Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report
This report is issued by the RSSB
If you would like to give feedback on any of the material contained in this
report, or if you have any suggestions for future editions, please contact:
Siona Pitman
Senior Safety Intelligence Analyst
RSSB
Block 2 Angel Square
1 Torrens Street
London EC1V 1NY
020 3142 5485
Siona.Pitman@rssb.co.uk
The report may be downloaded at no cost from the RSSB website:
http://www.rssb.co.uk/safety/spr/spreports.asp
Hard copies may be ordered at cost price by contacting the RSSB enquiry desk on
020 3142 5400.
© RSSB 2010
Published April 2010
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Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
2
Contents
Executive summary
5
1
Introduction
7
1.1
7
2
3
Scope and structure
Overall risk
9
2.1
9
The risk at the road-rail interface
Level crossings
3.2
3.1.1
SRMv6 level crossing modelling changes
10
3.1.2
Level crossing risk in context
11
3.1.3
Risk by crossing type
12
3.1.4
Precursor Indicator Model
14
3.1.5
Train accident risk at level crossings
16
3.1.6
All level crossing risk model
17
3.1.7
Level crossing population numbers
17
Progress against SSP trajectory
3.2.1
3.3
3.4
3.5
10
SSP trajectory – public behaviour at level crossings
18
18
Level crossing safety performance
19
3.3.1
Headlines
19
3.3.2
Fatalities and injuries in 2009
20
3.3.3
Trends in fatalities and injuries at level crossings
21
3.3.4
Pedestrian fatalities by time of day
22
3.3.5
Trends in harm at level crossings
23
3.3.6
Causes of harm at level crossings
24
3.3.7
Injuries by user behaviour
24
Train accidents at level crossings
26
3.4.1
Trends in collisions between trains and road vehicles
26
3.4.2
AOCL crossings
28
3.4.3
Causes of train collisions at level crossings
29
3.4.4
Level crossing collisions causing derailments
30
3.4.5
Trains striking barriers or gates
30
Near misses and misuse at level crossings
32
3.5.1
Near misses with road vehicles
32
3.5.2
Near misses with pedestrians
33
3.5.3
Near misses by time of day
35
3.5.4
Farm vehicle near misses and misuse
35
3.5.5
Misuse at level crossings
36
3.5.6
Users crossing when unsafe
37
3.5.7
Train performance delays due to level crossing misuse
38
3.6
Level crossing equipment failures
39
3.7
Level crossing vandalism
40
3.8
Performance against European targets
41
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
3
3.8.1
4
6
7
42
Bridge strikes
44
4.1
The risk from bridge strikes
44
4.1.1
Bridge strike risk in context
45
4.1.2
Risk by bridge type
46
4.1.3
Bridge numbers
47
4.2
5
Comparisons other European countries NRVs
Safety performance relating to bridge strikes
47
4.2.1
Headlines
47
4.2.2
Trends in fatalities and injuries due to bridge strikes
47
4.2.3
Total bridge strikes
48
4.2.4
Strikes by bridge type and severity
49
4.2.5
Overline bridge strikes
51
4.2.6
Train performance delays due to bridge strikes
52
4.3
Comparison with other European countries
52
4.4
Case study of a serious underline bridge strike
53
Vehicle incursions
54
5.1
The risk from vehicle incursions
54
5.2
Safety performance relating to vehicle incursions
55
5.2.1
Headlines
55
5.2.2
Aircraft and vehicle incursions explained
55
5.2.3
Trends in fatalities and injuries due to incursions
56
5.2.4
Trends in rail incursion incidents
57
5.2.5
Road vehicle incursions leading to derailments
58
5.2.6
Detailed analysis by entry point and foul of the line
58
Learning from operational experience
60
6.1
RAIB investigation reports
60
6.2
Causal analysis of RAIB recommendations
61
6.3
Worldwide level crossing accidents
64
6.3.1
64
Australasian level crossing awareness
Initiatives
65
Appendix 1.
Key safety facts
77
Appendix 2.
Collisions at level crossings
78
Appendix 3.
Research and Development
79
Appendix 4.
Investigation reports and recommendations
85
Appendix 5.
Case study – Northern Rail train driver
86
Appendix 6.
Pedestrian risks at level crossings
89
Appendix 7.
Crossing numbers and types
93
Appendix 8.
Bridge strike classification and process
97
Appendix 9.
Definitions
99
Appendix 10.
Glossary
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
104
4
Executive summary
In general, statistics show that the railways of Great Britain are safe relative to all other
forms of transport.
This has been achieved by continuous improvement through learning from experience and
investment in newer and safer technologies, including the introduction of the train protection
and warning system (TPWS) and the replacement of Mark I rolling stock with modern more
crashworthy passenger trains. More information on these developments may be found in
RSSB‘s Report on improvements in the safety of passengers and staff involved in train
accidents.
However, analysis shows that the risk at the road-rail interface remains an issue for the
following reasons:
By virtue of improvements in other areas, road-rail interface risk now represents almost
half of the current PIM train accident risk (two of the three most recent multi fatality train
accidents were caused by road vehicles).
Most level crossings risk arises from users exposing themselves to local hazards (either
wilfully or accidentally); this makes the risks much harder for the industry to ‗control‘.
The rail industry has therefore focussed on mitigating the risk at the road-rail interface
through the combined actions of the Road-Rail Interface Safety Group (R-RISG) and the
specific actions of Network Rail and the law enforcement agencies. Recognition has also
been given to worldwide good practice, expressed through the ‗5 Es‘; engineering,
enforcement, education, engagement and evaluation.
There has not been a multi-fatality interface accident since Ufton in 2004.1 The industry
continues to monitor the risks via the high-level analysis produced by RSSB and Network
Rail‘s management actions and specific local supervision and maintenance regimes. The
latter is described in Network Rail‘s Safety Management System, which includes the use of
the All Level Crossing Risk Model (ALCRM).
Accidents and incidents occurring at the road-rail interface (including level crossings, bridge
strikes and incursions through fences, bridges and access points) account for approximately
12.5 fatalities and weighted injuries (FWI) per year and represent 9% of the total system risk
(excluding suicides).
The Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) has shown that, since 2000, there have been greater
improvements in train accident risk, thanks to the reduction in risk from signals passed at
danger (SPADs), brought about by TPWS, improved rolling stock design and improved
infrastructure integrity. Collisions at level crossings account for around 42% of all PIM train
accident risk.
1
The accident at Ufton occurred when a road vehicle driver deliberately parked their car on the AHB
level crossing. The vehicle was struck by a passenger train, which derailed killing five passengers and
the train driver.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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Road vehicle occupant level crossing fatalities make up much less than 0.1% of the death
toll on roads (2008 saw 1,8222 road vehicle fatalities); but while the number of road deaths
has reduced by 23% over ten years, level crossing road vehicle fatalities have remained
fairly constant over the same period, with (on average) around three per year. At such a low
level, however, the statistical significance is questionable.
Despite the obvious issues, the UK compares favourably with other European Union
Member States. The risk expressed in terms of Fatalities and Weighted Serious Injuries
(FWSI)3 per billion train kilometres at level crossings in the UK is the lowest of the Member
States and nearly ten times lower than the average.
This report examines the road-rail interface safety performance recorded on Network Rail
managed infrastructure (NRMI) over the last ten years and the estimated underlying level of
risk derived from version 6 of the Safety Risk Model (SRMv6).
Level crossings
SRMv6 estimates that 8% (11.8 FWI per year) of the total system risk occurs at level
crossings. This includes risk to train occupants as a result of road user behaviour, as
well as risk to level crossing users (vehicle occupants and pedestrians).
There have been 80 fatalities to pedestrians at level crossings in the last ten years, an
average of eight per year, although in 2006 there were five fatalities and in 2008 there
were 13.
With the exception of a low of 11 collisions recorded in 2006 and 2007, the number of
collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings has remained broadly
constant over the last ten years. On average, there are around 16 collisions per year.
Bridge strikes
There have been no rail-related passenger fatalities due to a bridge strike in the last ten
years. The incident at Oyne in Scotland (May 1978) was the last recorded to result in
passenger fatalities.
Since 2000, there has been a continuing increase in reported bridge strikes. However,
there was a significant decrease of 23% in the total number of bridge strikes in 2009,
compared with 2008. The reduction in road freight transport due to the economic
downturn is regarded as the main contributory factor to this decrease.
Vehicle incursions
There have been 17 fatalities arising from incursions over the last ten years: seven
occurred to road vehicle occupants and ten to train occupants in the Great Heck
accident.
There have been 42 road vehicles struck (away from level crossings) in the last ten
years, five of which have caused derailments.
2
Source Department for Transport (DfT); excludes other motor or non-motor vehicle users and
unknown road users.
3
Ten serious injuries are considered to be statistically equivalent to one fatality. Minor injuries are not
included. Serious injuries are defined as those requiring a 24-hour or longer stay in hospital. This is
different from a major injury, which is defined in the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR).
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
6
1
Introduction
This is RSSB‘s second special topic report focusing on the risk that arises at the road-rail
interface. It reviews the performance levels achieved during the last ten calendar years at
the points where highways meet the railway. It presents the levels of risk and harm to
passengers, the workforce and members of the public from bridge strikes, road vehicle
incursions and the operation of level crossings. Note that the term ‗harm‘ refers to the actual
level of injury to people that has been recorded, and the term ‗risk‘ refers to the average
level of injury estimated by RSSB‘s Safety Risk Model.
This report reviews recent trends to highlight areas of changing safety performance and
presents the first detailed results of monitoring against the National Reference Values
(NRVs) and the Strategic Safety Plan (SSP) trajectories.
RSSB would appreciate your views on the content of this document, along with any ideas
about additional information that you would like to see in future editions. Please provide your
feedback either directly to the report manager, whose contact details are on the title page, or
via the online feedback form at http://www.rssb.co.uk/safety/spr/feedback/feedback.asp.
1.1
Scope and structure
The report considers safety performance on NRMI, based on safety data up to the end of
December 2009. It should be noted that the figures given are subject to change either as a
result of late reporting of events into the industry‘s Safety Management Information System
(SMIS) or as a result of additional information, such as coroners‘ verdicts on suspected
suicides, becoming available.
We assess harm and risk in terms of fatalities, major injuries and minor injuries. When
combining injury information into a composite measure, each fatality is given a weight of
unity and each major injury a weight of 0.1. RIDDOR4-reportable minor injuries and the more
severe cases of shock and trauma are given a weight of 0.005, with non-RIDDOR-reportable
minor injuries and less severe cases of shock and trauma being given a weight of 0.001.The
combined total is called ‗fatalities and weighted injuries‘ (FWI).
This report includes the same reporting scope as the Road-Rail Interface Safety Group (RRISG) where safety performance is continually monitored throughout the year at quarterly
meetings to discuss the issues surrounding the road-rail interface. The three main areas of
risk; level crossings, bridge strikes and vehicle incursions are reviewed. The report will also
focus specifically on:
Injuries and fatalities to passengers, staff and members of the public. Those who have
deliberately accessed the line via the level crossing for the purpose of trespassing on the
running line are not included in this analysis.
Trains striking road vehicles at level crossings and following incursions from bridges and
through fences.
Near misses and misuse at level crossings.
SSP trajectories related to the risk from public behaviour at level crossings.
4
RIDDOR: The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
7
European level crossings NRVs and a comparison with other European countries.
Vehicle5 incursions through fences where the road vehicle comes close to but does not
land on the running line.
National Programme Groups and their associated initiatives.
Research and development.
Scope exclusions
The scope excludes any trespass/vandalism or suicides at locations other than at level
crossings as this risk is covered in the scope of this report. There are two separate groups
in the Community Safety6 umbrella, Community Safety Steering Group (CSSG) and the
National Suicides Prevention Group (NSPG) that cover this type of public behaviour. See the
Initiatives section for details on the National Programme Groups that focus on road-rail
interface risks and the areas they cover.
Road vehicle occupants whose death or injuries occur in a road traffic accidents rather than
a result of railway operations are not in scope. Occupants of road vehicles who place their
vehicle on the line with the intention to commit suicide are also excluded from the report.
However, the injured parties who did not intend to come to harm (ie those onboard trains)
are classed as accidental and are included in the analysis.
Derailments that have had third party involvement (ie users of level crossings being on the
interface either in error or violation) are considered. Therefore, any event where a train has
derailed due to railway maintenance is not considered in this report.
Bridge collapses caused by environmental factors, such as landslips or other permanent way
failures that may have caused a bridge to fail are not included in this report.
Road traffic accidents that occur on the public highway are not included in the scope and
only includes events where a road vehicle leaves the road and infringes on railway property.
Data sources
SMIS is the main data source used in the analysis throughout this report and is
supplemented by information from British Transport Police (BTP), Network Rail and the
Department for Transport (DfT). The industry is required to report any safety related events
including injuries and accidents into the SMIS database as mandated by the Railway Group
Standard GE/RT8047: Reporting of Safety Related Information.
SMIS has been the main reporting tool for the industry since 1998, being based on an
amalgamation of a number of other reporting databases. RSSB began coding injuries in
2001; hence the injury charts only show data from 2001 onwards.
5
For the analysis of this report we consider vehicle types such as motorbikes, lorries, tractors, buses
and for incursions this also includes aircraft.
6
http://www.rssb.co.uk/national_programmes/community_safety_groups.asp
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
8
2
Overall risk
2.1
The risk at the road-rail interface
Version 6 of the RSSB Safety Risk Model (SRMv6) estimates the risk at the road-rail
interface (including level crossings, bridge strikes, and vehicle incursions) to be 12.5 FWIs
per year; this is 9% of the total system risk (excluding suicides).
Chart 1 reveals that most of this risk involves pedestrians struck by trains. Such accidents
are likely to prove fatal, largely because the mass and speed of a train are such that a
collision is more likely to kill a person than cause injuries. The second largest grouping
involves collisions between trains and road vehicles. Both types of accident are most likely to
occur at level crossings. Crossing users can also be harmed if they are hit by, or collide
with, barriers or other equipment (3%) – or if they slip, trip or fall (4%) while traversing the
crossing. Note that train occupants are exposed to less than 4% of the risk.
Chart 1.
Overall risk associated with road-rail interface (SRMv6)
Total system risk (excludes suicides)
Risk associated with road-rail interface
141.3 FWI/year
67 fatalities and 74.3 weighted injuries
12.5 FWI/year
10.1 fatalities and 2.4 weighted injuries
Road vehicle
occupants, 23%
Train occupants, 4%
Pedestrian slips trips
and falls, 4%
Pedestrian accidents
with crossing
equipment, 3%
9%
Road vehicle occupants
bridge strikes, 1%
Passengers on station
crossings, 7%
Public pedestrians,
58%
Pedestrians struck
by trains
(excluding trespassers
and suicides)
Of all the road-rail interface site types, level crossings represent the largest proportion of
risk, as shown in Chart 2. This is due to the fact that level crossings provide the greatest
opportunity for misuse by road vehicles.
Chart 2.
Overall risk at road-rail interface by site type (SRMv6)
Total system risk
Risk associated with
road-rail interface
(excludes suicides)
141.3 FWI/year
67 fatalities and 74.3 weighted injuries
12.5 FWI/year
10.1 fatalities and 2.4 weighted injuries
Bridges, 1%
Fence, 3%
9%
Level crossings, 95%
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
Access point, 1%
9
3
Level crossings
Crossings are open interfaces between the road and the railway. The greatest risk
associated with level crossings arises from deliberate or erroneous misuse by road vehicle
occupant crossing users as this group not only has the potential to cause itself harm, but can
also cause harm to train occupants. Pedestrians who misuse level crossings are putting
themselves at danger and the risk is entirely borne by the user.
SRMv6 estimates that 8% (11.8 FWI) of the total system FWI risk occurs at level crossings.
This includes risk to train occupants as a result of road user behaviour, as well as risk to
level crossing users. It also includes the small amount of risk at level crossings that is not
due to public behaviour (eg, injuries due to level crossing equipment failure).
Other risks that arise at level crossings include user slips, trips and falls (including cyclists),
equipment damage from vandalism, electric shock from overhead wires and road vehicle
collisions with barriers or level crossing equipment.
Most of the risk from train accidents at level crossings affects road users whose vehicles are
involved in collisions with trains. Fatalities to people on board the train are relatively rare.
Prior to the accident at Ufton in 2004, the last level crossing accident with on-train fatalities
occurred in 1986 at Lockington.7
3.1.1
SRMv6 level crossing modelling changes
SRMv5.5 estimated 3.5 FWI per year for collisions between trains and road vehicles at level
crossings; SRMv6 estimates 2.8 FWI per year. The reason for the reduction is the decrease
in the total number of events occurring in the data period and improvements in risk
modelling. The level crossing models have been substantially re-modelled to achieve
alignment with the All Level Crossing Risk Model (ALCRM).8 This has required the
development of separate models for each crossing type and the development of a wider
range of causes for each crossing type. For the models assessing the risk from collisions
with road vehicles (HET-10 and HET-11), the change has also enabled for the scope of
escalation factors of accidents to be considered at each type of crossing to be different to
account for:
The distribution of different types of road vehicles being struck.
The distribution of operational speeds at each type of crossing.
The subsequent likelihood of a derailment.
A result of the modelling change is a reduction in the average consequence per event at
some crossing types; in particular the likelihood of a derailment at lower speed crossings has
been reduced. Additionally, the likelihood of derailment at some crossings has been
reduced as account is taken of the types of vehicle that are typically struck at the different
types of crossing, ie heavy vehicles, such as tractors, are more likely to be struck at user
worked crossings than at AHBs. Furthermore, the consequences of passenger train
7
Eight passengers were killed when a diesel multiple unit struck a van which had been driven onto an
automatic open level crossing against the red lights.
8
ALCRM was developed over many years using inputs from research and Network Rail‘s experience.
It is used by Network Rail in the management of all its level crossings and is jointly owned by Network
Rail and RSSB.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
10
derailment at level crossings have reduced in line with changes to the general passenger
train derailment model (HET-12).
There has also been a reduction in the predicted frequency of collisions with road vehicles
(for HET-10 and HET-11 combined), from 15.6 to 12.4 per year. The cause of the reduction
in frequency is the generally lower level of collisions since SRMv5.5 (using data up to the
end of 2005)9: in 2006 and 2007, there were 11 collisions per year, whereas the rate in 2008
was higher at 19. Approximately 80% of such collisions are predicted to be with passenger
trains rather than freight trains. Another, less significant cause of the reduction is caused by
accounting for the decreasing population of crossings over the data period analysed.
3.1.2
Level crossing risk in context
Level crossings are safe when used correctly. Over 90% of risk in the previous ten years has
resulted from user misuse in the form of error or violation (the remainder being due to other
causes, such as equipment failure, reduced visibility or railway operator error).
Typical examples of user error include incorrect knowledge of operation, misjudging the time
it takes the train to reach the crossing or making incorrect assumptions regarding who has
priority of use, direction of travel or the presence of second train approaching (usually from
the opposite direction). Typical examples of user violation/abuse include users driving
around half-barriers, users crossing when the crossing lights are red, users not requesting
the signaller‘s authority to cross (where required) and leaving gates open after use.
The risk profile for level crossings is based on the quantification of risk resulting from
hazardous events occurring on the mainline railway that could lead to fatalities, major or
minor injuries and shock or trauma to passengers, workforce or members of the public
(excludes bridge strikes and incursion risk see Chart 35 and Chart 41 for a breakdown). The
risk at level crossings is estimated to be 11.8 FWIs per year. Chart 3 shows the breakdown
of which level crossing users are most at risk. 58% of the risk is to members of the public on
foot (including cyclists) being struck by trains.
Chart 3.
Fatalities and weighted injuries at level crossings (SRMv6)
Total system risk
Risk associated with level crossings
(excludes suicides)
141.3 FWI/year
67 fatalities and 74.3 weighted injuries
11.8 FWI/year
10.8 fatalities and 1.0 weighted injuries
Road vehicle
occupants, 20%
Train occupants, 4%
Slips trips and falls,
4%
Accidents with
crossing equipment,
3%
8%
Passengers on station
crossings, 8%
Public pedestrians,
62%
Pedestrians struck by trains
(excluding trespassers and
suicides)
9
SRMv6 considers incident data up to and including 30 September 2008.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
11
Approximately 77% of the total risk at level crossings is to pedestrians. Most of
pedestrian risk involves members of the public (62%) and passengers being struck by
trains (8%) on level crossings.
Approximately 4% of the total risk at level crossings is to passengers and members of
the workforce on board the train.
3.1.3
Risk by crossing type
Different types of level crossings offer different protection to users. There are two broad
groups:
Active crossings – where the road vehicle or pedestrian is warned of the approach of a
train through closure of gates or barriers and/or by warning lights and/or alarms.
Passive crossings – where no warning of a train‘s approach is given other than by the
train driver who may use the train horn. Here, the onus is on the road vehicle user or
pedestrian to determine whether it is safe to cross or not. Instructions for use are
provided at each location, along with other appropriate signs.
Generally automatic barrier and manually controlled crossings (including those monitored by
CCTV) are installed on public roads where road traffic levels are high.
Passive crossings for road vehicles are generally used in rural areas where there is a low
frequency of trains. These crossings tend to be either on private roads, for example to
provide access between a farm and fields or on roads which provide access to the farm
which can be used by invitees (for example, those delivering milk or post).
Footpath crossings are designed primarily for pedestrians. A small proportion of these
(around 2%) have automatic protection in the form of miniature warning lights. There are
also other types of crossing such as bridleway crossings which are intended for use by
horses (and cycles) and station crossings. Barrow crossings are not public rights of way and
are intended for station staff to use and are often protected by white lights. This information
is not always well captured in incident reports, so footpath (including bridleway, barrow and
station) crossings are analysed as a single category in this report.
Information on the level crossing population of Great Britain, along with an illustrated guide
to the different level crossing types, is in Appendix 7.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
12
Chart 4.
Risk from trains striking road vehicles (SRMv6)
2.51
2.5
2
2.63
1.83
1.5
0.72
0.71
0.46
Overall risk
OC
UWC
UWC+T
0.12
0.01
FP
0.19
0.14
UWC+MWL
UWC
UWC+T
UWC+MWL
AOCL/R
AHB
ABCL
MCG
MCB
MCB-CCTV
0
FP
0.01 0.02
AOCL/R
0.23
0.44 0.46
AHB
0.05 0.11 0.04 0.03
MCB-CCTV
0.30
MCG
0.45
0.5
ABCL
0.83
MCB
1
OC
Fatalities and weighted injuries per year
3
Risk per 1000 crossings
The overall risk for each type of crossing is affected by the number of such crossings on
the network, the hazards associated with them and their levels of usage.
The risk per 1000 crossings is a useful metric for safety management purposes when
compared to the overall risk, as it shows those crossings with the greatest individual risk.
AHB and UWC (with and without telephones) account for most of the level crossing risk
to road vehicle occupants. There are a large number of UWCs, but most are installed on
private roads, AHBs are typically fitted at locations where road and railway is more
heavily used and are often sited on busier, mainlines with a maximum line speed of
100mph.
AHB, AOCL and UWC-MWL have the highest risk per crossing for road vehicle users.
Both AOCL and UWC-MWL have low absolute levels of risk, but a much higher risk per
crossing. This is partly because there are comparatively few crossings of this type on the
network (around 2% of the total crossing population for each). AOCLs have the lowest
level of protection of all the automatic crossings, not having barriers but are provided
with lights and yodel alarms (see section 3.4.2 for further information on AOCLs).
Some of highest risk UWCs were upgraded with the addition of telephones and/or
miniature warning lights (to create UWC-Ts or UWC-MWLs). This led to a reduction in
the risk at UWC crossings, but the greater risk remains at those at those crossings fitted
with additional protection.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
13
Chart 5.
Risk from trains striking pedestrians by crossing type (SRMv6)
4.5
4.23
Fatalities and weighted injuries per year
4
3.5
3
2.71
2.47
2.5
2.14
1.85
2
1.55
1.5
1.11
1.00
1 0.81
1.01
0.93
0.77
0.58
0.5
0.23
0.59
0.25
0.11 0.14
0.05 0.13
0.48
0.05
Overall risk
FP
OC
UWC
UWC+T
UWC+MWL
AOCL/R
AHB
ABCL
MCG
MCB
MCB-CCTV
FP
OC
UWC
UWC+T
UWC+MWL
AOCL/R
AHB
ABCL
MCG
MCB
MCB-CCTV
0
Risk per 1000 crossings
Footpath crossings account for highest proportion of the overall risk to pedestrians and
37% of the total absolute risk at level crossings.
