian territory. Overall, Table 1 suggests LHROs can function in all five
countries, with challenges. This is another “most similar” cross-case characteristic.
Yet as Tables 2 and 3 note, the five cases are also “most different” in that they are situated in
varying world regions (Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and South America),
“civilizations” (Islamic, African, Latin American, Western, and Indian) (Huntington, 2011),
colonial traditions (Spanish, French, British), religions (Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and
Hinduism), and linguistic zones.
26
27
Physical Integrity Index, CIRI Human Rights Data Project, humanrightsdata.com.
New Empowerment Index, CIRI Human Rights Data Project, humanrightsdata.com.
15
Case
Table 2
Case Attributes:
Region, Religion, Civilization, and Language
World
Major
Colonial
Civilization28
Region
Religions
History
Major
Languages
Mumbai
South
Asia
Hinduism,
Sunni Islam
British
Hindi
Hindi, Marathi,
English
Rabat &
Casablanca
North
Africa
Sunni Islam
French
Islamic
Arabic, French
Mexico City
& San
Cristobal
Latin
America
Christian,
Catholicism
Spanish
Latin American
Spanish
Israel
Middle
East
Judaism,
Sunni Islam
British
Nigeria
SubSaharan
Africa
Sunni Islam,
Christianity
British
Western, Islamic
African, Islamic
Hebrew, Arabic
English, Pidgin,
African
languages
Moreover, as Table 3 notes highlights, they differ in national and urban per capita wealth
(GDPpc), Population size, and public propensity for Charity.29 Israel is the wealthiest, India is
the most populous, and Moroccan are the most charitable. In this sense, our case selection has
most different” attributes (Seawright & Gerring, 2008), suggesting that any cross-case
similarities on the dependent variable – LHRO political economy –offer prima facie evidence of
a truly global trend.
28
29
(Huntington, 2011)
World Bank Development Indicators and (Charities Aid Foundation, 2010).
16
Table 3
Case Attributes:
Population, Economy, and Charitable Giving
National
Charitable
Giving33
Case
National
Population
(millions)30
Urban
Population
(millions)
National
GDP per
capita31
Urban
GDP
per capita32
Mumbai
1,200
Mumbai: 12.534
$4,500
Mumbai:
$10,800
28%
Rabat &
Casablanca
32
Rabat: 2.4
Casablanca: 3.635
$6,190
Casablanca:
$10,300
Rabat: NA
72%
$14,590
Mexico
City:
$20,400
San
Cristobal:
NA
28%
Mexico City
& San
Cristobal
118
Mexico City: 8.9
San Cristobal:
0.18636
(Percent who
donated outside
the family “last
month”)
30
World Bank World Development Indicators dataset, available online at
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators. Figures for India, Morocco and Mexico are from 2010, when our fieldwork began. Figures for Nigeria
are from 2006, the year Okafor (2006) published his research, and for Israel, 2008, the year Berkovitch and Gordon
(2008) published their work.
31
2010 estimates for India, Mexico and Morocco; 2006 for Nigeria; 2008 for Israel. All figures PPP-adjusted from
World Development Indicators, available online at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD.
32
2008 estimates, based on (Hawksworth, Hoehn, & Tiwari, 2009).
33
Percentage of persons aged 15 or older who told Gallup pollsters they had donated money to an entity outside the
family - registered charity, community organization, political party or organization, place of worship - in the
preceding month (Charities Aid Foundation, 2010). Figures prior to 2010 not available. All Gallup polls probability
based.
34
2011 Mumbai and Mumbai suburban district populations from Census of India, available online at
http://www.dataforall.org/dashboard/censusinfoindia_pca/
35
2004 census estimates from the Haut-Commissariat au Plan of Morocco database, available online at
http://www.hcp.ma/Recensement-general-de-la-population-et-de-l-habitat-2004_a633.html
36
2010 census estimates from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Vivienda database, available online at
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/lista_cubos/consulta.aspx?p=pob&c=1
17
Israel
7.3
NA
$25,550
NA
51%
Nigeria
143
NA
$3,900
NA
29%
#4 ) Human Rights Perception Polls: In 2012, we conducted nationally representative surveys
of all adults aged 18 and over residing in Mexico (n=2400); in Rabat, Casablanca and their rural
environs (n=1100); and in Mumbai and its rural environs (n=1680). We oversampled Christians
and Buddhists in India, and rural residents in both India and Morocco. Our partners identical
similar polls in Colombia (n=1680) and Ecuador (n=1503), and we mention their findings where
appropriate. For details, see Appendix B.
Data Source #5 - A global public forum: In November 2013, we published our preliminary
findings in six different languages on a digital forum for human rights activists,
openGlobalRights (Ron & Pandya, 2013), and persuaded over 26 human rights practitioners,
scholars, and activists from 12 countries to comment on our findings.37 We incorporate their
views here.
In what follows, we first establish the rights/resources puzzle, and then show that the puzzle is
easily explained for LHROs working in authoritarian contexts, or with highly stigmatized
groups. It makes less sense, however, for LHROs working in more democratic contexts, or with
less stigmatized populations. We review alternative explanations for this subset of cases, and
37
See https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/funding-for-human-rights.
18
then focus on our preferred explanation, philanthropic routines. We conclude with theoretical
and policy reflections.
V. Establishing the Rights/Resources Puzzle
Developing-world researchers rarely enjoy access to non-profits’ financial reports (Bornstein,
2009; Fafchamps & Owens, 2009), and LHROs are particularly reluctant to discuss financial
details, given their politically sensitive positions. To ethically obtain this kind of sensitive
information, researchers must often establish trust through prolonged contact (Charmaz, 2006;
Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Patton, 2001). Okafor (2006) and Berkovitch & Gordon (2008) did
precisely this in Nigeria and Israel, where they were citizens and insiders. As cross-national
researchers, however, we had to devise other ways.
First, we asked all 233 informants from data sources #1 and #2, In your opinion, what
percentage of human rights organizations in [country toponym] receive substantial funding from
foreign donors? This was less threatening than a direct query about individual NGO finances,
and treated respondents as experts on domestic conditions, rather than as primary sources about
their own organizations.38 Figure A summarizes their responses. Note that our estimates for
Morocco, India and Mexico are based on several dozen proportionally sampled LHRO leaders in
each country (data source #2), while the 60-country estimate (data source #1) draws on numbers
supplied by one, or a small handful, of key informants in each country.
38
For informed expert surveys in human rights scholarship, see (Malhotra & Fasel, 2005). For general discussion,
see (Campbell, 1955; Krannich & Humphrey, 1986; Seidler, 1974). Established projects such as Transparency
International and Freedom House regularly rely on such sources.
19
Figure A
Key Informants Say Most LHROs In Their Country
Receive "Substantial" Foreign Aid
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
Purposive 60country sample
(N=98)
Rabat &
Casablanca
(n=18)
Mexico
(n=43)
Mumbai
(n=19)
40%
30%
Mean response:
"In your opinion, what percentage of human rights NGOs in [your country]
receive substantial funding from foreign donors?"
Confidence intervals for representative samples.
Given data source #1’s transnational skew, we expected its estimates of foreign aid to be higher
than those of data source #2. The LHRO leaders we interviewed in Morocco, however, offered
higher estimates, on average, than those in the purposive 60-country sample, as did the Nigerian
and Israeli respondents interviewed by Okafor (2006) and Berkovitch & Gordon (2008). And
while the LHRO leaders we interviewed in Mexico and Mumbai offered slightly lower estimates,
their means’ margin of error were close to the lower bound of the Moroccan sample’s confidence
interval. In short, Figure A demonstrates that across widely different contexts, both informed
experts and LHRO leaders believe that most rights groups in their country receive “substantial”
foreign aid.
Next, we asked informants from data sources #1 and #2, how many human rights organizations
in [country toponym] raise substantial local funds? Figure B summarizes their responses, the
20
most common of which was, “very few.” Statistically, there was no difference in the median
response across cases.
Figure B
Most Key Informants Say "Very Few" LHROs Receive
"Substantial" Local Money
70%
60%
Very few
50%
40%
Some
30%
Most
20%
All
10%
0%
60-country
sample (n=107)
Mexico
(n=41)
Mumbai
(n=25)
Rabat &
Casablanca
(n=21)
"In actuality, how many of [your country]’s human rights groups raise
substantial funds from local sources?"
χ2(9)=12.9 p=0.167
Fisher's exact test p=0.193
Qualitative elaborations reinforced this view. One Senegalese respondent, for example, told us
he did “not know one human rights organization… that lives off its own resources,”39 while a
Filipino counterpart explained, “its mostly European money that has been sustaining us.”40 In
Lebanon, “all of the people who work in human rights depend on funding from the European
Union, the United States, and the European foundations,”41 while in Peru, something “like
39
10-Burkina Faso
98-Phlippine
41
88-Lebanon
40
21
100%” of local rights groups do the same.42 In Armenia, similarly, “all active NGOs [in human
rights] are getting funding from abroad.”43
We also asked respondents whether their own organization received foreign funds. As Figure C
shows, the average number of affirmative responses, per sample, ranged from 67% to 89%. As
expected, respondents from the 60-country purposive sample were more likely to report
receiving international aid. Still, the LHRO leaders we interviewed in their own countries offered
statistically indistinguishable, and reasonably high, estimates.44 To this, we add the Nigerian and
Israeli numbers gleaned from the work of Okafor (2004) and Berkovitch and Gordon (2008).
Figure C
Most LHROs Report Receiving Foreign Funds
100%
Nigeria
(n=19)
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
Purposive
60-country
sample
(n=115)
Mexico
(n=45)
40%
Mumbai
(n=30)
Israel
(n=13)
Rabat &
Casablanca
(n=30)
30%
Percentage of respondents answering "yes" to:
"Does your organization receive foreign funds?"
Confidence intervals shown for representative samples. Nigerian and Israeli
estimates inferred from Okafor (2006) and Berkovitch and Gordon (2008).
42
33-Peru
5-Armenia
44
In the purposive sample estimate, we used responses only from informants working in local NGOs.
43
22
Finally, we asked all our informants to speculate what would happen if foreign funding for
human rights work in [country toponym] was cut off. If this happened, we asked, would local
human rights activities: (1) collapse entirely; (2); collapse somewhat; (3) stay about the same;
(4) grow a little, or; (5) grow a lot? As Figure D notes, most of the valid responses cited the two
worst-case scenarios; only the Moroccan LHRO leaders were optimistic.45
Figure D
Most Informants Said LHROs Would Collapse if Foreign Funding Ends
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
60-country sample Mexico City &
(n=111)
San Cristobal
(n=45)
Mumbai
(n=26)
Rabat &
Casablanca
(n=28)
"If foreign funding for human rights work in your country was cut off,
would local human rights activities..."
Collapse entirely
Collapse somewhat
Stay about the same
Although the sample sizes are too small to warrant regional generalizations, African respondents
did seem particularly concerned. In Zimbabwe, for example, an informant said a foreign aid cut 45
In ongoing work, we analyze the sources of human rights NGO resilience in the face of possible aid cutoffs.
