57
Four
A nationality policy framework
There are recurrent tendencies to ethnic cleavage and identifiable patterns of conflict, but (...) even in
the most severely divided society, ties of blood do not lead ineluctably to rivers of blood.
Donald L. Horowitz1
The main object of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for analyzing national
conflict in multi-national states, by combining elements from theories of nations and
nationalism with typologies of national conflict regulation. These traditions are only partly
overlapping. Theories of nations and nationalism tend to focus on why and how nations and
nationalism originated (basically in the 18th and 19th centuries), while studies of national
conflict regulation tend to focus on how contemporary states handle their multi-nationality.
The national conflict level in multi-national states is the outcome of four factors: The existence of national "we-groups"; the actual differences between them in political power, social
position and cultural opportunities; how these differences are perceived and presented in
terms of national demands on behalf of the various national groups; and how the demands are
met by the government. I will use the term nationality policy about government strategies2
directed at all types of national groups, which implies that national problems in multi-national
states can be analyzed within the same theoretical framework. That does not mean it is
unimportant whether the national groups in question are large or small, indigenous or
immigrant: On the contrary, these are factors that may have a bearing both on to what extent
national demands are advanced and especially on the specific contents of those demands.
My ambition has not primarily been to provide a theory of what makes a particular nationality
policy succeed, or to make a contribution to the development of real-world nationality policies
(the latter is the domain of politicians, not scholars), but to provide a theoretical framework
for empirical research. This framework is thus meant as a heuristic device that may help us to
ask the "right" questions, more than an attempt to provide the "right" answers. I will start by
elaborating on the nationality policy concept, through a survey of common demands voiced by
national movements, and possible nationality policy strategies on part of the government. This
comprises the larger part of the chapter. Then I will discuss some factors that may affect the
choice of government strategies. Finally, I will discuss the conditions for success: Under what
circumstances is a certain nationality policy most likely to succeed? Especially in the latter
part of the chapter I draw on the existing body of theories of nations and nationalism.
1
Donald L. Horowitz: Ethnic groups in conflict (1985:684).
2
The term "government" is here used in a loose sense, in the meaning of political authority.
58
Theoretical approaches to the study of government strategies towards the national question in
multi-national states vary considerably, even in the use of terms. We may distinguish between
three broad research traditions: One is focused on national integration or nation-building, and
is generally premised on the idea of making ethnic or national differences go away. A second
is focused on ethnic or national conflict resolution or regulation, and often, but not always,
takes the multi-national composition of the state for granted.3 A third research tradition is
associated with the concept of a nationality policy, and generally concerns Eastern Europe.4
The advantages of the third approach are, first, that no assumption is made about the objective
of the policy. Whether the aim of a nationality policy is to make national differences go away,
to solve national conflicts, or merely to contain or repress them, is an empirical question that
has to be resolved in each case. I think that the various strategies aimed at dealing with ethnic
or national diversity should be treated as a multi-dimensional variable rather than as separate
phenomena or parts of a typology. Second, the notion of a governmental nationality policy
forces us to distinguish between various agents in terms of power: The nationality policy is
formulated and executed by an elite in power, and can be contrasted with national demands
raised on behalf of national groups. These are formulated by somebody (with less power)
claiming to speak on behalf of the national group in question. Third, this approach allows us
to distinguish rather sharply between aims and outcomes, and thus raises the question of why
a policy failed or succeeded.
Pedro Ramet defines nationality policy as "a unified, purposeful and coherent program, which
is potentially consistent, and which infuses specific decisions and actions of state",5 which
implies both an ideological program and concrete actions by the government. In Walker
Connor's usage, a Leninist nationality policy denotes Lenin's view of the national question,
including a theory of nations and nationalism as well as a strategy. He distinguishes analytically between three dimensions of the Leninist policy of national equality: one cultural, one
economic and one political dimension. Combined, these provide an image of a nationality
policy as a multi-dimensional concept, involving consciously designed policies within the
political, the cultural and the economic domains. In addition, however, the policies of the
government should be related to potential demands made on behalf of national groups.
3
The distinction between these two research traditions is pointed out by Horowitz (1985: pp. 566 ff.). Examples of the
former are Karl W. Deutsch: Nationalism and Social Communication (1966), Charles Tilly (ed.): The formation of National
States in Western Europe (1975), Anthony H. Birch: Nationalism & national integration (1989). Examples of the latter is
Arend Lijphart: Democracy in plural societies (1977) and Eric A. Nordlinger: Conflict regulation in divided societies (1972).
Examples of a wider use of ethnic conflict regulation, which also includes integration/assimilation, are the typologies of John
McGarry & Brendan O'Leary: The politics of ethnic conflict regulation (1993), and John Coakley: The resolution of ethnic
conflict. Towards a typology (1992a).
4
See e.g. R. A. Kann: Geschichte des Habsburgerreiches (1993); L. Szarka: The Slovak national question and Hungarian
nationality policy before 1918 (1994); A. Kommisrud: Statsbygging og sosio-økonomisk endring i multinasjonale samfunn
(1993); J. Bugajski: Ethnic politics in Eastern Europe. A guide to nationality policies, organizations and parties (1995); P.
Ramet: Nationalism and federalism in Yugoslavia 1963–1983 (1984); W. Connor: The national question in Marxist-Leninist
Theory and Strategy (1984).
5
Ramet (1984:43).
59
National demands and nationally relevant conflicts
As pointed out in Chapter Three, national movements from below combined two tasks: On the
one hand, they formulated what it meant to be a nation and tried to diffuse the awareness of
being a nation to the masses. This is the nation-forming aspect of their activities. On the other
hand, they claimed to speak on behalf of this nation, and defended what they perceived as the
national interest against the ruling nation. This articulation of national demands belongs to the
outward-directed activities of national movements.
One kind of national demand directly related to the quest for national identity is the demand for
recognition as a nation. Such demands may be termed symbolic, as opposed to more practical
demands within the political, socio-economic, or cultural domain. Symbolic demands are tied
to the status of the national group in question within the multi-national state. This is first and
foremost a claim to uniqueness (we are a nation too), but it is also a claim to equality (as a
nation, we are entitled to the status and the rights that belong to a nation). This is more than a
matter of mere words: Recognition or the lack of such may be of consequence for how the
government meets other national demands as well. Without nationhood to bolster the claim, it
is much more difficult to get, say, separate schools or political autonomy. The claim for
national recognition is especially important where the government has a nation project of its
own that it wants to promote – as was the case in the First Czechoslovak Republic.
