Table of Contents
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
CHAPTER 1:
INTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHY: OVERVIEW AND TAXONOMY
Part I: The Argument from ‘Intuition’-Talk
INTRODUCTION TO PART I
CHAPTER 2:
‘INTUITIVE’, ‘INTUITIVELY’, ‘INTUITION’ AND ‘SEEM’ IN ENGLISH
CHAPTER 3:
PHILOSOPHERS’ USE OF ‘INTUITIVE’ (I): A DEFECTIVE PRACTICE
AND THE VERBAL VIRUS THEORY
CHAPTER 4:
PHILOSOPHERS’ USE OF ‘INTUITIVE’ (II): SOME STRATEGIES
CHARITABLE INTERPRETATION
FOR
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4: WILLIAMSON ON INTUITION AS BELIEF AND
INCLINATION TO BELIEVE
CHAPTER 5:
P HILOSOPHERS ’ U SE OF ‘I NTUITIVE ’ (III): A GAINST
EXPLAINING AWAY OF INTUITIONS
THE
Part II: The Argument from Philosophical Practice
INTRODUCTION TO PART II
CHAPTER 6:
CENTRALITY AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE
CHAPTER 7:
DIAGNOSTICS FOR INTUITIVENESS
CHAPTER 8:
CASE STUDIES
CHAPTER 9:
LESSONS LEARNED, REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS AND COMPARISON TO
WILLIAMSON
CHAPTER 10: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND INTUITIONS
CHAPTER 11: A BIG MISTAKE: EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
2
INDEX
Detailed Table of Contents
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
CHAPTER 1:
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
INTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHY: OVERVIEW AND TAXONOMY
The Role of Intuitions in the Self-Conception of Contemporary
Analytic Philosophers: Centrality
Two Arguments for Centrality: The Argument from ‘Intuitions’-Talk
and the Argument from Philosophical Practice
‘Intuition’ in Centrality
More on how to Interpret Centrality
Burning Questions for Proponents of Centrality: the Pessimists, the
Enthusiasts and the Concerned
Rejection of Centrality: Philosophy without Intuitions
Part I: The Argument from ‘Intuition’-Talk
INTRODUCTION TO PART I
CHAPTER 2:
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
The Adjective ‘Intuitive’ and the Adverb ‘Intuitively’
‘Intuitive’ as a Hedge
The Noun Phrase ‘Intuition’
‘Seem’ and ‘Intuitive’
Taking Stock
CHAPTER 3:
.1
.2
.3
.4
‘INTUITIVE’, ‘INTUITIVELY’, ‘INTUITION’ AND ‘SEEM’ IN ENGLISH
PHILOSOPHERS’ USE OF ‘INTUITIVE’ (I): A DEFECTIVE PRACTICE
AND THE VERBAL VIRUS THEORY
Constructive vs. Defective Theoretical Terms
Problems for ‘Intuition’ in Philosophy
Disagreement over the Theoretical Role of Intuitions
Are Unreflective Uses of ‘Intuition’ Meaningless?
CHAPTER 4:
PHILOSOPHERS’ USE OF ‘INTUITIVE’ (II): SOME STRATEGIES
CHARITABLE INTERPRETATION
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
First Strategy: Simple Removal
Second and Third Strategies: Snap and Pre-Theoretic
The Three Strategies at Work: Some Complicated Mixed Cases
Taking Stock
3
FOR
4.5
4.6
No Appeal to Special Feelings, Conceptual Competence or Default
Justificatory Status
Back to Centrality and AIT: None of these Interpretative Strategies
are Centrality-Supporting
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4: WILLIAMSON ON INTUITION AS BELIEF AND
INCLINATION TO BELIEVE
CHAPTER 5:
5.1
5.2
P HILOSOPHERS ’ U SE OF ‘I NTUITIVE ’ (III): A GAINST
EXPLAINING AWAY OF INTUITIONS
THE
The Argument Against Explain
Is There Some Intellectually Useful Activity That’s Mistakenly
Classified as ‘Explaining Away Intuitions’?
Part II: The Argument from Philosophical Practice
INTRODUCTION TO PART II
CHAPTER 6:
CENTRALITY AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE
6.1
6.2
Methodological Rationalism
The Influence of Methodological Rationalism
CHAPTER 7:
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
CHAPTER 8:
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
8.8
8.9
DIAGNOSTICS FOR INTUITIVENESS
Features of the Intuitive
Some Initial Qualifications
More on the Features of the Intuitive
Summary and Additional Reflections on how to Operationalize
Appeals to Intuitions
CASE STUDIES
Perry on the Problem of the Essential Indexical
Burge on Individualism and the Mental
Thomson’s Violinist in “A Defense of Abortion”
Thomson and Foot on Trolley Cases
Three Epistemology Cases: Lotteries, Truetemp and Fake Barns
Cappelen and Hawthorne on Disagreement, Predicates of Personal
Taste and Relativism about Truth
Bernard Williams on Personal Identity and the Fear of the Prospect
of Torture
Chalmers on Zombies
Conclusion
4
CHAPTER 9:
9.1
9.2
9.3
LESSONS LEARNED, REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS AND COMPARISON TO
WILLIAMSON
What Cases Are: Some Generalizations
Objections and Replies
Williamson on Evidence Neutrality, Psychologizing the Evidence
and Analyticity
CHAPTER 10: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND INTUITIONS
10.1
10.2
10.3
Hyperbole about Intuitions Leads to Hyperbole about Conceptual
Analysis
Are There any Conceptual Truths, and if so, Are They
Philosophically Significant?
Conclusion: Centrality as a Sectarian Thesis
CHAPTER 11: A BIG MISTAKE: EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
11.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
Experimental Philosophy: Positive and Negative
The Big Objection to Experimental Philosophy: It Attacks a
Practice that Doesn’t Exist
Experimental Philosophy without Intuitions?
Experimental Philosophy and the Expertise Defense of Traditional
Philosophy
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
5