23
off would lead to total “collapse of human rights organizations,”46 while in Burkina Faso, it was
“not viable” to run a local rights group without foreign money.47 In the Central African Republic,
“The [human rights] movement would stop,”48” while in Cameroon, a foreign aid cutoff “would
be a catastrophe.”49 In Uganda, moreover, “all the [human rights] organizations will close.”50
In 2010, the Ethiopian government provided a natural occurring “experiment,” drastically
restricting all external aid to LHROs. As expected, this prompted a near-total collapse of the
country’s LHRO sector (Dupuy et al., 2015).
Rights activists from other countries were also deeply concerned, however. One Armenian
respondent said LHROs would “not be able to continue their active work”51 without foreign aid,
while a Macedonian warned that without international aid, “there would be nothing”52 in human
rights activities. A Filipino said his group would “be crippled,”53 a Bangladeshi said human
rights work “would be over,”54 a Palestinian warned a cutoff would prove “catastrophic,”55 and
an Ecuadoran asked, “Where else would [human rights] NGOs get their funding?”56 A Bolivian
predicted LHRO work “would be over,” 57 a Haitian said LHRO activities “would stop,”58 and
even in Brazil, a comparatively wealthy emerging market, one respondent said there would be “a
46
27-Zimbabwe
10-Burkina Faso
48
20-Central African Republic
49
53-Cameroon
50
39-Uganda
51
5-Armenia
52
29-Macedonia
53
58-Philippines
54
100-Bangladesh
55
73-Palestine
56
97-Ecuador
57
85-Bolivia
58
26-Haiti
47
24
huge problem” for LHROs.59 Across world regions, informants feared their country’s LHROs
would either fail, or badly falter, without foreign money.
In theory, this heavy reliance on outside aid could stem from public attitudes and cultural values.
Scholars have long debated the universality of individual human rights, highlighting crossregional variations, and arguing that many cultures consider individual rights irrelevant, alien, or
even harmful (Cambridge & York, 2000; Cobbah, 1987; Cole, 2006; Donnelly, 1982, 2007;
Franck, 2001; Howard & Donnelly, 1986; Huntington, 1996; Mutua, 1996, 2001; Panikkar,
1982). So-called “universal human values,” some say, are really “Western values,” and thus
naturally attract Western, or global Northern, money.
If the cultural relativists are right, the rights/resource puzzle is easily resolved: people in the
global South and East do not donate to LHROs because they do not share their values. Yet the
available data suggests otherwise. In 2007-08, WorldPublicOpinion.org asked 47,241 people in
28 countries and territories - 13 of which appear in our 60-country sample60 - for their views on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Only six of these were in the global North,
and the 28 locales were, cumulatively, home to 60% of the world’s population. The survey
results, WorldPublicOpinion.org said, indicated that “the norms of the UDHR receive robust
support throughout the world...[and] are endorsed by majorities in every country.” There was no
evidence that global populations lived in “highly different moral universes”
(WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008, 7), and human rights principles appear to enjoy substantial,
cross-national appeal.
59
15-Brazil
The overlap countries are all from the global South or East: Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan,
Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Peru, Ukraine, and Thailand.
60
25
Consider their findings in greater detail. Seventy percent of polled populations, on average,
believed the United Nations (UN) “should actively promote human rights in member states,”
while 65% thought it should “do more” to promote rights in their own countries. Majorities in
every polled country believed it was “very important” to treat people of different religions,
gender, and race, equally. Even on contentious topics such as terrorism, security, and the
interrogation of suspected terrorists, majorities across the board believed “all torture should be
prohibited.” Popular support in most countries was even higher for economic and social rights.
In theory, of course, publics could support human rights principles while mistrusting human
rights organizations. Studies of philanthropic giving find that organizational “brand trust”
matters enormously (Bennett, 2003), and scholars are regularly intrigued by the topic of public
trust in NGOs overall (Davis, Murdie, & Steinmetz, 2012; Ebrahim, 2003; Fowler, 1998;
Haymarket Media, 2006; Lewis & Sobhan, 1999; Lloyd, 2005; A. Murdie & Peksen, 2014).
To gauge public trust in LHROs, our Human Rights Perception Polls (data source #3) asked
national public samples in Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico, and regional samples in Morocco
and India, How much trust [do] you … place in the following institutions, followed by a battery
of national and international actors, including [] human rights organizations. We rescaled
responses 0-1 (1 = most trust).61 Across all five case, median trust in local rights groups was
moderately strong: .58 in Colombia, .58 in Ecuador, .55 in India, 0.55 in Mexico, and 0.43 in
Morocco. These figures were lower than the most trusted institutions in each (.67 for domestic
61
In the Indian and Moroccan surveys, we asked respondents to rate their trust on a 1-4 scale, but in the Mexican
survey, we asked half the sample to rank on a 1-7 scale.
26
companies in Colombia, .72 for the church in Ecuador, 0.69 for banks in India; 0.66 for the
church in Mexico; and 0.6 for the army in Morocco), but far higher than the least trusted
institutions (.23 for politicians in Colombia, .31 for politicians in Ecuador, 0.28 and 0.39,
respectively for national politicians in India and Mexico; and 0.24 for the U.S. government in
Morocco).
In Israel, researches have conducted similar polls, with similar results, finding that a substantial
subsection of society views LHROs and human rights favorably.62 The most recent such poll was
conducted in 2011, and found that 41% of Jewish Israelis held favorable feelings towards
LHROs, compared to 31% with negative views.63 Had the poll sampled also from Israel’s
Palestinian citizens, support would likely have been stronger. Thus while the work of Israeli
LHROs for Palestinian rights are bitterly detested by some, they also enjoy strong support, in
some quarters.64 This pattern reappears across multiple countries.
To probe further, we asked publics in Mexico, Morocco, India, Colombia and Ecuador to what
extent they associated the term, “human rights,” with positive and negative-sounding phrases on
a 1-7 scale, with 7 representing the strongest association.65 As Figure E notes, all polled publics
associated the term more with positive phrases.
62
Interviews with former B’Tselem director Jessie Montell and with Israeli pollster Dahlia Scheindlin.
Dahlia Scheindlin, Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories and the Israeli Public: Findings and Analysis of
Public Opinion Research, slide deck. Poll conducted with 600 persons via telephone, May 22-24, 2011. Support
dropped to 20% when pollsters asked about LHROs working on Palestinian rights.
64
We commissioned a series of practitioner debates on the resonance of human rights ideas in Israel, the results of
which are available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights-subthemes/human-rights-resonance-inisrael-and-palestine.
65
We did not ask about “protecting women’s rights” and “protecting terrorists” in the Mexico, Colombia and
Ecuador surveys.
63
27
Figure E
Publics in Five Countries Have More Positive
than Negative Associations with “Human Rights”
7
Mean Level of Association
(1=weak, 7=strong)
6
5
4
3
2
1
Protecting
people from
torture and
murder
Promoting
Promoting free Protecting the
socio-economic
and fair
interests of
justice
elections
people in big
cities
Positive Associations
Protecting
criminals
Not protecting
or promoting
anybody’s
interests
Negative Associations
"In your opinion, how strongly do you associate ___ with the term 'human rights'?"
Ecuador
Colombia
Mumbai
Rabat & Casablanca
Mexico
Taken together, evidence from our Human Rights Perception Polls in five countries, and from
WorldOpinion.org in 28 countries and territories, suggest that publics are reasonably well
disposed towards human rights ideas and organizations. Even in Israel, an embattled country
where Palestinian rights are much debated, there is strong support, in some quarters, for LHROs.
Public attitudes, in other words, do not explain the rights/resource puzzle; on the contrary, there
28
is sufficient public sympathy for the idea of human rights, and sufficient public trust in LHROs,
to provide local funding.
To learn more, we asked informants in the purposive, 60-country sample (data source #1) to
theorize why, in their opinion, local LHRO funding was so rare. In descending order of
frequency, they pointed to: 1) the comparative ease of accessing international funds (32
respondents); 2) fear and political repression (22 respondents); 3) poverty (19 respondents); and
4) the stigmatization of specific human rights issues (4 respondents). We consider these
possibilities below, beginning with practitioner theories (1) and (4): political repression and
stigma.
VI. Repression & Stigma
In repressive political environments, it is often dangerous to support LHROs, because they
challenge political rulers. Donors are understandably afraid to give, and LHROs are
understandably afraid, or reluctant, to ask. As the boomerang theory of transnational activism
notes, state repression often propels human rights activists into transnational arenas precisely for
this reason: to find economic (and political) support (Brysk, 1993b; Keck & Sikkink, 1998a).
Money was never central to the boomerang studies, but their work clearly implies that in the
absence of state repression, domestic resources for LRHOs would materialize. Liberal
policymakers often make similar claims. One former US Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Labor and Human Rights, for example, told us that political repression was the chief
29
reason for the dearth of local LHRO funding,66 while the current UN special rapporteur on
freedom of assembly and association has warned that “the political environment” in many
countries, including that of authoritarianism, “undermine[s] access to funding to civil society”
(Kiai, 2013). This, in other words, is the standard policy view: local money for LHROs is lacking
because regimes are repressive.
Twenty-two informants from our purposive, 60-country sample agreed. In Zimbabwe, one
explained, citizens are typically “skeptical about involving themselves in things that are
potentially anti-government,” fearing “they can also end up being targeted.”67 In Kenya,
similarly, citizens donate to LHROs only “on condition of anonymity,” pleading with recipients
not to “lift the veil” on their clandestine support.68 Even in democratic India, sympathetic
businesspersons fear government retribution if they donate to LHROs working on national
security issues.69 In Kyrgyzstan, “the state….considers [LHROs] as [political] opposition,”70
prompting citizens to give them a wide berth. In Azerbaijan, similarly, citizens would “feel some
fear” if asked to donate.”71 In Yemen, moreover, citizens are afraid to give “because they don't
want to have a problem with the government.”72
To learn more, we calculated the statistical correlation between respondents’ estimates of how
many LHROs in their country received “substantial” foreign funding (Figure A), and their
country’s Regime score. The Pearson’s R-squared was -.26 – moderately strong - and was
66
JR conversation with a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, March 7, 2014.
61-Zimbabwe
68
8-Kenya
69
Interview with a veteran Indian rights activist in Delhi, September 29, 2010.
70
6-Kyrgyzstan
71
89-Azerbaijan
72
41-Yemen
67
30
significant, at the .0005 level. We also conducted OLS analysis of the Figure A estimates,
regressing them on a wide range of explanatory variables, including Regime, and discovered an
inverse and significant association.73 In politically repressive contexts, citizens are (understandably) reluctant to financially support LHROs.
Yet repression does a poor job of explaining why citizens in less repressive contexts also fail to
donate. Consider Table 1, which marshaled data on political conditions in our five cases studies:
Regime; Repression, our measure of government respect for physical integrity rights; and
Empowerment, our indicator for government respect of its citizens’ right to assemble, organize
and move. Taken together, these data suggest that repression doesn’t explain the five cases for
which we have substantial information on funding for local human rights groups: India, Israel,
Mexico, Morocco, and Nigeria. Globally, Regime may be a significant predictor of foreign
funding, but it does a poor job of explaining outcomes in these and other cases where political
conditions are challenging, but not entirely repressive.
