United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Committees
February 1997
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AND MATERIEL
Key Factors Affecting
Disposal Costs and
Schedule
GAO/NSIAD-97-18
GAO
United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
National Security and
International Affairs Division
B-266135
February 10, 1997
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
This report describes the Department of Defense’s programs for destroying the U.S. stockpile of
chemical munitions and planning for the disposal of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel.
The programs’ combined life-cycle cost estimate is $27.6 billion, which includes $12.4 billion for
the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and $15.2 billion for the Nonstockpile Chemical
Materiel Program. This report provides an overall assessment of the programs’ cost and
schedule, alternatives for improving program effectiveness and efficiency, and actions the Army
has and is taking to improve the programs.
Should the Congress wish to consider changing the programs’ current path, this report
discusses several options for addressing the key factors affecting the programs. We are not
taking a position on the options or current approach, rather the options are presented in
context of the tradeoffs they present.
We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities. We are providing it to you
because of your oversight responsibilities for chemical weapons disposal programs.
B-266135
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. We will make copies
available to others upon request.
This report was prepared under the direction of David R. Warren, Director, Defense
Management Issues, who may be reached at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any
questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix VI.
Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General
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B-266135
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GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary
Purpose
Since 1985, the Army has spent $3.2 billion on its programs for destroying
the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and planning for the disposal of
nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel. Today, the programs are still in
the early stages of implementation and the Army estimates that
$24.4 billion more will be needed to complete them.1 Since 1990, GAO has
issued a number of reports addressing opportunities to improve various
aspects of the disposal programs. Due to continuing congressional and
public interest about the progress and cost of the programs, GAO prepared
this report under its basic legislative responsibilities to provide an overall
assessment of the (1) programs’ cost and schedule, (2) alternatives for
improving program effectiveness and efficiency, and (3) actions the Army
has and is taking to improve the programs.
Background
In 1985, the Congress passed Public Law 99-145 directing the Army to
destroy the U.S. stockpile of obsolete chemical agents and munitions. The
stockpile consists of rockets, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks, and bulk
containers, which contain nerve and mustard agents. It is stored at eight
sites in the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific
Ocean. To comply with congressional direction, the Army established the
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and developed a plan to incinerate
the agents and munitions on site in specially designed facilities.
Recognizing that the stockpile program did not include all chemical
warfare materiel requiring disposal, the Congress directed the Army in
1992 to plan for the disposal of materiel not included in the stockpile. This
materiel, some of which dates back as far as World War I, consists of
binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel,
recovered chemical weapons, former production facilities, and buried
chemical warfare materiel.2 In 1992, the Army established the
Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program to dispose of the materiel.
In 1993, the United States signed the U.N.-sponsored Chemical Weapons
Convention. In October 1996, the 65th nation ratified the convention
making the treaty effective on April 29, 1997.3 If the U.S. Senate approves
1
The programs’ combined life-cycle cost estimate is $27.6 billion. This amount includes $12.4 billion for
the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and $15.2 billion for the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel
Program.
2
Binary weapons are formed from two nonlethal elements through a chemical reaction after the
munitions are fired or launched. The weapons were manufactured, stored, and transported with only
one of the chemical elements in the weapon. The second element was to be loaded into the weapon at
the battlefield.
3
The convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation ratified the treaty.
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Executive Summary
the convention, it could affect implementation of the disposal programs.4
Through ratification, the United States will agree to dispose of its
(1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile, binary chemical weapons,
recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical weapon production
facilities by April 29, 2007, and (2) miscellaneous chemical warfare
materiel by April 29, 2002. If a country is unable to maintain the
convention’s disposal schedule, the convention’s Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons may grant a one-time extension of up to
5 years. Under the terms of the convention, chemical warfare materiel
buried before 1977 is exempt from disposal as long as it remains buried.
Should the United States choose to excavate the sites and remove the
chemical materiel, the provisions of the convention would apply. As of
December 1996, the Senate has not approved the convention. However,
the United States is still committed by public law to destroying its
chemical stockpile and related warfare materiel.
In prior reports, GAO expressed concern about the Army’s lack of progress
and the rising cost of the disposal programs. (See Related GAO Products.)
In 1991, GAO reported that continued problems in the program indicated
that increased costs and additional time to destroy the chemical stockpile
should be expected. GAO recommended that the Army determine whether
faster and less costly technologies were available to destroy the stockpile.5
In a 1995 report on the nonstockpile program, GAO concluded that the
Army’s plans for disposing of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel
were not final and, as a result, its cost estimate was likely to change.6 On
July 13, 1995, GAO testified that the Army had experienced significant cost
growth and delays in executing its stockpile disposal program and that
further cost growth and schedule slippages could occur.7
Results in Brief
While there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical
stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of
consensus among the Department of Defense (DOD) and affected states
and localities about the destruction method that should be used. As a
result, the cost and schedule for the disposal programs are uncertain.
4
Under the U.S. Constitution, treaties must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.
5
Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule Slippages Are Likely to
Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991).
6
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel Can Be Improved
(GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994).
7
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13,
1995).
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Executive Summary
However, they will cost more than the estimated $24.4 billion above
current expenditures and take longer than currently planned. The key
factors impacting the programs include public concerns over the safety of
incineration, compliance with environmental laws and regulations,
legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal
technologies.
The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule are largely
driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in
agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining stockpile
sites. Based on program experience, reaching agreement has consistently
taken longer than the Army anticipated. For example, the Army has
consistently underestimated the time required to obtain environmental
permits for the disposal facilities. Furthermore, congressional direction in
the 1997 Authorization and Appropriations Acts to research and develop
alternative technologies to destroy assembled chemical munitions
indicates that there are continued public concerns about the proposed
disposal method. Until DOD and the affected states and localities reach
agreement on a disposal method for the remaining stockpile sites, the
Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy. Moreover, many of the
problems experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to affect the
Army’s ability to implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program.
For example, efforts to dispose of nonstockpile materiel are likely to be
driven by the need to obtain state and local approvals for destruction
methods. In addition, more time is needed for the Army to prove that its
proposed disposal method for the nonstockpile program will be safe and
effective and accepted by the affected states and localities.
Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns
associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been
made by members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the
programs’ basic approach to destruction. However, the suggestions create
trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in existing legal
requirements. These suggestions have included deferring plans for
additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to
incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national
or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare
materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal
facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying existing laws and
regulations to standardize environmental requirements.
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Executive Summary
Notwithstanding these overarching issues, DOD and the Army have taken
actions in response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations
to improve program management. In December 1994, DOD designated the
Army’s chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile
and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition
program. The objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal
schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of
program oversight. In addition, the Army initiated actions to identify
options for reducing costs. Army officials have identified cost-reduction
initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, that could
potentially reduce program costs by $673 million. However, the Army
cannot implement some of the more significant initiatives without the
cooperation and approval of state regulatory agencies.
Principal Findings
The Stockpile Program’s
Cost and Schedule Are
Uncertain, but Will Exceed
Current Estimates
The stockpile program will likely exceed its $12.4 billion estimate and take
longer than the legislative completion date of December 2004.8 This is
because reaching agreement on site specific disposal methods has
consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. Public concerns
about the safety of incineration have (1) resulted in additional
environmental requirements, (2) slowed the permitting of new
incinerators, and (3) required the Army to research disposal alternatives.
Since 1985, the Army’s cost estimate for the stockpile disposal program
has increased seven-fold, from an initial estimate of $1.7 billion to
$12.4 billion, and the planned completion date has been delayed from 1994
to 2004. Although the Army is committed to destroying the stockpile by the
legislatively imposed deadline of December 31, 2004, it is unlikely to meet
that date. Only two of the nine planned disposal facilities are built and
operating, 4 percent of the stockpile has been destroyed, and
environmental permitting issues at the individual sites continue to delay
construction of the remaining facilities. For example, since the Army
developed the most recent cost and schedule estimate in February 1996,
the plant construction schedule has slipped at Anniston, Alabama; Blue
Grass, Kentucky; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; and Umatilla,
Oregon.
8
Approximately $1 billion of the estimated $12.4 billion is associated with the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program.
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Executive Summary
Predicting the disposal schedule for the various sites is difficult. According
to Army officials, this is partly due to the uncertainty of the time required
to satisfy changing environmental requirements. For example, although
based on federal requirements, individual state environmental
requirements differ and are occasionally changed. In addition, according
to the Army, the original scope of the health risk assessment to operate the
disposal facilities was not completely defined, the health assessment
requirements have changed, and the requirements currently vary from
state to state. According to DOD officials, states have modified the
requirements of their health risk assessments well into the process,
delaying the development of the final assessment document. According to
Environmental Protection Agency officials, the agency has issued several
guidance documents concerning health risk assessments and has tried to
keep the Army informed of the changes and updates in the guidance. In
addition, the Environmental Protection Agency has advised the Army to
meet with state officials early in the process to agree on the methodology
and standards to use in the development of the assessments.
Based on program experience, the Army’s 1996 schedule does not provide
sufficient time for the Army to complete the environmental approval
process.9 For example, the schedule for the Anniston disposal facility
includes a grace period of a month for any slippage in the construction,
systemization, or operation to meet the legislative completion date of
December 31, 2004. Although the Army estimated that the permit would
have been issued by the end of September 1996, Alabama regulatory
officials expect the permit to be issued in June or July 1997—a slippage of
approximately 8 months in the schedule. The Army’s revised schedule
shows Alabama issuing the permit at the end of March 1997. Based on
current expectations, disposal operations at Anniston would extend to
mid-2005.
In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress directed DOD
to conduct an assessment of alternative technologies for the disposal of
assembled chemical munitions.10 The act also directed the Secretary of
Defense to report on the assessment by December 31, 1997. Similarly, the
1997 DOD Appropriations Act provided $40 million to conduct a pilot
9
Department of Defense’s Interim Status Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, DOD
(Apr. 15, 1996).
10
In the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress directed the Army to report on
potential technological alternatives to incineration. Consequently, in August 1994, the Army initiated a
program to investigate, develop, and support testing of alternative disposal technologies for the two
bulk-only stockpile sites—Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Newport Chemical Activity,
Indiana. This program is still in the development and testing phase.
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Executive Summary
program to identify and demonstrate two or more alternatives to the
baseline incineration process for the disposal of assembled chemical
munitions. The act also prohibited DOD from obligating any funds for
constructing disposal facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo,
Colorado, until 180 days after the Secretary reports on the alternatives.
Although the prohibition applies only to Blue Grass and Pueblo, public
concerns about incineration may prompt state regulators at other
locations to delay their final decisions to permit incinerators until the
Secretary reports his findings.
According to Army officials, alternative technologies may not reduce costs
or shorten disposal operations but are likely to be acceptable to a larger
segment of the public than incineration. The Army is currently researching
technological alternatives to dispose of chemical agents at the two
bulk-only stockpile sites. It is also planning to develop a program to
respond to recent congressional direction to research alternative
technologies to dispose of assembled chemical munitions. According to
the National Research Council, the Army has successfully involved the
state and the public in its alternative technology project for the two
bulk-only stockpile sites, demonstrating the importance of public
involvement to the progress of a program.11 The development of
alternative disposal technologies for assembled chemical munitions
provides the Army the mechanism for encouraging public involvement and
establishing common objectives for the remaining disposal sites.
The Nonstockpile
Program’s Cost and
Schedule Are Also
Uncertain
The Army has spent $105.9 million and estimates that the nonstockpile
program could cost another $15.1 billion and take nearly 40 years to
complete. However, given the factors driving the program, it is uncertain
how long the program will take or cost. The program is driven by the
uncertainties surrounding buried chemical warfare materiel and unproven
disposal methods. Although Army officials are confident that the proposed
disposal systems will function as planned, the Army needs more time to
prove that the systems will safely and effectively destroy all nonstockpile
materiel and be accepted by the affected states and communities.
Environmental issues similar to those experienced in the stockpile
program are also likely to affect the Army’s ability to obtain the
environmental approvals and permits that virtually all nonstockpile
activities require.
11
Public Involvement and the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, National Research Council
(Oct. 25, 1996).
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Executive Summary
The Army estimates that it can dispose of binary weapons, recovered
chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous
chemical warfare materiel within the time frames established by the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Under the terms of the convention,
chemical warfare materiel buried before 1977 is exempt from disposal as
long as it remains buried. Although the Army estimates that buried
chemical materiel accounts for $14.5 billion (95 percent) of the
nonstockpile program cost, the Army is still exploring potential sites and
has little and often imprecise information about the type and amount of
materiel buried. The Army estimated that it will take until 2033 to identify,
recover, and dispose of buried nonstockpile materiel.