ABCL, AHB and MCB-CCTV have the highest risk per crossing for pedestrians.
It is worth noting that MCB-CCTV level crossings are one of the safest types of level
crossings for road vehicle users, but not for pedestrians. This crossing type has a higher
overall risk because of the high number of violations, such as users jumping over the
lowered barriers.
A recent example of this occurred on 17 December 2008 at Rainham MCB-CCTV crossing
in Essex (South East). A member of the public jumped over the barriers and was clipped by
the train, suffering a broken foot as a result. The person deliberately crossed in violation
whilst the barriers were down; he was later arrested and charged by British Transport Police
(BTP).
3.1.4
Precursor Indicator Model
RSSB‘s Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) measures the underlying risk from train accidents
by tracking changes in the occurrence of accident precursors. It was first developed in 1999,
and has since been subject to a series of modelling improvements.
The PIM monitors the risk from train derailments, train collisions, buffer stop collisions, train
fires and trains striking road vehicles at level crossings. The precursors covered by the PIM
fall into six main groups, encompassing 28 separate sub-groups and 46 lower level groups.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
14
About 95% of the train accident risk at level crossings occurs from public behaviour (rather
than workforce errors or equipment failures). This is measured in the PIM by near misses
between trains and road vehicles.
Chart 6.
PIM model showing a breakdown of road-rail interface risk
140
Other train accident risk
Level crossing failures
Level crossing incidents due to weather
120
Irregular working affecting level crossing
Train striking road vehicles away from level crossings
Public behaviour at level crossings
PIM indicator
100
80
60
40
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Overall, train accident risk has fallen by two-thirds during the last ten years. This has
been driven by a large reduction in the risk from SPADs.
The PIM is made up of six groups. Currently, the largest (in risk terms) is public
behaviour at level crossings.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
15
The lower coloured section on in Chart 6 shows the risk from road-rail interface activities.
This is dominated by the risk from public behaviour at level crossings, but it also includes
small contributions from failures, irregular working and non-rail vehicles on the line at
other locations that lead to derailments.
Greater improvements in the Other train accident risk areas, such as the reduction in
SPADs and improved rolling stock design, mean that road-rail interface risk now
accounts for half of the current PIM train accident risk.
3.1.5
Train accident risk at level crossings
Collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings are classified as train
accidents (unlike collisions with pedestrians or cyclists). Collisions at level crossings account
for around 42% of all PIM train accident risk.
Chart 7.
Causes of train accident risk at level crossings (SRMv6)
Road vehicle driver
error
53%
Road accidents and
stranded vehicles
7%
Road vehicle driver
deliberate action
(including suicide)
17%
Signaller, crossing
keeper and track
worker errors
7%
SPAD, overspeeding
and train driver error
<1%
Environment
11%
Vandalism
4%
Equipment failure
1%
The total train accident risk at level crossings is 2.8 FWI per year.
The majority of risk, 77%, is caused by road vehicle drivers.
Road vehicle driver error is the largest cause category for risk at level crossings,
accounting for 53% of the total.
Just over 8% of the total risk relates to sources within the direct control of the rail
industry. The majority of this risk is associated with workforce errors.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
16
3.1.6
All level crossing risk model
There are around 6,500 level crossings on the mainline railway. The risk varies from
crossing to crossing, depending on its type and usage levels as well as a range of local
factors. The risk is assessed at each individual crossing using the All Level Crossing Risk
Model (ALCRM).10 The model is used by Network Rail to assess the level of protection
required. The level of protection is specified in legislative requirements and industry
standards, which are supplemented by Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) guidance. The
principal factors which can influence the level of protection are: maximum train speed, train
frequency, crossing user frequency and whether it is for public or private use. The road
layout and environment in the vicinity of the crossing are also considered when determining
the level of protection on public roads.
3.1.7
Level crossing population numbers
The level crossing population in Great Britain has changed over the years. This is due to the
fact that the type of level crossings can change (for example, because they are upgraded to
a higher level of protection) or because they are closed. Historically, there have been
differences in the way that crossings have been counted and categorised. Recent
improvements in the quality of Network Rail‘s level crossing census will reduce the instance
of changes in numbers of the total numbers of level crossings.
During 2009/10, there was a major UWC closure programme, in which approximately 383
crossings of this type were either designated for closure or were actually closed. The
current census of level crossing population by region and crossing type can be seen in
Appendix 7 along with a chart showing the number of road public level crossings since
1960.
Table 1 shows the total level crossing population on Network Rail managed infrastructure by
type from 2002/03 to 2008. The introduction of the ‗open active‘ category in 2006 allowed all
disused crossings (such as sleeping dogs or crossings on mothballed lines) to be separated
from those in use. This facilitated an improvement in the calculation of risk based on
crossings currently in use. Since 2006, there has been a 3.5% decrease in the total number
of level crossings.
Table 1.
Level crossing numbers on NRMI by type 2002/03-2008
Protected
Year
Totals MG
Unprotected
Manual
Automatic
MCBUWCMCB CCTV AHB ABCL AOCR AOCL MWL
Manual
UWC
UWC-T OC
FP
SFB
2002/03
8188
264
242
358
470
45
1
140
155
2290
1617
60
2546
-
2003/04
7937
259
255
361
462
49
1
134
172
1979
1677
60
2528
-
2004
7833
245
249
364
457
49
1
131
162
2003
1613
62
2497
-
2005
7674
253
235
373
456
49
1
127
129
1551
1668
58
2593
181
2006
6785
213
238
377
451
50
1
128
93
1060
1661
63
2266
184
2007
6652
191
234
380
452
48
1
120
88
980
1624
51
2290
193
2008
6542
193
240
378
455
50
1
119
104
940
1624
56
2206
176
Source: Network Rail Level Crossing Census
Note: Data prior to 2004 is on a financial year basis (April - March) and is therefore not directly comparable
Data changes: from 2006 the classification of open active crossings removed all disused crossings (ie sleeping dogs)
10
ALCRM is used to gain a greater understanding of crossing risk and to target investment to
close/divert or improve crossings where reasonably practicable.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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3.2
Progress against SSP trajectory
Planning is a key part of the industry‘s approach to safety management. Companies produce
individual safety plans, detailing the activities and initiatives for the forthcoming period, and
indicating the associated expected benefits. The overall expected benefit of industry
planning is brought together in the Strategic Safety Plan (SSP), which is based on the
information in individual plans. The current SSP covers the five-year period from April 2009
to March 2014.
3.2.1
SSP trajectory – public behaviour at level crossings
The risk that arises as a result of public behaviour at level crossings amounts to 10.3 FWI
per year (including 7.8 fatalities). This covers incidents at level crossings in which the
crossing user makes a genuine error (for example, failing to check for trains) as well as
cases of wilful misuse (such as weaving round half-barriers).
Most of the risk (8.5 FWI per year) is caused by pedestrians traversing level crossings when
it is not safe to do so. Such actions usually place only the crossing user at risk. The
behaviour of road vehicle drivers at level crossing accounts for 2.5 FWI per year, with most
of the harm again occurring to the crossing user.
Collisions between road vehicles and trains at level crossings have the potential to cause a
derailment, as evidenced by the incident at Ufton in 2004, in which six people were killed on
board the train.
The following list contains some of the actions that the industry is taking to tackle the issue
of public behaviour at level crossings and some are explained in more detail in the initiatives
section of this report:
Ways of facilitating the closure of level crossings or their conversion to lower-risk types.
Campaigns to raise public and workforce awareness of level crossing risks, to reduce
levels of misuse.
Adoption of new technologies where these prove successful in trials, to use technology
to help users or constrain misuse.
Work to secure convictions and appropriate sentences for those who misuse level
crossings, to discourage misuse among the public.
Implementation of a new design of level crossing telephone, which will be easier to use
in emergencies and therefore help reduce unintentional misuse.
Performance against the SSP trajectory related to public behaviour at level crossings is
shown in Chart 8. The red line shows the average level of harm that occurred at level
crossings over the period 2006-09 normalised by train miles. This accounts for changes in
rail traffic, but not changes to road traffic and pedestrian use of level crossings. The blue line
shows the expected trajectory.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
18
Chart 8.
Performance against SSP trajectory related to public behaviour at level crossings
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
Trajectory
40%
20%
Performance against trajectory
0%
123412341234123412341234123412341234
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Based on the number and type of incidents that have occurred at level crossings,
performance is currently in line within the trajectory. After a rising trend in 2007 and
2008, performance has levelled off in 2009; the situation will continue to be monitored.
3.3
Level crossing safety performance
Safety performance at level crossings has been well publicised in the media over the last
five years. This is due to the high-profile events that have caused multiple fatalities, not just
in Great Britain, but all over the world.
3.3.1
Headlines
There have been 80 fatalities to pedestrians in the last ten years, making the average
number of fatalities to be around eight per year. This has generally been the case over
the period, with the exception of 2006, which saw five, and 2008, when there were 13
recorded pedestrians killed on level crossings.
There were a total of 161 collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings in
the last ten years; 27 road vehicle occupants lost their lives as a result of collisions with
trains.
AOCLs have featured in 33% of the all collisions between trains and road vehicles at
level crossings in the last ten years (including a multi-fatality incident in September 2009
– see section 3.3.2).
Reported near misses with trains and road vehicles at level crossings peaked in 2003
and followed a decreasing trend until 2007. In 2008, there was an increase of 19% in
total numbers reported. The total number of reported events in 2009 saw a return fewer
numbers as those reported in 2007.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
19
3.3.2
Fatalities and injuries in 2009
There were five road vehicle occupants (in three separate events) fatally injured as a result
of trains striking road vehicles at level crossings in 2009. This compares with one11 in the
previous year and three in 2007.
On 5 January, a passenger train struck a car that was involved in a road traffic accident
at South Drove AHB crossing (London North East). The driver of the car was fatally
injured. The severe weather conditions may have been a contributing factor in causing
the road traffic accident.
On 2 September, a light locomotive train struck a car on Penrhyndeudraeth UWC-T
(Western). The road vehicle driver was fatally injured. The road vehicle driver regularly
used the level crossing however the train was an unscheduled service.
On 29 September, a passenger service struck a car at Halkirk (AOCL) automatic locally
monitored level crossing (Scotland). All three vehicle occupants received fatal injuries.
There were eight pedestrians struck and fatally injured on level crossings in 2009. This
compares with 13 in 2008 and nine in 2007.
On 23 January, a passenger train struck a person at Gatehead AHB level crossing, near
Kilmarnock (Scotland).
On 7 February, an elderly male was struck and fatally injured on Moulinearn Red/Green
miniature light level crossing (Scotland). The man was local and used the crossing
regularly.
On 2 April, a 17-year-old male pedestrian was struck on Pleth Lane footpath level
crossing (London North East). He was using the crossing whilst listening to an iPod.
On 3 April, a cyclist was struck on Eyton (AHB) level crossing (Western). The cyclist
ignored the lights and rode around the barriers and was struck by an oncoming train.
On 6 May, a woman walking two dogs was struck by a train at Fairfield footpath (no
lights) level crossing (Western).
On 23 May, a member of public was struck by a train at Tuckers UWC level crossing
near Trowbridge (Western).
On 7 September, a passenger train struck a two year old child at Fox Covert foot
crossing, (London North East). The child ran onto the crossing as the train approached.
On 2 November, a pedestrian was struck and fatally wounded on Attenborough nature
reserve footpath level crossing (London North East).
There were six major injuries to pedestrians in 2009; two people struck by trains, two slips,
trips and falls, and two people injured by the crossing equipment. This compares with 12 in
2008 and three in 2007.
A more recent event occurred at Morton-on-Lugg on 16 January 2010. One road vehicle
occupant was fatality injured and another three road vehicle occupants received major and
minor injuries. RAIB is carrying out an investigation to determine the cause of the accident.
11
Previous RSSB reports show that a collision with a road vehicle occurred on Marston-on-Dove on
10 May 2008 as accidental. The coroner has since held an inquest and returned a verdict of suicide.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
20
3.3.3
Trends in fatalities and injuries at level crossings
For a fatality to be classed as occurring on a level crossing, the deceased must have been
on board a train, in a road vehicle, or have been a pedestrian on the crossing at the time of
the incident. Due to the time it takes for coroners‘ reports and inquests to be returned, it can
take some time for information to become available. It is for this reason that numbers can
change from year to year.
Chart 9 shows the numbers of accidental fatalities that have occurred on level crossings
since 2000. The chart is broken down by level crossing user, pedestrian, road vehicle
occupant and train occupants. The majority of fatalities over the ten year period are to
pedestrians (71%) and road vehicle occupants (24%). Only one accident resulted in fatalities
to people on a train in the accident at Ufton in 2004.
Chart 9.
Fatalities at level crossings by user (excluding suicides)
16
Pedestrian
15
Road Vehicle
14
14
On board train
14
13
Total
Level crossing fatalities
12
12
11
11
10
10
8
8
6
5
4
2
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Table 2 below shows that suicides and suspected suicides at level crossings increased
during 2009. The crossing type that has featured most is footpath level crossings. The
majority of fatalities are to pedestrians, road vehicle occupants accounting for only 3% of the
total over the period.
Table 2.
Number of suicides and suspected suicides recorded at level crossings
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
11
12
18
14
20
26
23
20
22
31
Chart 10 shows the number of level crossing fatalities by crossing type and user. It shows
pedestrian and road vehicle occupant fatalities separately, and identifies the type of crossing
involved. The figure for accidental fatalities to road vehicle occupants and those on board
trains contrasts sharply with the pedestrian fatalities.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
21
Chart 10.
Fatalities at level crossings by crossing type (excluding suicides)
14
13
Footpath
UWC-T
12
UWC
UWC-MWL
AOCL
10
9
9
9
AHB
Fatalities
8
MCG
8
8
MCB-CCTV
7
MCB
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
4
3
3
2
3
3
2
2
1
Pedestrians
Road vehicle occupants
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
On board train
Pedestrian fatalities occur mainly on footpath crossings (40%) followed by fatalities at
automatic half barrier crossings (23%).
The road vehicle occupant fatality at Penrhyndeudraeth UWC-T in 2009 was the first
since 2003 at this type of crossing.
3.3.4
Pedestrian fatalities by time of day
Table 3 shows the pedestrian fatalities that have occurred at footpath crossings by time of
day.
Table 3.
Pedestrian footpath level crossing fatalities by time of day and year
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
23:00-06:59 07:00-11:59 12:00-17:59 18:00-22:59
0
5
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
1
1
1
2
3
1
0
1
1
0
3
0
1
0
2
0
2
0
1
0
3
0
3
2
3
0
0
2
1
2
15
11
17
Total
5
4
3
7
3
4
4
4
8
3
45
The majority of fatalities to pedestrians at footpath level crossings occur between the
hours of 18:00 and 22:59 (38%) and 07:00-11:59 (33%).
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
22
Since the introduction of the night time quiet period in April 2007 (where train drivers no
longer required to routinely sound their horns at whistle boards) there have been no
fatalities between the hours of 23:00 and 07:00. (See Section 3.5.3 for further analysis
on near miss by time of day during the quiet period.)
3.3.5
Trends in harm at level crossings
Chart 11 shows that most injuries at level crossings are fatal. Only a small proportion of FWI
total is made up from non-fatal injuries. Non-fatal injuries are mostly caused by events such
as, slips, trips and falls and when a barrier (or other crossing equipment) causes injury to a
person using the interface. At 13, the number of fatalities for 2009 is higher than the average
of 11 fatalities per year. One of the events (at Halkirk AOCL) involved a train collision with a
road vehicle which resulted in the deaths of three road vehicle occupants.
Over the period shown, there was one train collision with a road vehicle that resulted in a
derailment and on-board fatalities: the road user suicide at Ufton in November 2004, which
resulted in the deaths of five passengers and the train driver.
Chart 11.
18
Harm at level crossings since 2001 (excluding suicides)
Weighted injuries (all)
Pedestrian fatalities (public)
Fatalities and weighted injuries
15.3
13.8
14
3
12.5
12
5
2
1
12.4
1
2
11.0
3
5
8.8
5
8
3
2
6
4
Pedestrian fatalities (passenger)
15.5
16
10
Road vehicle occupant fatalities
Train occupant fatalities
16.9
2
9
1
5.8
11
9
6
8
6
2
5
5
2005
2006
8
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2007
2008
2009
There was an overall reduction of harm at level crossings in 2009 when compared with
2008. The total harm for 2009 is slightly above the ten year average of 12.6 FWI per
year.
Suicide fatalities by level crossing users are not shown in the chart. However, the injuries
that were subsequently caused as a result of their actions are. Including the Ufton
incident, there have been six road vehicle driver suicides at level crossings since 2000
(all of which occurred at AHB crossings).
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
23
3.3.6
Causes of harm at level crossings
Chart 11 above showed the trends in harm at level crossings over the last nine years,
confirming that most injuries at level crossings are fatal. Chart 12 shows the proportion of
fatal and non-fatal injuries and the causes of harm. Only a small proportion of the total is
made up from non-fatal injuries (8%).
Chart 12.
Breakdown showing the causes of harm at level crossings since 2001
Public behaviour: RV
fatalities
22%
Public behaviour: train
occupant fatalities
5%
Non-fatal injuries
8%
Level crossing equipment failure/condition
Workforce error
Public behaviour:
pedestrian fatalities
65%
Public behaviour
When the non-fatal injuries are further analysed, most of them are again due to user
behaviour (91%). The remainder have been recorded as due to level crossing
equipment failure (eg lights fail to operate) or condition (eg crossing surface poorly
maintained), or workforce error (eg operational errors on the part of signallers or crossing
keepers).
Since 2001, 99% of harm at level crossings has been recorded as due to public
behaviour.
3.3.7
Injuries by user behaviour
When analysing the trends in accidental injuries at level crossings the term ‗trespass‘12 is no
longer used as a classification of user behaviour at level crossings. Therefore the most
meaningful terms to determine a person‘s actions are categorised in three ways: proper use,
misuse (error) and misuse (violation). These are defined as follows:
Proper use: users begin to cross entirely legitimately, but unforeseen events lead to a
transgression (as when a motor vehicle breaks down half-way across a crossing, or the
level crossing fails due to an error outside the user‘s control).
Misuse: error - users cross when a train is imminent, but are in some way honestly
mistaken about its proximity and the warnings given by signs, sirens etc.
12
Level crossing users are never counted as trespassers, providing they are not using the crossing as
an access point into a permanently unauthorised area, such as the trackside.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
24
Misuse: violation - users cross when a train is imminent, but deliberately disregard
warnings and signs (as when users weave between half-barriers, or play ‗chicken‘ with
oncoming trains).
An example of proper use of a level crossing occurred on 19 December 2009, at Victory
AHB level crossing, near Taunton (Western). The person‘s wheelchair became stuck in a
pothole on the crossing surface as the barriers were lowered. They managed to remove
themselves from the wheelchair and clear the line before the train‘s arrival. However, the
wheelchair was subsequently struck and destroyed. The person suffered minor injures as a
result of falling from the wheelchair. The RAIB is investigating the incident.13
Chart 13 demonstrates that in 2009 there has been an increase in incidents to road users
while they are using the crossings correctly (proper use). This is mainly due to four road
vehicle occupants (three in one event at Halkirk14) who were fatally injured on level
crossings.
There are also a number of events where pedestrians slipped, tripped or fell on a crossing. A
number of pedestrians were also struck by the crossing barriers (see Chart 12 for the
breakdown of causes).
Chart 13.
18
Injuries by user behaviour
Improper use - error
16.9
Improper use - violation
16
Proper use
15.5
Total
15.3
Fatalities and weighted injuries
14
13.8
12
12.5
12.4
11.0
10
8.8
8
6
5.8
4
2
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
13
Anecdotal evidence from the Netherlands suggests that a number of incidents have occurred
involving mobility scooters being struck on level crossings.
14
The cause of the ongoing RAIB investigation will determine if the crossing users at Halkirk were
using the crossing correctly.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
25
3.4
Train accidents at level crossings
The following section analyses the safety performance in relation to train accident risk at
level crossings. When considering the potential risk at level crossings, trains striking road
vehicles has the highest consequences (mainly for road vehicle occupants). The potential for
trains to strike road vehicles at any point on the railway presents potentially significant risk
especially if derailment occurs (see Chapter 5 on vehicle incursion risk). The frequency of
derailments at level crossings has reduced significantly over the last ten years. Conversely,
there is little evidence of a sustained reduction in collisions at level crossings, which is an
area over which the railway has only limited control.
3.4.1
Trends in collisions between trains and road vehicles
Chart 14 shows the total number of collisions between trains and road vehicles at level
crossings over the last ten years; there have been 161 events recorded over this period,
which is an average of 16 collisions per year. This higher level chart is broken down by the
level crossing class and shows that there have not been any collisions between trains and
road vehicles at active manual crossings for the last three years (although one has recently
occurred at Moreton-on-Lugg in 2010); 65% of collisions occur at active automatic level
crossings.
Chart 18 gives a further breakdown by the type of crossing involved.
Chart 14.
Collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings (inc suicides)
30
Passive
Active - Manual protection
Train collisions with road vehicles
6
20
15
Active - Automatic protection
24
25
17
17
5
4
19
16
16
5
4
16
9
6
1
10
5
1
18
11
13
12
11
11
11
4
4
2
9
5
14
5
10
9
2008
2009
7
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
During 2009, there was a reduction in the total numbers of collisions between trains and
road vehicles from the previous year. The total of 14 is broadly in line with the ten year
average of 16. There is no evidence of a change in the rate which is backed up by the
analysis in the PIM.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
26
Chart 15 shows the breakdown of road
vehicle types that are most commonly
involved in collisions with a train; 63% of
vehicles struck are cars.
Heavy goods vehicles, lorries and farming
tractors using level crossings are typically
less manoeuvrable than smaller and lighter
road vehicles. As the Hixon15 accident
(1968) illustrated, the limited acceleration
speeds of such vehicles can lead to
greater exposure to collisions if due care is
not taken.
Chart 15.
Vehicle type struck 2000-09
Van
11%
Tractor
11%
Lorry/HGV
7%
Car
63%
Motorcycle
4%
Trailer
2%
Bus/minbus
2%
In recent years, has there has been increasing use of satellite navigation16 devices to guide
drivers using unfamiliar routes.
In some cases, and not just in the UK, the user has been guided onto level crossings without
them realising they are on a railway interface. An incident occurred in Wales on 24 February
2007, in which a road vehicle driver mistakenly drove onto Flynnongain UWC-WML crossing
and was struck by a passing train (Western). The road vehicle driver opened one of the
crossing gates and drove half way over the crossing before getting out of the vehicle to open
the second gate when a train stuck the road vehicle parked on the line. The road vehicle
driver moved away from the area before the train arrived at the crossing.
Chart 16 looks at the total number of collisions at each crossing type and the corresponding
FWI for each crossing type. Note that although there are more collisions at AOCL crossings,
AHBs suffer from a slightly higher number of fatalities and weighted injuries (excludes
suicide fatalities). For a full list of level crossing collisions with road vehicles and trains that
have resulted in accidental fatalities, see Appendix 2.
Two of the collisions in 2009 occurred at Fairbourne AOCL level crossing (Western), on 14
May and 27 June. A Pwllheli service (with the same train driver) was involved in both
incidents. In the first collision, the car driver admitted to ‗jumping‘ the red light.
15
The Hixon accident occurred on 6 January 1968. A slow moving low loader carrying a 120-ton
electrical transformer was struck by an express train on a newly installed AHB level crossing. Eight
passengers and three crew members were killed.
16
ProRail, the infrastructure manager in the Netherlands, is in discussion with the makers of TomTom
satellite navigation devices to improve the warnings given to road vehicle drivers on the approach to
level crossings.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
27
Chart 16.
