February19,2013
ActingAdministratorBobPerciasepe
UnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtectionAgency
1200PennsylvaniaAvenue,N.W.,Room3000
Washington,D.C.20460
perciasepe.bob@epa.gov
VIAE‐MAILANDCERTIFIEDMAIL
PetitionforRulemakingsandCallforInformation
underSection115,TitleVI,Section111,andTitleIIoftheCleanAirAct
toRegulateGreenhouseGasEmissions
DearActingAdministratorPerciasepe,
PursuanttotheAdministrativeProcedureAct,5U.S.C.§553(e),theCleanAirAct,42U.S.C.§7401
etseq.,andotherrelevantregulationsandpractices,theInstituteforPolicyIntegrity(Policy
Integrity)1herebyfilesthisPetitionwiththeEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)toinitiate
rulemakingproceedingsandacallforinformationundertheCleanAirAct.Specifically,Policy
IntegrityrequeststhatEPAtakerequiredactionsunderSection115,TitleVI,Section111,and
TitleIIoftheCleanAirActtocontrolgreenhousegasemissions.2
Section115createsamandatorydutyforEPAtorespondtoU.S.emissionsthatendangerpublic
healthandwelfareinforeigncountries.AlltheprerequisitesforactionunderSection115have
beensatisfiedforgreenhousegases:EPAhasalreadyacknowledged—basedinpartonreports
fromaninternationalbody—thatgreenhousegasesfromtheUnitedStatesendangerforeign
countries;andothercountries,suchasCanada,havegiventheUnitedStatesreciprocalrights.
PolicyIntegritypetitionsEPAto:
1. Makeaformalfindingthatalltheprerequisitesforactiontocontrolinternationalair
pollutionunderSection115havebeensatisfiedforgreenhousegases;
2. RequirestatestorevisetheirCleanAirActimplementationplanstocontroltheirdangerous
greenhousegaspollutionbymakingreasonableprogresstowardabatement;and
3. AdvisestatesontheiroptionsforimplementationunderSection115,includingflexible
regulatorytoolslikemarketincentives.
Section115providesamandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveapproachtoregulatinggreenhouse
gasemissions.ItisthereforethepreferredmechanismundertheCleanAirActforrespondingto
thedangersofclimatechange.Alternatively,TitleVIoftheCleanAirAct—specificallySection
1PolicyIntegrityisanon‐partisanthinktankatNewYorkUniversitySchoolofLaw.PolicyIntegrityisdedicatedto
improvingthequalityofgovernmentdecisionmakingthroughadvocacyandscholarshipintheareasofadministrative
andenvironmentallaw,economics,andpublicpolicy.PolicyIntegrityisacollaborativeeffortoffacultyatNewYork
UniversitySchoolofLaw;afull‐timestaffofattorneysandpolicyexperts;lawstudents;andaBoardofAdvisors
comprisedofleadersinpublicpolicy,law,andgovernment.
2Greenhousegasesincludecarbondioxide,methane,nitrousoxide,andfluorinatedgases.
139 MacDougal Street, Third Floor • New York, New York 10012 • (212) 992-8932 • www.policyintegrity.org
615—alsocreatesapotentiallymandatoryobligationforcomprehensivecontrolofgreenhouse
gases.UnderSection615,EPAmustcontrolpollutionthataffectsthestratosphereandsoimpacts
publichealthandwelfare.Scientificevidencealreadysupportstheconclusionthatgreenhouse
gasesareaffectingthestratosphereinwaysthatendangerthepublic,particularlybycontributing
toozonedepletion.EPAmay,however,requireadditionalinformationbeforemakingsuchaformal
finding.PolicyIntegritypetitionsEPAto:
4. InitiateapubliccallforinformationunderTitleVIregardingtheeffectofgreenhousegases
onthestratosphereandozoneinthestratosphere;
5. Ifthescientificevidenceexist,issueanendangermentfindingunderSection615;and
6. Uponissuinganendangermentfinding,controlgreenhousegasemissionsthroughflexible
regulatorytoolslikemarkets.
TheremainingauthoritiesundertheCleanAirActdonotprovideassimplearouteto
comprehensivegreenhousegascontrolsasSections115and615offer.Nevertheless,evensector‐
by‐sectorregulationunderotherprovisionscanbepiecedtogethertobuildacomprehensive
responsetoclimatechange.
Therefore,asathird‐bestoption,EPAshouldcontinuethepathithasalreadybegunfollowing,
issuinggreenhousegasstandardsunderSection111andTitleII.Section111requiresEPAto
regulatecategoriesofstationarysourcesthatsignificantlycontributetodangerouspollution.EPA
hasalreadybeguntheprocessofregulatingpowerplantsfortheirgreenhousegasemissionsunder
thisprovision,andtheagencyhasbeenpetitionedorsuedtoregulateadditionalsourcecategories.
Besidespromptlyfinalizingsuchregulations,forbothnewandexistingsources,PolicyIntegrity
alsopetitionsEPAto:
7. Listadditionalsourcecategoriesthatcontributesignificantlytogreenhousegaspollution,
includingagriculturalsources,andtodevelopperformancestandardsforsuchcategories
withinayearoftheirlisting;
8. Revisetheperformancestandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategoriestocoversignificant
greenhousegasemissions,suchasforlandfills,naturalgasandpetroleumsystems,and
variousmanufacturingindustries;
9. Instructstatestodevelopperformancestandardsforexistingsources,andtodosoin
coordinationwithEPA’snewsourceperformancestandards,toavoidgrandfathering;
10. Forbothnewandexistingsources,defineamarketasthe“bestsystem”ofcontrol;and
11. Automaticallyphaseinstrongerperformancestandardsovertime.
EPAcanuseSection111tocreateanefficientandlargelycomprehensivemarketforcontrolling
emissionsfromstationarysources.Buttocontrolmobilesources,EPAwillhavetouseitsauthority
underTitleIIoftheCleanAirAct.EPAhasalreadybegunregulatingsomesourcesunderTitleII,
andhasbeenpetitionedorsuedtoregulateadditionalsourcecategories:inparticular,Policy
IntegrityhaspetitionedEPAtoenactcomprehensivecontrolsbyregulatingvehiclefuels.IfEPA
doesnotenactvehiclefuelcontrols,PolicyIntegrityfurtherpetitionsEPAto:
12. Promulgateemissionsstandardsforallsignificantmobilesourcesnotyetregulatedor
petitionedtoberegulated,includingmotorcyclesandthetrailersofheavy‐dutytrucks.
2
Contents
I.EPAMustRequireStatestoRegulateGreenhouseGasesunderSection115..............................4 EPAhasreceivedreportsandstudiesfromadulyconstitutedinternationalagency—the
IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange..................................................................................................................4 ThosereportsgaveEPAreasontobelievethatgreenhousegasesemittedintheUnitedStatescause
orcontributetopollutionthatendangersforeignhealthorwelfare...................................................................5 EPAhasevidencecorrelatingtheendangermenttosourceswithinparticularstates.................................6 ForeigncountrieshavegiventheUnitedStatesessentiallyreciprocalrights..................................................7 EPAmustrequirestatestorevisetheirimplementationplanstoeliminatedangerousgreenhouse
gaspollution,andshouldadvisestatesonthemostworkableregulatoryoptions....................................11 Section115providesamandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveapproachtoregulatinggreenhouse
gasemissions................................................................................................................................................................................15 II.EPAShouldEvaluatetheImpactofGreenhouseGasesontheStratosphereandRespond
withAppropriateRegulationunderTitleVI.............................................................................................16 Greenhousegaseslikelyaffectthestratosphereandendangerpublichealthorwelfare........................16 EPAshouldestablishmarket‐basedregulationforgreenhousegasesunderTitleVI...............................17 TitleVIprovidesanalternatesourceofmandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveregulation............17 III.EPAMustRegulateSignificantStationarySourcesunderSection111.....................................18 EPAmustlistadditionalsourcecategoriesthatsignificantlyemitgreenhousegases..............................19 EPAmustissuegreenhousegasstandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategories.........................................20 ExistingsourcesmustberegulatedunderSection111(d),andregulationshouldavoid
grandfathering............................................................................................................................................................................23 EPAshoulddefineamarketasthe“bestsystem”........................................................................................................24 EPAshouldautomaticallyphaseinstrongerstandardsovertime.....................................................................28 EPAmustsetperformancestandardsforunregulated,significantstationarysources............................29 IV.EPAMustRegulateAllSignificantMobileSourcesunderTitleII..............................................30 Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................31 3
I.EPAMustRequireStatestoRegulateGreenhouseGasesunderSection115.
Section115oftheCleanAirActaddressesinternationalairpollutionandrequiresEPAtorespond
toU.S.emissionsthatendangerpublichealthandwelfareinforeigncountries.Theprovision
createsamandatorydutytoactifcertainprerequisitesaremet:

First,EPAmusthavereceived“reports,surveysorstudies”froma“dulyconstituted
internationalagency.”3

Second,thereportsreceivedmustgiveEPA“reasontobelievethatanyairpollutantor
pollutantsemittedintheUnitedStatescauseorcontributetoairpollution”that“may
reasonablybeanticipatedtoendangerpublichealthorwelfareinaforeigncountry.”4

Third,EPAmustdeterminethataforeigncountry“hasgiventheUnitedStatesessentially
thesamerightswithrespecttothepreventionorcontrolofairpollutionoccurringinthat
country.”5

Ifallthoseconditionsaresatisfied,EPAmustrequireanystatescontainingsourcesofthe
internationalairpollutiontorevisetheirapplicableimplementationplansto“preventor
eliminate”thedangertoforeignhealthorwelfare.6
Alltheprerequisitesforactionhavebeensatisfiedforgreenhousegases:EPAhasalready
acknowledged—basedinpartonreportsfromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange—
thatgreenhousegasesfromtheUnitedStatesendangerforeigncountries;andothercountries,such
asCanada,havegiventheUnitedStatesessentiallyreciprocalrights.EPAthereforemustdirect
statestocontroltheirgreenhousegasemissionsunderSection115.
EPAhasreceivedreportsandstudiesfromadulyconstitutedinternationalagency—the
IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.
Thoughthestatutedoesnotdefine“dulyconstitutedinternationalagency,”courtshavefoundthe
meaningtobeself‐evident.7TheonlytwocasesthattreatSection115involveacidrainpollution
driftingintoCanadafromMidwesternstates—anenvironmentalissuethathadbeenstudiedbythe
InternationalJointCommission.D.C.CircuitcourtsfoundtheInternationalJointCommissionto
“concededly”beadulyconstitutedinternationalagency,8highlightingthattheCommissionwas
establishedbytreatyandchargedwiththeresponsibilityofresolvingtrans‐boundarywater
disputes.9Perhapsalsorelevant,theCommission’smembershipissplitbetweentheUnitedStates
andCanada,andexpertsfrombothcountriessubmitevidencetothebody.10
TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangesharesallthoserelevantcharacteristicsand,
therefore,isalsoadulyconstitutedinternationalagency.ThePanelwasestablishedbytwoUnited
NationsorganizationsandendorsedbyaUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyResolution,which
chargedthePanelwithconductingacomprehensivereviewofthestateofknowledgeofclimate
change,thesocialimpactofclimatechange,andpossibleresponsestrategies.11ThePanelis
342U.S.C.§7415(a).Alternatively,theSecretaryofStatecanpresentsuchinformation.
4Id.
5Id.§7415(c).
6Id.§7415(b).
7SeeNewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.1472,1482(D.D.C.1985),reversedonothergrounds,Thomasv.NewYork,802
F.2d1443(D.C.Cir.1986).
8Thomasv.NewYork,802F.2dat1445;HerMajestytheQueenv.EPA,912F.2d1525,1529(D.C.Cir.1990).
9NewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1482.
10Int’lJointComm’n,WhoWeAre,http://www.ijc.org/en/background/ijc_cmi_nature.htm(lastvisitedApr.14,2012).
11U.N.G.A.Res.43/53(1988);seealsoMassachusettsv.EPA,549U.S.497,508(2007)(callingtheIntergovernmental
Panel“amultinationalscientificbodyorganizedundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNations”).
4
composedofmembersfromseveralcountries,includingtheUnitedStates.12Scientistsfromaround
theworldcontributetothePanel’sreports,whicharereviewedandapprovedbymember
countries.13CongresshaseveninstructedU.S.federalagenciestobasetheirclimatechangeplans
onthereportsoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.14
EPAhasreceivedstudiesregardinggreenhousegasemissionsfromtheIntergovernmentalPanelon
ClimateChange.Mostnotably,whenEPAissuedafindingin2009thatgreenhousegasesendanger
U.S.healthandwelfare,theagencyreliedinpartonthePanel’sreports.15Inthatfinding,EPA
reasonedthatitdidnotneedtoindependentlyreviewthePanel’sreportsbecauseEPAtook“an
activepartin[their]review,writing,andapproval.”16EPAwentontostatethatthe
IntergovernmentalPanel’sassessments“havebeenreviewedandformallyacceptedby,
commissionedby,orinsomecasesauthoredby,U.S.governmentagenciesandindividual
governmentscientists.ThesereportsalreadyreflectsignificantinputfromEPA’sscientistsandthe
scientistsofmanyothergovernmentagencies.”17
Insummary:EPAhasreceivedreportsongreenhousegasemissionsfromtheIntergovernmental
PanelonClimateChange—adulyconstitutedinternationalagency.
ThosereportsgaveEPAreasontobelievethatgreenhousegasesemittedintheUnitedStates
causeorcontributetopollutionthatendangersforeignhealthorwelfare.
Thoughthestatutedoesnotdefine“reasontobelieve,”theD.C.Circuitfoundthatthephrase—
combinedwiththeword“whenever”—does“implyadegreeofdiscretionunderlyingthe
endangermentfinding.”18Yetthatdiscretionisnotlimitless:inparticular,EPAcannotexerciseits
degreeofdiscretioninanarbitraryorcapriciousmanner,19andoncetheendangermentfindingis
made,“theremedialactionthatfollowsisbothspecificandmandatory—theAdministratorshall
notifytheGovernorofthespecificStateemittingthepollutionandrequireittoreviseitsSIP.”20
Whenareportprovidesan“amplebasis”ofinformationsupportinganendangermentfinding,and
whenEPAinfactreliesonareportinmakinganassessmentaboutdangertohealthandwelfare,
the“reasontobelieve”prongissatisfied.21
In2007,theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeissueditsFourthAssessmentReport.The
Reportconcludedthatgreenhousegasemissionsfromhumanactivitiesareacauseofclimate
change.Ithighlightedthegloballyrisingatmosphericconcentrationsofgaseslikecarbondioxide
andmethane,22andfoundthattheUnitedStateswasthesecond‐largestsourceworldwideofboth
carbondioxideandmethaneemissions(afterChina).23TheReportfurtherdeterminedthatclimate
changewillharmpublichealthandwelfare,byimpactingmalnutrition,extremeweatherevents,
cardio‐respiratorydiseases,infectiousdiseases,foodproduction,coastalerosion,waterscarcity,
12IPCC,Organization,http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml(lastvisitedJan.31,2013).
13Id.
14E.g.,10U.S.C.§118(g)(instructingtheDepartmentofDefensetoexaminenationaldefensestrategyinlightofthe
effectsofclimatechange,andtobaseitsplansonprojectionsfromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange).
15EndangermentandCauseorContributeFindingsforGreenhouseGasesunderSection202(a)oftheCleanAirAct,74
Fed.Reg.66,496,66,510(Dec.15,2009)(citingtothePanel’sFourthAssessmentReportof2007).
16Id.at66,511.
17Id.
18HerMajestytheQueen,912F.2dat1533(emphasisadded).
19See5U.S.C.§706.
20HerMajestytheQueen,912F.2dat1533.
21NewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1482.
22IPCC,CLIMATECHANGE2007:SYNTHESISREPORT36(2007).
23IPCC,CLIMATECHANGE2007:WORKINGGROUPIII:MITIGATIONOFCLIMATECHANGEat4.2.2(2007).