Also, additional time is needed for the Army to demonstrate that its mobile
disposal systems are safe and effective and will meet state environmental
requirements. The Army’s disposal concept is based on developing mobile
systems capable of moving from one location to the next where the
munitions are remotely detoxified and the waste is transported to a
commercial hazardous waste facility. Although the systems may operate in
a semi-fixed mode, they are scheduled to be available for mobile use at
recovered and burial sites after 1998. Whether the systems are allowed to
operate at a particular location will depend on the state regulatory agency
with authority over the disposal operations. In addition, public acceptance
or rejection of the mobile systems will affect their transportation plans
and disposal operations.
Alternatives to the
Programs’ Basic Approach
to Destruction
Recognizing the difficulty of resolving the public concerns associated with
each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change
the programs’ basic approach to destruction. For example, Members of the
Congress and officials from environmental groups and affected states and
counties have suggested deferring plans for additional disposal facilities
until an acceptable alternative technology to incineration is developed.
Congressional members have also suggested consolidating disposal
operations at a national or regional sites. In addition, officials of various
DOD organizations have suggested destroying selected nonstockpile
chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a
centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying
existing laws and regulations to standardize environmental requirements.
Deferring disposal operations may eliminate much of the public concern
that has influenced the current approach to destroying the chemical
stockpile because alternative technologies are likely to be acceptable to a
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Executive Summary
larger segment of the affected states and local communities than
incineration. However, given the current status of alternative technologies,
the cost and schedule would remain uncertain, and there would be a
corresponding increase in the risk of an accident from continued storage
of the munitions. Although the Army has been researching technological
alternatives to incineration for chemical agents stored in bulk containers,
only recently have research and testing demonstrated potentially effective
alternatives. Currently, there is no proven alternative technology to
incineration capable of safely and effectively destroying assembled
chemical munitions.
Consolidating disposal operations could reduce construction and
procurement costs, but the required transportation of chemical munitions
could be an insurmountable barrier. This option would extend the disposal
schedule and result in increased risk not only from storage but also from
handling and transportation. Although consolidating disposal operations
could reduce estimated facility construction and operation costs by as
much as $2.6 billion, the savings would be reduced by uncertain but
potentially significant transportation and emergency preparedness costs.
To help reduce costs, the Army would have to consolidate three or more
stockpile sites, develop less expensive transportation containers, and
control emergency response costs. In 1988, the Army and many in the
Congress rejected transporting the chemical stockpile weapons to a
national or regional disposal sites because of the increased risk to the
public and the environment from moving the munitions. DOD and Army
officials continue to be concerned about the safety of moving chemical
weapons and public opposition to transportation of the munitions has
grown since 1988.
Similarly, using the chemical stockpile facilities or a national disposal
facility to destroy nonstockpile chemical materiel has the potential for
reducing costs. Although selected nonstockpile items could be destroyed
in stockpile disposal facilities, the 1986 DOD Authorization Act, and
subsequent legislation, specifies that the chemical stockpile disposal
facilities may not be used for any purpose other than the disposal of
stockpile weapons. This legislative provision, in some cases, necessitates
that the Army implement separate disposal operations for nonstockpile
materiel along side of the stockpile facilities. In its 1995 implementation
plan, the Army suggested that the stockpile disposal facilities could be
used to process some nonstockpile weapons, depending on the location,
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Executive Summary
the type of chemical weapon or materiel, and condition.12 Another method
for destroying nonstockpile chemical materiel could be based on the use
of a central disposal facility with equipment designed specifically for
destroying nonstockpile materiel. Although a national disposal facility
could reduce program costs, the legislative restrictions on the
transportation of nonstockpile chemical material and the prevalent public
attitude that such a disposal facility should not be located in their vicinity
would be significant obstacles that would have to be resolved.
Modifying existing laws and regulations to standardize environmental
requirements could enhance both the stockpile and nonstockpile
programs’ stability and control costs. The current process of individual
states establishing their own environmental laws and requirements and the
prevalent public attitude that the Army’s disposal facilities should not be
located in their vicinity have been obstacles to the stockpile disposal
program and are also likely to affect the nonstockpile program. For
example, individual state environmental requirements differ and are
occasionally changed. As a result, there is no standard environmental
protocol and requirements for stockpile and nonstockpile disposal sites.
According to the Army, establishing standardized environmental
requirements for all disposal sites would enhance the programs’ stability.
However, efforts to modify existing laws and regulations to standardize
the environmental requirements for chemical weapons disposal would
likely be resisted by the affected states and localities, and environmental
organizations.
Steps Taken to Improve
the Disposal Programs
DOD and the Army have taken encouraging steps, some in response to GAO’s
recommendations, to improve their management and oversight of the
stockpile and nonstockpile programs. In December 1994, DOD designated
the Army’s chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile
and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition
program. The objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal
schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of
program oversight. In response to recommendations by the National
Research Council and GAO, the Army initiated the Enhanced Stockpile
Surveillance Program in 1995 to improve its monitoring and inspection of
chemical munitions. On the basis of those activities, the Army estimates
that the stockpile will be reasonably stable through 2013.
12
Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program Implementation Plan, U.S. Army Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization (Aug. 1995).
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Executive Summary
The Army’s review of the stockpile disposal program has identified several
promising cost-reduction initiatives, but the Army cannot implement some
of the more significant initiatives without the cooperation and approval of
state regulatory agencies. Army officials estimated that the initial
cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, could
potentially reduce program costs by $673 million. The Army plans to
submit its assessment of the initiatives to the Congress with its fiscal
year 1998 budget request. It also plans to identify additional cost
reductions as the stockpile program progresses.
Matters for
Congressional
Consideration
As the Congress continues its oversight of the chemical stockpile and
nonstockpile disposal programs and considers modifications or
alternatives to the current approach, it may wish to include consideration
of the suggestions discussed in this report relating to the creation of
alternative technologies, consolidation of stockpile disposal operations,
utilization of stockpile facilities for nonstockpile items, centralization of
nonstockpile destruction, and standardization of environmental laws and
requirements.
Agency Comments
provided written comments on a draft of this report and they are
presented in appendix V. DOD stated that the draft accurately and fairly
characterized the current status of the disposal programs and generally
concurred with the suggestions of the draft report that changes in existing
legal requirements would be necessary to change the current path of the
disposal programs. DOD also concurred with GAO’s suggestions that should
the Congress decide to consider modifications or alternatives to the
current approach, it could consider the ones to establish a centralized
disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel and to modify existing laws and
regulations to standardize environmental requirements for chemical
weapons disposal. DOD recommended against consideration of the options
to defer incineration plans, consolidate disposal operations, and to use
stockpile facilities for destroying nonstockpile items.
DOD
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Contents
Executive Summary
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
The Chemical
Stockpile Disposal
Program Will Require
More Time and Funds
Than Currently
Planned
Chapter 3
The Nonstockpile
Program Is Likely to
Be Affected by Issues
Similar to Those in
the Stockpile Program
Chapter 4
Conclusions, Matters
for Congressional
Consideration, and
Agency Comments
Appendixes
4
The U.S. Chemical Warfare Materiel
Evolution of the Disposal Process
Management Structure of the Disposal Programs
International Efforts to Eliminate Chemical Agents and Weapons
Our Prior Concerns With the Army’s Disposal Programs
The Army’s Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
Program Delays Past 2004 Are Likely
Program Costs Will Likely Exceed
$12.4 Billion
The Stockpile Should Be Stable Through 2013
Program Alternatives Generate Trade-offs
The Army Is Far From Accomplishing Its Objectives
Recovery and Disposal of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel Will
Be Problematic
Environmental Laws and Requirements Govern Most
Nonstockpile Activities
The Army’s Mobile Disposal Systems Are Not Fully Developed
Opportunities for Cost and Schedule Reductions Are Limited
Conclusions
Matters for Congressional Consideration
Agency Comments
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Appendix II: Appropriated, Obligated, and Disbursement Data for
Fiscal Years 1988 Through 1997
Page 14
16
16
18
21
22
24
25
25
28
33
33
34
40
40
42
45
47
52
55
55
56
56
58
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GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Contents
Appendix III: Summary of Major Federal Environmental Laws
Affecting the Army’s Disposal Programs
Appendix IV: Chronology of the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization
Program
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix VI: Major Contributors to This Report
Related GAO Products
Tables
Figures
62
63
66
69
71
Table 2.1: Slippage in the Army’s Estimated Dates for
Construction Permits at the Remaining Seven Disposal Sites
Table 2.2: The Army’s Initial Cost-Reduction Initiatives as of
August 1996
Table 3.1: Summary of Nonstockpile Program Activities
Table 3.2: Summary of the Nonstockpile Disposal Systems and
Estimated Operational Dates
Table II.1: Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
Table II.2: Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project
Table II.3: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project
Table II.4: Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program
31
Figure 1.1: Percent of Appropriated Funds by Category for Fiscal
Years 1988 through 1996
Figure 1.2: The Baseline Disassembly and High-Temperature
Incineration Process
Figure 2.1: The U.S. Stockpile of Chemical Agents and Munitions
Figure 2.2: Key Dates for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program After January 2004
Figure 3.1: Potential Locations With Buried Chemical Warfare
Materiel
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Drawing of the Rapid Response System
Figure 3.3: Conceptual Drawing of the Munitions Management
Device-1
17
38
41
47
60
60
60
61
20
26
27
43
49
51
Abbreviations
DOD
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GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 1
Introduction
For nearly 80 years, the United States produced and stored chemical
weapons to deter other countries from using them against U.S. military
personnel. In 1985, the Congress directed the Department of Defense
(DOD) to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and establish a
management organization within the Army to be responsible for the
disposal programs. In 1992, the Congress directed the Army to plan for the
disposal of chemical warfare materiel not included in the stockpile. The
Army has spent nearly $3.2 billion on its efforts and estimates that it will
cost $24.4 billion and take nearly 40 years to dispose of the remaining
chemical stockpile weapons and nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel.
Although the Army is committed to destroying the chemical stockpile by
the legislatively imposed deadline of December 31, 2004, only two of the
nine planned disposal facilities are built and operating, 4 percent of the
stockpile and little of the nonstockpile materiel have been destroyed, and
environmental issues continue to delay the remaining facilities. Currently,
the Army has more than 30,000 tons of chemical agent stored at 9 sites and
an unknown amount potentially buried at 64 locations in the United States
and its territories.
The U.S. Chemical
Warfare Materiel
U.S. chemical warfare materiel is classified as either chemical stockpile or
nonstockpile materiel. Since World War I, the United States has
maintained a stockpile of chemical weapons and agents to deter the use of
chemical weapons against its troops. The stockpile consists of rockets,
bombs, projectiles, spray tanks, and bulk containers. Some munitions
contain nerve agents, which can disrupt the nervous system and lead to
loss of muscular control and death. Others contain a series of mustard
agents that blister the skin and can be lethal in large amounts.
Nonstockpile materiel consists of all other chemical warfare items,
including binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare
materiel, recovered chemical weapons, former production facilities, and
buried chemical warfare materiel.
Historically, DOD has placed a higher priority on the destruction of the
chemical stockpile because most nonstockpile items did not pose an
immediate hazard to the environment or public health. Potential threats to
the chemical stockpile include external events such as earthquakes,
airplane crashes, and tornadoes; and internal events such as spontaneous
leakage of chemical agents, accidents during normal handling and
maintenance activities, and self-ignition of propellant. Nonstockpile items,
such as binary weapons’ components, miscellaneous warfare materiel, and
recovered chemical weapons, were placed in storage and old chemical
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production facilities were closed years ago. Although documentation
surveys, interviews, and site visits have been conducted, much of the
information concerning burial sites remains unknown. The priority for
destroying nonstockpile materiel has increased because of recent
accidental discoveries of buried materiel, congressional interest, and
international efforts to destroy chemical weapons.
The Army has spent nearly $3.2 billion on its efforts to destroy its chemical
stockpile weapons and nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel. (See
app. II.) As shown in figure 1.1, more than half of the funds has been
appropriated for operations and maintenance activities, such as operating
salaries and utilities, and systems engineering and program management.
The balance has funded procurement of equipment, construction of
facilities, and research and development activities.
Figure 1.1: Percent of Appropriated
Funds by Category for Fiscal Years
1988 through 1996
Procurement
4%
Research and development
•
• 31%
52% •
Operations and maintenance
13%
•
Construction
Source: Based on data from DOD’s Selected Acquisition Report dated December 31, 1995.
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Evolution of the
Disposal Process
From 1917 through the 1960s, obsolete or unserviceable chemical warfare
agents and munitions were disposed of by open pit burning, land burial,
and ocean dumping. In 1969, an Army plan to dispose of chemical agents
and munitions at sea raised public concerns about the safety of
transporting chemical weapons from their storage sites to a port of
embarkation and about the potential effects of ocean dumping on the
environment. In June 1969, the National Academy of Sciences
recommended that ocean dumping be avoided and that public health and
environmental protection be emphasized. It suggested two alternatives to
ocean disposal: incineration of mustard agents and chemical neutralization
of nerve agents. In response, the Army stopped ocean dumping operations.1
(See chronology in app. IV.)