Practical demands may principally be subdivided in two: demands for national equality and
demands for autonomy. Demands for autonomy go to the very core of the nationalist doctrine,
claiming for each nation the right to decide its own fate and manage its own affairs. These
demands are directed at structures, rules and decision-making power. Demands for national
equality are relational in character, concern the outcome of policies and may be expected to be
more directly associated with the existence of nationally relevant conflicts.
A nationally relevant conflict of interest may be said to exist objectively when national
divisions coincide with patterns of cultural, economic or political inequality. It becomes
important for the national conflict level only if the members of a national group are made
aware that they are being deprived or disadvantaged, whether compared to other national
groups or compared to the former status of their own group. If that happens, nationally
relevant conflicts become expressed through national demands aimed at correcting the alleged
wrong. This also means that we can expect a national demand to disappear from the national
agenda once the problem has been solved.
However, the link between national demands and nationally relevant conflicts is not quite that
simple. First, we cannot assume that all national demands correspond to the "objective"
interests of all parts of the nation. As Miroslav Hroch has pointed out, there will be some
interests that are shared by practically all members of the national group, regardless of their
standing. In addition, however, some group interests become transformed into national interests through their association with members of the personified nation, which is conceived as
a unity. The interests of a part of the nation are thus seen as the interests of the whole nation.
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Second, the articulation of national demands requires a national movement or a group of
individuals who take it upon themselves to speak on behalf of the nation(-to-be). Historically,
such national spokesmen began to appear only after national awareness had started to become
widespread, in Europe in the course of the 19th century. Third, national demands were not
uniform, even within one and the same national movement. Hroch has shown that national
demands were cumulative and expanding during the nation-forming process. He distinguishes
between various levels of social, cultural-linguistic and political demands and shows that, contrary to a common assumption, full national self-determination became a demand very late.6
Before we take a look at the most common practical demands within the political, cultural and
economic domains, it should be noted that there is no fixed time sequence between them. In
some cases, political demands came early in the nation forming process (sometimes even
before the nation was fully formed), but cultural demands preceded political demands in the
case of most non-dominant nations in Europe (including the Czechs and Slovaks).7
Political demands for autonomy may be more or less far-reaching. The ultimate demand is an
independent state, although historically, national movements have often stopped short of this.
Secession does not always seem feasible, and demands for independence may lead to accusations of treason, possibly also reprisals. Among many of the nationalities of the Habsburg
empire, independence was not presented as a national goal until the First World War. More
common than secession are demands for autonomy at a local, (municipal), or national level
(e.g. federation) or within certain policy areas (e.g. cultural autonomy) – or for the establishment of an administrative unit (the national homeland) for which autonomy is claimed.
The political demand for equality concerns "fair" representation for the nation in the political
system. This is a matter of participation in the existing organs, at state level or also at
province level. Historically, national and democratic demands often went hand in hand:
National groups were under-represented in the political system because they were underrepresented in the social groups that had access to political power. A national struggle for
participation thus became a struggle for democratization of the political system in order to
allow a larger part of the underprivileged national group to participate. Such claims for equal
representation became meaningful only under constitutional conditions, of course.
Participation is, at least initially, often seen as a means to achieve other national goals, be they
linguistic, cultural, socio-economic or whatever – a means to support the perceived national
interest. If this is difficult at state level (the leaders of the national group being in permanent
minority), the struggle for autonomy (more influence for the nation in its own affairs) follows
naturally, and is often parallel to the struggle for participation, as it was in the Czech case.8
6
Hroch: V národním zájmu (1996b:203–204, 212); National self-determination from a historical perspective in S. Periwal:
Notions of nationalism (1995); The social interpretation of linguistic demands in European national movements (1994).
7
Hroch (1996b:200).
8
Hroch (1996b:100–104).
61
In theory, the claim for equality may take on two forms: "our" nation should have an influence
that corresponds to our size; or, alternatively, we should have the same influence as the other
nations, irrespective of size. In the latter case, the personified nation is taken as a point of
departure, and the principle "one nation, one vote", replaces "one man, one vote."
Economic demands for autonomy cannot be separated from political autonomy, since they
generally require such autonomy, whether they concern national control of natural resources
(such as minerals), of the economic surplus that is created on the national territory, or of the
recruitment policy. A second type of economic demands concerns justice or equality for the
members of the nation and the national territory. Demands may concern investments in
infrastructure or industry in the national territory, greater income equality, redistribution of
wealth between regions and financial help to ensure economic development for their territory.
Logically, we would expect control over natural resources or economic surplus to become an
issue only if the national territory is economically more developed than the rest of the state,
and redistribution to become an issue when it is less developed, but again, perceptions play a
role. This also means that demands for economic autonomy and demands for economic
equality may be partly contradictory, and national movements may have to make a trade-off
between the two. Historically, however, another type of (socio-) economic demands was
important: demands for the abolition of feudal conditions. These included freedom for serfs
and peasants, equal taxation and customs, improvement of the conditions of townspeople,
equal access to the school system and equal pay regardless of nationality. The latter workingclass oriented demand was naturally a latecomer.
Cultural demands are first and foremost aimed at preserving national identity and developing
the national culture (especially the language). This is a question of the right to express
oneself: Internally, it concerns the right to develop one's own culture and national identity
without government interference. Externally, it concerns the right to practice and display this
culture in public arenas, like the school system, the administration, the courts and the
Parliament. The latter is also a question of cultural equality compared to other national groups
within the state, including the ruling nation. Cultural demands may be expected to vary
according to which attributes are seen as constituting for the nation, but the major arenas to
which they apply tend to be the same: the school system, "public life" and "cultural life."
Demands for the introduction of the national language in the school system may be presented in
two forms – as a demand for the national language as a subject, and as a medium of instruction.