Collisions at level crossings by crossing type over ten years
60
Number of collisions with road vehicles by crossing type
2009
53
2008
2007
50
2006
2005
2004
39
40
2003
2002
2001
2000
28
30
FWI
20
17
10
10
9.3
8.2
6
5.2
3
0
0.0
AOCL
3.4.2
AHB
UWC-T
UWC
2
3.3
3.1
UWC-MWL
OC
0.0
ABCL
1
0.0
MCB
1
0.0
footpath
1
0.0
0.0
MCG
MCB-CCTV
AOCL crossings
AOCL crossings represent only 3% (119) of the total vehicular level crossing population.
However, over the last ten years, 33% of collisions have occurred at crossings of this type.
This can also be seen in Chart 16, above and Table 4 below.
Although AOCLs see the most collisions, they do not experience the highest number of
fatalities (AHBs have 33% of the total fatalities whereas AOCLs have 26%). This is due to
the fact that the Rules require the train driver to check that the crossing is clear before
passing over at a maximum speed of 55mph (with most individual crossings having a lower
speed). Therefore, any collisions occur at relatively low speeds.
AHBs, on the other hand, are typically fitted at locations where road and railway is more
heavily used and are often sited on busier, main lines with a maximum line speed of
100mph.
Table 4.
Collisions and fatalities at level crossings comparison over ten years
Collisions
% total
collisions
Fatalities
% of total
fatalities
AOCL
53
33%
7
26%
AHB
39
24%
9
33%
UWC-T
28
17%
5
19%
UWC
17
11%
3
11%
UWC-MWL
10
6%
3
11%
OC
6
4%
0
0%
ABCL
3
2%
0
0%
MCB
2
1%
0
0%
footpath
1
1%
0
0%
MCB-CCTV
1
1%
0
0%
MCG
1
1%
0
0%
161
100%
27
100%
Crossing type
Total
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
28
3.4.3
Causes of train collisions at level crossings
Chart 17 looks at the causes of collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings
from 2000-2009.
The most common causes of collisions at level crossings are due to the road vehicle driver.
Those who fail to use the crossing as designed account for 27% of all incidents. This
includes RV drivers failing to use the telephone to check the line is clear and failing to stop,
look and listen. This category also contains events where users fail to close the gates to
road traffic and leave the crossing unsafe for future users of the level crossing.
Chart 17.
Causes of train collisions with road vehicles 2000-2009
RV driver suicide
4%
RV stranded/failed or
RTA
5%
RV error- misuse:
fails to use crossing
correctly
27%
RV struck:
equipment failure or
worker error
5%
RV driver error: fails
to observe crossing
or grounding
9%
RV deliberate action:
zigzag/redlight
running
24%
RV struck: cause
unclear
11%
RV struck:
environmental
factors
15%
Another common cause in 15% of collisions is due to road vehicle drivers not taking into
account the environmental factors on the approach to or on the level crossing (eg fog/snow).
Users can also place themselves in danger by taking unnecessary risk, such as running a
red light and zig-zagging around the barriers; this has been the case for 24% of all collisions
in the last ten years. Trains striking road vehicles due to equipment failure or workforce
error feature in 5% of events.
At AOCLs, there is a possibility that the road user may underestimate the time an
approaching train might take to arrive at the interface and the speed at which it is travelling.
This is exacerbated by the fact that not all types of level crossings have a set line speed and
for a variety of reasons individual train speeds below the ruling rail speed limit. At AOCL
crossings, train drivers must ensure the crossing is clear before approaching. However,
some road users still drive across in error or violation without apparent consideration of all
the risks involved in getting across the interface safely.
The most recent collision between a train and a farm vehicle that was caused by worker
error17 occurred in 2008. The incident occurred at Loover Barn UWC-T. The signaller had
17
The last fatality caused by workforce error within occurred in 1970, when a train struck a lorry on
the level crossing at Shalmsford Street near Canterbury (South East) after the crossing keeper failed
to close the gate to road traffic. The lorry driver and a train guard were killed.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
29
thought that the train had already passed over the crossing and gave permission for the
farmer to use the crossing. The train struck the tractor just as the front of the tractor was
entering the crossing. The only harm was a minor injury sustained by the train driver. An
incident occurred in 2007 at Abbey Farm crossing in similar circumstances.
3.4.4
Level crossing collisions causing derailments
Chart 18 shows the total number of collisions by crossing type and the total number each
year that have caused derailments.
Chart 18.
Level crossing collisions by crossing type and the total causing derailments
30
4.5
footpath
OC
4
UWC-T
24
25
AOCL
UWC-MWL
3.5
AHB
ABCL
20
19
3
MCG
3
MCB-CCTV
17
17
16
16
MCB
16
Derailments
2.5
14
15
2
2
2
11
11
10
Derailments
Road vehicle collisions with trains
4
UWC
1.5
1
1
5
0.5
0
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
0
2006
0
2007
0
2008
0
0
2009
There have been no derailments at level crossings due to trains striking road vehicles
since 2004. Details on recent improvements in vehicle standards regarding
crashworthiness and obstacle deflectors may be found in chapter 2 of RSSB‘s Report on
improvements in the safety of passengers and staff involved in train accidents.
In 2009, for the first time in four18 years, there were no collisions with road vehicles at an
OC type level crossing.
3.4.5
Trains striking barriers or gates
Chart 19 shows the number of trains striking level crossing gates or barriers and the
associated FWI as a result of the collision. Passive manual crossings, including user-worked
crossings and trainman-operated crossings, contribute most to the overall trend. Although
the numbers are low, and example of a more serious event occurred on 15 November 2004,
when the up side gate at Rowston MCG level crossing (London North East) was struck and
destroyed by a passenger train. The train window was smashed and the unit incurred a fuel
18
For a detailed list of all collisions between trains and road vehicles that have resulted in fatalities,
see Appendix 2.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
30
leak. There were a number of on-board injuries. One person with head injuries was air-lifted
to hospital; there were also minor injuries to two school children. The cause was due to the
crossing keeper being distracted whilst talking to a member of the public. This is the first
incident of a train striking a level crossing gate or barrier that has resulted in a major injury
since 1991.
In general, trains only strike barriers when a road vehicle has pushed them foul of the
running line – immediately prior to the train reaching the crossing. Gates at UWCs should
be hung in such a way that they cannot be opened or blown towards the line. Gates can be
struck either when the clasp had become defective or they have become unhinged in some
way.
Trains striking level crossing gates or barriers
Trains striking gates or barriers at level crossings
12
Passive
Active - Manaul protection
Active - Automatic protection
FWI
9
10
10
8
0.12
0.1
0.08
5
7
4
6
6
6
0.06
2
5
4
5
1
3
4
0.04
2
3
3
3
2
4
1
2
6
Fatalities and weighted injuries (FWI)
Chart 19.
1
0.02
4
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
0
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Active automatic protection classed level crossings have barriers for protection, during
2009 there were no level crossing barriers struck by trains.
2004 was the last time an injury occurred as a result of a train striking a level crossing
gate or barrier.
Passive level crossings suffer from more train strikes because they require human
involvement in securing them properly after use.
Although it is not within time period covered in this report, a more recent event occurred on
22 February 2010. A passenger train struck the gates of Stow Park Tillbridge Lane MCG
level crossing (London North East). The signaller had left the gates open to road traffic
when the collision occurred. The train driver suffered minor injuries as a result. RAIB is
investigating the incident and will publish a bulletin highlight any lessons from the incident.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
31
3.5
Near misses and misuse at level crossings
Due to the relatively small number of accidents at level crossings, it is hard to monitor trends
and identify patterns from accident data alone. The industry therefore also uses data on
reported near misses.
Near misses are typically reported by train drivers who feel that they have had to take action
(ie an emergency brake application) to avoid a collision, or feel that they came close to
striking a road vehicle or pedestrian (ie where the train driver may have suffered traumatic
shock). This obviously involves a certain level of subjectivity. They can also be reported by
crossing operators, but this depends on whether or not the crossing is manned. Many near
misses may go unobserved due to prevailing light and visibility conditions and even due to
the curvature of the line preventing the driver getting a clear view of the crossing.
3.5.1
Near misses with road vehicles
Chart 20 shows the number of reported near misses between road vehicles and trains at
level crossings. There is a clear seasonal pattern which shows that the majority of near miss
events are reported during summer months which may be due to increased daylight hours
and farming activities (as seen in section 3.5.4). The AMA number of reported near misses
with road vehicles has been quite variable over the past ten years but generally downward.
Chart 20.
Near misses with road vehicles and trains at level crossings
Near misses with road vehicles
80
Unknown
Passive
Active - Manual protection
Active - Automatic protection
AMA
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2001
2002
2003
The current AMA level is a 22%
reduction from the level at the end
of 2000.
The number of near misses with
road vehicles decreased by 17% in
2009 compared with 2008.
The yearly total number of reported
near misses with trains and road
vehicles peaked in 2003 (Chart 21)
and was followed a decreasing
trend until 2007. In 2008, the
decreasing trend was reverted and
an increase of 19% was recorded.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
2004
2005
Chart 21.
Near misses with road vehicles
2000
2006
150
2008
2009
Near misses with road vehicles
250
200
2007
223
186 190 191
173
183
160
174
146
145
100
50
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
32
Chart 22.
Near misses with road vehicles and trains by route (normalised)
0.10
10 yr avg
2008
2009
0.09
Road vehicle near misses by route
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
Sussex
Wessex
Anglia
Kent
South East
London
North
Eastern
London
North West
Scotland
Western
The total number of (normalised by crossing numbers per route) near misses shows that
the majority of reports are in the South East19 apart from the Wessex region, which has
seen a decrease in the last two years compared with the ten-year average.
Sussex has seen an increase in the last two
years, compared with the ten-year average.
London North Western has seen a slight
decrease in the last two years, compared with
the ten-year average.
Chart 23 shows the majority of near misses
with trains occur at UWC-T and UWC type
level crossings with a combined total of 53%.
AOCL type level crossings have also had a
high proportion (22%) of events, followed by
AHB crossings at 12% of all collisions
occurring at this crossing type.
3.5.2
Near misses with pedestrians
Chart 23.
RV near misses by
crossing type 2000-2009
Other
Active OC
3%
manual 4%
4%
UWC-MWL
2%
UWC-T
37%
AHB
12%
UWC
16%
AOCL
22%
The annual moving average shows there has
been a steady increase of near miss events with pedestrians over the last ten years.
Recorded numbers are generally lower in the autumn and winter months; this may well be
due to generally poorer visibility conditions or possibly because leisure use by walkers is
reduced. The trend in reported pedestrian near misses has been generally rising over the
19
The frequency of trains in the South East is generally higher than elsewhere. On a daily basis, more
trains operate in Wessex than Scotland.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
33
period shown in Chart 24. However, over the same period, the number of reported road
vehicle near misses has fallen slightly (as seen in the analysis above in section 3.5.1).
Near misses with pedestrians
Chart 24.
Near misses with pedestrians and trains
Unknown
Passive
Active - Manual protection
Active - Automatic protection
AMA
100
80
60
40
20
0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
The last quarter of 2008 saw a large reduction in near misses with pedestrians, when
measured against the last quarter of 2007. The end of 2009, however, saw a rise to a
level more comparable with the close of 2006.
The total number of near misses in 2008 (282) was the highest on record over the last
ten years. A previous high was recorded in 2005, with 241 events.
Chart 25.
Near misses with pedestrians and trains by route (normalised)
0.30
Near misses normalised by crossing numbers
10 yr avg
2008
2009
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Sussex
Wessex
Anglia
South East
Kent
London
North
Eastern
London
North West
Scotland
Western
When looking at the number of near misses normalised by crossing numbers per region,
Sussex has again seen a large increase in the last two years when compared with the
ten-year average.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
34
3.5.3
Near misses by time of day
April 2007 saw the introduction of the night time ‗quiet‘ period, between 23:00 and 07:00,
where train drivers are no longer routinely required to sound their horns at whistle boards.
Chart 26 shows the overall increase in reported near misses in 2008 was not related an
increase in the events reported during the night time period.
Chart 26.
Near misses with trains by time of day
300
281
18:00-22:59
266
12:00-17:59
07:00-11:59
250
24
101
75
94
86
144
100
78
45
89
61
10
5
5
2
3
7
9
13
2000
2001
2003
64
2009
2002
49
2008
10
59
62
2007
7
74
64
2006
8
66
2005
6
2001
63
106
93
106
84
63
2004
77
60
2000
0
71
95
84
64
50
125
126
26
76
67
62
142
17
72
156
45
Road vehicle
72
8
17
10
13
54
45
57
58
10
10
16
8
38
79
51
2009
150
41
34
19
2008
27
58
61
2007
25
54
172
158
49
2006
173 174
34
70
180
2005
26
73
207
2004
34
200
33
2003
200
232
220
2002
Near miss by time of day
221
186 188 190
241
23:00-06:59
211
Pedestrian
The peak time for near misses to be recorded is between the hours of 12:00 and 18:00.
In 2008 45% of all pedestrian and vehicle near misses were recorded in this period.
The number of events during the quiet time increased slightly in 2009 for both road
vehicle occupants and pedestrians. However, it is worth noting that this period only
represents 5% of the total near misses when compared with other times of the day.
The start of the quiet time has been specifically monitored to consider whether the frequency
of incidents at this time are increasing and review any fatalities.
3.5.4
Farm vehicle near misses and misuse
The following analysis was undertaken to assess the number of near misses and types of
misuse with farm worker vehicles on level crossings. This was conducted using a word
search on events where the words farmer, combine harvester, farm worker and tractor have
been used in the narrative. Of the total number of near misses, farm-related events account
for around 18% of the total. The analysis confirms that the majority of near miss events
occur during the harvesting and hay-making months, which are generally from July to
September each year.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
35
Chart 27.
Near misses with farm vehicles (excludes pedestrians)
20
Unknown
Passive
Active - Manual protection
Active - Automatic protection
AMA
Near miss with farm vehicles
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Reported near misses with farm vehicles and trains has decreased over the period
shown but the annual moving average has slightly increased in 2008 and 2009.
Misuse and near misses by farmers
account for 69% of the total near
misses reported.
Chart 28.
Other
The causes of near miss and misuse by
farm workers are shown in Chart 28.
The chart shows both road vehicles and
farmer workers on foot.
The most common misuse is from
farmers failing to contact the signaller to
either report they are clear or indeed
asking whether it is safe to cross in the
first place.
3.5.5
Cause of incidents by farmers
User fails to
contact
signaller
RV strikes
/struck by LX
equipment
Gate / barrier
left open /
raised
RV crosses
when unsafe
Pedestrian
crosses when
unsafe
Phone left off
the hook
Misuse at level crossings
User behaviour in terms of misuse at level crossings can be analysed to determine if there
are any underlying events that occur at any particular level crossing. At user-worked
crossings with telephones, there are issues with users failing to phone the signaller, either
before they use the crossing or report they have cleared it. In some cases, the phone has
been left off the hook. Typical misuse reports involve road users jumping red lights and
trying to beat the barriers, pedestrians ignoring warnings (including cases of people playing
‗chicken‘), and, at user-worked crossings, gates being left open.
Most accidents involving trains at level crossings are caused by errors or, sometimes,
deliberate violations by crossing users. It is important to remember that not all misuse will
directly affect the person using the crossing, but may affect those who use the crossing in
future.
Often there are doubts in the reported numbers of misuse of level crossings, simply because
there are no railway personnel to report the events, resulting in significant underreporting. In
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
36
light of these difficulties, it is best to consider the overall patterns rather than the numbers
themselves
Active - Manual
protection
Active - Automatic
protection
Chart 29.
Reported misuse of level crossings by category and crossing type 2000-2009
UWC-MWL
RV crosses when unsafe
6%
Pedestrian crosses when unsafe
ABCL
1%
Phone left of the hook / vandalism / children playing
AHB
10%
Gate / barrier left open / raised
RV strikes /struck by LX equipment
AOCL/R
4%
MCG
User fails to contact signaller
Other
3%
MCB-CCTV
17%
MCB
14%
Passive
UWC-T
30%
UWC
10%
OC
1%
footpath
3%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
User worked crossings with telephones are the level crossing type with the most
recorded misuse events; gates left open and users failing to contact the signaller making
up most of the misuse at this type of crossing.
Misuse events that are featured in the ‗other‘ category include users breaking down on
the level crossing or general misuse of the crossing.
3.5.6
Users crossing when unsafe
The most serious cases of misuse tend to be those where a pedestrian or vehicle occupant
uses the crossing when it is unsafe to do so. Examples include crossing users trying to beat
the lights or pedestrians running across when the barriers are lowering. Such incidents are
not always classified as a ‗near miss with a train‘. The data suggests the number of events
is a lot higher in the last five years than the preceding five years. This is believed to be due
to increased reporting and improved data quality rather than an increase in actual numbers.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
37
Chart 30.
Level crossing user crossing when unsafe (includes near misses)
900
786 790
800
775
742
711
Manually protected
610
653
652
Automatic protected
573 573
600
Unknown
Unprotected
663 670
700
User crosses when unsafe
777 786
742
509
500
423
400
363
381
337
300
200
100
Road vehicle
3.5.7
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
Pedestrian
Train performance delays due to level crossing misuse
Delays to train services as a result of incidents, mainly equipment damage and failures, at
level crossings result in delays to passengers and freight customers, financial penalties for
industry parties and the potential loss of reputation and business for the railway overall. In
performance terms it is estimated that 2% of delay minutes can be attributed to level
crossing issues and there are many additional costs such as calling out staff to operate
crossings after barriers are struck by road vehicles and the cost of repairing the damage
caused.
Table 5 shows the total number of performance delay minutes due to level crossing incidents
(ie road vehicle collisions with trains or fatalities) and the delay due to misuse (ie road
vehicles striking level crossing equipment). The cost per incident (CPI) and delay per
incident (DPI) shows that whilst the total number of incidents has fluctuated over the last
three years, the cost per incident is decreasing. This is a good indication that although
incidents and misuse has increased, the industry has become more successful at managing
them.
Table 5.
Performance delays due to level crossing incidents and misuse
Year
2007
2008
2009
Total
Incidents
2752
2926
2545
8223
Delay
69860
81046
66164
217071
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
Cost
£1,808,162
£1,720,606
£1,477,210
£5,005,977
DPI
25
28
26
26
CPI
£657
£588
£580
£609
38
3.6
Level crossing equipment failures
The number of RIDDOR-reportable level crossing equipment failures is shown in Chart 31.
These events relate to any failure of equipment at a level crossing that could endanger
users, where the level crossing is on a running line. Note that it does not include misuse of
equipment as seen in the misuse analysis above.
Equipment failure accounts for a small proportion of the risk at level crossings, the risk being
mitigated by the fact that equipment is designed to ‗fail safe‘; that is, it automatically defaults
to a position of safety. For example, if the equipment fails at an automatic level crossing, the
warning lights operate and the barriers lower.
Equipment failure can range from minor component defects, to more serious disruptions
caused by power cuts and technical faults. Damage to equipment is also caused by vandals,
thieves, road traffic accidents and the weather (particularly wind, floods and lightning).
Chart 31.
Level crossing equipment failures (excluding telephone faults)
400
350
346
Other (including general system failures)
Lights (including white lights)
300
CCTV system (including floodlights)
Equipment failures
Gate
250
Barrier
Crossing surface
189
200
150
131
86
100
61
50
40
33
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
The number of RIDDOR-reportable incidents has increased again in 2009. It is believed
that the increase in the number of recorded incidents in 2009 is due to an increase in
reporting rather than a general increase in faults at level crossings.
The number of telephone faults can be seen in Table 6.
Table 6.
RIDDOR-reportable telephone faults
2003
12
2004
10
2005
167
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
2006
444
2007
480
2008
302
2009
362
39
In the seven-year period shown in Chart 31 and Table 6, there have only been two minor
injuries sustained as a result of equipment failure (one in 2004; the other in 2008). There
have also been two reported cases of shock in the same period, both of which occurred
in 2004.
Performance delays due to level crossing failures or faults are shown in Table 7. The CPI
and DPI has generally remained the same indicating that faults are continuing to cost the
railways time and money.
Table 7.
Performance train delays due to level crossing failures or faults
Year
2007
2008
2009
Total
Incidents
1974
2294
2198
6466
Minutes
101089
99435
111521
312045
Costs
£2,812,971
£2,512,381
£3,155,150
£8,480,502
DPI
51.2
43.3
50.7
48.3
CPI
£1,425
£1,095
£1,435
£1,312
Failures and faults at level crossings cause almost twice as much delay and cost twice
as much to repair as misuse and other level crossing incidents.
3.7
Level crossing vandalism
Crime at level crossings is a serious issue, which has the potential to cost lives, as well as
cause delays and cost to the industry. Usually, these incidents involve members of the public
defacing signs or causing damage to gates, barriers, telephones and the like.
In previous reports, the following data contained level crossing vandalism events that were
caused by trespassers putting obstructions on the line and vandals throwing missiles. This
type of event has been removed from the analysis to show only those where the level
crossing equipment itself has been stolen or tampered with. This is because of the difficulty
in recording the exact location at which the event occurred and the fact that this type of
vandalism does not always occur exclusively at level crossings.
Table 8.
2000
204
Incidents of level crossing vandalism
2001
159
2002
165
2003
193
2004
168
2005
78
2006
117
2007
67
2008
58
2009
62
Cases of vandalism have shown a significant decrease since 2004 with the exception of
2006, when the recorded number of incidents was significantly higher than in 2007 and
2008.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
40
3.8
Performance against European targets
The European Railway Safety Directive requires the European Rail Agency (ERA) to
develop a set of Common Safety Targets (CSTs) for Member States. The long-term aim is to
prevent safety becoming a barrier to opening the rail market. The CSTs are based on the
assumption that, although the level of safety differs greatly across all countries, the level of
safety is acceptable in each. They seek to avoid compromising safety in countries with a
superior safety performance. CSTs only relate to significant accidents associated with ‗rolling
stock in motion‘ and are quantified in terms of Fatalities and Weighted Serious Injuries
(FWSIs). The CSTs cover approximately 40% of the overall risk on the railway.
An evolutionary process has been developed for the establishment of appropriate targets
through the development of National Reference Values (NRVs) for each Member State
which precede the delivery of more meaningful CSTs. NRVs are common in definition but
have different values for each Member State.
CSTs and NRVs are set at Member State level for the whole railway system, and do not
apply to individual transport operators. They are therefore the responsibility of the
Department for Transport (DfT) to manage on behalf of the UK.
The first set of CSTs was set at a level to ensure that Member States would comply without
taking special improvement action. This equates to CSTs at a level equal to the highest NRV
for a Member State or the ten times the European average NRV, whichever is the lower.
All six NRVs are suitably normalised to enable effective comparison year on year taking
account of the passenger and train usage in each Member State. There are six NRVs
adopted by the Commission for the UK in early 2009, covering the following categories:
Passengers (6.22 FWSI/bn train kms and 0.062 FWSI/bn pass kms).
Employees (8.33 FWSI/bn train kms).
Level crossing users (23 FWSI/bn train kms and 93 FWSI/bn train traverses).
Others (6.98 FWSI/bn train kms).
Unauthorised persons (94.7 FWSI/bn train kms).
Whole society (131 FWSI/bn train kms).
The NRVs are based on the data recorded under the Common Safety Indicators (CSIs). The
requirement is for Member States to maintain the level of safety as measured at the end of
2007 based on a four-year moving weighted average (MWA).
A second set of CSTs, to be adopted by the Commission before 30 April 201120, will reflect
priority areas where safety needs to be improved further. This will be a key evolutionary
stage towards achieving a harmonised European safety performance.
The following Chart 32 and Chart 33 show the UK position for the level crossing NRVs as at
the end of 2008. Note that the data covers both Great Britain and Northern Ireland, whereas
the remainder of this report covers Great Britain alone.
20
This date may not be achieved as the definition work has not yet been started by the ERA.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
41
Chart 32.
NRV 3.1: Level crossing users (FWSI per billion train km)
FWSI per billion train km
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
FWSI
NRV
10.0
NRV Tolerance
5.0
MWA
0.0
2004
FWSI per billion train traverses
Chart 33.