Use of Incineration and
Chemical Neutralization
During the 1970s, the Army destroyed obsolete chemical weapons
primarily by high-temperature incineration or by chemical neutralization.
The neutralization process involves altering the chemical, physical, and
toxicological properties of a chemical warfare agent to render it
ineffective for use as intended. In 1984, the National Research Council,
under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, decided that
incineration was the more desirable disposal method. It concluded that the
neutralization process was more costly and produced larger quantities of
waste than incineration. In 1986, the Army submitted to the Congress a
plan to dispose of the chemical stockpile. Its plan considered the costs and
potential problems associated with three options: (1) transferring the
entire stockpile to one site for disposal, (2) transferring it to two regional
disposal sites, and (3) operating separate disposal facilities at each of the
storage locations. In 1988, the Army formally announced that on-site
incineration was its preferred disposal method. The Army and many in the
Congress rejected transporting the chemical stockpile weapons to a
national or regional disposal sites because of the increased risk to the
public and the environment from moving the munitions.
The Army’s Baseline
Incineration Process
A baseline incineration process uses a reverse-assembly procedure that
drains the chemical agent from the weapons and containers and takes
apart the weapons in the reverse order of assembly. (See fig. 1.2.) Once
disassembled, the chemical agent and weapon parts are incinerated in
separate furnaces and the gaseous and solid waste is treated. Liquid brine
resulting from the treatment of exhaust gases in the pollution abatement
1
The last chemical munitions ocean dump occurred in August 1970.
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system is dried to reduce the volume and transported to a commercial
hazardous waste management facility.
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Figure 1.2: The Baseline Disassembly and High-Temperature Incineration Process
Dunnage
The dunnage incinerator
burns packing materials
and wooden pallets.
Projectile
Burster and
Supplementary
Charge
Explosives and
propellants are
incinerated in the
deactivation furnace.
The pollution-abatement
system cools and
"scrubs" exhaust gases,
chemically neutralizes
components, and
removes pollutants.
Chemical
weapons such as
this projectile are
taken apart by
machines in the
reverse order of
assembly.
Chemical Agent
The liquid incinerator
destroys the chemical
agent and
decontamination
solutions.
Metal Body
The metal parts furnace
decontaminates the
metals, which may be
sold as scrap.
Other residual materials
are shipped to a
hazardous-waste
landfill.
Source: Based on data provided by the Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.
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Potential Alternatives to
Incineration
In November 1991, because of public concern about the safety of
incineration, the Army requested the National Research Council to
evaluate potential technological alternatives to the baseline incineration
process. In the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 102-484), the
Congress directed the Army to use the National Research Council’s
evaluation and report on potential technological alternatives to
incineration.2 The Congress also directed the Army to consider safety,
environmental protection, and cost-effectiveness when evaluating
alternative technologies. Consequently, in August 1994, the Army initiated
a more aggressive research and development program, called the
Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project, to investigate, develop,
and support testing of two technologies based on chemical neutralization
of chemical agents at the bulk-only stockpile sites—Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland, and Newport Chemical Activity, Indiana. In addition,
three other technologies—molten metal pyrolysis, high-temperature
hydrogenation, and electrochemical oxidation—have been tested and are
undergoing further development by the commercial firms promoting them.
This research and development effort is conducted in conjunction with
activities to implement the baseline incineration program.
In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201), the
Congress directed DOD to conduct an assessment of alternative
technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions. The
authorization act also directed the Secretary of Defense to report on this
assessment by December 31, 1997. Similarly, the 1997 DOD Appropriations
Act (P.L. 104-208) provided $40 million to conduct a pilot program to
identify and demonstrate two or more alternatives to the baseline
incineration process for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions.
The appropriations act also prohibited DOD from obligating any funds for
constructing disposal facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo,
Colorado, until 180 days after the Secretary reports on the alternatives.
Management
Structure of the
Disposal Programs
The Army was assigned responsibility for the chemical weapons stockpile
in 1981 when DOD designated the Army as its single manager for
ammunition. In March 1991, DOD directed that the Army be accountable for
the disposal of all chemical warfare material. The Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), as the executive agent
for the chemical disposal programs, has oversight and policy authority for
the destruction of the chemical stockpile weapons and nonstockpile
2
U.S. Army’s Alternative Demilitarization Technology Report for Congress, Department of the Army
(Apr. 11, 1994).
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materiel. The Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization is
responsible for implementing the disposal programs and ensuring the
maximum protection to the environment, the public, and personnel.
Because of increasing disposal costs and schedule slippage, changing
legislative and regulatory requirements, and growing public concern about
incineration, DOD designated the Army’s chemical demilitarization
program, consisting of both stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and
materiel, as a major defense acquisition program in December 1994. The
designation was intended to (1) stabilize the disposal schedule, (2) control
costs, and (3) provide more discipline and higher levels of program
oversight. As such, the Army has been required to
•
•
•
develop a program cost and schedule baseline;
prepare quarterly defense acquisition executive summaries, which are
intended to provide an early warning that the baseline may be exceeded;
and
submit an annual selected acquisition report to the Congress, which
includes variances from the program baseline schedule and cost.
Other organizations within and separate from DOD contribute to the
programs. For example, at formerly used defense sites, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers has overall responsibility for site investigations,
planning, excavations, and environmental cleanups of burial sites. In
addition, the Department of Health and Human Services oversees public
health issues, the Department of Transportation advises DOD on
transportation issues, and the Environmental Protection Agency oversees
the environmental aspects of the programs.
International Efforts
to Eliminate Chemical
Agents and Weapons
The 1925 Geneva Protocol established the international norm against the
use of chemical weapons in combat, but did not prohibit the production or
deployment of chemical agents and munitions. In 1989 and 1990, the
United States and Russia entered into two bilateral agreements that
required sharing of data on their respective chemical stockpiles, provided
for visits to confirm the accuracy of the shared data, and would eliminate
chemical weapons production and most of their chemical weapons.
In 1993, the United States, Russia, and more than 150 nations signed the
U.N.-sponsored Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention.
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In October 1996, the 65th nation ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention, making the convention effective on April 29, 1997.3 However,
as of December 1996, the United States and Russia have not ratified the
convention. The group of ratifiers includes major industrial states such as
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain; and a wide geographical range of nations such as Algeria,
Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Brazil, Czech Republic, Georgia, India,
Ireland, Latvia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Oman, Poland, Romania,
Slovak Republic, South Africa, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uruguay.
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and other countries, mainly
small island nations, have not yet signed the convention.
If the U.S. Senate approves the convention, it could affect implementation
of the disposal programs.4 Through ratification, the United States will
agree to dispose of its (1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile, binary
chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical
weapon production facilities by April 29, 2007, and (2) miscellaneous
chemical warfare materiel by April 29, 2002. If a country is unable to
maintain the convention’s disposal schedule, the convention’s
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons may grant a
one-time extension of up to 5 years. Under the terms of the convention,
chemical warfare materiel buried before 1977 is exempt from disposal as
long as it remains buried. Should the United States choose to excavate the
sites and remove the chemical materiel, the provisions of the convention
would apply. On November 30, 1993, the President submitted the
convention to the U.S. Senate for its approval. The Senate held hearings in
1994 and 1996, but has not approved the convention. However, the United
States is still committed by public law to destroying its chemical stockpile
and related warfare materiel.
Once Russia ratifies the convention, it will be committed to destroying its
chemical warfare stockpile by April 29, 2007, with a 5-year extension if
needed. However, Russia does not have an operational capability to
destroy large quantities of chemical weapons and would need to construct
several chemical weapons disposal facilities to meet the convention’s
requirement.5
3
The convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation ratified the convention.
4
Under the U.S. Constitution, treaties must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.
5
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-222,
Sept. 27, 1996).
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Since 1990, we have issued a number of reports that focused on
interrelated issues involving cost and schedule estimates, performance,
environmental compliance, stability of chemical weapons, and alternative
disposal technologies. (See Related GAO Products.) For example:
Our Prior Concerns
With the Army’s
Disposal Programs
•
•
•
•
•
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management
(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13, 1995). We reported that there was a possibility
of further cost growth and schedule slippage for the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program.
Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67, Dec. 22,
1994). We reported that the Army lacked data to conclusively predict the
stability of stockpiled chemical weapons.
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare
Materiel Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994). We reported that
the Army’s plans for disposing of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel
were not final and, as a result, its cost estimate was likely to change.
Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of
Alternatives to Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar. 18, 1994). We reported
that alternative disposal technologies identified as most likely to be
feasible for the chemical stockpile program were in the initial stages of
development and over a decade away from operation.
Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule
Slippages Are Likely to Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991). We
reported that continued problems in the chemical stockpile program
indicated that increased costs and additional time to destroy the chemical
stockpile should be expected. We recommended that the Army determine
whether faster and less costly technologies were available to destroy the
chemical stockpile.
Our objectives, scope, and methodology are described in appendix I.
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In 1985, the Congress directed the Army to destroy the U.S. stockpile of
chemical agents and munitions. To comply with congressional direction,
the Army established the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and
developed a plan to incinerate the agents and munitions on site in
specially designed facilities. The Army has spent $2.6 billion and estimates
that the stockpile program could cost another $9.8 billion and take until
December 2004 to complete. However, the program will likely cost more
than estimated and continue past the estimated completion date. This is
because reaching agreement on site specific disposal methods has
consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. Furthermore, recent
congressional direction in the 1997 Authorization and Appropriations Acts
to research and develop alternative technologies to destroy assembled
chemical munitions indicates that there is continued public concerns
about the incineration disposal method. Recognizing the difficulty of
satisfactorily resolving the public concerns associated with each
individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change the
program’s basic approach to destruction. These have included developing
an acceptable alternative disposal technology to incineration and
consolidating disposal operations at a national or regional sites. Although
many suggestions offer some benefit, no one change is likely to materially
reduce costs, shorten the disposal schedule, and increase public
acceptance. They also generate other obstacles and issues that need to be
resolved to make them viable.
The Army’s Chemical
Stockpile Disposal
Program
In the DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-145), the
Congress mandated that the Army destroy the U.S. stockpile of obsolete
chemical agents and munitions, which are stored at eight sites in the
continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. (See
fig. 2.1.) As of December 15, 1995, the stockpile consisted of 3.3 million
items.1 The objectives of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program are to
(1) destroy the stockpile of unitary chemical weapons and (2) provide for
the maximum protection of the environment, the public, and personnel
involved in the storage, handling, and disposal of the stockpile.
1
The chemical weapons stockpile information was declassified on January 9, 1996.
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Figure 2.1: The U.S. Stockpile of Chemical Agents and Munitions
Umatilla Depot Activity,
Oregon
Number of items: 220,599
Tons of agent: 3,717
Newport Chemical Activity,
Indiana
Number of items: 1,690
Tons of agent: 1,269
Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland
Number of items: 1,818
Tons of agent: 1,625
Blue Grass Army Depot,
Kentucky
Tooele Army Depot,
Utah
Number of items: 101,764
Tons of agent: 523
Number of items: 1,138,488
Tons of agent: 13,616
Anniston Army Depot,
Alabama
Pueblo Depot Activity,
Colorado
Number of items: 661,529
Tons of agent: 2,254
Number of items: 780,078
Tons of agent: 2,611
Hawaii
Pine Bluff Arsenal,
Arkansas
Number of items: 123,093
Tons of agent: 3,850
Johnston Atoll,
Pacific Ocean
Number of items: 292,121
Tons of agent: 1,134
Note: As of December 15, 1995.
Source: DOD.
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There are several key dates that congressional and defense
decisionmakers will consider as they determine future funding and
program direction for the stockpile program. (See fig. 2.2.) For example,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993
(P.L. 102-484) directed the Army to destroy the stockpile by December 31,
2004. If the United States ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
United States will agree to dispose of its unitary chemical weapons
stockpile by April 29, 2007, and the convention’s signatories may grant a
one-time extension of up to 5 years. In addition, on the basis of its
stockpile assessment and monitoring activities, the Army estimates that
the stockpile will be reasonably stable through 2013. However, according
to Army officials, most of the risk to chemical munitions in storage result
from external events such as earthquakes, airplane crashes, lightning
strikes, and tornadoes.
Figure 2.2: Key Dates for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program After January 2004
Chemical Weapons
Convention completion
date with a 5-year extension
Legislative
completion date
December 31, 2004
April 29, 2007
Chemical Weapons
Convention
completion date
April 29, 2012
2013
Estimated safe
storage date
Source: Based on data provided by the Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.
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The Army has taken encouraging steps, some in response to our
recommendations, to improve its management and oversight of the
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. In December 1994, DOD designated
the Army’s chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile
and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition
program. The objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal
schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of
program oversight. In addition, in response to the National Research
Council’s and our recommendations, the Army initiated the Enhanced
Stockpile Surveillance Program in 1995 to improve its monitoring and
inspection of chemical munitions.
