Impact of Florida Legislative & Regulatory Innovations on Nursing Home Turnover, Tenure, Financial Performance & Quality of Care Panel Presentation at Academy Health June 5,2007 2/1/2007 1 Collaboration across Florida Universities Kathryn Hyer,PhD, MPP, University of South Florida Mishu Popa & Shabnam Mehra, PhD students Larry Polivka, PhD, Victor Molinari, PhD Christopher Johnson, Ph.D., Texas A&M University Health Science Center, Co-Principal Investigator Jeffrey Harman, PhD, University of Florida David Macpherson, PhD, Florida State University William Even, PhD, Miami University of Ohio Robert Weech-Maldonado, University of Florida 5/29/2016 Alexandre Laberge, PT, PhD student Acknowledge Funding Sources Administration on Agency research grant Award # 90AM2750/02 Commonwealth Fund (Hyer, Johnson, Harman) Award # 20050582 5/29/2016 Acknowledge Advisors Charlene Harrington, PhD, Chair, National Advisory Board for Commonwealth Fund Christine Bishop, PhD Dana Mukamel, PhD Vince Mor, PhD 5/29/2016 Goals of presentation To examine how nursing home providers in Florida responded over a six-year period (1999-2004) to both financial incentives to increase spending on direct care and to new staffing mandates Understand the long term care nursing labor market in Florida and the US Understand top management stability and its impact on deficiencies and nurse staff turnover To examine how quality of care and financial performance changed in Fl nursing homes after new staffing, regulatory requirements and reimbursement rates were changed to improve quality. 5/29/2016 Fl Nurse Staffing Changes 1999-2007 1999-2001 2002 2003 2007 5/29/2016 Appropriate Medicaid direct care staffing adjustment (DCSA) incentives (HB 1971) Increase CNA and LPN/RN staffing standards effective January 2002 Increase CNA staffing standards to 2.6 effective January 2003 Daily minimum of 2.7 CNA HPRD effective January 2007 1.7 0.6 2.3 2.6 1 1 2.9 w eekly 1 Background: Fl. Nursing Home Florida has 650 NHs with 70,000 with beds certified as Medicaid and Medicare Florida has 2,200 Assisted Livings with 70,000 beds Late 1990’s Florida was a high litigation state, insurance coverage was expensive and difficult to obtain, NHs were filing for bankruptcy and quality of nursing care was suspect. 5/29/2016 Staffing Mandates Matter: Florida Nursing Home Provider Response to Financial Incentives to Increase Nurse Staffing Presentation at Academy Health Annual Research Meeting Kathryn Hyer, Ph.D. University of South Florida Principal Investigator Christopher Johnson, Ph.D. Texas A&M University Health Science Center Co-Principal Investigator Jeffrey Harman, PhD, Investigator, University of Florida Shaban Mehra, University of South Florida PhD Program 2/1/2007 8 Direct Care Staffing Adjustment (DCSA) Incentive Program 1999 legislation 5/29/2016 Who: Incentives paid to Medicaid-participating facilities. 600 of 648 Medicaid providers volunteered. 594 provided follow-up data When: Beginning April 1, 2000 and continuing until mandates were imposed in January 2002. How: Direct patient care increase in Medicaid per diem ($31.7 million dollars/annualized and sustained until mandates began in Jan 2002) Direct Care Staffing Adjustment Medicaid Payments Baseline study period 1/1/99—6/30/99 Follow-up study period 5/1/00—10/31/00 595 Medicaid providers Minimum payment of $0.50/Medicaid patient day of money spent on minimum ($8 million-25% of total allocated) Additional money ($23.1 million-75%) inversely allocated to providers with lowest staffing and highest Medicaid utilization NH Medicaid add-on payments 5/29/2016 $1.96 average Medicaid patient day $2.81 maximum Medicaid patient day Direct Care Staffing Adjustment (DCSA) Incentive Program Pay “cost of hiring additional CNA and licensed nurses or cost of salary or benefit enhancements to retain such staff” 5/29/2016 Financial Incentives to Increase Staffing in Florida Nursing Homes What are the characteristics of nursing homes that responded to Medicaid direct patient care increase incentive? How did nurse staffing change? What was the impact on quality? 5/29/2016 Data CMS OSCAR data was used for deficiencies and structural characteristics. Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration Cost Data provided following data for baseline and follow-up periods 5/29/2016 amounts of incentive provided to nursing homes nursing hours per patient day by nurse level overtime hours and agency hours Methods Baseline statistics T-tests on facility characteristics Minimum incentive dollars (N=145) Maximum incentive dollars (N=146) Two-way ANOVA Changes in nurse staffing hours by nurse level Changes in use of agency by nurse level Difference in difference by incentive payment amount Quality indicators Deficiencies 5/29/2016 Methods Compare: Baseline period (Jan-June 99) with follow-up (May-Oct 2000) Quartiles of providers receiving money Minimum incentive $ Maximum incentive $ Changes in nurse staffing hours Employee hours, overtime hours Changes in use of agency Changes in quality of resident care (Quarter 1 2000 