Railway Crime Safety Performance Report
July 2006
If you would like to give feedback on any of the
material contained in this report, or if you have
any suggestions for future editions, please
contact:
Adrian Smith
Safety Intelligence Analyst
Rail Safety and Standards Board
Evergreen House
160 Euston Road
London NW1 2DX
adrian.smith@rssb.co.uk
The report can be downloaded at no cost from
the RSSB website www.rssb.co.uk.
© Copyright Rail Safety and Standards Board 2006
1
Executive summary
3
2
Introduction
5
3
Aims and objectives
6
4
Scope and structure of the report
6
4.1
Report scope
6
4.2
Report structure
6
5
Safety performance
7
5.1
Overview of safety performance
7
5.1.1
Trespass
8
5.1.2
Vandalism
9
5.1.3
Workforce assault
10
5.1.4
Passenger assaults
10
5.2
5.3
6
7
Trespass
12
5.2.1
Trespass and near misses
12
5.2.2
Analysis of trespass hotspots
15
Vandalism
18
5.3.1
Vandalism leading to train accidents
18
5.3.2
General vandalism on the railway infrastructure
22
5.3.3
Vandalism hotspots
24
5.4
Violence at work
27
5.5
Crime against persons
35
5.5.1
Performance indicators
35
5.5.2
General analysis
42
Risk profile
45
6.1
Risk profile - overall risk
45
6.2
Risk from assaults
48
6.3
Risk profile - summary and conclusions
51
Initiatives
53
7.1
National initiatives
53
7.1.1
Education
53
7.1.2
Rail Personal Security Group
54
7.2
Local initiatives
55
7.2.1
Spotlight: Northern Rail against youth crime
56
7.2.2
Examples of local initiatives
58
8
Appendix 1 - Fatalities and major injuries
64
9
Appendix 2 - Top 30 trespass hotspot locations (April to March)
65
10
Appendix 3 - Top 30 vandalism hotspot locations (April to March)
66
11
Appendix 4 - Crime-related research projects
67
12
Glossary
71
13
Definitions
73
2
Railway crime safety performance report
1
Executive summary
On 27 May 2006, a 19-year-old student was fatally wounded near Oxenholme while travelling
on a Glasgow to Paignton service. He had been stabbed by a fellow passenger.1 This event
highlights the potentially serious nature of railway crime and the danger that subsequent
media coverage could significantly effect public perceptions of personal security.
This report considers all aspects of railway crime and covers crime information up to 31
March 2006. It also updates the last edition, which was presented in September 2005.
To help disseminate good practice throughout the industry, we have taken a close look at the
local initiatives being used to fight railway crime. Information was received from Network Rail
and a wide range of Train Operating Companies (TOCs), which we have tabulated in section
7. We have also included a ‘spotlight’ feature on the many measures being undertaken by
Northern Rail. Details of the ongoing research into railway crime-related issues are
presented in Appendix 4.
Some of the key safety facts presented in this edition of the report are as follows:
In addition to the Oxenholme incident referred to above, there have been eight
passenger/public murders on the railway since 2000.
Five members of the workforce suffered major injuries from assaults in the first quarter of
2006. Two train drivers, one revenue protection officer, a conductor and a member of level
crossing staff were the victims of physical assaults. The assaults occurred twice on stations,
twice on board trains and once on a level crossing. This is in line with previous years, but
highlights the differing job roles and site locations that are vulnerable.
Key performance indicators suggest that several of the initiatives in place to tackle railway
crime have had a positive effect. Recorded incidents of trespass and vandalism have shown
annual improvements over the last five years, although the number of trespass fatalities did
not follow this trend in 2005, which saw the highest number of fatalities since 2001.
‘Hotspots’ in both categories have however shown marked improvement, suggesting that
local initiatives targeting these areas have been working.
Fatalities and major injuries to trespassers had shown a decreasing trend between 2001 and
2004; however, 2005 was a particularly bad year, with the level returning to that seen in
2001. The first quarter of 2006 has also seen an increase when compared to the first quarter
of 2005, although a sign of improvement is the total rate of near miss incidents with
trespassers, which dropped between 2003 and 2005.
For recorded incidents of vandalism, all three of the main categories showed improvements
in 2005: trains being struck by missiles fell by 12%, obstructions being placed on the track
fell by 5% and arson-related train fires fell by 50%.
The general level of assaults is constant, although the level of reported verbal abuse and
threats continue to rise.
1
Although this crime is outside the report’s timescale, we felt it should be highlighted, in order to show that these
events, unfortunately, continue to occur.
Railway crime safety performance report
3
According to the Safety Risk Model (SRM version 4), on average 191 fatalities and weighted
injuries (FWI) occur each year. Just over 6% of the total risk results from workforce assaults,
which - to put it in context - is about the same as the risk from train accidents.
British Transport Police (BTP) crime data provides a useful means of analysing overall trends
in crimes against the person, by location type, time of incident and particular crime (such as
drink or weapon offences). This is viewed in relation to BTP, British Crime Survey and other
police forces’ analyses.
Recent analyses of SMIS and BTP data have highlighted the potential under estimate of
passenger assault risk from data recorded in SMIS. Rail Safety and Standards Board
(RSSB) is working closely with the BTP to research and understand the differences in the
way in which assault-related data is recorded in SMIS and by the BTP. The Police
Information System (PINS) data on victim type was unavailable for this edition, but
negotiations are under way to allow its inclusion in the next railway crime report. We hope to
issue guidance on the use of the different sources of data later in the year.
4
Railway crime safety performance report
2
Introduction
A crime committed on railway property is a railway problem. Certain offences, like pickpocketing, can be easier to carry out at stations and on trains. However, assaults tend to
occur wherever interfaces exist between the public and railway staff, such as revenue
protection officers, ticket office employees and train managers. Our industry’s challenge is to
manage the risk and work with the BTP to bring the perpetrators to justice.
This report presents the levels of risk to passengers, the workforce and members of the
public from crime. Recent trends are identified, in order to highlight areas of changing safety
performance. The report also outlines the underlying causes that contribute to the current
level of risk, along with the initiatives and research projects that are in hand to improve safety
further.
Information on fatalities and injuries is discussed throughout this document. In all cases, the
fatalities that have occurred in a particular event, or group of events, are first considered in
isolation. The major and minor injuries that arose are then taken into account. This enables
injuries to be weighted in accordance with their relatively less serious outcome. The current
weighting is 0.1 for each major injury and 0.005 for each minor injury, the combined measure
being deemed ‘fatalities and weighted injuries’ (FWI). This replaces ‘equivalent fatalities’ (ef),
which was used previously within the industry.
We would appreciate your views on the content of this document, along with any ideas about
additional information that you would like to see in future editions.
Railway crime safety performance report
5
3
Aims and objectives
RSSB’s suite of safety performance reports support the industry’s Strategic Safety Plan
(SSP) by presenting detailed information on targeted topics. It is updated periodically so that
trends may be observed as the industry addresses areas of high risk.
The key aim of this report is to present information on the risk from all aspects of railway
crime, ranging from trespass to vandalism and assaults. The report also details the many
steps being taken to reduce this problem.
4
Scope and structure of the report
4.1
Report scope
The report considers the railway network of Great Britain in relation to the following event
types:
•
Trespass.
•
Vandalism: obstructions placed on the line, trains striking obstructions, stone throwing,
arson, graffiti and damage of equipment and property.
•
Violence at work: verbal and physical assaults on staff.
•
Crime against persons: robbery, sexual offences, murder, attempted murder and
assaults on passengers.
The report contains safety data up to the end of March 2006. The Risk Profile section has
been compiled using data from version four of the Safety Risk Model (SRM).
4.2
Report structure
The report is in four main sections:
Safety performance – here, key findings on trespass, vandalism, workforce assaults and
crimes against the person are presented, with an emphasis on current trends.
Risk profile – this section provides the results from the SRM relevant to railway crime.
Current initiatives – national and local initiatives intended to minimise the risk from railway
crime are shown in this section. This includes groups, strategies and conferences.
Appendices – there are four main appendices, covering trespass, vandalism and crimerelated research projects. A glossary and table of definitions are also provided.
6
Railway crime safety performance report
5
Safety performance
5.1
Overview of safety performance
This section presents a general overview of safety performance relevant to railway crime. A
detailed assessment of the performance in each area is presented in the sections that follow.
Chart 1 shows the risk from railway crime weighed against all risk on the railway (as
indicated by version 4 of the SRM). It illustrates that, excluding suicide, railway crime
incidents comprise approximately 37% of the total. The right-hand pie indicates that most of
this comes from trespassers (77%), while the second highest risk arises from passenger,
public and workforce assaults (21%). The remainder is made up of vandalism incidents.
Chart 1.
Railway crime risk in context of overall railway risk (excluding suicide)
RSSB is working closely with BTP to research and understand the differences in the way in
which assault-related data is recorded within SMIS and by the BTP.
The two systems were designed for different purposes: BTP records and categorises
criminal assaults in accordance with Home Office rules, whereas SMIS records incidents
reported by rail staff where ‘in circumstances related to their work, a member of staff is
assaulted, threatened or abused, thereby affecting their health, safety or welfare.’ Although
SMIS does contain some records on assaults on passengers and members of the public, the
vast majority of assaults recorded in SMIS are assaults on railway employees. Conversely,
just 17.5% of assaults recorded by BTP are assaults on rail staff.
SMIS data alone was used to estimate passenger assault risk in version 4 of the SRM.
However, figures from the BTP indicate the number of passenger and public assaults per
year is much higher than what was recorded in SMIS, and that rather than around three
FWIs per year, as was profiled in version 4 of the SRM, the risk associated with these
assaults could actually be closer to around 20 FWIs per year. This has now been
incorporated into version 5 of the SRM, which will be published shortly.
RSSB and BTP will continue to work together to improve the sharing of intelligence and
information, and to understand the differences between the databases. The Police
Information System (PINS) data on victim type was unavailable for this edition, but
negotiations are under way to allow its inclusion in the next railway crime report. We hope to
issue guidance on the use of the different sources of data later in the year.
Railway crime safety performance report
7
Fatalities resulting from crime unfortunately do occur on the railway infrastructure. Between 1
January 2000 and 31 March 2006, there have been eight deaths resulting from such
incidents:
•
On 8 January 2006, a man was fatally assaulted by a youth at Welwyn Garden City
(London North Eastern) station.
•
On 31 August 2005, a woman jumped in front of a train at Southall station (Western)
whilst holding her two children in her arms. All three were fatally injured.
•
On 6 September 2004, a man was fatally stabbed at Wood Green Station (London
North East).
•
On 2 May 2004, a man was pushed in front of a moving train at Ainsdale station
(London North West). He died from his injuries.
•
On 1 February 2004, a fight broke out on the platform at Highbury and Islington (South
East). A man died en route to hospital from head injuries sustained during the
altercation. His assailant was arrested and charged at the scene.
•
On 10 November 2002, at 03:56, an incident at White Hart Lane (South East) resulted
in a person being fatally injured on the platform. The emergency services attended and
the police declared the station a scene of crime.
•
On 3 August 2002, a man was pushed off a platform at Manchester Piccadilly into the
path of a freight train (London North West). A man was later charged with murder.
5.1.1
Trespass
Every year, a significant number of people lose their lives or sustain injuries while
trespassing illegally on the railway.
Chart 2 presents the number of trespass fatalities and injuries since 2001. It shows that the
total number of trespassers killed on the railways had been falling every year. However,
2005 saw a return to the level of 2001. This increase has continued with the number of
fatalities occurring over the period January - March 2006 being higher than for the same
period in 2005.
8
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 2.
5.1.2
Trespass fatalities, major injuries and minor injuries
Vandalism
Vandalism has continued to show the encouraging downward trend seen over the last few
years. Chart 3 illustrates both the overall trend and recent trends in the individual contributors
to the problem. The reduction in the number of incidents reduces the risk from hazardous
events with the potential for multiple fatalities, such as a derailment due to running into
obstructions placed on the track by vandals, as well as single injury-related hazardous
events, such as drivers and passengers being injured when missiles are thrown at trains.
Chart 3.
Vandalism on the railway
Railway crime safety performance report
9
5.1.3
Workforce assault
Chart 4 looks at all assaults on members of the workforce between January 2001 and March
2006. It suggests that assaults are becoming more frequent. However, most of the increase
in the overall number of assaults is derived from the increase in verbal assaults. This stems
largely from industry campaigns to encourage better reporting. Indeed, the overall risk in
terms of total FWI per year indicates that the harm sustained in assaults has not increased,
but decreased in 2005.
Chart 4.
Workforce assaults by type
5.1.4
Passenger assaults
As mentioned at the start of this section, BTP data is viewed as a more effective way of
estimating passenger assaults than SMIS. The following chart illustrates the trends in BTP
recorded assaults from 2001 to 2006. As with Chart 4, it suggests that assaults are becoming
more frequent; however, changes in recording practices and initiatives to persuade
passengers and the public to file reports have had an influence on the overall trend. More
detailed information may be found in section 5.5.