The Army has also expanded its public outreach activities to promote
dialogue between the Army and the public. For example, the Army has
established storefront information offices near some of the storage sites,
developed public outreach pamphlets and information videos, distributed
information to public libraries and locations, provided toll-free telephone
numbers, and conducted town meetings. However, the National Research
Council recently recommended that the Army increase substantially and
institutionalize public involvement throughout the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program.2 The Council reported that the credibility of the Army
was low and that the treatment of public concerns had been inadequate. It
concluded that the Army’s public relations and outreach efforts to educate
the public about chemical stockpile activities by themselves will not be
enough to facilitate the safe and timely disposal of the stockpile. The
Council recommended that the Army expand its public affairs program to
ensure public involvement in the program, giving the affected
communities a participatory role and a sense of ownership in the
program’s decision-making process. According to the National Research
Council, the Army has successfully involved the state and the public in its
alternative technology project for the two bulk-only stockpile sites,
demonstrating the importance of public involvement to the progress of the
program.
Program Delays Past
2004 Are Likely
Although the Army is committed to destroying the stockpile by the
legislatively imposed deadline of December 31, 2004, its ability to meet
that date is questionable. The program cost and schedule are largely
driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in
agreement with the proposed disposal method. Historically, reaching
2
Public Involvement and the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, National Research Council
(Oct. 25, 1996).
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agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. Since
the Army began planning the destruction of the chemical weapon
stockpile in 1985, it has destroyed 4 percent of the stockpile, built and
operated two of nine proposed facilities, and the program has been
extended more than 10 years—from September 1994 to December 2004.
The Army plans to phase in the construction, systemization, and operation
of the remaining seven disposal facilities over the next 8 years. However,
environmental permits for the remaining facilities have already slipped by
3 years or more since April 1992. At the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility, obtaining Utah’s approval to operate the facility took 17 months
longer than the Army estimated it would in 1992.
Obtaining Environmental
Permits Will Require More
Time Than the Army Has
Allowed
Before constructing or operating a chemical weapon destruction facility,
the Army must obtain permits to comply with federal, state, and local
environmental laws and regulations. The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, as amended, regulates the storage, treatment, and disposal
of most chemical weapons and materiel. (Environmental laws are
summarized in app. III.) The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
controls hazardous waste through a permit process that requires
government approval for individuals who generate, transport, store, or
dispose of hazardous waste. Under the act, the Environmental Protection
Agency may authorize individual states to administer and enforce
hazardous waste programs that are as least as stringent as the federal
program. The act also allows states to establish requirements more
stringent than federal standards. The Clean Air Act, as amended, governs
potential sources of air pollutants and establishes emission standards. The
Army must obtain permits for air pollution control prior to operating a
chemical stockpile disposal facility.
According to the Army’s 1994 risk assessment, there was a high possibility
states would use their authority under these laws to delay or prevent the
construction of incinerators in their states.3 For example, states can place
restrictions on hazardous waste generators as well as the disposal of the
hazardous waste generated by the chemical agent incinerators, or prohibit
disposal of the waste within their jurisdictions. States may also simply
delay the permit review process for an inordinate amount of time. These
actions could increase the Army’s costs, cause it significant administrative
difficulties, or delay operations. To illustrate, before it will issue a permit
for a chemical stockpile disposal facility, Kentucky requires that
3
Programmatic Risk Assessment Final Report, U.S. Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency (Sept. 30,
1994).
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information showing that no alternative disposal method, including, but
not limited to, neutralization and transportation, exists or could be
developed. Maryland and Indiana have also passed laws or adopted
regulations specific to the disposal of chemical agents within their
jurisdictions.
Although the Army’s 1994 risk assessment acknowledges the potential for
delays due to environmental regulations, its program schedule provides
little leeway for dealing with potential problems at the remaining stockpile
sites. For example, the Army’s 1996 schedule only allows for slippage
ranging from 1 to 6 months for delays in the permitting process,
construction, systemization, and operation of the proposed facilities at
Anniston, Pine Bluff, and Umatilla.4 The schedule for the Anniston
Chemical Agent Disposal Facility shows that to destroy all of the chemical
munitions at Anniston by the end of December 2004, Alabama would have
to issue its permit to start construction no later than October 1996. Army
officials now estimate that the permit will be issued by March 31, 1997,
approximately 6 months later than scheduled. (See table 2.1.) Alabama
regulatory officials expect the permit to be issued in June or July 1997—a
slippage of approximately 8 months. Unless the Army can shorten
construction, systemization, or destruction time frames, disposal
operations at Anniston would extent to mid-2005.
4
Department of Defense’s Interim Status Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, DOD
(Apr. 15, 1996).
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Table 2.1: Slippage in the Army’s
Estimated Dates for Construction
Permits at the Remaining Seven
Disposal Sites
Estimated date of permit to start construction
Site
February 1996
schedulea
August 1996
scheduleb
Slippage
Aberdeen Proving
Groundc
Before January 1,
1999
November 12, 1998
None
Anniston Army Depot
Before October 1,
1996
March 31, 1997
6 months
Blue Grass Army
Depotd
Before January 1,
1998
September 20, 1998
None
Newport Chemical
Activityc
Before January 1,
2000
August 18, 1999
None
Pine Bluff Arsenal
Before October 1,
1996
June 24, 1997
9 months
Pueblo Depot Activityd
Before April 1, 1997
February 4, 1998
10 months
Umatilla Depot Activity
Before October 1,
1996
January 30, 1997
4 months
a
Based on DOD’s interim status assessment for the chemical demilitarization program dated
April 15, 1996.
b
Based on data provided by the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization dated
September 27, 1996.
c
Schedules are subject to change pending alternative technology decision for the bulk-only
stockpile sites.
d
Schedules are on hold as the result of the 1997 DOD Appropriations Act requirement to research
alternative technologies.
The February 1996 schedule for the Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility shows construction starting by the end of fiscal year 1996 and
provides a 6-month leeway to complete disposal operations by the end of
2004. Based on the Army’s current schedule for the environmental permits,
the start of construction in 1996 is no longer possible because the
schedule shows an issuance date of June 24, 1997—a slippage of 9 months.
This delay eliminated the 6-month leeway and operations now are likely to
continue past December 2004. The disposal schedule for the Umatilla
Chemical Agent Disposal Facility provides a leeway of 4 months. The
Army had expected Oregon to issue the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act and Clean Air Act permits for the facility by the end of
September 1996. However, Army officials had estimated that the permits
would have been issued by January 30, 1997, approximately 4 months later
than scheduled. This delay eliminated the grace period for starting
disposal operations at Umatilla.
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According to Army officials, implementation of the health risk assessment
requirement has added another layer of uncertainty to the schedule. They
said that the original scope of the health risk assessment to operate the
disposal facilities was not completely defined, the health assessment
requirements have changed, and the requirements currently vary from
state to state. According to DOD officials, states have modified the
requirements of their health risk assessments well into the process,
delaying the development of the final assessment document. According to
Environmental Protection Agency officials, the agency has issued several
guidance documents concerning the health risk assessments over the last
5 years and has tried to keep the Army informed of the changes and
updates in the guidance. In addition, the agency has advised the Army to
meet with state officials early in the process to agree on the methodology
and standards to use in the development of the risk assessment.
Public Support for More
Research on Alternative
Disposal Technologies
Congressional direction in the 1997 Authorization and Appropriations Acts
to research and develop alternative technologies to destroy assembled
chemical munitions indicates that there is continued public concerns
about the proposed disposal method. In the 1997 Authorization Act, the
Congress directed DOD to conduct an assessment of alternative
technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions. The act
also directed the Secretary of Defense to report on the assessment by
December 31, 1997. Similarly, the 1997 Appropriations Act provided
$40 million to conduct a pilot program to identify and demonstrate two or
more alternatives to the baseline incineration process for the disposal of
assembled chemical munitions. The act also prohibits DOD from obligating
any funds for constructing disposal facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and
Pueblo, Colorado, until 180 days after the Secretary reports on the
alternatives.
According to Army officials, the construction and the procurement of
equipment for the disposal facilities at Blue Grass and Pueblo has been
placed on hold because of the 1997 Appropriations Act’s requirement to
research alternative technologies. If the report is not issued before
December 31, 1997, the Army cannot obligate construction funds for Blue
Grass and Pueblo until June 30, 1998. This would delay the planned award
of the construction contract at Blue Grass by 6 months and the planned
award of the construction contract at Pueblo by 15 months. According to
these officials, the Army and the states will continue to work together to
process the environmental permits. However, a recent Army schedule
shows Blue Grass disposal operations ending in June 2005, 6 months past
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the mandated completion date. Although the prohibition applies only to
Blue Grass and Pueblo, public concerns about incineration may prompt
state regulators at other locations to delay their final decisions to permit
incinerators until the Secretary reports his findings.
Program Costs Will
Likely Exceed
$12.4 Billion
The Army has spent $2.6 billion and estimates that the stockpile program
could cost another $9.8 billion to complete. Since 1985, the Army’s cost
estimate for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program has increased
seven-fold, from an initial estimate of $1.7 billion to $12.4 billion.5 Reasons
for the cost increases include (1) program enhancements to respond to
concerns for maximizing the safety of the public and environment,
(2) delays in completing the operational verification tests at the Johnston
Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, (3) technical problems resulting in
lower than expected disposal rates, (4) additional legislative requirements,
and (5) implementation of the National Research Council’s
recommendations.
The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program will likely cost more than the
estimated $9.8 billion above current expenditures to complete because of
the schedule slippages since February 1996 and the additional costs to
research alternative disposal technologies. Schedule delays, such as those
previously discussed at Anniston, Blue Grass, Pine Bluff, Pueblo, and
Umatilla, will increase program cost at these locations. These delays
increase direct costs, including personnel, storage, emergency
preparedness, and program management at each disposal site. In addition,
the Congress appropriated the Army $40 million in fiscal year 1997 to
conduct a pilot program to identify and demonstrate two or more
alternatives to the baseline incineration process for the disposal of
assembled chemical munitions. This appropriation was not included in the
Army’s cost estimate.
The Stockpile Should
Be Stable Through
2013
On the basis of its stockpile assessment and monitoring programs, the
Army estimates that the stockpile will be reasonably stable through 2013.
Although continued storage of the M55 rockets is a concern, the Army will
continue to monitor the stockpile until it is destroyed and has developed a
contingency plan to deal with the M55 rockets, which pose a risk.
According to Army officials, most of the risk to chemical munitions in
5
Approximately $1 billion of the estimated $12.4 billion is associated with the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program.
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storage result from external events such as earthquakes, airplane crashes,
lightning strikes, and tornadoes.
In December 1994, we reported that the Army’s assessment that the
chemical stockpile could be safely stored until the legislatively imposed
deadline of December 31, 2004, was subject to question based on the
nature of the supporting information.6 The data on which the Army based
its assessment were old and may no longer represent the chemical
weapons in storage. For example, at that time, field samples of the M55
rocket propellant had not been taken since 1989. Also, the assessment did
not include an analysis of leaking munitions. Leaks increase the risk of
auto-ignition during handling, which could lead to fires and potential
explosions in the stockpile storage area. In addition, a contingency plan
for disposal of the rockets was needed because they cannot readily be
reconfigured to remove their propellant. Propellant is inherently unstable
and must be stabilized to help prevent reactions that could lead to a
spontaneous ignition. Manufacturers added stabilizing compounds, but
they deteriorate over time.
Recent Army initiatives to obtain better information to predict the safe
storage life of the stockpile, including the M55 rockets, are encouraging.
For example, the Army initiated an Enhanced Stockpile Assessment
Program to determine the effects of an agent on a propellant, identify the
most appropriate predictive methodology, develop sampling plans, and
perform periodic assessments. In 1995, the Army completed a
reassessment of the stability of the M55 rockets and concluded that the
likelihood of propellent ignition through 2013 was negligible. However,
data were obtained from leaker rockets on Johnston Atoll that were
consistent with the theory that exposure to agent accelerates the
degradation of the propellent stabilizer. Gaining a better understanding of
this chemical process and its impact on the rockets’ stability will be a
major thrust of the Army’s stockpile assessment activities in 1997.
Program Alternatives
Generate Trade-offs
The concern about incineration and the cost and progress of the disposal
programs have led to suggestions for alternative technologies, the
transportation of agents and munitions to a national or regional site, and
other measures to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Two widely
discussed suggestions are (1) changing the planned disposal technology to
something other than incineration or (2) transporting the weapons to a
regional or national site rather than building local disposal sites. Although
6
Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67, Dec. 22, 1994).
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changing the technology could improve public acceptance and using
national and regional sites could save money, these changes raise other
issues that present trade-offs for decisionmakers. Thus far, these
trade-offs have not been acceptable to one or more of the parties involved
in the program. In addition, the Army is developing other measures to
improve program effectiveness and efficiency.