2005
2006
2007
2008
NRV 3.2: Level crossing users (FWSI per billion train traverses)
140.0
120.0
100.0
80.0
FWSI
60.0
NRV
40.0
NRV Tolerance
20.0
MWA
0.0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
For both level crossing metrics, the FWSI level for 2008 is above both the NRV and the NRV
tolerance level, while the four-year MWA is above the NRV level, but below NRV tolerance
level. The calculation of NRV 3.2 (Chart 33) includes the number of level crossings recorded
on the network each year. The number of level crossings recorded for 2008 (based on
Network Rail data) at 6,542 was significantly below the average number for the period 2004
to 2007 at 7,657. It is considered that this is likely to be due to differences in reporting rather
than an actual change in the number of crossings (this is further explained in Section 3.1.7).
With the 2009 performance being similar to 2008 the NRVs to the end of 2009 are unlikely to
exceed the NRV Tolerance levels for either NRV.
3.8.1
Comparisons other European countries NRVs
When comparing UK level crossing NRVs with other European countries it can be seen from
Chart 34 that the UK is the lowest among the Member States.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
42
National Reference Values (NRVs) FWSI/billion train KMs
Chart 34.
Level crossing National Reference Values (NRV 3.1) (excludes suicides)
800.0
700.0
NRV
average
600.0
500.0
400.0
300.0
200.0
100.0
0.0
Source: recommendation on the first set of CSTs which was delivered by the European Railway Agency to the European
Commission21.
NRV 3.1 is expressed as: the number of level-crossing user FWSIs per year arising from
significant accidents divided by the number of train-km per year.
No comparison exists for NRV3.2 as the NRV3.2 data for other Member States is not
available. Chart 34 suggests that while level crossing risk remains a significant topic for
discussion within the UK, safety performance compares favourably with the other Member
States being nearly ten times lower than the European average.
21
Data should be treated with caution as the scope and reliability of reported data for railway
accidents may be significantly different from Member State to Member State.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
43
4
Bridge strikes
The SRM covers the expected risk from bridge strikes that is presented to the railways and
estimates a low level of risk to both road and rail users. Some bridge strikes cause injury and
fatalities to road users, but these statistics are generally not recorded as the details of road
user deaths or injuries are unrelated to rail industry operations.22
Whilst a fatality from a bridge strike has not happened recently in the UK there is still an
underlying level of risk from road vehicles striking such structures. The last recorded case of
a bridge strike leading to the displacement and derailment of a train was at Oyne, Scotland
in May 1978. A low-loader carrying construction plant struck an underline bridge, displacing
the structure and causing severe distortion to the track and subsequent derailment of a
passenger train.
4.1
The risk from bridge strikes
The risk from bridge strikes is estimated based on high frequency low consequence events
The SRM provides estimates of the frequency and risk of train derailments resulting from
road vehicles striking bridges. The SRM considers the frequency and risk of derailment from
both bridge collapse and displacement. There has been only one recent derailment from a
bridge strike which occurred at Barrow on Soar, whilst this was not a typical bridge strike it
resulted in one major, two minor and one shock related injuries. There have been, on
average, around six serious bridge strikes per year over ten years occurring at underline
bridges; 12 events have led to the railway track being buckled or displaced.
The SRM estimates the overall risk from bridge strikes to be 0.071 FWIs from subsequent
train derailment. This risk estimate is low due to the fact that there have not been any
injuries or fatalities to passengers or workforce since 1978. Those that have occurred
recently occur outside of the railway boundary and therefore fall within the road accident
statistics. An example of this would be injuries to passengers onboard a double-deck bus23
involved in a bridge strike with a low bridge. Incidents involving buses account for
approximately 3% of all underline bridge strikes each year.
The most common type of bridge strike occurs when an oversized vehicle (eg heavy goods
or large goods vehicle) strikes an underline bridge. This type of event usually causes
minimal damage however they are seen as precursor to more serious events. There is also
been occasions when drivers of large goods vehicles are at risk when their vehicle overturns
after colliding with a bridge that crosses over a road at a skew.
The risk with which the railway is concerned involves the potential for a train to derail from
displaced railway tracks, or the possibility that the damaged caused may affect the ability for
a bridge to support trains. At overline bridges, debris falling on the line from dislodged
masonry is a further concern.
22
This also means that such events are not recorded in industry systems such as SMIS unless they
are to members of the public who are affected by a subsequent train derailment.
23
A notable accident occurred in Great Britain involving a double-deck bus at West Street, Glasgow,
in 1994. Five people (three children and two adults) were killed when the top of the bus was ripped off
after striking a low bridge. The group involved a girl guides who had been on an outing and were
returning to Drumchapel when the accident occurred.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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4.1.1
Bridge strike risk in context
There are, on average, five reports of road vehicles colliding with underline and overline
bridges each day. The majority pose little threat to the safety of trains. However, almost one
incident a week is classified as serious or potentially serious due to the damage caused. The
rate of bridge strikes to overline bridges can be directly correlated to fluctuations in the total
number of powered road goods vehicles that are registered24. See Table 9 for the total
number of goods vehicles registered in the UK over the last ten years. The decrease in the
total number of registered vehicles in 2009 corresponds with the decrease in bridge strikes.
Table 9.
Source: DfT
Number of road goods vehicles registered by area of origin
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
UK
545
518
493
474
441
418
406
400
382
347
Foreign Unknown
1,043
18
1,174
20
1,290
18
1,322
19
1,446
10
1,513
10
1,606
9
1,719
11
1,672
5
1,404
13
Total
1,605
1,712
1,802
1,815
1,897
1,941
2,021
2,129
2,060
1,764
In recent years, some bridges have been painted to make them more visible to approaching
drivers and in some cases, where a bridge, collision protection beams (steel or concrete)
have been installed adjacent to flat soffit bridges and also in a few locations at arch bridges,
with a headroom the same as the minimum bridge headroom, so that the bridge is protected.
Vehicle interactive signs have been installed on the approach to some bridges; with the
message ‗DANGER LOW BRIDGE AHEAD‘ appearing automatically when over height
vehicles approach the bridge. Research just beginning is designed to evaluate and compare
all the various initiatives and make recommendations about future policy.
With these improvements to the signs at bridges, giving improved warning of the presence of
low bridges, and the permitted road vehicle height along with good practice guides being
made available for various user groups to raise awareness of the consequences of a bridge
strike. The developers of such guidance documents have also recognised in that due to the
improved transport links between mainland Europe and the UK there has been a need to
educate foreign lorry drivers about the risks of bridge strikes in the UK.
Developments in technology, along with guidance from Network Rail, are helping to manage
these issues and the consequences of bridge strikes. A major new research study has just
started (see Area 8 in the research and development section and Appendix 3, for more
information).The Bridge Strike Prevention Group (BSPG) facilitated by Network Rail ensures
the risks are managed with all relevant parties. (See the Initiatives and in Appendix 3 for
further details of the work the group has conducted to manage the risk.)
24
Foreign registered vehicles that are temporarily brought into the UK by overseas residents are
usually exempt from UK registration and licensing. The vehicle, which must be properly registered
and taxed in its home country, may be used by the visitor for up to six months in twelve without being
subject to domestic registration and licensing requirements.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
45
Chart 35 shows the estimated risk to the two groups that are directly at risk from bridge
strikes. The chart separates out the proportion of risk at underline bridges and overline
bridges and then shows the proportion of risk to the two categories that are affected; train
occupants and members of the public. The members of the public category represents
injuries to road vehicle occupants or other members of the public who happen to be present
should a train derail. The estimate also looks at the potential consequences of a bridge strike
from an overline bridge strike where debris may end up foul of the running line which may be
subsequently struck by a train; this is where the potential for derailment could cause train
occupant injuries.
Chart 35.
Risk associated with bridge strikes (SRMv6)
Risk associated with bridge
strikes
Train occupant, 100%
0.071 FWI/year
Members of the
public, 27%
Overline
bridge
strikes,
12%
Underline
bridge
strikes, 88%
Train occupant, 73%
4.1.2
Risk by bridge type
There are two main classes of railway bridge; overline (road over rail) and underline (rail
over road) bridges:
Overline bridges are mostly owned by Network Rail although some are owned by local
highway authorities, DfT and other bridge owners.
Underline bridges are generally owned by Network Rail (though there are exceptions)
and signs on public roads are the responsibility of the highway authority.
The risks are shared by both the railway industry and the highways authorities. The risk is
therefore difficult to manage due to the fact that road users are not under the direct control of
the industry. Enforcement of mandatory height restrictions and other offences is the
responsibility of the Home Office police. Joint co-operation with all the authorities
responsible is vital to ensure safety of both transport links is maintained. Underline bridge
strikes account for 92% of all bridge strikes; this occurs when lorries or buses that are too
high to pass beneath become wedged. Although there are fewer bridge strikes at overline
bridges, the strikes are of a greater concern, as the risk from a derailment is considered to
be higher as there is also a chance that a train may strike debris that has fallen on the line.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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4.1.3
Bridge numbers
Network Rail has rolled out a primary asset database for structures called the Civil Asset
Register electronic Reports System (CARRS), which includes all data on bridges and their
associated examination reports. The database is used in the main for creating examination
requests of the bridge asset stock, a repository for accepting and reviewing the examination
reports and a place for storing work items created against the bridge assets. One of the
types of examination reports that are stored in CARRS is a Bridge Strike report. This type of
report is called for when ever Network Rail Control sends out the Structures Examination
Contractor to a reported bridge strike. The database then creates a unique exam ID for the
report to be sent in and review against once the structure has been examined following the
bridge strike. Upon receipt of the bridge strike report the SMIS database is updated.
SMIS includes a bridge register but it only includes bridges which have been involved in a
bridge strike. Whenever a bridge strike is reported a bridge that has not been previously
struck, a new entry in the bridge register is required. On many occasions, however, it has not
been possible to identify the bridge involved on the bridge register, although it is actually
included, and consequently for the same bridge the bridge register includes multiple entries.
CARRS has now been populated with a complete list of all bridges on the network and
details are shown in Table 10.
Table 10. Total number of bridges on the rail network in the CARRS database
London North
Western
South East
Western
London North
Eastern
Scotland
Grand Total
Underline bridge
4191
4179
3539
3169
2728
17806
Overline bridge
3338
2277
1931
1946
1654
11146
Viaduct
356
759
202
281
254
1656
Intersection bridge
122
125
39
76
25
387
51
7
6
16
6
282
8058
7347
5717
5488
4667
31277
Bridge type
Viaduct/Intersection
Grand Total
4.2
Safety performance relating to bridge strikes
4.2.1
Headlines
There have been no rail-related passenger fatalities due to a bridge strike in the last ten
years. The incident at Oyne in Scotland (May 1978) was the last recorded to result in
passenger fatalities.
Since 2000, there has been a continuing increase in reported bridge strikes. However,
there was a significant decrease of 23% in the total number of bridge strikes in 2009,
compared with 2008. The reduction in road freight transport due to the economic
downturn is regarded as the main contributory factor to this decrease.
4.2.2
Trends in fatalities and injuries due to bridge strikes
It is not possible to give a comprehensive analysis of injuries resulting from bridge strikes to
road users even those resulting in fatal injuries. Very few train accidents result from bridge
strikes, and members of the public (that is, the motorists involved and other vehicle
occupants, sustain almost all resulting injuries).
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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There has been one derailment caused by a bridge strike in the last ten years which
occurred on 1 February 2008 at Barrow-on-Soar (London North Eastern). A tipper lorry
delivering ballast to site had moved off with its tipper raised and struck25 a footbridge which
collapsed and fouled both lines. A passenger train struck the debris and derailed. The train
driver and guard were both injured. A track worker suffered from shock and lost
consciousness as a result. One passenger required hospital treatment for minor injuries.
The total number of injuries, including the example above, are shown in Table 11 below. The
majority are to train drivers who are involved in the incident and suffer from shock or trauma
when their train has passed over debris from an overline bridge strike.
Table 11. Harm due to bridge strikes
Date
Location
DESCRIPTION
Shock
01/03/2003 10:03
Linlithgow
Lorry struck an overbridge demolishing the
parapet. Debris was struck by two trains
2
28/02/2004 06:25 Roughcastle Sdg
01/02/2008 06:36
Barrow-on-Soar
Car damaged boundary wall causing train
to strike rubble on line
Lorry struck footbridge which in turn was
struck by 1L03 causing derailment
Minor
Major
2
1
Fatal
1
1
The incident at Barrow-on-Soar was the only incident to have resulted in passenger
injuries; all the other injuries are to members of the workforce.
4.2.3
Total bridge strikes
From Chart 36, it can be seen that underline bridge strikes account for 92% of all bridge
strikes since 2000. Overline bridge strikes can affect the running of trains as debris can fall
to the track below with the potential to cause a derailment.
On 12 January 2009, a road vehicle struck Old Stockley overline bridge near Airport Junction
(Western). The bridge was damaged, the brickwork on the parapet being pushed 120mm out
of alignment and onto the track below. The line was closed until the debris was cleared and
the parapet was made safe. The road was also closed to traffic due to the brickwork damage
leaving the bridge unsafe for road users. The line was reopened once the bridge strike
examiner confirmed the structure was safe for rail traffic to pass beneath.
The Other category contains bridge types such as side bridges, footbridges and viaducts
and also includes any events where the bridge type is not entered.
25
Although this event is technically a bridge strike, it was not a bridge strike that is commonly
accepted as it did not occur on a public road, but on Network Rail land when a tipper lorry struck an
overline footbridge. The lorry was on a haul route parallel to the tracks as part of a Network Rail
project.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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Chart 36.
Bridge strikes by bridge type
2500
Overline
2302
Underline
2125
2170
Other
1989
2000
2196
143
147
2072
Number of bridge strikes
1755
114
110
2083
129
152
107
1769
144
134
1610
114
1500
1000
1857
1640
1633
2000
2001
1942
2039
1986
2137
1902
1902
1433
500
0
2002
2003
2004
The number of bridge strikes decreased
significantly in 2009; both UK and foreign
freight vehicle registration numbers
decreased in 2009 (see Table 9 above).
2005
2006
Chart 37.
4.2.4
2008
2009
Vehicle type involved in strike
Light goods
vehicle
12%
Most bridge strikes occur at underline
bridges. However, a higher proportion of
strikes involving overline bridges are
classed as serious.
The most common vehicle types to strike
underline bridges since 2000 are heavy
goods and light goods class vehicles;
77% and 12% respectively.
2007
Bus/coach
4%
Car
4%
Other
2%
Plant vehicle
1%
Farm tractor/
machinery
<1%
Heavy goods
vehicle
77%
Strikes by bridge type and severity
Chart 38 shows the total number of reported bridge strikes to underline bridges by the
severity recorded over the last ten years. See Appendix 8 for details on classification of the
bridge strike severity grading and the details of assessments carried out on underline bridge
robustness.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
49
Chart 38.
Underline bridge strikes by severity
2500
Bridge strikes by severity
1816 1813 1904 1869 2000 2117
1587 1601
2000
1884
1500
1399
1000
500
50
3
0
4
26
25
2
0
97
9
24
7
36
38
8
1
23
8
9
21
9
2006
13
Not entered
11
7
Potentially serious
Not serious
Not entered
0
9
9
2000 2001
2002 2003
2004 2005
Serious
4
Not serious
16
7
Potentially serious
5
Serious
2007
2008
2009
There was an increasing trend seen in the numbers of reported bridge strikes to
underline bridges from 2000 to 2007.
Although there are many more bridge strikes to underline bridges, the consequences are
less severe than overline bridge strikes and this is represented by the low percentage of
bridge strikes classed as serious and potentially serious.
Chart 39.
Overline bridge strikes by severity
124
140
101
Bridge strikes by severity
120
123
115
98
122
110
100
119
75
90
80
60
0
40
20
12
1
2
0
2000
2001
Serious
Potentially serious
Not serious
Not entered
1
4
4
0
28
10
3
2002
3
16
7
17
0
6
10
14
4
2003
2004
2
0
23
2005
2006
2007
16
3
16
8
2
5
Not entered
Not serious
Potentially serious
Serious
2008
2009
Although they occur less often, a higher proportion of bridge strikes to overline bridges
are categorised as serious or potentially serious because debris from the parapet
generally ends up on the railway below.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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4.2.5
Overline bridge strikes
Overline bridges pose a greater risk as the debris may land on the line in front a train
travelling at normal speed with the risk of possible derailment. Debris on the track or
adjacent cutting slope occurs more frequently than an underline bridge moving with
associated track distortion or damage being caused to an underline bridge that affects its
carrying capacity.
Overline bridge strikes are managed in accordance with the Rule Book (GSR 17.2) which
requires the signaller to stop any train movements and requires the driver of the first train on
each line to report whether the bridge parapet is damaged or if there is any debris or defects
on the line. If no debris is reported then subsequent trains are able to pass under the bridge
at 5 mph until bridge is examined, otherwise train movements are stopped.
This method of management occurs irrespective of the type of parapet and period between
the strikes and report of bridge strike is sent to Network Rail.
A proposal to change to this rule to permit subsequent trains at 20 mph has been submitted
for consideration by the Train Operations and Management Subject Committee. See
Appendix 8 for further details on the process of examination.
Chart 40.
Overline bridge strikes resulting in debris on the line
45
Bridge strikes to overline bridges resulting in debris on the line
Train strike
40
40
Debris on track
Parapet unsafe
38
35
35
35
32
33
30
25
22
20
19
18
15
12
10
5
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
The chart shows the number of overline bridges that have been struck, resulting in the
parapet being left unsafe or debris falling on the line and those that were struck by a
train. The number of events for 2008 and 2009 were significantly lower than the number
rerecorded for 2002 to 2007 and more in line with the 2000/01 performance.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
51
4.2.6
Train performance delays due to bridge strikes
The total train delay caused by bridge strikes from TRUST for the last five years is shown in
Table 12 below. Although the reported number of bridge strikes has increased up to 2008,
the number of incidents that have caused a delay has decreased. This reflects the initiative
to allow trains to continue running after a strike.
Table 12. Train performance delays due to bridge strikes
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
4.3
Incidents
1619
1703
1564
1493
1148
7527
Minutes
268985
252221
235677
230238
188361
1175483
Cost
£8,242,542
£7,653,980
£8,268,533
£6,293,131
£4,869,753
£35,327,939
DPI
166
148
151
154
164
156
CPI
£5,091
£4,494
£5,287
£4,215
£4,242
£4,693
Comparison with other European countries
Comparison of bridge strikes with other European countries is difficult since most of Europe
do not collect bridge strike data. The vast majority of Member States only count a bridge
strike if it resulted in an accident that involved a train in motion26. This was discovered during
a survey which was sent to a selection of European countries at the ERA meeting in Lille in
2007. The findings of the survey are presented in a special topic report published by the Irish
Railway Safety Commission in 2009, Railway Bridges in Ireland and Bridge Strike Trends.27
The survey aimed to investigate the risk of bridge strikes in Europe and whether they
believed there was a safety risk posed by strikes at different types of bridge. The research
discovered that Ireland experienced more accidents as a consequence of bridge strikes per
route kilometre than most other EU Member States. In the UK and Ireland, there is a more
robust data collection process compared to the rest of Europe; this is mainly because the
risk of bridge strikes is greatest in these two countries. The report showed that some of the
reasons why bridge strikes were seen as less of a problem in some European countries are:
Drivers of heavy goods and similar vehicles are mandated to know their vehicle / load
height (this is the case for UK but not for Ireland).
There are more restrictions on the maximum height of road vehicles and it is written into
national legislation.
The fact that more freight is carried by rail in the majority of European countries.
26
The question asked, ―Do you collect statistics on under-bridge strikes?‖ Of the 18 responses
received (including Australia and East Japan; 11 confirmed they did collect bridge strike data and
seven confirmed they did not.
27
http://www.rsc.ie/uploads/RSC/Bridge-Strikes-Ireland1.pdf
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
52
4.4
Case study of a serious underline bridge strike
The following is an example of a serious underline bridge strike and gives the details of the
effort required to allow the safe running of trains to resume.
At 16:43 on 31 March 2009, a lorry
which had been conveying two large
containers struck Meddat Road
underline bridge in Kildare (Scotland).
The strike caused significant damage
with the impact having moved the
structure approximately one foot both
horizontally and vertically and caused
20 metres of track misalignment.
Services between Invergordon and
Tain were suspended with a
replacement bus service introduced.
By 18:20, an emergency engineer‘s possession had been established in readiness for the
arrival of additional resources to undertake a full assessment of the damage caused and
provide an estimate for when full repairs would be completed. A road crane was brought to
site and the track was removed and the bridge lifted by 08:00 on 2 April. Repairs thus
commenced and were completed by 16:25. The route was then reopened with a 20 mph
emergency speed restriction (ESR). After trains had been monitored and no further issues
have been found, the ESR was withdrawn and normal working resumed from 07:00 on 3
April.
Track misalignment
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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5
Vehicle incursions
Road vehicles can gain access to and obstruct the railways via road bridges, fences, access
points and level crossings, and have the potential to cause a catastrophic train accident.
There is also risk from aircraft (or parts of aircraft wreckage) landing on the railway.
5.1
The risk from vehicle incursions
Vehicle and aircraft incursions include all incidents where a vehicle has infringed on railway
property, whether or not a train strikes it. This includes all vehicles entering railway property
through: fences, bridges and access points (see Chapter 3 on level crossings for separate
analysis on incursions at this site type). It also includes any road traffic accidents that occur
on the public highway and end up on NRMI. All injuries from incursions are included, except
if they are injured before entering the railway property or in aircraft crashes. These are not
considered in railway reporting scope and will appear on the air accident or road28 traffic
accident statistics. The actual events will be included in the incursion data, but not the
injuries themselves. While the railway can take steps to reduce road vehicle incursions and
encourage road users to behave responsibly at level crossings, much of the risk at the roadrail interface remains beyond the industry‘s direct control.
Over the last ten years, there have been six occasions when a light aircraft has landed on or
near a railway line. Of these, there was one incident where the aircraft actually landed on the
line, a further three where some debris was deposited on the line and two where the aircraft
landed completely clear of the line. It is estimated that there are some 20 to 30 light aircraft
(small planes, helicopters, gliders and microlights) crashes per year in the UK.
Although there is very little risk associated with vehicle incursions (less than 1% of the total
system risk) Chart 41 shows the proportion of risk at each site type and the proportion of risk
to the two main groups; road vehicle occupants in collisions with trains and train occupants.
28
STATS19 is the form filled out by police recording traffic accidents. It includes all incidents the
police become aware of within 30 days which occur on a highway where one or more person is killed
or injured and involving one or more vehicles.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
54
Chart 41.
Risk associated with vehicle incursions (SRMv6)
Risk associated with vehicle
incursions (excluding level crossings)
Train occupant, 31%
0.61 FWI/year
Vehicle occupant in
collision with train,
69%
Access
point, 20%
Bridge, 10%
Vehicle occupant in
collision with train,
89%
Fence, 70%
Train occupant, 22%
Vehicle occupant in
collision with train,
78%
Train occupant, 11%
5.2
Safety performance relating to vehicle incursions
5.2.1
Headlines
There was an increase in the number of incursions at fences during 2009 when
compared with 2008.
There have been 42 road vehicles struck (away from level crossings) in the last ten
years, five of which have caused derailments.
There have been 17 fatalities to those involved in incursions over the last ten years;
seven to road vehicles occupants and ten to train occupants (Great Heck).
There have been a total of six incidents where aircraft has ended up or come close to
ending up on the running line since 2000.
5.2.2
Aircraft and vehicle incursions explained
There are approximately 350 reported vehicle incursions entered into SMIS each year,
approximately 20% of these are considered to be in scope. Many of these are counted in the
misuse section only cause damage to level crossing equipment and do not affect the running
of trains or cause a safety concern as they are often witnessed by railway personnel and the
running of trains is stopped before a collision can occur. Those that occur away from level
crossings are more serious as they occur on sections of the track where it is difficult to be
seen by anyone other than train drivers and often it is too late to avoid collision. Road traffic
accidents on the public highway are not included in the scope of this analysis and only
include events where a road vehicle leaves the road and infringes on railway property. This
is where a threat for a potential collision or derailment can occur.