The latter demand is stronger and often comes later. Historically, these demands especially
concerned secondary schools, as the national language had often already been introduced into
elementary school as a matter of necessity (e.g. in the Habsburg empire). Other examples are
demands that certain confessions be taught (if religion is important for national identity), or
that appropriate attention be paid to (the correct interpretation of) the history of the nation (if a
shared history is important for national identity – as is normally the case). Often these
demands will be combined with demands for separate schools and universities.
62
Public life is another important arena. The most far-reaching demands of the linguistic program concern the use of the national language in the courts, in the local and central administration, in post offices, in the railway system and in politics. Apart from demands for national
linguistic equality, also proportional representation in the public sector may become an issue.
The latter demand is of a socio-economic character. According to Hroch, these demands have
been linked; the call for linguistic equality sooner or later turned into a struggle for positions.9
The third arena concerns the preservation of national culture. Demands could include
permission to publish books etc. in the national language and about the nation, erection of
national memorials and preservation of historical ruins and churches, financial and institutional means to study the history and language of the nation, etc. The latter may involve a
demand for separate universities and research facilities, and/or employment quotas.
Thus far, I have concentrated on situations where national movements exist and national
demands are filed. Both the scope and the contents of national demands vary. We may expect
to find the greatest variation between, on the one hand, large, clustered, self-aware national
groups, living in their own homeland, and, on the other hand, small, dispersed, non-indigenous
groups. Immigrant groups are often more willing to shed their original identity than indigenous
populations in the first place – if they are not too different from their host population. Second,
their cultural and economic demands seem more limited. Both may have something to do with
the fact that immigrants have generally come voluntarily. Finally, I do not know of a single
example of a recent immigrant group claiming autonomy or secession. Part of the reason for
this is probably that, throughout history, demands for political autonomy have been linked to a
strong homeland rhetoric, and that alternative arguments are not easily available.
National demands become directed against the government of the multi-national state, either
because the situation that is sought remedied (such as the lack of schools) is the result of a
government policy, or also because the national leaders believe that the government can do
something about it. This means that they require a government response.
Nationality policy strategies
A nationality policy may be seen as a policy at two levels, both linked to national demands: A
government policy on a symbolic level, dealing with demands for recognition, and a policy on
a more practical level, dealing with demands for equality and autonomy. In this perspective,
the available selection of nationality policy strategies can be described in terms of government
responses to common national demands. In addition, there are some strategies that do not have
counterparts in national demands. Two of these are clearly repressive and morally appalling:
Forced population transfer and genocide. A third strategy is the indigenization (korenizaciya)
policy of the Soviet regime in the 1920s, which encouraged signs of "national uniqueness"
among ethnic groups who never even asked for it.
9
Hroch (1994:20).
63
Government responses may be ranged from giving far-reaching concessions to the national
groups (an accommodating strategy), via a more neutral stance, to total repression (national
discrimination). The two former strategies correspond to Nathan Glazer and Michael Walzer's
distinction between measures aimed at protecting or promoting an ethnocultural identity and
non-discrimination.10 Non-discrimination or a neutral stance basically means that the state
will leave the various national groups alone, allowing individual, but not group rights. Only
the accommodating strategies allow for nationality as a legitimate interest, and these are thus
the only strategies that permit any kind of national autonomy. Accommodating strategies may
involve a centralized or a decentralized decision-making system. The table below provides a
theoretical grid within which the nationality policy may be said to vary.
Table 1. Nationality policy strategies
Stance:
Level
Accommodating
*
Repressive
Centralized power
Decentralized power
Either*
Either**
consociation
federation
individual rights
discrimination
Economic
equality
economic autonomy economic criteria
discrimination
Cultural
equal rights
cultural autonomy
individual rights
discrimination
indifference
rejection
Dimension
Practical Political
Symbolic
Neutral
recognition of individual nationhood
A neutral stance towards the national question may well be combined with a federal political structure, but the state
will not be federated according to national distribution, as nationality is not a legitimate interest in the system.
** A repressive stance means that national groups are being discriminated against. The decision to do so may be taken
at the central or local level. In the latter case, the group may appeal to the central level over the heads of the local
elite, as in the case of the Slovaks before 1867.
Obviously, not all of the conceivable strategies may be combined. (I will return to this later).
It should also be kept in mind that the distinction between the levels, dimensions and
strategies has been made chiefly for analytical purposes; it may not be that clear-cut in the real
world. Some demands within each level and dimension may be accommodated, others not,
while both national demands and nationality policies may have practical as well as symbolic
aspects. Cultural rights may be institutionalized to a greater or lesser degree, valid for all or
just some of the national groups in the state; the political system may be more or less
centralized; decision-making may be decentralized in all or just some policy areas.
On the symbolic level, demands for national recognition will either be rejected (the regime
will not accept the existence of the national group in question) or met (the multi-national
structure of the state is admitted). Logically, we would not expect regimes that recognize
national plurality to make any attempt at creating an overarching civic identity. The exception
is the korenizaciya policy, which was seen as a first step on the "dialectical" road to merging.
10
See Will Kymlicka (ed.): The rights of minority cultures (1996:9), and Glazer's and Walzer's contributions in this book.
64
Conversely, we would expect regimes that refuse to recognize certain national groups to
advance an alternative, competing nation project. In this case, a struggle over identity, over
"who we really are", may ensue. Subgroups (seeing themselves as separate nations) are then
often referred to as regions, tribes or at best ethnic groups. The regime may use pan-national
ideologies to cultivate a new overarching identity, or may try to merge the existing national
groups into a new identity using the attributes of the dominant group as the point of departure.
The borderline between civic and overarching identities may not always be very sharp.
We may expect some sort of cohesion between the nationality policy at a symbolic and
practical level: If the nation does not exist, it does not deserve special treatment. If this were
always the case, however, the distinction between a symbolic and a practical level would not
be very interesting. However, there are even in West European "nation-states" examples of
cultural and even political concessions being given also when the group in question is not
recognized as a separate nation (Basques in Spain, Scots in Britain).
On a more practical level, national demands for autonomy and equality within the political,
economic and cultural domains can be met by various government strategies. Within the
political dimension, the demand for autonomy or self-determination is more far-reaching than
the demand for the right to participation or representation in the decision-making system,
because its fulfillment limits the power and thus the control of the central government over the
affairs of the national group in question. Moreover, once such arrangements have been
established, they tend to narrow down future options.