10
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 5.
BTP recorded assaults
Railway crime safety performance report
11
5.2
Trespass
Over recent years, trespassers (excluding suicides) have accounted for the vast majority of
all accidental fatalities on the railway. Tackling this criminal activity is therefore key, and
becomes even more so when the effects of delays, trauma and health risks associated with
clean-up operations are also considered.
The open interface with the infrastructure provided at stations and level crossings, along with
limited fencing over large sections of the railway, means that gaining access to the track is
normally not difficult for those intending to trespass on the railway. It is important that public
opinion be shifted to improve the general understanding of the dangers of trespassing. The
seriousness of the potential wider consequences of the act must also be emphasised.
Table 1 shows the numbers of accidental fatalities and injuries occurring to trespassers since
2001 (these are shown graphically in Chart 2). With the exception of 2004, there has been a
yearly decrease in fatalities and injuries since 2001. The period from January 2006 to March
2006 has seen an unusually high number of fatalities. However, this is likely to fall as time
elapses and information on coroner’s verdicts becomes available, since many will be
reclassified as suicides. The number of minor injuries in 2006 is over four times that in the
same period of 2005 and almost equal to the total number of minor injuries seen in 2004.
Table 1.
5.2.1
Trespasser fatalities and injuries
Trespass and near misses
Chart 6 shows the trend in public near misses with trains per million train miles (MTM)
broken down by age-group. No information is presented on trends in accidental trespass
fatalities, as the correlation between the two incident types is poor. The chart shows:
•
A decreasing trend in the total rate of near misses per MTM between 2003 and 2005.
•
A year on year decreasing trend in the rate of youth near misses per MTM (yellow
bars) since 2001 and in child near misses per MTM (red bars) since 2003.
•
An increase in the total rate of near misses per MTM between January and March
2006, compared with the same period in 2005. This is due to an increase in the adult
and youth rates.
12
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 6.
Trend in public near misses with trains
Near miss data
•
Youth records selected where the words ‘youth’ or ‘teenage’ are present in the narrative.
•
Child records selected where the words ‘child’, ‘kid’, ‘girl’ or ‘young boy’ are present in the narrative. ‘Boy’ has been
excluded since it is often used in the context of a youth or young-looking adult.
•
Adult records are all near misses minus youth and child near misses.
Chart 7 shows that there has been only a small increase in the rate of recorded trespass
incidents over the last 12 months. The well-defined seasonality of trespass reports is also
clear, with many more events being recorded during the summer. There are two probable
effects at play here. One is that the warmer weather is likely to result in more people going
out for walks or trips, thus increasing the potential for trespassing. The second is that people
on or around the track are more likely to be seen during the longer sunlight hours that this
season enjoys. The chart also shows:
•
A high degree of correspondence between total trespass and total near miss incidents
per month.
•
A decreasing trend in the rate of near misses per month since 2004.
Railway crime safety performance report
13
Chart 7.
Seasonality in public trespass and near misses
Chart 8 depicts the weekly time profile of trespass incidents from 2001 to 2006. In general,
the majority occur in the afternoon and early evening, before tailing off to lower levels during
the night. There is an apparent downward trend in the overall levels of trespass from Monday
to Sunday, with the exception of a peak in reported incidents on Saturdays, most of which
occur in the evening. Incidents of public near misses with trains have a similar time profile to
trespass during the day. However, they do not exhibit a strong trend over the whole week.
Chart 8.
14
Trespass and near miss day of week and time of day profile
Railway crime safety performance report
5.2.2
Analysis of trespass hotspots
Trespass incidents are not evenly distributed across the network. Most occur at locations
that experience multiple instances in a given year. Targeting specific problem areas can
have the effect of reducing the overall level of trespass, whilst maximising the benefit of
resources.
The larger of the two charts in Chart 9 displays the numbers of trespass incidents occurring
by concentration at individual sites between April 2005 and March 2006. It shows that
trespass is indeed concentrated, with 56% of incidents occurring at locations with five or
more reports per year. A small proportion (2%) takes place at locations with 25 or more
reported incidents in the year. This is the lowest proportion since at least April 2000 - March
2001, when 3.45% of trespass incidents occurred at locations with 25 or more reported
incidents in the year. This provides evidence that the policy of addressing trespass ‘hotspots’
is having a positive effect.
The smaller of the charts in Chart 9 shows the number of locations where 10 and 15 or more
acts of trespass are reported in the year. An increasing trend in trespass hotspots between
April 2000 and March 2003 was followed by a fall in the number of locations fitting the
hotspot criteria. April 2005 - March 2006 has seen an increase on the previous year, with
levels rising above that of April 2000 to March 2001.
Chart 9.
Trespass concentration
Table 2 presents the relationship between trespass hotspots with 10 or more trespass events
in a year, and fatalities occurring at those same sites. It shows that:
•
Each year, around 200 locations have over 10 reported trespass incidents, accounting
for about a quarter of all trespass incidents.
Railway crime safety performance report
15
•
Up to 34% of accidental trespass fatalities occur at trespass hotspot locations. There
is no apparent trend in the numbers of these fatalities, and they are not correlated with
the number of trespass hotspots.
•
Between 12% and 17% of suicides/suspected suicides occur at trespass hotspot
locations. There is no trend in either the numbers of suicides, or the percentage of
suicides occurring at trespass hotspot sites.
•
There is a good correlation between the number of hotspot locations and the number of
suicides per year. This indicates that tackling the worst hotspots would also have an
effect on reducing the total number of suicides per year.
Table 2.
Hotspots and fatalities
Table 3 provides statistics on near misses and fatalities. A location deemed a ‘near miss
hotspot’ must have seen two or more reported incidents in the same year. Table 3 shows
that:
•
The number of near miss hotspots in April 2005 - March 2006 is the lowest since 2000.
•
Low numbers of accidental fatalities occur at these locations. There is a strong
relationship between the numbers of these fatalities and the number of near miss
hotspots.
•
A stronger relationship exists between the total number of accidental fatalities and the
total number of near miss locations.
•
No significant relationship exists between suicides and near miss hotspots, highlighting
the very deliberate and premeditated nature of suicide.
Table 3.
16
Near miss hotspots and fatalities
Railway crime safety performance report
Table 4 shows the trespass hotspot locations that have seen the biggest improvements and
largest deteriorations in performance from April 2005 to March 2006, compared with the
same period a year earlier. It also details the locations that have persistently been the most
heavily trespassed in the last five years. The average rankings for each of the five years are
used as the measure; a low aggregate score means that a location has consistently occupied
high positions in the list of all hotspots.
Table 4.
Current trespass hotspot performance in context
Table 5 shows the number of hotspot sites that contribute 5% of the trespass incident totals
for the periods indicated. An increase implies that the numbers of incidents at the most
heavily trespassed locations are falling. During the period April 2005 - March 2006, the 25
most heavily trespassed locations contributed 5% of the total number of trespass incidents.
This is the highest number since April 2000.
Table 5.
Sites contributing 5% of total trespass
Railway crime safety performance report
17
5.3
Vandalism
Vandalism is a serious issue for the rail industry. The impact, in terms of cost, train
performance and safety is not insignificant. It ranges from small, relatively inconsequential
acts of superficial property damage (such as graffiti) to much more serious acts of sabotage
(like the placing of cars on the line). The total cost to the industry has been estimated to be
around £250m2 per year.
The main concern regarding acts of vandalism is the potential for such behaviour to cause
harm to others, as a result of a train accident or other outcome (a serious station fire, for
instance). Such activity also carries risk for the perpetrator, since it often takes place in an
unsafe area.
The principle types of vandalism are:
•
Loss of equipment function (eg level crossing telephones being broken or removed,
preventing users from contacting the signaller).
•
Causing line-of-route obstructions (eg placing objects on the line in an attempt to derail
trains).
•
Arson (eg train, station and lineside fires).
•
Individual malicious acts (such as throwing objects at trains and dangling objects from
bridges).
5.3.1
Vandalism leading to train accidents
The Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) provides an indication of the risk from train collisions,
train derailments, trains striking buffer stops, train fires and trains striking road vehicles at
level crossings. The risk indicator has a reference value of 100 at the end of March 2002
and the PIM provides a measure of the change in risk relative to this, based upon the rate of
occurrence of 84 train accident precursors. Chart 10 shows the overall level of the PIM
indicator, and the contribution that vandalism (red area) makes to it. Both have steadily
decreased since 2000. The proportion that vandalism contributes to the PIM has also
decreased steadily over the period, indicating that vandalism has diminished faster than the
overall PIM.
2
The total cost estimate comes from the RSSB research programme document Trespass and
vandalism cost modelling, published March 2004.
18
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 10.
Vandalism contribution to the train accident precursor indicator model
Chart 11 shows the vandalism element of the PIM risk indicator, broken down into its
constituent parts.
Chart 11.
Breakdown of vandalism in the PIM
The chart shows improvements in each of the individual indicators over the analysis period,
with passenger train fires showing a good reduction in 2005. Passenger trains striking
Railway crime safety performance report
19
objects is still the highest individual contributor to the vandalism risk group, accounting for
57%. Passenger train fires account for 30%.
Recent trends in vandalism related to train accidents, as captured in SMIS, are shown in
Chart 12. It is clear that there has been a steadily decreasing trend in acts of vandalism
against trains. If the incident levels recorded between January and March 2006 continue, the
fewer incidents in each category forecast for 2006 indicate that the annual trend observed
since 2000 is likely to be maintained in 2006.
In 2005, the number of trains struck by missiles fell by 12%, a very encouraging sign.
Another positive sign is that the level of train fires as a result of vandalism fell by 50% in
2005. This is probably related to the presence of CCTV in the new rolling stock introduced to
replace the Mark 1 electric multiple units used in the south east.
Chart 12.
Vandalism causing train accidents
The trends are mirrored in the reportable incidents recorded over the same analysis period,
as illustrated in Chart 13. The chart also highlights the proportion of reportable incidents,
suggesting that incidents of trains being struck by missiles are becoming less serious in
nature. While there was some early suggestion of improvement in the seriousness of
incidents of trains striking objects due to vandalism, the level has now returned to just below
that seen in 2000.
20
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 13.
Reportable incidents of vandalism causing train accidents
Trains continue to run into objects that have been left on the track by vandals. From the
nature of the materials used in most of these incidents, it is clear that the culprits usually find
an appropriate object in their immediate vicinity (that is, about the lineside). Chart 14 takes a
look at the more serious incidents of trains striking objects from Jan 2000 to March 2006,
listing the materials that were placed on the track.
Chart 14.
Trains running into serious obstructions – what did they strike?
Railway crime safety performance report
21
It is also clear that a distinct time profile exists regarding vandalism incidents that lead to
train accidents. Data suggests that the vast majority of infrastructure vandalism takes place
during the afternoon and early evening. Chart 15 shows a pattern when looking at all
vandalism events, and those that cause train accidents. The peak clearly lies between the
hours of 5pm and 7pm.
Chart 15.
5.3.2
Time profile of train accidents caused by vandalism (January 2000-March
2006)
General vandalism on the railway infrastructure
Vandalism occurs mainly at the trackside. As discussed previously, the reasons for this
seem to be that there is less security here and that vandals are able to find a variety of
objects suitable for their crimes in close proximity.
The cross-section of locations that have experienced some sort of vandalism incident
between January 2000 and the end of March 2006 is illustrated in Chart 16. Vandalism
incidents at the trackside account for 80% of the total, with trains, stations, level crossings
the other notable areas comprising the remainder. The proportion of trackside events is
falling on a yearly basis, with 77% occurring in 2005 (down from 84% in 2000). The smaller
pie chart provides an indication of the spread of territories where these events occur.
22
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 16.
Where vandalism occurs
The seasonality associated with instances of vandalism is presented in Chart 17. It is clear
that there is a significant decreasing trend year-on-year, continuing with that seen in the last
railway crime report (published in September 2005). It is also apparent that there is a
significant seasonal pattern, with clear peaks in the summer months and troughs in the
winter. The level during peak times is approximately twice that seen during troughs, mirroring
the trend seen in trespass incidents.
Chart 17.
Vandalism presented by seasonality of recorded incidents
Railway crime safety performance report
23
Unfortunately, the actual nature of the line of route offences recorded in SMIS is not easy to
see. The BTP collects crime figures for these events and categorises them by type. This
provides a much clearer picture of vandalism as a whole. The detail is presented in Chart 18,
which shows that:
•
The number of ‘serious’ line of route offences (pink bars) continues to fall. Serious line
of route offences are incidents of vandalism resulting in actual material damage, or
where there are serious concerns for the safety of persons on the railway (such as
when large objects are placed on the line).
•
Incidents for graffiti (yellow bars) have followed an increasing trend since 2001.
•
Recorded stone throwing incidents have decreased every year since 2001.
Chart 18.
5.3.3
‘Serious’ line of route and other vandalism offences (source BTP)
Vandalism hotspots
Although vandalism is not limited to one area or one type of crime, there are definite
‘hotspots’ where a greater-than-average number of incidents take place. The following
section is an analysis of their concentration.