Alternative Technologies
May Not Reduce Costs or
Shorten Disposal
Operations
Since 1994, the Army has been researching five technological alternatives
for destroying chemical agents stored in bulk containers. The results are
promising but, according to the Army, the alternative technologies are not
likely to significantly affect the program’s overall cost or duration.
Additionally, any alternative, including neutralization, will have its own set
of problems such as hazardous waste disposal and the possibility of leaks
or accidents.
In August 1994, the Army initiated a research and development project to
investigate, develop, and support testing of two technologies based on
chemical neutralization of chemical agents at the bulk-only stockpile
sites—Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Newport Chemical
Activity, Indiana. A neutralization process involves altering the chemical,
physical, and toxicological properties of a chemical warfare agent to
render it ineffective for use. In addition, three other technologies—molten
metal pyrolysis, high-temperature hydrogenation, and electrochemical
oxidation—have been tested and are undergoing further development by
the commercial firms promoting them. DOD will decide in 1997 whether to
construct pilot facilities to further demonstrate the alternative
technologies. The Army also will continue laboratory and bench-scale
testing of disposal technologies in support of the program. This research
and development effort is conducted in conjunction with activities to
implement the baseline incineration program.
Transportation Could
Reduce Costs, but There
Are Some Trade-offs
Concerns about the cost and progress of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program have generated interest about moving chemical stockpile
weapons to a national or regional site to improve the program’s
effectiveness and efficiency. However, the Army is prohibited from
transporting stockpile weapons to any of the eight storage sites in the
continental United States by a general provision in DOD’s annual
appropriations act. This provision prohibits the Army from using funds to
prepare studies on the feasibility of transporting chemical weapons.
Transportation options offer some cost benefits, but they also increase the
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risk to the general public and are likely to be opposed by most affected
states and communities.
Although transporting chemical weapons has the potential to reduce
construction and procurement costs by as much as $2.6 billion, the
reduction could be offset by shipping and emergency preparedness costs.
The potential savings come from reducing the number of disposal facilities
that must be built. According to the Army estimates, construction and
procurement of a disposal facility and related equipment cost from
$243 million for a small facility that will handle only bulk agent such as
Newport, to $471 million for a large facility that will process all types of
explosively configured munitions such as Umatilla. The reduction in costs
is offset by increased storage, emergency preparedness, and program
management costs from extending disposal operations at the consolidated
sites. Using existing disposal rates, a national destruction facility at Tooele
could extend the program to 2017 and add as much as 770 months of
storage, emergency preparedness, and management costs to the program.
Similarly, regional disposal sites at Anniston and Tooele could extend the
program to 2010 and add as much as 320 months of storage, emergency
preparedness, and management costs.
In addition, potential savings would be offset by large transportation costs.
In 1987, an Army transportation panel recommended that, prior to
transporting any agent or munitions, the Army develop a shipping
container that (1) provides redundant protection against agent release
during normal transport, (2) prevents agent release in most transportation
accidents, (3) is compatible with standard cargo handling and transport
equipment, and (4) has the capability for automated agent and
temperature monitoring within the transport container. In 1987, the
Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization estimated that 400
containers would cost $96.4 million.7 An Army official who developed the
on-site transportation containers estimated that the containers would cost
significantly more and could cost as much as $2 million for each container.
In addition, the Army’s transportation concept plan found that using the
rail system would require 70 to 75 rail shipments to a national disposal
site, each consisting of a convoy of 136 railcars. Shipping by truck to a
national disposal site would require 820 convoys, and airlifting would
require several thousand sorties using C-141 aircraft. According to an
Army study, transporting the Blue Grass stockpile would take 1,200 to
1,500 flights. Further, airfields capable of handling large aircraft would
7
Conceptual Design of a Chemical Munitions Transport Packaging System, Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization (Aug. 1987).
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have to be constructed. Costs for these transportation alternatives have
not been estimated. However, we reported that moving more than 100,000
U.S. chemical-filled munitions from West Germany to Johnston Atoll in
1990 cost $61.6 million, including $13.6 million for shipping containers.8
The Army shipped the munitions in sealed steel boxes called secondary
steel containers, which were loaded into shipping containers.
Another significant cost element could be emergency preparedness along
the transportation corridor. Proposed rail routes to a national destruction
center total approximately 13,000 miles and pass through 20 states. Rail
routes to regional destruction sites total approximately 7,100 miles and
pass through 16 states. In its response to the Army’s 1987 Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, the Department of Health
and Human Services stated that the difficulties in preparing adequate
contingency plans for a transportation alternative are staggering and that
resources to cope with a worst case scenario in a consistent manner could
never be mobilized. The Department reported that while it might be
possible to provide hospitals near the eight existing storage sites with
enough respirator equipment to support a number of casualties, it would
be difficult to supply all communities along a transportation route. Few
communities along the transportation routes would have the necessary
equipment available to them without federal assistance.
Any movement of chemical weapons or material could be opposed by
federal agencies and the affected states and localities. Before the Army
can transport a chemical weapon, it must (1) coordinate efforts with the
Department of Health and Human Services and must adopt any
precautionary measures that it recommends, (2) meet all regulations
imposed by the Department of Transportation, and (3) obtain permits from
the receiving state and potentially from each state traveled through.
Although the departments of Health and Human Services or
Transportation have not formally opposed transportation, both have
expressed strong reservations about transportation alternatives. In 1988,
13 states provided written comments on the Army’s Final Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement. Twelve of the states opposed
transporting the chemical weapons, including 7 of the 8 states where
chemical weapons are stored, and endorsed an on-site disposal option.
Only Kentucky wanted the Army to transport its agents and munitions
elsewhere. Utah has gone on record opposing receipt of chemical weapons
from other states.
8
Chemical Warfare: DOD’s Effort to Remove U.S. Chemical Weapons From Germany
(GAO/NSIAD-91-105, Feb. 13, 1991).
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The Army’s Cost-Reduction
Initiatives
Environmental permitting is the most likely area to affect the disposal
schedule for the stockpile program. According to its 1994 risk assessment,
the Army concluded that high-level involvement, possibly from the
Congress or the White House, was needed in the environmental permitting
process to overcome opposition from state regulators. In 1996, DOD
assembled an environmental management team comprised of federal and
state officials to track new and revised environmental requirements to
maintain the current disposal schedule and ensure compliance. In
addition, the Army is reviewing whether the number of trial burns and
time necessary to gain state approval to initiate disposal operations can be
reduced.
The Army is also reviewing the stockpile program’s contracting structure,
disposal operations, and incineration process to identify potential
cost-reduction initiatives. As a result, Army officials have already
identified some cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of
assessment, that could potentially reduce program costs by $673 million.
(See table 2.2.) They also plan to identify additional cost reductions as the
program progresses.
Table 2.2: The Army’s Initial
Cost-Reduction Initiatives as of
August 1996
Dollars in millions
Estimated
savings
Category
Confidencea
Reduction in consumables
High
$50
Engineering improvements in the pollution
abatement filter system
High
55
Removal of the pollution abatement filter
system at Tooele
High
95
Removal of the pollution abatement filter
system at Aberdeen and Newport
Medium to high
85
Elimination of the dunnage furnaces
Medium
Elimination of the pollution abatement filter
system at Anniston and Umatilla
Low to medium
145
Improved disposal rates for projectiles
Medium
160
Elimination of the pollution abatement filter
system at Pine Bluff
Low to medium
Total
a
10
73
$673
Indicates the Army’s level of confidence that the initiative will be implemented.
The Army cannot implement some of the more significant cost-reduction
initiatives without the cooperation and approval of state regulatory
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agencies. Regulatory requirements connect the initiatives to the National
Environmental Policy Act process and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act and Clean Air Act permitting processes. The Army plans to
submit its assessment of the initiatives to the Congress with its fiscal
year 1998 budget request.
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Recognizing that the stockpile disposal program did not include all
chemical warfare materiel that requires destruction, the Congress directed
the Army to plan for the disposal of nonstockpile chemical warfare
materiel. The Army has spent $105.9 million and estimates that the
nonstockpile program could cost another $15.1 billion and take nearly
40 years to complete. However, given the factors driving the nonstockpile
program, it is uncertain how long the program will take or cost. For
example, the program is driven by uncertainties surrounding buried
chemical warfare materiel, environmental requirements, and disposal
methods. The Army has limited and often imprecise information about the
nature and extent of buried chemical materiel, which accounts for
$14.5 billion (95 percent) of the program cost. Environmental issues
similar to those experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to
affect the Army’s ability to obtain the environmental approvals and
permits that virtually all nonstockpile activities require. In addition, the
Army’s disposal concept is not yet fully developed and the Army has not
proven that its proposed process can safely and effectively destroy all
nonstockpile materiel and will be accepted by the affected states and
localities. The nonstockpile program offers some savings opportunities;
however, these opportunities create obstacles and issues that would have
to be resolved.
The Army Is Far From
Accomplishing Its
Objectives
Although the Army has made some progress in defining the scope of the
program and removing nonstockpile materiel from some locations, more
work is required. The Army’s objectives for the nonstockpile program are
to (1) develop and implement disposal schedules and cost estimates;
(2) determine the magnitude of the nonstockpile chemical problem in
terms of locations, qualities, and types of agents and materiel; and
(3) develop implement transportation and disposal procedures. The Army
plans to continue to refine the cost and schedule estimates as the program
matures, collect information on the magnitude of nonstockpile materiel,
research disposal technologies, and develop disposal plans.
The Army has spent $105.9 million and estimates that it will cost another
$15.1 billion to dispose of its nonstockpile materiel. The Army’s cost
estimate is considered a “rough order of magnitude” estimate, typically
used when a program is not fully developed. According to the Army, it will
issue a revised cost estimate in 1997. To date, nonstockpile materiel has
been disposed of on a limited basis, such as the emergency disposal of
dangerous items. (See table 3.1.)
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Table 3.1: Summary of Nonstockpile
Program Activities
Category
Activity
Binary chemical
weapons
Some of the key chemical components have been destroyed
and advance planning has been completed.
Miscellaneous
chemical warfare
materiel
The Army’s BZ agent, an incapacitating agent, and bomb
bursters have been destroyed.
Empty ton containers at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado,
have been shipped to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, for smelting.
Recovered chemical
warfare materiel
Using isotopic neutron spectroscopy and enhanced X-ray
systems, the Army has evaluated and inventoried recovered
chemical materiel.
The Army discovered that some previously classified recovered
chemical materiel did not contain chemical agents and
transferred them to the appropriate agency for use or disposal.
Some recovered chemical weapons considered dangerous
were destroyed.
Former chemical
weapons production
facilities
A contract was awarded in 1994 to assess requirements,
develop technical alternatives, and prepare a statement of work
for the disposal of the former production facility in Indiana.
Rocky Mountain Arsenal facilities are in the process of
remediation. Lessons learned from this effort form the basis for
the disposal method and cost estimate for the remaining three
sites.
Buried chemical
warfare materiel
On the basis of documentation surveys, site visits, and
interviews, the Army has developed a database on potential
burial sites.
In June 1995, the Army contracted for the recovery,
transportation, storage, and disposal of chemical materiel
discovered at small burial sites.
The Army has completed remediation of the Spring Valley site,
Washington, D.C.; Forts Richardson and Wainwright, Alaska;
Jackson, Mississippi; and Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden,
Utah.
Remediation activities at small burial sites at the former Raritan
Arsenal, New Jersey, and former Fort Segarra, U.S. Virgin
Islands, are in process.
The Army has initiated remediation actions at large burial sites
at Aberdeen Proving Ground and Rocky Mountain Arsenal.
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Recovery and
Disposal of Buried
Chemical Warfare
Materiel Will Be
Problematic
Although the Army has good information about most nonstockpile
materiel, it has limited and often imprecise information about the nature
and extent of buried items. The Army estimates that it can dispose of
binary weapons, recovered chemical weapons, former production
facilities, and miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel by the time frames
established by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Under the terms of the
convention, chemical warfare materiel buried before 1977 is exempt from
disposal as long as it remains buried. The Army is still exploring potential
sites and has little and often imprecise information about the type and
amount of materiel buried. This lack of data can critically affect the
successful implementation of the program, because recovering and
disposing of buried materiel accounts for 95 percent of the program cost.
Buried Chemical Warfare
Materiel Accounts for
95 Percent of Program
Cost
The Army estimates that the disposal of buried chemical materiel will cost
$14.5 billion and be completed in 2033. Burial was a common disposal
method for chemical warfare materiel until the late 1950s and considered
to be the final disposal act. As a result, little record-keeping was done for
burial activities and additional chemical burial sites are likely to be
discovered. Based on its preliminary analyses, the Army has identified
potential buried chemical warfare materiel at 64 locations in 31 states and
the U.S. Virgin Islands that may require further investigation or
remediation actions. (See fig. 3.1.) Of these locations, 40 are active military
installations and 24 are located on formerly used defense sites, which DOD
no longer controls. Some locations have multiple sites and include one or
more burial pits, weapon ranges, or chemical test sites.