Principally, the demand for national self-determination may be accommodated in two ways:
Through decentralization of decision-making power to the national group in question, or
through "national co-rule" at the central level. The former often implies federation, the latter
some form of consociationalism. Combinations are of course also possible. If devolution of
power from the central to the local level is to serve the purpose of national self-determination,
the political-administrative units to which power is devolved must be nationally homogeneous, which in turn requires a certain geographical clustering of the relevant national groups. It
is possible to formulate schemes that permit decision-making power – for instance, in cultural
matters – for a national group dispersed unevenly over a territory, but this is not usual.11
To some extent, political autonomy also requires individual political rights for the national
group in question, because participation in political decision-making requires national representation, while the converse is not true. The right to participate in elections and run for office
for instance, form part of any democratic system, whereas the safeguarding of the influence of
named national groups will require some sort of extra institutional arrangement. In severely
divided societies national minorities tend to become permanent political minorities.
11
This is what Otto Bauer contemplated in order to save the Habsburg empire, although he wanted economic decisions to be
centralized. For details on Otto Bauer's scheme, see A. Kommisrud: "Historiske og historieløse folk. En historisk-sosiologisk
teori om nasjonalitetskonflikter i Sentral-Europa", Sosiologi 3/1992. The establishment of Sametinget, a political organ for
members of the Sami minority in Norway, might be one practical example, although it is admittedly not very powerful.
65
A neutral strategy means the absence of national political discrimination. All citizens have the
same political rights regardless of nationality – but nationality is not a legitimate interest in the
political system, and national groups thus have no collective rights. The state may be unitary or
federal, but, in the latter case, the system is not federated according to national divisions (one
example here is the United States). While an accommodating stance means giving people rights
both as individuals and collectives, a neutral stance thus only allows for the former.
Finally, a repressive strategy allows for neither. This means that members of other nations
than the ruling nation(s) are oppressed, deprived of local autonomy, as well as individual
political rights. Members of non-ruling nations are poorly represented in political positions, or
not represented at all. This does not necessarily mean that the state is centralized – only that
the national group is deprived of political rights, the origin of which may be at the central or
the local level.
Within the economic dimension, national demands concern economic autonomy (the freedom
to utilize own resources), and economic equality. Economic autonomy is hardly possible
without a measure of political autonomy, which may make it impractical to divorce from the
political dimension. Economic equality is a question of whether the national group is
discriminated against economically, in terms of job opportunities, state investments or
economic development. The matter of job opportunities is more directly related to national
groups than policies of economic development and state investments, which are spatially
oriented in most states – directed at certain territories rather than at specific social groups.
It may be argued that any government will try to keep the regions happy, irrespective of the
national composition. Even repressive and centralized regimes sometimes see economic
equality as a goal. If the main rationale is not the national question, but a wider objective of
stability and harmonious economic development, it may be argued that economic policies
should be kept apart from the nationality policy. On the other hand, national movements do
file certain economic demands. If we retain the notion of a "policy" as something intentional,
we may include among nationality policy strategies those economic policies that explicitly
refer to national demands and/or are designed to achieve economic equality among national
groups. The fact that economic policies aimed at equality seem to cut across political
strategies is the main argument in favor of keeping a separate economic dimension.
Demands for national economic equality may be accommodated through measures like state
investments in the territory of the national group, investments in infrastructure, supporting the
establishment of new economic activity, employment quotas in the public sector, etc. A
neutral stance again means that nationality is considered irrelevant: Investments are placed
where the need is greatest or where the economic returns are expected to be superior, and the
employment criterion is merit. Again, people have rights as citizens and individuals, not as
members of national groups. (This may have an integrating effect, even though this is not
necessarily the aim.) A repressive strategy means that national groups are economically
oppressed, excluded from certain jobs, by-passed in terms of investments and infrastructure,
taken advantage of, deprived of resources and land, of property rights and the like.
66
National demands within the cultural dimension concern preservation and development of the
national "self", as articulated through language, religion, traditions, etc. In practice, accommodation of cultural demands is often a question of institutionalization of cultural rights.
Language rights are of course important; especially the right to use the national language as
the medium of instruction at all levels of education, and as the language of administration,
locally and centrally. In the latter case, bilingualism is in practice required. In order to achieve
a national education system where children are taught in their own culture and religion,
traditions and history, schools (or at least classes) must be segregated. The ultimate accommodating policy thus becomes separate universities for the national groups. Even cultural rights
presuppose a certain geographic clustering of the national group in order to be workable,
especially if there are many minorities. It would not be very practical to require civil servants
or judges to be fluent in three or four or sixteen languages. For that reason, we can expect
institutionalized rights to apply only to the core territory of the national minorities, while the
cultural rights of the ruling nation or the majority will be ensured everywhere.
A neutral stance means giving national groups language education in their mother tongue (as
a subject), but not necessarily the right to instruction in it. Schools will usually not be segregated; there will be segregated classes only during language education in the mother tongue. The
curricula will be the same for all, and the history of the state will be taught. The religion of the
state (or no religion at all) will be taught, but the national groups will be free to practice their
religion. All citizens will be obliged to learn the official language of the state, whether this is
the mother tongue of the ruling nation or a non-indigenous language.
A repressive strategy means having a uniform school system with the same curriculum for all,
or even that national minorities are excluded. National groups may be deprived of the right to
practice their religion, be excluded from the administration, the universities, and generally
discriminated against culturally. Many cultural expressions will be forbidden. The
administration will be monopolized by the ruling nation(s).
Obviously, some combinations of these strategies are more conceivable than others. The
accommodation strategies on all three dimensions may be combined, in a federalized or
consociational political system, with institutionalized cultural rights, employment and representation quotas for the various national groups, etc. Belgium may serve as an example of this.
The neutral strategies put together is the classical response of Western liberal societies to
immigrants. This nationality policy is based on the non-discrimination principle, where the
state protects the minorities against prejudice and discrimination and allows them to maintain
whatever part of their ethnic heritage they wish, but does not support them actively, apart from
occasional language instruction in the mother tongue. People have rights as individuals or
citizens, and these rights are the same for all. The aim of this policy is normally integration. In
reality, of course, this "neutral" policy supports the majority's language, history and culture.12
12
See Kymlicka (1996:10) for a discussion of this.