Chart 19 shows vandalism incidents over the last analysis year (in this case, April 2005 to
March 2006), grouped into bands according to how many instances there were at a specific
location. The smaller chart also displays the trend in the number of hotspots with ten or more
incidents in a year. From these charts we see that:
•
24
Over the period April 2005 - March 2006, 87% of vandalism incidents occurred at
locations where there has been more than one instance of vandalism. This highlights
the point that specific areas can be targeted to reduce vandalism levels with expected
positive results.
Railway crime safety performance report
•
Most acts of vandalism occur at locations with 2 - 4 and 5 - 9 recorded instances a
year.
•
The smaller chart shows that, since April 2000, the number of sites with ten or more
events per year has been falling consistently. This would suggest that work being
carried out to tackle vandals in hotspot areas has been successful, and continues to be
so.
•
It is clear that vandalism events are not evenly distributed across the network. There
are significant hotspots where problems are more likely to occur. Over the period April
2005 - March 2006, 54% of incidents occurred at locations where five or more acts of
vandalism were reported.
Chart 19.
Concentration of vandalism incidents
Table 6 presents the extent to which acts of vandalism that cause trains to run into
obstructions and missiles to strike trains are concentrated in the same places as where other
forms of vandalism occur. The information presented in the table covers locations with 10 or
more acts of vandalism reported in any April to March period. It shows that the downward
trend in the proportion of total vandalism events, reportable and serious running into
obstruction events, and reportable missile strikes occurring at vandalism hotspots, has
continued. This demonstrates again that vandalism hotspot policy has been particularly
effective in these areas.
Railway crime safety performance report
25
Table 6.
Vandalism hotspots and reportable train accidents due to vandalism
Table 7 shows the change in performance per the period April 2005 - March 2006, compared
with April 2004 - April 2005. It also highlights the most persistent hotspots. Note that, over
the past five years, none of the locations that have seen the largest decline in performance
feature in the consistently highest ranked list. Another point to mention here is that three of
the most improved hotspots also feature in the consistently highest ranked list, once again
proving that successful work is being done to tackle the vandalism hotspot problem.
Table 7.
Looking at the extent of vandalism at the worst sites gives us another chance to confirm
whether work being done to tackle hotspot areas is succeeding. Table 8 shows the number
of vandalism sites that contribute 5% of total vandalism incidents. An increase in the number
of sites making up the contribution indicates that the hotspot policy has worked at the most
heavily vandalised locations. Note from the table that none of the years have been worse
than the previous year, suggesting consistent success in tackling these problem locations.
Table 8.
26
Railway crime safety performance report
5.4
Violence at work
Violence at work is a significant issue for the railway, but it is not one that is unique to the
industry. As is common with other public-facing services (for example the National Health
Service), there are many daily assaults to the workforce. These can take the form of verbal
abuse and threats, which will often result in shock, to actual physical assault which may lead
to injuries and absence from work.
These assaults are taken seriously by the industry; indeed, they are not tolerated and wherever possible - the offenders are prosecuted. During the last five years, the issue of
workforce assaults has become increasingly prominent.
As part of the industry’s
commitment to tackling the issue, changes were made to SMIS (the industry’s central conduit
for the collection of staff assaults, threats and abuse) last April. The modifications were
made to gain a better understanding of the incidents so that appropriate actions may be
taken.
The analysis which follows is designed to:
•
Give an overview of the trends in workforce assaults and the resulting injuries.
•
Provide a breakdown of the contributing factors and geographical aspects.
•
Summarise the quality of the input data.
Five members of the workforce suffered major injuries from assaults in the first quarter of
2006. Unfortunately, this number is in line with previous years (the total for 2005 was 12).
These five major injuries highlight the range of job roles and site locations which are
vulnerable to assault. Two train drivers and one each of revenue protection, conductor and
level crossing staff were the victims of physical assaults; they occurred twice on stations,
twice on board trains and once on a level crossing. It appears that any activity that involves
public interaction carries the risk from assault.
So, what is the risk from assault?
According to the SRM version 4, each year there is on average 191 fatalities and weighted
injuries (FWI). Chart 20 shows that just over 6% results from workforce assaults, which - to
put it in context - is about the same as the risk from all train accidents. Later on in this
chapter, we will look at how this risk breaks down by location and workforce type.
Railway crime safety performance report
27
Chart 20.
Workforce assaults in context
Source: SRM version 4
Chart 21 illustrates the recent trends in assaults on the workforce, broken down by assault
type: verbal abuse3, threats4 and assaults5. It clearly displays the result of the increased
prominence being placed on this phenomenon. The encouragement of reporting and a
supportive management policy has led to the reported increase in the rate of verbal abuse
and threats. The chart also shows that the rate of those assaults more likely to result in a
physical injury has, for the last sixteen months, remained constant at about 177 per month.
During the first quarter of 2006, over 1,200 reported assaults on the workforce were reported.
This equates to over 14 every day: 45% were physical assaults, 10% were threats and the
remaining 45% was verbal abuse.
In the introduction to this chapter, we mentioned that the railway industry has similar
problems to other public service providers. However, in addition, violence on the railways
reflects a wider social problem. The RSSB Annual Safety Performance Report for 20056
looks at this issue in detail, and concludes that violence is a social problem; thus what
happens on trains and in stations reflects what is happening in society at large.
3
Any verbal statement or physical act that is considered by the victim to be offensive, abusive or insulting, but is
not accompanied by the actual use or threat of force.
4
Any verbal statement or physical act that does not amount to the actual use of force, but causes the victim to
fear that some kind of force may be used against them.
5
The intentional use of force that results, or was intended to result, in a physical contact with the victim. If a
weapon is produced but not used, or a missile is thrown but fails to make contact, then this also constitutes an
assault.
6
The 2005 Annual Safety Performance Report can be downloaded from www.rssb.co.uk/aspr.asp.
28
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 21.
Frequency of assaults to the workforce
We have seen that the general level of assaults is constant and that the level of reported
verbal abuse and threats continue to rise. Chart 22 looks at the consequences from these
assaults in terms of the periods from January to March and April to December. The
consistent level of injuries (from major to shock) helps to prove that the increases seen in
Chart 21 are due to improved reporting of verbal abuse and threats, and that they are not
indicative of an overall increase in assaults on the workforce.
Chart 22.
Workforce assaults by severity
Railway crime safety performance report
29
Even though 45% of the workforce assaults were physical assaults, only half of these
resulted in actual injuries: five majors, 28 minors leading to the victim attending hospital, and
243 other minor injuries. This is not an unusual ratio.
Physical injuries are not the only consequence from an assault on the workforce: many
people are traumatised and, as a result, are unable to return to work for a considerable
period of time. On Chart 23, it may be seen that the total time lost due to assault is currently
400 person days each month (on average). The total time lost during 2005 – over 4,500
days - nearly equates to 22 person years.
Chart 23.
Time lost from assaults to workforce, per month
Having considered that much time is lost in this way, it is useful to look at the distribution
involved. That is, what percentage of the days lost is due short term absences of one or two
days, and how much may be considered long-term? Chart 24 displays this and reveals that:
•
11% of all assaults result in a period of absence from work.
•
When there is an absence, it is for up to 10 days in 72% of the incidents.
•
One in nine absences are for at least one month.
•
One in 30 absences (One in 250 assaults) are for more than 100 days.
30
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 24.
Percentage of assaults resulting in at least { days lost
Based on data from 1998 to 2005.
As might be expected, the type of assault (physical assault, threat and verbal abuse)
influences the amount of time lost. This is shown in Table 9.
Table 9.
Time lost by assault type
There are three main occupations that are the most vulnerable to an assault: traincrew (rear
end), revenue protection staff (both on-board trains and at stations) and other platform staff.
However, any activity involving face-to-face contact with the public is at risk. This is borne
out by the five major injuries in the first quarter of 2006 (two train drivers, one revenue
protection officer, one conductor and one level crossing keeper.
Chart 25 shows that the majority (73%) of the injuries from assaults occur around the station,
whilst another 23% occur on-board trains. Assaults do occur at other settings and this is
illustrated by the major injury to a level crossing keeper.
Railway crime safety performance report
31
Chart 25.
Workforce assault injuries by location type
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, changes were made to SMIS in April 2005. Additional
fields now allow analysis of the category and key factors. With one year’s worth of data now
available we can, for the first time, analyse the data. Chart 26 and Chart 27 look at the
assault category for physical assault, threats and verbal abuse.
Chart 26.
Assaults by type and category
The charts show:
32
Railway crime safety performance report
•
Physical assaults have been well recorded, with only 9% categorised as unknown.
This is not the case for verbal abuse and threats, where only 60% are categorised.
•
Physical assaults tend to involve punching, swearing or pushing and prodding.
•
Unsurprisingly, verbal abuse and threats are mainly comprised of swearing.
Chart 27.
Proportion of assaults by type and category
The following chart displays the three types of assault by the factors involved. As well as
showing the most common elements, it reveals that the factor behind the assault does not
affect the type of assault.
The most common factors are:
•
Ticket disputes: 40% of the assaults in the last year involved these.
•
Alcohol: a factor in 13% of assaults.
•
The data also reveals that a contributing factor, other than the twelve available in
SMIS, was involved in 17% of assaults.
Even if April 2005 is excluded from the analysis (as the new fields did not become available
until the end of the month), no factor was entered for 12% of incidents.
Railway crime safety performance report
33
Chart 28.
Assaults by type and factor
Even though we only have data for one year, it may be seen from Chart 29 that the factors
involved each month are similar. One pleasing aspect from is that the proportion of unknown
events appears to be decreasing.
Chart 29.
34
Assaults by type, factor and month
Railway crime safety performance report
5.5
Crime against persons
Personal security has been a significant issue for our railway for some time. It is of utmost
importance that all persons, be they passengers, members of the workforce or the public, not
only are safe, but feel safe when they interact with the railway.
The analysis of trends in crime affecting the person is based on SMIS data and data from the
BTP. SMIS data provides a rich source of information about assaults on members of the
workforce, including those that are verbal and do not result in any physical injury. Information
on assaults to passengers or members of the public does not tend to be recorded in SMIS as
they are mostly handled by the BTP. BTP data is therefore examined when looking at the
incidence of assaults as a whole. (Note that the BTP data used for analysis in this report
excludes incidents on the London Underground and those occurring in Scotland.)
Crime statistics should be interpreted with care. Dramatic fluctuations can be misleading and
statistics can contribute to our fear of crime if misused. Hundreds of millions of passenger
journeys are made safely each year and the statistics should be viewed in context. More than
a billion passenger journeys were made in 2005 and the vast majority were incident-free,
with the BTP recording less than one assault for every 100,000 passenger journeys made on
the mainline railway. The likelihood of any one individual being the victim of crime is
therefore low.
5.5.1
Performance indicators
The Home Office introduced a National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) that all police
forces across England and Wales (not Scotland) were required to adopt. It was implemented
by the BTP 1 April 2002. The basic principle of NCRS is that if, on the balance of probability,
a crime has been committed, then it is recorded as such. This has made crime recording
more victim-focussed. Crime statistics are not always accurate indicators of crime levels.
Police activity to target particular offences, changes in reporting patterns and other factors
can all affect these figures.
Interpreting crime data, and identifying trends in the level of crime, has always been difficult,
especially as BTP crime reporting can be influenced by initiatives to target certain
areas/incidents, thus raising the level of reported crimes. Chart 30 shows three measures of
the level of violence – two at the national level, and one specific to the railway.
The blue line represents the trend of crimes involving violence against the person that were
recorded by the 43 police forces of England and Wales. The figures are affected by changes
in the way that the police record crime, particularly the introduction of the NCRS (and
subsequent audits and improvements). There is also evidence that an increased proportion
of violent crimes are being reported to the police.
The red line represents the overall level of violent crime as estimated by the British Crime
Survey (BCS), which is generally regarded as the most reliable measure of violent crime in
England and Wales. The BCS assesses crime levels by asking a sample of the population
about their experiences as victims of crime over previous 12 months. It is unaffected by
changes in people’s willingness to report crimes to the police and changes to police
recording practices. The sample size (approximately 45,000) and the method of sampling
ensure that the results of the survey are statistically valid. The BCS does not provide a direct
measure of crime on the railway, nor does it cover 'victimless crimes' (such as vandalism) or
crimes in which the victim is under 16. Nevertheless, what happens on trains and in stations
reflects what is happening in society at large, and the BCS is helpful for benchmarking
railway crime and for interpreting trends in police-recorded crime.
Railway crime safety performance report
35
The green line represents the trend of assaults on the mainline railway in England, Scotland
and Wales that were recorded by the BTP. BTP recording practices have been subject to
the same changes as those of other forces.
All three lines show an annual moving average expressed as a percentage of the level of
crime recorded in the year to the end of March 2002. Figures from the Home Office and the
BCS are available to the end of December 2005, and BTP figures to the end of March 2006.
Chart 30.