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Figure 3.1: Potential Locations With Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel
Virgin Islands -six potential locations.
Locations with potential buried chemical warfare materiel that may require remediation
Source: Based on 1996 data provided by the Army’s Project Manager for Nonstockpile Chemical
Materiel.
Even at well-documented sites, the actual amount, chemical agent,
condition, and type of buried materiel will remain relatively unknown
prior to excavation and visual identification. For example, in 1995 a
chlorine-filled projectile was discovered at Fort Lewis, Washington, and
more than 260 vials of chemical agent were found buried under the
Mississippi State Fairgrounds in Jackson. The Army moved the vials to
Pine Bluff Arsenal, where they remain in storage waiting disposal.
In some locations, chemical materiel was expected to be found but was
not. For example, a 3-day excavation in 1995 at Fort Wainwright, Alaska,
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uncovered no buried chemical materiel, despite evidence of a burial in the
area. The Army’s 1993 Survey and Analysis Report indicated that up to
30 cylinders of mustard agent may have been buried in the area.1
Subsequent ground-penetrating radar also indicated the potential for
buried materiel. Upon excavation, the Army discovered the objects
detected by the radar were pockets of groundwater sitting on bedrock.
The water created an electrical condition that produced the unexplained
reading.
Other Nonstockpile
Materiel Has Been Easier
to Locate, but Still Difficult
to Destroy
Over the years, the Army has located and inventoried nonstockpile
materiel that has not been buried. Nevertheless, this materiel, which may
include energetics and partially deteriorated weapons, will still be difficult
to destroy.2
Binary Chemical Weapons
The locations and quantities of binary chemical weapons are
well-documented. Binary chemical weapons are formed from two
nonlethal elements (called precursors) through a chemical reaction after
the munitions are fired. Binary weapons were manufactured, stored, and
transported with only one of the chemical elements in the weapon. The
second element was to be loaded into the weapon only at the battlefield.
As of October 1996, the precursors for the binary chemical weapons are
stored at Aberdeen, Pine Bluff, Tooele, and Umatilla.
Miscellaneous Chemical
Warfare Materiel
The Army has documented the location, configuration, quantity, and type
of miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel to be destroyed. The materiel
was designed for use in the employment of chemical weapons and
includes unfilled munitions and components, simulant-filled munitions,
dummy rounds, rocket motors, cartridge containers, and other metal and
plastic parts. Some items contain explosive charges that may need to be
extracted before disposal. According to the Army, miscellaneous materiel
is stored at Aberdeen, Anniston, Blue Grass, Pine Bluff, Pueblo, Tooele,
Umatilla, and Dugway Proving Ground.
Recovered Chemical Weapons
Chemical weapons have been recovered from range-clearing operations,
chemical burial sites, and research and development test areas. According
to the Army, most recovered items are stored at Aberdeen, Dugway,
Johnston Atoll, Pine Bluff, Tooele, and Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The Army
1
Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program Survey and Analysis Report, Program Manager for
Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel (Nov. 1993).
2
Energetics are the explosives and propellants in the munitions.
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believes that handling and disposing of recovered chemical weapons will
be difficult because they are more likely to have deteriorated than other
nonstockpile materiel and the identity of the agent is unknown in some of
the items.
According to the Army, the most immediate concern of the nonstockpile
program is the treatment and disposal of Chemical Agent Identification
Sets because of the relative frequency of their recovery and tendency to be
found by the general public. The sets consist of chemicals contained in
glass ampoules, vials, and bottles that are packed in metal shipping
containers and wooden boxes.3 In the late 1930s, approximately 110,000 of
the sets were produced in various configurations to train soldiers and
sailors how to identify chemical warfare agents. Thousands of the sets are
not accounted for and, in some cases, only the glass vials or bottles filled
with chemicals have been recovered. A small quantity of sets are stored at
Camp Bullis, Texas; Fort Richardson, Alaska; Johnston Atoll, Pacific
Ocean; Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; and Tooele Army Depot, Utah.
Former Chemical Weapon
Production Facilities
Chemical agent and weapons were produced in various government
facilities prior to 1968. These facilities are located at Aberdeen, Pine Bluff,
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana,
and are in various degrees of deterioration. DOD is reviewing former
production facilities at Swannanoa, North Carolina, and Van Nuys,
California, to determine whether they require remediation actions.
Environmental Laws
and Requirements
Govern Most
Nonstockpile
Activities
The Army has limited experience destroying nonstockpile materiel and is
unfamiliar with what types of environmental problems to expect. Prior to
recovering, storing, moving, or destroying nonstockpile chemical warfare
materiel, the Army must comply with state environmental laws and
regulations. These laws and regulations may impose time frames for
certain efforts that, in turn, drive other nonstockpile activities and related
costs. For example, if an operating permit is delayed for one of the
nonstockpile disposal systems because of an unanticipated requirement,
virtually all disposal activities at the remediation site must stop until the
permit is issued.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act controls hazardous waste
through a permit process that requires government approval for
individuals who generate, transport, store, or dispose of hazardous waste.
3
The sets contain sulfur mustard agent, nitrogen mustard agent, lewisite, phosgene, cyanogen chloride,
chloroform, chloropicrin, solid chloroacetophenone, solid triphosgene, solid adamsite, and other
chemicals.
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Under the act, the Environmental Protection Agency may authorize
individual states to administer and enforce hazardous waste programs that
are as least as stringent as the federal program. Although based on the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s requirements, individual state
hazardous waste laws and requirements differ and are occasionally
changed. According to the Army, changes in the states’ laws and
requirements may affect the nonstockpile disposal program because they
are likely to apply to most aspects of the program on military installations.
According to the Army, state regulatory agencies could add unanticipated
requirements to the permitting process, including extra demonstrations or
tests prior to the start of disposal operations. Depending on the time
involved, disposal activities at follow-on sites could be stalled or
suspended, resulting in additional costs. The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act requires (1) site-specific operating permits for the Rapid
Response System and munitions management devices; (2) specific
disposal standards for the hazardous waste generated by the program; and
(3) precise permitting, record-keeping, and reporting requirements.
Similarly, changes in the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act requirements may affect the nonstockpile
program. The act provides overall cleanup procedures for some
nonstockpile sites and incorporates the standards of other federal and
state statutes if they are applicable or relevant and appropriate to the
cleanup process. A specific sequence of activities, guaranteeing the
participation of federal and state agencies and the public in key decisions,
must be followed before a nonstockpile site can be cleaned up. The act
requires (1) completion of remedial investigation and feasibility studies for
most formerly used defense sites such as the former Raritan Arsenal, New
Jersey; (2) site-specific closure standards; and (3) emergency response
actions, such as those taken in response to the Spring Valley site in
Washington, D.C.
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act governs the transportation of
most nonstockpile chemical materiel and limits the movement of materiel
without special permits, licenses, and authorizations. The act delegates
regulatory and enforcement responsibilities to the states but limits some
state regulations. Nevertheless, states may still implement routing
restrictions, transportation curfews, notification deadlines, and public
right-to-know requirements. The act requires specialized packaging for
transporting nonstockpile materiel and the treatment residues, and limits
commercial transportation of selected nonstockpile chemical materiel or
neutralized chemical agent. The Army anticipates that every state
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nonstockpile materiel travels through will have some jurisdiction over part
of the move.
The Army’s Mobile
Disposal Systems Are
Not Fully Developed
Table 3.2: Summary of the
Nonstockpile Disposal Systems and
Estimated Operational Dates
The Army’s disposal concept is based on mobile systems capable of
moving from location to location where the munitions are characterized
and the agent is detoxified, the waste is sent to a commercial hazardous
waste facility, and the system and equipment are detoxified before the
next move. The Army is developing mobile systems to characterize and
destroy Chemical Agent Identification Sets, recovered chemical weapons,
and bulk chemical warfare materiel. (See table 3.2.) Although Army
officials are confident that the proposed mobile remediation systems will
function as planned, the Army needs more time to prove that the systems
will safely and effectively destroy all nonstockpile materiel and be
accepted by the state regulatory agencies and the public.
System
Description
Status
Portable Isotopic
Neutron Spectroscopy
A portable, gamma ray system used for
noninvasive characterization of elemental
components of chemical agents in
recovered chemical warfare materiel.
Operational
Raman
Spectrophotometer
A portable device used to identify
Operational
chemical agents inside glass containers
found in Chemical Agent Identification Sets.
Chemical Agent
Transfer System
A fixed system at Aberdeen Proving
Ground that transfers chemical agents
from recovered nonexplosive-configured
materiel to storage containers and
performs other chemical operations.
Operational
Rapid Response
System
A portable system designed to process
small amounts of chemical agents and
materiel contained in Chemical Agent
Identification Sets.
Operational in
fiscal year 1998
Munitions Management A portable system designed to detoxify
Device-1
most nonexplosive-configured chemical
warfare materiel.
Operational in
fiscal year 1998
Munitions Management A portable system designed to detoxify
Device-2
most explosive-configured chemical
warfare materiel. The system will be
designed to fully contain any potential
explosion resulting from operations.
Operational in
fiscal year 1999
Munitions Management A portable system designed to detoxify
Device-3
nonexplosive-configured bulk chemical
warfare items larger than a 500-pound
bomb.
Operational in
fiscal year 1998
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Stockpile Program
In its 1993 Survey and Analysis Report, the Army concluded that the
technical risk for the nonstockpile program was high because the disposal
systems were not yet completed. It also reported that if effective processes
or procedures were not discovered, it would have to fund “a major
research and development program.” In its 1994 risk assessment, the Army
reported that the lack of technology for on-site disposal operations could
hamper the completion of the nonstockpile program.
Accelerated Program to
Develop the Rapid
Response System
According to the Army, the most immediate concern of the nonstockpile
program is the treatment of Chemical Agent Identification Sets because of
the relative frequency of their discovery. As a result, the Army accelerated
the program to develop a system, called the Rapid Response System, to
process and destroy the sets. When operational, the two-trailer system will
use commercially available technology. (See fig. 3.2.) The chemical
detoxification of the agent, as well as packaging of the waste, will occur
inside a glovebox housed in the operational trailer. Air circulating through
the glovebox is vented through charcoal filters to entrap agent and other
hazardous chemicals prior to discharge from the trailer. The utility trailer
houses an electrical generator to use mainly at remote sites and a
refrigerator for use in monitoring activities. Once treated with neutralizing
chemicals, the residue will be sent to a commercial hazardous waste
facility. The system will be detoxified before moving to the next location.
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual Drawing of the Rapid Response System
Utility
Trailer
Operations
Trailer
Source: The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.
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Stockpile Program
The Rapid Response System has been designed and assembled and is
scheduled to be tested at Tooele Army Depot in mid-1997. The Army’s
slow development of background data for Utah’s environmental permitting
process has delayed the start of the system’s concept demonstration by
9 months. The Rapid Response System is scheduled for its first use at Fort
Richardson, Alaska, in fiscal year 1998. It is expected to process 12 to 15
vials of agent each day.
Prototype of the Munitions
Management Devices Is
Scheduled for Operational
Use in Fiscal Year 1998
The Army is developing mobile munitions management devices to assess,
access, and dispose of most nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel on
site. According to Army officials, the disposal rates are not yet established
and could be as low as one or two items per day. The Munitions
Management Device-1 consists of two tractor trailers, one for processing
nonexplosive configured munitions using chemical neutralization and the
other for controlling operations. (See fig. 3.3.) Weapons and materiel will
be placed in the treatment vessel, drained of liquid chemical agent, and
decontaminated with a neutralizing solution. As a precautionary measure,
the process trailer is designed to contain liquid or vapor accidentally
released and is surrounded by a tent-like enclosure to provide an
additional level of safety. A gas-processing system filters and treats any
chemical vapors in the process trailer and the outside is monitored for
agent. Neutralized waste is packaged and shipped to a commercial
hazardous waste management facility.
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Stockpile Program
Figure 3.3: Conceptual Drawing of the Munitions Management Device-1
Control Trailer
Process
Trailer
Process
Trailer
Enclosure
Source: The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.
If the Munitions Management Device-1 proves successful, two other
systems will be developed for disposing explosively configured munitions
and bulk munitions and containers. The Army considers the Munitions
Management Device-2, which will process explosively configured
munitions, to be the most technologically challenging of the devices. Its
design, fabrication, and testing are scheduled through mid-1998, with two
follow-on units scheduled for delivery in 2000 and ready for operation in
2001. The Munitions Management Device-3, scheduled for operations in
1998, will process items larger than 500-pound bombs and recovered ton
containers with chemical agent. The Army plans to pack the neutralized
chemical waste and ship it to a commercial hazardous waste facility.