67
A highly authoritarian regime that relies on coercion may combine the repressive strategies on
all three dimensions. In this case, the political system will be centralized, national groups will
not have any political rights nor any right to assert their culture, and they will be economically
oppressed. The initial policy towards the indigenous Americans may be a case in point here.
As for the other combinations, cultural concessions are possible without political concessions.
Granting cultural rights (such as the right to use the mother tongue in contact with the authorities) may be an impediment to efficient communication and may increase administration costs,
but it will not be a threat to the viability of the multi-national state, unless it should lead to
escalating political demands. The reverse option – granting political autonomy without allowing cultural expression – is logically impossible, since autonomy tends to mean decisionmaking power for national bodies in issues of special importance to that nation. To a certain
extent, economic strategies cut across the other two, in as much as policies aimed at economic
equality may be combined with all strategies within the political and the cultural dimension.
Since the political dimension seems to be the most confining, we can take this as our point of
departure when addressing the possible combinations of strategies:
1. An accommodating stance on the political dimension can be combined only with accommodating strategies within the cultural dimension, and logically goes together with recognition of the national group(s) in question. Economic autonomy requires political autonomy, and probably vice versa. Political autonomy could in principle be restricted to legislation, but even that would require a minimum of funding. In the real world, a certain
degree of economic autonomy for regional bodies is more common than is legislative
power. Finally, political autonomy and cultural rights may be combined both with employment quotas and with merit as an employment criterion, but hardly with discrimination.
2. A neutral stance within the political dimension (people have rights as individuals, not as
national groups) may be combined with a neutral stance within each of the other two
dimensions or also with an accommodating stance in economic matters (integration
policies in Western democracies). It can be combined with an accommodating stance
within the cultural dimension (limited cultural rights for minority groups in democratic
societies, which may or may not mean that national groups are recognized). Finally, it can
be combined with a repressive position on the cultural dimension and a neutral or
accommodating stance on the economic dimension (assimilation policies in democracies).
3. A repressive stance on the political dimension may again be combined with a repressive
position on both other dimensions (hegemonic control or assimilation strategies in authoritarian societies, depending on the aim. In the former case, the national or ethnic pluralism
is not denied; in the latter case, it is). Total political repression can hardly be combined
with extensive cultural autonomy or with the right for national groups to control their own
national resources. Yet, limited cultural rights are possible along with political repression
in authoritarian and centralized systems. A repressive position on the political dimension
may thus be combined with cultural rights, but not with cultural autonomy.
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The choice of strategy
It is not easy to provide any general answers to why governments choose one particular
combination of strategies and not another. Obviously, governments in different states, and
even consecutive governments in the same state, have made different choices over the course
of the years. Ultimately, a specific answer must be given for each empirical case. However,
we can point out some factors that may serve to confine the policy options that are available.
Strategies and aims
A rather banal point is that the choice of strategy depends on the aim that one seeks to achieve.
A nationality policy may be aimed at eliminating national differences and thereby national
conflict, at merely keeping the national groups down (hegemonic control) or at moderating
conflict. Aims may also be used as alternative criteria of classification. John McGarry and
Brendan O'Leary, for instance, classify conflict regulation in terms of methods for eliminating
differences and methods for managing differences. Among the former are genocide, forced
mass-population transfers, partition and/or secession (self-determination) and integration
and/or assimilation. Methods of managing differences are hegemonic control, arbitration (thirdparty intervention), cantonization and/or federalization and consociationalism or powersharing. Aims are also indirectly a criterion of classification in John Coakley's typology.13
Apart from secession, strategies aimed at eliminating national conflict will be located at the
repressive end of the scale, at least in terms of culture. In the most extreme case, elimination
means genocide; but also assimilation and integration involve a certain amount of coercion,
mainly in terms of cultural standardization. If nothing else, they condition the scope of choice:
If your chances of getting work depend on certain language abilities, you have little choice.
Strategies aimed at keeping national groups down (hegemonic control) are generally also
located at the repressive end of the scale. This is historically the most common way of handling a multi-ethnic composition. Imperial or authoritarian regimes control multiple cultures
within their territories through coercive domination and elite co-option. Throughout history,
hegemonic control has often rested on the support of the largest or most powerful national
group, but this is not a prerequisite. For the target groups, the practical difference between
hegemonic control and assimilation may be obscure in terms of cultural rights.
Strategies aimed at moderating national conflict generally tend more towards the accommodating end of the scale – if not necessarily in terms of political power, at least in terms of
cultural rights and economic policy. The government's point of departure will often be that the
multi-national composition of the state is there to stay, and that national conflicts will be less
of a problem if concessions are given to the national groups. Since cultural and economic
demands are less threatening, we can expect these to be met before political demands. On the
whole, however, national movements generally get less than they ask for.
13
See McGarry & O'Leary (1993:4); Coakley (1992). McGarry & O'Leary lack limited cultural rights as separate category.
69
Among the moderating strategies, the least accommodating mode is limited cultural rights,
while federalization and consociationalism are the most accommodating: Once national
groups have been given decision-making power, institutionalization of cultural rights cannot
be prevented. Consociational arrangements are sometimes combined with some measure of
decentralization or federalization.
The question is then: Why do governments seek to achieve that particular goal through the
nationality policy? and, given the goal, why was this and not another strategy chosen? First,
factors like the international situation, the available economic resources, and not least the type
of regime (democratic/authoritarian) put constraints on the range of choice. Second, how the
government evaluates the various strategies as means to an end will depend on the prevailing
beliefs (underlying conceptions of nationhood and perceived causes of national conflict), and
the national composition of the state. The latter includes the character of the national
demands, the number and size of the national groups and their internal relations.
Constraints on the choice of strategy
First a few words about economy: While measures like employment quotas are in principle
independent of the economic situation, it is obvious that extensive state investments in
infrastructure or other development schemes in national "homelands" require a certain
economic basis. Even employment quotas may be problematic in an economic recession,
because better opportunities for a disadvantaged group mean fewer jobs for the ruling nation.
