Regulating Access to Health Care Providers and Inequalities of Utilization in European Countries Claus Wendt Harkness/Bosch Fellow of Health Policy and Practice Harvard School of Public Health J.F. Kennedy Fellow Center for European Studies, Harvard University wendt@fas.harvard.edu claus.wendt@mzes.uni-mannheim.de Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung 1 From Access to Access Regulation Access quasi 100% no variance Coverage of the System X Provider Density (OECD 1987, Moran 2000) Regulation 2 Dimensions of Access Regulation Access Regulation Gatekeeping Inequality Cost Sharing Utilization Provider Density Costs 3 Sources of Data Macro-Indicators: self-coded out of WHO-country studies, comparative studies Micro-Data Share-Survey: 1. wave 2004 Population: people over 50 11 countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain. Number of doctor visits Multilevel- and country-specific logit-models 4 SHARE 2004 Country N Austria 1,825 Belgium 3,639 Denmark 1,583 France 2,905 Germany 2,894 Greece 2,625 Italy 2,463 Netherlands 2,772 Spain 2,274 Sweden 2,920 Switzerland 908 Total 26,808 5 Gatekeeping - Index Country GP Registration Geographic Restriction GPs paid by capitation Access to specialist Access to outpatient care in hospital France -- -- -- free free 0 0 Greece -- -- -- free free 0 0 Switzerland -- -- -- free free 0 0 Belgium -- -- -- skip & pay skip & pay 2 2.9 Germany -- -- -- free referral 2 2.9 Austria -- -- + skip & pay skip & pay 3 4.3 Sweden + -- -- skip & pay skip & pay 3 4.3 Netherlands + -- + referral referral 6 8.6 Spain + + -- referral referral 6 8.6 Denmark + + + referral referral 7 10 Italy + + + referral referral 7 10 Legal Regulation Index LRI rescaled (0-10) 6 Overview of Regulation Indices 13.6 14 12 10.8 10 10.0 10.1 10.0 8.9 8.5 8 9.2 8.6 10.0 8.6 7.5 5.8 6 4 10.0 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 2.9 2 0.8 0.0 0 Austria Belgium Denmark France Access Regulation Index (ARI) 4.3 3.5 3.6 2.9 0.6 Germany 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.0 Greece Italy Legal Regulation Index (LRI) Netherlands 0.6 Spain 0.0 Sweden Switzerland Financial Incentive Index (FII) 7 Effects on Utilization Level RI Country-Level Variance Explained Variance N (1) Any-DoctorModel (2) Any-GPModel (3) AnySpecialist Model (4) AverageDoctor Model (5) AverageGP Model (6) AverageSpecialist Model 0.873*** 0.901** 0.921+ 0.953 0.959 0.946+ (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 0.102 (0.05) 59% 0.097 (0.04) 47% 0.156 (0.07) 26% 0.327 (0.14) 8% 0.385 (0.17) 5% 0.134 (0.06) 22% 24183 24183 24183 26808 26808 26808 8 Equity Effects: Utilization Differences across Income Groups (Specialists) 9 Equity Effects: Utilization Differences across Educational Groups (Specialists) 10 Equity Effects: Utilization Differences across Groups with different health status 11 Conclusions: Level Effects Based on multilevel analyses with the SHARE dataset including 11 countries we found that: The overall degree of access regulation has a decreasing effect on the overall level of service utilization The effect was focused mainly on the probability of having any visit than on the number of visits This fits in the idea of patient- and provider-initiated visits which assumes that the first visit in an illness spell is initiated by the patient, all further visits, however, might be strongly influenced by doctors Since cost sharing and gatekeeping are mainly patient-focused access regulations our finding are in line with this conceptualization 12 Conclusions: Equity Effects We investigated inequity in specialist care both across groups with different income and educational level and health status: Income inequity is not related to the degree of cost sharing as would be hypothesized Educational inequity is associated with the degree of access regulation A higher degree of regulation decreases the probability of a doctor visit for people with low need levels This could be a sign for increased efficiency of these access regulations since the take up rate of medical services by people in good health is lower 13 What are the Policy Implications? The results indicate that access regulations can contribute to a reduction of health services used However, the regulations mostly affect whether people have a first doctor visit This shows that an effective control of consumption levels has also to influence provider behavior Putting the locus of responsibility in the GP also seems to have beneficial results in terms of increased equity across groups with different educational level 14 Regulating Access to Health Care Providers and Inequalities of Utilization in European Countries Claus Wendt Harkness/Bosch Fellow of Health Policy and Practice Harvard School of Public Health J.F. Kennedy Fellow Center for European Studies, Harvard University wendt@fas.harvard.edu claus.wendt@mzes.uni-mannheim.de 1515