5
economicdevelopment,oceanacidification,andecosystemresilience.24Theseimpactstohealth
andwelfareweredocumentedforeachregionoftheglobe:Africa,Asia,AustraliaandNewZealand,
Europe,LatinAmerica,NorthAmerica,PolarRegions,andSmallIslandnations.25
TheFourthAssessmentReportclearlyprovidesEPAwithanamplebasisofinformationsupporting
anendangermentfinding.EPAhasdeterminedthattheReportiscomprehensive,isgroundedinthe
peer‐reviewedliterature,andunderwent“arigorousandexactingstandardofpeerreviewbythe
expertcommunity,aswellasrigorouslevelsofU.S.governmentreviewandacceptance.”26
Moreover,EPAhasalreadybasedadeterminationofthedangersofgreenhousegasesontheFourth
AssessmentReport.WhenEPAissuedafindingin2009thatgreenhousegasesendangerU.S.health
andwelfare,theagencyreliedinpartonthePanel’sreports.27BothEPA’s2009findingandthe
FourthAssessmentReportalreadysupporttherelatedconclusionthatU.S.emissionsendanger
foreignhealthandwelfare.UnitedStatesemissionsclearly“causeorcontribute”toglobal
greenhousegasconcentrations.Notably,Section115setsnothresholdamountforthecontribution
requirement.Regardless,theU.S.contributionissizable:thesecond‐largestemitteroverall,
producingabout18percentoftheworld’sgreenhousegases.28Thoseglobalgreenhousegas
concentrationsarealsoclearly“anticipatedtoendangerpublichealthorwelfareinaforeign
country.”DrawingfromtheFourthAssessmentReport’sdetailsontheglobalimpactsofclimate
change,EPA’sown2009findingnotedthe“unavoidableglobalnatureoftheclimatechange
problem”anddescribedhowimpactsonforeignhealthandwelfare“mayexacerbateproblemsthat
raisehumanitarian,trade,andnationalsecurityissuesfortheU.S.”29Indeed,theentirePartVof
EPA’sTechnicalSupportDocumentfortheendangermentfindingwasentitled“Observedand
ProjectedHumanHealthandWelfareEffectsfromClimateChangeinOtherWorldRegions.”30
Inshort,EPAhasalreadyreliedonreportsfromadulyconstitutedinternationalagencyto
determinethattheUnitedStatescontributessignificantlytogreenhousegaspollution,andthat
greenhousegaspollutionendangersforeignhealthandwelfare.Ineffect,EPAhasalreadymadethe
necessaryendangermentfindingtotriggerSection115,throughits2009finding,whichunderwent
therequirednotice‐and‐commentprocess.31ButevenifEPAbelievesaseparate,Section115‐
specificendangermentfindingisnecessary,tobeissuedfornotice‐and‐commenttogetherwitha
reciprocityfindingandSIP‐call,EPAcertainlyhas“reasontobelieve”thatU.S.emissionsendanger
foreignhealthandwelfare,andtheagencymustactunderSection115.
EPAhasevidencecorrelatingtheendangermenttosourceswithinparticularstates.
InHerMajestytheQueenv.EPA,theD.C.CircuitfoundEPA’sinterpretationthatSection115
requireda“unitaryproceeding”wasreasonable,butnotclearlyorunambiguouslyrequiredbythe
statutorytext.32Underthe“unitaryproceeding”interpretation,EPA“musthavesufficientevidence
correlatingtheendangermenttosourcesofpollutionwithinaparticularStatebefore[theagency]
24IPCC,SYNTHESISREPORT,supranote22,at48,52.
25Id.at50,52.
2674Fed.Reg.at66,511.
27Id.(citingtothePanel’sFourthAssessmentReportof2007).
28Id.at66,539(citingIPCCestimationandreportingprocedures).
29Id.at66,535.
30EPA,TechnicalSupportDocumentforEndangermentandCauseofContributeFindingsforGreenhouseGasesunderSection
202(a)oftheCleanAirAct(2009).
31Cf.Thomasv.NewYork,802F.2dat1446‐47.
32912F.2dat1533.
6
canexercise[its]discretiontomakeendangermentfindings.”33Tostart,EPAisfreetochangeits
statutoryinterpretation.34ButevenifEPAchoosesnottochangeitsinterpretation,thesufficient
evidencecriterionhasbeenmetforgreenhousegases.
EPAalreadypossessesconsiderableevidenceofmajorgreenhousegassourcesandemissionslevels
perstate.35Since1990,inaccordancewiththeU.N.FrameworkConventiononClimateChange,EPA
hasdevelopedanationalgreenhousegasemissionsinventoryeachyear.36Moreover,since2010,
EPAhascollectedgreenhousegasemissionsdatafrommajorindividualsourcesnationwide,
includingpowerplants,refineries,chemicalmanufacturing,landfills,themetalandminerals
sectors,thepulpandpaperindustry,governmentandcommercialsources,anddozensofother
industrialsectors—6,700facilitiesintotal,brokendownbystate.37Inshort,allfiftystates(plusthe
DistrictofColumbia,PuertoRico,andU.S.territories)emitgreenhousegases,andEPAmustgive
noticetoeachstateoftheneedtoreviseitsapplicableCleanAirActimplementationplansto
preventoreliminatetheendangermenttoforeignhealthandwelfare.
ForeigncountrieshavegiventheUnitedStates“essentiallythesamerights.”
ThereciprocitylanguageofSection115limitsitsscopetocountriesthathave“giventheUnited
Statesessentiallythesamerightswithrespecttothepreventionorcontrolofairpollution
occurringinthatcountryasisgiventhatcountrybythissection.”38Precedentsuggeststhat
reciprocityis“basedonananalysisoffactsandlawastheyexistataparticulartime.”39Thefinding
isthereforenottechnicallylegalisticanddoesnotdemandanassurancethatreciprocitywillexist
inperpetuity.Instead,allthatisrequiredisEPA’sinitialdeterminationthattheUnitedStates
receives“essentiallythesamerights,”plusperiodicreexaminationbyEPAtoensurereciprocity
continuestoexist.40
TheonlyexplicitrightgrantedtoforeigncountriesunderSection115istherighttoappearatany
publichearingassociatedwiththerelevantrevisionstostateimplementationplans.41Additionally,
foreigncountriesimplicitlystandtobenefitfromtheUnitedStates’commitmenttopreventor
eliminateitsshareofharmfulinternationalairpollution.42
Therightsundertheforeigncountry’slawmustbe“essentially”thesame,notnecessarily
identical.43Inpreviouscases,EPAreasoneditwassufficientthatanothercountry’slawsprovided
33Id.
34SeeNat’lCable&Telecomm.Assoc.v.BrandXInternetServices,545U.S.967(2005).
35See,e.g.,EPA,2010GreenhouseGasEmissionsfromLargeFacilities,http://ghgdata.epa.gov(lastvisitedJan.31,2013);
EPA,GHGRP2010:ReportedData,http://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghgdata/reported(lastvisitedJan.31,2013);EPA,
CO2EmissionsfromFossilFuelCombustion(2010)(listingcarbondioxideemissionsbysectorandbystate).
36EPA,U.S.GreenhouseGasInventoryReport,http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html
(lastvisitedJan.31,2013);seealsoU.N.FrameworkConventiononClimateChange,NationalReports,
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php(lastvisitedJan.31,2013).
37EPA,GreenhouseGasData,http://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghgdata(lastvisitedJan.31,2013);seealsoEPA,
GreenhouseGasReportingProgramFactSheet(2012);EPA,NumberofFacilitiesReportingGHGEmissionsbyState—2012,
http:/www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/documents/pdf/2010/ghgdata_figures.pdf.
3842U.S.C.§7415(c).
39NewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1483.
40Id.(“achangeofeitherfactsorlawmightrequirereexaminationofthedetermination”).
4142U.S.C.§7415(b).
42Seeid.
43SeeNewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1492(reproducingAdmin.Costle’sfindingthatthedifferencebetweenthe
UnitedStates’detailedrequirementsforstateimplementationplanrevisionsandCanada’s“moregeneralrequirement...
forprovincialconsultationandreasonableefforts,”“doesnotsignificantlyrestricttheabilityoftheGovernmentofCanada
toprovideessentiallythesamerightstotheUnitedStates”).
7
thegovernmentwiththeauthoritytogivetheUnitedStatesessentiallythesamerightsasSection
115.44Therefore,reciprocitycanexistsimplybecauseacountryhasindicatedthroughaffirmative
conductitsintentorabilitytocooperatewiththeUnitedStatesinabatinginternationalair
pollution.45Itfollowsthatacountry’slawsoractionscansatisfythisstandard:eitherthetextofa
country’slawindicatesthatitcouldcontrolairpollutionharmingtheUnitedStates,oracountry’s
actionsdemonstratethatitslawisinterpretedtoallowforthecontrolofsuchharmfulairpollution.
BecausethereisscantcaselawonSection115,thepreciseparametersofthereciprocitystandard
aredifficulttodefine.However,underthemostplausiblereadingsofSection115(c),reciprocity
alreadyexistsforgreenhousegasesthroughthelawsandactionsofseveralforeigncountries.
BecauseSection115refersto“aforeigncountry,”EPAneedonlyfindasinglecountrythatsatisfies
thereciprocityrequirementforitsdutiesunderSection115tobetriggered.
Canada’sEnvironmentalProtectionActsatisfiesSection115(c)’sreciprocityrequirement.
In1981,EPAfoundthatCanada’sCleanAirAct,Section21.1,createdreciprocalrightstoSection
115.Indeed,theCanadianlegislationwasenactedspecificallytomeettherequirementsofSection
115.46KeyfeaturesofCanada’sSection21.1thatcreatedreciprocitywithSection115include:47
1. Authorizingafederalofficialtomakeafindingofforeignendangermentcausedbydomestic
emissionsandtoprescribespecificemissionslimitstoreduceorpreventsuchdanger;
2. Allowinglocalgovernmenttotakeabatementactionsandauthorizingthefederal
governmenttolimitemissionsifthelocalityfailstoprovideanadequateremedy;and
3. Providingopportunitiesforpublichearingsonproposedactionsandallowingparticipation
inthehearingbytheaffectedforeigngovernment.
The1981reciprocityfindingmadebyEPAwasupheldbythedistrictcourtinNewYorkv.Thomas,48
andthevalidityofthesefindingswasneveraddressedonappeal.
Canada’sCleanAirActwassubsequentlyreplacedbytheCanadianEnvironmentalProtectionAct
(CEPA).49TherelevantprovisionsfromSection21.1weresubstantiallyrecreatedinDivision6of
Part7ofthatnewlegislation,whichalsofulfillsreciprocity:50
1. CEPASection166(1)authorizestheFederalMinisterofEnvironmenttotakepreventative
actionif“asubstancereleasedfromasourceinCanadaintotheaircreates,ormay
reasonablybeanticipatedtocontribute,toairpollutioninacountryotherthanCanada.”
2. CEPASection166(2)instructstheMinistertoconsultwithlocalgovernmentsresponsible
forsourcesofinternationalairpollution,todeveloparesponseplan;ifthelocalgovernment
44Seeid.at1483(citingEPA’sreciprocityfinding).
45ThedistrictcourtinThomasstressedthispointaswell.InreproducingEPA’sreciprocitydetermination,thecourt
addeditsownemphasisasfollows:“Inmyview,theamendmentstotheCanadianCleanAirActdogiveadequate
authoritytotheGovernmentofCanadatoprovideessentiallythesamerightstotheUnitedStatesasSection115provides
toCanada.”).Id.at1491.
46DeanAdamWillis,Thomasv.NewYork:SisiphyeanTragedyontheEnvironmentalStage,10LoyolaInt'l&Comp.L.Rev.
469,474(1988);Am.Soc.ofInt’lLaw,Canada:AmendmentoftheCleanAirActtoProvideU.S.withLegislativeProtection
SimilartothatOfferedtoCanadaunderU.S.CleanAirAct,20Int’lLegalMaterials762(1981)(reprintedfromCanadian
CommonDebates,Dec.16,1980).
47SeeNewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1488(reproducingAdmin.Costle’slettertoSec’yMuskieandSen.Mitchell).
48Id.at1483–84.
49EnvironmentCanada,TheHistoryofCEPA,http://www.ec.gc.ca/lcpe‐cepa/default.asp?lang=En&n=4FA2C2C7‐1(last
visitedAug.5,2012);CanadianEnvironmentalProtectionAct,(S.C.1999,c.33).
50Notably,CEPASection166(4)alsocontainsitsownreciprocityrequirement.
8
cannot“prevent,controlorcorrecttheairpollution,”theMinister“shall”thentake
abatementactionunderSection166(3).
3. CEPASection168requiresnotificationtoaffectedforeigncountriesofsuchproposed
regulations,andprovidesopportunityforforeigncountriestosubmitwrittencomments.
UnderSection166(5),theMinistermusttakesuchcommentsintoaccount.
TheseprovisionsoftheCanadianEnvironmentalProtectionActareapplicabletogreenhousegases.
Carbondioxide,methane,nitrousoxide,hydrofluorocarbons,perfluorocarbons,andsulfur
hexafluoridearealllistedinCEPASchedule1astoxicsubstances,thusmakingthemsubjecttothe
developmentofpollutionpreventionplans.51
ThelegalauthorityprovidedbyCEPAforCanadatoaddressitsinternationalemissionsof
greenhousegasesisalonesufficienttosatisfySection115’sreciprocityrequirement.But,infact,
Canadahasalsotakenactiontoreduceitsemissions.In2012,itfinalizedgreenhousegasstandards
forcoal‐firedelectricityplants,notingthatCanada’sapproachtoclimatechange“isbroadlyaligned
withthatoftheU.S.,”andcalculatingtheregulatorybenefitsbasedon“theavoidedglobaldamages
associatedwithGHGemissionreductionsbroughtforthbyCanadianaction.”52Importantly,the
mandatoryactionsthatEPAandthestatesmusttakeunderSection115arenotlimitedbythe
scopeofpollutioncontrolsalreadyachievedinothercountries.Oncereciprocityisestablished—as
ithasbeenbyCanada’slegalauthoritytoaddressinternationalgreenhousegasemissions,andby
Canada’scommitmenttocontinual,constructiveactiononclimatechange53—U.S.statesmustact
generallyto“preventoreliminate”theirdangerousemissionslevels,andnotjusttotheextentthat
othercountrieshavealreadyreducedtheirpollution.
Thus,theCanadianEnvironmentalProtectionActprovidestheUnitedStateswithessentiallythe
samerightsasthosegivenbySection115,andsoreciprocityissatisfied.
Thelawsofothercountries,likeSouthAfrica,alsosatisfythereciprocityrequirement.
BesidesCanada’sEnvironmentalProtectionAct,SouthAfrica’sAirQualityActalsomeetsthe
reciprocityrequirement.Thelaw’spreambleemphasizesthat“atmosphericemissionsofozone‐
depletingsubstances,greenhousegasesandothersubstanceshavedeleteriouseffectsonthe
environment,bothlocallyandglobally.”54TheactauthorizestheMinisterofEnvironmentalAffairs
toinvestigate“anysituationwhichcreates,ormayreasonablybeanticipatedtocontributetoair
pollutionacrosstheRepublic’sboundaries.”55Iftheinvestigationshowsthatdomesticemissions
mayhavea“significantdetrimentalimpactonairquality,theenvironmentorhealth”inaforeign
country,theMinistermayprescribemeasuresto“prevent,controlorcorrect”thedomestic
emissions.56Finally,theactallowsthegovernmenttoprovidenoticetoforeigncountriesbefore
publicationofanysuchregulations.57BasedonthesameanalysisperformedforCanada,South
Africa’sAirQualityActmeetsthetestforcreatingalegalauthoritytoactongreenhousegas
emissions,whichgrantstheUnitedStatesessentiallythesamerightsasunderSection115.
Othercountriesmayalsohavesimilarlawsthatwouldmeetthetestforreciprocity.
51SeeCEPA§56(1)(notingtheapplicabilityofSection166(1)toSchedule1pollutants).