Trends in different measures of violent crime
Level of crime (benchmark March 2002 = 100%)
180%
160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
BTP-recorded assaults on the
mainline railway
All police-recorded violence
against the person (AMA)
BCS-recorded violence
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
0%
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
The main conclusions to be drawn from Chart 30 are:
•
Police-recorded violence has increased by more than 60% over the 4-year period, with
the largest increase in the year following the introduction of the NCRS. The rate of
increase slowed during 2005.
•
The level of violence recorded by the BCS fell by around 10% over the same period,
although there was a small increase during 2005.
•
If the BCS is indeed an accurate reflection of the true level of crime, then it is
reasonable to conclude that the large increase in the level of police-recorded crime
does not reflect higher levels of violence but is a consequence of the police recording a
greater proportion of violent offences than before (approximately 80% more over four
years).
•
The level of BTP-recorded violent crime on the railway has risen by approximately 50%
over the four-year period, at a slightly slower rate than all police-recorded violent crime.
The figures are certainly influenced by the changes in police recording practices. It is
tempting to apply the ratio derived in the previous paragraph to railway assaults: if the
proportion of assaults that are recorded by the BTP has increased by 80%, then the
true level of assaults on the railway may have actually fallen by around 15% over the
four years. However, a strong note of caution must be attached to such an analysis.
The nature of violent crime on the railway does not precisely mirror that of violent crime
36
Railway crime safety performance report
in society at large; the effect of changes in the reporting and recording of crime may
therefore be different. Additionally, the sets of offences that constitute each of the
categories plotted in Chart 30 do not match exactly (although they are broadly similar).
Chart 31 illustrates the recent trends in BTP recorded robbery incidents, assaults and sexual
offences. It shows:
•
Robberies recorded by BTP fell by 15% in 2005, registering the lowest total in the fiveyear analysis period. This indicates a clear improvement during a time when passenger
journeys have increased by 12%. Robberies recorded in the first quarter of 2006
indicate that this level of incidents is likely to remain constant if the same levels are
seen in quarters two to four. However, as there are seasonality influences to be borne
in mind, it is too early in the year to predict any final trend for 2006.
•
Recorded assaults rose by 4% from 2004, with the total now standing 57% higher than
the 2001 figure. The sharpest increase occurred in 2003, coinciding with the first full
year following the introduction of the NCRS. This is broadly in line with national police
figures, which rose significantly as BCS-measured violent crime fell. It is therefore
possible that the true numbers of assaults have been falling.
•
Recorded violent assaults rose by 3% in 2005; however, according to the data assaults
have increased by 86% since 2001. This illustrates once again the change in the
recording practise and how it has influenced trends. With the relatively small change
recorded in 2005, the incidents of violent assaults recorded under new counting rules,
with a higher proportion of crimes reported, seem to have stabilised. The rising trend is
much lower than the high numbers seen previously.
•
Incidents of racially or religiously aggravated harassment rose significantly in 2005.
Some of the 48% increase on 2004 figures may be the result of increased reporting
and recording (reflecting changing attitudes and recording practices - doubtless
exacerbated by the BTP’s encouragement of a zero-tolerance approach to racially and
religiously motivated crime).
•
Sexual offences were 12% lower than 2004, reversing the trend of the previous three
years.
Railway crime safety performance report
37
Chart 31.
Assaults, robberies and sexual offences on the railway (BTP data)
Detection rates indicate the likelihood of an offender being apprehended. A high detection
rate should deny some previous wrongdoers the opportunity of re-offending, increase public
confidence, and encourage the victim of a crime to report it to the police. It should be noted,
however, that ‘detection’ indicates that a crime has been solved.
Chart 32 illustrates the trends in detection rates. Robbery detection rates have risen steadily
over the five-year period. The detection rates for assaults fell in 2003, although this should
be seen in context of the increase in the number of recorded assaults that year. Subsequent
improvements have seen the rate start to climb back towards its 2002 level, and in 2006 thus
far, following a drive to improve detections and complete data issues, the rate is
exceptionally high. This drive has also given rise to a marked improvement in the detection of
sexual assaults in 2006.
38
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 32.
Detection rates for assaults, robberies and sexual offences. (BTP data)
The term ‘public disorder’ applies to behaviour such as drunkenness, harassment and
fighting. Such behaviour can contribute to an atmosphere that is threatening to passengers
and staff, and can also escalate. Many assault incidents begin with a verbal altercation or
other disorderly conduct.
The BTP publishes crime data (for notifiable and non-notifiable disorder offences) in two
separate groups. The notifiable offences group contains crimes that are generally more
serious, such as provocation/violence, violent disorder, affray, harassment, alarm and
distress.
Chart 33 looks at the recent trends in these offences.
Railway crime safety performance report
39
Chart 33.
Public disorder on the railway (BTP data)
There was a significant rise in BTP-recorded public disorder on the railway in 2005. This was
brought about by increases in the more serious offences, particularly violent disorder and
affray, and incidents of harassment, alarm and distress. The increase is likely to be due, in
large part, to increased police activity and the fact that the BTP has been targeting anti-social
behaviour, with the aim of increasing the number of offenders brought to justice. This may
have been further helped by the fact that some TOCs now have staff authorised to issue
penalty notices for disorder.
Alcohol is a contributory factor for disorder and violence on the railway (as well as accidents
such as slips, trips and falls). Across the country, victims of violent crime believed offenders
to be under the influence of alcohol in almost half (48%) of all cases. The impact of extended
licensing hours and 24-hour drinking legislation (which came into place on 24 November
2005) will be closely monitored by the industry.
Chart 34 identifies the trend of drink offences recorded from January 2001 to March 2006.
40
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 34.
Drink offences recorded on the railway (BTP)
The chart shows that:
The majority of offences related to alcohol (65%) occur inside the station, with the next
highest proportion occurring on trains (14%).
After a steady increase, drink related offences reduced slightly from the end of 2003 to mid2005. Since that time, however, offences have risen again, and are currently at the level
seen during the worst point in the period of analysis.
There may have been a slight increase in offences recorded since the 24-hour drinking
legislation came into effect, although there is nothing significant to note at this stage.
Campaigns have been put in place to combat these incidents since the legislation was
implemented, which may mask any significant increase that may have occurred otherwise.
What can we conclude about the level of violence on the railway? BTP data shows a 50%
increase over four years, but – based upon what is known about the discrepancy between
police-recorded violent crime and violent crime as experienced by victims – this is not
incompatible with a fall in the true level of violence on the railway. SMIS data appears to
show that physical assaults on staff have increased by 34% and that verbal assaults and
threats have more than tripled in four years. One reason for this may be that staff are now
more confident that, due to assault initiatives employed by the industry, something will be
done about the problem if reported. However, as previously discussed, SMIS data probably
significantly under-estimates the amount of passenger risk due to assault. It is almost certain
that improved awareness and increased reporting have played an important part in shaping
these trends.
Railway crime safety performance report
41
5.5.2
General analysis
Although crimes occur in all areas of the railway infrastructure, the majority takes place at the
lineside, in stations or on trains. Crimes occurring lineside are mostly incidents of vandalism.
Chart 35 looks at the areas where robbery and assaults occurred between January 2001 and
March 2006. It is interesting to note that half of all robberies occur on trains. One reason for
this may be that there are fewer BTP officers patrolling trains than there are in stations.
Another reason is thought to be that robbers perceive the CCTV cameras on trains to be less
effective than those on platforms or in stations. Following the terrorist assault on London last
year, the police presence in stations was increased, which may have had a knock-on effect
regarding the high proportion of robberies on trains since that time. Robberies are also
thought, in many cases, to be pre-meditated, whilst assaults tend to be committed in the heat
of the moment. When looking at the assaults that took place between 2001 and March 2006,
half occurred within stations, whilst 29% occurred on trains.
Chart 35.
Assault and robbery area breakdown (BTP data)
Robbery
Assault
Chart 36 shows there to be a clear pattern in the time of day when both robberies and
assaults take place. Note too that the working week trends differ from those at weekends.
42
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 36.
Robbery and assaults – when do they occur?
The chart shows:
•
The highest rate of assaults occurs on Friday evenings, followed by Saturday
evenings. Alcohol is an important contributory factor at these times. According to the
British Crime Survey 2004/5, victims of violence believed perpetrators to be under the
influence of alcohol in 48% of cases. Incidents that lead to violence on the railway
can be sparked by ticket disputes, delays, over-crowding and the behaviour of other
passengers. Alcohol often exacerbates (and sometimes generates) the problem.
•
On weekdays other than Friday, assaults peak between 4-5pm, and remain at a fairly
high level throughout the rush hour and into the late evening (especially on
Wednesdays and Thursdays). There is an additional small peak during the morning
rush hour.
•
The peak hour for robbery incidents is from 4-5pm, although there is a second peak
around midnight (especially prevalent on Friday nights).
•
There are relatively few robberies in the morning and – unlike assaults – no peak
during the morning rush hour.
•
The trend for all crimes is also very interesting as there are two peaks during the
week and only one during the weekend. As may be expected, the peaks are the
evening and morning rush hours.
Much has been made of knife possession in recent national newspaper articles. Chart 37
provides an insight into the trends of recorded crimes where offensive weapons have been
found on persons coming into contact with the railway infrastructure.
Railway crime safety performance report
43
Chart 37.
44
Possession of weapons offences on the railway (BTP)
•
A substantial proportion of weapon possession offences were recorded at the
Eurostar barriers at Waterloo International and Ashford International, where metal
detectors are routinely used. Excluding these records, BTP’s London South and
London North Areas together account for a similar level of weapon crime to the
combined total for the other areas of Great Britain. (Note that the London South
and London North Areas cover much of the East and South East of England, as
well as the London metropolitan district.)
•
The rate of weapon possession crimes (as recorded by the BTP, again excluding
Eurostar) shows little change from mid-2002. The exceptional months are February
and March 2006, when very high rates were recorded in London North and London
South, coinciding with the introduction of Operation Shield, a pro-active approach to
tackling this type of crime currently being employed by BTP.
•
Note that this analysis has been limited to possession offences as the crime
category used to record cases of assault and robbery does not easily identify
whether or not a weapon was used.
Railway crime safety performance report
6
Risk profile
The risk profile for railway crime has been derived from version 4 of the SRM. This is based
on a quantification of the risk resulting from those hazardous events on the railway that have
the potential to lead to fatalities, major injuries or minor injuries to passengers, staff or
members of the public (MOPs). The next version (version 5) of the SRM will have been
updated, published, and will be in use by the time the next edition of the railway crime report
is released.
6.1
Risk profile - overall risk
The total risk attributable to railway crime is 71 FWIs per year. This comprises 52 fatalities,
54 major injuries and 2708 minor injuries. Of the total railway crime risk, trespass accounts
for 54.4 FWIs per year.
Chart 38 shows the risk contribution in FWIs per year for the three risk groups that make up
railway crime: assaults, trespass and vandalism.
Chart 38.
Railway crime (Fatalities and weighted injuries (FWIs) per year)
Assault
15.2 FWIs/ year
Vandalism
1.3 FWIs/ year
Trespass
54.4 FWIs/ year
The risk contribution from railway crime is compared to the total risk on the mainline railway,
in Table 10. (Note that suicides are excluded from all the analyses.)
Railway crime safety performance report
45
Table 10. Railway crime risk compared to the total risk on the mainline railway
Total fatality
risk on the
mainline
railway
(Fats/year)
Railway
crime per
category
(Fats/year)
Railway crime
as a % of
accident
category risk
(FWIs/ year)
Railway crime
category as a % of
total mainline
railway risk (FWIs/
year)
0.43
7.97
0.19
4.02%
0.22%
0.48%
Total
Railway
mainline
crime per
railway risk category
Accident category (FWIs/year) (FWIs/year)
Train accidents
10.64
Movement accidents
32.73
0.91
13.03
0.00
2.79%
accidents
93.30
15.20
8.40
0.33
16.29%
7.95%
Trespass
54.43
54.43
51.49
51.49
100.00%
28.48%
191.10
70.97
80.90
52.02
Total
37.14%
After suicide, trespass is the largest source of risk on the mainline railway. The 54.4 FWIs
per year due to trespass account for 28% of the risk (excluding suicide). A further 9% of the
total risk is due to assaults and other acts of vandalism, such as placing objects on the line,
train fires, and throwing objects through windows. Overall, railway crime accounts for 37% of
the risk in FWIs on the railway (excluding suicide). The most dominant risk contributor in
relation to fatalities is trespass.
When trespass and suicide are excluded from the analysis, the total risk on the railway is 137
FWIs per year. Of this, the risk contribution from railway crime is 16.5 FWIs per year or,
12%. For fatalities, the total risk on the mainline railway is 29.4 fatalities per year. The
proportion of this fatality risk attributable to railway crime is about 0.52 fatalities per year, or
1.8%.
Chart 39 shows the total risk for each railway crime hazardous event contributing to greater
than one FWI per year. The risk in FWIs per year is shown in blue, and the fatality risk per
year is provided in red for comparison.