The nature of the regime restricts the aim as well as the means of a nationality policy. Among
the aims, hegemonic control is a more suitable aim for the authoritarian than democratic
regimes, because the repressive means that it implies run contrary to democratic principles.
Hegemonic control in democracies seems to imply that the democratic structure is formal
rather than real, or that the dominating nation is ensured the upper hand through the election
system. The best example of the former is probably South Africa under apartheid. Elimination
and moderation of national conflict are, on the other hand, aims that may be sought by
authoritarian regimes and democracies alike.
It may be argued that authoritarian regimes will have a broader range of choice if the goal is
elimination of national differences (including genocide and mass population transfers).
Likewise, it may be argued that democracies will have a wider range of choice if the goal is
moderation of conflict, because genuine federalism and consociation probably require a
minimum of democratic institutions in order to work.14 To accommodate national demands for
individual political rights and/or autonomy, an authoritarian regime will thus have to accept
some degree of democratization. This may also be a reason why political concessions are less
frequent than cultural concessions.
14
Some Communist states have applied a sort of pseudo-federalism, notably Yugoslavia, yet it remained rather centralized
until Tito's death. See Bakke: På slakk line. Jugoslavisk nasjonalitetspolitikk1945–1980 (1989: pp. 171 ff.).
70
Strategies involving (limited) cultural rights seem to be least sensitive to regime, as they have
been employed by both authoritarian and democratic regimes. Finally, democracies do not
always choose moderating strategies: assimilation policies directed at indigenous ethnic
groups (groups with low self-awareness) have been quite common in West European
democracies, including Norway (cf. the earlier treatment of the Sami ("Lapp") people).
It may be argued that an authoritarian regime will be less vulnerable to national conflict than a
democracy, since it can always resort to coercion. Yet a minimum of support is probably
required for any regime to survive over a length of time, and a regime that can ally itself with
a ruling nation (preferably a majority) is likely to be stronger. This limits the choice: even the
strongest government can hardly afford to alienate both the ruling nation and the others.
However, also democracies must take into consideration the reactions of the ruling nation.
International considerations are especially important where one or more of the subject nations
or national minorities have "a state of their own" outside the framework of a multi-national
state – an irredenta situation. This becomes particularly acute where the national group in
question lives in the border area of the multi-national state and the borders are disputed. There
are many examples of this, and the solutions have varied, from trying to convince the people
in question that they are their own nation, via concessions, to total suppression. We cannot
generalize about the implications of an irredenta situation, only note that it will affect the
choice of strategy to a greater or a lesser extent. This will depend on how articulate the
national group is, how strong the alternative state is, and the perception of external threat.
However, (the prospect of) external intervention may also influence policies.
Prevailing beliefs and strategy
The clearest link to theories of nationalism is that any nationality policy rests on some theory
or conception of nationhood, however loose and ill-defined. First, the predominant nation
concept may in itself affect the range of choice. Providing that the aim of an integration
policy is to make the national target group(s) a part of the state-nation without necessarily
having to shed their culture, it presupposes a voluntarist nation concept. In this scheme
national identity is acquired, and it is assumed that any individual can become a member of
any nation if he or she chooses to. Assimilation policies are also based on the assumption that
people can change their identity, but this is not enough: People must in addition shed their
culture (assimilate) in order to change national identity. Here national identity becomes
ascribed as much as acquired. The underlying nation concept here sees the nation as a cultural
community.
Finally, if you believe that national identity cannot be changed at all, assimilation ceases to be
an option. Then the nation is conceived as a community of ancestry, accessible only by birth.
In this case, the only resort is genocide or forced mass population transfers; or simply living
with the differences. Strategies aimed at repressing/controlling or moderating conflict are in
principle less influenced by the concept of nationhood, but often rest on the implicit
assumption that national identities cannot easily be erased or changed at will.
71
The choice of strategy will also to a certain extent be affected by underlying beliefs as to what
causes national conflict, provided that the aim is harmony/moderation of national conflict.
This aim can be derived from the higher aim of ensuring the survival of the state, which seems
a fairly dominant objective of democratic and authoritarian regimes alike. Again, the resolve
to control or repress national conflict is generally independent of underlying beliefs; what
causes national conflict remains irrelevant if you do not intend to do anything about it.
Strategies of assimilation (and partly also integration) seem based on the assumption that it is
not only possible, but indeed necessary to eliminate national differences in order to make
national conflict disappear. A quite common underlying belief, found also in the literature on
national conflict resolution, is that national conflict is primarily a reflection of economic
inequality. A natural response would be to try to buy off the national group in question, by
offering economic support and employment opportunities. The Marxist variant was to see
national sentiment as a transitional phenomenon produced by the kind of inequality that
appeared during the early stages of industrialization. The Leninist version was slightly
different: national sentiment was seen as being caused by earlier oppression. Thus, if only the
various national groups are not oppressed, they will come to their senses and join the ruling
nation voluntarily.15 Needless to say, things did not turn out quite that way.
Accommodating strategies are implicitly based on the assumption that if the national groups
get what they want, national conflict will disappear. Often the assumption will be that national
equality will reduce tensions, and that national groups that get a certain amount of autonomy
will abstain from issuing the ultimate demand: Secession and a separate state. When governments choose accommodating strategies, they thus either believe that it will work, or else
concessions are forced upon them by external forces. Yet, the fact that a nationality policy
failed does not necessarily mean that the government made a wrong assessment. Timing is in
itself extremely important, and some conditions are more favorable than others.
Nature of the national demands and group relations
On the one hand, the specific national demands that are advanced provide inputs for the
nationality policy. The government may decide to accede to national demands wholly or in
part, or reject them altogether. Conversely, if national demands are lacking or limited in scope,
this will also affect the nationality policy, in the sense that the government is given more
leeway, and in the sense that certain aims become easier to attain, chiefly assimilation/integration. A rather banal point is that governments seldom give national groups more than they
ask for. A possible exception is again the Soviet korenizaciya policy, where cultural concessions were given to groups that never asked for anything of the kind. As Hroch points out,
national demands tend to be cumulative, meaning that they become more extensive over time.16
Concessions that may be acceptable at T1 may thus not necessarily be acceptable at T2.