52ReductionofCarbonDioxideEmissionsfromCoal‐FiredGenerationofElectricityRegulation,SOR/2012‐167(Can.).
Canadahasalsoproposedregulationsformotorvehiclesto“alignwiththemandatorynationalstandardsoftheUnited
States.”EnvironmentCanada,RegulatoryGreenhouseGasEmissionsfromLight‐DutyVehicles(Nov.27,2012).
53SeeReducingGreenhouseGases,http://climatechange.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=4FE85A4C‐1(visitedJan.9,2013).
54NationalEnvironmentalManagement:AirQualityAct39of2004(S.Afr.).
55Id.§50(1)(“TransboundaryAirPollution.”)
56Id.§50(2).
57Id.§50(5).
9
Existinginternationalagreementsandactionsdemonstrateessentiallysimilarcommitments
forforeigncountriestocontrolgreenhousegaspollution.
The“essentiallythesamerights”standardlikelydoesnotrequirethemirroringofSection115’s
languagefoundinthelawsofcountrieslikeCanada.Ifagovernmenthasobligationssimilarto
thosecreatedbySection115,iteffectivelygrantstheUnitedStatesessentiallythesamerights.
Existinginternationalagreementsindicatethatmanycountrieshavesuchobligations.
TheleadingexampleofsuchaninternationalagreementistheUnitedNationsFramework
ConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC),towhichtheUnitedStates,alongwith190other
countries,isaparty.58DifferingcommitmentsexistundertheUNFCCC,dependingonwhethera
countryisdevelopedordeveloping,butallpartiesareobligatedtoformulatenationalprogramsto
mitigateclimatechangebyaddressingsourcesofgreenhousegases.59
EachUNFCCCcountry,andinparticularthosethatarealreadyreducinggreenhousegasemissions,
hassatisfiedthereciprocityrequirementofSection115.ByparticipatingintheUNFCCC,acountry
iscooperatingwiththeUnitedStatesinagreeingtoreduceairpollutionthatendangersglobal
healthandwelfare.TheUnitedStateshastherighttoattendtheUNFCCC’smeetingsandotherwise
stayinformedaboutwhatcountriesaredoingtoreducetheirgreenhousegasemissions.60Someof
theobligationscreatedbyinternationalagreementsliketheUNFCCCmaynotbestrictly
enforceable.However,anenforceabilitymechanismisnotlikelyarequirementforreciprocity
underSection115.Section115doesmandatecertainactionsbyEPAandstates,butitdoesnot
explicitlygrantforeigncountriestherighttosueinUnitedStatescourtstoenforcetheprovision.61
Manycountriesarealreadytakingstepstoreducetheirgreenhousegasemissions,incompliance
withtheirobligationsundertheUNFCCCandthesubsequentKyotoProtocol.Becauseany
reductioninglobalgreenhousegasemissionsbenefitstheUnitedStates,andbecauseseveral
countrieshaveexpressedinterestincooperatingwiththeUnitedStatesincontrollinggreenhouse
gaspollution,thereciprocityrequirementissatisfied.
Inparticular,theEuropeanUnionoperatesacap‐and‐tradesystemacrossthirty‐onecountriesto
controlgreenhousegasemissionsandmeetitsUNFCCCobligations.62Thosecountriesparticipating
intheEuropeanUnion’semissionstradingschemesubmitreportsonimplementationtothe
UNFCCCConferenceofParties.63TheEuropeanCommissionhasalsoindicateditswillingnessto
furtherreduceemissionsifothermajoremittersmakeproportionalcommitments.64TheEuropean
Union’stradingsystemthereforealsosatisfiesthereciprocityrequirementofSection115(c).
58SeeUNFCCC,Parties&Observers,http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php(lastvisitedApr.18,2012).
59UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange,art.4(1)(b),May9,1992(“AllParties,takingintoaccount
theircommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilities...shall....”)(emphasisadded).
60Seeid.art.4(1)(j)(requiringpartiestocommunicateinformationrelatedtoimplementation);id.art.12.
61CanadadidsueEPAfordenialofitsrulemakingpetitionthatsoughtimplementationofSection115,butthe
jurisdictionalprovisioninvokedwasnotSection115itself,butratherSection307(b)(1).HerMajestytheQueenv.EPA,
912F.2dat1529‐31.However,thetestforreciprocityunderSection115(c)requiresonly“essentiallythesamerights...
asisgiven...bythissection,”referringjusttotherightsgrantedwithinthetextofSection115itself,andnotthebroader
CleanAirAct.Inthealternative,itispossiblethattheUnitedStatesalreadyenjoysenforcementrightsthroughcustomary
internationallaw,whichprohibitscountriesfrominjuringoneanotherthroughtrans‐boundarypollutionandprovides
remediesforsuchharms.SeegenerallyRESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW§§601–02(1987).
62Eur.Comm’n,EmissionsTradingSystem,http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm(lastvisitedJan.31,
2012);seealsoDirective2009/29/EC,oftheEuropeanParliament&theCouncil,of23April2009,toImproveandExtend
theGreenhouseGasEmissionAllowanceTradingScheme,2009O.J.(L140/63)(referencingtheUNFCCCobjective).
63SeeUNFCCC,Compilation&SynthesisofFifthNationalCommunications,SBI/2011/INF.1/Add.1,23May2011,at47.
64Eur.Comm’n,WorkingwithInternationalPartners,http://www.ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international(lastvisited
Jan.31,2013)(“TheEUisofferingtostepupits2020reductiontargetsto30%ifothermajoreconomiescommit.”).
10
CountriesoutsideEuropearetakingactionaswell.NewZealand,forexample,enactedaClimate
ChangeResponseActin2002,aimedatmeetingitsobligationsundertheUNFCCC.65Theact
requirescooperationwithothercountriesandrecommendsintegratedinternationalapproachesto
reducinggreenhousegasemissions.66Assuch,itprovidesthepublichealthandwelfarebenefits
andtheparticipationrightsthatSection115(c)requires.Theseexamplesarenotexhaustive:many
othercountriesmayalsocurrentlyhavestatutesorregulationsthatwouldsatisfythereciprocity
requirement,andfutureactivitiesmaycreatereciprocityinadditionalcountriesaswell.
EPAmustissueareciprocityfinding.
Becauseothercountries—atleastthoselikeCanadaandSouthAfricawithlegislativelanguage
mirroringthetextofSection115,ifnotallcountriesthathaveclimateobligationsunder
internationallawandarealreadytakingactiontoreduceemissions—havegrantedtheUnited
StatesessentiallythesamerightsasthosefoundinSection115,EPAmustmakeadetermination
thatthereciprocityrequirementhasbeenmetforgreenhousegasemissions.
Sincethecriteriaforbothanendangermentfindingandareciprocityfindinghavebeenmet,and
sinceEPAhassufficientevidencecorrelatingtheendangermenttosourcesofpollutionwithin
particularstates,themandatoryprovisionsofSection115aretriggered.EPAmustnotifyallthe
statesoftheneedtorevisetheirCleanAirActimplementationplanstopreventoreliminatethe
dangerouslevelsofgreenhousegasemissions.
EPAmustrequirestatestorevisetheirimplementationplanstoeliminatedangerous
greenhousegaspollution,andshouldadvisestatesonthemostworkableregulatoryoptions.
OncetheendangermentandreciprocityfindingsaremadeunderSection115,“theremedialaction
thatfollowsisbothspecificandmandatory—theAdministratorshallnotifytheGovernorofthe
specificStateemittingthepollutionandrequireittoreviseitsSIP.”67Forgreenhousegases,those
prerequisiteshavebeensatisfied,andEPAhassufficientevidenceofthemajoremissionsof
greenhousegasesinallfiftystates(aswellastheDistrictofColumbia,PuertoRico,andU.S.
territories).Therefore,EPAmustinstructthestatestorevisetheirCleanAirActimplementation
plansinorderto“preventoreliminatetheendangerment.”68
EPAshouldprovideguidancetothestatesonwhatrevisionstotheirimplementationplanswillbe
necessarytoadequatelypreventoreliminatethedangertoforeignhealthandwelfare.In
particular,eventhoughSection115triggersarevisionofStateImplementationPlans,itdoesnot
triggersettingNationalAmbientAirQualityStandardsforgreenhousegases.Therequirementto
“preventoreliminatetheendangerment”alsowillnotrequirestatestoachievezeroemissionsof
greenhousegases.EPAshouldemphasizethatmarket‐basedtoolsareavailabletostatestocontrol
greenhousegasesundertheirrevisedimplementationplans.Toclarifythesepoints,EPAshould
issueeitherofficialguidanceoraproposedFederalImplementationPlanforstatestofollow.
RegulationofgreenhousegasesunderSection115doesnotrequiretheuseofNAAQS.
Section115saysthatEPA’snoticetothestatesoftheirdangerousinternationalemissions
constitutesafindingunderSection110(a)(2)(H)(ii),whichrequiresrevisionofthestates’
65ClimateChangeResponseAct2002,PublicAct2002No.40(N.Z.);seealsoNewZealandMinistryforEnviro.,Reducing
GreenhouseGasEmissions,http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/policies‐initiatives/index.html(lastvisitedJan.31,
2013)(discussingemissionstargetsandtradingschemeundertheClimateChangeResponseAct).
66Id.Schedule2,art.2§b(“CooperatewithothersuchPartiestoenhancetheindividualandcombinedeffectivenessof
theirpoliciesandmeasures”);id.art.10§c.
67HerMajestytheQueen,912F.2dat1533.
6842U.S.C.§7415(b)(referencingtheSIPrevisionprocessunder§7410(a)(2)(H)(ii)).
11
implementationplans.69Section110dealswiththedevelopmentofstateimplementationplans,
whicharemostcommonlydesignedtoachievetheNationalAmbientAirQualityStandards
(NAAQS)setbyEPAforcertaindesignated“criteriapollutants.”Nevertheless,states’useofSection
110tocarryouttheirobligationsunderSection115doesnotrequireclassifyinggreenhousegases
ascriteriapollutantsorestablishingNAAQSforthem.
EPA’smostrecentinterpretationoftheSection115/110interplaywouldsuggesttheopposite,that
revisionofimplementationplanswilltriggerNAAQS.70And,indeed,Section110doesfacially
appearexclusivetotheNAAQSprogramduetoitstitle,“StateImplementationPlansforNational
PrimaryandSecondaryAmbientAirQualityStandards.”71However,bothstatutorytextand
legislativehistoryrevealthatSection110isnotexclusivetoNAAQS.EPAshouldreturntoitsprior
position,whichrecognizedthetruebreadthofSections110and115.72
ThestatutorytextofSections115showsthatNAAQSneednotbeusedtocontrolinternationalair
pollution.Section115requiresregulationof“anyairpollutant,”73whichsuggestsabroaderambit
thanthecategoryofcriteriapollutantssubjecttotheNAAQSprogram.Additionally,Section115(d)
specifiesthatinternationalemissionscontrolsdevelopedbefore1977“shallremainineffectwith
respecttoanypollutantforwhichnonationalambientairqualitystandardhasbeenestablished.”74
Inotherwords,thescopeofSection115isbroaderthanjustpollutantssubjecttoNAAQS.
Similarly,thestatutorytextofSection110indicatesthatimplementationplanscovermorethan
justcriteriapollutants.Section110(a)(2)(H)(ii)specifiesthatstateimplementationplansmustbe
revisedwheneverEPA“finds...thattheplanissubstantiallyinadequatetoattainthe[NAAQS]
whichitimplementsortootherwisecomplywithanyadditionalrequirementsestablishedunderthis
chapter.”75Theuseoftheword“or”impliesthatimplementationplansmaybeusedtoachieve
statutoryobligationswhollydistinctfromtheNAAQS.76Furthermore,whenSection110(a)(2)(D)
specifiesthatimplementationplansmustcontrolinternationalpollutionunderSection115,77the
samesubsectionalsoreferencesinterstatepollution.78There,statesareinstructedtocontrol
emissionsof“anyairpollutant”thatinterfereswithanotherstate’sachievementofNAAQS.Again,
“anyairpollutant”isbroaderthanthecategoryofcriteriapollutantsdirectlysubjecttoNAAQS.
Evenifanon‐criteriapollutantinterfereswithanotherstate’sachievementofNAAQS,thatnon‐
criteriapollutantstillmustbecontrolledbythestateimplementationplan,underthetermsof
Section110(a)(2)(D).Likewise,stateimplementationplansmustenforceobligationsunderSection
115,evenfornon‐criteriapollutants.79
69Id.
70SeeAdvanceNoticeofProposedRulemakingforRegulatingGreenhouseGasEmissionsundertheCleanAirAct,73Fed.
Reg.44,354,44,482–83(July30,2008).
7142U.S.C.§7410.
72EPApreviouslyexplainedthatSection115“isbroadlydraftedtoencompassallformsofairpollution‐related
endangermenttopublichealthorwelfareandisnotlimitedtointerferencewithU.S.airqualitystandardsorsignificant
deteriorationprograms.”LetterfromDouglasM.Costle,Admin.EPA,toEdmundS.Muskie,Sec’yofState(Jan.13,
1981),reprintedinNewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1472,1488.ThisunderstandingofSection115isrepeatedin
scholarshipfromthattime.See,e.g.,BennettA.Caplan,TheApplicabilityofCleanAirActSection115toCanada's
TransboundaryAcidPrecipitationProblem,11B.C.ENVTL.AFF.L.REV.539,570(1983).
7342U.S.C.§7415(a).
74Id.§7415(d)(emphasisadded).
75Id.§7410(a)(2)(H)(ii)(emphasisadded).
76HannahChang,CapandTradeUndertheCleanAirAct?:Rethinking§115,40ENVTL.L.REP.NEWS&ANALYSIS10,894,
10,896(2010).
7742U.S.C.§7410(a)(2)(D)(ii).
78Id.§7410(a)(2)(D)(i).
79Chang,supranote76.
12
Arecentarticle’sdetailedanalysisofthelegislativehistoryofSection115furtherdemonstrates
thattheprovisiondoesnotnecessarilytriggerNAAQS.80The1970amendmentstotheCleanAirAct
distinguishedbetweendomesticpollution,whichbecamesubjecttostateimplementationplans,
andinternationalpollution,whichwasthenregulatedbyanabatementconferenceapproachthat
gatheredrelevantpartiestonegotiatepollutioncontrols.Bythe1977amendments,however,the
conferenceapproachwasdeemedafailure,andCongresswantedtotakeadvantageofthemore
successfulimplementationplanprocess.Consequently,Congressoptedtoaddressinternational
pollutionthroughuseofstateimplementationplans,butnowheredidCongressexpressanintentto
eliminatethedistinctionbetweenemissionswithonlydomesticimpacts,whichweresubjectto
NAAQSfollowinganendangermentfindingunderSection108,andinternationalpollution,which
wasnotsubjecttoNAAQSandwasregulatedfollowingaseparateendangermentfindingunder
Section115.81
Section115onlyrequiresreasonableprogresstowardgreenhousegasabatement,and
nottheeliminationofallemissions.
Thestatuteinstructsstatesto“preventoreliminatetheendangerment”toforeigncountriesthat
theiremissionshavecontributedto.82However,duetoexistingatmosphericconcentrationsof
long‐livedgreenhousegases,andthecontinuingemissionsbyothercountries,evenifallU.S.states
reducedtheiremissionstozero,theystillcouldnottruly“eliminate”alltheclimatechangedangers
facedbyforeigncountries.Evenshortofsuchextremeactions,greenhousegasreductionsbeyond
acertainpointwillstarttobecomeprohibitivelyexpensive.AnoverlynarrowreadingofSection
115,therefore,couldseemtocreateastandardimpossibleorimpracticalforstatestoachieve.
However,statutorycontextandlegislativehistory83counselinfavorofamoreflexible
interpretationofSection115,onethatonlyrequiresreasonableprogresstowardabatement.