All hazardous events resulting in greater than one FWI per year are related to trespass,
except for passenger and workforce assaults. For railway crime, workforce assaults are the
second highest hazardous event risk resulting in 12.0 FWIs per year. Passenger assaults
are the sixth highest, resulting in 3.0 FWIs per year. However, the majority of assault risk (ie
passenger and workforce assault) lies with minor injuries. Fatalities account for only 2.2% (at
0.33 fatalities per year) of the total assault.
46
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 39.
Overall risk profile for railway crime related accidents > 1 FWIs per year
Risk/ year
HEM-30 HEM-28 HEM-27 HEN-36 HEN-64 HEM-26 HEM-12 HEN-38 HEN-65 HEM-25
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
32
Adult trespasser struck/crushed
while on the mainline railway
34
32.95
31.66
Workforce assault
Adult trespasser
electric shock (conductor rail)
Adult/child trespasser struck
while crossing track at station
Child trespasser struck/crushed
while on mainline railway
Passenger assault
Adult trespasser fall
while on the mainline railway
MOP pedestrian struck/crushed
by train on level crossing
MOP pedestrian struck/crushed
by train on footpath crossing
Fatalities and Weighted Injuries
Fatalities
MOP fall while
riding illegally on train
Chart 40 below shows the top 10 precursors for railway crime. These contribute 57.5 FWIs a
year, or 81% of the total railway crime risk in FWIs. The chart indicates that the overall
precursor risk is dominated by trespass. The total fatality risk from the top 10 precursors
account for 87% of that related to railway crime.
Chart 40.
Top 10 railway crime precursors
Risk/ year
2
4
6
32
Adult trespasser struck/crushed
by train on NRCI
34
32.95
31.67
Other workforce assault: physical on station concourse
Adult trespasser electric shock: contact
with conductor rail not at station
Adult trespasser struck while crossing track at station
Child trespasser struck/crushed
by train on NRCI
Train crew (other) assault:
physical on train
Adult trespasser fall
while on the mainline railway
HEN38A
Train crew (other) assault:
verbal on train
Adult trespasser electric shock:
contact with conductor rail at station
HEN-64
HEN-65 HEN-36 HEN-65 HEM-26 HEM-12
HEN38B
HEN-65 HEM-25
0
Passenger assault: physical
on station concourse or platform
Railway crime safety performance report
Fatalities and Weighted Injuries
Fatalities
47
Public behaviour is seen to be the dominant contributor to the overall railway crime risk. As
may be expected, even though there may be some measures in place to influence public
behaviour, this is not something over which the industry has full control. Current initiatives at
the local and national level are being undertaken to manage this risk more effectively. See
section 7 for further details.
6.2
Risk from assaults
To complement the additional analysis on assaults in sections 5.4 and 5.5, assault data from
version 4 of the SRM has been broken down by person type, location and assault type to
show how assault risk is distributed.
Chart 41 shows how the total risk from assaults of 15.2 FWIs per year is distributed by
person type.
Chart 41.
Reported assault risk by person type (FWIs)
Member of public, 0.28
Track Worker, 0.08
Train Driver, 0.47
Passenger, 2.94
Other workforce, 5.81
Train Crew (other), 5.62
As discussed in the safety overview, physical assault on workforce is believed to be well
reported in SMIS. However, physical assault on passengers and members of the public is
highly underreported in SMIS since figures from the BTP indicate that the numbers of
passenger and public assaults per year is in the region of 4,000, accounting for almost 20
FWIs. The low estimate of passenger risk on Chart 41 has now been re-modelled and
Version 5 of the SRM will incorporate the changes described.
Chart 42 shows how assault risk to the workforce and passengers is split by location type
and assault type.
In summary:
48
•
The vast majority of the risk is due to physical assaults (73%).
•
Over half the total risk from assaults occurs in stations (56%), with a further 43%
occurring on board trains.
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 42.
Reported assault risk by location and assault type (% of events per year)
Trackside
1%
14%
Verbal
Physical
43%
Station
Train
30%
Physical
0%
12%
Verbal
Other, eg sexual assault
Chart 43 shows how assault risk is distributed by person type and assault type.
It shows:
•
An even split of risk between train crew and other members of the workforce.
•
The most exposed other workforce groups subjected to physical assault are platform
staff and revenue protection officers.
•
The most exposed other workforce groups subjected to verbal assault are platform
staff, revenue protection officers and level crossing staff.
•
A smaller proportion of the assault risk to train crew is physical, compared to other
members of the workforce.
•
The majority of assault risk to passengers is physical (93%). This figure may be
higher than the reality, since passengers are less likely to report a verbal assault than
a member of the workforce.
Railway crime safety performance report
49
Chart 43.
Assaults per year by person type and assault type
MOP
Train driver
3%
Physical
12%
4%
13%
Passenger
Physical
Other
32%
workforce
42%
Verbal
14%
Train crew
(other)
41%
Physical
Verbal
10%
26%
Chart 44 breaks down the assault risk to train crew further. It shows:
50
•
81% of the risk occurs to train crew on board trains, with the remainder occurring on
station concourses.
•
Of the on-board train risk, 62% is physical and 38% is verbal.
•
Of the risk occurring on station concourses, 76% is physical and 24% is verbal.
Railway crime safety performance report
Chart 44.
Train crew assaults - FWIs
Other
0.0182
Verbal
0.245
Physical
0.795
On station
concourse
1.06
Physical
2.84
Verbal
1.72
On - train
4.56
6.3
Risk profile - summary and conclusions
The overall level of risk from railway crime is 71 FWIs per year (52 fatalities, 54 major
injuries, and 2,708 minor injuries). Of this, 76.7% is due to trespass, 21.4% to assault and
1.9% to vandalism.
Trespass is the largest source of risk on the railway, at 54.4 FWIs per year. This illegal public
behaviour is not within the direct control of the railway. However, the rail industry can seek
to influence behaviour even if it cannot necessarily control the actions and behaviours that
create the risk. Whilst it is predominately the individuals themselves that suffer in these
types of events, there are also significant knock-on effects to staff and passengers. The
driver and recovery staff suffer shock/ trauma, frequently requiring time off work. In addition,
significant performance issues arise in the management of trespass: delays for passengers
and financial losses to the railway. Successful actions taken by railway companies have
reduced the risk by about 20% over the last three years. However, there still remains a
considerable level of risk to be addressed through education and closure of access points.
Assault is an increasing issue for the railway, with 5% of non-rail users citing personal
security as a reason for not travelling by train. Assault accounts for 15.2 FWIs per year but
only 2.2% of the risk result from fatalities (0.33 fatalities per year). Nevertheless, in terms of
projecting an image to customers that the railway is effectively controlling risk, it is important
that the railway is seen to be addressing this very visible risk. Train crew and other
workforce members (such as station staff and cleaners) are exposed to the majority of the
risk. The 2006 Strategic Safety Plan addresses the issue of workforce assaults, and
discusses initiatives in place by train operating companies, such as increased use of CCTV
and improving station environments, to assist in preventing the occurrence of both physical
and verbal assault.
Railway crime safety performance report
51
Acts of vandalism (such as placing objects on the line, throwing objects through windows,
and lighting fires) account for the lowest level of risk of the three railway crime categories at
1.34 FWIs per year (0.2 fatalities per year, 2.0 major injuries per year and 189 minor injuries
per year). Injuries to passengers and train crew, as a result of vandals throwing objects
through windows, accounts for the majority of this risk at 0.91 FWIs per year. However, the
majority of this risk relates to minor injuries. Precursors with the potential for hazardous event
leading to multiple fatalities risk are classified into three groups:
•
Train derailment caused by vandalism (including trains striking vehicles placed on the
line by vandals).
•
Collision with road vehicle placed on level crossings by vandals.
•
Fires caused by arson/vandalism.
In terms of fatalities, the highest risk category of vandalism with the potential for multiple
fatality consequences is train derailment at 0.11 fatalities per year. Fire caused by
arson/vandalism is the most frequent risk category of vandalism with the potential for multiple
fatality consequences. However, it generally results in minor injuries and represents 0.07
FWIs per year.
While no multiple fatality accidents have occurred as a result of vandalism over the last 5
years, there is the potential for them, as demonstrated by the accidents at Ufton level
crossing in November 2004 and Great Heck in February 2001, where trains struck objects
(road vehicles) on the track. Again, this risk is outside the direct control of the railway, but
reducing the amount of scrap material left at the line side after engineering work and the
introduction of robust fencing in urban areas has reduced levels of railway crime significantly.
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Railway crime safety performance report
7
Initiatives
In this section, we shall be looking at the initiatives and policies that are currently in action at
national and local level. Train Operating Companies (TOCs) were invited to submit details of
best practice to share with industry colleagues. As well as listing these, we have also
decided to focus on the excellent work being undertaken by Northern Rail.
7.1
National initiatives
Contact Maurice Wilsdon on 020 7904 7510 or maurice.wilsdon@rssb.co.uk.
In January 2006, RSSB approved a new industry-wide structure for the management of risks
posed by a range of public behaviour issues. These are known collectively as ‘community
safety’ and cover trespass and vandalism, in addition to suicides, level crossing misuse and
assaults on staff and customers.
A new high-level unit, the Community Safety Steering Group (CSSG), has been established
to direct the industry’s strategic approach to these matters. Delivery is through a series of
nine Community Safety Partnership Groups (CSPGs), which cover the entire national
network. They are chaired by Network Rail, with attendance from representatives of the
relevant TOCs and the BTP.
A small number of national task groups exist to address specific problems.
commissioned by the CSSG and will disband when their tasks are complete.
These are
The new structure was progressively introduced from April 2006. Some of the previous
groups have been disbanded, including the Rail Fatality Management Group and the
National Railway Crime Group (though the latter’s working group will continue to operate for
the time being).
The national groups are all facilitated by RSSB. Until May 2006, this was augmented by the
Community Safety Support Unit (CSSU), which was a two-person team funded on a trial
basis by the RSSB-managed industry Research and Development programme (R&D). The
CSSU’s success has led to many of its activities being absorbed by RSSB. The monthly
community safety newsletter will resume publication on September 2006.
7.1.1 Education
Contact Gaynor Anderson on 020 7904 7674 or gaynor.anderson@rssb.co.uk.
The CSSG will be monitoring the current suite of education and communications channels,
while considering changes to improve their effectiveness.
The communications programme aims to address the impact of public behaviour on the rail
network in Great Britain and seeks to educate a variety of audiences about the dangers and
consequences of crime and other anti-social behaviour that impact on the railway system.
Usage of the industry’s education website (aimed principally at teachers), www.trackoff.org,
continues to grow. Downloads of curriculum-focused lesson plans (in conjunction with new
whiteboard technology) now top 6 million a year. The site is accredited by the British
Educational Communications and Technology Agency (BECTA) and has been identified as a
key site for safety, welfare and citizenship information in schools.
The www.railwaycrime.org website provides an ideal platform on which to share industry
campaign information and best practice details with its members and partners. This site will
Railway crime safety performance report
53
soon be expanded and refreshed, to reflect the new industry approach to managing
community safety related risk.
A national initiative targeting the key role that music plays in young people’s lives is being
developed by RSSB. MusicTraX harnesses youngsters’ interest in music of all kinds whether listening to or making it - while conveying core railway community safety messages
through a specially devised website. This features a competition for music makers - a sort of
‘Pop Idol’ online – the winning entry being given the chance to record. Other features include
music articles, reviews, links with official music download sites, free mobile ringtones, ezines, and music events. The site also helps rail organisations to raise their profile in the
local community by sponsoring local authority-run events.
Northern Rail, the UK’s largest community train operator, is the industry’s first major sponsor
of the initiative through its pilot portal site, NorthernTraX. Consideration is being given to
extending the concept to other partners depending on whether NorthernTraX is judged to be
a success. See section 7.2.1 for further details.
A separate recent competition, which was open to all secondary schools in mainland Britain,
allowed school to enter creative ideas, to inform young people about the dangers &
consequences of railway crime and anti-social behaviour. The categories were Art, Drama,
Music and Multimedia.) Penkreth High School, Warrington won the overall prize at a
ceremony held at the National Railway Museum on 6 July 2006. Work from the entrants is to
be incorporated into educational materials being produced for future use in schools.
7.1.2 Rail Personal Security Group
Contact Alan Davies on 020 7904 7964 or alan.davies@rssb.co.uk.
RSSB established the Rail Personal Security Group (RPSG) in 2003 as a national initiative
across the whole industry, including representatives from trades unions, the Department for
Transport, the Home Office and the Rail Passenger Council (now Passenger Focus). The
RPSG has addressed such issues as:
• Getting all companies to adopt the same definitions for assault.
• Encouraging staff to report all instances of assault and abuse.
• Raising public awareness that assaults on staff are unacceptable.
• Sharing experiences on the success of countermeasures to deal with assaults on staff
and passengers.