Consider first Israel. Although Berkovitch & Gordon (2008) discovered that the Israeli rights
sector was overwhelmingly reliant on foreign aid, the Israeli government’s Regime score was
+10, “most democratic.” Israel performed worse on its Empowerment and Repression scores, but
these stemmed mostly from military rule in the occupied Palestinian territories, rather than
within Israel proper. Pressure on Israeli LHROs has risen since the UN investigation of alleged
war crimes in Gaza during 2008-09 (the “Goldstone Report”) (Bronner, 2011; Scheindlin, 2014),
and there is no dearth of human rights concerns within Israel’s 1967 borders (Human Rights
73
See Appendix C.
31
Watch, 2001, 2008; Robinson, 2013). Still, Israeli officials distinguish carefully between the
occupied territories and their own territory (Ron, 2000b), and conditions in the latter are such
that ordinary citizens can contribute to legally registered rights groups without fear of retaliation.
Political repression, in other words, does a poor job of explaining the rights/resources puzzle in
Israel.
Next, consider Morocco. The country’s monarchy began liberalizing politically two decades ago,
and conditions improved further when Mohammed VI succeeded his father to the throne in 1999.
Serious human rights concerns remain, but political repression has eased since the 1970s and
1980s, the country’s dreaded “Years of Lead” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, 2013a; Zoglin,
2009). Most importantly, Morocco now has a vibrant civil society and an outspoken and self
confident domestic human rights sector (Bouyach, 2014; Ron & Golden, 2013; Slyomovics,
2005a). Morocco earned a very poor -6 on its Regime score, due to its hereditary monarchy, but
its Repression score was a middling 4, and its Empowerment score was 5; not good, but not
awful. More importantly, none of the 30 LHRO leaders we interviewed in Rabat and Casablanca
reported that citizens feared contributing financially to their groups. And yet, as Figures A and B
demonstrate, the Moroccan LHRO leaders estimated, on average, that 83% of LHROs in their
country received “substantial” overseas money, while 62% said “very few” raised substantial
domestic funds. Like Israel, Morocco’s political conditions do not explain the rights/resources
puzzle.
Consider also Mexico. In 2010-11, the years we conducted our LHRO leader interviews, the
country was entering its second decade of political democracy. Criminal violence was high,
32
however, and human rights abuses by criminals and security forces were common (Anaya
Muñoz, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2013b; International Crisis Group, 2013). Still, as
Table 1 notes, Mexico’s Regime score in 2010 was 8, or close to “full democracy,” and its
Empowerment figure was 8, better than midpoint. Its Repression score was a disastrous 3 due to
the internal violence, but the LHRO leaders we interviewed in Mexico City and San Cristobal
did not report citizens were too scared to donate. One expert said fear might prevent citizens in
drug war zones from donating, but that this unlikely elsewhere.74 Yet as Figures A and B note,
LHRO leaders in Mexico City and San Cristobal estimated, on average, that 64% of the
country’s rights groups received “substantial” foreign aid, while 53% said “very few” received
substantial local funding.
India, similarly, is politically democratic, as indicated by its 2010 Regime score of 9. Still, the
country is poorly governed, and suffers from multiple armed insurgencies and human rights
emergencies, as indicated by its Repression score of 0. In some parts of the country, moreover,
government-allied militias target civil society groups (Human Rights Watch, 2012). As one
activist told us, Indian donors are often scared to contribute to LHROs working on sensitive
national security issues.75 Yet LHROs working on “softer” human rights issues such as children,
gender, and sanitation are subject to far less scrutiny and intimidation (Jalali, 2008); why do they
not benefit from more local funding?
The case of Indian donors who will not support LHROs working with victims of government
repression in insurgency zones is an instance of the stigma-based argument, which claims that
74
75
Email interview with locally based Mexican human rights expert, May 11, 2014.
Interview with key informant in Delhi, January 2006.
33
locals do not support LHROs working with highly stigmatized group. Four respondents in the
purposive sample (data source #1) offered similar arguments. In Kenya, for example, “issues
with women… entirely depend on foreign funding,”76 while in Brazil, rights-based work with
LGBTQ individuals is similarly taboo.77 Sex workers in Mumbai are also highly stigmatized,
forcing at least one LHRO to rely entirely on foreign money.78 Some governments have
criminalized homosexuality, and in some countries, much of the public views homosexuality “as
an abomination in religious terms” (Nkom, 2013a), leading to a paucity of local LHRO funding.
Yet social stigma can explain only a subset of the rights/resource puzzle, since LHROs often
work with populations that are not as heavily stigmatized.
VII. Income & Philanthropic Inclination
Nineteen purposive sample respondents (data source #1) said their countries were too poor to
support LHROs. In Southern Sudan, one explained, “there is no economic venture … that can be
used to draw funding to support human rights activities,”79 while in Cuba, “we are [too] poor.”80
The Philippines “is a poor country,”81 while in Palestine, “poverty is the situation.”82 The
rights/resources puzzle, for these informants, is easily explained by global inequality. The global
North is wealthier than the global South, and resources for human rights naturally flow from one
to the other.
76
8-Kenya
86-Brazil
78
JR Mumbai key informant interview, January 31, 2006.
79
3-Sudan
80
90-Cuba
81
109-Philippine
82
104-Palestine
77
34
Poverty seems like a plausible explanation in Nigeria, where the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)adjusted per capita income in 2006, the year of Okafor’s LHRO study, was a mere $3,900 (see
Table 3). But what about Israel, where the PPP-adjusted per capita income in 2008, the year of
Berkovitch & Gordon’s LHRO study, was $25,600?83 As Figure A notes, rights groups in both
Nigeria and Israel were similarly dependent on foreign aid, but the latter’s per capita income was
roughly 17 times larger.
Our interviews with LHRO leaders in India, Mexico, and Morocco (data source #2) make us
similarly skeptical. As Figure A notes, Moroccan respondents were more likely than India’s to
believe their country’s rights groups received “substantial” foreign aid, even though the former’s
per capita income was higher.84 LHRO leaders in India and Mexico, moreover, offered
statistically similar estimates of LHRO dependence on foreign aid, even though Mexico’s per
capita income was roughly 4.5 times higher.85 And as Figure B notes, respondents across all
samples (data sources #1 and #2 together) believed that “very few” LHROs in their countries
raised local funds. Simple correlation analysis, moreover, finds no significant link between a
country’s per capita income and the estimates of LHRO foreign aid described in Figure A.86
Per capita income, in other words, does a poor job of explaining the rights/resource puzzle, a
conclusion in line with broader research on philanthropy and nonprofits worldwide (Themudo,
83
Based on the World Development Indicators Database.
As Table 3 notes, city-level data do not account for these differences either.
85
Mexico’s PPP-adjusted GDP per capita for 2010 was $14,590, compared to India’s $4,500.
86
Per capita income, moreover, was not a significant predictor in the regressions analysis presented Appendix C.
84
35
2013, 7-8).87
What about the public’s proclivity to donate at all? Once again, the evidence does not persuade.
Consider Table 3, where the variable Charity reports the percentage of adults who told Gallup
pollsters in 2010 they had donated funds to “an organization” of any kind in the previous month,
including community associations, places of worship, registered charities, or political parties and
associations (Charities Aid Foundation, 2010). Table 3 indicates no clear association between
these percentages – ranging from lows of 28% and 29% in India, Mexico, and Nigeria, to highs
of 51% and 72% in Israel and Morocco – and Figure A’s estimates of rights-based NGO
dependence on foreign aid. Statistical analysis, moreover, reveals no significant correlation
between Charity and the estimates informants supplied for Figure A.88
Indeed, while most informants told us that “very few” rights groups raised funds locally (Figure
B), most also believed that there was considerable potential in their country for local fundraising.
When asked, In your opinion, is substantial local funding for human rights organizations in
[country toponym] available, over 50% of the 60-country sample (data source #1) responded
“yes,” as did 93% of LHRO leaders in Morocco, 70% in India, and 64% percent in Mexico (data
source #2). Statistically, moreover, the latter three estimates were indistinguishable. Informants
across countries felt that local money for human rights was available, but that LHROs were not
accessing those funds.
87
Themudo (2013) argues for U-shaped relationships between per capita income, philanthropy, and volunteering.
The bivariate correlation was not statistically significant, and Charity was not a significant predictor in the OLS
regression presented in Appendix C.
88
36
Other sources attest to the philanthropic proclivities of citizens in our countries of interest, as
well as among the relevant diasporas. In the mid-1990s, for example, private donations
underwrote 17% of Israel’s non-profit sector (Anheier & List, 2005, 198), and in 2007,
American Jews donated over two billion USD to Israeli groups and projects, but very little of
that money made its way into Israeli LHRO budgets (Cannon, 2014; Fleisch & Sasson, 2012).
And while Mexico is generally considered a regional laggard in philanthropic giving, 18% of the
country’s non profit sector in the mid-1990s was funded by voluntary donations of time and
money (L. M. Salamon, Anheier, List, Toepler, & Sokolowski, 1999, 438). The Indian diaspora
sends a significant amount of resources home, chiefly in the form of remittances (Kapur, 2010),
but one study ((L. M. Salamon, Sokolowski, & Associates, 2004) estimates that from 1995 to
2000, almost 13% of Indian civil society funding (excluding volunteer labor) came from private
donors in India. In 2001, according to another study, 21% of donations from urban, middle, and
upper class Indian homes went to secular, charitable Indian organizations, including to groups
providing social services or helping victims of natural disasters, war, and terrorism (Sampradan:
Indian Centre for Philanthropy, 2002). More recently, a 2011 study estimated that some 26% of
Indian charitable donations come from private individuals, most of whom prefer to support
groups working on providing education, food, clothing and housing ((Seth & Singhal, 2011).
To explore further, our Human Rights Perceptions Polls (data source #3) asked publics whether
they had themselves donated to various local actors, including domestic rights groups, political
parties, unions, religious organizations, environmental organizations, and parent associations.
These options were more limited than those offered in the above-mentioned Gallup Charity
polls, but we offered respondents a broader time horizon to choose from, as we asked whether
37
they had ever donated, rather than whether they had donated in the last month, Gallup’s query.
As a result, we expected our findings to differ somewhat from those of Gallup and the Charity
variable.
Like Gallup, however, we discovered wide variation in philanthropic contributions across sectors
and countries (see Table 4). A very small number (0.3%) of Moroccans reported donating to
political parties, for example, while many more Mumbaikers (38%) reported contributing to
religious organizations.89 Notably, however, LHROs fared very poorly across all samples. In
Mexico, only 1.4% of the national sample said they had ever donated to an LHRO, compared to
4% for political parties, 3.5% for environmental groups, roughly 3% for unions, and 12.6% for
religious and parental associations. In Mumbai and its rural environs, only 4.2% reported having
donated at least once to an LHRO, compared to the 38% who had given to political parties, the
nearly 8% who gave to environmental organizations, 7% to political parties, and just over 6% to
local parental associations. LHROs appear at first glance to have fared better in Morocco, but not
when we note that our survey failed to capture religious zakat tithing, which other studies put at
92% in Morocco.90 When compared to that kind of religiously motivated giving, Moroccan
LHROs did just as poorly as their counterparts elsewhere.
89
Our Morocco survey likely underestimated the numbers donating charitably through Islamic zakat, perhaps due to
the way our surveyors explained the term, “religious organizations.” If recent Gallup and Pew surveys are correct,
anywhere from 70-92% of adult Moroccans donate charitably this way. As noted in Table 3, Gallup found in 2010
that over 70% of Moroccans had donated to “an organization” in the previous month, while a Pew Research Center
poll from 2012 found that 92% of Moroccans participated in zakat. These suggest that our survey—which asked
about donations to “religious organizations,” but not about zakat per se—likely failed to capture this mechanism
(Pew Center, 2012).