Road vehicles are not the only threat to the railway. Aircraft can accidentally end up on the
railway line and cause issues. Over the last ten years, there have been six occasions where
a light aircraft has ended up on or near the railway line (as noted above). An example of a
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
55
recent potentially serious incursion of a light aircraft occurred on 2 January 2009. A light
aircraft struck the overhead line at Colwich (London North West). There were no trains in the
area at the time, but normal running was impaired. The three aircraft occupants were fatally
injured. The Air Accident Investigation Branch carried out an investigation into the accident.29
The list below defines the places from which a vehicle can infringe the boundary:
Level crossing: a road vehicle leaves the crossing surface or is left stranded on the
running line. This can be caused either deliberately by vandals or by an accident eg road
traffic accident. If the vehicle ends up foul of the crossing and is subsequently struck by a
train, these events will appear in the train collision analysis (see level crossing risk in
Chapter 3 above).
Access point: railway maintenance vehicles are mistakenly left foul of the line and
thieves accessing the track for theft of cable etc.
Bridge: a road vehicle leaves the road via an overline bridge and lands on the railway
property on the embankment below.
Fence: a road vehicle enters rail property via a lineside fence parallel or adjacent to
railway property and ends up on wholly within the boundary limits. If the fencing is struck
and no infringement is made, these are not considered in scope.
In each individual event, if the road vehicle becomes foul of the running line this will be
indicated in the charts. If the vehicle is subsequently struck by a train, this will also be
included (except for level crossing collisions as mentioned above).
5.2.3
Trends in fatalities and injuries due to incursions
The rail industry and road authorities have done a great deal to mitigate the risk at the roadrail interface, and this is reflected in the fact that there has not been a multiple fatality due to
an incursion since Great Heck, nine yeas ago. The risk assessment methodology that was
put in place has allowed the high risk sites to be identified and measures put in place to
reduce the impact of incursions at these sites. (See Managing the obstruction of the railway
by road vehicles in initiatives section for details on the work DfT has carried out.)
The following table shows the number of fatalities and injuries by person type due to
incursions since 2001.
Table 13. Fatalities and harm due to vehicle incursions since 2001
Passenger
Year
Fatal
29
Major Minor
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
35
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
35
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
6
35
35
Public
Shock/
Fatal
trauma
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
7
Major Minor
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
1
0
0
1
2
2
6
8
Workforce
Shock/
Fatal
trauma
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
3
4
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Shock/
trauma
4
1
4
2
2
1
1
2
1
4
2
18
Major Minor
FWI
15.20
1.11
2.11
0.11
0.02
1.01
0.01
0.02
2.22
21.79
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/october_2009/piper_pa_28_140_cherokee__g_awps.cfm
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
56
5.2.4
Trends in rail incursion incidents
Road vehicles can unintentionally or intentionally gain access to the railway and obstruct the
running line via access points, bridges, fences and level crossings, and have the potential to
cause a catastrophic train accident.
A recent incursion from a bridge occurred on the 22 September 2009, when the driver of
passenger service reported striking a car that had collided with a garden wall and then came
off an overline bridge at Broken Cross bridge between Salisbury and Grately (South East).
The driver was still in the vehicle when he saw the train approaching. He managed to
escape before the collision. There were no reported passenger or traincrew injuries,
although the train driver was shaken.
Chart 42 shows the total number of vehicle incursions by entry point, and identifies those
that were subsequently struck by trains (shown in darker shades). It includes incursions onto
the railway after road traffic accidents, road vehicles abandoned or driven onto the railway
and railway/contractor owned road vehicles that have been driven onto railway infrastructure
via access points. It also includes aircraft landing on the railway from above or through
fencing.30 Note that incursions at level crossings occur when a road vehicle has left the
crossing and onto the track, accidentally or deliberately. Incidents where a train has
subsequently collided with a road vehicle at level crossings are not on this chart as they are
included in the level crossing collision charts in Chapter 3 above.
Chart 42.
Road vehicle incursions via entry point
60
Vehicle incursions by entry point
50
Darker colours refer to
vehicle incursions being
struck by trains
40
30
20
10
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
0
Access point
Bridge
Fence
Level crossing
The greatest number of incursions onto the railway is reported as being via lineside
fencing. Over the last ten years 61% of all incursions were via the fence. However, since
2000 there has been a 31% fall in incursions of this type.
30
Aircraft incursions are included in the chart under the category Fence.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
57
5.2.5
Road vehicle incursions leading to derailments
Derailments that are caused by a vehicle incursion on the railway are rare occurrences,
there have only been five occurrences in the last ten years (see table below). However, they
have the potential to harm those on board the train as seen at Great Heck.
A significant accident (similar in some respects to the accident at Great Heck) occurred on
18 December 2008, when an empty car which was parked in a private car park rolled
through a boundary fence and down the embankment onto the railway line near North Rode
(LNW). It was struck by local passenger train on the up line, and subsequently by an express
passenger train travelling in the opposite direction. The local train derailed by the leading
bogie on the leading coach. Both trains remained upright and no major injuries or fatalities
were reported, however one of the train drivers suffered severe shock and trauma as a
result.
The most recent derailment occurred on 12 November 2009. A freight train derailed one
bogie at Cobham Road, near Derby Road Station, Ipswich (South East) when a road vehicle
struck a wagon in the centre of the train. The cause was road vehicle driver error as the car
left the public highway and ended up track side and struck by the passing train. The road
vehicle driver was placed in custody. There were no reported injures on board the train.
There was extensive damage to the track.
Date
Location
28/02/2001 06:20 Great Heck
28/02/2002 18:26 Metheringham
25/09/2006 21:07 Copmanthorpe
18/12/2008 17:59 North Rode
12/11/2009 12:25 Derby Road
5.2.6
Description
Road vehicle ran down the embankment and onto the railway. The vehicle was struck by a
passenger train, which derailed and was then struck by a freight train travelling in the
opposite direction.
Road vehicle collided with the boundary line and fouled the running line. The car was
subsequently struck by a passenger train.
Fatal collision between a passenger train and a car on the line at Copmanthorpe.
Passenger train struck an empty car on line and became derailed, another train struck
same car but did not derail.
Road vehicle left the highway and fouled the running line, subsequently struck by a passing
freight train.
Passenger and
workforce fatalities
10
0
0
0
0
Detailed analysis by entry point and foul of the line
The following analysis looks at the number of times a vehicle has ended up on NRMI and
either come close to or ended up foul of the running line.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
58
Chart 43.
Road vehicle incursions foul and not foul of the running line
60
Fence
54
Bridge
Level crossing
Number of vehicle incursions
50
46
39
40
41
Access point
42
41
36
33
36
37
36
31
30
41
27
27
35
31
29
31
20
20
10
Foul of the line
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
Not foul of the line
Around half of all incursions on the railway end up foul of the running line.
The following Table 14 looks at the total number of incursions that are due to trespassers on
the line. This type of event occurs when those involved in crime on the railway either stealing
cables or deliberately driving rail or road vehicles on to the line or near the lineside.
Table 14. Road vehicle incursions due to vandalism/crime
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
Access point
1
0
9
13
13
9
6
8
2
7
68
Bridge
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
Fence
17
17
13
5
8
6
1
5
6
4
82
Level crossing
1
2
2
4
1
1
3
8
3
3
28
Total
19
20
24
22
22
16
10
21
12
14
180
A serious vehicle incursion and fatality occurred in December 2009. A quad bike was struck
by an empty coaching stock (ECS) train in the vicinity of the Rumney River Bridge, Cardiff
(Western). Two people who had been fleeing the scene of a robbery on the vehicle were
fatally injured. The train sustained damage with part of one of the quad bikes wedged under
the leading vehicle. There was also damage to the track as a result.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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6
Learning from operational experience
6.1
RAIB investigation reports
RAIB was established in 2005 to investigate incidents on UK railway infrastructure without
apportioning blame or liability.31 It is independent of the rail industry and ORR, with the Chief
Inspector of Rail Accidents reporting directly to the Secretary of State for Transport. RAIB‘s
recommendations are addressed to ORR, which must then ensure that they are considered
by duty holders and that, where appropriate, action is taken. See Appendix 4 for a full list of
RAIB investigation reports on level crossings, bridge strikes and vehicle incursions that have
been published and those that are currently in progress.
Chart 44 on the left shows the distribution of RAIB level crossing reports and the chart on the
right shows which crossing types are featured in their reports.
RAIB level crossing report distribution and crossing types featured
18
8
16
7
14
No. of reports
No. of reports
Chart 44.
12
10
8
6
4
2
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
UK heavy
rail
Tram
Metro
Heritage N Ireland
0
FP
UWC
AHB
MCG
AOCL
SFP
OC
Most of the 22 reports (64%) have featured passive crossings (FP, UWC and OC). This
aligns with the number of passive crossings, which – at 5,138 – represents 77% of the total
level crossing population. It also aligns with the SRMv6 of which shows that footpath
crossings account for highest proportion of the overall risk to pedestrians and 37% of the
total absolute risk at level crossings, and UWCs (along with AHBs) account for most of the
overall risk to road vehicle occupants. UWC-Ts are also the most misused crossing type,
with 30.4% of all reported incidents of misuse.
RAIB recognised the risk presented by UWCs and accordingly produced a ‗class review‘ on
them in 2009. A similar review is for accidents at AOCL crossings are currently under
proposal.
RSSB is constitutionally obliged to report on progress against recommendations from Formal
Inquiries. Traditionally, this was published in a separate report, which became part of the
Annual Safety Performance Report (ASPR) after the closure of the Formal Inquiries
department in 2005.
31
RAIB will lead an investigation, draw conclusions and make recommendations if an accident
involves a derailment or collision which results in, or could result in, the death of at least one person,
serious injury to five or more people or extensive damage to rolling stock, the infrastructure or the
environment. RAIB may also investigate other incidents that have implications for railway safety,
including those which, under slightly different circumstances, may have resulted in an accident.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
60
RSSB will be publishing its Learning from Operational Experience Annual Report in spring
2010. Given the progress made throughout 2009 in shaping the definition and objectives of
LOE to Industry requirements, RSSB saw a need to produce a document which describes
the new process and its evolution, while retaining the recommendations tracking function of
previous documents. As learning is also a two-way process, some of the learning points
raised in 2009 are also included. The report will provide a complete list of all
recommendations published throughout 2009.
ORR publishes RAIB report recommendations on their website and includes the status of
each recommendation ie open, closed or in progress. See http://www.railreg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.1974. A summary of which has been added to the list of all RAIB
investigation reports and Formal Inquiry reports are listed in Appendix 4. The table shows
the total number of recommendations made for each investigation and the number of
recommendations that are either open, closed or in progress (as at February 2010).
6.2
Causal analysis of RAIB recommendations
The industry is continually monitoring and learning from accident investigations. RSSB is
currently developing an Incident Causal Classification System (ICCS). The database is
designed to allow accident and incident reports from rail and other industries to be classified
and analysed. This allows trends in accident and incident causes to be monitored.
The ICCS causal classification taxonomy is based on the one developed by RAIB for
consistency, which is aligned with the European Rail Agency. Each cause is split into five
levels and the user can pick more than one cause depending on what is written in the
conclusions section of an investigation report. The five levels are:
1 Industry area is the general area of the industry where the cause originated.
2 Sub-area adds more detail to the industry area.
3 Phase, 4 Safeguard, 5 Weakness add increasing detail as to what and went wrong and
why.
For example, an incident that was caused by the lack of maintenance inspections of a
footpath crossing (1) and an error by the level crossing user (2); would be coded as:
1
2
Industry area
Infrastructure
Third party
action
Sub-area
Platforms, walkways,
access routes
Action by
passengers or
others
Phase
Maintenance
Safeguard
Inspections
Weakness
Absence
Operation
Human capabilities &
performance
Error by
individual
There are currently 20 RAIB reports into incidents at level crossings in the ICCS. The list of
reports includes all level crossings on heritage railways and tramways including metro and
Northern Ireland (see Chart 44 for distribution). Note however that, the report into safety at
user worked crossings are excluded as this was a general report into crossings of this type.
The Venn diagram shown in Chart 45 below shows the overlap in industry area causes that
were stated by the 20 RAIB investigation reports. It shows that 75% list the third party (ie,
user) action as one of the causes of a particular event.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
61
Chart 45.
The Industry area causes stated by the 20 RAIB investigation reports into level
crossing incidents
6 (30%)
reports state
Operations
15 reports
(75%) state
Third Party
action
6
1
3
1
7
1
1
10 (50%)
reports state
Others
Source: ICCS
Chart 46 looks at the Industry area cause of railway ‗Operations’ in more detail. It focuses on
the number of times a cause is stated and so cannot illustrate the overlap like a Venn
diagram. It shows the number of occurrences of each cause stated by the six RAIB reports
into level crossing incidents that state ‗Operations’ as an industy area cause.
Chart 46.
Causal classification of RAIB reports where the industry area cause is
‘Operations’
4
4
Safeguard
Total reports
Competence & compliance
Equipment / system / infrastructure
Human capabilities & performance
3
Reports
Environmental conditions
Procedures / instructions
0
Driving
1
Operation & control (mgmt,
instructions etc)
Sub-area
1
1
Absence
1
Absence
1
Inappropriate
1
Human error
1
Human error
1
Env. conditions
Absence
1
Human error
1
2
Failure
2
2
Inappropriate
Warning & protection systems
2
Protection of staff when working
Source: ICCS
Chart 47 shows the number of occurrences of each cause stated by the ten RAIB reports
into level crossing incidents that cite ‘Other’ industry area causes.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
62
Chart 47.
Causal classification of RAIB reports where the industry area cause is ‗Other’
6
Safeguard
Total reports
Competence & compliance
Equipment / system / infrastructure
Inspection and maintenance
Organisational information management
Organisational structure & management
Procedures / instructions
Protection of railway from third parties
Sufficient resources
Regulatory framework
Planning
5
5
Reports
4
3
3
3
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1
0
Infrastructure: Track - plain
line
S&T: Level crossing
equipment
Infrastructure: Buildings,
platforms etc
Others
Industry area: Sub-area
Source: ICCS
With only 20 coded RAIB reports available, the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis
are limited. However, it is RSSB‘s intention to code Formal Investigation reports in a similar
way to give a more meaningful dataset in the future.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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6.3
Worldwide level crossing accidents
The following Table 15 lists details of some recent published accident reports and train
accidents from across the world, focussing on those within the scope of the R-RISG.
Table 15. Recent reports published into accidents around the world
Type
Country
Details
Investigation
report
Investigation
report
Investigation
report
Investigation
report
Incident
Ireland
Incident
Incident
Vietnam
USA
Incident
Pakistan
Incident
Germany
Incident
Bangladesh
Incident
Russia
Ballast train collision with LC
gates.
Collision between tram and road
vehicle.
Collision between passenger train
and road vehicle.
Collision between freight train and
road vehicle.
Collision between passenger train
and lorry.
Collision between train and bus.
Collision between passenger train
and road vehicle.
Collision between passenger train
and bus.
Collision between passenger train
and lorry.
Collision between passenger train
and bus.
Collision between passenger train
and car.
6.3.1
France
Estonia
Portugal
India
Incident
date
02/12/08
04/06/07
26/08/08
27/11/06
02/11/09
Key issues
Competency management;
training and procedures.
Road user behaviour; road user
education; LC ‗environment‘.
Road user behaviour; sighting;
road speed limit; risk assessment.
Road user behaviour.
12/01/10
Road user behaviour; passenger
loading.
Infrastructure.
Road vehicle behaviour; risk
assessment.
Weather conditions.
20/01/10
Misfortune.
09/02/10
Road user behaviour.
09/02/10
Road user behaviour.
23/11/09
10/12/09
Australasian level crossing awareness
The worst level crossing accident in recent Australian history occurred on 5 June 2007 at
Kerang in Victoria. It involved a Melbourne-bound passenger train, which was struck by a
laden articulated lorry at an interface on the Murray Valley Highway. Eleven passengers
were killed and a further 15 (including the lorry
driver) were injured.
The investigation report noted that the crossing
was later fitted with barriers and rumble strips on
the approach. However, it recommended that the
maximum vehicle speed over the crossing be
reduced from 100 km/h to help increase vehicle
driver reaction times and that drivers of heavy
road vehicles be ‗reassessed at regular intervals
throughout their driving careers‘. This suggestion
of cross-modal co-operation is also implicit in
Canada‘s stance on level crossing safety.
The report also recorded that the local ‗Don‘t risk it!‘ advertising campaign had been
updated. The Australasian Railway Association had also established National Rail Safety
Week, which is an initiative aimed at increasing community awareness about rail safety and
improving behaviour at and around railways.
More information may be found on the National Rail Safety Week website:
http://www.ara.net.au/site/nrsw.php.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
64
7
Initiatives
Road-Rail Interface Safety Group (R-RISG)
The R-RISG was formed in 2008, after the National Level Crossing Safety Group was wound
up. The role of the R-RISG is to work under the general direction of the Community Safety
Steering Group (CSSG). The group seeks to steer the work of the rail industry – together
with road authorities – in increasing awareness of the hazards and risk at level crossings
arising from inappropriate behaviour by those who use the crossings. The group also
considers bridge strikes and other incursions by motor vehicles onto the railway, working
closely with Network Rail‘s BSPG. R-RISG is a member of the European Level Crossing
Forum, which exchanges good practice, education campaigns and outcomes of research on
level crossings.
The group members are; Network Rail, RSSB, ORR, BTP, ATOC and ADEPT32 (Association
of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport). The DfT also attends to
inform the group about legislative and policy issues. The group is chaired by Network Rail
and facilitated by RSSB.
The following are among the priority tasks of the R-RISG:
Managing the obstruction of the railway by road vehicles
Following the Great Heck accident in February 2001, a number of
working groups from all interested parties produced Managing the
obstruction of the railway by road vehicles, which the DfT
published in 2003. This offers guidance on how highway
authorities and rail authorities can demonstrate that they have
ranked sites where roads cross or run alongside railways
according to their relative risk and that they have considered how
to manage that risk.
After ORR‘s recognition of several years of unsuccessful
pressure by Network Rail on local highway authorities (LHA), in
May 2009 DfT wrote to 28 English LHAs with sites having a risk
ranking score of 100 and above where remediation was
outstanding seeking their timetable to completion; this was followed in October 2009 with
approaches to a further 11 similar authorities on Network Rail‘s Western route. Also in
October 2009 a letter was sent to 18 LHAs who appeared, from Network Rail data, to have
identified sites without a risk ranking and in November 2009 a letter was sent to 33 LHAs
who had sites with a risk ranking score of 90 to 99 outstanding. DfT‘s template letters were
copied to the devolved administrations in Cardiff and Edinburgh and the Scottish Executive
(SE) undertook a parallel exercise to the DfT‘s, but the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG)
only issued a general ―reminder‖ letter.
Returns received by both DfT and SE have built up an agreed listing between LHAs and
Network Rail of the work completed, work outstanding and the programme to completion and
established contacts within the LHAs to whom subsequent queries could be directed.
32
Previously known as the CSS (County Surveyors‘ Society).
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
65
Road-Rail Partnership Groups (Network Rail)
The National Level Crossing Safety Group helped Network Rail to set up the Road-Rail
Partnership Groups, with local highway authorities around the country. There are now in
excess of 36 groups. These partnerships provide opportunities for collaboration in order to
help understand and resolve issues connected with:
Optimal risk controls
Impact of nearby planning decisions (with planning authorities)
Obligations under the Road Safety Act
Closure of crossings and diversion of traffic flows
Improvement of safety performance by road-based controls and the effect of crossings
on road traffic delay and congestion
Environmental matters, such as street lighting, winter road gritting policies, use of town
CCTV
Use and development of the AXIAT model
The partnerships cover the public road-rail interface, footpath and bridleway crossings, and
occupation crossings.
Review of Safety Principles and Guidance (Office of Rail Regulation)
In early 2008, ORR announced that it intended to review the Railway Safety Principles and
Guidance, specifically section 2E, which covers level crossings.
RSSB and other members of the R-RISG were consulted in the preparation of the new
document. Towards the end of 2009, ORR issued a draft of chapter 1, a guide for users of
level crossings, of the new guidance Managing level crossings – Railway Safety Publication
7. A final draft of this was discussed at a meeting at ORR on 12 March 2010, and a first draft
of the ‗technical‘ chapters was also circulated.
Law Commissions’ review of level crossing legislation
The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission are working on a joint project,
which is reviewing the law relating to level crossings in Great Britain. The project is included
in the Law Commission‘s Tenth Programme of Law Reform but is being undertaken as a
joint project as much of the relevant legislation applies to Scotland as well as to England and
Wales. The project arose following concerns raised by the ORR that the legislation relating
to level crossings was in need of review.
The project is complicated because the relevant legislation is scattered over several parts of
the Statute Book and is contained in public general Acts, private Acts (for example those
relating to the former British Transport Commission and numerous British Railways Acts)
and statutory instruments as well as administrative orders made under statutory powers. It
is also complicated by the fact that whilst health and safety law and most aspects relating to
railways are reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998, other
areas of law which are relevant to level crossings (for example, roads, planning and access
to land) fall within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
66
The Commissions have been looking at possible ways of improving the procedures for
closure of level crossings and considering whether changes are needed as regards
regulation of safety at level crossings. They have also been looking at whether there is
scope for improving consultation and co-operation between the various parties concerned
with level crossings.
In December 2009, the joint team had a meeting with the project Advisory Group and with
key stakeholders to discuss the provisional proposals for reform. The team is in the process
of preparing a joint consultation paper, which will be published in 2010. The paper will invite
comments on a number of proposals and questions relating to reform.
Annual Level Crossing Information Forum (RSSB)
RSSB held a meeting in June 2009, on behalf of R-RISG, at which those interested in the
use of level crossing were able to hear from the rail industry and others about these
initiatives. It is intended to hold this public forum every year.
The R-RISG will continue to work with the Driving Standards Agency to improve the
coverage of level crossings in motorist driving testing and behaviour. In the past this has led
to further information on how to use level crossings being put into the Highway Code, and
questions on level crossings being available in the bank of questions used in the theory test
for new drivers.
The R-RISG will work with the Network Rail level crossing strategy group to introduce new
technology at level crossings. The group will also support Network Rail in its work with the
National Farmers‘ Union, authorised users and others to help and facilitate the closure
programme for user worked and footpath crossings. Network Rail is on target to close 150
UWCs in the 12 months to March 2010.
Network Rail initiatives
Don’t run the risk
Network Rail started a national safety campaign on television, radio and local community
initiatives (eg, letter drops, leaflets), in 2006, called Don‘t run the risk. The campaign has
been run each year since then and its main aim is to raise awareness of the dangers of level
crossing misuse and ultimately to change user behaviour. This will then lead to a reduction
in incidents, reduce risk and improve safety. Local awareness days have also been held with
help from ORR and BTP (Operation Galley). The purpose is to explain directly to users how
to use the crossings safely and the consequences of misuse.
The short term objective of the campaign is to get the issue on people‘s agenda and to raise
levels of awareness in the general public and at a national stakeholder level.
Network Rail‘s latest research shows that over 65% of the general public and 82% of
Members of Parliament have now seen and are more aware of the campaign. This is the first
measurement of success.
The long-term objective is to turn the campaign into a sustained behaviour change or to
educate those who have a more limited understanding of how to use a level crossing safely.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
67
There is no evidence to support any improvement or change in user behaviour at this stage
of the campaign. This is not a surprise as research carried out by Network Rail also shows
that there should not be an expected change over such a relatively short time frame of four
years. The build time of similar campaigns such as seat belts, drink driving and smoking, has
taken at least ten years and up to 30 to see a real cultural shift in attitudes and behaviour.
With this in mind, Network Rail will continue to run the public awareness campaign but will
also target specific user groups for more intense and integrated communications, using a
variety of media.
Network Rail has 23 different workstreams dedicated to improving safety at level crossings
during control period four, including:
A dedicated community safety team visiting schools and youth forums to explain about
railway safety.
Engineering solutions such as obstacle detectors and new technology warning lights.
A programme to close 383 UWCs in consultation with the land owners, or when land
changes ownership on one side of a crossing.