The RPSG produced a good practice guide, entitled Reporting and Recording Assaults on
Rail Staff, to assist industry managers when any member of staff suffer instances of abuse,
assault or threatening behaviour. The group monitors the accuracy in SMIS incident
recording of violence towards staff, with a view to getting greater consistency in data by
using the good practice guide.
The RPSG ran a poster campaign throughout 2005 to raise public awareness of the
problems of staff assaults. These were displayed by all train operators, the campaign being
evaluated by MORI, whose results showed an encouragingly high level of recognition by the
public.
RPSG has acted as a stakeholder for an RSSB research project which identifies the conflict
management training packages currently used in the rail industry and compiles evidence of
good practice training. This report will shortly be available on the RSSB website.
A practical guidance document has been prepared jointly with the Home Office Fear of Crime
unit, aimed at improving understanding and relationships between rail businesses and Crime
54
Railway crime safety performance report
& Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). It is intended to promote the document at a
workshop with the CDRPs and TOCs in the Yorkshire and Humber Government Office area.
The group has been in discussion with the BTP, Crown Prosecution Service, Sentencing
Advisory Panel and the Magistrates Association to raise awareness of the public interest
factor when rail staff members become victims of assault.
The group has reached agreement with the CPS and police forces, via ACPO, that all rail
staff on duty will be considered as persons serving the public. This will create an
‘aggravating factor’ for prosecution decisions, so that workforce assaults should no longer be
dismissed with a simple caution.
The group has also written to the Sentencing Advisory Panel, as part of a public consultation
on assaults against the person, stating that rail staff should have the protection of the courts
when they are assaulted. The additional point was made that deterrent sentences should be
given to those convicted of violence.
The RPSG has commissioned the production of a DVD for use as a module within its training
courses, showing staff how to deal with potential conflict from difficult customers. Messages
of endorsement have been received from the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport
Workers (RMT) and the Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association (TSSA).
The group is considering how to improve feedback to the TOCs on the progress and
outcomes of police investigations and prosecutions. This will aid the passing of information
on to assault victims.
The group has distributed training material from the BTP to all TOCs and Network Rail about
the use of DNA testing kits in spitting incidents, encouraging their use whenever possible.
South East Trains will report regularly to the group on its Rail Safety Accreditation Scheme
pilot, so that experiences and benefits may be shared with other companies.
Suicides
Contact Maurice Wilsdon on 020 7904 7510 or maurice.wilsdon@rssb.co.uk.
Suicide is not a criminal act, but it is very disruptive to the railway network. The BTP tries to
return the scene to the train operators within 90 minutes of being notified, but sometimes the
circumstances do not allow this.
Even when the immediate aftermath is over, there can be long-term effects both on
witnesses and staff involved in the clear-up. These can lead to time off work and lasting
personal trauma. The RSSB-managed industry R&D programme has published a piece
discussing ways of minimising the impact of suicides on railway staff
(http://www.rssb.co.uk/allsearch.asp - see project T317).
As access is relatively easy, many suicides occur at stations. In an attempt to reduce the
number of events, there has been a campaign to train station operators in the recognition
and diversion of potential victims before an incident. This training may be provided by The
Samaritans.
7.2
Local initiatives
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, RSSB invited TOCs and Network Rail to
submit details of any work being undertaken to tackle railway crime at a local level. We have
listed the responses below, in order to promote the sharing of best practice ideas and
Railway crime safety performance report
55
communicate the good work being done by those who actively confront issues of railway
crime. These TOCs not only help promote and improve safety for their own staff, but also
anyone who comes into contact with the railway infrastructure at any time.
7.2.1 Spotlight: Northern Rail against youth crime
Here, we present two initiatives that Northern Rail uses to fight the problems that can arise
when dealing with large groups of schoolchildren. By these means, the company aims to
highlight the dangers and consequences of anti-social behaviour and hopes to develop a
positive attitude to the railway in the community it serves.
7.2.1.1
Code of conduct
Northern Rail operates a code of conduct for pupils who travel to and from school on routes
that have experienced problems in the past. It focuses on behaviour and respect for staff and
passengers. Failure to comply is reported to the child’s school or college and the BTP and
can lead to the withdrawal of the child’s travel pass, a ban from travelling on Northern Rail
services, and possible prosecution. The company has joined forces with schools, Metro in
West Yorkshire and the BTP to implement the code. There has been an impressive 74%
reduction in anti-social behaviour on those routes where it is operated.
Initially, Chris Leech, Northern Rail’s Schools Liaison Manager, approached schools whose
children travelled on the company’s trains. He asked if he could chat to children about the
dangers of certain behaviours on the trains and at trackside. This enabled him to promote
safety and also created the opportunity to get his young audience to sign up to the code of
conduct. Due to the success and interest generated, it is now the schools that invite him to
come along and talk to their pupils. Good work indeed!
Chris Leech – Northern Rail’s Schools Liaison Manager – with a group of new recruits.
7.2.1.2
Youth offender reparation scheme
For the perpetrator, throwing stones at trains and placing obstacles on the track can seem
like ‘victimless’ crimes, the trains themselves being merely abstract, inanimate objects.
Northern Rail has designed a scheme to bring such offenders face-to-face with the very real
victims of their actions.
Youths found guilty of a crime against Northern Rail are given a Community Service Order
and allotted a probation officer (PO), working for the youth offending team. Authorities then
56
Railway crime safety performance report
ensure the punishment fits that crime by contacting Chris Leech, who tailors a scheme for
each individual case.
When offenders first arrive on-site (accompanied by their PO), they are interviewed. This
helps Northern Rail obtain information about the child and the incident in which he or she
was involved. By this means, attention may be drawn to any deficiencies in security (if
access to the track were gained via a hole in a perimeter fence, for example). The technique
also helps the child come to terms with the seriousness of the crime committed.
The next port of call is the control manager’s office. Here, offenders are shown how
incidents (including theirs) are recorded, and just how much time and energy it takes to deal
with incidents of that nature. Then comes a more nerve-wracking experience, as they are
taken to the Mess Room to meet train drivers and guards - the people in the trains at which
they had been throwing stones, or whose path they had blocked with rubble. This helps the
child to understand that theirs was indeed NOT a victimless crime. Crucially, the victims are
also able to explain how the crime made them feel, generating a more personal perspective
for the offenders to focus on.
This leads naturally to the granting of a cab pass, allowing the child to view the railway from
the workforce point of view. For example, if the offender was caught playing ‘chicken’, an
emergency brake test is demonstrated to show how hard it is to stop a train quickly when an
obstacle presents itself. This is another way to demonstrate that the victims are not the
massive, metallic trains, but the people working on them, vying to do their jobs and provide a
safe reliable mode of transport for millions of people every year. From here, offenders are fed
back into the probation system.
Of the 58 youths who have undergone this programme, NOT ONE has re-offended. A 100%
success rate for Northern Rail.
In addition to the above, the company is also heavily involved in other initiatives focussing on
getting youths away from the railway lines and involved in other activities:
•
NorthernTrax – major initiative with Northern Rail-sponsored competitions and
activities. Children are able to make music or record songs on-line or in a mobile
studio. It is a pop-idol style competition, with winners performing live in Leeds to
thousands of screaming fans! Other local authority music/arts events are also
sponsored. NorthernTrax has had over 700,000 hits on the website, and the media
coverage has been unprecedented.
•
NorthernArt – this is a new initiative from Northern Rail, which aims to reduce graffiti
on trains and railway property. Youths are invited to send artwork in to the scheme and
have it displayed online and perhaps in local art galleries, where events are being
hosted. Winners of the competition will have their art displayed on one of Northern
Rail’s trains. Northern Rail will also host gallery nights encouraging other local
businesses and councils outside the rail industry to use the artwork. In all cases,
artwork used will also display the child’s/artist’s name, thus encouraging children to
submit artwork rather than engaging in illegal graffiti activities.
For more information about any of these schemes, please contact Chris Leech at Northern
Rail: chris.leech@northernrail.co.uk.
If you would like to feature in the next Spotlight, contact Adrian Smith on 020 7904 7521 or
adrian.smith@rssb.co.uk.
Railway crime safety performance report
57
7.2.2 Examples of local initiatives
Company
Initiative
Contact
Merseyrail
Merseyrail’s dedicated security team of 30 staff has mcarroll@merseyrail
continued to make significant progress in reducing railway .org
crime whilst improving personnel security since the last
Railway Crime SPR. The revised private contract with
Carlisle Security, along with the partnership approach to
the policing of the Merseyrail network with BTP, has
demonstrated a notable decrease in incidents.
Workforce Safety shows a 20% decrease in incidents.
Central
Trains
Central Trains’ Don’t be a loser – buy a ticket campaign Paul.Frost@centraltr
saw £141,748 collected in fines, compensation and costs ains.co.uk
and more than 600 people convicted in its first five months
of operation. The ‘name and shame’ initiative involves
posters at Midland stations featuring the names and
addresses of culprits and the fines imposed on them. It is
part of a much wider campaign, which has seen a fall in the
number of people travelling around the West Midlands
without a ticket from 6% to 3%.
First
Great
Western
Upgraded crime busting DNA test kits have been issued to Richard.Harrington
all frontline staff. These kits, which contain sterile evidence @firstgroup.com
bags and swabs, are used to collect DNA samples when
customers or staff are assaulted. This evidence may be
used by the police during prosecution proceedings. A
further initiative includes all frontline staff being issued with
a key-ring which displays the BTP Emergency telephone
number. Direct feedback from the BTP Western area on
staff assaults and progress on these cases is also available
to the individual(s) involved. Personal alarms are also
available to any frontline staff member who request one.
Network
Rail
Network Rail has increased its commitment to educating Ian.chapman2@net
young people about the dangers of playing on the railway workrail.co.uk
by recruiting three more Railway Crime Education
Managers.
There are now nine dedicated full-time
education professionals. The team visits schools, youth
services, youth offending teams, Crucial Crew and Junior
Citizen interactive safety events to set up diversionary
programs to target areas that experience high levels of
railway crime.
No Messin'!, Network Rail’s own youth communication
programme, has also been expanded this year. In the
spring, boxing hero Amir Kahn launched this year’s
program of 10 two-day events. These will take place in the
peak crime months during the summer holidays. The team
tours the country, showing young people some safe and
fun things they can do as an alternative to hanging around
on the railway. In an attempt to standardise the railway
safety message given to young people at Junior Citizen
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Railway crime safety performance report
events and Crucial Crews, Network Rail has now invested
in five more interactive ‘Peppers Ghost’ models, which
describe the real-life consequences of railway crime and
will tour the country for year six school children.
Nexus
Offenders targeting Tyne and Wear Metro can be ‘shopped’ ali.tombling@nexus.
by sending a simple text message to a dedicated number. org.uk
Passengers use mobile telephones to report incidents in
complete confidence to Metro’s control room, which can
then act on the information and take the appropriate steps
quickly. The text message technology has been installed by
Metro operator Nexus to crack down on crime and antisocial behaviour on the system. If members of the public
see anything on a train that concerns them, they can get in
direct contact with control room staff, which can then pass
information on to the Metro Police Unit and the BTP. Nexus
chiefs say that the new system will make it quicker and
easier to report offending and will give travellers greater
peace of mind when making their journeys.
Southern
In 2004, Southern put together a task force incorporating david.hynes@southe
three different skills sets to combat crime and disorder. rnrailway.com
The task force constitutes a full time BTP Officer, five
Railway Revenue Protection Officers and four Private
Security Officers. The team forms an integral part of
complimentary policing on the railway and is intelligenceled, being deployed through a combination of police and
railway tasking that follows the Police National Intelligence
Model. The team has also been deployed to tackle antisocial behaviour, vandalism (graffiti, obstructions on the
track), fighting on trains, train surfing and fare evasion.
In partnership with Transport for London (TfL), Southern
has installed 1032 CCTV cameras and interactive Help
Points at 50 stations in the Southern Metro area. A new
CCTV Control Centre provides information and assistance
by speaking to customers via help points at these stations.
The CCTV Control not only monitors activity on stations,
but also prepares evidential packages (including still and
motion pictures) to the police for investigation. Nearly 3000
evidence packs have been prepared in the last 12 months.
This relieves the police of much of the time-consuming
investigation of recorded images. It also supports the BTP
further in its fight against railway crime. Images from the
cameras has led to a number of arrests for high-profile
offences and have also supported Southern's ‘shop a yob’
campaign, which provides clear images of vandals and
criminals as yet unidentified to local newspapers.
DNA swab kits have been issued to all Southern front-line
staff and also placed in emergency equipment on trains.
The kits have proved to be extremely useful in identifying
offenders; several prosecutions for this form of assault
have resulted.
Railway crime safety performance report
59
First
ScotRail
First ScotRail now participates in BTP ‘Tactical’ meetings. brian.orr@firstgroup.
This process ensures that the BTP targets its resources at com
issues that will have a safety/security impact on
passengers and the company. First ScotRail continues to
meet with the BTP at ‘Backtrack’ meetings to examine
route of crime issues such as trespass and vandalism.