First,thetextofSection115doesnotexclusivelyreferto“elimination.”Section115(c)saysthat,to
establishreciprocity,foreigncountriesmustgrantsimilarrights“withrespecttothepreventionor
controlofairpollution.”84Byessentiallyequatingthe“preventoreliminate”requirementwiththe
broaderformulation“controlofairpollution,”Section115givesEPAdiscretiontodeterminethe
extentofemissionsreductionsrequired.Similarly,evenSection115(b)doesnotmandatethe
eliminationofallemissionsthataffectforeigncountries.Instead,itinstructsstatestoeliminatethe
dangertowhichU.S.emissionshavecontributed.85EPAdoeshavesomediscretioninmakingits
endangermentfinding,bothonwhatconstitutesadangertoforeignhealthandwelfare,andon
whatcontributionU.S.emissionshavemadetosuchdanger.86Moregenerally,courtshavelong
recognizedEPA’sdiscretionundertheCleanAirActtodetermine“howmuchoftheregulatedharm
istoomuch,”87andhaveacknowledgedthatprotectingthepublicdoesnotrequire“aworldthatis
freeofallrisk—animpossibleandundesirableobjective.”88Rather,EPAcanconsidercontextwhen
80Id.at10,897–901.
81Id.
8242U.S.C.§7415(b).
83SeeWhitmanv.Am.TruckingAssoc.,531U.S.457,471(2001)(“interpretedinitsstatutoryandhistoricalcontext”).
84
42 U.S.C. § 7415(d) (emphasis added).
85Section115envisionsbothpreemptiveandreactiveresponsestointernationalairpollution:“preventoreliminate”the
“anticipated”danger.Inthiscase,however,“preventing”thedangerislikelyimpossible,sinceclimatechangehasalready
beguntoimpactglobalhealthandwelfare.Therefore,theapplicablestatutorylanguageis“eliminatetheendangerment.”
86SeeHerMajestytheQueen,912F.2dat1533(“implyadegreeofdiscretionunderlyingtheendangermentfinding.”).
87Whitman,531U.S.at475(“Buteveninsweepingregulatoryschemeswehaveneverdemanded...thatstatutesprovide
a‘determinatecriterion’forsaying‘howmuch[oftheregulatedharm]istoomuch.’InTouby,forexample,wedidnot
requirethestatutetodecreehow‘imminent’wastooimminent,orhow‘necessary’wasnecessaryenough,oreven—most
relevanthere—how‘hazardous’wastoohazardous.”)(citationsomitted).
88Id.at494(Breyer,J.,concurring).
13
“decidingwhatrisksareacceptableintheworldinwhichwelive.”89Inshort,EPAcandetermine
whatlevelofgreenhousegasreductionsisnecessaryforstatestocomplywithSection115.90
Second,Section115notablylacksanyrigiddeadlineforachievingfullcompliance.Incontrastwith
thestricttimelinesandpenaltiesforstatesthatfailtoachieveormaintainNAAQSusingtheir
implementationplans,91Section115setsnocomplianceschedulethatstatesmustadheretowhen
revisingtheirimplementationplanstomitigateinternationalairpollution.Section110reinforces
that,bygrantingstatestheabilitytoset“schedulesandtimetablesforcompliance,asmaybe
necessaryorappropriatetomeettheapplicablerequirementsofthischapter.”92Furthermore,
Section110impliesthatrevisedplansneedonlybe“substantiallyadequate”tocomplywithSection
115,93aloosestandardthatshouldgrantsomediscretiontobothEPAandthestates.Indeed,states
mayhaveevenmoreauthoritythanEPAdoestoconsiderfactorslikecostsindesigningtheir
implementationplans.94
Finally,Section115’slegislativehistorysuggeststhatstatesmayonlyberequiredtoachieve
reasonableprogresstowardabatement.Congressaddedthe“preventoreliminate”languagewhen
itrevisedSection115inthe1977CleanAirActAmendments.95However,thelanguagedidnot
appearintheoriginalbillproposedbytheSenate(theHousebillhadnocomparablerevisionsto
Section115).96Instead,thephrasewasaddedinConference.TheConferenceReportgiveslittle
explanation,otherthantheslightqualificationthatplansmustberevised“onlytotheextent
necessarytopreventoreliminatetheendangerment.”97Therefore,theSenate’sdescriptionofits
originalbillisthebestsourceforinterpretingCongressionalintent.TheSenateReportsuggests
thatapplyingtheimplementationplanprocesstoSection115wasthedrivingmotivationforthe
revisions,andnotchangingthestandardforstringencyofcontrols.TheSenateReportevenstates,
“Section115asrevised...willrequiretheStateinwhichthesourceofthoseemissionsislocatedto
reviseitsimplementationplantocontrolthoseemissions”98—control,noteliminate.Beforethe
1977revision,thestringencyofcontrolsforinternationalpollutionwasdeterminedbyabatement
conferencesandpublichearings.Underthatmodel,thestandardwas“effectiveprogresstoward
abatement,”99tobeachievedbyadopting“reasonableandsuitable[measures].”100
Basedonthestatutorytext,context,andlegislativehistory,Section115shouldbeinterpretedto
requirethemoreachievablestandardofreasonableprogresstowardabatement.EPAcanuseits
89Id.at495(quotingNRDCv.EPA,824F.2d1146,1165(D.C.Cir.1987)).
90Cf.id.at496(“Norneedregulationleadtodeindustrialization.Preindustrialsocietywasnotaveryhealthysociety;
henceastandarddemandingthereturnoftheStoneAgewouldnotprove‘requisitetoprotectthepublichealth.’”).
91E.g.42U.S.C.§§7502,7509.
92Id.§7410(a)(2)(A).
93Id.§7410(a)(2)(H)(ii)(“provideforrevisions...whenevertheAdministratorfinds...thattheplanissubstantially
inadequate...tootherwisecomplywithanyadditionalrequirementsestablishedunderthischapter”)(emphasisadded).
94Whitman,531U.S.at470(“ItistotheStatesthattheActassignsinitialandprimaryresponsibilityfordecidingwhat
emissionsreductionswillberequiredfromwhichsources....Itwouldbeimpossibletoperformthattaskintelligently
withoutconsideringwhichabatementtechnologiesaremostefficient,andmosteconomicallyfeasible—whichiswhywe
havesaidthat‘themostimportantforumforconsiderationofclaimsofeconomicandtechnologicalinfeasibilityisbefore
thestateagencyformulatingtheimplementationplan.’”).
95CompareCleanAirActof1977§115withCleanAirActof1970§115.
96S.Rep.95‐127,pt.2at56(1977).TheSenateversiondidnotsay“preventoreliminate,”butonlythat“[t]henoticeof
theAdministratorshalloperateasfindingunderclause(ii)ofsubparagraph(H)ofsubsection(a)(2)ofsection110ofthis
Act.”TheHousebillhadnocomparablerevisionstoSection115,seeH.R.Conf.Rep.95‐564,at1517(1977).
97H.R.Conf.Rep.95‐564,at1517(emphasisadded).
98S.Rep.95‐127at65.
99CleanAirActof1970§115(e).
100Id.§115(f)(2).
14
discretiontodeterminewhatlevelofgreenhousegasreductionsisrequiredtoeliminatetheglobal
dangersthatU.S.emissionscontributeto.Settingthestandardatthepointwherethemarginal
abatementcosts,basedonreasonabletechnologyprojections,equaltheglobalsocialcostofcarbon
wouldbethemostappropriateapproachtotherequirement.Additionally,EPAcanapprovestate
implementationplansthatproposeareasonablylongtimelineforfullcompliance,toavoidany
issuesoftechnologicaloreconomicfeasibility.
Section115permitsflexibleregulatoryoptions,includingmarket‐basedtools.
UnlikeothersectionsoftheCleanAirAct,greenhousegasregulationsunderSection115wouldnot
belimitedtoapiecemealapproach,applyingtoonlyonesectoratatime.Instead,stateswouldbe
freetocraftthemostcost‐effectiveimplementationplan,takingadvantageofthelowest‐cost
abatementopportunitiesnomatterwhetherthesourcewerestationaryormobile,newor
existing.101
Inparticular,statescouldimplementmarket‐basedsystemsforemissionscontrol.Thisauthorityis
strengthenedbySection115’sdirectionstousethestateimplementationplanprocessunder
Section110,whichexplicitlyallowsstatestoadopt“economicincentivessuchasfees,marketable
permits,andauctionsofemissionsrights.”102Anationwidecap‐and‐auctionscheme,with
dividendsrebatedbacktolower‐incomeconsumers,wouldcreatethemostefficientandfairest
programforreducinggreenhousegasemissions.103EPAcoulduseitsauthorityunderSection115
toseteitheranationalcaporstate‐basedbudgetsatthelevelrequiredtoeliminatetheglobal
dangersthatU.S.emissionscontributeto;again,comparingthesocialcostofcarbonagainst
marginalabatementcostswouldbetheoptimalwaytosetthisbudget.ThoughEPAcannot
mandatetheformofstates’implementationplans,itcanencouragestatestocoordinatetheirplans
tocreateanationwideauctionsystem.104Bymaximizingthegeographicandsectoralscopeofthe
market,suchanationalcap‐and‐auctionsystemwouldmaximizeregulatoryefficiency.
Section115providesamandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveapproachtoregulating
greenhousegasemissions.
AlltheprerequisitestotriggerSection115havebeensatisfiedforgreenhousegases:EPAhas
receivedreportsfromadulyconstitutedinternationalagencythatgivetheagencysufficientreason
tobelievethatU.S.emissionsareendangeringforeignhealthandwelfare;andothercountrieshave
grantedtheUnitedStatesreciprocalrights.Consequently,EPAisrequiredtoinstructstatesto
revisetheirimplementationplanstoachievereasonableprogresstowardabatementofgreenhouse
gases.Stateshavetheauthoritytoconstructanintegrated,nationwidecap‐and‐auctioncontrol
system,coveringallsectorsoftheeconomyinthemostcost‐effectivemanner.
Section115isthereforethepreferredmechanismundertheCleanAirActtoregulategreenhouse
gases,andSection115‐basedregulationwouldmakemostgreenhousegasregulationsunderother
provisionsoftheCleanAirActlargelyredundant.
101Thoughtherearesomerestrictionsonstates’abilitytodirectlyregulateemissionsfromnewmotorvehiclesandnon‐
roadvehicles,42U.S.C.§7543,aswellasfromaircraft,id.§7573,statescanincorporatevehiclefuelcontrolsintheir
implementationplans,id.§7545(c)(4)(A),sinceEPAhasneitherissuedgreenhousegascontrolsforvehiclefuelsnor
madeafindingthatnogreenhousegascontrolsarenecessaryforvehiclefuelsunderparagraph(c)(1).EPAhasindirectly
regulatedthegreenhousegascontentoffuelsthroughitsrenewablefuelprogram,butthatregulationisunderparagraph
(o)of§7545,notunder(c)(1).
102Id.§7410(a)(2)(A).
103InimaiChettiar&JasonSchwartz,TheRoadAhead:EPA’sOptionsandObligationsforRegulatingGreenhouseGases,ch.4
(PolicyIntegrityReport3,2009).
104Id.atch.5.
15
II.EPAShouldEvaluatetheImpactofGreenhouseGasesontheStratosphereand
RespondwithAppropriateRegulationunderTitleVI.
AcallforinformationunderTitleVIwouldadvanceEPA’scurrentunderstandingoftheinteraction
betweengreenhousegasemissionsandthestratosphere.IfEPAfindsthatgreenhousegasesaffect
thestratosphereorozoneinthestratosphereinawaythatendangerspublichealthorwelfare,it
mustdevelopregulations,preferablyacap‐and‐auctionsystem,throughTitleVI.Suchcontrols
wouldberedundantandunnecessaryifEPAhasalreadyenactedcomprehensiveregulations
throughSection115,butTitleVIisalsoavailable—andpotentiallymandatory—asanalternative.
Greenhousegaseslikelyaffectthestratosphereandendangerpublichealthorwelfare.
If,inEPA’sjudgment,“anysubstance,practice,process,oractivitymayreasonablybeanticipatedto
affectthestratosphere”or“ozoneinthestratosphere”inawaythatendangerspublichealthor
welfare,thenEPAisrequiredbySection615oftheCleanAirActtoregulatesuchsubstance,
practice,process,oractivity.105WhileEPAhasrarelyissuedregulationsunderthisparticular
statutoryauthority,itcouldbeutilizedtoregulategreenhousegases.
Thefirststatutoryinquiryiswhethergreenhousegasemissionsaffectthestratosphere.“Affect”is
abroadterm:EPAneedonlyfindthatgreenhousegasesinteract,insomeway,withthe
stratosphereorozoneinthestratosphere.Existingscientificliteraturesupportsthisconclusion.
Forexample,a2010reportproducedbytheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramstated,
“stratosphericozonecanbeaffectedbytheincreasesintheconcentrationofGHGs.”106Feedback
loopsmayalsoexistbetweenclimatechangeandozonedepletion.107
Nitrousoxide—agreenhousegas—isofparticularimportanceforozoneinthestratosphere.Since
atleast2009,scientistsfromtheNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministrationhave
acknowledgedtheneedtoaddressnitrousoxideemissionsbecauseoftheirozone‐depleting
potential.108WhiletheMontrealProtocolhasadvancedtheprotectionoftheozonelayer,
anthropogenicemissionsofnitrousoxide,suchasfromagriculture,continuetocontributetothe
destructionofozone.109Inadditiontonitrousoxide,scientificreportsindicatethatmethaneaffects
thestratosphereandozonedepletion.110Theimpactofcarbondioxideontheozonelayerisless
clear‐cut,butevidencesuggestscarbondioxidedoeshavesomeimpactonthestratosphere.111
Thesecondstatutoryinquiryiswhethertheeffectsofgreenhousegasesonthestratosphere
endangerpublichealthorwelfare.Existingscientificliteraturesuggeststhatsomegreenhousegas
emissionsmaymeetthatstandard,butthatadditionalinformationisneededontheimpactsof
10542U.S.C.§7671n(“...theAdministratorshallpromptlypromulgateregulations...“).
106U.N.ENV’TPROGRAMME,ENVIRONMENTALEFFECTSOFOZONEDEPLETIONANDITSINTERACTIONSWITHCLIMATECHANGE1(2010).
107SeeM.Sigmondetal.,DriversofPastandFutureSouthernOceanChange:StratosphericOzoneVersusGreenhouseGas
Impacts,38GEOPHYSICALRES.LETTERSL12601(2011)(arguingthatdepletingofstratosphericozoneimpactsocean
circulationandtemperatures,whichalsoaffectstheglobalcarboncycle);M.Lal&T.Holt,OzoneDepletionDueto
IncreasingAnthropogenicTraceGasEmissions,1CLIMATERES.2,85(1991).
108NOAA,StudyShowsNitrousOxideNowTopOzoneDepletingEmission,Aug.27,2009;seealsoA.R.Ravishankaraetal.,
NitrousOxide(N2O):TheDominantOzone‐DepletingSubstanceEmittedinthe21stCentury,326SCI.MAG.123(2009).
109MartynChipperfield,AtmosphericScience:NitrousOxideDelaysOzoneRecovery,2NATUREGEOSCIENCE742(2009);
CatherineHénault&CecileRevellin,InoculantsofLeguminousCropsforMitigatingSoilEmissionsoftheGreenhouseGas
NitrousOxide,346PLANT&SOIL1‐2,289(2011);seealsoUNITEDNATIONSENV’TPROGRAMME,QUESTIONSANDANSWERSABOUTTHE
ENVIRONMENTALEFFECTSOFTHEOZONELAYERDEPLETIONANDCLIMATECHANGE:2010UPDATE17(2010).
110WORLDMETEOROLOGICALORG.,SCIENTIFICASSESSMENTOFOZONEDEPLETION:2010,at1.76(2010)(“Increasingconcentrations
ofmethaneanditseffectsonhydrogenoxidescanenhancethedestructionofozoneintheupperstratosphere.”);seealso
UNITEDNATIONSENV’TPROGRAMME,supranote109,at43(describingmethaneasanozone‐depletinggas).
111WMO,supranote110,at5.22(concludingcarbondioxidemaybothincreaseanddepletestratosphericozone).