Operations Risk Control Co-ordinators
Network Rail has dedicated Operations Risk Control Co-ordinators working with local
authorities and private users to increase understanding of how to use level crossings
correctly and the potential consequences of not doing so.
British Transport Police initiatives
Operation Galley
Operation Galley was implemented by BTP in July 2009, working on the principles of
ensuring that relevant enforcement and education methods are used at ‗hot spot‘ level
crossings to prevent the risk of serious injury and fatal incidents. The operation has
continued throughout November and December 2009.
There have been 31 operations nationally in England, Wales and Scotland.
106 prosecutions under the Road Traffic Act 1988. Prosecutions can vary from 3+
penalty points being imposed, large fines and disqualifications from driving.
The operations have involved high profile attendance by BTP officers, Network Rail staff
and in some cases the media with positive press releases.
Educational safety leaflets have also been handed out.
An educational approach has also been completed with local residents and communities
being spoken to at hot spot level crossings.
Feedback from communities and stakeholders has been very complimentary of BTP in
relation to Operation Galley.
Enforcement
The BTP is liaising with the Crown Prosecution Service to improve evidence presented for
prosecution of level crossing offences. There are two types of offences considered for
motorists;
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
68
Failure to comply with traffic signs (likely penalty £60 fine and 3 points on licence)
Endangering the railway and passengers
The R-RISG will monitor trends in the number of prosecutions for level crossing misuse.
European Level Crossing Forum (ELCF)
The European Level Crossing Forum was created in 2005, after the EU High Level Roads
Group was discontinued and several members of that group decided there should be a
means of exchanging information and outcomes of research on level crossings. The Forum
consists of rail infrastructure managers and regulators, and road authorities from more than
twenty countries in Europe, together with the International Union of Railways (UIC),
European Transport Safety Council and the Directorate-General for Transport and Energy.
RSSB, Network Rail and ORR have been full members since the forum was formed. RSSB
currently chairs the ELCF.
ELCF arranged the European level crossing awareness day, when national campaigns were
coordinated across twenty seven countries on 25 June 2009, under the common banner
STOP accidents! Europe for safer Level Crossings
The European Commission held a high level press
conference which was streamed live on the internet.
Network Rail took part in the event with Don‘t run the
risk.
The event will go global with the international level
crossing awareness day (ILCAD) on 22 June 2010,
supported by the United Nations and the European
Commission.
The ELCF signed the European Road Safety Charter (ERSC) in March 2009, along with
UIC, European Rail Infrastructure Managers (EIM) and Community of European Railway
(CER). This commits the forum to raise awareness of level crossing safety to reduce lives
lost in road accidents. This will be done through the awareness days and the website
www.levelcrossing.net. Other members of the ELCF, including RSSB, have also signed the
ERSC.
ELCF has contributed to the European Road Safety Action Programme (ERSAP) 20112020.
The European Commission is holding a workshop with ELCF on 15-16 April 2010, to discuss
level crossing policy, engineering, education and enforcement, involving rail companies and
the road sector from across the EU.
Level crossing information
A source of information about level crossing issues is available through the Community
Safety Partnerships Ltd (CSP) at www.lxinfo.org. The website and ‗online‘ magazine are the
latest initiatives developed by CSP.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
69
The website and magazine are dedicated to bringing the latest information from around the
world about level crossing issues to among others rail industry staff, safety professionals,
government departments and specialist companies and contractors.
CSP offers quality solutions to help address safety and other risks. CSP takes a holistic
intelligence led approach to partnership between business and community, business and
regulator and at other interfaces where risk arises.
Bridge Strike Prevention Group (BSPG)
The BSPG was formed following a recommendation by the Railway Inspectorate‘s report on
the derailment at Oyne, Scotland in 1978. The BSPG includes of representatives of bridge
owners (Network Rail, London Underground, ADEPT, Northern Ireland Railways; highway
authorities (County Surveyors‘ Society, Highways Agency, Transport for London, Transport
Scotland and the Welsh Assembly, regulatory bodies, DfT, ORR and transport organisations
(Freight Transport Association, Road Haulage Association, Confederation of Passenger
Transport). The Group is currently chaired by Network Rail.
The BSPG is a forum for the exchange of information between Government, the road
transport industry, local authorities and bridge owners about road traffic collisions in which
rail bridges are struck by road vehicles.
In particular the Group will:
Drive policy and promote changes in legislation to reduce the risk of bridge strikes.
Monitor the size and trends of the hazard of bridge strikes, and identify areas where the
risk is increasing.
Raise awareness, and clarify responsibilities.
Promote the adoption of affordable solutions for the prevention and mitigation of bridge
strikes.
Support the development of cost effective measures for the prevention and mitigation of
bridge strikes, and monitor their effectiveness.
Be a source of information and guidance.
Encourage collaboration between and to provide support to stakeholders affected by the
hazard of bridge strikes.
The group will influence the management of the risk of bridge strikes to be as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP) with the intent that the safety and reliability of the network
(road and rail) and infrastructure is maintained.
The following initiatives are among the group‘s successes in recent years and current work.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
70
Education of commercial vehicle drivers to raise their awareness of the dangers of
striking a bridge
Network Rail, in conjunction with other members of the BSPG,
developed information booklets that provide good practice in the
prevention of bridge strikes. These have been made available to
freight and passenger transport companies through the various
trade organisations in the BSPG. A leaflet is currently being
developed which is aimed at foreign lorry drivers.
The driving test for large vehicles incorporates a theory and hazard
perception test. The theory test has been review by a BSPG
working party to identify amendments considered necessary to
questions associated with the risk of bridge strikes, and the results
of the review will be passed to the Driving Standards Agency.
European Directive EU 2003/59 Driver Certificate of Professional Competence (CPC), which
came into force in September 2008 for professional bus and coach drivers and 12 months
later for large goods vehicle drivers, requires drivers to have a minimum of 35 hours‘ training
every five years. The BSPG proposes that a training course on the risk from bridge strikes is
developed.
The Road Operators‘ Safety Council and the Freight Transport Association have run
awareness campaigns on bridge heights, and articles have been regularly published trade
journals.
Improved availability of information about bridge heights
Network Rail is working with the Highways Agency to develop a national record of signed
heights of low bridges that can be made available to satellite navigation and mapping
companies. This should be available through the Highways Agency Electronic Service
Delivery for Abnormal Loads (ESDAL) web site. Information provided by Network Rail and
local Highway Authorities (Road Authorities in Scotland) is currently being collated.
The Truckers‘ Atlas published by the AA, details heights of low bridges on A and B roads.
Network Rail hosted a workshop in September 2008 to determine best practice for use and
installation of satellite navigation systems, incorporating data on low bridges and diversion
routes. However, currently there is no uniformity in telematic systems used in road vehicles.
Overline bridge strike protocol
During a HAZID workshop convened to consider the management of bridge strikes, a
recommendation was made to write a protocol dealing with overline bridges, this lead to a
Rule Book change. The protocol was developed in a series of workshops with
representatives from Police (BTP, Association of Chief Police Officers and AOCPOS),
highway authorities (ADEPT, SCOTS working group, Transport Scotland and Highways
Agency) and Network Rail, and has been issued and briefed to all interested stakeholders.
In addition the protocol for bridge owners has been developed by ADEPT and Network Rail
representatives of BSGP. This protocol is aimed primarily at highway managers to improve
signing at low bridges.
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Information and Guidance on bridge strikes
Better reporting and recording of bridge strikes is considered necessary to understand
trends and identify particular risks associated with bridge strikes by improving the accuracy
and details provided in incident reports. The road traffic accident reporting form, STATS19
has recently been reviewed by the DfT but the comments made by Network Rail on behalf of
the BSPG to enable improved recording of bridge strikes were not accepted.
Web sites providing information about the risk of bridge strikes (Network Rail, Highways
Agency, DfT and ESDAL) are available.
Enforcement
A workshop to consider actions to improve enforcement and prosecutions on bridge strikes
is proposed to be held with enforcement agencies.
Research
Research is being commissioned by RSSB on behalf of the BSPG to monitor drivers‘
behaviour at low bridges to understand the root causes of why bridge strikes occur. This will
inform the development of training packages to focus on the correct issues including
effectiveness of existing signing. (See Area 8 in the research and development section and
Appendix 3, for more information.)
Department for Transport initiatives
DfT has published Know your traffic signs for commercial vehicle drivers (a sister document
to the Highway Code). This includes a four-page section on low bridge signs, advance
warning/alternative route signs, a section on level crossings with signs for safe heights under
power cables.
RSSB Research and Development
RSSB manages a programme of research and development (R&D) on behalf of government
and the rail industry. The programme is funded by the Department for Transport (DfT) and
aims to assist the industry and its stakeholders in achieving key objectives:
Increasing capacity and availability
Reducing cost
Integrating all of these to compete effectively with other transport modes (or complement
them as appropriate) and deliver a sustainable future for the railway
The RSSB-managed rail industry research programme focuses on industry wide and
strategic research that no individual company or sector of the industry can address on its
own. The programme is also instrumental in supporting the development of a future vision
that can best be delivered. In addition, RSSB manages the rail industry strategic research
programme which has been specifically developed to support industry and its stakeholders
in the delivery of ‗step changes‘ in industry strategy in ten, 20 and 30 years time – as
outlined in the Rail Technical Strategy.
The Road-Rail Interface research topic covers R&D into the causes of misuse, the
effectiveness of existing and new technologies in reducing risk, and ways of improving the
management of, level crossings, including improved risk profiling. It has also been extended
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
72
to cover the causes and incidence of bridge strikes and other vehicle incursions. The scope
of this topic includes both footpath and station crossings, as well as road vehicle crossings. It
includes technical, human factors and economic issues that affect the railway (and roads) at
level crossings, of which there are almost 6700 on the national rail network. At the broadest
level, the topic considers the impact of external and societal changes on level crossings and
other places where the road network impinges on the railway, including bridges. The scope
extends beyond the rail industry and the British context to understand and learn from best
practice elsewhere.
Research in this area is underpinned by the Road-Rail Topic Research Plan (click for a link
to the document). It is designed to be a living document and will be updated on a regular
basis.
The Community Safety Resource Centre website
was launched in March 2009. It is a one-stop-shop
for industry resources and information. The site will
only be accessible to industry – users can apply for
a login username and password via the main home
page. For more information about the Road-Rail
Interface Safety Group and the European level
Crossing Forum, sign up for an account today!
Click on the picture above to be
directed their website.
Please see Appendix 4 for a full list of all published research and research currently in
progress.
A considerable amount of research has been
undertaken on road-rail interface safety covering
footpath and station crossings, as well as road
vehicle crossings. This guide pulls together
summaries of this research in one document to
provide a useful resource to assist industry with
accessing relevant information.
This booklet focuses on the Road-Rail Interface
Safety area of RSSB research. Its aim is to:
Inform you about research that has been done
Show you where to find the results of the
research
Encourage you to find out more including
registering to receive the RSSB R&D enewsletter
Click here to download A guide to RSSB research in Road-Rail Interface Safety.
Road-Rail interface research is conducted in nine main areas, which are:
Area 1 – Understanding the risk at level crossings to enable prioritisation of remedial
actions
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
73
Research in this area looks at the societal and attitudinal changes to risk taking and to
authority in general, and how changes may lead to positive or negative effects in terms of
safety at level crossings. Different social groups may behave, and change their patterns of
behaviour, in different ways. Practical application of knowledge in this area would include
improving the design of safety communications.
Area 2 – Identifying and sharing good practice in Britain and overseas to facilitate the
adoption of appropriate solutions
Research in this area investigates:
International practices on road-rail issues that help deliver safety improvements, which
are reasonably practicable and fundable within the current industry arrangements.
Experience gained within Canada regarding ‗second train coming‘.
Disability research carried out in Australia regarding the problems associated with flange
way gaps.
Good practice in the education of the risks associated with level crossings.
Area 3 – Identifying new technical and operational solutions to prevent errors and
misuse of crossings
Research in this area aims to assist the industry by investigating possible solutions such as:
Median strips (a form of physical barrier, separating adjacent lanes) on the road
approaches to crossings although use of such a solution has not been found to be
reasonably practicable in Great Britain (see report into research project T719 Monitoring
motorists‘ behaviour at level crossing median strip trial sites).
Alternative technology, such as signs, cameras, road markings, vehicle-activated signs
and traffic calming to understand what works best.
Area 4 – Understanding the costs of level crossings and the benefits of adopting
alternatives to optimise societal benefits
Research in this area reviews how the costs associated with maintaining, operating,
upgrading, and renewing level crossings may be reduced. A comprehensive model to
aggregate the various whole-life costs of a public road crossing allows the industry to decide,
using cost benefit analysis, whether it is economic in the long term to replace any particular
crossing by a bridge or by diverting traffic to other routes. This model will assist in the
development of business cases for crossing closures or conversions to bridges. It is
currently on trial in several local authority areas. Research can also assist in improving
safety at public level crossings by understanding why current upgrade techniques can be
expensive, and identifying how less expensive, yet effective, upgrades can be implemented.
Area 5 – Working in collaboration with highway and planning authorities to design out
safety risk and reduce the overall cost to society
Research can contribute to the development of better relationships with external agencies
representing public authorities and stakeholder groups. In particular, a better appreciation of
highway issues and working together with planning authorities may help address the overall
residual safety risk, design risk out of new schemes at source, reduce road congestion /
delay issues and save money through integrated planning.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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Issues that have already been identified as requiring research support under this area
include:
The use of level crossing signs on private roads.
The timing of amber lights and whether it is sufficient.
The impact on the road network with the introduction of extra and faster trains.
The impact of smart re-routeing to help high vehicles avoid bridges on the road network.
The potential use of cheap bridge crossings and footpaths at level crossings.
The lower overall weight of modern trains (especially their leading vehicles) against the
increased size and weight of heavy goods vehicles.
Area 6 – Understanding the needs of vulnerable users at level crossings to facilitate
social inclusion
Research is needed to inform future developments of new crossing types (or modifications to
existing designs) to take account of the need of vulnerable users, particularly pedestrians
and other non-motorised users at level crossings. A start has been made via R-RISG
disability working party, which has helped identify areas of concern that need to be better
understood and a major piece of research is now in progress.
This research will also look at how to reduce the impact of any potential ‗vulnerable-user‘
solutions on ‗able-bodied‘ users.
Area 7 – Review and overhaul of the legislative framework for level crossings to
identify legal requirements and consolidate disparate regulations
Members of R-RISG have identified the need for a review and overhaul of the legislative
framework for level crossings, consolidating disparate laws/regulations into a single act
covering road, rail and planning issues. Government has invited a review by the Law
Commissions of England and Wales, and Scotland and inputs are being made to the
process. Research could also assist in defining the needs and areas for change, and help
secure a legislative, consultative and standards framework that engages all parties and
facilitates adequate risk control by duty holders.
Area 8 – Research into bridge strikes and vehicle incursions
Despite a number of initiatives to reduce bridge strikes, the number of incidents has
remained at a consistent level (apart from the impact of the recession on road freight
movements), indicating that either the current reduction methods are not having the desired
effect, or the underlying causes have not been fully identified and understood. Research
now starting will specifically look at:
Improved understanding of why bridge strikes occur and integration of human factors
principles into the design of measures to reduce bridge strikes, numbers and severity of
bridge strikes could be reduced.
Reducing the number and impact of vehicle strikes on railway underline bridges and the
effectiveness of interactive road signs.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
75
A study of bridge strikes through a detailed review of research projects, incidents, current
legislation, surveys with key stakeholders and review of measures for mitigating bridge
strikes.
Improved guidance for reducing bridge strikes will then be produced. All work will be
undertaken by subject matter experts with input from human factors specialists as
necessary.
Area 9 – Research to support inquiry recommendations, government and regulatory
policies, proposed and new legislation
Research is from time to time required to ensure recommendations relating to the
management of relevant risks from investigations of recent major incidents, from RAIB
investigations as well as other HMRI and industry investigations, are satisfactorily
addressed. The impact on the railways from changes to Traffic Management Acts and the
increase in the use of congestion charging may also need to be investigated in the future.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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Appendix 1.
Key safety facts
Level crossings
Category
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total fatalities
35
36
28
32
36
44
Accidental fatalites
15
10
5
12
14
13
Suicide and suspected sucides
20
26
23
20
22
31
16.9
11.0
5.8
12.4
15.3
13.8
16
16
11
11
19
14
3
0
0
0
0
0
Collisions with road vehicles, no derailment
13
16
11
11
19
14
Road vehicle level crossing near misses
173
183
160
146
174
145
Road vehicle level crossing misuse
923
1096
1167
1082
1042
1110
Pedestrian level crossing near misses
209
241
221
234
282
266
3136
3824
4304
3882
4284
3863
43
228
530
611
491
708
1961
1877
2026
2131
1900
1429
8
9
9
7
7
5
137
151
130
143
129
110
7
6
10
4
2
5
Vehicle incursions at fences
49
41
47
40
28
34
Vehicle incursions at bridges
1
1
2
3
2
2
Vehicle incursions at level crossings
13
5
15
19
17
20
Vehicle incursions at access points
20
19
13
23
9
11
Accidental FWI
Collisions with road vehicles at lc
Collisions with road vehicles, derailment
Pedestrian level crossing misuse
Incursions
Bridge strikes
RIDDOR reportable equipment failures
Underline total
Underline: serious
Overline total
Overline: serious
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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Appendix 2.
Collisions at level crossings
Collisions between trains and road vehicles resulting in road vehicle occupant fatalities – ten years
Date/time
23/10/2000 10:15
15/11/2000 12:16
28/11/2000 18:06
05/05/2001 19:34
26/07/2001 09:45
01/01/2002 11:25
29/04/2002 17:10
31/01/2003 14:12
07/07/2003 08:24
15/10/2003 19:45
17/02/2004 21:54
06/12/2004 13:24
30/06/2005 18:25
17/09/2005 09:40
19/10/2005 12:04
02/02/2007 08:15
01/03/2007 07:25
03/11/2008 12:33
05/01/2009 08:59
02/09/2009 11:35
29/09/2009 14:11
Location
Territory Crossing type
Treath Mawr LC
W
AOCL
Coltishall LC
SE
UWC-T
Waterbeach LC
SE
AHB
Moulinearn LC
Sc
UWC-MWL
Swineshead LC
LNE
AHB
Norwood LC
SE
AHB
Parkers No. 4 Occupation LC
LNW
UWC
New Fishbourned LC
SE
AHB
Pools LC
W
UWC-T
Three Horseshoes No.1 LC
SE
AHB
Kirknewton LC
Sc
AHB
Pumphouse LC
LNE
UWC
Creykes LC
LNE
UWC-MWL
Rillington LC
LNE
AHB
Black Horse Drove LC
SE
UWC-MWL
Delny LC
Sc
AOCL
Swainsthorpe LC
SE
AHB
Wraysholme LC
LNW
AOCL
South Drove LC
LNE
AHB
Penrhyndeudraeth LC
W
UWC-T
Halkirk LC
Sc
AOCL
Description/cause
Fatalities
Passenger train struck a car on crossing RV deliberate action: ignoring lights/red-light running.
1
Passenger train struck car crossing due to RV driver error: failed to use phone to check line is clear.
1
Passenger train struck a car on crossing RV error due to blocking back of traffic on the crossing.
1
RV driver error: road user fails to use phone to check line is clear.
1
RV driver error: fails to observe level crossing.
1
RV struck train. RV incorrectly on LC due to snow / ice on the crossing. Driver error: user brakes too late.
1
RV driver error: misuse due to gates left open.
1
RV incorrectly on LC due to environmental factors/driver error: user brakes too late.
1
Passenger train stuck a minibus on crossing. RV driver error: road user fails to use phone to check line is clear.
3
RV driver deliberate action: zigzags barriers.
1
RV driver error: road user turns onto the railway.
1
Passenger train struck a van at the crossing and derailed. Cause remains unclear.
2
RV driver error: misuse due to gates left open.
1
RV incorrectly on LC due to environmental factors: sunlight obscures crossing/lights.
1
Passenger train struck a tractor. RV driver error: misuse due to gates left open
1
RV driver deliberate action: ignores lights/red-light running
2
RV driver deliberate action: zigzags barriers
1
RV driver error: fails to observe level crossing.
1
RV incorrectly on LC due to road traffic accident.
1
Light locomotive train struck a car. RV driver error: road user fails to use phone to check line is clear.
1
Passenger train struck a road vehicle at level crossing. Cause remains unclear.
3
* Grey shading represents multiple fatalities to road vehicle occupants.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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Appendix 3.
Research and Development
Published research (For further details and to view the reports, click on the project title)
Project
Number
Project Title
Current Position
Date
published
T000
User worked and footpath level
crossing research
This was the first piece of research undertaken just as the research programme was beginning. It
helped define the problems and led to a sequence of implementation activities.
August 2001
T028
Development of a universal
level crossing risk tool
The project won the 2007 Award for the Advancement of Railway System Safety. The level
crossing tool that was developed, the ‗All Level Crossing Risk Model‘ (ALCRM), is being used by
Network Rail to assess the risk at their crossings and is a key plank in its level crossing strategy. It
led directly to some further research T737 Documenting the All Level Crossing Risk Model to
provide a description of the development of ALCRM and to an enhanced specification for the
ALCRM so that future developers would be able to see the structure and functionality of the model
easily and quickly thus facilitating future upgrades to the model.
July 2007
T032
Trials of median strips / lane
separators at level crossings
This project was followed by research project T719 Monitoring motorists‘ behaviour at level
crossing median strip trial sites, which has been continuing to monitor the crossings with CCTV
equipment, although it was decided in early 2009 to reduce this activity to one crossing, Downham
Market.
July 2007
T105
Wayside horns at level
crossings
Since this research was carried out, there has been a review of the Rule Book requirements for
the use of horns at level crossings, and changes have been made.
May 2005
T232
Improving level crossing
information systems
It was decided to incorporate much of the functionality required in the ‗All Level Crossing Risk
Model‘ (ALCRM). See research project T028 Development of a universal level crossing risk tool
which itself has links to the various Network Rail databases.
February 2006
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
79
T269
Human factors risk at user
worked crossings
The project has led to a number of initiatives and follow-on research. Using the results of this
project, the industry was able to overcome a view that vehicle users at user worked crossings
would not look again for oncoming trains once they had returned to their vehicles after going
through the gate opening procedures. The project also highlighted that users did not understand
well the differences in warble tone that signified another train was coming very close after the
passage of a first train. This led to another research project that focused on this issue and
produced guidance on the way forward, see T652 Examining the benefits of ‗another train coming‘
warnings at level crossings.
June 2004
T332
Understanding the risk at station
and barrow crossings
Findings from this project have led to further research being undertaken, T730 Understanding
human factors and developing risk reduction solutions for pedestrian crossings at railway stations
and also T652 Examining the benefits of ‗another train coming‘ warnings at level crossings.
November
2005
T333
Evaluating good practice
deterrence and enforcement
mechanisms at level crossings
The project highlighted the need for a research-led examination of red light enforcement with a
trial at a number of crossings focusing on clearly defined ‗before installation‘ and ‗after installation‘
phases to elucidate the costs and benefits of the current generation of red light enforcement
equipment. This is now being taken forward by Network Rail.
May 2007
T334
Reducing the risk to motorists
traversing user worked
crossings on foot
A site specific risk assessment will be needed for each crossing where co-acting gates could be
installed. Network Rail is now working towards a trial of these gates at two sites. The opportunity
to consider wider adoption at more level crossings may be then considered.
August 2009
T335
Improving road user and
pedestrian behaviour at level
crossings
The Level Crossing Risk Management Toolkit (LXRMTK) produced by this project is widely used
by Network Rail level crossing practitioners. The toolkit allows them to choose appropriate risk
mitigations and gives salient details of each, such as the cost (range). The toolkit works well in
tandem with the All Level Crossing Risk Model; the latter assesses the risk, the former suggests
ways of managing it. A technical update for the toolkit is in the pipeline: T863 Updating the level
crossing risk management toolkit.
July 2008
T336
Modelling the economics of
level crossing closures and
conversions
The project produced a model, AXIAT, which needs data from both Network Rail level crossing
practitioners and from local authority representatives. As such, AXIAT provided a catalyst for the
formation of road-rail partnership groups. The Model has been further developed in research
project T738 Trialling the national roll out of the level crossing cost model.