These sessions assist the BTP to focus on lines of route
that are experiencing high levels of trespass or vandalism,
and so on.
Several plans to upgrade station and car park safety have
been completed and further work is ongoing (additional
CCTV, Help Points and improved lighting etc).
CCTV is now currently fitted at 193 First ScotRail stations.
This year, a further two stations will be fitted (Dumfries &
Hamilton Central). Significant financial commitment has
been made over the next four year to fit other stations with
CCTV. The installation of CCTV and additional customer
support facilities at stations means that First ScotRail is
able to respond more promptly to any enquiries or
concerns that passengers may have and provide improved
security/safety for them. In addition this tackles the
perception of crime.
First ScotRail has fitted CCTV to over 50% of its trains. It
is anticipated that all First ScotRail trains will be fitted with
CCTV by the end of the year. The company has also
introduced a Safety Improvement Group meeting between
trades union representatives and First ScotRail mangers to:
Ensure that all relevant incidents are reported.
Gather additional intelligence, allowing the BTP to allocate
resources to where they are most needed.
Provide a forum for staff to raise ideas and suggestions.
Progress appropriate and realistic suggestions, consider
initiatives introduced by other train operating companies
and adopt best practice from the RSSB, HSE, ORR and
other relevant organisations.
Great
North
Eastern
Railway
GNER has taken a tough stance with drunkards on trains Sue.buzzeo@gner.c
and at stations. Aware that drink and ticket irregularities are o.uk
the two main drivers for verbal or physical assaults against
staff, the company has adopted a ‘firm but fair’ approach,
similar to that exercised by the airlines.
GNER staff say ‘no’ to passengers under the influence of
alcohol. If passengers get carried away with drink they do
not carry them home. The company has linked with the
BTP to roll out the initiative and is keen to involve other
train operators to strengthen the industry response to
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Railway crime safety performance report
drunken travellers.
Arriva
Trains
Wales
Arriva Trains’ Adopt a Station scheme actively encourages
community involvement, with schools, businesses,
residents and customers taking a more active interest in
their local station, helping to keep them in better condition.
Over 100 stations have been adopted, along with 21 new
Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), who have
joined the BTP to patrol the stations and trains across their
network. The officers are funded by the Welsh Assembly
Government, the BTP and Arriva Trains Wales (ATW).
ATW also allows free travel to uniformed officers from both
the BTP and the Civilian Forces when travelling to or from
work.
Geraint.morgan@arr
ivatw.co.uk
www.arrivatrainswal
es.co.uk
When ATW receives requests from schools for rail trips, it
always incorporates a safety lesson on board, with
members of staff and officers from the BTP. The lesson is
tailored to the age of the children; they also receive ‘goody
bags’ containing educational material obtained from ‘Track
Off’ in Leeds. Such visits are publicised in local media and
are a good way of creating positive interaction between the
railway, the BTP and the children.
ATW supports two child safety education centres – ‘Safety
Zone’ in Trefforest South Wales and ‘Dangerpoint’ in
Prestatyn North Wales. Both are centres where school
children can visit to learn about all aspects of personal
safety.
Campaign posters are also produced every year. These
are displayed on trains and at stations.
At stations with high levels of anti-social behaviour and
vandalism, ATW is working proactively with the BTP and
civil Police to encourage greater community responsibility
for the actions of children / youths who congregate there.
Leaflets requesting all incidents to be reported to
Crimestoppers are being distributed by the new PCSOs to
properties immediately adjacent to these stations. Without
the support of the local communities, such problems, which
are not unique to their network, will be difficult to resolve.
Bristol
Graffiti
P’ship
The Bristol Graffiti Partnership was set up to tackle graffiti Colin.saysell@btp.p
across the city. Partners include the BTP, the Avon and nn.police.uk
Somerset Police, Network Rail, First Great Western,
Wessex Trains, Bristol City Council and environment
groups. Leyhill Open Prison, the Crown Prosecution
Service and the local media were also part of the
campaign. Service level agreements, with terms of
reference focusing on enforcement, cleansing and
prevention, were drawn up, success being measured by
recorded crime, public surveys and the number of arrests.
Twenty-three offenders who had caused £2 million of
damage were caught at the height of the campaign with
Railway crime safety performance report
61
some being given substantial custodial sentences.
South
Eastern
Trains
A new Railway Safety Accredited Scheme, via the Paul.Nicholas@setra
introduction of Rail Enforcement Officers (REOs), was ins.co.uk
implemented on South Eastern. This scheme was set up
under the Railway Safety Accreditation Scheme (RSAS)
Regulations.
Successful accreditation allows a Train
Operator to employ staff who can be further accredited by
the Chief Constable of the BTP with certain police powers
to deal with low-level anti-social behaviour and other
matters. Fixed penalty notices may be used to deal with
offenders and other powers invoked to eject persons under
railway byelaws. This meant a fundamental change to
South Eastern’s previous policy on how staff dealt with
unruly behaviour and heralded a move towards a more
‘hands-on’ approach. A considerable amount of time and
effort was spent on ensuring staff and the unions fully
understood and supported this new role. South Eastern
became the first train operator to be fully accredited under
the scheme.
Some 40 REOs were employed, which has led to a
significant improvement in visibility on trains. This has
been reflected via improvements in South Eastern’s
Passenger Satisfaction Surveys. As well as reporting and
apprehending offenders, the REOs are also trained and
empowered to issue tickets to travel (as well as issuing
penalty fares). Results in their first eight months of
operation are impressive and are summarised below:
Tickets issued: 8708
Penalty fares: 7094
Ticket/ offence reports: 1898
Byelaw reports: 400
Crime/ intelligence reports: 389
Persons arrested: 281
‘one’
62
‘one’ is currently trialling personal tracker devices amongst Joanne.Beesley@on
its Revenue Protection Inspectors (RPIs), in order to erailway.com
mitigate the effect of assaults and to improve the personal
safety of the RPIs. The device operates using a SIM card
and is contained within a badge (credit-card sized), which
is worn around the neck. The device is registered with the
‘one’ control centre, based in London. If an RPI is
confronted with a situation in which he/she is unable to use
a mobile telephone to call for help, on activation, a red alert
is raised within Control, which can locate the RPI on the
network and call the BTP. Once the trial has been
completed, it is proposed to expand the scheme.
Railway crime safety performance report
At some ‘one’ depots and sidings, FlashCams have been
installed to deter vandalism. These cameras are activated
on detecting movement and will continue to film any
trespassers. The recording may then be used as evidence.
Dummy camera boxes have also been installed at high-risk
locations; if it is suspected that there is a growing issue
with trespass/vandalism, the FlashCams can be moved into
the dummy boxes.
A major CCTV initiative is currently underway within 'one',
in order to align the management of all CCTV, both on
trains and in stations. On-train CCTV is being fitted to
Class 321s, 315s and the majority of the company’s Class
317 fleet. (Class 360s are already fitted.) Funding has
been secured from TfL for a remotely-monitored CCTV
control room to be established at Hackney Downs which
will manage the CCTV in the London North area, including
many of the 'one' stations.
Railway crime safety performance report
63
Appendix 1.
64
Fatalities and major injuries
Railway crime safety performance report
Appendix 2.
March)
Top 30 trespass hotspot locations (April to
Railway crime safety performance report
65
Appendix 3.
March)
66
Top 30 vandalism hotspot locations (April to
Railway crime safety performance report
Appendix 4.
Crime-related research projects
RSSB’s Research and Development (R&D) programme is responsible for the development
and delivery of the railway industry’s safety-related research projects. It recognises that
safety management is one element of managing business risk and is therefore aimed at
providing and implementing viable business improvements for the industry. R&D’s principal
objectives are to identify and develop ways of reducing safety risk and the cost of delivering
a safe railway, and to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of safety management
across the network.
R&D is being conducted across twelve topics, ranging from the engineering of the wheel-rail
interface to human factors and operational research policy issues, such as risk tolerability.
This appendix presents details of the ongoing and completed programmes in the field of
railway crime. They may be classified into six main areas:
•
Public perception.
•
Workforce assaults/safety.
•
Passenger assaults/safety.
•
Trespass.
•
Vandalism.
•
General security/policing.
The number of research projects in each of these areas is summarised in the table below.
Note that some address more than one area. The total number of projects is therefore
greater than the figure shown:
Topic
No.
Public perception
5
Workforce assault
7
Passenger assault
6
Trespass
12
Vandalism
10
General security/policing
7
Total
47
Each of these research areas is summarised in the following section. The full reports (where
available) may be downloaded from the RSSB website at www.rssb.co.uk. For further
information on the research programme, or to provide comments on it, please e-mail the
research team at research@rssb.co.uk.
Railway crime safety performance report
67
Number Title
T039 Reducing assaults on
railway staff
Brief description
Status
Understanding the size of the growing problem Published
of assaults on railway staff, and identifying
measures to counteract it.
T040
Railway crime – industry
perceptions
Assessing the attitudes of the British Transport Published
Police and staff in key industry sectors to route
crime and its solutions. Comparing these
attitudes to those of the general public.
T047
Fears and experiences of
assault and abuse on the
railway
T061a
Maximising benefits from
CCTV on the railways –
executive summary
T061b
Maximising benefits from
CCTV on the railways –
existing systems
Investigating the fears and experiences of
Published
railway staff and customers in relation to assault
and abuse on the railway. Identifying measures
to improve personal security - better data, risk
analysis, best practice and partnerships.
Summarising the research work undertaken into Published
the use of CCTV on the railway. This comprises
separate projects on existing CCTV systems,
new and emerging technologies and pilot
project proposals.
Identifying the current uses of CCTV systems
Published
on the railway and simple means of improving
their effectiveness.
T061c
Advanced CCTV pilot
projects
Identification of three advanced CCTV systems Published
to assess their suitability for use in the rail
environment: Intelligent Station Surveillance,
Digital Video Recording and Wireless CCTV.
T061d
New and emerging
technology
T062a
Evaluation handbook for
route crime and other
initiatives
Assessing the type, availability, potential railway Published
applications and benefits of new CCTV
technology. Maximising benefits from existing
and future systems to counter vandalism and
other security problems.
Developing a single methodology to evaluate
Published
the effectiveness of anti -vandalism and other
schemes on the railway. Determining which of
the schemes work, and which do not.
T062b
Rail participation in the
work of youth offending
teams
T062c
Vandalism –lessons to be
learned from the USA and
other initiatives
T063
Trespass and vandalism
cost modeling
68
Investigating the reasons for low levels of
Published
participation in Restorative Justice schemes for
young offenders who trespass and/or vandalise
the railway. Proposing measures to increase
participation.
Reviewing USA and other international
Published
experience arising from zero-tolerance and
other anti-vandalism initiatives. Evaluating the
transferability to the British context of lessons
learned.
Identifying the direct and indirect costs of
Published
railway trespass and vandalism, by populating
an industry-wide model; this expresses them by
organisation, event and region to support
investment decision-making.
Railway crime safety performance report
Number Title
T064a Development of rail safety
material for teachers and
schools
T064b
T064c
T103
T316
Brief description
Status
Development of a curriculum-led framework for Published
incorporating rail safety messages enabling
web based rail safety resources to be
accredited by the National Grid for Learning.
Raising awareness of third Investigating the attitudes of teenage boys to
Published
and fourth rail risks
the risk associated with the third and fourth rail.
Using the knowledge thus gained in a campaign
to increase awareness.
Trespass – transferable
Reviewing advertising campaigns that have
Published
lessons from a review of
addressed large-scale societal behaviour issues
safety campaigns
such as drink driving, to identify lessons that
might transfer to a railway trespass reduction
context.
Assessing the cost of
Assessing the financial impact of physical and Published
assaults
verbal assaults on rail staff and passengers on
the railway.
Developing a community
safety support unit for
public behaviour initiatives
Establishing a small unit to help industry coordinate its approach to managing national
initiatives on public behaviour issues - route
crime, personal safety / security, suicides, level
crossings, and dealing with the bereaved /
injured.
Minimising the impact of
Identifying ways to prepare railway staff for the
suicides on staff
possibility that they may witness suicides.
Determining the most appropriate support
systems to reduce post-incident trauma.
Investigating the benefits of Examining and evaluating the opportunities
complementary policing
provided by the concept of complementary
within the railway
policing and the associated new legislative
environment
arrangements to the rail industry.
An investigation into
Investigating causal factors of trespass via
trespass and access via the station platform ends, and legitimate access
platform ends at railway
requirements of authorised persons.
stations
Developing options for measures to mitigate the
former without impeding the latter.
Child fatalities – signage to How to ensure that anti-trespass signs are
prevent trespassers
effective and influence patterns of unauthorised
access to the railway, especially by young
people.
Completed
T592
Management of football
fans on the railway
Evaluating the risk from travelling football fans
and the violence, drunkenness, anti-social
behaviour and disruption they cause to the
railway industry, its staff and passengers.
In progress
T605
Management of crowding
on trains
Evaluating techniques, including modelling and In progress
contingency planning, for managing crowded
trains as a result of service disruption, local
events or sheer weight of rush hour traffic.