16
otheremissions.ThestratosphericozonelayerprotectsEarthfromultravioletradiation,whichcan
causeskincancerandotherhealthandenvironmentalproblems.112Therefore,totheextentthat
greenhousegasescontributetoozonedepletion,theyendangerpublichealthandwelfare.Asnoted
above,thescientificliteraturealreadysupportsthatnitrousoxideandmethaneemissionsdeplete
stratosphericozone.113Carbondioxideemissionsaffectthestratosphere,butitislessclear
whethertheyhaveanozone‐enhancingorozone‐depletingeffect.114EPAshouldfurtherexplore
thisgapintheliterature.Additionally,moreinformationshouldbecollectedonhowchangesinthe
stratospheremayaffectclimate,andthehealthandwelfareimpactsofthatinteraction.
EPAshouldthereforeissueapubliccallforinformation,requestingthatthescientificcommunity
andotherinterestedpartiessubmitthemostrecentandrelevantinformationconcerningthe
interactionbetweengreenhousegasesandthestratosphere,especiallyozoneinthestratosphere,
andthehealthorwelfareeffectsthereof.Basedontheinformationcollected,EPAshouldidentify
anyremaininglimitationsinthescientificevidenceandconductitsownassessment.
EPAshouldissueanendangermentfindingif,basedonthecollectedinformation,EPAdetermines
thatgreenhousegasesaffectthestratosphereinamannerthatendangershealthorwelfare.IfEPA
makessuchafinding,itwillthenberequiredunderSection615todeveloparegulatoryprogram
thataddressesgreenhousegasemissions.115TitleVIalsorequiresinternationalcooperationonthe
protectionofthestratosphere.116EPAshouldconsiderpromotinginternationalcooperationonthe
reductionofgreenhousegasemissionsnotcoveredbytheMontrealProtocol.
EPAshouldestablishmarket‐basedregulationforgreenhousegasesunderTitleVI.
ShouldEPAregulategreenhousegasesthroughTitleVI,amarket‐basedapproachwouldbe
optimal.EPAhastoauthoritytoestablishmarket‐basedregulationunderTitleVI.117Section615
statesthatonceEPAissuesanendangermentfinding,it“shallpromulgateregulationsrespecting
thecontrol”ofthesubstance,practice,process,oractivityforwhichitmadethefinding.118Theuse
oftheword“control”issignificant.ThoughtermisnotdefinedintheCleanAirAct,itisoftenused
throughoutthestatuteinconnectionwithexplicitgrantsofauthorityforuseofmarket‐based
tools.119ThelegislativehistoryofTitleVIfurtherdemonstratesthatCongressintendedtogiveEPA
discretionindeterminingthekindofregulatoryprogramitwishestopursue,andinthepastEPA
developedatradingschemepursuanttotheprecursortoSection615.120
TitleVIprovidesanalternatesourceofmandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveregulation.
IfEPAfindsaconnectionbetweengreenhousegasemissions,stratosphericimpacts,andpublic
healthorwelfare,thenSection615offersapotentiallycomprehensive,efficient,andmandatory
sourceofauthorityforgreenhousegasregulation.
112SeeEPA,Ozone,http://www.epa.gov/ozone;ERIKAWILSON,EPA,CLIMATECHANGE,STRATOSPHERICOZONE,ANDTHECLEANAIR
ACT(2011)(explainingdepletionofstratosphericozoneleadsto“skincancer,cataractsandecologicaldamage”).
113SeealsoM.Prather&J.Hsu,CouplingofNitrousOxideandMethanebyGlobalAtmosphericChemistry,330SCI.952
(2010).
114WORLDMETEOROLOGICALORG.,supranote110,at5.22.
11542U.S.C.§7671n.
116Id.§7671p.
117SeeChettiar&Schwartz,supranote103,at72–73;butseeid.at67‐68onlimitationsofrebatingauctionrevenueto
consumers.
11842U.S.C.§7671n.
119SeeChettiar&Schwartz,supranote103,at65‐67.
120Id.at72‐73.
17
III.EPAMustRegulateSignificantStationarySourcesunderSection111.
Section111requiresEPAtopromulgateperformancestandardsforcategoriesofstationarysources
thatsignificantlycontributetodangerouspollution.Becausethecriteriahavebeenmet,EPAmust
regulatesignificantstationarysourcesofgreenhousegasesunderSection111:



First,EPA“shall”createalistofsourcecategoriesthat,initsjudgment,“cause,or
contributedsignificantlyto,airpollutionwhichmayreasonablybeanticipatedtoendanger
publichealthorwelfare.”121
o
EPAhasalreadydeterminedthatgreenhousegaspollutionendangershealthand
welfare.Severalcategoriesofstationarysources,includingagriculturalsourcesand
coalmines,havenotyetbeen“listed”underSection111,butcontributesignificantly
togreenhousegaspollution.EPAmustlistsuchsourcecategories.
o
ListinganewsourcecategorygivesEPAoneyeartopropose“Federalstandardsof
performancefornewsourceswithinsuchcategory.”122
Second,somestationarysourceshavealreadybeen“listed”andregulatedforother,non‐
greenhousegaspollutants,butalsoemitsignificantquantitiesofgreenhousegases.EPA
“shall,”atleasteveryeightyears,revisetheperformancestandardsforalready‐listed
sourcecategories.123
o
Nopollutant‐specificendangermentorcontributionfindingisrequiredbeforeEPA
canrevisetheperformancestandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategoriestocover
greenhousegasemissions.EPAhasalreadybegundevelopingnewsource
performancestandardsforsomecategories,butmanyimportantsourcesalready
listedunderSection111arenotyetregulatedforgreenhousegases.
o
EPAshouldusecost‐benefitanalysistoprioritizeandissuegreenhousegas
standards,suchasfor:naturalgasandpetroleumsystems,landfills,ironandsteel
producers,cementproducers,nitricacidplants,andwastewatertreatmentfacilities.
Third,onceEPAhasdevelopedperformancestandardsfornewsourcesofgreenhousegas
emissionsunderSection111(b),EPAmustalsoinstructstatesunderSection111(d)to
developperformancestandardsforexistingsourcesinthesamecategories.
EPAisalreadyintheprocessofdevelopingnewsourceperformancestandardsforsomecategories,
andhasbeenpetitionedorsuedtodevelopthemforothercategories.124EPAmustpromptly
finalizetheseregulations,forbothnewsourcesandexistingsources—inparticular,fornewand
existingpowerplants.ButEPAmustalsoregulategreenhousegasesfromallothersignificant
sourcesofemissions,andisherebypetitionedtodoso,ifsuchsourcesarenotalreadycoveredby
actiontakenunderSections115or615.EPAshoulddevelopperformancestandardsfornewand
existingsourcessimultaneously,toavoidgrandfathering;shouldallowstatestouseflexible,
market‐basedmechanismsintheregulationofexistingsources;andshouldsetschedulesto
automaticallyphaseinstrongerstandardsovertime.
12142U.S.C.§7411(b)(1)(A).
122Id.§7411(b)(1)(B).
123Id.
124E.g.,StandardsofPerformanceforGreenhouseGasEmissionsforNewStationarySources:ElectricUtilityGenerating
Units,77Fed.Reg.22,392,22,412‐13(proposedApr.13,2012)(tobecodifiedat40C.F.R.pt.60);seealsoLawrence
Hurley,7StatesPlantoSueEPAoverMethaneEmissions,Greenwire,Dec.11,2012(discussinglitigationoverperformance
standardsfortheoilandnaturalgasindustry).
18
EPAmustlistadditionalsourcecategoriesthatsignificantlyemitgreenhousegases.
Section111(b)requiresthatEPA“shall...publish(andfromtimetotimethereaftershallrevise)a
listofcategoriesofstationarysources.[EPA]shallincludeacategoryofsourcesifin[its]judgment
itcauses,orcontributessignificantlyto,airpollutionwhichmayreasonablybeanticipatedto
endangerpublichealthorwelfare.”Oncelisted,EPAmustdevelopperformancestandardsforsuch
sources.Importantsourcecategories,suchasagricultureandcoalmines,contributesignificantlyto
dangerousgreenhousegaspollutionand,therefore,mustberegulated.
Revisingthelistofcategoriesisamandatoryobligation.
EventhoughthestatutesaysEPAonlyneedreviseitslistofregulatedcategories“fromtimeto
time,”EPA’sdiscretioninthismatterissharplylimitedbytherepeatedcommandword“shall,”
whichappearsthreetimesinSection111(b)(1).Interpretingnearlyidenticallanguageunder
Section231oftheCleanAirAct,aD.C.CircuitdistrictcourtrecentlyfoundthatthoughEPAmay
havesomediscretionastotiming,thephrase“shallfromtimetotime”doesprovideastandardfor
judicialreviewofunreasonabledelay.125Inotherwords,whenEPAhasreasontobelievethatan
unregulatedstationarysourcecontributessignificantlytogreenhousegaspollution,theagencyis
allowedsomeleewayinprioritizingitsowndocketofrulemakings,butitmustarticulatea
reasonableexplanationforitstimingandcannotindefinitelydelay.EPAmustdevelopaprocessfor
makingreasonableprogresstowardlistingadditional,significantsourcecategoriesofgreenhouse
gases.
EPAalreadyhasevidenceofendangermentandsignificantcontributionforseveralcategories,
includingagriculturalsourcesandcoalmines.
EPAhasalreadydeterminedthatgenerally,andforpurposesofSection111regulation,greenhouse
gaspollutionendangerspublichealthandwelfare.126Therefore,theonlyprerequisitetolisting
additionalsourcecategoriesisafindingofsignificantcontributiontogreenhousegaspollution.
Thoughtheterm“significantly”isnotdefinedintheCleanAirAct,EPArecentlyindicatedthatthe
qualifierdoesnotrestrictitsabilitytobroadlyaddressgreenhousegasemissionsunderSection
111.EPAreasonedthateven“alimitedamountofcontributionwouldmeet[thesignificant
contribution]standardinlightofthefactthatGHGairpollutioniscausedbyalargenumberof
typesofsourcesandthatnoonesourcecategorydominatestheentireinventory.”127EPAalready
hassufficientevidenceofthesignificantcontributionsofunregulatedsourcecategories,throughits
nationalgreenhousegasinventory.Ratherthansettinganysortofnumericalthresholdforthe
significantcontributioncriterion,EPAshouldsimplyprioritizelistingthoseunregulatedsource
categoriesthatmakethelargestcontributionstogreenhousegaspollution.
Forexample,EPAhasdeterminedthatagriculturalsources,suchaslivestock,soilmanagement,and
riceproduction,constitute7%ofU.S.greenhousegasemissions.128Coalmines,including
abandonedundergroundmines,constitute1.1%ofallU.S.greenhousegasemissions.129Again,
whileEPAshouldnotsetanyrigidnumericalthresholdforsignificance,itisnotablethatinrelated
contexts,EPAhasfoundcontributionsaslowas0.5%ofnationwideemissionstobe“significant.”130
125Ctr.forBiologicalDiversityv.EPA,794F.Supp.2d151,161–62(D.D.C.2011).
12677Fed.Reg.at22,412‐13;seealsoEndangermentandCauseorContributeFindingsforGreenhouseGasesunder
Section202(a)oftheCleanAirAct,74Fed.Reg.66,496(Dec.152009).
12777Fed.Reg.at22,413.
128EPA,SourcesofGreenhouseGasEmissions,http://http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html
(lastvisitedJan.31,2013)(basedonEPA’s2012InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasandSinks:1990‐2010).
129CalculatedfromEPA,InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasandSinks:1990‐2010(2012).
130See,e.g.,ControlofEmissionsfromNonroadLargeSpark‐IgnitionEngines,andRecreationalEngines(Marineand
19
Acoalitionofenvironmentalgroupsalreadypetitioned,in2010,forEPAtolistcoalminesasa
sourcecategoryunderSection111,duetotheirgreenhousegasemissionsandotherpollution.131
Morerecently,inDecember2012,EPAindicateditsopennesstoasettlementagreementinthe
litigationrelatedtothatpetition.132ThispetitionsimplyrenewsthecallforEPAtoregulate
greenhousegasemissionsfromcoalminesasexpeditiouslyaspossible.
Similarly,in2009,acoalitionofenvironmentalandanimalrightsorganizationspetitionedEPAto
listconcentratedanimalfeedingoperationsunderSection111,duetotheirgreenhousegasand
otherharmfulemissions.133Thispetitionbothrenewsthatcallandextendsittocoverall
significantagriculturalsourcesofgreenhousegasemissions.
TheCleanAirActdoesnotprohibitthelistingofagriculturalsourcesunderSection111.EPA
previouslyreasonedthatagriculturalsourcesarenotexemptfromCleanAirActrequirementsfor
thepurposesofNewSourceReview.134Thedefinitionof“stationarysource”undertheNewSource
ReviewprogramisthesameasthedefinitionofstationarysourceforSection111:“anybuilding,
structure,facility,orinstallationwhichemitsormayemit[pollution].”135Itfollowsthatagricultural
sourceslikewisemayfallwithinthescopeofSection111andcanberegulatedasstationary
sources.EPAshouldregulateagriculturalsourcesunderSection111duetotheirsignificant
contributiontogreenhousegaspollution.
Othercurrentlyunlistedsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionsmayalsomeetthecriteriafor
significantcontribution.Onceacategoryislisted,EPAmustproposenewsourceperformance
standardswithinoneyear.136
EPAmustissuegreenhousegasstandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategories.
ManyimportantsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionshavealreadybeenlistedunderSection111
andregulatedfortheirnon‐greenhousegaspollution.Onceasourcecategoryhasbeenlistedunder
Section111,EPA“shall,atleastevery8years,reviewand,ifappropriate,revisesuch[performance]
standards.”137Performancestandardsaredefinedbroadlyas“standard[s]foremissionsofair
pollutants,”138butSection111doesnotexplicitlylayoutadecisionmakingframeworktoguideEPA
Land‐Based),67Fed.Reg.68,242,68,245(Nov.8,2002)(“(“Nationwide,[spark‐ignition]enginesandvehiclesarea
significantsourceofmobilesourceairpollution.Asdescribedbelow,ofallmobilesourceemissionsin2000theyaccounted
forabout9percentofHCemissions,4percentofCOemissions,3percentofNOXemissions,and2percentofdirectPM
emissions.”)(discussingthesignificancetestunderSection213oftheCleanAirAct)(emphasisadded).Butmobilesource
emissionsofPM,forexample,onlyconstituted23%oftotalman‐madesources,id.at68,246,and2%of23%isabout
0.5%.
131PetitionfromEarthjusticeetal.,toEPA,forRulemakingundertheCleanAirActtoListCoalMinesasaSourceCategory
andtoRegulateMethaneandOtherHarmfulAirEmissionsfromCoalMiningFacilitiesUnderSection111,June16,2010.
132ManuelQuinones,Enviro‐EPASettlementPossibleonMineEmissions,Greenwire,Dec.10,2012.
133PetitionfromtheHumaneSocietyoftheU.S.etal.,toEPA,toListConcentratedAnimalFeedingOperationsunderClean
AirActSection111(b)(1)(A)andtoPromulgateStandardsofPerformanceunderCleanAirActSections111(b)(1)(B)and
111(d),Sept.21,2009.
134See,e.g.,RevisionstotheCaliforniaStateImplementationPlan;SanJoaquinValleyUnifiedAirPollutionControl
District,69Fed.Reg.27,837(May17,2004)(indicatingthattheSIPinquestioncouldnotbeapprovedifitexempted
agriculturalsourcesfrompermitting);seealsoAss’nofIrritatedResidentsv.FredSchakelDairy,2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS
36769,*37(E.D.Cal.2005)(rejectingtheargumentthatthefarminquestionwasexemptsimplyforbeingafarmunder
thereasoningthatthereisnoapparentexemptionforagriculturalsourcesundertheCleanAirActandthat“itisEPA’s
positionthatCAAdoesnotexemptmajorstationaryagriculturalsources”).
135Compare40C.F.R.§51.165(a)(1)(i)(2011),with42U.S.C.§7411(a)(3);seealso42U.S.C.§7602(z).