90
See previous footnote.
38
Table 4
Few Survey Respondents Donated to HROs
“Have you ever donated money to any of these organizations?”
(Percent reporting “yes”)
Rabat &
Mexico
Mumbai
Ecuador
Casablanca
91
(n=2,398)
(n=1,680)
(n=1,503)
(n=1,100)
Religious
organizations
12.6%
0.3%
38.0%
18.5%
Parents
associations
12.6%
0.8%
6.1%
31.3%
Environmental
organizations
3.5%
0.5%
7.9%
3.5%
Political parties
4.0%
0.3%
7.0%
2.4%
Human rights
organizations
1.3%
1.1%
4.2%
3.0%
Unions
2.9%
0.3%
1.7%
2.4%
In sum, neither per capita income nor the public’s philanthropic proclivities explain the
rights/resources puzzle. In Appendix C, we present exploratory regression analysis that lends
further weight to these claims.
VII. Philanthropic Logics
Thirty-two informants from our purposive, 60-country sample (data source #1) said LHROs
didn’t raise money locally because of local philanthropic habits, and the comparative ease of
raising human rights money internationally.
91
Table 4 indicates the total number of respondents (n) for each survey. Response rates for these questions in
Mexico, Rabat and Casablanca, and Mumbai were all above 98%; response rates in Ecuador were 71-75%.
39
When people in their countries donate money or time, respondents explained, they generally
preferred to support individuals and groups outside the local human rights community. As also
noted above in studies of Indian philanthropy, ordinary people in the global South prefer to
donate for purposes of health, education, or material relief. Many give directly to individuals,
while others donate through established philanthropic channels. People are charitable, but
donating to LHROs, rather than to other civil society actors, is not part of their long standing
philanthropic “action repertoire.”
In Pakistan, one respondent told us, religiously inclined “welfare organizations…gladly donate
money for the construction of mosques” and give generously to the poor, but never give money
to LHROs.92 In Bangladesh, another said, citizens generously support “infrastructure …like
building schools, roads, hospitals, or community clubs,” but “the money doesn’t come” for
human rights.93 In Peru, similarly, “Private [local] funding [is typically] for cancer or other
issues, not human rights,”94 while in Bolivia, local donors support the poor, but never “give
money for human rights.”95 In India, one informant told us, her father donates generously to “the
school, infrastructure and…temple” in his native village, but would never consider donating to
the respondent’s own LHRO. It just wouldn’t make any sense, she said.96
Many scholars make similar claims. Giving in the global South is often more “charitable” than
“strategic,” providing relief rather than contributing to advocacy on structural issues (Dulany &
92
40-Pakistan
92-Bangladesh
94
33-Peru
95
85-Bolivia
96
121-India
93
40
Winder, 2001a). In Asia, people give generously to individuals and religious charities, but rarely
donate to formal NGOs (Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, 2002). In Palestine, citizens
regularly donate through their local zakat committee, but give little or nothing to the “strategic”
NGO sector, including those focused on human rights (Challand, 2008, 50).
Constructivists call entrenched routines of this sort “logics of appropriateness,” and define them
as the taken-for-granted rules that actors often unthinkingly follow because they are “natural,
rightful, expected, and legitimate” (March & Olsen, 1989, 2009:1). Neuroscientists speak of
“fully acquired habits” in individuals and groups that are “performed almost automatically,
virtually nonconsciously” (Graybiel, 2008, 361). An abiding concern of IR constructivists has
been to demonstrate that international norm entrepreneurs can promote new routines and norms
surrounding issues of humanitarian aid, human rights, military intervention, gender equity, and
more (Barnett, 2005; Berkovitch, 2002; C. Carpenter, 2014; R. C. Carpenter, 2003; Finnemore,
1993, 1996a, 1996b; McNeely, 1995; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997; Price, 2003; Ron,
2000; Sikkink, 2011; Wapner, 1996). Although IR scholars rarely talk about charity,
philanthropy is in fact subject to very similar processes of routinization, naturalization and takenfor-grantedness (Ilchman et al., 1998). The human impulse to share, after all, is “cultivated and
articulated in ritual practice” (Bornstein, 2009, 634); charitable giving is invariably subject to
“culturally specific” routines, norms, and styles (Dulany & Winder, 2001b).
Changing Philanthropic Logics
41
Like other routines, the logics of philanthropy are neither timeless nor static; dedicated change
activists can, with effort and propitious conditions, create innovation. Typically, however, they
do this through the re-interpretation and re-framing of existing routines, rather than through
creating entirely new routines. In social movement parlance, activists “graft” revised
interpretations onto existing “frames,” extending the old meanings in new but related ways
(Benford & Snow, 2000; R. C. Carpenter, 2007; Joachim, 2003; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly,
2001; Sundstrom, 2005)
Examples of philanthropic reinterpretation abound. In 19th century India, for example, famed
guru and social innovator Swami Vivikenda reworked traditional Hindu doctrines of social
service to create the radically egalitarian Ramakrishna Mission, which disavowed caste and
inter-religious differences, among other innovations (Beckerlegge, 1990). Gandhi did the same a
few decades later, reworking traditional Hindu concepts of dan (gift-giving) and seva (service) to
create a new philanthropic synthesis focused on support for land reform, Hindu-Muslim unity,
anti-Untouchability, and more (Bornstein, 2009; Juergensmeyer & McMahon, 1998). In
countries with large Islamic populations, moreover, philanthropic innovators invariably rework
interpretations of the religiously mandated tithe, zakat, and its associated charitable foundations,
the awqaf (Candland, 2001; Kozlowsky, 1998; Petersen, 2012).
These reinterpretations require much hard work, however, as well as deep cultural and religious
fluency, and strong alliances with at least some leaders from traditional charitable sectors,
including religious figures.
42
In theory, LHROs in somewhat democratic contexts could extend and reinterpret traditional
philanthropic frames to mobilize local money. International rights principles may not always
resonate easily with local audiences, however, and must often be “vernacularized” (Levitt &
Merry, 2009b; Merry, 2006a). In our 233 interviews (data sources #1 and #2), informants readily
acknowledged the challenges of vernacularization. We read them a statement - Some say that the
term “human rights” is hard for the average person to understand and use - and found that 60%
of our interviewees “strongly agreed” or “agreed.” More often than not, informants said, the
concept of human rights was “too abstract,” too “hard to grasp,” “too thin,” or “too broad” for
local audiences. And while determined LHRO workers could overcome these barriers, it required
substantial time, energy, and creativity. Our informants spoke readily about these efforts, as this
was one of their central missions, as well as a major international donor preoccupation (Englund,
2006).
When it came to engaging with local citizens as potential donors, however, our informants drew
a blank. Vernacularizing human rights fund raising was not part of their mission, and was not
something their international donors required. Instead, informants repeatedly told us that the
financial incentives pushed them towards international, rather than local, fund raising. “It’s the
easy option,” one Senegalese explained. “A foreign donor sends you one million dirham,” and an
LHRO “would have huge difficulties raising half of that locally.” Naturally, he explained, LHRO
workers “prefer what is easier.”97 In Nigeria, another said, local funding “doesn’t come as
quickly as when you go to a [foreign] donor that deals with … human rights,”98 while in
97
98
44-Senegal
2-Nigeria
43
Thailand, foreign money is “easier” and permits local rights groups to “do more work.”99 The
same is true in Indonesia, where “it’s easier to get big money” from international sources,”100 or
in the Ukraine, where “it is enough to use international foundations and international financial
resources.”101 In Bangladesh, another said, LHROs “are … getting the funds from the
[international] donors [and]… not giving much…time” to explorations of local funding.102
Importantly, one long-time, New York-based donor specializing in Israeli civil society confirmed
that this was the case for that country: “Everyone who cares about human rights in Israel knows
that local donors need to step up and fund their own HR (human rights) work but it is happening
very slowly. I think the influx of foreign monies for the last two decades has made it seem like
funding the HR [human rights] scene in Israel is a foreign, not a domestic, responsibility and has
created a skewed reality.”103
Indeed, many key informants and LHRO leaders told us they didn’t have the capacity, skills, or
contacts to engage effectively with potential local donors. In the Gambia, one said, raising local
money requires expertise that his group, and others like his, don’t have,104 while in Cameroon,
LHROs would have to “train people on [local] fundraising strategies” to succeed, but this would
require new and large investments of time, money, and effort.105 In Pakistan, LHRO workers
would have to “make [local donors] understand what we think,” but this is not necessary when
99
106-Thailand
105-Indonesia
101
70-Ukraine
102
92-Bangladesh
103
JR email exchange with key donor to Israeli human rights groups, December 1, 2013.
104
64-Gambia
105
63-Cameroon
100
44
approaching international sources.106 In the Ukraine, LHROs would “need some [new] skills for
it [domestic fund raising].”107
The current international funding and human rights system, in other words, does not encourage
LHROs to regard their co-citizens as potential financial donors, or to engage creatively with their
countries’ philanthropic traditions. Instead, it assumes that local money is impossible to raise,
and that international assistance is entirely necessary.
These conditions recall the international political economy of African Christianity (McGinnis,
2007b). When European and American missionaries began devoting serious consideration to
African conversion, mission headquarters in the global North fully funded most of their African
outposts. As decolonization gathered steam in the 1950s and 1960s, however, the flow of foreign
aid diminished, often under pressure from African governments and local clergy. As a result,
local church leaders “were forced to cope as best they could in a more competitive religious
marketplace,” struggling to find local resources and make ends meet (McGinnis 2007, 408). The
impact was disruptive, and many local churches failed. Those that succeeded, however, opened
robust dialogues with local religious traditions, leaders, and communities, and ultimately raised
local funds by “indigenizing” their faith. Diminished international aid for African missions, in
other words, eventually produced a more vibrant, diverse, and self-reliant African church. Today,
African Christianity is one of the fast growing worldwide (Jenkins, 2007).
106
107
40-Pakistan
84-Ukraine
45
Reasoning analogously, as McGinnis (2007) does for Northern-supported democracy and
governance programs, Southern LHROs are structurally akin to pre-decolonization African
churches. Although most LHROs are locally staffed and directed, the comparative availability of
international assistance keeps these groups tied to external, rather than local, donors. Substantial
numbers of co-citizens are generally sympathetic to the LHRO mission, but long-standing and
deeply rooted philanthropic routines route their charitable donations elsewhere. Shifting these
habits would require significant creativity, effort, and informed, culturally fluent engagement.