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Stockpile Program
Opportunities for Cost
and Schedule
Reductions Are
Limited
The Army could potentially reduce costs by using (1) chemical stockpile
disposal facilities for destroying selected nonstockpile materiel or (2) a
centralized disposal facility designed specifically for destroying
nonstockpile materiel. However, according to Army officials, these options
create legal and political obstacles and public acceptance issues that
would have to be resolved.
Use of Stockpile Disposal
Facilities
The DOD Authorization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-145), and subsequent
legislation, specifies that the chemical stockpile disposal facilities may not
be used for any purpose other than the disposal of stockpile weapons. The
Army interpreted this legislation to mean that the stockpile disposal
facilities, with the exception of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent
Disposal System, may not be used to dispose of other DOD materiel,
including nonstockpile chemical materiel. This interpretation necessitates
that the Army, in order to comply with the act, implement separate
disposal operations for nonstockpile materiel along side of the stockpile
facilities.
In its 1995 implementation plan, the Army suggested that the stockpile
disposal facilities could be used to process some nonstockpile weapons,
depending on the location, the type of chemical weapon or materiel, and
condition.4 For example:
•
•
The first category of nonstockpile materiel that could be destroyed
includes items that are (1) already located at the disposal site requiring no
off-base transportation, (2) similarly configured stockpile weapons
scheduled to be disposed of in the facility, and (3) the same agent type as
those scheduled to be destroyed in the facility. An example is the
nonstockpile ton containers previously filled with mustard agent stored at
Tooele Army Depot, Utah. The facility is already designed to dispose of
stockpile ton containers filled with mustard agent. The containers are
exactly the same except that the nonstockpile containers were used in
prior sampling and disposal programs and historically recorded as
nonstockpile, while the stockpile containers hold production stock.
A second category of nonstockpile materiel includes items that (1) are
already located at the disposal site, (2) are similarly configured to items
scheduled for disposal, and (3) contain a different agent type than those
scheduled to be destroyed in the facility. An example is the nonstockpile
ton containers filled with nerve agent stored at Aberdeen Proving Ground,
4
Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program Implementation Plan, U.S. Army Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization (Aug. 1995).
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Stockpile Program
•
•
Maryland. With some modifications to a stockpile disposal facility
designed to incinerate mustard-filled ton containers, the facility could
destroy the containers filled with nerve agent.
A third, and more difficult, category of nonstockpile materiel includes
items that are (1) already located at the disposal site, (2) configured
somewhat differently than the stockpile weapons scheduled for disposal,
and (3) the same or different agent type as those scheduled to be
destroyed. An example is the nonstockpile bottles of mustard agent
located at Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado. Pueblo’s proposed facility will
be designed to destroy mustard agent and could easily incinerate the
bottles.5 According to Army officials, some nonstockpile materiel in this
category would probably be easier processed, and for less money, by one
of the proposed nonstockpile disposal systems.
The last category involves transporting nonstockpile materiel from its
current storage or burial site to an existing stockpile disposal facility.
However, the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 103-337) allows the transport of only newly discovered nonstockpile
materiel to the nearest storage site that has the necessary environmental
permits. The nearest permitted location may not have the appropriate
facilities to dispose of the materiel.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act also has the potential to
limit using the stockpile disposal facilities to destroy nonstockpile
materiel. State regulators, under the act’s comprehensive body of
requirements, can implement disposal limits and controls for the disposal
facilities. For example, the state of Utah has established disposal limits for
the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility based on the amounts of
chemical weapons and agent stockpiled at Tooele. To dispose of
nonstockpile materiel, the Army would have to amend the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act permit to increase the facility’s disposal
limits. The amendment process, controlled by the state, requires time and
money. In addition, DOD and Army officials expect that any efforts to
increase the use of the stockpile facilities would likely result in strong
state and public opposition and potential delays in the state environmental
permitting process.
5
The 1997 DOD Appropriations Act prohibits DOD from obligating any funds for constructing disposal
facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado, until 180 days after the Secretary reports on
disposal alternatives.
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Stockpile Program
Use of a Centralized
Facility Designed
Specifically for Destroying
Nonstockpile Materiel
Another method for destroying nonstockpile chemical materiel could be
the use of a central disposal facility with equipment designed specifically
for destroying nonstockpile materiel. The facility could operate in
cooperation with existing government and commercial facilities—much
the way it will be done in European countries. According to Army officials,
a similar program in the United States would reduce the costs of the
nonstockpile program. However, the legislative restrictions on the
transportation of nonstockpile materiel would have to be lifted to make a
central disposal facility a viable option. In addition, the current process of
individual states establishing their own environmental requirements and
prevalent public attitude that a chemical weapons disposal facility should
not be located in their vicinity would be significant obstacles that would
have to be resolved to make a centralized disposal facility viable.
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Consideration, and Agency Comments
Conclusions
While there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical
stockpile and related nonstockpile materiel, progress has slowed due to
the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about
the destruction method that should be used. As a result, the cost and
schedule for the disposal programs are uncertain. However, the programs
are likely to cost more than the estimated $24.4 billion above current
expenditures and take longer than currently planned. The key factors
impacting the programs include public concerns about the safety of
incineration, compliance with environmental laws and regulations,
legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal
technologies.
The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule are largely
driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in
agreement with the proposed disposal method. Historically reaching
agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated.
Furthermore, the recent congressional direction in the 1997 Authorization
and Appropriations Acts to research and develop alternative technologies
to destroy assembled chemical munitions indicates that there is continued
public concern about the proposed disposal method. Until DOD and the
affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method for
individual sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical
Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule with any degree of
accuracy. Moreover, many of the problems experienced in the stockpile
program are also likely to affect the Army’s ability to implement the
Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program. For example, efforts to dispose
of nonstockpile materiel are likely to be driven by the need to obtain state
and local approvals for destruction methods. In addition, more time is
needed for the Army to prove that its proposed disposal method for the
nonstockpile program will be safe and effective and accepted by the
affected states and localities.
Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns
associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been
made by Members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the
programs’ basic approach to destruction. However, the suggestions create
tradeoffs for decision makers and would require changes in existing legal
requirements. These suggestions have included deferring plans for
additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to
incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national
or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare
materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal
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Consideration, and Agency Comments
facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying existing laws and
regulations to standardize environmental requirements.
Matters for
Congressional
Consideration
As the Congress continues its oversight of the chemical stockpile and
nonstockpile disposal programs and considers modifications or
alternatives to the current approach, it may wish to include consideration
of the suggestions discussed in this report relating to the creation of
alternative technologies, consolidation of stockpile disposal operations,
utilization of stockpile facilities for nonstockpile items, centralization of
nonstockpile destruction, and standardization of environmental laws and
requirements.
Agency Comments
DOD
provided written comments on a draft of this report and they are
presented in their entirety in appendix V. DOD stated that the draft
accurately and fairly characterized the current status of the disposal
programs and generally concurred with the suggestions of the draft report
that changes in existing legal requirements would be necessary to change
the current path of the disposal programs.
While DOD agreed that the Congress could consider options presented by
us, it recommended consideration of the ones to establish a centralized
disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel and to modify existing laws and
regulations to standardize environmental requirements for chemical
weapons disposal. DOD does not support consideration of deferring plans
for additional stockpile disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative
technology is developed because such delays result in substantial
increases in public risk from continued storage of the stockpile. DOD does
not recommend transportation of the stockpile at this time because
transportation of chemical weapons increases the risk to the general
public. In addition, DOD recommended against using stockpile disposal
facilities to destroy nonstockpile materiel because of the strong public
opposition to both the use of stockpile disposal facilities to treat any other
waste materiel and the transportation of chemical materiel for disposal in
these facilities.
Our draft report recognized that some options could increase the risk to
the general public and would likely be opposed by some of the affected
states and localities and other interested parties. We presented the options
in context of their tradeoffs should the Congress wish to address the key
factors affecting the programs’ disposal costs and schedule. We did not
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Consideration, and Agency Comments
take a position on the options or current approach given the associated
policy and legislative implications.
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Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Due to continuing congressional and public interest about the progress
and cost of the programs, we prepared this report under our basic
legislative responsibilities to provide an overall assessment of the
(1) programs’ cost and schedule, (2) alternatives for improving program
effectiveness and efficiency, and (3) actions the Army has and is taking to
improve the programs. During our review, we interviewed and obtained
data from officials of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Army, the
Army Chemical and Biological Defense Agency, the U.S. Army Nuclear and
Chemical Agency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We also met with
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency officials to discuss and collect data
on environmental and legal issues related to the disposal programs. We
visited Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Anniston Army Depot,
Alabama; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado;
Tooele Army Depot, Utah; and Umatilla Depot Activity, Oregon. We also
visited state and county officials in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Maryland, Oregon, and Utah. We did not include the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program and overseas U.S. chemical warfare
material in our review. We plan to issue a report later this year on the
status and the management of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program in the ten states participating in the program.
To assess the programs’ cost and schedule, we reviewed the Army’s
implementation plans, disposal data, status reports, and data on
environmental and legal issues. We reviewed the Army’s estimation
methodology, potential problems that may affect current cost and
schedule estimates, and the causes of previous schedule slippages and
cost increases. We analyzed (1) the reasons for the public concerns about
incineration of chemical agents, (2) the Army’s efforts to obtain
environmental permits and current issues, (3) obstacles in the
environmental compliance and permitting process, (4) the status of the
environmental permits at each of the disposal sites, and (5) federal and
state environmental laws and regulations that apply to the disposal
programs. We also obtained federal and state officials’ views on the
accuracy of the Army’s estimated schedule to determine how current or
proposed state laws or regulations could affect the disposal programs.
To assess alternatives for improving program effectiveness and efficiency,
we analyzed the Army’s current cost position and initiatives for reducing
costs and shortening the disposal schedules. We also examined data on
the Army’s management approach to contracting, disposal experience at
Johnston Atoll and Tooele, the baseline incineration process, and
approaches for addressing environmental permitting issues. To assess
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Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
technological alternatives, we analyzed data on disposal technologies, the
advantages and disadvantages of the baseline incineration process, the
advantages and disadvantages of selected alternatives, and public
concerns and issues related to the baseline and alternative technologies.
We also analyzed plans and methodologies for developing alternative
technologies, costs and schedule data related to the alternatives,
acquisition strategies and responsibilities, and test and evaluation results.
To assess transportation options, we analyzed transportation studies and
concepts, packaging methods, and the risk associated with transportation.
We reviewed data on chemical weapon movements, chemical munitions
transport packaging systems, transportation containers for hazardous
material, potential transportation routes, emergency response plans, and
transportation modes. In addition, we collected information concerning
the public opposition to transportation of chemical weapons, obstacles in
the environmental compliance and permitting process for transportation
options, and environmental laws and regulations applicable to
transportation.
To assess the actions the Army has and is taking to improve the programs,
we reviewed DOD’s 1994 designation of the Army’s chemical
demilitarization program as a major defense acquisition program. We
documented and analyzed data on lessons learned from disposal
operations at Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System and Tooele
Chemical Agent Disposal System and their effects on the stockpile and
nonstockpile programs. Lastly, we reviewed the Army’s actions to
strengthen its public outreach efforts and improve its monitoring and
inspection of chemical munitions.
provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments
are presented in their entirety in appendix V.
DOD
We performed our review from August 1995 to November 1996 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
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Appendix II
Appropriated, Obligated, and Disbursement
Data for Fiscal Years 1988 Through 1997
Table II.1: Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program
Dollars in millions
Fiscal year
Table II.2: Alternative Technologies
and Approaches Project
Appropriated
Obligated
Expended
1988
$195.8
$194.3
$192.9
1989
168.0
165.5
165.4
1990
210.4
208.2
205.9
1991
255.0
252.3
251.5
1992
331.3
330.1
326.8
1993
419.1
417.9
316.0
1994
249.1
246.7
234.9
1995
486.5
472.2
279.2
1996
484.2
346.0
130.5
1997
534.7
Total
$3,334.1
$2,633.2
$2,103.1
Appropriated
Obligated
Expended
1994
$22.4
$22.2
$10.2
1995
9.4
9.4
6.8
1996
22.2
19.6
12.2
1997
56.0
Total
$110.0
$51.2
$29.2
Appropriated
Obligated
Expended
1988
$2.5
$2.5
$2.5
1989
11.3
11.3
11.1
1990
43.8
43.7
43.3
1991
37.7
37.6
37.5
1992
40.9
40.5
40.0
1993
88.2
87.5
62.1
1994
71.9
71.6
65.5
1995
56.5
56.4
27.6
1996
80.0
65.2
27.3
1997
82.4
Total
$515.2
$416.3
$316.9
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Dollars in millions
Fiscal year
Table II.3: Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Project
Dollars in millions
Fiscal year
Appendix II
Appropriated, Obligated, and Disbursement
Data for Fiscal Years 1988 Through 1997
Table II.4: Nonstockpile Chemical
Materiel Program
Dollars in millions
Fiscal year
Appropriated
Obligated
Expended
1992
$2.2
$2.2
$2.2
1993
6.3
6.3
6.0
1994
31.5
31.2
26.4
1995
26.0
25.8
18.5
1996
69.7
40.4
14.6
1997
85.3
Total
$221.0
$105.9
$67.7
Source: The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.