June 2007
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
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T364
The cost of level crossings – an
international benchmarking
exercise
The findings were shared with a large number of infrastructure managers, operating level and
grade crossings throughout Europe and overseas. Many of them, including the infrastructure
manager responsible for such crossings in Great Britain, Network Rail, were able to assess where
they found themselves in the ‗league tables‘ which should help drive down costs and promote the
adoption of smarter solutions.
September
2006
T521
Developing enhanced
consequence algorithms for
level crossing risk models
This was a very specialised research project which concentrated on low frequency, high
consequence accidents following the accident at Ufton. The results were fed directly into T028
Development of a universal level crossing risk tool.
February 2006
T522
Research into obstacle
detection at level crossings
The findings from this research project have been actively pursued by Network Rail. The first trial
of a crossing fitted with obstacle detection is in progress at Filey. Further research work is being
undertaken to understand some of the detailed implications, see T729 Further work on obstacle
detection at level crossings.
November
2006
T524
Use by other railways of risk
models and risk assessments
for level crossings
This research project provided useful guidance to those involved in risk modelling in Great Britain
as it showed that the ‗All Level Crossing Risk Model‘ (ALCRM) was one of the more sophisticated
level crossings models in the world. Recently it was decided that one of the ideas from the
project—to promulgate good practice in level crossing management—is to be taken up in the next
update of the ‗Level Crossing Risk Management Toolkit‘. See T863 Updating the level crossing
risk management toolkit.
May 2007
T527
Analysis of research ideas from
recent international level
crossing conferences
This work was supported by the National Level Crossing Safety Group (now the Road-Rail
Interface Safety Group), which has been considering the potential research ideas identified by the
project as part of the development of its topic research plan. It helped benchmark existing
research against other ideas being investigated elsewhere.
June 2007
T528
Attitudes to, processes and
funding for, crossing closures in
other countries
The information produced by this project has been fed into the review of level crossing legislation
being led by the Law Commissions of England and Wales, and of Scotland. The Commissions are
scheduled to produce a consultation paper in Autumn 2009, and a draft Bill is planned for around
two years after that.
June 2007
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
81
T561
Evaluating safety benefits from
miniature warning lights at level
crossings
This project has been put on hold while its links to physical works by Network Rail could be
assessed. Further work is being planned for the future.
On hold
T652
Examining the benefits of
‗another train coming‘ warnings
at level crossings
Network Rail is currently considering how it should take forward the findings in the report. The
research was also fed into project T730 Understanding human factors and developing risk
reduction solutions for pedestrian crossings at railway stations.
December
2008
T653
Safer European level crossing
assessments and technology
(SELCAT)
The work was split into three work packages plus a ‗dissemination activity‘. A crucial prerequisite
for the collection of relevant information in the form of documents or statistics was the design and
development of a level crossing web portal: http://www.levelcrossing.net/. Its ontology based
implementation features provided for an effective and easily accessible knowledge management
system. Its functionality provides for the direct use of a tool for international level crossing safety
performance monitoring in accordance with the Railway Safety Directive.
March 2009
T668
Research into the safety
benefits provided by train horns
at level crossings
The introduction of a night time quiet period and the use of the low tone has removed many of the
concerns of the public and established a better balance between the safety of crossing users and
the health of neighbours of the railway. This is evidenced by the considerable drop in the number
of public complaints and media queries about train horn nuisance, since this change was
implemented. The industry is keeping the actual level of risk at level crossings and the impact of
horn noise on members of the public under review. This project supported an innovative industry
decision to remove a control (and thereby increase the level of risk) in favour of reducing harm,
caused by noise nuisance, to the health of neighbours of the railway. Further work on some
specific signaler issues has recently been completed.
December
2006
T680
Mapping the extent of the train
horn noise problem
Please see current position under T668 Research into the safety benefits provided by train horns
at level crossings.
November
2006
For further information, please visit: www.rssb.co.uk/community_relations/index.asp. See also
T681 Understanding the problems that train horn noise causes to neighbours.
T681
Understanding the problems
that train horn noise causes to
neighbours
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
Please refer to current position under T668 Research into the safety benefits provided by train
horns at level crossings and T680 Mapping the extent of the train horn noise problem. For further
information, please visit: www.rssb.co.uk/community_relations/index.asp.
82
November
2006
T730
Understanding human factors
and developing risk solutions for
pedestrian crossings at railways
stations
The research showed that if it were possible to close a small number of the highest risk crossings
(as is being planned by Network Rail), the total overall risk at station pedestrian crossings could
be reduced significantly (for example replacing the top five crossings with footbridges could in
theory reduce total risk by around 50%). In this case, the total benefits available from the options
presented in the report would be reduced, and in many cases this would mean that they could not
be justified on a cost-safety benefit basis. The findings from the research are being studied by
DfT, Network Rail and ORR in order to inform their responses to RAIB recommendations.
March 2009
T737
Documenting the All Level
Crossing Risk Model
The ‗Enhanced Specification‘ has been used to facilitate a technical audit by the ORR. It is soon to
be updated to reflect minor changes to be made in the model. Meanwhile the history document
will also be updated. Both documents help to spread knowledge about the model to facilitate the
competition amongst suppliers or to enable Network Rail to maintain the model in-house.
March 2008
T719
Monitoring motorists‘ behaviour
at level crossing median strip
trial sites
Following project T032 Trials of median strips / lane separators at level crossings, RSSB
continued to provide collection and analysis of CCTV footage from Beccles, Littleport and
Downham Market. It was decided in early 2009 to reduce this activity to one crossing, Downham
Market. It was also confirmed that Network Rail‘s updated strategy no longer supported the
continuance of the filming, or the development of the planned trials. The Road-Rail Interface
Safety Group consequently decided that the research should be terminated.
December
2009
T818
Highlighting the presence of
emergency level crossing
phones in emergency situations
This research took a human factors and risk based approach to provide guidance on the best
methods for contacting the signaler/duty holder to take positive action in an emergency situation at
a level crossing. The project recommendations have been accepted in principle by Network Rail
and the BTP. Network Rail are considering which specific modifications will be taken forward in
the redesign of level crossing phones and will be working up proposals for a Level Crossing
Emergency Protocol.
December
2009
T907
A guide to RSSB research in
Road-Rail Interface Safety
Designed for industry personnel who are short on time and need a general overview of research
completed and in progress, this guide may help refresh knowledge throughout industry on
research previously published and provide for further implementation of research outputs. Copies
of the booklet are available to download from www.rssb.co.uk and printed copies can be
requested by e-mailing research@rssb.co.uk.
November
2009
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
83
Research projects in progress
Project
Number
Project Title
Description
Due for
publication
T650
Improving safety and accessibility at
level crossings for disabled
pedestrians
Network Rail is currently planning for the next generation of level crossing designs and
this research aims to find out what specific facilities for disabled pedestrians should be
included in order to improve accessibility and reduce risk.
August 2010
T707
Analysing the potential of vehicle
activated signs at public road level
crossings
Vehicle activated signs (VASs) are widely used within the British road network. The
project seeks to establish the efficacy of VASs in preventing blocking back of road
traffic over AHB level crossings.
January 2011
T729
Further work on obstacle detection at
level crossings
The risk from using obstacle detection systems to check that level crossings are clear
of people and objects is compared to the risk of using a signaller to do the same task.
March 2010
T756
Research into traffic signs and
signals at level crossings
Evaluating the effectiveness and comprehensibility of traffic signs and signals on the
approach to level crossings.
November 2010
T737
Documenting the All Level Crossing
Risk Model
Supplying a history of the All Level Crossing Risk Model, and a detailed, referenced
explanation of its construction and functionality, and the main parameters used in its
formulation.
April 2010
T738
Trialling the national roll out of the
level crossing cost model
Trialling the national roll out of the level crossing cost model (AXIAT) using road-rail
partnership groups.
March 2010
T854
Reducing the number and impact of
vehicle strikes on railway underline
bridges
To determine the effectiveness of interactive road signs, and to indentify bridges that
are suitable for such installations; with recommendations for improvements where
necessary.
March 2012
T863
Updating the Level Crossing Risk
Management Toolkit
The widely used Level Crossing Risk Management Toolkit was completed in 2006 and
is now in need of a technical content update.
April 2010
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
84
Appendix 4.
Event
Investigation reports and recommendations
Report title
Link
Publication
No. of
Status
date
recs
(2/10)
Report
12/07/05
23
23C
Report
21/07/06
4
4C
Report
28/03/06
NR
date
06/11/04
RSSB Formal inquiry: Ufton Level Crossing: Passenger train
collision with a road vehicle and subsequent derailment
19/10/05
Collision at Black Horse Drove Crossing, near Littleport,
Cambridgeshire
13/11/05
Passenger-train collision with road vehicle at Swainsthorpe level
crossing
21/11/05
The fatality at Barratt‘s Lane No1 footpath crossing
Report
21/07/06
NR
03/12/05
RSSB Formal inquiry: Two girls were struck and fatally injured by a
Report
12/05/06
9
9C
Report
11/12/06
10
8C 2IP
train on the station footpath crossing at Elsenham
03/12/05
Investigation in station pedestrian crossings initiated by a fatality at
Elsenham Station
08/01/06
Serious injury to a cyclist at Scate Moor bridleway crossing
Report
16/06/06
NR
01/05/06 &
Two near misses at Crofton Old Station No. 1 level crossing, near
Report
29/05/07
6
5C 1IP
18/05/06
Wakefield
22/05/06
Train collision with a road vehicle at Bratts Blackhouse No 1 User
Report
26/04/07
8
8C
Report
05/09/07
2
2C
Report
26/09/07
UK
Report
03/06/09
8
Worked Crossing, near Sizewell, Suffolk
25/09/06
Fatal collision between a Super Voyager train and a car on the line
at Copmanthorpe
05/02/07
Collision between a train and a road vehicle on the M20 overline
bridge at Aylesford
Na
Investigation into safety at user worked crossings
2C 4IP
2UK
22/01/08
Accident at West Lodge crossing
Report
20/01/09
4
1C 3IP
01/03/08
Collision of a train with a demolished footbridge, Barrow upon Soar
Report
25/09/08
4
3C 1IP
31/03/08
Fatal accident at Tackley station level crossing, Oxfordshire
Report
30/03/09
6
3C 3IP
16/04/08
Accident at Moor Lane footpath level Crossing in Staines, Surrey
Report
23/12/08
4
4IP
01/07/08
Near miss at Poplar Farm level crossing, Attleborough, Norfolk
Report
11/06/09
2
2IP
21/10/08
Near miss at Llanbadarn AOCL near Aberystwyth
Report
28/07/09
8
2C 6IP
03/11/08
Fatal accident at Wraysholme crossing, Flookburgh, Cumbria
Report
06/10/09
5
1C 4IP
22/11/08
Double fatality at Bayles & Wylies crossing, Bestwood, Nottingham
Report
19/11/09
8
8IP
18/12/08
Collision and derailment of a passenger train at North Rode,
Report
14/12/09
3
2IP 1UK
Bulletin
21/01/10
NR
Report in
progress
Report in
Fatal accident at Halkirk level crossing, near Wick
Summary
progress
Report in
Near-miss at Victory level crossing near Taunton
Summary
progress
Report in
Fatal accident on a level crossing at Moreton-on-Lugg
Summary
progress
C = closed
IP = in progress NR = no recommendations UK = unknown
NA
between Macclesfield and Congleton
22/09/09
Passenger train collision with road vehicle at Broken Cross bridge
between Salisbury and Grateley
06/05/09
29/09/09
19/12/09
16/01/10
KEY:
Fatal accident at Fairfield level crossing, Bedwyn, Wiltshire
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
Summary
NA
NA
NA
85
Appendix 5.
Case study – Northern Rail train driver
Level crossings are an operational interface as well as a road-rail interface. Their safety
performance is as important to train operating companies as it is to the infrastructure
manager. Northern driver, Ian Palmer, talks about his experiences and the impact level
crossing incidents have had on him.
Train driving requires a high level of skill and concentration. As a driver, it‘s my job to get my
train from ‗A‘ to ‗B‘, safely and punctually.
Having worked on the railways for over 25 years, it‘s rewarding to be the human part of a
system helping to get people to work, school, to the shops and to see their friends. To meet
these expectations, I have to stay focussed and have the safety and reliability of the system
at the heart of everything I do – including observing and responding to signals, carrying out
safety critical communication and contributing to the train crew‘s attention to the welfare of
our passengers.
On the Northern network we operate 2,500 train services every weekday across 1,675 route
miles.
While staff in train operating companies like Northern are committed to doing the best they
can to manage safety, there are some issues over which we don‘t have direct control, and
incidents that we can‘t prevent.
Behaviour by road users – both motorists and pedestrians – at level crossings, is one such
issue. If a motorist decides to disobey the flashing red lights, or if a pedestrian at a userworked crossing fails to follow the instructions on the signs and doesn‘t stop, look or listen,
they take a massive risk. The biggest impact of this risk is likely to be on the person who has
mistakenly or recklessly crossed the threshold onto the running railway. But there‘s a ripple
effect on others – including train drivers and others who work on the railway and support it,
like the BTP. Managers and ‗on call‘ staff have a critical role to play looking after the welfare
of drivers and other staff and they often witness the horrific aftermath of incidents at the
scene.
There are also rare circumstances where the entry of a road vehicle on to the railway in the
wrong place at the wrong time can lead to catastrophic consequences for the train – leading
to loss of life of passengers and the workforce. Motorists‘ behaviour was the root cause of
high profile accidents at Great Heck in 2001 – involving GNER and Freightliner – where four
members of the workforce were killed, including both train drivers, and Ufton in 2004
involving First Great Western, where the train driver died. This kind of event is rare, and
overall train accident risk is much lower now than ten years ago, but it‘s a sobering thought
that, in recent times, motorists have been the root cause of most fatalities in train accidents,
and not SPADs.
Although thankfully not on the same scale as these events, about five years ago, I was
personally involved in a near-miss incident with a tractor, on the Newcastle to Carlisle route.
Having nearly completed a trouble free journey, about four miles outside of Carlisle my train
rounded a blind corner, and to my utter horror, I was met with the sight of a green farm
tractor crossing in front of my train, about 250 yards ahead.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
86
I immediately put the train‘s brake into emergency and watched in front, as 80 tonnes of my
train doing 60 mph, headed towards the tractor. I phoned our conductor from our cab-to-cab
phone to explain that we were potentially about to collide with a tractor, so he could carry out
trained and drilled emergency procedures.
We just avoided colliding with the tractor.
Having come to an abrupt stop, I rang out from our cab telephone to our Northern control at
York and explained that we had been involved in a near miss, and to request that British
Transport Police (BTP) be called to attend the incident. I then had to make sure that our
passengers were alright.
There‘s nothing a train driver can do to prevent these events, but as the person in the cab,
there‘s a significant impact on you – it can be traumatic. This can result in drivers needing
counselling and time off work to recover – some suffer post-traumatic stress disorder, and
some never recover.
The ripple effect then continues to the railway network. This relies on train drivers to
physically move the trains around, and so there‘s the impression an incident will make at the
human level, to the wellbeing of the workforce, and also at the system level, which needs a
full complement of people to meet our customer‘s expectations of services.
In the wake of my particular incident, I quizzed the tractor driver and found that he had not
contacted the signaller via the crossing telephone for permission to cross. Having gathered
as much information as possible, I made a detailed report and sent if off to our control centre
in York. Police could not find the tractor driver and unfortunately, there was not enough
evidence to prosecute him, even if they had.
The whole experience inspired me to propose the introduction of a new reporting form
through our staff suggestion scheme, specifically for crossing misuse. I conducted a
successful six month trial and we now have a company-wide ‗crossing misuse form 340‘. I
have since used my own form in a successful crossing misuse case which went to court.
The driver was prosecuted for endangering trains and with the help of the information
captured on the form, helped BTP secure the court case. He received a total £800 penalty.
The new form works because it brought the relevant railway organisations together in
partnership - namely BTP, Network Rail Control, Northern Control, our Driver Team
Managers, and last but not least the driver. And although this is just a form, I hope it makes
a small contribution in reducing crossing misuse.
It‘s also heartening to see the rail industry working together in other ways in response to
these issues. Network Rail‘s Don’t Run The Risk campaign is a good way of promoting the
right sort of behaviour by the public at level crossings. It helps show that the rules of the road
aren‘t there for their own sake, there‘s a point to them, and the adverts on TV and radio
hopefully help dissuade motorists and pedestrians from dangerous, hasty behaviour.
I‘m also aware of RSSB‘s work in encouraging cooperation within the rail industry and with
other agencies, like local highways agencies and the Driving Standards Agency. There‘s
also a great deal of research into different technologies and risk.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
87
It‘s clearly a cross-industry issue with effects across different companies and people, and I
hope we continue to work together to do what we can to improve level crossing safety, to
protect the public from themselves, and protect the workforce and passengers from the
effects incidents can potentially have.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
88
Appendix 6.
Pedestrian risks at level crossings
In early 2009, the R-RISG asked RSSB to convene a workshop to examine the problem of
pedestrian accidents at level crossings. As the figures in this report show (see Chart 9 and
Chart 10), the number of pedestrians killed has averaged eight over the last ten years but in
2007 the figure was nine and in 2008 13 pedestrians were killed. (In 2009 the figure reverted
to eight.) Approximately 77% of the total risk at level crossings is to pedestrians and most of
the pedestrian risk involves members of the public being struck by a train (58%) followed by
passengers being struck on station crossings (7%).
The workshop included representatives from ADEPT (previously known as County
Surveyors‘ Society) DfT, Network Rail, ORR and RSSB. Two main questions were posed:
Is the increase in pedestrian fatalities (applicable in March 2009) statistically significant?
What actions can be taken to attempt to reduce the numbers?
The group focused on accidents and near misses as well as the trend in fatalities. Expert
advice was that the emerging figures showed that if the figure of 13 fatalities was repeated in
2009 the trend would be regarded as statistically significant but in any case societal concern
was being expressed and if proportionate and effective action could be taken to help reduce
the apparent trend that would be worth considering. The group was aware of work done by
the European Level Crossing (Research) Forum and under the auspices of the SELCAT
project that suggested that railway organisations had historically concentrated on level
crossing risk as a potential cause of train accidents, rather than the individual risk to
pedestrians. At crossings with fast trains, limited protection and high pedestrian use, while
the overall risk of a fatality would be low, the risk to a specific regular pedestrian user could
be relatively high. This quandary has been expressed in some of the reports into pedestrian
accidents produced by RAIB. However, the level of risk to which an individual is exposed is a
key consideration in the safety management process, but is not explicitly part of the criteria
applied to deciding about whether or not to implement an action to improve safety. As an
indication of this it is fair to say that most of the research undertaken by the rail research
programme has focused on mitigating the risk posed by motor vehicle driver error and abuse,
and at least the early stages of Network Rail‘s ‗Don‘t Run the Risk‘ campaigns have
concentrated on this area also. In some European countries there is only a limited amount of
recording of pedestrian accidents, although this is beginning to improve.
The workshop attempted to disaggregate the events recorded and found some common
threads:
Leisure walkers. A high proportion of those involved in fatal accidents had appeared to
involve leisure walkers and hikers whose activities, whilst perfectly legitimate, could not
be categorised as ‗essential‘. Whilst the right to roam is an issue, the need for people not
to put themselves in danger by virtue of their leisure activity, or perhaps to use routes
which were intrinsically safer, could be considered. Whilst some of the leisure walkers
were local and so could be expected to know how to use particular crossings safely,
some of them would be so used to them that they might not treat them with the care
needed.
Dog walkers – as a sub-set of leisure walkers – appeared particularly vulnerable because
of their protective responses to their pets / companions which may have the tendency to
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
89
rush off into the path of a train (and probably survive the experience) when not on a lead.
There appears to be a pattern where ‗dog escapes – owner follows – dog survives –
owner trapped / injured / killed‘. A coroner considering his verdict on one of these
accidents asked DfT to consider whether there should be a railway byelaw making it an
offence to cross a railway level crossing with a dog which was not on a lead. It was
considered to be completely unenforceable so was not progressed. Network Rail have
prepared a factsheet for dog-walkers to distribute via places such as veterinary practices,
camping/caravanning sites near to railways/level crossings, pet stores etc; they will also
target organisations like the Ramblers Association.
Other distractions, including the use of iPods and walkmans which can reduce the impact
of audible warnings, can be a factor.
Age profile and disabilities. While fatalities to pedestrians noted as falling into one of the
disabled categories is rare, the proportion of elderly victims is higher than would be
expected in the population as a whole. This is, however, not much different from the
situation regarding road pedestrian fatalities where fatality rates are highest for those
aged over 80 and nearly a third of road pedestrian fatalities are aged 70 and over.
Children. Accidents to child pedestrians are rare at level crossings which is very different
from the roads where pedestrian casualty and killed / seriously injury rates per are
highest for 12-15 year olds, and high for those under 15. One child was killed – at Fox
Covert foot crossing – in 2009.
Error versus violation. It is always a difficult task to try and establish what was in the
mind of a person fatally injured in an individual road or rail accident but the rail industry
has spent a great deal of effort in establishing which events can be categorised as
suicide in order to separate them from the level crossing accident trends. However,
looking at the remainder (the eight or so fatalities a year as reported in this report) the
overall conclusion is that the vast majority appear to be in the category of errors where
people did not see a train approaching, or failed to see it in time, or misjudged its speed,
or failed to get off the crossing quickly enough, or slipped and fell. There do not seem to
be many which have the appearance of people recklessly trying to beat a train or wilfully
ignoring red lights etc, although in places where telephones are provided there is often a
tendency for them only to be used in exceptional circumstances such as in foggy
weather.
Educational deficiencies. It is possible that a significant proportion of pedestrian users do
not understand the risk at level crossings, the meaning of fixed and dynamic signs, and
telephones, the correct place to stand before taking a decision about whether it is safe to
cross, and the speed of trains when seen. These areas are not well understood.
Discussions took place about the best ways of improving the situation. These have been
split between the traditional categories of engineering, enforcement, education, engagement
and evaluation, as follows:
Engineering
Is the trade-off between the use of train horns only where the sighting distances are suboptimal, and not routinely at night working well?
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
90
Should there be a campaign to produce a robust decision point at all / selected crossings
and if so, how should they be marked so as not to confuse different user categories?
Are there technological solutions which could be applied to make pedestrian crossings
safer? (Noted that research into helping to better identify the location of trains on long
rural branch lines is under development).
Is the vegetation clearance activity undertaken by Network Rail sufficient?
Are the sighting distances undertaken by Network Rail staff suitable and sufficient?
Is enough attention given to surfaces and is any given to de-icing during bad weather?
Enforcement
Is the level of near miss reporting, especially by train drivers, satisfactory or could it be
improved?
Should there be penalties for pedestrian misuse of level crossings and, if so, how could
they be enforced?
What can the BTP (and other police forces) do to enforce the law or help people cross
safely?
Can private pedestrian users at user worked crossings with pedestrian rights be
prosecuted for leaving gates open or failing to ensure that others close them?
Education
Do people understand the various signs and warning systems? Is research needed in
this area?
If decision points were provided, how should people be made aware of their meaning and
what to do?
Is it possible to train new users, such as rambler groups, or even casual walkers?
Engagement
Should local authorities and user groups continue to press to keep rights of way open or
should legislation be brought forward to try to reduce the numbers of crossings to those
where there is no alternative access?
Evaluation
Does the rail industry know enough about the causes of pedestrian accidents and does it
need to monitor societal trends such as increased demand for leisure pursuits such as
walking, dog ownership, causes of distraction (phones, personal music etc)?
These issues were considered by R-RISG members and it was decided to pay particular
attention to the emerging trends of pedestrian risk (which now appear to have gone back to
the norm) and to consider research into pedestrian information needs to help reduce the
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
91
error levels in the future. Research has been identified to follow the existing project T756
‗Research into traffic signs and signals at [public road] level crossings‘ as that may have
some important findings of a general nature which could be applied to pedestrian risk. That
research is due for conclusion in early 2011; meanwhile, the scope of a possible follow-onproject is being considered.
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
92
Appendix 7.