As noted above, however, international donors were “converted” to the human rights “faith” by
global policy entrepreneurs in the 1990s. The rights-based approach is now mainstreamed
throughout UN agencies, bilateral donors, the European Union, and private international
development groups (Atwood, 2013; Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Frankovits, 2006;
Kindornay et al., 2012; Schmitz, 2012; USAID, 2013; Uvin, 2007), and international donors
offer routinized, taken-for-granted human rights funding opportunities that LHROs can apply for
with relative ease and predictability. Local activists, not surprisingly, are following this path of
least resistance. International funding for human rights has become routinized and pathdependent, akin to other processes identified by constructivist scholars of international and
domestic policy (Finnemore, 1993; March & Olsen, 1989; Meyer et al., 1997; Pierson, 2000)
IX. Conclusions
Across world regions, LHROs depend heavily on foreign money, even though sizeable segments
of their public support human rights ideas and organizations. There are good reasons for this in
politically repressive contexts, where potential local donors rightfully fear government
46
retaliation. The same is true in more democratic settings, when LHROs work with, and for,
heavily stigmatized populations. In other cases, however, the dearth of local funding for LHROs
is harder to explain. Notably, poverty and the public’s general charitable inclination are not
persuasive.
Instead, our explanation focuses on deeply rooted philanthropic routines and LHROs’ material
incentives. In many societies, donating to LHROs working on legal rights, abstract principles, or
state policy is not part of the public’s long-standing, historically rooted, philanthropic repertoire.
Instead, most donors prefer to give through traditional charitable mechanisms to traditional
charitable causes, such as humanitarian relief, education, and health.
Philanthropic routines can be changed, but this requires significant effort, and the current
international funding system does not incentivize LHRO innovation. Although many states are
cracking down on foreign aid to local NGOs, the international donor system still offers local
activists more funding opportunities than their local philanthropic sectors. In part, this is because
international donors tend to view all LHROs as embattled groups fighting repression in highly
authoritarian governments. Donors have not internalized the fact that many LHROs now work in
less repressive environments, and that these groups, as well as the human rights “brand” they
promote, enjoy reasonably strong public reputations, at least in some quarters. Under the right
political conditions, we argue, LHROs can, and perhaps should, raise more local funds.
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Online Appendices APPENDIX A: RIGHTS BASED NGOS IN MEXICO, MOROCO, & INDIA Mexico City Sampling Frame 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Abogados y Abogadas para la Justicia y los Derechos Humanos, A.C. Academia Mexicana de Derecho de la Seguridad Social Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, A.C. (AMDH) Agenda LGBT APIS -­‐ Fundación para la Equidad. A. C. Asistencia Legal por los Derechos Humanos, A.C. Asociacion Nacional de Locutores de Mexico, A.C. Asociacion Nacional Para La Proteccion de los Derechos Humanos y La Viligencia Permanente de la Aplication de la Ley A.C. 9. Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral de Personas Violadas (ADIVAC) 10. AVE DE MÉXICO, A.C. 11. BALANCE, Promoción para el Desarrollo y Juventud A. C. 12. Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir, A.C. 13. Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Francisco de Vitoria, O.P. 14. Centro de Reflexión y Acción Laboral (CEREAL-­‐DF) (Distrito Federal) -­‐ SEE COS-­‐MONTIEL EMAIL FOR INFO 15. Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, A.C. (CEMDA); 16. Centro Nacional de Comunciacion Social A.C.(CENCOS) 17. Cochitlehua centro meixcano de intercambios, (CEMIAC) A.C. 18. Colectivo contra la Tortura y la Impunidad, A. C. 19. Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos A.C. 20. Comité Nacional de los 63 Pueblos Indínas, A.C. 21. Comunicación e Información de la Mujer, A.C. (CIMAC) 22. Convergencia de Organismos Civiles, A.C. 23. Desarrollo, Educación y Cultura Autogestionarios (DECA) Equipo Pueblo 24. Educación con el Niño Callejero (Ednica), -­‐ Institución de Asistencia Privada (IAP) 25. El Centro de Derechos Humanos “Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez”, AC. 26. Enlace, Comunicación y Capacitación, A.C. (ENLACE) 27. Equidad de Género: Ciudadanía, Trabajo y Familia, A.C. 28. FIAN México, A.C. (Red por el Derecho Humano a Alimentarse) 61
29. Fundación Infantia, A.C. 30. Fundar 31. GIMTRAP, A. C. -­‐-­‐ Grupo Interdisciplinario sobre Mujer, Trabajo y Pobreza (Mexico) 32. Groupo de Education Popular con Mujeres (Mexico) 33. Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida -­‐ GIRE, A.C. 34. Incide Social, A.C. 35. Iniciativas para la Identidad y la Inclusión (INICIA) A.C. 36. IQ, INVESTIGACIONES QUEER, A.C. 37. Letra S, Sida, Cultura y Vida Cotidiana, A. C. 38. Liga Mexicana por la defensa de los derechos humanos 39. Proyecto de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, A. C. (PRODESC) 40. Red de Jóvenes por los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos AC , A.C. 41. Red Democracia y Sexualidad A. C. (DEMYSEX) 42. Red Nacional Género y Economía (REDGE) / Mujer para el Dialogo (Mexico) 43. Red Nacional de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos "Todos Derechos para Todas y Todos" -­‐ Secretaría Ejecutiva 44. Red Por Los Derechos de la Infancia en México 45. SERAPAZ (Servicios y Asesoría para la Paz) 46. Servicios a la Juventud, A. C. 47. Sin Fronteras, I.A.P. 48. SIPAM -­‐ Salud Integral para la Mujer A.C. 49. Sociedad Mexicana por los Derechos de la Mujer (SEMILLAS) 50. Taller Universitario de Derechos Humanos, A. C. (TUDH) San Cristobal de las Casas Sampling Frame 1. Capacitación, Asesoría, Medio ambiente y Defensa del derecho a la
salud (CAMADDS) A.C.
2. Centro de Capacitación en Ecología y Salud para Campesinos–
Defensoría del Derecho a la Salud A.C.
3. Centro de Derechos de la Mujer de Chiapas, A.C.
4. Centro de Derechos Humanos "Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas", A.
C.
5. Centro de Investigación y Acción de la mujer latinoamericana A.C.
6. Chiltak A.C.
7. Colectivo de Empleadas Domésticas de los Altos de Chiapas
(CEDACH) A.C.
8. Colectivo de Promoción de los Derechos Civiles y Desarrollo
Social, A.C. (DECIDES/Alianza Cívica Chiapas)
62
9. Colectivo Educación para la Paz y los Derechos Humanos, A.C.
10. Comité de Derechos Humanos de Base de Chiapas “Digna Ochoa”
11. Coordinación Diocesana de Mujeres
12. Diócesis de San Cristóbal de las Casas
13. Formación y Capacitación A.C. (FOCA)
14. FORO para el desarrollo Sustentable A.C.
15. Fortaleza de la Mujer Maya (FOMMA) A.C.
16. Grupo de Mujeres de San Cristóbal, COLEM A.C.
17. K’inal Antsetik, A.C. (Chiapas)
18. Maderas del Pueblo del Sureste A.C.
19. Melel Xojobal A.C.
20. NICHIM JOLOVIL Asociación Civil
21. Otros mundos Chiapas A.C.
22. Programa de Apoyo a la Mujer, A.C.
23. Proyecto DIFA, Alternativas y Actualización, A.C. (DIFA)
24. Red de Defensores Comunitarios Por Derechos Humanos A.C.
25. Skolta’el Yu’un Jlumaltic, A.C.–Ch’ulme’il (SYJAC) A.C.
Rabat & Casablanca Sampling Frame 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Al Wassit - Le Mediateur
Amicale Marocaine des Handicapes
Association ADALA-JUSTICE
Association AMAL femmes en mouvement pour un avenir meilleur
Association Chouala pour l'éducation et la culture
Association de Lutte Contre le Sida (ALCS)
Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc
Association des amis des centres de reforme et la protection de l'enfance
Association Espam pour la Protection des Personnes Agées au Maroc
(ESPAM)
10. Association femmes pour l’égalité et la démocratie
11. Association Manbar Al Mouak
12. Association Marocaine d’Aide aux Enfants en Situation Précaire
(AMESIP)
13. Association marocaine de la femme handicapée
14. Association Marocaine de Lutte contre la Violence à l’Egard des
Femmes (AMVEF)
15. Association marocaine de recherche et d’échange culturel
16. Association Marocaine de soutien et d'aide aux handicapés mentaux
AMSAHM
17. Association Marocaine des Déficients Moteurs
18. Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH)
63
19. Association Marocaine pour Adultes et Jeunes Handicapés
20. Association Marocaine pour la promotion de la femme rurale
21. Association Marocaine pour les Droits des Femmes
22. Association Médicale de Réhabilitation des Victimes de la Torture
(A.R.M.V.T)-Centre d’Accueil et d’Orientation des Victimes de la
Torture
23. Association Ofok
24. Association Soleil pour le soutien des enfants affectés et infectés par le
VIH/SIDA au Maroc
25. Association solidarité féminine
26. ATFAL
27. Bayti
28. Carrefour marocain des jeunes pour la modernité
29. Centre d'Etudes en Droits Humains et Démocratie (CEDHD)
30. Centre de Démocratie
31. Centre Marocain des Droits de l'Homme
32. Comité de Soutien à la Scolarisation des Filles Rurales
33. Défi environnement - Tahaddi Baya
34. Energie pour le développement Humain
35. Espace Associatif
36. Espace des jeunes pour l'innovation et le développement
37. Femme Action
38. Femme Activité Physique et sport
39. Fondation marocaine pour le développement de l'handicape
40. Forum des alternatives Maroc
41. Forum Vérité et Justice (FVJ)
42. Institution Nationale de Solidarité avec les Femmes en Détresse- INSAF
43. Jossour Forum des Femmes Marocaines
44. La Voix de la Femme Amazighe
45. Ligue Démocratique des Droits des Femmes
46. Ligue Marocaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme
47. Montada Al Mowatana-Citizenship Forum
48. Mountada azzahrae pour la femme marocaine
49. Mouvement Mouwatinoun
50. Muntada Al Karama
51. Observatoire Marocain des Prisons
52. Observatoire marocain de l'intégration de la femme dans la vie politique
53. Organisation des libertés des médias et d'expression
54. Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains (OMDH)
55. Réseau Amazigh pour la Citoyenneté
56. Union pour l'Action Féminine (UAF)
64
Mumbai Sampling Frame 1. Able Disabled All People Together (ADAPT - formerly the Spastic
Society of India)
2. Academy for Mobilising Urban Rural Action through Education
(AAMRAE)
3. Akshara
4. All India Citizen's Vigilance Committee
5. All India Human Rights Citizen Option
6. All Maharashtra Human Rights Welfare Association (India)
7. Apnalaya
8. Arpan
9. Association for Early Childhood education and Development
10. Awaaz-e-Niswan (AEN)
11. Bal Prafullata
12. Basic Equality and Development (BEND) Foundation
13. Bombay Catholic Sabhaa
14. Bombay Urban Industrial League for Development (BUILD)
15. Centre for Enquiry Into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT)
16. Centre for Social Action
17. Child Rights and You
18. Childline India Foundation
19. Committed Communities Development Trust (CCDT)
20. Committee for the Right to Housing
21. Committee of Resource Organizations for Literacy (CORO)
22. Disability Research and Design Foundation
23. Documentation and Research and Training Centre-DRTC
(Archdiocesan Justice and Peace Commission)
24. Don Bosco Development Society
25. Hamara Foundation
26. Human Rights Association of India
27. Human Rights First (Gyan Vikas Public Charitable Trust)
28. Hurt Foundation
29. Kinnar Kastoori
30. Labour Education And Research Network (LEARN)
31. Lawyers Collective
32. Magic Bus
33. Maharashtra Law Graduates Association
34. Mahila Dakshata Samiti
35. Majlis - A Centre for Rights Discourse and Inter-Disciplinary Arts
Initiatives
65
36. Meljol
37. National Domestic Worker's Movement
38. Nivara Hakk
39. Population First
40. Prerana
41. Public Concern for Governance Trust
42. Saathi
43. Sabrang
44. Sahayak..A Socio-Legal & Educational Forum
45. Salaam Balak Trust
46. Sambhav Foundation
47. Society for Nutrition, Education and Health Action (SNEHA)
48. Stree Mukti Sanghatana
49. Sumati Gram Human Rights Protection Forum
50. Swadhar (Self-Reliance)
51. The Humsafar Trust
52. The Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers (SPARC)
53. Vacha - Voices of Girls and Women
54. Vikas Adhyayan Kendra
55. Women's Research and Action Group (WRAG)
56. Women’s Centre
57. Youth for Unitary and Voluntary Action (YUVA)
66
APPENDIX B: DATA SOURCES
Data Source 1: Key Informants from 60 Countries
The project began with 10 pilot interviews in June 2005 at a three-week training seminar, the
International Human Rights Training Program (IHRTP), organized annually by the Montrealbased NGO, Equitas: The International Centre for Human Rights Education, with financial
support from Canada’s official development agency.