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Appendix III
Summary of Major Federal Environmental
Laws Affecting the Army’s Disposal
Programs
Date
Title
Provisions
1969
The National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.)
Requires the Army to develop an environmental impact statement or
assessment about the potential environmental effects of destroying chemical
weapons and materiel.
1970
The Clean Air Act, as amended (42 U.S.C.
7401 et seq.)
Governs potential sources of air pollutants and establishes emission standards.
The Army must obtain permits for air pollution control prior to constructing and
operating any disposal facility.
1972
The Marine Protection, Search, and
Sanctuaries Act (33 U.S.C. 1411 et seq.)
Restricts ocean dumping of chemical weapons.
1974
The Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act (49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.)
Regulates the packaging, marking, loading, and transporting of hazardous
materials by road or rail.
1976
The Toxic Substances Control Act, as
amended (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.)
Regulates the disposal of items containing polychlorinated biphenyls and
asbestos. The fiberglass matrices of the shipping and firing tubes for stockpiled
M55 rockets contain polychlorinated biphenyls, and some former production
facilities contain asbestos.
1976
The Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.)
Regulates the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. The Army
must obtain state permits prior to constructing and operating any disposal
facility or system where stockpile and nonstockpile items are classified as
hazardous waste.
1977
The Clean Water Act, as amended
(33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)
Governs potential sources of water pollution and specifically prohibits the
discharge of any chemical agent into U.S. navigable waters.
1980
The Comprehensive Environmental
Addresses hazardous substance releases into the soil, air, surface water, and
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act groundwater and regulates the cleanup of these releases. A specific sequence
(42 U.S.C. 9620 et seq.)
of activities guaranteeing the participation of federal and state agencies and the
public in key decisions must be followed before cleanup of some nonstockpile
sites.
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Appendix IV
Chronology of the U.S. Chemical
Demilitarization Program
Time frame
Activity
1917-1960s
Obsolete or unserviceable chemical warfare agents and munitions were disposed of by open pit burning, land
burial, and ocean dumping.
1969
The National Academy of Sciences recommended that ocean dumping be avoided and that public health and
environmental protection be emphasized. It suggested two alternatives to ocean disposal: chemical
neutralization of nerve agents and incineration of mustard agents.
1970
The Armed Forces Authorization Act (P.L. 91-441) required a Department of Health and Human Services review
of any disposal plans and detoxification of weapons prior to disposal. It also limited the movement of chemical
weapons.
1971
The Foreign Military Sales Act prohibited the transportation of U.S. chemical weapons from Okinawa, Japan, to
the continental United States. The weapons were moved to Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
1971-1973
The Army tested and developed an incineration process and disposed of several thousand tons of mustard
agent stored in ton containers at Rocky Mountain Arsenal.
1973-1976
The Army disposed of nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralization at Tooele Army Depot and
Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The process was problematic and not very reproducible, making automation difficult.
1979
The Army opened the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System at Tooele to test and evaluate disposal
equipment and processes for chemical agents and munitions on a pilot scale.
1981
The Army decided to build the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System to dispose of its chemical M55
rocket stockpile.
1981-1986
The Army used the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System to test and evaluate incineration of chemical
agents and energetic materiel, and decontamination of metal parts and ton containers.
1982
An Arthur D. Little Corporation study for the Army concluded that using incineration, rather than neutralization, to
dispose of the stockpile would reduce costs.
1982
The Army declared its stockpile of M55 rockets obsolete.
1983
The Army expanded its chemical disposal program to include the M55 rocket stockpile at Anniston Army Depot,
Umatilla Depot Activity, and Blue Grass Depot Activity.
1984
The Army expanded its chemical disposal program to include the M55 rocket stockpile at Pine Bluff Arsenal and
Tooele Army Depot.
1984
The National Research Council endorsed the Army’s disassembly and high-temperature incineration process for
disposing of chemical agents and munitions. It also recommended that the Army continue to store most of the
chemical stockpile, dispose of the M55 rockets, and analyze alternative methods for disposing of the remaining
chemical stockpile.
1985
The Army began construction of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System.
1985
The DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-145) mandated the destruction of the U.S. stockpile of
lethal chemical agents and munitions. It also required that the disposal facilities be cleaned, dismantled, and
disposed of according to applicable laws and regulations.
1986
The DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (P.L. 99-500) prohibited shipments of chemical weapons,
components, or agents to the Blue Grass Depot Activity for any purpose.
1987
Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System operations were suspended as a result of a low-level nerve agent
release.
1988
The Army issued the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program. The Army selected on-site disposal of the chemical stockpile because it posed fewer potential risks
than transportation and off-site disposal.
1988
The National Defense Act of Fiscal Year 1989 (P.L. 100-456) required the Army to complete operational
verification testing at Johnston Atoll before beginning to systematize similar disposal facilities in the continental
United States.
(continued)
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Appendix IV
Chronology of the U.S. Chemical
Demilitarization Program
Time frame
Activity
1989
The Army started construction of the chemical demilitarization facility at Tooele Army Depot.
1990
The Army completed the successful retrograde of all chemical munitions stored in Germany to storage facilities
at Johnston Atoll.
1990
The Army initiated disposal of M55 rockets at Johnston Atoll.
1990
A very small amount of nerve agent leaked through the common stack during maintenance activities at Johnston
Atoll. The agent release was below allowable stack concentration.
1990-1993
The Army completed four operational verification tests of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System.
During the tests, the Army destroyed more than 40,000 munitions containing nerve and mustard agents. In
August 1993, the Secretary of Defense certified to the Congress that the Army had successfully completed the
operational verification tests at Johnston Atoll.
1991
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510) restricted the use of funds to transport
chemical weapons to Johnston Atoll except for U.S. munitions discovered in the Pacific, prohibited the Army from
studying the movement of chemical munitions, and established the emergency preparedness program.
1991
The Army moved 109 World War II mustard-filled projectiles from the Solomon Islands to Johnston Atoll for
storage and disposal.
1991
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-190) required the Secretary of
Defense to develop a chemical weapons stockpile safety contingency plan.
1992
The U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency was established to consolidate operational responsibility
for the destruction of chemical warfare capabilities into one office.
1992
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484) directed the Army to establish
citizens’ commissions for states with storage sites, if the state’s governor requested one. It also required the
Army to report on (1) disposal alternatives to the baseline incineration method and (2) plans for destroying U.S.
nonstockpile chemical weapons and materiel identified in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
1993
The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System was shut down during operation and verification tests when
residue explosive material generated during the processing of M60 105mm projectiles caught fire, causing
damage to a conveyor belt and other equipment in the explosive containment room.
1993
The Army completed construction and started systemization of the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility.
1993
The Army issued its report on the physical and chemical integrity of the chemical stockpile to the Congress.
1993
A mustard leak from a ton container was discovered at Tooele Army Depot.
1993
The Army issued an interim survey and analysis report on the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program to the
Congress.
1994
Approximately 11.6 milligrams of nerve agent were released into the atmosphere at the Johnston Atoll facility
during a maintenance activity on the liquid incinerator.
1994
The National Research Council issued its recommendations for the disposal of chemical agents and munitions to
the Army.
1994
The Army issued its alternative demilitarization technology report to the Congress. The Army recommended the
continuation of the chemical demilitarization program without deliberate delay and the implementation of a
two-technology research and development program.
1994
The Army issued its M55 rocket stability report to the Congress. The report recommended that an enhanced
stockpile assessment program be initiated to better characterize the state of the M55 rocket in the stockpile.
1994
The Army initiated the Alternative Technologies Project to develop an alternative disposal technology to the
baseline incineration process for the bulk-only stockpile locations in Maryland and Indiana. This research and
development effort is conducted in conjunction with activities to implement the baseline program.
(continued)
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GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix IV
Chronology of the U.S. Chemical
Demilitarization Program
Time frame
Activity
1994
The U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency was redesignated the U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization
and Remediation Activity after a merger with the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command. In
addition, the Army restructured and centralized its chemical stockpile emergency preparedness program to
streamline procedures, enhance responsiveness of operations, and improve the budgeting process.
1994
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition became the DOD Executive
Agent for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, replacing the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations,
Logistics, and Environment. The Chemical Demilitarization Program was designated a DOD Acquisition Category
1D Program.
1995
The Army initiated the Enhanced Stockpile Surveillance Program to investigate, develop, and support methods to
improve monitoring and inspection of chemical munitions.
1995
The U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation Activity was renamed the Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization.
1995
The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System surpassed the 1-million pounds target and completed the
disposal of all M55 rockets stored on Johnston Atoll. Disposal rates exceeded established goals.
1995
A perimeter monitor located about 100 yards from the demilitarization building at Johnston Atoll detected a trace
level of nerve agent. The source of the leak was identified as a door gasket in the air filtration system. Temporary
air locks were erected and the gasket replaced. No one was harmed from this event.
1995
The Army awarded the contract for small burial sites and issued its implementation plan for the nonstockpile
program.
1995
The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility completed equipment systemization testing.
1995
The Army certified to the Congress that all Browder Amendment requirements for the award of the Anniston
construction contract were met.
1996
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106) directed DOD to conduct an
assessment of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and options that could be taken to reduce program
costs.
1996
The Army completed disposal of all Air Force and Navy bombs stored on Johnston Atoll ahead of schedule.
1996
The Army awarded the systems contract for the construction, operation, and closure of the proposed Anniston
Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. Construction of the facility is scheduled to began after the state of Alabama
issues the environmental permits.
1996
The Army started disposal operations at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. Shortly after the start,
operations were shut down for a week after a small amount of agent was detected in a sealed vestibule attached
to the air filtration system. No agent was released to the environment and no one was harmed.
1996
Several hair line cracks were discovered in the concrete floor of the Tooele disposal facility’s decontamination
area. The cracks caused a small amount of decontamination solution to leak to an electrical room below. No
agent was detected and the cracks were sealed.
1996
The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201) directed DOD to conduct an assessment of
alternative technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions. The act also directed the Secretary of
Defense to report on this assessment by December 31, 1997.
1996
The 1997 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) provided the Army $40 million to conduct a pilot program to
identify and demonstrate two or more alternatives to the baseline incineration process for the disposal of
assembled chemical munitions. The act also prohibited DOD from obligating any funds for constructing disposal
facilities at Blue Grass and Pueblo until 180 days after the Secretary reports on the alternatives.
1996
The Chemical Weapons Convention was ratified by the 65th country needed to make the convention effective. As
a result, the convention will go into effect April 29, 1997. Through ratification, the United States will agree to
dispose of its (1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile, binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons,
and former chemical weapon production facilities by April 29, 2007, and (2) miscellaneous chemical warfare
materiel by April 29, 2002.
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GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix V
Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 66
GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix V
Comments From the Department of Defense
Now on pp. 55 and 56.
Now on pp. 55 and 56.
Now on pp. 55 and 56.
Page 67
GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix V
Comments From the Department of Defense
Now on pp. 55 and 56.
Now on pp. 55 and 56.
Page 68
GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix VI
Major Contributors to This Report
National Security and
International Affairs
Division, Washington,
D.C.
Thomas J. Howard, Assistant Director
Glenn D. Furbish, Senior Evaluator
Mark A. Little, Senior Evaluator
Bonita J. Page, Evaluator
Page 69
GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix VI
Major Contributors to This Report
Page 70
GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Related GAO Products
Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is
Hampered by Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996).
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management
(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13, 1995).
Chemical Weapons: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program Has
Financial Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-95-94, Mar. 15, 1995).
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review (GAO/NSIAD-95-66R, Jan. 12,
1995).
Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67, Dec. 22,
1994).
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare
Materiel Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994).
Chemical Weapons: Issues Involving Destruction Technologies
(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-159, Apr. 26, 1994).
Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of
Alternatives to Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar. 18, 1994).
Arms Control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (GAO/NSIAD-94-136, Mar. 15, 1994).
Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program
Has Been Slow to Achieve Results (GAO/NSIAD-94-91, Feb. 22, 1994).
Chemical Weapons Storage: Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to
Emergencies (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18, July 16, 1993).
Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule,
and Performance (GAO/NSIAD-93-50, Jan. 21, 1993).
Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Related to Environmental
Permitting and Testing Experience (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-43, June 16, 1992).
Chemical Weapons Disposal (GAO/NSIAD-92-219R, May 14, 1992).
Page 71
GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Related GAO Products
Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule
Slippages Are Likely to Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991).
Chemical Warfare: DOD’s Effort to Remove U.S. Chemical Weapons From
Germany (GAO/NSIAD-91-105, Feb. 13, 1991).
(709134)
Page 72
GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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