15
See e.g. Connor (1984:34), Horowitz (1985:14) on this.
16
See Hroch (1994: pp. 13 ff.); Hroch (1995); Hroch (1996b).
72
There will often be more than one subject nation in a multi-national state, and occasionally
also more than one ruling nation (as was the case with the Habsburg monarchy after 1867).
The number of national groups and relations among them will also affect the choice of
strategy. With more than one national opposition movement, the demands of these may be
compatible or incompatible with each other as well as with the interests of the ruling nation(s)
– depending, among other things, on national distribution and disputed homelands.
The size of the ruling nation compared to the others taken together is probably especially
important for the willingness of the government to give political concessions, because such
concessions will often be at the expense of the ruling nation: If some gain power, others
necessarily lose power. If national opposition movements have mutually incompatible
demands, that increases the leeway of the government. Conversely, the leeway of national
movements increases if central and local government can be played out against each other.
To the extent that the present-day situation of the national group is affected by the nationality
policy (and it invariably is), a specific nationality policy will also indirectly affect national
demands, since demands are inversely related to the situation of the national group. A group
that already has individual rights to political participation will not make that a major demand
unless those rights are violated through censorship, election fraud, etc.; a group that already
has been granted the right to language instruction in the school system will not make that a
major demand, unless the right is violated, and so on. A corollary is that for a national
movement that appears only under democratic, constitutional conditions – where political
participation is already instituted – individual political rights will not be an issue.
A nationality policy may be directed at all national groups in a state, or at one specific group.
In either case, neither the aim nor the strategies are given once and for all – and the outcome
in terms of national conflict least of all. Ultimately, the success of a nationality policy will
depend on the reactions of the national target groups to that specific nationality policy.
National demands and nationality policy can thus be seen as action–reaction sequences.
Nationality policy strategies and conditions for success
Success can never be guaranteed – not for national movements, and not for governments. A
nationality policy aimed at controlling national conflict is a success as long as the government
remains in control and does not have to grant concessions. When the strategy breaks down,
that usually means either that the regime is (at the verge of) being overthrown or that the
multi-national state is falling apart. The main condition for success is thus repressive capacity.
The conditions for successful integration or assimilation are different from the conditions for
successful accommodation of conflict. These will therefore be discussed separately. First a
few words on the two most extreme elimination strategies, genocide and mass population
transfers. Insofar as all individual members of the national group are killed or moved, these
strategies can be termed successful; otherwise both methods (apart from being morally
appalling) tend to aggravate conflict.
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Conditions for successful assimilation/integration
Assimilation and integration strategies both aim at creating some sort of common identity for
the multi-cultural population of a state, whether this is merely a common civic identity or a
common cultural identity. Any successful assimilation policy requires large-scale individual
changes of identity. It is beyond doubt that change of national identity is possible, even within
a single generation and certainly in the course of two or three. On the other hand, for a whole
national group to be swallowed up, a vast majority of the group in question must be willing to
redirect loyalty to the new group. At the individual level, people must have a reason to change
their allegiance – and this may still not be enough if their former identity is very strong.
The threshold for change of identity may be expected to be lower the more inclusive the conception of nationhood is: If you can be accepted as a member of the nation simply by
swearing allegiance to the flag, to certain institutions, rules and regulations, then the threshold
is lower than if you have to speak the language like a native, believe in the same God, wear
the same kind of clothes, eat the same food, and have the same skin color as the natives.
National identities containing a strong civic element may thus be easier to acquire than more
culturally confined identities. They also represent a less drastic change, since they permit
cultural features to be retained, at least to a certain extent.
The most favorable conditions for large-scale assimilation seem to be situations where national
consciousness is weak and not very widespread (an early stage of the nation forming process),
where the target group(s) have few members, where the group is dispersed or not indigenous to
the area, and where the members of the target group(s) are not too different in attributes from
the group they are about to enter. Conversely, achieving assimilation and integration can be
expected to be far more difficult when the national consciousness is strong, the group in
question is large and lives on its ancestral lands,17 and nationally relevant conflicts between
groups keep reinforcing national identity. In such cases, assimilation/integration strategies
would seem to aggravate conflicts rather than eliminating them.
Conditions for successful accommodation
Accommodating strategies usually presuppose that the nation-forming process of the national
groups in question has reached the stage where a national movement starts issuing demands
on behalf of the nation-to-be.18 Also here, the pattern of national distribution and the level of
national conflict will circumscribe the choice of strategy. The settlement pattern is most
critical in relation to federalism, yet also cultural autonomy presupposes a certain clustering of
the national communities. Cultural rights may be the least sensitive to national distribution.
17
18
See also McGarry & O'Leary (1993:19).
Again the nationality policy of the Soviet union in the 1920s is an exception. Here the government helped nation-forming
processes, by codifying languages that had not previously been codified and telling people that they were unique. Likewise,
the Yugoslav government actively sought to convince the Macedonians that they were a separate nation and not Bulgarians.
In the Soviet case, this policy was based on the theory that national flourishing was a necessary intermediate stage of national
merging, while the Yugoslav policy was more based on practical, foreign policy considerations. See e.g. Svein Mønnesland:
Før Jugoslavia og etter (1992) and Hélène Carrère d'Encausse: The national question in the Soviet Union and Russia (1995).
74
Basically, for a federal solution to ensure the longed-for political autonomy or rule by conationals, the national groups must be concentrated on certain territories, and the national
territories must be continuous. Two important reasons why units are less than homogeneous
are (1) insufficient clustering of the national communities caused by enclaves and nationally
mixed areas (as in former Yugoslavia), and (2) lack of congruence between the borders of the
units and the national dividing lines, for historical reasons. In this case, a federalization of the
state (or secession) may lead to new national conflicts, as new minorities are created.
Cantonization may be conceived of as a form of "internal secession" that is possible even in
areas with national enclaves, since it means de-composing the arena of national conflict and
competition into smaller and more manageable units. However, this may not be an acceptable
solution for the national movements in question; achieving one national political unit under a
single government is often seen as a goal in its own right. The question also arises who should
decide the borders of the micro-units. Historically, there are no examples where cantonization
has been used as a conscious device in order to solve national conflict. The Swiss example
developed organically; it was not a result of any deliberate policy.