According to Equitas staff, some 600 men and women from the global South and former
Communist countries apply to the IHRTP each year. Equitas staffers offer admission to some
130 of these, the majority of whom eventually attend the Canadian seminar. Selection criteria
include applicants’ experience in rights-related work, the strength of their written
recommendations and statements of intent, minimal competence in French or English, and
eligibility for Canadian Overseas Development Assistance, typically granted to persons from
countries below a certain per capita income.
Most applicants work in their country’s non-governmental sector, live in a major city, are
university educated, and have some human rights experience. Our analysis of the 2006 applicant
pool suggests that successful applicants tend to be more organizationally senior, and have more
human rights experience, than those who are unsuccessful.
The team conducted 128 standardized interviews at the IHRTP in June 2006, 2007, 2008, and
2010. Equitas staff helped select respondents based on considerations of world region, country,
English or French competency, and sex. The goal was to achieve rough parity across these five
variables. The median number of respondents from each country was 2; the range was 1-7; and
only three countries supplied more than five respondents.
Figures 1 and 2 detail respondents’ region and country of origin.
Percent of Respondents
26%
Figure 1. Respondent World Region (N=128)
17%
16%
13%
13%
11%
4%
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Latin &
Central
America
South Asian Middle East Southeast &
& N. Africa East Asia
67
Eastern
Europe &
Russia
Central Asia
Figure 2. Respondent Countries of Activity (N=128)
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
China
Cote d'Ivoire
Cuba
Egypt
Gambia
Ecuador
Georgia
Ghana
Guyana
Haiti
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Macedonia
Malawi
Maldives
Moldova
Morocco
Nepal
Nigeria
Mexico
Palestine
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Tanzania
Tajikistan
Thailand
Tunisia
Uganda
Ukraine
Vietnam
Zimbabwe
Yemen
The team employed a standardized oral and written questionnaire with structured and semistructured questions, and qualitative probes. The interview’s oral segment included 50
(structured and semi-structured) questions, took place in English or French, and lasted 57
minutes, on average (range=29-84 minutes, standard deviation=12). At the interview’s end, we
asked respondents to fill out and return a written questionnaire with 41 structured questions, and
to provide signed consent for use of their data.108 A handful failed to return those forms, and
their data was discarded.
Characteristics of Respondent NGOs
As shown in Figure 3, 88 (69%) of our 128 respondents worked for a domestic NGO, the median
founding date of which was 1996. The remainder worked for their country’s public service
(15%), a local or regional branch of an international NGO (8%), a regional or international NGO
(1%), or other (7%). Many did not identify their domestic NGOs as “human rights
organizations,” preferring instead to self identify as members of the development or social justice
sector, with an interest in human rights. This blurring of identities and mandates is increasingly
common due to international donor interest in the rights-based approach to development
(Kindornay, Ron, & Carpenter, 2012).
The domestic NGOs in our sample had a median staff size of 17, of whom 72%, on average,
were paid, rather than volunteer. Over half (54%) operated at the national level, while 24%
108
Ethics Review Board permission on file with authors.
68
operated at the sub-national level.
Figure 3. Respondent Workplace Characteristics
Percent
Workplace Type (N=128)
Domestic NGO
69%
Government Agency
15%
Local/Regional Branch or Headquarters of an
8%
International NGO
Other
7%
Regional/International Organization
1%
Domestic NGOs (N=88)
Median Founding Year
1996
Median Staff Size
17
Mean Percentage Paid Staff
72%
Operates at Sub-National Level
24%
Operates at National Level
54%
Operates at Regional or Global Level
6%
Median Annual Number of Visits by Foreigners
1
N
128
128
128
128
128
87
85
73
84
84
84
86
Respondent Characteristics
The 128-strong sample was evenly split by sex, and included persons drawn from either the
senior (48%) or middle (44%) tier of their organization’s hierarchy. Most (77%) respondents
were salaried; 66% full-time, and 11% part-time. The average respondent age was 37. They
came from a range of professional backgrounds, including law (27%), social work (9%), teacher
(5%), university professor (5%) and journalist (5%). On average, respondents had begun
working for entities interested in human rights in 1998, and 36 percent had prior experience with
other types of NGOs.
Respondents were highly educated, well traveled, and largely religious. Virtually everyone had
attended university in a major city, and over three quarters had also attended secondary school in
a major city. Their median number of work-related international trips over the preceding five
years was three. Over 70% were practicing members of their faith.
Figure 4. Respondent Characteristics
General Information
Mean Age at Time of Interview
Female
Position
Median Years at Current Workplace
Senior Level Position
69
Frequency/
Percent
N
37
51%
125
128
4
48%
123
122
Middle Level Position
Junior Level Position
Median # Work-Related International Trips in Last 5 Years
Salary
Salaried, Full-Time
Salaried, Part-Time
Unpaid, Volunteer
Religion
Christian
Muslim
No Religion
Buddhist
Hindu
Other Religion
Practicing Members of Faith
Education
Completed Secondary School
Attended University
Mean Years at University
Father Attended University
Mother Attended University
Attended Secondary School in a Major City
Attended University in a Major City
Primary Professional Background/Training
Other109
Lawyer
Social Worker
Other Teacher
University Professor
Journalist
44%
7%
3
122
122
122
66%
11%
23%
111
111
111
53%
24%
10%
6%
5%
2%
71%
124
124
124
124
124
124
123
98%
96%
5
39%
24%
76%
96%
127
126
120
125
126
127
121
34%
27%
9%
9%
5%
5%
119
119
119
119
119
119
Data Source 2: Leaders of Rights-Based NGOs
109
“Other” includes backgrounds with less than 5% representation: medicine, religious service, economics,
psychology, sociology, civil engineering, pharmacy, mathematics, international affairs, accountant, anthropology,
engineering, community development, chemical engineering, architecture, political science, science, statistics,
publics service, rural development, student, and business.
70
Mexico City, Mexico
The Mexico City data was gathered from May 2010 to March 2012. The frame includes 50 Local
Human Rights Organizations (LHROs), of which the research team sampled 30, or 60%.
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that were legally
registered as “civil associations”; based in Mexico’s Distrito Federal; not part of an international
NGO; and that contained the term “rights,” either in an international language or in the
vernacular, in their mission statements or major activity descriptions.
Web-based Searches: All 50 groups had a web presence. We found not legally registered
LHROs in Mexico City without a URL. We searched the following online sources, and
scrutinized them for candidate organizations. We then verified those meeting our inclusion
criteria through further web searches, phone calls, physical contact, or key informant
consultation.
•
•
•
•
•
First five pages of results form a search of Google.int/en using the terms “Derechos
Humanos y Mexico" and "Derechos Humanos y Distrito Federal."
UNESCO’s list of Mexican NGOs.
www.idealista.org
Development Organizations Index 2010.
National networks, including: Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libre Comercio
(RMALC); Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia Mexico (MCD Mexico); Red de
Jóvenes por los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos; Red Por Los Derechos de la
Infancia en Mexico; and Red National de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos
"Todos Derechos para Todoas y Todos."110
Issue Crawler Search: Google for “Derechos Humanos” + “Distrito Federal,” and “Derechos
Humanos” + “Mexico” on Google.int/es on 6 May 2010, and inputted URLs from the first five
pages into Issuecrawler, a Web-based “mapping” device that identifies inter-organizational
networks on the Internet.111 We conducted two “crawls,” one for the “Distrito Federal” results,
and another for the “Mexico” results. Our goal was to identify two different “issue networks” of
organizations with a valid web presence, working on rights-based issues in the Distrito Federal
and in Mexico as a whole.112 We compared these two lists to the list created through the Web
searches outlined above, and added new organizations that matched our criteria.
110
We also included legally registered network secretariats, as long as they had human rights in their mandate.
See issuecrawler.net and Richard Rogers, “Mapping Public Web Space with the Issuecrawler,” in Digital
Cognitive Technologies: Epistemology and Knowledge Society, Claire Brossard and Barnard Reber, Eds, (Hoboken,
NJ: Wiley, 2010) 89-99.
112 The crawls were conducted on 6 May 2010. See Issuecrawler.net, “Scenarios of use for NGOs and other
researchers: Issue Crawler Applications for Civil Society - Locating Networks,” Govcom.org (n.d.),
<http://www.govcom.org/scenarios_use.htm> for a description of social networks versus issue networks. This page
describes an issue network as “the network of organizations around a particular issue,” and notes that the
Issuecrawler was originally purposed to locate such networks.
111
71
Key Informant Verification: We sent a draft sample frame to 5 key informants in Canada and
Mexico for verification and substantiation. Two of these were based at Canada’s international
Development Research Centre, one at the Ottawa-based non-profit Inter Pares, one from the
Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) Mexico City Office and one
informant from the Mexican National network for human rights (Todos Derechos para Todoas y
Todos).
This led to a final sampling frame of 50 LHROs in the Mexican Distrito Federal.
Sampling: On May 27, 2010, we conducted an inter-actor Issue Crawl on the URLs of all 50
LHROs. From these results, we created two sampling strata: one with 29 “core” groups whose
URLs received at least two links the other 49 URLs, and another with 21 “peripheral” groups
whose URLs received one or no links from the others.
Aided by a random number generator, we selected, contacted, and interviewed representatives of
17 “core” and 13 “peripheral” groups, largely in Spanish. We conducted the first 14 interviews
from June to August 2010, and the remaining 16 from February to March 2012.
Survey Instruments: The interview’s oral portion included 19 questions and several probes, and
its written portion had 31 closed questions, as well as a signed consent form.
Interview Duration: Our 30 interviews lasted 73 minutes, on average, with a range of 24-138
minutes, and a standard deviation of 26.
Data Recording and Analysis: The interviews were digitally taped and are on file with the
project leader. Interviewers took written notes during interviews, summarized the interview’s
contents after the interview, and translated and added verbatim interview quotes.
72
San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas State, Mexico
The San Cristobal data was gathered in 2010. The sampling frame included 25 LHROs in the
city of San Cristobal, of which the team sampled 15, or 60%.