13642U.S.C.§7411(b)(1)(B).
137Id.
138Id.§7411(a)(1).
20
onwhichairpollutantsgetstandardsofperformanceandwhichdonot.Nevertheless,EPA’s
discretiontomakethisdeterminationislimitedbythestatutorycontext,principlesforrational
rulemaking,andexecutiveorders.Forgreenhousegases,EPAmustusecost‐benefitanalysisto
prioritizeandissueadditionalperformancestandardsforalready‐listed,significantcategories.
Statutorycontextandprinciplesforrationaldecisionmakingsupportaddingperformance
standardsforanysignificantsourcesofadangerouspollutant.
Listingsourcecategoriesandissuingperformancestandardsare,underSection111,twodistinct
processes,andonlytheformerexplicitlyrequiresanendangermentandcontributionfinding.EPA
hasadoptedthepositionthatneitherendangermentnorcontributionfindingsareprerequisitesto
addingaperformancestandardforanewpollutantemittedbyanalready‐listedsourcecategory.139
Certainly,requiringentirelynew,repetitive,formalendangermentandcontributionfindingsevery
timeEPAwantedtoaddgreenhousegasperformancestandardsforacategorycouldprovetobe
unnecessarilyburdensome,costingtimeandmoneyandcausingdelayswithoutaddinganynew
information.Instead,EPA’sexistingendangermentfindingfrom2009shouldbesufficienttoprove
thedangerofgreenhousegasesemittedbyanystationarysourcecategory,140andtheagency’s
greenhousegasinventory,whichliststheannualemissionsbysourcecategory,shouldprovide
ampleevidencethatparticularsourcecategoriescontributesignificantemissions.141
However,justbecauseendangermentandcontributionfindingsarenotformalprerequisitesto
addingperformancestandardsforalready‐listedcategoriesdoesnotmeanEPAhaslimitless
discretiontodecidewhichpollutantsareregulatedandwhicharenot.Forexample,ifcement
manufacturerswerenotalreadyalistedsourcecategory,andifEPAfoundthatcement
manufacturerscontributedsignificantlytodangerousgreenhousegaspollution(whichtheydo),
thestatutewouldrequiretheagencytolistcementmanufacturersasasourcecategoryanddevelop
performancestandardsforthem.142Itwouldmakelittlesense,then,forEPAnottoberequiredto
setperformancestandardsforgreenhousegasemissionsfromcementmanufacturersjustbecause
thatsourcecategorywaslistedbeforeEPAfullyrealizedthedangersofgreenhousegases.
Furthermore,anydiscretionEPAhastodeterminewhichpollutantsgetperformancestandardsand
whichdonotislimitedbyprinciplesforrational,non‐arbitrarydecisionmaking.143EPAhasalready
begunmovingforwardwithgreenhousegasperformancestandardsduringitsSection111review
ofpowerplants.ItwouldbeinconsistentandarbitraryforEPAtorefusetoregulatesignificant
greenhousegasemissionfromothersourcecategoriesduringfutureSection111reviews.144
Thus,basedonthecontextofSection111andprinciplesforrationaldecisionmaking,EPAshouldbe
requiredtodevelopperformancestandardsforalready‐listedsourcesthatcontributesignificant
emissionsofdangerousgreenhousegaspollution.
13977Fed.Reg.at22,412‐13.
14074Fed.Reg.at66,496.
141EPA,InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasEmissionsandSinks:1990‐2010,supranote129.
142See42U.S.C.§7411(b)(1)(A)(“TheAdministratorshall...publish(andfromtimetotimethereaftershallrevise)alist
ofcategoriesofstationarysources.Heshallincludeacategoryofsourcesinsuchlistifinhisjudgmentitcauses,or
contributessignificantlyto,airpollutionwhichmayreasonablybeanticipatedtoendangerpublichealthorwelfare.”)
(emphasisadded).
143SeeMotorVehicleMfrs.Ass’noftheU.S.v.StateFarmMut.Auto.Ins.Co.,463U.S.29,43(1983)(definingthearbitrary
andcapriciousstandardinrulemaking).
144Inthepast,EPAhasnotbeenopentoregulatinggreenhousegasesunderSection111,andhasassertedthatitcan
exerciseitsdiscretionunderthestatutenottoissuesuchregulations.ForadiscussionofsuchpreviousEPApositions,as
wellasanexplanationofthelimitationsofEPA’sdiscretionunderSection111,seeLetterfromPolicyIntegritytoEPA,on
NewSourcePerformanceStandardsforNitricAcidPlants,June23,2011.
21
Executiveorderssupportprioritizingsubsequentperformancestandardsaccordingtoacost‐
benefittest,suchasforlandfillsandindustrialprocesses.
WhileEPA’sdiscretionmaybelimited,neithershouldEPAberequiredtoregulateeveryair
pollutantemittedbylistedcategories—evenpollutantsthatdonotposeadangertopublichealth
orwelfare,thatarenotemittedinsignificantquantities,orthatcouldonlyberegulatedatcosts
grosslydisproportionatetobenefits.Cost‐benefitanalysisisarationalwaytoexercisediscretion,is
requiredbyexecutiveorders,andisnotprohibitedbystatute.EPAshouldassessthecostsand
benefitsofsettingperformancestandardsforadditionalpollutantsemittedbylistedcategories,and
shouldselectthosepoliciesthatmaximizenetbenefits.
Asageneralpolicymatter,regulationshouldmaximizesocialwelfare.Cost‐benefitanalysisisthe
besttoolthatagenciescanusetoachievethisgoal,torationally,consistently,andtransparently
makepolicychoices.145Accordingtoexecutiveorders,agenciesmustusecost‐benefitanalysisto
guidetheirregulatorydecisionswhennototherwiseprohibited.146Section111oftheCleanAirAct
doesnotforeclosetheuseofcost‐benefitanalysis.Onthecontrary,phrasesinthedefinitionof
“standardofperformance”—suchas“takeintoaccountthecost”and“best”147—areconsistentwith
cost‐benefitanalysis.WhilecourtshavedeterminedthatthislanguagedoesnotmandatethatEPA
baseitsdecisionsoncost‐benefitanalysis,“becauseCongressdidnotassignthisspecificweight...
ofthesefactors,theAdministratorisfreetoexercisehisdiscretioninthisarea.”148
Whenrevisingthesestandardsofperformance,EPAshouldbeginbyfocusingoncategorieswhose
emissionsreductionswouldyieldthegreatestnetbenefits.Thisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthe
largestemittersshouldberegulatedfirst.Certainsmallercategoriesmaylendthemselvesto
particularlylow‐costreductionsinemissions.Thelargestcategoriesmaynonethelessrepresent
thegreatestopportunitiestorealizeimprovementstopublichealthandwelfare.Indeed,EPA
recognizesthatthisisusuallythecase.149
EPAshouldofcoursefirstfinalizeitspendingperformancestandardsforpowerplants,forboth
newandexistingsources,whichasacategorymakethelargestcontributiontogreenhousegas
pollution.Severalotheralready‐listedcategorieswouldalsopassacost‐benefittestforadding
greenhousegasperformancestandards.EPAshouldfocussubsequentregulationsonsomeofthese
largersources,includingnaturalgasandpetroleumsystems,landfills,ironandsteelproducers,
cementproducers,nitricacidplants,andwastewatertreatmentfacilities.150
Importantly,adoptingacost‐benefitframeworkdoesnotmeanthatperformancestandardsunder
Section111cannotbetechnology‐forcing.Indeed,asdiscussedfurtherbelow,thestatute
145RICHARDL.REVESZ&MICHAELA.LIVERMORE,RETAKINGRATIONALITY:HOWCOST‐BENEFITANALYSISCANBETTERPROTECTTHE
ENVIRONMENTANDOURHEALTH10(2008).
146Exec.OrderNo.12,866§1(a),58Fed.Reg.51,735(Sept.30,1993);Exec.OrderNo.13,563§1(b),76Fed.Reg.3,821
(Jan.18,2011)(stipulatingthatagenciesmust“proposeoradoptaregulationonlyuponareasoneddeterminationthatits
benefitsjustifyitscosts”).
14742U.S.C.§7411(a)(1).
148NewYorkv.Reilly,969F.2d1147,1150(D.C.Cir.1992).Thispositionisconsistentwiththattakenintherelevant
ExecutiveOrders,aswellasrecentSupremeCourtdecisions.See,e.g.,Entergyv.Riverkeeper,129S.Ct.1498(2009).
149EndangermentandCauseorContributeFindingsforGreenhouseGasesUnderSection202(a)oftheCleanAirAct,74
Fed.Reg.at66,538–39(“Thus,whenanalyzingwhetherasourcecategorythatemitswell‐mixedgreenhousegasesinthe
UnitedStatescontributestotheglobalproblem,itisappropriatefortheAdministratortoconsiderhowthatsource
categoryfitsintothelargerpictureofU.S.emissions.”);StandardsofPerformanceforGreenhouseGasEmissionsforNew
StationarySources:ElectricUtilityGeneratingUnits,77Fed.Reg.at22,395(“TheEPAisfocusingfirstonreducing
emissionsfromthelargestemittersthroughmeasureswithreasonablecosts”);id.at22,396(“Thespecialcharacteristics
ofGHGsmakeitimportanttotakeinitialstepstocontrolthelargestemissionscategorieswithoutdelay.”).
150SeeEPA,InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasEmissionsandSinks:1990–2010,supranote129.
22
authorizesEPAtomakereasonableextrapolationsoftechnologicalperformance.EPAneednotbe
limitedtocomparingthebenefitsofgreenhousegasreductionsagainstcurrentcompliancecosts.
Instead,EPAcanmaketechnologicalprojectionsandsetascheduleforautomaticallyphasingin
strongerstandardsovertime.
ExistingsourcesmustberegulatedunderSection111(d),andregulationshouldavoid
grandfathering.
Forgreenhousegases,thedevelopmentofnewsourceperformancestandardsforsourcecategories
underSection111(b)willautomaticallytriggertheneedforstatestodevelopperformance
standardsforexistingsourceswithinthosecategories.Performancestandardsfornewandexisting
sourcesshouldbedevelopedinacoordinatedfashion,toavoidgrandfathering.
Section111(b)regulationtriggersSection111(d)regulation.
Section111(d)stipulatesthatEPAshallguidestatesonissuingperformancestandardsforexisting
sourcesofpollutantsnotregulatedunderSection108(NationalAmbientAirQualityStandard
program)or112(HazardousAirPollutantprogram),andthatwouldotherwiseberegulatedunder
Section111iftheywereemittedbynewsources.151Section111(d)explainsthatstatesshould
developplansfortheimplementationandenforcementoftheperformancestandards.152
GreenhousegasesarenotcurrentlyregulatedunderSections108or112.Therefore,asEPAcarries
outitsmandatoryobligationstoregulatecertainnewsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionsunder
Section111(b),stateswillneedtosubmitplanstocontrolthesepollutantsatexistingfacilities.153
UnderthecurrentregulationsgoverningtheuseofSection111(d),EPAisrequiredtofirstpublisha
guidancedocument.154Subsequently,eachstatemustsubmitimplementationplanswithemissions
standards,whichcantaketheformofeither“anallowancesystemorprescri[ptionof]allowable
ratesofemissions.”155Asarguedbelow,inordertomaximizenetbenefits,statesshouldutilizethe
allowanceprovisionstoimplementaflexible,market‐basedprogramunderSection111(d).
EPAshoulddeterminestandardsfornewandexistingsourcesatthesametime,tolimit
grandfathering.
Creatingmorelenientstandardsforexistingsourcesthanfornewsourcestypicallycreates
incentivestokeepexistingplantsinoperationlongerthaniseconomicallyefficient.EPAshould
developstandardsforexistingandnewsourcesinacoordinatedfashiontominimizesuch
inefficiencies.
Thecriticalconcernforgrandfatheringisthe“oldplanteffect,”inwhichexistingfacilitiesstayin
operationlongerthanisoptimalunderanefficientpollution‐pricingscheme.Differentialstandards
fornewandexistingplantsdistorttheeconomicanalysisthatplantownersundertakewhen
151See42U.S.C.§§7411(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii)(“TheAdministratorshallprescriberegulationswhichshallestablisha
procedure...underwhicheachStateshallsubmittotheAdministratoraplanwhich(A)establishesstandardsof
performanceforanyexistingsourceforanyairpollutant(i)forwhichairqualitycriteriahavenotbeenissuedorwhichis
notincludedonalistpublishedundersection7408(a)ofthistitleoremittedfromasourcecategorywhichisregulated
undersection7412ofthistitlebut(ii)towhichastandardofperformanceunderthissectionwouldapplyifsuchexisting
sourcewereanewsource.”).
152Id.§7411(d)(1)(B).
153See,e.g.,ApprovalandPromulgationofStatePlansforDesignatedFacilitiesandPollutants;StateofIowa,69Fed.Reg.
51,957(“Section111(d)oftheCAArequiresstatestosubmitplanstocontrolcertainpollutants(designatedpollutants)at
existingfacilities(designatedfacilities)wheneverstandardsofperformancehavebeenestablishedundersection111(b)
ofthesametype,andEPAhasestablishedemissionguidelinesforsuchexistingsources.”).
15440C.F.R.§60.22.
155Id.§60.24(b)(1).
23
decidingwhethertobuildanewplantortocontinueoperatingtheexistingone.156New
constructionbecomesrelativelymoreexpensive(andkeepinganolderplantinoperationbecomes
relativelycheaper)thanitwouldbeifthelevelofregulationwereconsistentacrossallplants.
Theseproblematicincentivescreateanoldplanteffect,keepingexistingplantsrunningand
delayingthetimelyclosureofold,inefficientfacilities.157(Forasummaryoftheempiricalevidence
for“oldplanteffects”underhistoricalCleanAirActregulations,seePolicyIntegrity’slettertoEPA
andOIRAonthenewsourceperformancestandardsforpowerplants.158)
Inadditiontotheoldplanteffect,theCleanAirAct’sNewSourceReviewprovisionscreatea
“significantimprovementeffect.”SinceNewSourceReviewistriggeredbysignificant
modifications,159differentialstandardsformodifiedandnon‐modifiedplantswillcauseexisting
plantstomakelargemodificationslessfrequentlythanisoptimal.160Thisaddsasecondbarrierto
newconstructionandinvestmentinup‐to‐datepowerplantfacilities.EPAshouldavoidreinforcing
theCleanAirAct’sexistingbarrierstosociallyoptimalinvestmentdecisions.
Itisthediscrepancybetweenthestandardsfornewandexistingsourcesthatcreatesthepotential
fornegativegrandfatheringeffects.Therefore,EPAshoulddevelopitsperformancestandardsfor
newandexistingsourcesincoordinationandatthesametime,sotheagencycanexaminesuch
discrepanciesandtrytominimizethenegativeeffectsofgrandfathering.161Byjointlysettingnew
andexistingsourcestandards,EPAcanoptimizetheregulatoryregime:itmayachievegreater
emissionsreductionsatthesamecostorachievethesameemissionsreductionsatalowercost
thanbyfollowingthepastpracticeofenactingstrictnewsourcestandardswithfullgrandfathering.
Thisdecisionmakingprocesswillensurethattheoverallregulatoryregimeoffersoptimal
incentivesforthetimelyretirementofolderplants.
EPAshoulddefineamarketasthe“bestsystem.”
InEPA’sproposedperformancestandardsforpowerplants,theagencydefinesnaturalgas
combinedcycleunitsasthe“bestsystemofemissionreduction,”162andsetstheperformance
standardat1,000poundsofcarbondioxidepermegawatt‐hour,basedonthedemonstrated
performanceofthattechnology.163However,EPAofferslittlejustificationforwhythattechnology
isthe“bestsystem”orwhythatstandardisthemostefficient.Infuturerulemakings,EPAshould
interpret“bestsystem”toallowforflexiblecompliancemechanismslikemarkets.