T639
Best practice in station
adoption schemes
The project will produce a good practice guide
for ‘Station Adoption’ schemes throughout the
railway industry.
T317
T318
T322
T555
Railway crime safety performance report
Published
Published
Published
Completed
In progress
69
Number Title
T657 Better control of access at
stations and level crossings
to reduce railway crime
T667
70
Research into security at
Stations
Brief description
Establishing what more can be done to further
reduce unauthorised access to the tracks from
level crossings and stations.
Status
In progress
Understanding the nature and extent of crime
on stations and trains and the measures
effective in controlling it – together with an
understanding of passengers’ fear of crime
and relevant factors.
In progress
Railway crime safety performance report
Glossary
Acronym
ABCL
AHB
AMA
AOCL
AOCR
ASPR
ATOC
BCS
BTP
CCTV
CIRAS
COSS
CPS
CSPG
CSSG
CSSU
DDA
DfT
DSA
ESLG
FC
FP
FWI
GNER
HEM
HEN
HET
HLOS
HMRI
HSC
HSE
IMC
LC
LNE
LNW
LOR
LUL
MAS
MCB
MCG
MIMS
MOM
MPJ
MSL
MSS
MTM
MWL
NCC
NCRS
NGfL
NIR
NLXSG
Expansion
automatic barrier crossing locally monitored
automatic half-barrier crossing
annual moving average
automatic open crossing, locally monitored
automatic open crossing, remotely monitored
Annual Safety Performance Report
Association of Train Operating Companies
British Crime Survey
British Transport Police
closed-circuit television
Confidential Incident Reporting and Analysis System
controller of site safety
Crown Prosecution Service
Community Safety Partnership Group
Community Safety Steering Group
Community Safety Support Unit
Disability Discrimination Act
Department for Transport
Driving Standards Agency
Emergency Services Liaison Group
footpath crossing
footpath level crossing
fatalities and weighted injuries
Great North Eastern Railway
hazardous event movement
hazardous event non-movement
hazardous event train
higher-level outputs
Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate
Health and Safety Commission
Health and Safety Executive
Infrastructure maintenance company
level crossing
London North East
London North West
line of route
London Underground Ltd
multi-aspect signalling
manually controlled barrier crossing
manually controlled gate crossing
Maintenance Information Management System
mobile operations manger
million passenger journeys
level crossing with miniature stoplights
maximum safe speed
million train miles
miniature warning lights
National Control Centre
National Crime Recording Standard
National Grid for Learning
National Incident Register
National Level Crossing Safety Group
Railway crime safety performance report
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Acronym
NMF
NPS
NR
NRCG
NRCI
NSA
NSFG
OC
OHL
OOARL
OPSRAM
ORR
OTDR
OTP
PHRTA
PIM
PINS
PO
PRM
PTS
RAIB
RCF
REO
RFMG
RGM
RGS
RGSP
RIDDOR
RISAS
RISB
RMMM
ROGTS
ROSCO
RPI
RPSG
RRV
RSSB
S&T
SCCFG
SIC
SMIS
SPAD
SRA
SRM
SRRT
SSP
TCOD
TfL
TOC
TPWS
TSSG
UWC
UWG
72
Expansion
network modelling framework
National Passenger Survey
Network Rail
National Route Crime Group
Network Rail controlled infrastructure
National Safety Authority
National SPAD Focus Group
open crossing
overhead line equipment
on or affecting a running line
operations risk and mitigation
Office of Rail Regulation
on-train data recorder
on-track plant
potentially higher risk train accident
Precursor Indicator Model
Police Information System
probation officer
persons of reduced mobility
personal track safety
Rail Accident Investigation Branch
rolling contact fatigue
Rail Enforcement Officer
Rail Fatalities Management Group
Railway Group Member
Railway Group Standard
Railway Group Safety Plan
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations
Railway Industry Supplier Approval Scheme
Rail Industry Safety Body
rail-mounted maintenance machine
Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006
rolling stock leasing company
Revenue Protection Officer
Rail Personal Security Group
road-rail vehicle
Rail Safety and Standards Board
signalling and telecommunications
Safety Critical Communications Focus Group
System Interface Committee
Safety Management Information System
signal passed at danger
Strategic Rail Authority
Safety Risk Model
SPAD risk ranking tool
Strategic Safety Plan
track circuit operating device
Transport for London
Train operating company
train protection and warning system
Track Safety Strategy Group
user-worked crossing
user-worked gated crossing
Railway crime safety performance report
Definitions
Term
Definition
Accident
An unexpected, unplanned occurrence, resulting in physical harm to an
individual, damage to property, a loss or any combination of these effects.
Accidental death
Such has occurred if the victim had no intention to take his/her own life or
cause self-injury. Note that if reasonable doubt exists, the death is treated
as accidental, and not a suspected or attempted suicide. Accidental death
can occur to those engaging in dangerous activities, including trespass, as
well as those going about their legitimate business.
Automatic train
protection (ATP)
This system provides either a continuous or regular update of speed
monitoring for each train and causes the brakes to apply if the driver fails
to bring the speed within the required limit. It can minimise – but not
eradicate - the chances of a train passing a signal at danger.
Automatic warning
system (AWS)
This is a system that provides audible and visual warnings to the driver on
the approach to signals, certain level crossings and emergency, temporary,
and certain permanent speed restrictions. It is a track inductor-based
system linked to the aspects of fixed lineside signals.
Child
A person aged 15 years or below.
Collision inrunning: open track
This occurs in circumstances where trains are not intended to be in close
proximity on the same line. The speed of one or both of the trains involved
may be high.
Coupling: open
track
Similar to ‘shunting collision at station’, but occurs away from a station.
Detection rate
The rate at which the police identify perpetrators of crime (leading to
several possible outcomes, including convictions and cautions).
Fatality
Including where death occurs within one year of an incident.
Level crossing
This is the ground-level interface between a road and the railway. A table
defining the many individual types of crossing is given in Chapter 7
(section 7.2).
Major injury
This is as defined in RIDDOR 1995, and applies to passengers, staff and
members of the public. Injuries such as fractures, amputations, loss of
sight or those resulting in admittance to hospital for a period of more than
24 hours are included in this category.
Minor injury
This is defined as injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public
that are not major injuries. Note that while shock is not classified as a
minor injury in RIDDOR 1995, it has been included as such in the Safety
Risk Model.
Movement
accidents
These are accidents to people involving trains (in motion or stationary), but
excluding injuries sustained in train accidents.
Multi-aspect
signalling (MAS)
A colour light signalling system designed to maintain a safe separation
between trains.
Railway crime safety performance report
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Network Rail
Controlled
Infrastructure
(NRCI)
This falls within the boundaries of Network Rail’s operational railway and
includes the permanent way, land within the lineside fence, and plant used
for signalling or exclusively for supplying electricity for operational
purposes to the railway. It does not include stations, depots, yards or
sidings that are owned by, or leased to, other parties. However, it does
include the permanent way at stations and plant within these locations
used for signalling or exclusively for supplying electricity for operational
purposes to the railway.
Network Rail:
under contract
Persons working under contract to Network Rail, either as direct
employees of organisations within the Railway Group (for example,
infrastructure companies), or contractors to such organisations (like
Mowlem).
Non-movement
accidents
These are accidents unconnected with the movement of trains, occurring
to people on railway premises.
Older adult
A person aged 30 years or above.
On-track plant
This refers to rail-borne vehicles used to repair/maintain the track (such as
rail grinders, ballast tampers and on-track machines).
Passenger
A person travelling or intending to travel whether in possession of a ticket
or not. Passengers who are trespassing are not included – these are
dealt with under ‘Public’.
Pedestrian
This refers to a person travelling on foot. Note that the category also
includes cyclists.
Permissible speed
The maximum speed at which trains are permitted to run over a section of
line.
Permissive working
A method of working that allows running movements into an occupied
section of track on designated lines and platforms.
PHRTA
This stands for ‘potentially higher risk train accident’ and refers to
accidents that have the potential to result in harm to any or all person types
on the railway. PHRTAs comprise train derailments (excluding road
vehicle strikes on level crossings), train collisions (excluding roll backs),
trains striking bufferstops, trains striking road vehicles at level crossings
(including derailments), and trains running into road vehicles not at level
crossings (with no derailment).
Possession
The complete stoppage of all normal train movements on a running line or
siding for engineering purposes.
Precursor Indicator
Model (PIM)
An RSSB-devised means of assessing the underlying risk from train
accidents by calculating the monthly risk from 84 distinct precursors.
Public (members
of)
Persons other than passengers or workforce members (that is,
trespassers, persons on business and other persons). This includes
passengers who are trespassing (when crossing tracks between platforms,
for example).
RIDDOR
This, the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences
Regulations, 1995, is a set of health and safety regulations that require any
major injuries, illnesses or accidents occurring in the workplace to be
formally reported to the enforcing authority. It defines major injuries and
lists notifiable diseases - many of which can be occupational in origin. It
also defines notifiable dangerous occurrences - such as explosions,
structural collapse, electrical overloads, fires, and so on - where no injury
occurs but subsequent investigations may be needed.
Road vehicle
All vehicles that travel on the highway, including motorcycles, but not pedal
cycles.
74
Railway crime safety performance report
Robbery
Robbery and assault with intent to rob. This excludes theft of passenger
property (such as luggage), and pick-pocketing offences.
Roll-back collision
This is when a train rolls back (while not under power) into a train on the
same line (including one from which it has decoupled).
Safety Risk Model
(SRM)
A quantitative representation of the safety risk that can result from the
operation and maintenance of the GB rail network. It comprises 120
individual computer-based models, each representing a type of hazardous
event (defined as an event or incident that has the potential to result in
injuries or fatalities).
Setting back
collision
This occurs when a train making a reversing movement under power
collides with a train on the same line, usually as part of a decoupling
manoeuvre.
Sex crimes
These are sexual offences against males and females, including indecent
exposure and other related offences.
Shunting collision
at station
This arises when the locomotive or unit causing a collision is engaged in
marshalling arrangements. While it characteristically occurs at low speed
and involves the rolling stock with which the locomotive or unit is to be
coupled, the accident may involve a different train that could be travelling
more quickly.
SMIS
The Safety Management Information System, is a national database used
by Railway Group members to record any safety related events that occur
on the railway. SMIS data is accessible to all members, so that it may be
used to analyse risk, predict trends and focus action on major areas of
safety concern.
Station accidents
These are movement, non-movement and train accidents ascribed to
stations. Movement accidents are those associated with platform
management (occurring during boarding or alighting, for example).
Suicide
Where a Coroner’s verdict is suicide.
Suspected suicide/
Attempted suicide
Where objective evidence of suicide exists (other than a Coroner’s verdict).
This is an assessment based on the application of Ovenstone criteria
adapted for the railways. These are based on the findings of a 1970
research project into rail suicides and cover aspects such as the presence
(or not) of a suicide note, the clear intent to commit suicide, behavioural
patterns, previous suicide attempts, prolonged bouts of depression and
instability levels.
Train Protection
and Warning
System (TPWS)
A safety system that automatically applies the brakes on a train which
either passes a signal at danger, or exceeds a given speed when
approaching a signal at danger, a permissible speed reduction or the buffer
stops in a terminal platform.
A ‘TPWS activation’ is where the system applies the train’s brakes after the
driver has already initiated braking.
A ‘TPWS intervention’ occurs when the system applies the train’s brakes
without this action having been taken by the driver first.
Trackside/lineside
A person is on the lineside if they are within the area between the railway
boundary fencing and a point 3 metres from the nearest rail of any line
(beyond which is termed ‘on or near the line’).
Trackworkers
Workforce members employed in engineering or technical activities on or
near the line or lineside (as defined in the Rule Book, including within 4
feet of the platform edge). Note that traincrew members are not included
in this category.
Railway crime safety performance report
75
Train accidents
In general, this refers to accidents occurring to trains and rolling stock, as
reportable under RIDDOR 1995 (see introduction to Chapter 6). However,
non-RIDDOR reportable incidents that occur in yards, depots or sidings
(such as shunting derailments that do not foul a running line) are also
classed as ‘train accidents’.
Trespass
The term ‘trespass’ is defined as occurring when people go where they are
never authorised to be, rather than where they behave inappropriately
(either from error or violation) at places where they are allowed to be at
certain times and under certain conditions (such as level crossings).
Violent assaults
These include homicide, attempted murder and serious assault (that is,
grievous bodily harm, wounding, threats to kill and actual bodily harm).
Workforce
All persons working for the Railway Group (either as direct employees or
contractors).
Weighted injury
In this document, the numbers of major and minor injuries are weighted in
recognition of their relatively less serious outcome in comparison to a
fatality. The current weighting is 0.1 of a fatality for each major injury and
0.005 for each minor injury. The combined measure is designated
‘fatalities and weighted injuries’ (FWI). The term FWI replaces ‘equivalent
fatalities’, which was used previously within the industry.
Young adult
A person aged between 16 and 29 years.
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Railway crime safety performance report