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: Identical to Mexico City; see above.
Web-based Searches: 18 of the final list of 25 LHROs had a Web presence. To locate these
LHROs, we conducted the following searches, identified candidate NGOs, and verified that they
fit our inclusion criteria through online searches, phone contact, physical contact, or key
informant input:
•
•
•
•
•
First five pages of results, www.google.mx, www.google.int/en and www.google.com in
English and Spanish, search phrases “human rights + Chiapas” and “human rights + San
Cristobal.”
Key issues or rights categories in Spanish, including women’s rights, indigenous rights,
migrant rights, reproductive rights, children’s rights, and land rights, on the same search
engines listed above. This led to the discovery of several issue-specific networks.
Member lists of Mexican NGO and social movement networks identified above.
www.idealista.org and www.laneta.org.
Online directories such as The Struggles for Women’s Rights in Chiapas: A Directory of
Social Organisations Supporting Chiapas Women, and the Development Organizations
Index. We searched each of these directories independently, first selecting San Cristobalbased organizations, then narrowing this list down to organizations using rights language,
and then, finally, selecting only those groups that were legally registered civil
associations.
Issue Crawler: On May 6, 2010, we searched for “Derechos Humanos” + “San Cristobal” and
“Derechos Humanos” + “Chiapas” on Google.int/es, and identified all URLs of NGOs in the first
five pages of results. We then entered those URLs into Issue Crawler, conducting separate
“crawls” for San Cristobal and Chiapas. This creating two “issue networks,” which we compared
to the list of LHROs created above.
Key Informants: We sent the draft list to four key informants, including one employee of the
Fray Bartolomé Centre for Human Rights in San Cristobal; one from SIPAZ; one former
employee of DESMI; and one from CIEPAC. They checked our list, and added several additional
groups that we had not otherwise identified.
Sampling: Seventeen of the final list of 25 San Cristobal-based LHROs had websites. We
entered their URLs into Issue Crawler for an inter-actor crawl on July 12, 2010, and identified
seven “core” groups whose URLs received at least two links from the other 18 URLs, and 10
“peripheral” groups with one or no links to the other URLs. We also had a further 8 groups with
no web presence at all.
Aided by an online random number generator, we selected, contacted, and interviewed
representatives of five LHROs from each strata.
73
Survey Instruments: We conducted interviews in Spanish, with the same Spanish language
questionnaire used in Mexico City (see above).
Interview Duration: These 15 interviews lasted 67 minutes, on average, with a range of 40-92
minutes, and a standard deviation of 17.
Data Recording and Analysis: The interviews were digitally taped and are on file with the
project leader. Interviewers took written notes during interviews, summarized the interview’s
contents after the interview, and translated and added verbatim interview quotes.
74
Rabat & Casablanca, Morocco
The team created the combined Rabat/Casablanca sampling frame of 56 LHROs, and
interviewed representatives of 30 (53%), from September 2010 through May 2011. We pooled
these two cities’ LHROs because they are geographically close, and are often regarded as a
single unit. Casablanca is Morocco’s financial capital, while Rabat is its political capital.
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: Legally registered entities; headquartered in the Rabat or
Casablanca prefectures113; not part of an international NGO; and that contained the term “rights”
(either in an international language or in the vernacular) in their mission statements or major
activity descriptions.
Web-based Searches: 35 of the 56 Moroccan LHROs had a Web presence. To locate them, we
conducted the searches noted below, identified candidate NGOs, and verified that they fit our
inclusion criteria through telephone or in-person contact. In a smaller number of cases, it was
possible to verify inclusion through a Web investigation.
•
•
•
•
Google international (www.google.coma) and Google Morocco (www.google.ma) using
the following key words: “rights-based organisations” +”Morocco” +“rabat” +
“casablanca”, “human rights organisations” +”Morocco”+ “rabat” +“casablanca”,
“organisations de droits humains”+ “ maroc”+ “rabat”+ “casablanca”, “organisations de
droits de l’homme”+ “maroc” + “rabat”+ “casablanca.” Searches in English and French.
Google search using the Arabic translation of “human rights organisations Morocco.”
This did not generate additional organisations over those already identified above.
www.tanmia.ma, an extensive database of 7492 Moroccan NGOs (as of February 2012),
663 of which are located in Casablanca, and 709 of which are in Rabat. We searched for
all organizations in each city, as well as for all “human rights” groups in each city.
The more limited UNESCO human rights organisations database
(http://rabat.unesco.org/droits_humains/mot.php3?id_mot=1)
Key informants: The president of the Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH), shared
their human rights group database, which we used to cross check our own draft list. The former
president of l’Association Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines provided more suggestions, as
did the president of la Ligue Marocaine de Défense des Droits de l’Homme.
Sampling: We inputted the 35 URLs into Issue Crawler on February 23, 2011, and conducted a
crawl to identify 12 (21%) “core” groups that received two or more incoming links from the
other 34 URLs, and 23 (41%) “peripheral” groups that received one or less links from the other
34. To this, we added another group of 21 (36%) with no web presence at all.
113
Morocco’s administrative map divides the country into 16 regions, which in turn are sub-divided into provinces
(48) and prefectures (13). Provinces and prefectures are the second level of administrative division, the former
referring to rural centers and the latter referring to urban centers or cities. Cities are further sub-divided into
municipalities (communes) and districts (arrondissements) in certain metropolitan areas.
75
We then used a random number generator to select, contact, and interview 30 of the 56 groups.
Seven of these were “core” groups, 12 were from the “peripheral” category, and 11 were from
the strata with no web presence at all.
Survey Instruments: We translated the Mexico questionnaire into French and Arabic, and
conducted the interviews in both languages.
Interview Duration: These 30 interviews lasted 67 minutes, on average, with a range of 40-92
minutes, and a standard deviation of 17.
Data Recording and Analysis: The interviews were digitally taped and are on file with the
project leader. Interviewers took written notes during interviews, summarized the interview’s
contents after the interview, and translated and added verbatim interview quotes.
76
Mumbai, India
Our researchers identified 57 LHROs in Mumbai, and interviewed representatives of 30 (52%),
between July 2010 and April 2011. This list may not be complete, as many smaller groups in
Mumbai are extremely difficult to locate.
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: Legally registered organizations; headquartered in Mumbai; use
the word “rights” in their mandate, mission statement, objectives, “About us” section, or
description of activities. Mumbai branch offices of groups headquartered elsewhere in India were
excluded.
Web-based Searches: 48 of these 57 had some kind of Web presence. To locate them, we
conducted the following searches, and then examined candidate organizations to see if they fit
our inclusion criteria. Verification was done online, via phone, in person, or by key informant.
• Idealist.org, consulted July 17, 2010, and filtered using “non-profit organizations” in
Mumbai.
• Human Rights Internet, consulted July 18, 2010, searched by “NGOs”, “India”, “national”
level work, and “HROs.”
• The Indian government’s NGO partnership system database of NGOs and Voluntary
Organizations, consulted July 19, 2010 and August 21, 2010. Organizations listing “human
rights” or “right to information and advocacy” as an area of interest, filtered from within
the “Mumbai” and “Mumbai suburban” parts of Maharashtra State.
• www.Karmayog.org, consulted August 6-7, 2010, filtered by “Mumbai,” “human rights”
and “legal aid.” Searched again on September 6, 2010, and listed all 1355 organizations in
Mumbai, each of which was manually searched for “rights” in their work description.
• International Human Rights Association list, consulted August 7, 2010, searched by
“Mumbai” and “Maharashtra.”
• www.GiveIndia.org, consulted August 7, 2010, searched by “human rights.”
• Google International and Google India, searched August 7, 2010 with the keywords:
“human rights” and “Mumbai,” first 10 pages of results.
• Google International, searched August 7, 2010, with the keywords: “democratic rights +
Mumbai” and “civil liberties + Mumbai,” first 5 pages of results.
• qww.sulekha.com, consulted August 8, searched by “city,” “non-profit organizations,” and
“social justice NGOs.”
• Child Rights Information Network (CRIN) database, consulted August 19, 2010, searched
for NGOs that included “training or education on child rights,” “research child rights,”
“rights-based programming,” or “reporting to, or monitoring, the Convention on Children’s
Rights” in their mandate, and that were based in India (78) and then Mumbai (2).
• Google International and Google India, August 21, 2010, with the keywords “Manav
Adhikar” and “Mumbai,” first 10 pages of results.
• Directory of Development Organizations in India 2010, searched for all groups in Mumbai,
and then individually scrutinized.
• http://www.maharashtra.ngosindia.com/ database, consulted October 18, 2010 for NGOs in
Maharashtra, and then Mumbai.
77
Google India, October 20, 2010, keywords “Manav Adhikar” and “Mumbai” in Marathi
(मानवी अधिकार and मुंबई), and Hindi (मानव अधिकार and मुम्बई), first 10 pages of results.
• The Mumbai Street Children’s Empowerment Network.
•
Issue Crawler: Search on May 6, 2010, for “Human Rights” + “Mumbai” on Google.int/en,
September 7, 2010. URLs from the first 5 pages of results inputted into Issue Crawler to identify
“issue networks” of groups with a valid Web presence, working on rights-based issues in
Mumbai. These results were compared to those obtained through the search efforts described
above.
Key Informants: Researchers shared a draft sampling frame with eight Mumbai-based and three
New Delhi-based key informants. Several said the list was comprehensive, several could not
comment, and one said it was impossible to compile a complete Mumbai list. Two were
concerned that a handful of the groups did not truly exist, or were front organizations for
political organizations.
Sampling: We conducted an Issue Crawler inter-actor analysis of the available 48 URLs on
November 23, 2011. Only three were “core” organizations receiving two or more incoming links
from the other 47 URLs; the rest were “peripheral” groups with one or no incoming links from
the other 47. Given this dearth of virtual LHRO networks in Mumbai, we randomly sampled
from the entire list of 57 groups, assisted by a random number generator.
Survey Instruments: The English questionnaire was translated into Hindi; both were used in the
30 interviews.
Interview Duration: These 30 interviews lasted 66 minutes, on average, with a range of 34-136
minutes, and a standard deviation of 125.
Data Recording and Analysis: The interviews were digitally taped and are on file with the
project leader. Interviewers took written notes during interviews, summarized the interview’s
contents after the interview, and translated and added verbatim interview quotes.
78
Descriptive Statistics
The median founding date of groups in our sample is 1995, and most focus their work on the
sub-national or national level. Their median staff size is 22, but only 63% of these, on average,
are partially or fully paid. Most groups work on human rights education (20%), legal
interventions (25%), or public advocacy (18%).