Crossing numbers and types
The level crossing population on NRMI (December 2008)
Scotland
MCB-CCTV
18
MCB
16
MCG
3
Total active manual
37
UWC-MWL
6
ABCL
3
AHB
29
AOCR
1
AOCL
23
Total active automatic 62
OC
2
UWC
56
UWC-T
314
FP
77
Total passive
449
TOTAL
548
LNE
146
94
115
355
38
11
187
0
27
263
15
316
387
588
1306
1924
LNW
49
34
17
100
10
3
20
0
9
42
6
98
200
374
678
820
Anglia
47
20
28
95
28
17
95
0
16
156
2
179
125
179
485
736
Sussex
27
9
4
40
2
0
25
0
0
27
0
18
28
105
151
218
Kent
13
10
9
32
4
2
21
0
3
30
12
49
51
148
260
322
Wessex
44
8
3
55
6
0
33
0
3
42
0
7
57
166
230
327
Western TOTAL
34
378
49
240
14
193
97
811
10
104
14
50
45
455
0
1
38
119
107
729
19
56
217
940
462
1624
745
2382
1443
5002
1647
6542
Source: Network Rail. The table excludes disused crossings on mothballed lines and ‗sleeping dogs‘ (see definition section). The
category of footpath crossings comprises footpath crossings (86%), bridleway crossings (6%) and station foot and barrow
crossings (8%). These are analysed as a single category in the analysis because the data in SMIS is not always precise enough
to differentiate between them. They have been collectively grouped under ‗passive‘ crossings, but in reality some have automatic
protection: 2% (including some at stations) have miniature warning lights and 1% are station crossings with white lights. A further
4% are equipped with telephones and around one-third have whistle boards.
Level crossing modernisation in Britain: public and road crossings 1960-2008
3000
PUBLIC ROAD LEVEL CROSSING MODERNISATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
1960 - 2008
Public road crossings
2500
2000
OC
AOCR
AOCL
ABCL
AHB
CCTV
Barriers
Gates
1500
1000
500
0
Road-Rail Interface Special Topic Report 2010
93
ACTIVE CROSSINGS
Manual crossings
Manually controlled gate (MCG) This crossing is
equipped with gates, which are manually operated
by a signaller or crossing keeper either before the
protecting signal can be cleared, or with the
permission of the signaller or signalling system. At
the majority of these crossings, the normal position
of the gates is open to road traffic, but on some
quiet roads the gates are maintained ‗closed to the
road‘ and opened when required if no train is
approaching.
Manually controlled barrier (MCB) MCB crossings
are equipped with full barriers, which extend across
the whole width of the roadway, and are operated
by a signaller or crossing keeper before the
protecting signal can be cleared. Road traffic
signals and audible warnings for pedestrians are
interlocked into the signalling system.
Manually controlled barrier protected by closed
circuit television (MCB-CCTV) Similar to MCB
crossings, except that a closed circuit television (CCTV)
is used to monitor and control the crossing from a
remote location.
Automatic crossings
Automatic half-barrier (AHB) AHB crossings are equipped with barriers that only extend across the
nearside of the road (so that the exit is left clear if the crossing commences operation when a vehicle is on
it). Road traffic signals and audible warnings are activated
a set time before the operation of the barriers, which are
activated automatically by approaching trains. The barriers
rise automatically when the train has passed, unless
another train is approaching. Telephones are provided for
the public to contact the signaller in case of an emergency
or, for example, to ensure it is safe to cross in a long or
slow vehicle. These crossings can only be installed where
the permissible speed of trains does not exceed 100mph.
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Automatic barrier locally monitored (ABCL)
As far as the road user is concerned, this
crossing looks identical to an AHB crossing. The
difference is that train drivers must ensure that
the crossing is clear before passing over it. Train
speed is limited to 55mph or less.
Automatic open crossing remotely monitored (AOCR) The AOCR is equipped with road traffic
signals and audible warnings only: there are no barriers. It is operated automatically by approaching
trains. Telephones are provided for the public to contact the signaller in an emergency. Only one
crossing of this type remains on NRMI, at Rosarie in the Scottish Highlands.
Automatic open crossing locally monitored
(AOCL) Like the AOCR, this crossing is equipped
with road traffic signals and audible warnings only
and is operated automatically by approaching
trains. The only difference is that no telephone is
provided for crossing users: train drivers must
ensure that the crossing is clear before passing
over it and train speed is limited to 55mph or less.
If a second train is approaching, the lights
continue to flash after the passage of the first
train, an additional signal lights up, and the tone
of the audible warning changes.
User-worked crossing with miniature warning
lights (UWC-MWL) This crossing has gates or full
lifting barriers, which the user must operate prior to
crossing. Red/green miniature warning lights,
operated by the approach of trains, inform the user
whether it is safe to cross.
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PASSIVE CROSSINGS
User-worked crossing (UWC) This crossing has
gates or, occasionally, full lifting barriers, which the
user must operate prior to crossing. The user is
responsible for ensuring that it is safe to cross; hence
there must be adequate visibility of approaching
trains. Once clear, the user is required to close the
gate or barriers. These crossings are often found in
rural areas, for example providing access between a
farm and fields. They often have an identified user,
some of whom keep the crossing gates padlocked to
prevent unauthorised access.
User-worked crossing with telephone (UWC-T) These
are similar to the standard user worked crossing, but a
telephone is provided. In some circumstances (for
example when crossing with livestock or vehicles) the user
must contact the signaller for permission to cross, and
report back when they are clear of the track. They are
provided where visibility of approaching trains is limited, or
the user needs to move livestock over the railway on a
regular basis.
Open crossing (OC) At open crossings, which
are sited when the road is quiet and train
speeds are low, the interface between road and
rail is completely open. Signs warn road users
to give way to trains. Road users must therefore
have an adequate view of approaching trains.
The maximum permissible speed over the
crossing is 10mph or the train is required to stop
at a stop board before proceeding over.
Footpath crossing These are designed primarily for
pedestrians and usually include stiles or wicket gates
to restrict access. The crossing user is responsible
for making sure that it is safe to cross before doing
so. In cases where sufficient sighting time is not
available, the railway may provide a ‗whistle‘ board,
instructing drivers to sound the horn to warn of their
train‘s approach, or miniature warning lights. A
variant is the bridleway crossing, which is usually on
a public right of way, although some are private and
restricted to authorised users. Some footpath
crossings are in stations and these can be protected
by a white light generally used by railway staff only (which extinguishes when a train is approaching).
All these crossing types, some of which clearly have automatic protection, are analysed as a single
group in this report because of concerns over the accuracy of crossing type data in SMIS.
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Appendix 8.
Bridge strike classification and process
Network Rail has a severity classification scheme which currently classifies33 the severity of a
bridge strike as follows:
A: Serious bridge strike
A bridge strike is classed as ‗serious‘ if any of the following result from it:
The horizontal or vertical alignment of the track is affected.
A load-carrying element is damaged, distorted or displaced to such an extent that its
load-carrying capacity is in doubt.
There is a physical obstruction to the passage of trains, such as fallen debris from the
parapet of an overline bridge lying within the loading gauge.
An arch or spandrel wall is damaged to such an extent that its stability is affected and
an operational railway track has to remain closed, or subject to temporary speed
restriction, until repairs have been carried out.
A pre-stressed concrete element carrying live load is damaged to such an extent that
the pre-stressing steel is exposed.
A reinforced concrete element carrying live load is damaged to such an extent that the
reinforcement is broken or displaced.
B: Potentially serious bridge strike
A bridge strike is classed as ‗potentially serious‘ if any of the following result from it:
A load-carrying element suffers structural damage to the extent that it is necessary to
carry out extensive repairs, but it is not necessary to impose a temporary speed
restriction on rail traffic pending such repairs.
An arch or spandrel wall is damaged to the extent that its stability is not immediately
affected but any further significant damage would require part of the arch or spandrel
wall to be replaced.
Fallen debris, such as from the parapet of an overline bridge, is lying on a cutting slope
or on the track, but it does not infringe the loading gauge.
A reinforced concrete element carrying live load is damaged to the extent that the
reinforcement is exposed but not broken or displaced.
C: Not serious bridge strike
Quite simply, a bridge strike is deemed ‗not serious‘ if none of the situations described in A
or B occurs.
Assessment of underline bridge robustness
Network Rail implemented the national bridge strike initiative in 2004 to minimise the effect
on performance from bridge strikes (see Table 12 for delay minutes). In the initiative, the
robustness of underline bridges over public roads to withstand a strike by road vehicles is
33
Network Rail is currently reviewing the classifications to simplify and remove potential for confusion.
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assessed, by route, and for suitable bridges Signal Box Special Instructions (SBSI) are
issued to authorise the signaller to continue to run trains prior to an examination of the
bridge.
The actions that a signaller is permitted to take are classified for each line over the bridge as
follow:
GREEN; trains continue to run as the bridge has sufficient weight and mass or the deck is so
high that it will not be struck, that a strike has no affect on the structure.
DOUBLE AMBER; the first train on each line approaches the bridge is permitted to pass
over the bridge at 5mph and if the train driver positively reports that there is no track defects
or any debris on the line, subsequent trains are able to cross the bridge at normal speed.
AMBER; as for Double Amber, but subsequent trains on each line are able to cross the
bridge at 20 mph.
RED; all train movements are stopped until the bridge has been examined. ie the Rule Book
requirements in GE/RT8000/TS1: general signalling regulations – regulation 17.2 are
applied.
Lines on bridges which are determined to have insufficient robustness are classified as Red.
Similarly lines on bridges which have not been assessed are classified as Red.
Examination process
An initial bridge examination is carried out generally by a bridge strike nominee (BSN)
against limits of damage defined in NR/L3/CIV/076, and this is followed up by an examination
by a Bridge Strike Examiner (BSE). Provided the damage limits are not exceeded, a BSN is
permitted to authorise train movements at normal speed.
A BSE will examine the bridge to confirm the BSNs actions, or to determine action to be
taken when the damage caused exceeds the limits for a BSN.
The damage limits were reviewed and amended limits issue in 2008.
NR/GN/CIV/201: Managing Bridge Strikes – A Good Practice Guide for Bridge Strike
Nominees, gives guidance on the process to be followed and examples of damage to
illustrate the damage limits which a BSN applies.
Coincident with this change, the BSN training course was revised.
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Appendix 9.
Definitions
Term
Definition
Accident
This term refers to an event that causes harm or damage that was not
intended by its victims. Suicides are not therefore classed as accidental
fatalities. However, injuries sustained as a result of other people‘s behaviour
(for example, from assaults or trains striking objects that have been
deliberately placed on the line) are classed as accidental if the injured party
did not intend to come to harm.
Train accidents are accidents occurring to trains and rolling stock.
Individual accidents are accidents to people on railway premises or on
trains, but excluding injuries sustained in train accidents.
Bridge
A structure of one or more spans greater than or equal to 1,800mm, whose
prime purpose is usually to carry traffic or services over an obstruction or
gap, but excluding culverts. For the purposes of this standard, structures
whose prime purpose is to carry services (utilities) over an obstruction or gap
are excluded.
Bridge Strike
An incident in which a road vehicle or its load, or a waterborne vessel or its
load, impacts with the fabric of a Bridge.
Bridge Strike Examiner
(BSE)
A person who has been certificated as competent to permit the movement of
trains up to Normal Speed over or under Bridges following a Bridge Strike.
Bridge Strike Nominee
(BSN)
A person who has been certificated as competent to permit the movement of
trains at Normal Speed over or under Bridges following a Bridge Strike, when
the damage is within defined limits.
Child
This term is used to describe a person aged 15 years or below.
Controlling signaller
A person appointed by Network Rail with responsibility for controlling train
movements over or under a Bridge following a Bridge Strike.
Escalation factors
A system failure, sub-system failure, component failure, human error,
physical effect or operational condition which could, individually or in
combination with other escalation factors, result in significantly different
outcomes following a hazardous event. For instance, following a train
derailment there could be a bridge collapse onto a train, a fire or a hazardous
goods release. Escalation factors are those that give rise to increased
consequence outcomes following the occurrence of a hazardous event.
Fatalities and weighted
injuries (FWI)
An overall measure of safety harm, taking account of injury and fatalities in
the following way:
One FWI = one fatality = ten major injuries = 200 RIDDOR-reportable minor
injuries or class 1 shock/traumas = 1,000 non RIDDOR-reportable minor
injuries or class 2 shock/traumas.
Fatality
Death within one year of the causal accident.
Hazardous event
An event that has the potential to lead directly to death or injury.
Irregular working
Irregularities affecting, or with the potential to affect the safe operation of
trains or the safety and health of persons. The term irregular working applies
to a disparate set of human actions involving an infringement of relevant
rules, regulations or instructions.
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Term
Definition
Key Risk Area (KRA)
A concept introduced by the Strategic Safety Plan. There are currently 15
KRAs, covering engineering, human error and public behaviour causes of
risk. Individually, the KRAs make a significant contribution to the overall
safety risk profile of the railway; collectively they represent over 95% of the
residual risk on the railway.
Late reported bridge
strike
A Bridge Strike when the first report of a Bridge Strike at an Underline Bridge
is received by the Operations Controller either (a) after rail traffic has passed
over the Bridge on one or more lines since the Bridge Strike occurred, or (b)
when there is insufficient time to prevent rail traffic passing the protecting
signal on the approach to the Bridge.
Level crossing
The ground-level interface between a road and the railway. The different
types of crossing are defined in Appendix 7.
Improper use refers to occasions when users cross when a train is
imminent, but are either honestly mistaken about its proximity and the
warnings given by signs, sirens and so on (error), or deliberately disregard
them (violation).
Proper use refers to occasions when users begin to cross entirely
legitimately, but unforeseen events lead to a transgression (as when a motor
vehicle breaks down half-way across a crossing, or the level crossing fails
due to an error outside the user‘s control).
RIDDOR-reportable level crossing equipment failures relate to any failure
of equipment at a level crossing that could endanger users, where the level
crossing is on a running line. Note it does not include misuse of equipment.
Sleeping dogs are crossings that have fallen into disuse, although
individuals may still have the legal right to use them.
Open active is the classification given to all level crossings that are in use
within the census period for any given year.
AXIAT model brings together all the significant road and rail costs associated
with continuing to use the level crossing and with an alternative to a level
crossing.
Major injury
An injury to a passenger, staff or member of the public as defined in
Schedule 1 to RIDDOR 1995 (including most fractures, amputations, losses
of consciousness), or where the injury resulted in hospital attendance for
more than 24 hours.
Minor injury
Physical injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public that are not
major injuries.
For workforce, minor injuries are RIDDOR-reportable if they result in greater
than three days‘ lost time. For passengers and members of the public, minor
injuries are RIDDOR-reportable if the injured person was taken from the
accident site direct to the hospital.
Other minor injuries are not reportable under RIDDOR.
Network Rail managed
infrastructure (NRMI)
This falls within the boundaries of Network Rail‘s operational railway and
includes the permanent way, land within the lineside fence, and plant used for
signalling or exclusively for supplying electricity for operational purposes to
the railway. It does not include stations, depots, yards or sidings that are
owned by, or leased to, other parties. However, it does include the permanent
way at stations and plant within these locations.
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Term
Definition
Normal speed
In the context of bridge strikes, Normal Speed is the maximum speed on
each line that applied immediately before the bridge strike occurred or was
reported.
Ovenstone criteria
Explicit set of criteria, adapted for the railway, which provides an objective
assessment of suicide where a coroner‘s verdict is not available. The criteria
are based on the findings of a 1970 research project into rail suicides and
cover aspects such as the presence (or not) of a suicide note, the clear intent
to commit suicide, behavioural patterns, previous suicide attempts, prolonged
bouts of depression and instability levels.
Overline bridge
A bridge carrying non-rail vehicular traffic over one or more operational
railway tracks. An overline bridge usually carries a road and may also be
referred to as an overbridge.
Passenger
A person on railway infrastructure, who either intends to travel, is travelling or
has travelled. Note this does not include passengers who are trespassing or
who commit suicide – they are included as members of the public.
Passenger train
A train that is in service and available for the use of passengers.
Pedestrian
A person travelling on foot. Note that the category also includes cyclists in
relation to level crossings.
Precursor
A system failure, sub-system failure, component failure, human error or
operational condition which could, individually or in combination with other
precursors, result in the occurrence of a hazardous event.
Precursor Indicator
Model (PIM)
An RSSB-devised model that measures the underlying risk from train
accidents by tracking changes in the occurrence of accident precursors.
Public (members of)
Persons other than passengers or workforce members (that is, trespassers,
persons on business and other persons). Note this includes passengers who
are trespassing (when crossing tracks between platforms, for example).
RIDDOR (Reporting of
Injuries, Diseases and
Dangerous Occurrences
Regulations)
RIDDOR 1995 is a set of health and safety regulations that require any major
injuries, illnesses or accidents occurring in the workplace to be formally
reported to the enforcing authority. It defines major injuries and lists notifiable
diseases – many of which can be occupational in origin. It also defines
notifiable dangerous occurrences, such as collisions and derailments.
Road vehicle
Include; cars, vans, buses, lorries, heavy goods vehicles, farming machinery,
motorcycles and quad bikes (excludes pedal cyclists, mobility scooters and
pedestrians on foot or horses).
Running line
A line that is ordinarily used for the passage of trains, as shown in Table ‗A‘ of
the sectional appendices.
Rule Book
National operations publications are standards which set out mandatory
requirements for direct application in the workplace.
Safety Management
Information System
(SMIS)
A national database used by railway undertakings and infrastructure
managers to record any safety-related events that occur on the railway. SMIS
data is accessible to all of the companies who use the system, so that it may
be used to analyse risk, predict trends and focus action on major areas of
safety concern.
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Term
Definition
Safety Risk Model (SRM)
A quantitative representation of the safety risk that can result from the
operation and maintenance of the GB rail network. It comprises 125 individual
models, each representing a type of hazardous event (defined as an event or
incident that has the potential to result in injuries or fatalities).
Shock/trauma
Shock or traumatic stress affecting an employee, passenger or member of
the public who has been involved in, or a witness to, an event.
Class 1 refers to shock or traumatic stress related to being involved in or
witnessing fatality incidents and train accidents (collisions, derailments and
fires).
Class 2 refers to shock or traumatic stress related to all other causes of
shock/trauma, such as verbal assaults, witnessing physical assaults,
witnessing non-fatal incidents and near misses.
Signal box special
instruction (SBSI)
A set of instructions required by a Controlling Signaller to perform his/her
duties, and which in the context of management of the risk from Bridge
Strikes, specifies for a particular Underline Bridge or Bridges (a) the criteria
for rail traffic to be authorised to pass over the Bridge following a Bridge
Strike until the Bridge has been examined, and (b) the speeds applicable.
Statistical significance
A concept used to determine whether a change in accident statistics implies
that the safety of the system has really altered, or whether the change could
be explained by ‗statistical variation‘.
Strategic Safety Plan
This is a joint statement by the companies responsible for Britain‘s mainline
rail network setting out an agreed industry approach to managing safety.
The 2008-2010 plan was developed by bringing together commitments made
by industry companies in their own individual safety plans, thus creating a
linkage with the duty holder planning process.
Suicide and suspected
suicide
A fatality is classified as a suicide where a coroner‘s verdict is suicide. It is
classified as a suspected suicide where the coroner has yet to return a
verdict or returns an open verdict, but where objective evidence of suicide
exists based on the application of Ovenstone criteria.
Train accident
See Accident – Train accidents.
RIDDOR-reportable train accidents are defined in RIDDOR 1995. To be
reportable under RIDDOR, the accident must be on or affect the running line.
There are additional criteria for different types of accident, and these can vary
depending on whether or not the accident involved a passenger train.
Derailment
This includes all passenger train derailments, derailments of non-passenger
trains on running lines and any derailment in a siding that obstructs the
running line. Accidents in which a train derails after a collision with an object
on the track (except for another train or a road vehicle at a level crossing) are
included in this category, as are accidents in which a train derails and
subsequently catches fire or is involved in a collision with another rail vehicle.
Train striking road vehicle
All collisions with road vehicles on level crossings are RIDDOR-reportable.
Collisions with road vehicles elsewhere on the running line are reportable if
the train is damaged and requires immediate repair, or if there was a
possibility of derailment.
Trains running into objects
This includes trains running into or being struck by objects anywhere on a
running line (including level crossings) if the accident had the potential to
cause a derailment or results in damage requiring immediate repair.
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Term
Definition
Trains striking animals
This includes all collisions with large-boned animals and flocks of sheep, and
collisions with other animals that cause damage requiring immediate repair.
Trains being struck by
missiles
This includes trains being struck by airborne objects, such as thrown stones,
if this results in damage requiring immediate repair.
TRUST
TRUST is a Network Rail owned system that records the times at which trains
arrive, depart or pass specific locations and the causes of train delays.
Trajectory
A concept developed for the Strategic Safety Plan. There are three aspects to
a trajectory: a statement of current safety performance in a particular risk
area, details of the actions being taken to address the risk and an estimation
of the safety performance improvement that the actions are expected to
deliver.
Trespass
Trespass occurs when people go where they are never authorised to be,
rather than where they behave inappropriately (either from error or violation)
at places where they are allowed to go at certain times and under certain
conditions, such as level crossings.
Underline bridge
A bridge carrying one or more operational railway tracks. An underline bridge
usually carries the railway over a road or watercourse and may also be
referred to as an underbridge.
Vehicle
Vehicle types such as cars, motorbikes, lorries, tractors, farm machinery,
buses and for incursions this also includes aircraft.
Workforce
Persons working for the industry on railway operations (either as direct
employees or under contract).
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Appendix 10. Glossary
Acronym
ABCL
ADEPT
AHB
ALARP
ALCRM
AOCL
AOCR
ATOC
AOCPOS
BSPG
BTP
CARRS
CCTV
CER
CPC
CPI
CSP
CSS
CST
DfT
DPI
EC
ECS
EIM
ELCF
ERSAP
ERSC
ERA
ESDAL
ESR
EU
FP
FWI
FWSI
HEM
HEN
HET
HMRI
LC
LHA
ILCAD
LNE
LNW
Expansion
automatic barrier crossing locally monitored
Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport
automatic half-barrier crossing
As low as reasonably practicable
All Level Crossing Risk Model
automatic open crossing, locally monitored
automatic open crossing, remotely monitored
Association of Train Operating Companies
Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland
Bridge Strike Prevention Group
British Transport Police
Civil Asset Register electronic Reports System
closed-circuit television
Community of European Railway
Certificate of Professional Competence
Cost per incident
Community Safety Partnerships Ltd
County Surveyors‘ Society
common safety targets
Department for Transport
Delay per incident
European Commission
empty coaching stock
European Rail Infrastructure Managers
European Level Crossing Forum
European Road Safety Action Programme
European Road Safety Charter (ERSC)
European Railway Agency
Electronic Service Delivery for Abnormal Loads
Emergency speed restriction
European Union
footpath level crossing
fatalities and weighted injuries
fatalities and weighted serious injuries
hazardous event movement
hazardous event non-movement
hazardous event train
Her Majesty‘s Railway Inspectorate
level crossing
Local highway authorities
International level crossing awareness day
London North East
London North West
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Acronym
MCB
MCG
MWL
MWA
NRMI
NRV
OC
ORR
PIM
RAIB
RIDDOR
R-RISG
RSSB
RTA
RV
SBSI
Sc
SE
SE
SELCAT
SFP
SMIS
SPAD
SRM
SSP
TPWS
UIC
UWC
UWC-T
WAG
Expansion
manually controlled barrier crossing
manually controlled gate crossing
miniature warning light
moving weighted average
Network Rail managed infrastructure
National Reference Values
open crossing
Office of Rail Regulation
Precursor indicator model
Rail Accident Investigation Branch
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995
Road-Rail Interface Safety Group
Rail Safety and Standards Board
road traffic accident
road vehicle
signal box special instructions
Scotland
Scottish executive
South East
Safer European level crossing assessments and technology
station footpath level crossing
Safety Management Information System
signal passed at danger
Safety Risk Model
Strategic Safety Plan
train protection and warning system
International Union of Railways
user-worked crossing
user-worked crossing with telephone
Welsh Assembly Government
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