Byenablingfirmstoidentifyandtakeadvantageofthelowest‐costopportunitiesforemissions
reductions,flexiblecompliancemechanismsincreasetheoverallefficiencyofregulation.164Several
156JonathanRemyNash&RichardL.Revesz,GrandfatheringandEnvironmentalRegulation:TheLawandEconomicsof
NewSourceReview,101NW.U.L.REV.1677(2007);seealsoGarthHeutel,PlantVintages,Grandfathering,and
EnvironmentalPolicy,61J.ENVTL.ECON.&MGMT.36(2010).
157Nash&Revesz,supranote156,at1708.
158
Letter from Policy Integrity, to OIRA and EPA, on Forthcoming Greenhouse Gas New Source Performance Standards for
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, Dec. 1, 2011.
159See40C.F.R.§52.24(f)(6).
160SeeNash&Revesz,supranote156,at1713‐14.
161SeeRichardL.Revesz&AllisonL.WestfahlKong,RegulatoryChangeandOptimalTransitionRelief,105NW.U.L.REV.
1581(2011).
162StandardsofPerformanceforGreenhouseGasEmissionsforNewStationarySources:ElectricUtilityGeneratingUnits,
77Fed.Reg.at22,414.
163Id.at22,394.
164Chettiar&Schwartz,supranote103,at62–63;RobertN.Stavins,PolicyInstrumentsforClimateChange:HowCan
NationalGovernmentsAddressaGlobalProblem?,1997U.CHI.LEGAL.F.293,297–98.
24
typesofflexiblecompliancearelegallyavailabletoEPAunderthestatuteandareeconomically
justified,uptoandincludingmarket‐basedstructures.
EPAshouldinterpret“standardofperformance”and“bestsystem”topermit
flexiblecompliancemechanisms.
AsdefinedinSection111(a)(1),astandardofperformanceisbasedon“thedegreeofemission
limitationachievablethroughtheapplicationofthebestsystemofemissionreduction...takinginto
accountthecost.”165Thebroadtermsofthisprovision,aswellasarecentSupremeCourtdecision
holding“mostefficient”asonereasonableinterpretationofthe“best”regulatoryapproach,166give
EPAampleauthoritytoincorporateflexiblecomplianceintoitsgreenhousegasperformance
standards.EPAshouldexerciseitsdiscretionanddefineflexiblecompliancemechanisms,like
trading,asavitalpartofthemostefficientandbestsystemforreducinggreenhousegasemissions
underSection111.
Nothingintheexpansivedefinitionof“standardofperformance”precludestheuseofflexible
compliancemechanisms,andnonegativeinferenceagainstauthoritytoapplyflexiblemechanisms
iswarranted.Inthecurrenttext,thestandardisdefinedintermsofa“system,”ratherthana
particulartechnologyordesign.167In1990,CongressamendedSection111toremovetheword
“technology”fromitsdefinitionofperformancestandards,demonstratingcongressionalintentto
increasetheflexibilityofthe“standardofperformance”phraseandfreeingSection111(a)(1)from
anystatutoryrequirementthatthestandardsbetechnology‐based.168Similarly,inthecontextof
newandmodifiedsources,Section111(b)(5)expresslystatesthat,exceptasprovidedforinSection
111(h)(whichaddressesworkpracticeandotheralternativestandards),“nothinginthissection
shallbeconstruedtorequire...anynewormodifiedsourcetoinstallandoperateanyparticular
technologicalsystemofcontinuousemissionreductiontocomplywithanynewstandardof
performance.”169Thus,thestatutorytextandlegislativehistorysupportEPA’sauthoritytoapply
flexiblecompliancemechanisms.
Inaddition,thepresenceofageneraldefinitionof“standardofperformance”inSection302(l)of
theCleanAirActdoesnotprecludetheuseofflexiblecompliancemechanismsunderSection
111.170WhilethedefinitionsinSection302doapplytotheCleanAirActasawhole,“[s]pecific
termsprevailoverthegeneralinthesameoranotherstatutewhichotherwisemightbe
controlling.”171ThegeneralprovisioncontainedinSection302(l)shouldnottrumpthedefinition
of“standardofperformance”containedinSection111(a)(1).
EvenifEPAbelievesthatthetextofSection302(l)isrelevanttointerpretationofSection111(a)(1),
useofflexiblecompliancemechanismsisnotprohibited.WhileSection302(l)definesa“standard
ofperformance”asrequiring“continuousemissionreduction,”172theabsenceofsimilarlanguagein
Section111indicatesthatthisrequirementdoesnotapplytonewsourceperformance
16542U.S.C.§7411(a)(1)(emphasisadded).
166SeeEntergyCorp.v.Riverkeeper,Inc.,129S.Ct.1498,1506(2009)(“‘[B]esttechnology’may...describethe
technologythatmostefficientlyproducessomegood.Incommonparlanceonecouldcertainlyusethephrase‘best
technology’torefertothatwhichproducesagoodatthelowestper‐unitcost.”).
16742U.S.C.§7411(a)(1).
168SeeJonasMonast,TimProfeta&BrooksRaineyPearson,Pre‐WorkshopPaper:RegulatingGreenhouseGasEmissions
fromExistingSources:Section111(d)andStateEquivalency7–10(2011)(citingEPA’sreferencetotheseamendments).
16942U.S.C.§7411(b)(5)(emphasisadded).
170Id.at§7602(l).
171FourcoGlassCo.v.TransmirraProds.Corp.,353U.S.222,228–29(1957)(citationsandquotationmarksomitted).
17242U.S.C.§7602(l).
25
standards.173IfEPAstillbelievesthattherequirementisbyinferenceapplicabletoSection111,the
agencycanincorporatestrategiestoensure“continuousemissionsreduction”thatarecompatible
withflexiblecompliancemechanisms.Bysettingastandardmorestringentthancurrentemissions
levelsandrequiringuninterruptedcompliance,EPA’sregulationwouldachieve“continuous
emissionreduction.”Further,EPAisrequiredunderSection111(b)torevisethestandards“from
timetotime”174andcouldprovideforautomaticfuturereductionsintherule(ameritorious
approachinitsownright,asdescribedbelow).EPAcouldalsoensure“continuousemission
reduction”byincludingprojectionsofplants’remainingusefullivesinanyemissionsbudget
allocationorbyretiringtheemissionsallowancesofretiredplants.175
EPAitselfhasinterpretedthephrase“standardofperformance”toallowtradingintworecent
Section111rulemakings.InitsCleanAirMercuryRule,EPAenactedacap‐and‐tradesystemfor
existingsourcesunderSection111.176Inthatrulemaking,EPAdeclaredthatatradablepermit
programfitwithin“acarefulreadingofthesection111(a)definition[of]standardofperformance,”
findingsupportinboththestatutorytextandthelegislativehistoryofthe1977CleanAirAct
Amendments.177Previously,EPAhadalsoauthorizedatradingschemeunderSection111(d)for
emissionsofnitrogenoxides.178
RecentcourtdecisionsonEPAtradingprogramshaveleftintactEPA’sauthoritytoincludetrading
mechanismswithinSection111regulations.TheD.C.Circuit’sdecisioninNewJerseyv.EPAdid
strikedowntheCleanAirMercuryRule’stradablepermitprogram,butthecourt’svacaturwas
spurredbyEPA’sfailuretofollowproceduresspecifictoSection112.179Thecourtneverreached
theentirelyunrelatedissueofEPA’sauthoritytoestablishtradablepermitprogramsunderSection
111.180Similarly,thedecisionsinNorthCarolinav.EPAandEMEHomerCityGenerationv.EPA
involvedEPA’stradingprogramsunderSection110,buttheD.C.Circuit’sdecisionstooverturn
thoseruleswerespurredbylanguagespecifictoSection110(a)(2)(D)andunrelatedtoSection
111’sprovisions.181TherequirementsofSection110arenotreflectedinthecapaciouslanguageof
Section111;therefore,theNorthCarolinaandEMEHomerCityholdingsdonotapplyhere.
Furthermore,flexiblecompliancemechanismshavebeen“adequatelydemonstrated”asrequiredin
Section111(a).MultipleEPAregulationshavesuccessfullyincorporatedemissionstrading.The
173Asdiscussedabove,§111(b)(5)expresslystatesthat,exceptasprovidedforin§111(h)(whichaddresseswork
practiceandotheralternativestandards),“nothinginthissectionshallbeconstruedtorequire...anynewormodified
sourcetoinstallandoperateanyparticulartechnologicalsystemofcontinuousemissionreductiontocomplywithanynew
standardofperformance.”Id.§7411(b)(5)(emphasisadded).
174Id.§7411(b).
175Furtherdiscussionoftheroleof§302(l)ininterpretationof§111(a)(1)isavailableinChettiar&Schwartz,supranote
103,at86–88.
176StandardsofPerformanceforNewandExistingStationarySources:ElectricUtilitySteamGeneratingUnits,70Fed.
Reg.28,606,28,616–17(May18,2005)[hereinafterCAMR].
177Seeid.
17840C.F.R.§60.33b.
179PriortoissuingCAMR,EPAhadremovedelectricutilitygeneratingunitsfromthelistofsourcesofmercuryregulated
under§112withoutfollowingthespecificdelistingproceduresenumeratedin§112(c)(9).Thecourtconcludedthat
electricutilitygeneratingunitswerethereforestilllistedassourcesofmercuryunder§112andthusregulationoftheir
mercuryemissionsunder§111wasunlawful.517F.3d574,578(D.C.Cir.2008).
180Id.at584(“Inviewofourdisposition,thecourtdoesnotreachothercontentionsofpetitionersorintervenors.”).
181531F.3d896,907(D.C.Cir.2008)(“BecauseCAIRisdesignedasacompleteremedytosection110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)
problems,asEPAclaims,CAIRmustdomorethanachievesomethingmeasurable;itmustactuallyrequireeliminationof
emissionsfromsourcesthatcontributesignificantlyandinterferewithmaintenanceindownwindnonattainmentareas.
Todoso,itmustmeasureeachstate's‘significantcontribution’todownwindnonattainmentevenifthatmeasurement
doesnotdirectlycorrelatewitheachstate'sindividualizedairqualityimpactondownwindnonattainmentrelativeto
otherupwindstates.”(citationsomitted));seealsoEMEHomerCityGenerationv.EPA(D.C.Cir.Aug.21,2012).
26
AcidRaintradablepermitprogramenactedunderthe1990CleanAirActAmendmentsreduced
sulfurdioxideemissionsdramaticallyinitsfirsttwelveyears,evenaselectricitygeneration
increasedduringthesameperiod.182ThenitrogenoxidesSIPCallalsousedatradablepermit
schemetoreduceemissionswithinthecoveredtwenty‐onestatesandtheDistrictofColumbia.183
Theargumentfortradingappliestobothnewandexistingsourcesinalmostidenticalform.Both
Sections111(b)and(d)usetheterm“standardofperformance,”definedinSection111(a),which
canincludetradingmechanismswithinitsscopeasdescribedabove.Nevertheless,some
commentatorshavearguedthatlegalauthorityfortradingmaybemoresecureunderSection
111(d),forexistingsources.184Section111(d)instructsstatestouseanimplementationplan‐like
processsimilartowhatisestablishedunderSection110.SinceSection110specificallyreferences
states’abilitytousemarket‐basedmechanismsintheirimplementationplans,185thestatutory
argumentforflexibilityisarguablystrongerforexistingsources.However,ultimatelytheinclusion
offlexiblecompliancemechanismsunderSection111turnsonthedefinitionof“standardof
performance,”whichappliesequallytonewandexistingsources.
EPAhasgreatdiscretiontointerprettermslike“bestsystem”underthestatute,buttheagency
shouldexercisethisdiscretionconsistentlywiththegoalsoftheexecutiveorders—namely,tomake
regulatorydecisionsthatmaximizenetbenefitsandutilizeefficient,flexiblecomplianceoptions.186
Assuch,EPAshoulddefinethe“bestsystem”asaflexible,market‐basedapproach,whichwill
incentivizefirmstodiscoverthemostefficientwaystoreducepollution.
Multipleflexiblemechanisms,includingcap‐and‐auctionmarkets,areavailabletoEPA.
AsdiscussedmoreextensivelyinprevioussubmissionstoEPAfromPolicyIntegrity,multiple
flexiblemechanismsareavailableunderSection111,including“bubbling,”“bankingand
borrowing,”intra‐categoryandinter‐statetrading,andre‐definingsourcecategoriesbroadlyto
facilitateintra‐sectortrading.187ButEPAhastheevengreaterauthoritytobaseitsperformance
standardsonasystemofinter‐categorytradingwithoffsets,suchasthatachievedbyacap‐and‐
auctionprogram.Giventheincreasedefficiencythatcomesfromincreasingthegeographicand
sectoralcoverageofamarketbyallowingregulatedentitiestotakeadvantageofthelowest‐cost
abatementopportunityinanystateandinanyindustry,andgiventheinstructionsofexecutive
orderstomaximizeregulatoryefficiency,EPAshouldpursuemarket‐basedperformancestandards.
EPAhasseveralargumentsthatithaslegalauthoritytoapplyacap‐and‐auctionprogramunder
Section111.188Thebroaddefinitionof“standardofperformance”inSection111(a)(1)requires
EPAtodeterminethe“bestsystemofemissionreduction”;thestatutemakesnoexplicit
requirementthatsucha“system”beaplant‐basedemissionscontrolratherthanatradingscheme.
Similarly,thestatutemakesnorequirementthattheemissionsreductionsattributedtoafacilitybe
madeon‐siteatthefacilityitself.189Forexistingsources,someadditionallegaljustificationscome
182SeeCAMR,70Fed.Reg.28,606,28,617(describingtheAcidRainprogram).
183Id.(describingtheNOxSIPCall).
184See,e.g.,ResourcesfortheFuture,Ctr.forClimateChangeLaw&Inst.forPolicyIntegrity,PrevailingAcademicViewon
ComplianceFlexibilityunder§111oftheCAA4‐6(2011).
18542U.S.C.§7410(a)(2)(A)(“Eachsuchplanshallincludeenforceableemissionlimitationsandothercontrolmeasures,
means,ortechniquesincludingeconomicincentivessuchasfees,marketablepermits,andauctionsofemissionsrights.”).
186Exec.OrderNo.12,866at§1(a);Exec.OrderNo.13,563at§1(b).
187See,e.g.,CommentsfromPolicyIntegrity,toEPA,ontheProposedRuleonStandardsofPerformanceforGreenhouse
GasEmissionsforNewStationarySources,June25,2012.
188EPAmaybelimitedinitsabilitytorebateauctionrevenuedirectlybacktoconsumers,butstateswouldlikelyretain
suchauthority.SeeChettiar&Schwartz,supranote103,at67‐68.
189Section111(b)specifiesthatEPA“shallpublishproposedregulations,establishingFederalstandardsofperformance
fornewsources”;similarly,§111(d)statesthatEPA“shallprescriberegulations...underwhicheachStateshallsubmitto
27
intoplay.Section111(d)explicitlyreferstotheproceduresofSection110,whichallowstatesplans
toinclude“economicincentivessuchasfees,marketablepermits,andauctionsofemissionrights.”
Similarly,EPAregulationsunderSection111(d)authorizestatestoadoptan“allowancesystem”in
theirplans.EPAexercisedthisauthoritywhenitappliedacap‐and‐tradeapproachinitsCleanAir
MercuryRule.190Thatprogram’slegalitywasneverresolvedincourt,astherulewasvacatedon
othergrounds.191
FormoreonEPA’sauthoritytoconstructacap‐and‐auctionprogramcoveringallregulatedsource
categoriesunderSection111,ontheefficiencyadvantagesofthatapproachoverarate‐based
approach,andonbuildinginlegalsafeguardsbymakingthetradingprovisionsseverablefromthe
overallregulations,seePolicyIntegrity’scommentstoEPAonitsproposedgreenhousegas
performancestandardsforpowerplants.192
EPAshouldautomaticallyphaseinstrongerstandardsovertime.