Figure 1. LHRO Characteristics
HISTORY
Median Founding Year
Founded Before 1993 (%)
Founded Between 1993 and 2000
(%)
Founded Between 2001 and 2010
(%)
STAFF
Median Number of Staff
Mean Percentage of Paid Staff (%)
SCOPE
Median Number of Visits by
Foreigners in the Last Year
Local or Village Level Focus (%)
State or National Level Focus (%)
World Regional or Global Focus
(%)
MAIN ACTIVITIES114
Formal Legal Interventions (%)
Public Advocacy (%)
Human Rights Education with
Government Officials or Average
People (%)
Information Gathering (%)
Other (%)
Combine
d
(N=105)
Mexic
o City
(N=30)
San
Cristobal
(N=15)
RabatCasablanc
a
(N=30)
Mumbai
(N=30)
1995
39
1993
50
1993
27
1999
30
1990
53
32
20
33
36
20
29
30
40
34
27
22
63
15
63
10
49
50
24
50
67
3
2
3
4
4
12
76
14
76
27
67
93
93
67
90
13
10
7
0
3
25
18
24
10
13
0
37
33
33
10
30
24
33
23
30
7
20
0
41
0
53
7
0
7
20
Respondents tend to be urban-raised, highly educated, middle-aged, and are senior members of
their respective organizations. Their work-related international exposure is moderate, with an
114
Some respondents listed multiple “main activities,” but this table relies only on the first mentioned.
79
average of three work-related international trips over the past five years. Respondents from
Mexico City tended to travel the most internationally, while those in Mumbai traveled the least.
Over half the sample reported being a practicing member of their faith, but this varied
substantially by city.
Figure 2. Respondent Characteristics
Combine
d (N=105)
Mean Age (at time of interview)
Female (%)
POSITION
Median Years at current LHRO
(#)
Mean Years at current LHRO
(#)
Senior Level (%)
Middle Level (%)
Junior Level (%)
One or more Work-related
International Trips in the Last 5
Years (%)
RELIGION
Buddhist (%)
Christian (%)
Hindu (%)
Muslim (%)
No Religion (%)
Other Religion
Practicing Members of Faith
(%)
EDUCATION
Completed Secondary School
(%)
Attended Secondary school in a
Major City (%)
Attended University (%)
Median Years at University (#)
Attended University in a Major
City (%)
Father Attended University (%)
41
52
42
63
San
Cristob
al
(N=15)
46
60
6
5
10
12
12
11
10
11
8
14
64
32
5
86
14
0
62
39
0
73
23
0
97
0
3
3
5
3
3
1
4
41
8
25
20
2
0
40
0
0
57
3
0
60
0
0
33
7
0
0
0
80
10
0
7
10
37
10
30
0
61
41
57
30
48
99
100
93
100
100
79
87
64
80
83
96
5
100
5
80
5
97
5
100
6
92
85
100
93
90
38
64
53
13
52
80
Mexic
o City
(N=30)
RabatCasablanc
a
(N=30)
49
53
Mumbai
(N=30)
51
43
Mother Attended University
(%)
21
43
33
3
21
Data Source 4: Human Rights Perception Polls
In 2012, in collaboration with local partners in Mexico, Colombia, Morocco and India, we
conducted representative public opinion polls on perceptions of human rights and human rights
organizations. A nation wide sample was collected in Mexico and Colombia, whereas citysamples with smaller rural comparative samples were collected from Morocco and India.
Country and context specific methodologies were adopted in each country in order to gather data
from average citizens.
A. Mexico
In order to conduct a national level poll in Mexico, we collaborated with the Mexico, the
Americas, and the World initiative based at the Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas,
(CIDE). Since 2004, this initiative has been conducting multi-country surveys on foreign policy
and public opinion in Latin America on biannual basis. The surveys are conducted on a national
level and include a wide range of topics including: interest in politics, contact with the world,
trust and security, national and regional identity, political knowledge, foreign policy and the
country’s role in the world, international rules of the game and regional and international
relations.
In 2012, we added a battery of 9 questions specific to perceptions of human rights and human
rights organizations to the existing Mexico survey instrument.115
Sampling: A local Mexican survey firm, Data-OPM, executed by a local survey company
between August and October 2012 after completing initial pilot tests. The survey only included
Mexican nationals residing in Mexico who were 18 years or older.
The sampling frame used for the survey population was the electoral sections defined by the
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) which included data from the latest federal election in 2012. The
survey utilized a multi-stage sampling strategy where the survey firm conducted a randomized
selection process for each of the three sampling units. The primary sampling units were electoral
polling districts, the secondary sampling units were blocks within each electoral polling district
and the tertiary sampling unit was the households and individuals within each block.
The survey firm collected a sample of 2,400 in order to allow for analysis of the results at both
national and regional levels. Field researchers hired by the survey firm conducted face-to-face
interviews in Spanish and the sample margin of error was ±2.0%. For details on the territorial
and national breakdown of the sample and more information on sampling procedures please see
pages 121 to 122 of the Mexico, The Americas, and the World 2012-2013 report.
115
The Mexico survey instrument and further details on the added questions are available upon request.
81
B. Rabat and Casablanca, Morocco
We conducted a poll of Moroccan nationals residing in Morocco above the age of 18 in
collaboration with a Moroccan research firm called LMS-CSA. In line with the representative
LHRO survey completed in Morocco in 2011, we decided to conduct the survey in Rabat and
Casablanca, it’s surrounding environs116 and smaller sample of rural municipalities within 80
kilometers of the two adjacent cities. 117
With the help of LMS-CSA’s expertise, we established that an urban sample of 800 combined
with a rural sample of 300 would be sufficiently large to create a representative dataset of the
cities and their surrounding rural environs.
Sampling: LMS-CSA conducted a proportional stratified random sampling process for the urban
and rural samples. In other words, each of the two samples (Urban and Rural) have been
allocated to the two regions to be covered (Casablanca and Rabat - Salé, and Skhirat Temara)
depending on the weight of their target population.
For the urban sample, the primary sampling units were local municipalities, the secondary
sampling units were permanent landmarks within municipalities and the tertiary sampling units
were the households and individuals within municipalities. For the rural sample, the primary
sampling units were rural municipalities, the secondary sampling units were Mosques within the
municipalities and the tertiary sampling units were households and individuals. The survey firm
randomly selected each sample unit and conducted no more than 30 interviews per urban
municipality and no more than 12 interviews per rural municipality.
The local field research team conducted interviews in Arabic and French in October 2012 after
the questionnaire was first piloted in September. The survey questionnaire had a total of 31
questions. For more details on the sampling, data entry, weighting process, as well as the survey
instrument, a full methodological report is available from the authors upon request.
C. Mumbai, Maharashtra, India
In collaboration with CVOTER, an Indian research firm, we polled 1,680 Indian adult citizens
over 18 years of age in Mumbai and rural Maharashtra. To triangulate findings with those of the
representative LHRO survey completed in Mumbai in 2010 and 2011, we collected a
representative sample of 1080 residents of Mumbai, booster sample of Christians and Buddhists
of 150 each and a sample of 300 rural Maharashtrian residents.
116
The urban samples were specifically taken from Grand Casablanca Casablanca, Mohammedia, Médiouna and
Nouasseur and Rabat - Salé - Skhirat and Témara.
117
Given the high degree of urbanization in the two targeted regions study, we to expand the geographic scope of
the investigation and include among the eligible sampling points some "communes rurales" which,administratively
speaking, do not belong to the targeted regions but that lie within a radius of 70-80 km from the main cities
(Casablanca, Rabat, Salé, and Skhirat Temara). The selection of rural sampling points was made on a reasoned basis
by using road-maps of the neighboring regions of Casablanca, Rabat-Salé-Skhirate-Temara.
82
Sampling: A multi-stage stratified random sample was conducted in Mumbai and the rural
Maharashtra. The primary sampling unit for Mumbai was the legislative assemblies that form
part of Mumbai and Maharashtra’s parliamentary constituencies. Using a random number
generator software, CVOTER first selected assembly segments. Within each selected assembly
segment they selected a polling booth as the secondary sampling unit. From each selected polling
booth’s corresponding electoral roll names, they randomly selected the first individual’s name
was randomly for interview and from there, if the interview was successfully completed, they
chose every 10th individual’s name on the list for an interview. When the listed individuals were
not available or chose not to participate, the next name on the list was contacted until a full valid
interview was completed.
Booster & Rural Sampling: In order to collect booster sample data of Buddhists, Christians,
and rural residents, the survey firm conducted a qualitative analysis of Mumbai’s booth lists and
created a separate list of neighborhoods and communities with greater Buddhist and Christian
population densities as well as rural polling booths in Maharashtra. From these lists, booths and
respondents were selected and interviews were conducted following the same procedures as
described above.
CVOTER’s field research team conducted all interviews in Hindi and Marathi between
December 2011 and January 2012 after pilot testing the survey questionnaire, which included 34
questions. For more details on the sampling, data entry, weighting process, as well as the survey
instrument, a full methodological report is available from the authors upon request.
D. Colombia
We collaborated with the Mexico, the Americas, and the World initiative based at the Centro de
Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, (CIDE) and its Colombian partners to gather data in
Colombia. The Colombian research team conducted a national survey between November and
December 2012 using a questionnaire which included the same battery of questions on human
rights and human rights organization included in the Mexican national survey.
Sampling: The Colombian sample is a multi-stage stratified random sample. The Departamento
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) cartography was used to select municipalities
across the nation as the Primary Sampling units. The secondary sampling units were blocks
selected proportionally to rural stratus and districts. The tertiary sampling units were the
household in these segments. At eat step the survey team randomly selected the sampling units.
To collect working groups were organized in the cities of Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla,
Cartagena and Pasto and interviewers moved from these cities to cover all points of the sample.
While the interviews were conducted face-to-face at respondents’ homes, field supervisors called
20% of interviewed households to verify the interviews
A total of 1,699 adults were interviewed, this size sample was taken in order to have a
confidence level in the estimates of 95% and an expected error of + / - 3%. This size of the
sample is nationally and regionally representative, but not representative at the municipal level.
Further details on the geographic breakdown of the sample and sampling procedures are
83
available upon request from the authors.
APPENDIX C: EXPLORATORY REGRESSION ANALASIS
Table 4:
OLS Analysis of Key Informant Estimates,
How Many LHROs in Your Country Receive
“Substantial” Foreign Funds?
Variables of Interest
GDPpc (log)
Charity (log)
Repression
Regime
Empowerment
0.63 (3.42)
-7.35 (7.34)
1.12 (1.63)
-1.78 (0.65) **
1.86 (1.40)
Controls
Random Sample
-7.01 (6.01)
Foreign Funding
20.26 (6.31) **
Government Funding
-0.96 (4.79)
Year Founded
-0.14 (0.24)
Percent Staff Paid
0.07 (0.06)
Organizational Size (log)
-0.65 (1.49)
Constant
357.04 (485.67)
Number of observations
141
F
4.13***
R squared
0.26
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: ~p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
In this analysis, we regress the key informant estimates from data sources #1 and #2 (see Figure
A) on five variable of interest, all of which are described in the article text: GPDpc, Charity,
Repression, Regime, and Empowerment, as well as six control variables which may have some
influence on the respondent’s estimates: Random Sample, a dummy variable that takes the value
of “1” when the respondent is from one of the LHRO leader surveys in Mexico, Morocco, or
India (data source #2); Foreign Funding, a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the
respondent’s organization itself received any foreign funding; Government Funding, another
dummy variable for groups that receive aid from their own governments; Year Founded, the
founding year of the respondent’s own organization; Percent Staff Paid, the percentage of staff at
the respondent’s organization that received a salary, as opposed to working as a volunteer; and
Organizational Size, the combined number of paid and voluntary staff at the respondent’s own
group. The number of observations is 141 out of a total of 233; we excluded some respondents
84
because of missing data, and also excluded all data source #1 respondents who did not work for a
local NGO.
85