The existence of nationally relevant conflicts and the intensity of national conflict may also
affect the chances of success, because conflict helps to reinforce national identity, national
solidarity and the tendency to divide the world into of "us" and "them", friends and foes. The
higher the conflict level, the lower is trust between the national groups likely to be, and
likewise also the willingness to accept compromises. The level of national conflict is most
critical in relation to consociationalism, yet even federation may prove an unworkable solution
if the conflict level is too high. For a consociational system to function, no national group must
be committed to strategies of assimilating others or creating their own nation-state; successive
generations of political leaders must be committed to the survival of the system; and
compromise must be possible without giving rise to accusations of treason.19 If the conflict
level is very high and national movements demand independence, it may be argued that no
strategy (short of secession) will succeed in moderating national conflict. However, secession
often leads to war, especially when the national groups are insufficiently clustered.20
As noted by Horowitz, the relationship between national groups may be ranked or unranked.21
In the former case, national identity coincides with social class (in terms of social and/or
political positions), and class divisions thus reinforce national divisions. This is a variety of
what Hroch calls nationally relevant conflicts. In the latter case, national identity is independent of class divisions, and social cleavages are cross-national. Other things being equal, a
situation where national groups are ranked will probably be more prone to national conflict.
19
See Arend Lijphart: Democracy in plural societies (1977).
20
The only examples of entirely peaceful divorces in Europe in this century would seem to be the dissolution of the union
between Norway and Sweden in 1905, and the Czecho-Slovak divorce in 1993.
21
Horowitz (1985:22).
75
Another matter is whether a nationality policy always can moderate national conflict. An
important point here is to what extent the national demands of one group are incompatible
with the interests of other national groups in the multi-national state: Will concessions to one
national group affect other national groups adversely, comparatively or in actual terms? This
is also a matter of to what extent national demands are relational or even zero-sum.22
The three types of national demands – symbolic demands, demands for national equality and
demands for national autonomy – are not equally relational in character, and do not involve
the same kind of interests. A demand on the part of group A for recognition as a separate
nation is not per se contrary to the interests of any other national group in the state, unless an
overarching nation project is at stake. Symbolic demands are thus not particularly relational,
but demands for recognition are often linked to demands for national equality and autonomy.
Demands for national equality are, by contrast, typically relational: They always affect the
situation of other national groups in the state, at least in relative terms. In a situation where
group A is dominant (and wants to keep things that way) and groups B and C demand national
equality, the government will often be in a no-win situation, because giving concessions to B
and C will mean alienating A. The problem is greatest when the conflict is perceived by both
parties as zero-sum: The gain of one then becomes the loss of the other. The larger A is, the
easier it is for the government to let A keep its privileged position. One solution to this is to
try to keep all national groups unhappy by steering a middle course.
On the other hand, national demands for equality seldom form strictly zero-sum conflicts. A
conflict over economic redistribution is zero-sum only when there is no growth in the economy; a conflict over redistribution of political positions in the Parliament or the central administration is zero-sum only when there is no growth in the number of parliamentary seats or civil
servants. Cultural demands for equality are even less likely to be zero-sum: A demand for
separate schools for the children of group A in their own language becomes a problem for
group B only if B-schools are turned into A-schools and children from group B have to attend
these. On the other hand, any demand for linguistic equality in the civil service will affect
other national groups, since this will often in practice be a demand for bilingualism. The
trouble is that sometimes a change in the relative distribution will be resented by the dominating group. Even extended individual political rights may cause conflict if this tips the balance
of power between different national groups. In ranked systems, this will typically be the case.
Demands for autonomy may or may not affect other national groups. Cultural demands for
autonomy are usually not very relational in character. The freedom to develop one's own
national identity through national organizations, journals, newspapers etc., the right to study
one's own history and cultivate one's own language and the right to cultivate one's own
religion hardly affect other national groups directly, unless this is seen as subversion of a
common or overarching nation project.
22
See Horowitz (1985:566).
76
Whether or not political demands for autonomy affect other national groups will depend in
part on distribution. If the national groups live neatly separated in compact territories, a
federal solution may be acceptable to all groups. If not, a federal solution may be resented by
those who find themselves separated from co-nationals by the new borders, and especially if a
former ruling nation is turned into a minority. On the other hand, federalization also means
redistribution of power from the central level to more local levels – from a central elite (often
dominated by the ruling nation), to more local elites. Political demands for autonomy are thus
partly relational, while Economic autonomy may increase national conflict if there is a
redistribution effect.
Concluding remarks
We have seen that, depending on the aim of the nationality policy, success is likely to be more
easily achieved under certain conditions. While low conflict level and non-relational demands
are always an advantage, conditions that are favorable to accommodation are not necessarily
favorable to integration/assimilation. Crucial factors in the latter case seem to be the level of
national consciousness, the willingness to assimilate, the dispersion of the group and the
(non-)existence of nationally relevant conflicts.
Since national demands are expressions of dissatisfaction, we can expect the national conflict
level to increase when a national groups feels its identity threatened, and when it feels
discriminated against linguistically-culturally, economically or in terms of political
representation/influence. The conflict level is more likely to be high in ranked systems.
For the government, the dilemma is that concessions may lead to new, more extreme
demands, as demands tend to be cumulative. Concessions to one national group may also lead
to reactions from other national groups in the multinational state, and the government must
decide what group(s) it can least afford to antagonize. This will depend among other things on
the size and relations between the groups and the degree of zero-sum conflicts.
Timing is crucial for the outcome in the case of accommodating strategies: A policy that
might have moderated national conflict at T1 may prove unworkable at T2 because the scope
of the national demands has changed or the national conflict level has increased. Cultural concessions may work in the early stages of the nation-forming process, but not after a political
program has been developed. A government that wants to keep a certain freedom of choice
will often hesitate to concede to political demands for autonomy, because federalization/
consociationalism means changing the rules, and is much more difficult to reverse than
cultural concessions. The choice of strategy at T1 will thus circumscribe the range of choice at
T2. Governments hesitate, and when concessions do come, it is often too late.