EPAshouldphaseinstrongerstandardsovertimeunderSection111.Thisapproachwouldallow
performancestandardstoreflectandfosteremerginggreenhousegasreductionstrategies,suchas
newefficiencytechnologies,newgenerationoptions,andcarboncaptureandsequestration.A
predeterminedscheduleofemissionsreductionswouldclarifyfutureobligationsandallow
regulatedentitiestoplaninvestmentsfarinadvance—aparticularlysalutaryfeatureforthe
predetermined,capital‐intensiveinvestmentpatternofmanyregulatedsectors.
UnderSection111,EPAmustseta“standardofperformance”thatreflectsthe“degreeofemission
limitationachievablethroughtheapplicationofthebestsystemofemissionreductionwhich...has
beenadequatelydemonstrated.”193Withrespecttonewsources,theD.C.Circuithasruledthat
Section111hasatechnology‐forcingmandateand“lookstowardwhatmayfairlybeprojectedfor
theregulatedfuture,ratherthanthestateoftheartatpresent.”194Thus,neither“adequately
demonstrated”nor“achievable”meansthatthestandardislimitedtowhatcanalreadyberoutinely
achieved.WhileEPAcannotbasestandardsonpuretheoryorspeculation,itcanmakereasonable
extrapolationsoftechnologicalperformance.Aperformancestandardthatprescribedfuture
phasesbasedonreasonableexpectationsoffuturetechnologycouldfallwithinEPA’sdiscretionto
interpretwhatis“adequatelydemonstrated.”195
theAdministratoraplanwhich[]establishesstandardsofperformanceforanyexistingsource.”42U.S.C.§§
7411(b)(1)(B),(d)(1)(emphasisadded).Thislanguagedoesnotincludeanyrequirementthatemissionsreductions
occuratthesource.Instead,itrequiresEPAtosetstandardsforeachsource.AslongasEPAappliesits“standardof
performance”toanynewand(throughstateplans)existingsources,itsstandardfulfillstherequirementsof§111,
regardlessofwhethersourcescomplybyimplementingtheirownemissionsabatementmeasuresorbypurchasing
creditsorallowancesfromqualifiedsources.
190SeeCAMR,70Fed.Reg.28,606,28,616(“Inthefinalrule,EPAinterpretstheterm‘standardofperformance,’asapplied
toexistingsources,toincludeacap‐and‐tradeprogram.Thisinterpretationissupportedbyacarefulreadingofthe
section111(a)definitionoftheterm,quotedabove:Arequirementforacap‐and‐tradeprogram(i)constitutesa
‘standardforemissionsofairpollutants’(i.e.,aruleforairemissions),(ii)‘whichreflectsthedegreeofemission
limitationachievable’(i.e.,whichrequiresanamountofemissionsreductionsthatcanbeachieved),(iii)‘through
applicationof(a)...systemofemissionreduction’(i.e.,inthiscase,acap‐and‐tradeprogramthatcapsallowancesata
levellowerthancurrentemissions).”).
191SeeNewJerseyv.EPA,517F.3d574,578(D.C.Cir.2008).
192Seesupranote187.
19342U.S.C.§7411(a)(1).
194PortlandCementAss’nv.Ruckelshaus,486F.2d375,391(D.C.Cir.1973).
195SeeLigniteEnergyCouncilv.EPA,198F.3d930,934(D.C.Cir.1999)(quotingPortlandCement,486F.2dat391);Sierra
Clubv.Costle,657F.2d298,346(D.C.Cir.1981)(NSPSshould“notstymieinnovation.SolongasEPAconsidersinnovative
technologiesintermsoftheirprospectiveeconomic,energy,nonairhealthandenvironmentalimpactstheagencyiswithin
thescopeofitsauthorizedanalysis.”);Nat’lAsphaltPavementAss’nv.Train,539F.2d775,785–86(D.C.Cir.1976)
28
ThemandateinSection111thatEPAconsidercostsalsoarguesinfavorofEPAdiscretionto
establishapredetermined,incrementalschedule.196Iftheagencywereforcedtosetasingle
standardtogovernfortheforeseeablefuture,thestandardwouldlikelybemorestringentatthe
outsetandthusmorecostly.EPAcanarguethatsettingastandardthatincreasesinstringencyover
timeisanallowableexerciseofitsdiscretiontoconsidercosts.197
Inthepast,EPAhascommittedtophasinginincreasinglystringentemissionslimitsunderSection
111.TheCleanAirMercuryRule’scap‐and‐tradeprogramfornewandexistingsources,whichwas
establishedasa“standardofperformance”underSection111,includedtwophasesandmandateda
morestringentemissionslimitinthesecondphase.198Therule’sfirstphasecalculateditscap
basedonlyonemissionsreductionsachievableasco‐benefitsfromtheCleanAirInterstateRule.199
EPAassertedthatinformationonmercury‐specifictechnologieswas“onlyadequateforusto
concludethatsuchtechnologiesareadequatelydemonstratedforuse”inthesecondphase.200Asa
result,EPAfactoredadditionalreductionsfromuseofmercury‐specificcontrolsintoitscalculation
ofthesecondphasecap,butnotintocalculationsforthefirstphase.201
InthefinalCleanAirMercuryRule,EPAstatedthatatwo‐phaseapproachwaspermissiblefornew
sourcesunderprecedentthatinterpreted§111(b)as“authoriz[ing]EPAto‘looktowardwhatmay
fairlybeprojectedfortheregulatedfuture,ratherthanthestate‐of‐the‐artatpresent.’”202For
existingsources,EPAmaintainedthatbecauseSection111(d)affordedmoreflexiblecompliance
deadlines,atwo‐phaseapproachwasalsopermissible.203WhiletheD.C.Circuitlatervacatedthat
mercuryrule(whichhassincebeenreplaced,andiscurrentlyundernewlitigationintheD.C.
Circuit),thecourtruledonunrelatedgroundsanddidnotaddressthelegalitythetwo‐phase
approachunderSection111.204
PastprecedentandtheimperativethatEPAconsidercostsinthisrulemakingmakeclearthatEPA
canandshouldphaseinstricterstandardsovertime,bothtocomplywiththeletterofthestatute
andtobestservetheunderlyinggoalofachievingoptimallevelsofemissionsreductions.
EPAmustsetperformancestandardsforunregulated,significantstationarysources.
Inadditiontopromptlyfinalizingitsperformancestandardsfornewandexistingpowerplants,and
respondingtoallotherpendingpetitionsunderSection111,EPAmusttakeactionstoregulate
significantstationarysourcesofgreenhousegases,whetheralready‐listed(suchaslandfills)or
unlisted(suchasagriculture).Adoptingmarket‐basedregulationscanharmonizethissector‐by‐
sectorapproachandmaximizeefficiency.Buttocomprehensivelyaddressgreenhousegas
pollution,EPAmustcomplementsuchstationarysourceregulationwithactiononmobilesources.
(“adequatelydemonstrateddoesnotmeanthatexisting[facilities]mustbecapableofmeetingthe[newsource]standard;to
thecontrary,‘section111lookstowardwhatmayfairlybeprojectedfortheregulatedfuture,ratherthanthestateoftheart
atpresent.’”)(quotingPortlandCement,486F.2dat391).
19642U.S.C.§7411(a)(1)(“takingintoaccountthecostofachievingsuchreduction”).
197Forfurtherdiscussion,seePrevailingAcademicView,supranote184,at9–10.
198SeeCAMR,70Fed.Reg.28,606,28,607.
199Id.at28,618.
200Id.at28,617–18.
201Id.at28,620–21(“TheEPAhas...establishedaPhaseIIHgemissionscapbasedonthereductionsinHgemissions
foundedintheCAIRprogramandreductionsthatcanbereasonablyobtainedthroughtheuseofHg‐specificcontrols.”).
202Id.at28,620(quotingPortlandCementAss’nv.Ruckelshaus,486F.2d375,391(D.C.Cir.1973)).
203Id.(“WebelievethatEPAstandardssetundertheauthorityofCAAsection111(d),wherethecompliancedeadlinesare
notsoimmediate,affordEPAsignificantflexibility,commensuratewiththeamountoflead‐timebeinggiventoaffected
sources.”).
204SeeNewJerseyv.EPA,517F.3d574,584(D.C.Cir.2008).
29
IV.EPAShouldRegulateAllSignificantMobileSourcesunderTitleII.
IfEPAdoesnotenactcomprehensiveregulationsunderSection115orTitleVI,itwillneedto
supplementitsstationarysourcecontrolswithmobilesourceregulationunderTitleII.EPAhas
beguntoaddressgreenhousegasemissionsfrommobilesourcesthroughTitleII,butexisting
regulationsareincomplete:severalsignificantcategoriesofmobilesourcesremainunchecked.To
mostefficientlyaddressmobilesectoremissions,EPAshouldestablishacap‐and‐tradesystemfor
vehiclefuels.Alternatively,EPAcouldinsteaddevelopefficiencystandardsorotherregulationsto
controlemissionsfromaircraft,marinevessels,non‐roadvehicles,buses,locomotives,motorcycles,
andtrucktrailers.
EPAhasreceivedseveralformalpetitionstoregulategreenhousegasesemissionsfrommobile
sources.205Bylaw,EPAmust,withinareasonableamountoftime,issueitsfinaldeterminationwith
respecttothesependingpetitions.206Inparticular,in2009,PolicyIntegritypetitionedEPAto
instituteacap‐and‐tradesystemforgreenhousegasemissionsfromvehiclefuels.207Theaction
calledforisdetailedinPolicyIntegrity’spetition,aswellasitssubsequentlettersentNovember28,
2012.Thosedocumentsalsoexplainwhyacap‐and‐tradeforvehiclefuelswouldbethemost
efficientwaytoregulatethemobilesourcesector.
IfEPAregulatesvehiclefuels,thensupplementalregulationofgreenhousegasemissionfromair
conditioningsystemsmaybesufficienttocoverallsignificantemissionsfrommobilesources.
Otherwise,however,EPAwillneedtodevelopefficiencystandardsforunregulatedmobilesources
toensurecomprehensivecoverageofgreenhousegases.
SeveralpartieshavealreadypetitionedEPAtosetgreenhouseemissionsstandardsforunregulated
mobilesourcessuchasmarinevessels,aircrafts,andnon‐roadvehicles.208Litigationispendingon
someofthesepetitions.Wherethestatutesetsamandatorydutytoregulatedangerousemissions,
asitdoesforaircraft,EPAmustmovetowardemissionsstandardswithoutunreasonabledelay.
WherethestatutegrantsEPAmorediscretion,asitdoesfornon‐roadandmarinevehicles,the
agencyshouldneverthelessdevelopanycost‐benefitjustifiedregulation.
Afewremainingcategoriesofmobilesourcehavenotbeenthesubjectofpetitions.PolicyIntegrity
herebypetitionsEPAforgreenhousegasregulationofthoseremainingsources,inparticular
motorcyclesandthetrailersofheavy‐dutytrucks.Motorcyclescontribute2.1milliontonsof
carbondioxideannuallytototalU.S.emissions.209EPAshouldalsoestablishdesignstandardsfor
trailers.AsEPArecognizes,“theaerodynamicandtirerollingresistanceimprovementstotrailers
representasignificantopportunitytoreducefuelconsumptionandGHGs.”210
205SeeJAMESE.MCCARTHY,CONG.RESEARCHSERV.,CARS,TRUCKS,ANDCLIMATE:EPAREGULATIONOFGREENHOUSEGASESFROMMOBILE
SOURCES6(2010).
20642U.S.C.§7604(a)(2006)(grantingjurisdictiontodistrictcourtsto“compel…agencyactionunreasonablydelayed”).
OnMarch20,2012theD.C.DistrictCourtorderedEPAtorespond,withinninetydays,totheCenterforBiological
Diversity’sthreeoutstandingpetitionsregardingtheregulationofGHGsfrommarinevessels,aircraft,andothernon‐road
enginesandvehicles.Ctr.forBiologicalDiversityv.EPA,2012U.S.Dist.LEXIS37870,*3(2012).
207PetitionfromPolicyIntegrity,toEPA,forRulemakingUnderSections211and231oftheCleanAirActtoInstitutea
Cap‐and‐TradeSystemforGreenhouseGasEmissionsfromVehicleFuels(2009).
208See,e.g.,PetitionfromCalifornia,toEPA,forRuleMakingSeekingtheRegulationofGreenhouseGasEmissionsfrom
Ocean‐GoingVessels(2007);PetitionfromCtr.forBiologicalDiversityetal.,forRulemakingUnderthecleanAirActto
ReducetheEmissionofAirPollutantsfromMarineShippingVesselsthatContributetoGlobalClimateChange(2007).
209SeeMcCarthy,supranote205,at4,7(indicatingthatmobilesourcesrepresent23.6%ofU.S.emissionsandthat
motorcyclesconstitute.1%ofthatamount).Whenregulatingmotorcycles,EPAmust“considertheneedtoachieve
equivalencyofemissionsreductionsbetweenmotorcyclesandothermotorvehicles.”42U.S.C.§7521(a)(3)(E).
210GreenhouseGasEmissionsStandardsandFuelEfficiencyStandardsforMedium‐andHeavy‐DutyEnginesand
Vehicles,76Fed.Reg.57,106,57,111(Sept.15,2011).
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Conclusion
Greenhousegasesrepresentasignificantthreattoglobalhealthandwelfare.EPAhasalready
begundevelopingsomeregulationsundertheCleanAirActtocontrolthisdangerouspollution,and
itshouldcontinuetoexercisethoseauthorities:inparticular,EPAshouldpromptlyfinalizeits
pendingperformancestandardsfornewandexistingpowerplants.
However,manyremainingsourcesofauthorityintheCleanAirActhavenotyetbeenutilizedto
respondtotheenvironmentalcrisisofclimatechange.Someoftheseauthoritiesaremandatory
andwouldenableEPAtodevelopefficientandcomprehensiveregulationofgreenhousegases.
PolicyIntegritypetitionsEPAtoactonthesestatutoryobligations:
1. Makeaformalfindingthattheprerequisitesforactiontocontrolinternationalairpollution
underSection115havebeensatisfiedforgreenhousegases;requirestatestorevisetheir
CleanAirActimplementationplanstocontroltheirdangerousgreenhousegaspollutionby
makingreasonableprogresstowardabatement;andadvisestatesontheiroptionsfor
implementationunderSection115,includingflexibleregulatorytoolslikemarkets.
2. InitiateapubliccallforinformationunderTitleVIregardingtheeffectofgreenhousegases
onthestratosphere;ifthescientificevidenceexists,issueanendangermentfindingunder
Section615;anduponissuinganendangermentfinding,controlgreenhousegasemissions
throughflexibleregulatorytoolslikemarkets.
3. UseSection111tolistadditionalsourcecategoriesthatcontributesignificantlyto
greenhousegaspollution,includingagriculturalsources,andtodevelopperformance
standardsforsuchcategorieswithinayearoftheirlisting;revisetheperformance
standardsforalready‐listedsourcecategoriestocoversignificantgreenhousegas
emissions,suchasforlandfills,naturalgasandpetroleumsystems,andvarious
manufacturingindustries;instructstatestodevelopperformancestandardsforexisting
sources,andtodosoincoordinationwithEPA’snewsourceperformancestandards,to
avoidgrandfathering;forbothnewandexistingsources,defineamarketasthe“best
system”ofcontrol;andautomaticallyphaseinstrongerperformancestandardsovertime.
4. UseTitleIItopromulgateemissionsstandardsforallmobilesourcesnotyetregulatedor
petitionedtoberegulated,includingmotorcyclesandthetrailersofheavy‐dutytrucks.
Theprovisionsofthispetitionareseverable:ifanypartisinvalidorunenforceable,theinvalidityor
lackoflegalobligationshallnotaffectotherterms.Asrequiredbylaw,EPAmustgivethispetition
promptconsideration.Petitionerrequestsasubstantiveresponsewithin180calendardays.
RespectfullySubmitted,
MichaelA.Livermore
JasonASchwartz
HelenaS.Siljestrom
ChristopherDodge
AlinaJ.Fortson
InstituteforPolicyIntegrityatNYUSchoolofLaw
139MacDougalStreet,WilfHall,Suite317
NewYork,NY10012
(212)988‐6093
jason.schwartz@nyu.edu
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