vs 4th Quarter 2001) 5/29/2016 Baseline characteristics of NH receiving Minimum and Maximum Incentive dollars Variables Avg add-on/ patient day Avg total addon facility 5/29/2016 Minimum Incentive Quartile N=146 sd mean Maximum Incentive Quartile N=145 sd mean T-tests $1.33 $0.40 $2.44 $0.15 *** $34,163 $25,332 $68,117 $31,974 *** Baseline characteristics of NH receiving Minimum and Maximum Incentive dollars Minimum Incentive Quartile (N=146) Variables Number of beds Medicaid Ratio Medicare Ratio Acuity Index 5/29/2016 Maximum Incentive Quartile (N=145) mean sd mean sd T-Tests 131 60 119 40 * 0.57 0.23 0.7 0.17 *** 0.14 10.71 0.12 1.38 0.11 10.37 0.07 1.09 *** * Characteristics of NH responding by Minimum and Maximum add-on quartiles 1999 Minimum Incentive Quartile (N=146) Variables % For Profit % Chain % Urban Number of beds 5/29/2016 Maximum Incentive Quartile (N=145) mean 71 65 96 sd 45 48 20 mean 91 83 88 sd 29 38 33 T-Tests *** *** *** 131 60 119 40 * CNA Percent Change in Hours/ prpd 80 60 40 20 Minimum Maximum 0 Mean Total Nurse Staffing Hours -20 -40 -60 5/29/2016 Mean Agency Nurse Staffing Hours Mean Total Overtime Hours Mean Employed Nurse Staffing Hours Percent Change in LPN Hours/ prpd 120 100 80 60 Minimum 40 Maximum 20 0 Mean Total Nurse Staffing Hours -20 -40 5/29/2016 Mean Agency Nurse Staffing Hours Mean Total Overtime Hours Mean Employed Nurse Staffing Hours Percent Change in RN Hours/ prpd 250 200 150 Minimum 100 Maximum 50 0 Mean Total Nurse Staffing Hours -50 5/29/2016 Mean Agency Nurse Staffing Hours Mean Total Overtime Hours Mean Employed Nurse Staffing Hours Changes in total nurse staffing hours/prpd Means in nurse staffing hours/ prpd Minimum Incentive Maximum Incentive Mean SD Mean SD p CNA total hours baseline 2.60 1.09 1.77 0.25 *** CNA total hours after $ 2.32 0.44 2.08 0.69 *** Within group change(p) ** *** LPN total hours baseline 1.01 0.45 0.67 0.17 *** LPN total hours after $ 0.90 0.29 0.76 0.20 *** Within group change(p) * *** RN total hours baseline 0.56 0.32 0.29 0.13 *** RN total hours after $ Within group change(p) Total hours baseline Total hours after $ Within group change(p) 0.46 0.29 0.31 0.17 *** 2.73 3.14 0.32 *** 0.83 *** 5/29/2016 ** ns 4.17 3.66 *** 1.54 0.75 *** Changes in Mean Hourly Wage Means in hourly wages Minimum Incentive Mean SD $8.40 1.18 $9.39 1.32 CNA hourly wage baseline CNA hourly wage after $ *** LPN hourly wage baseline LPN hourly wage after $ 1.73 1.55 *** 5/29/2016 $14.54 $15.42 1.85 1.5 ** ns $18.08 $18.98 2.65 2.23 ns *** *** $18.67 $19.97 *** p * * *** $13.93 $15.49 RN hourly wage baseline RN hourly wage after $ Maximum Incentive Mean SD $8.86 1.4 $9.66 1.23 2.99 2.51 ** Difference in difference Quality Indicator ADL decline 4 points Bladder worsening Coefficient P-value (Compared to middle incentive group) P-value (High vs. Low incentive) Min group -0.006 0.417 0.437 Max group 0.001 0.921 Min group 0.001 0.874 Max group 0.021 0.014 Incentive quartile 0.056 Log Linear transformations Bowel worsening Pressure sore_low Restraints 5/29/2016 Min group -0.006 0.914 Max group 0.140 0.010 Min group 0.124 0.180 Max group -0.019 0.833 Min group -0.047 0.596 Max group -0.042 0.627 0.024 0.186 0.962 Results-Incentive Program Expected to see increase in mean hours/prpd at all facilities receiving new monies Significant between-group differences at baseline Significant increases in employed nurse hours for CNAs, LPNs, RN increases only in group receiving maximum incentive dollars Even after new money group receiving maximum $ is still not at minimum HPRD LPNs appear to substitute for RN HPRD Wages increased for CNAs, LPNs, mixed RNs 5/29/2016 Discussion How was the direct care staffing money spent? 5/29/2016 Spent according to legislative intent Differences between minimum and maximum incentive groups. Incentives allow discretion which does not translate to staffing increases per resident day Low amounts of money spent on RNs despite increasing acuity Discussion Incentives did not improve the quality of care 5/29/2016 Was money sufficient? Total Nursing HPRD Total Nursing Hours Per Resident Day Florida versus Nation* 5 4.5 Florida 4 US 3.5 3 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year * From Slack, A., Hyer, K. & Johnson, C.E.. “Reviewing Florida’s Efforts to Improve Nursing Home Quality Through Nurse Staffing Mandates, Regulation and Medicaid Reimbursement” (Figure 1, Working paper, 2006.) 5/29/2016 Staffing Mandates Matter Incentives change organizational behavior in nurse staffing but do not necessarily increase hours per resident per day Florida staffing changes are natural experiment with mandates following incentives Can’t address how staff are deployed 5/29/2016 Next Steps Difference in difference models over mandates Examine the changes in quality at facilities when mandates are imposed Track total salary within departments with Dr. Weech-Maldonado Identify characteristics of facilities with variation in quality by staffing (high quality and low quality) 5/29/2016 More information Kathryn Hyer khyer@cas.usf.edu 5/29/2016