DRSRG Chairman's address Brian Tomlinson 18 April 2016 Attendance Welcome to our guests Delayed arrivals Coen van Gulijk, University of Huddersfield Andrei Loukianov, University of Huddersfield Ross McLarnon, Ideagen Plc Early departures Johnny Schute, ORR & HSL Joseph Januszewski from HSL Annette Edgington, GB Railfreight Nigel Nevis, ORR Liz Davies, RSSB Joining DRSG at various times from RSSB Apologies Jeff Brewer, Siona Vass, Maria Grazia Vigliotti, Steve Enright, Abellio Namrita Kohil & Jay Heavisides Priti Patel, Network Rail Meeting support Stephanie Lavy, Meeting Manager, stepping in for Irene Tracey Hammond, Programme Support 2 John Collins, Angel Trains SSRG Chairman’s address 18 April 2016 Confidentiality level Key topics for today’s meeting This morning Review our action tracker SMIS+ presentations and group work ‐ All ‐ Jeff, Siona, Johnny Schute and Ross This afternoon Projects, updates from ‐ Marcus, Namrita, Cajetan and Coen Cyber Security & Safety Management, presentation and group work ‐ Maria Rail Safety Legislation Update ‐ No 78 Rail Industry Health & Safety Strategy ‐ Ian DRSG ‐ Strategy for approval ‐ Marcus SSRG Update and DRSG Terms of Reference High Integrity Systems Group ‐ George and Brian 3 SSRG Chairman’s address 18 April 2016 Confidentiality level Agenda item 2 – Minutes and actions Minutes ‐ Any feedback or comments? Membership and alternates, administration update ‐ Will be circulated post meeting to capture any updates and your alternates. Top 5 key messages ‐ Following today’s session DRSG will be releasing a summary email of the top 5 key messages to all members and each sub group Chair. ‐ Released from our own new DRSG@rssb.co.uk email account. ‐ Please forward any communications to the inbox going forward. Open Actions 0009 4 MARs Task Force –Coordinate the work of the MARs Task Force to develop a roadmap, with clear short/medium/long terms actions, for presentation SSRG Chairman’s address 18 April 2016 Confidentiality level IM / TD Open Item 3 SMIS+ Jeff Brewer, RSSB SMIS+ update to DRSG Jeff Brewer, RSSB 18th April 2016 Agenda • Overview of the 5 projects that make up SMIS+ • Update on progress to date • What functionality will be in the first two phases and how we intend to reduce the impact • Overview of the agile development process • Enabling infrastructures (RSSB Business Change) • Stakeholder engagement • What more do you need from us? • And this isn’t all. High level SMIS+ road map Presentation title • Your questions 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level SMIS+ Programme workstreams SMIS + Data Presentation title System 20 April 2016 Business change Confidentiality level Enabling infrastructure Road map High‐level programme plan 2015 Dec 2016 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep 2016 2017 Nov Dec Mar Oct Phase 1 Initiation Phase 2 Design, build, test and business impact/change Themes x 17 Project planning Bowtie workshops – Draft specification – Theme Discovery workshops – functional specification ‐ UAT Activities Update on the Stakeholder Engagement Strategy ‐ Jane Planning Theme identification Benefit mapping Capabilities x 18 U A T Workshops – functional specification ‐ UAT Training Plan for phase 2 P g h o a ‐ s l e i v 1 e Phase 2 Design/ Build/ UAT Infrastructure support and RSSB business change Presentation title 20 April 2016 Stakeholder engagement & communication to ensure organisations Confidentiality level are aware and prepared SMIS+ Implementation Phases Phase 1 – 30th Nov 2016 Phase 2 – 31st March 2017 (TBC) – New user‐friendly web based system Capture and record a safety event or risk via a mobile device – New data event model that is risk based Close call recording and – Investigation recording and recommendation tracking management Links to Network Rail’s asset – Business process workflow and KPI’s systems to assist with the collection of safety Improved data quality processes data and investigation management – New state‐of‐the‐art business intelligence software 5 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Investigation management functionality following industry best practice Confidentiality level Close call Other events YDS Infrastructure work Train ops & failures July Level crossings June Fires & explosions People on trains May ERTMS April Ill health Road driving Fixed infrastructure People in stations PTI Confidentiality level 20 April 2016 Presentation title Train accidents Dangerous goods 6 August SPADs & signalling March Trespass and suicide Assaults and abuse February SMIS+ themes and schedule An example of agile working Scoping Analysis Industry workshop Review SMIS+ Design Advisory Group Industry Risk Groups Theme discovery Functional workshop spec Review Build User acceptance testing Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Forms Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Input Fields Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Enabling infrastructure (RSSB Business Change activities) Close Call Strategy Guidance Group standards SMIS Business Support Team On‐going developments Meeting our stakeholders on‐going BI requirements Access rights/RSSB membership Systems Safety Case Data protection Act Operational safety requirements On‐going governance Data quality processes/dispute management and escalation 10 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Change requests Investigation management training Confidentiality level SMIS+ stakeholder engagement strategy • Relate SMIS+ to your needs Business sponsors Industry business change leads Industry groups Business Impact Assessment • Co‐ ordinated contact 11 Presentation title 20 April 2016 • Plan and lead change in your business • Describe required changes Confidentiality level Planning guidance for SMIS+ We’ve produced a pack that contains activities to help SMIS+ business change leads to think about how to prepare for the changes that come with SMIS+, and consider what decisions need to be made by who and when. Content covers: • • • • • • • Business impact assessments Identify stakeholders Align with strategy and plans Communications Training and tools Technology Company culture To achieve smooth implementation, we advise that they work with their organisation’s SMIS+ business sponsor and IT lead. We recommend they set up a project team where the three of them meet regularly Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level 12 to prepare their organisation for SMIS+. What do you need to know to be able to talk confidently about SMIS+ to your industry contacts? 13 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level SMIS+ Roadmap Single SMS SMS Improvement Plan Enterprise Safety Management System Software Effectiveness of Controls (MOC) Training & Competence Phase 1 Future phases Future phases SMIS /CCS Predictive analytics Integration with SIDB Interfaces Safety Event Analysis Safety Event Reporting NIR On‐Line Rail Notices Audits Health & well‐being Investigation Action and recommendation Tracking Risk Assessments Future phases Bowties Setting up Environments Presentation title Group Standards Management and Compliance to Group Risk Assessments Standards & Standards Management 20 April 2016 Inspections Confidentiality level Inspections & Audits SMIS+ Future Phases What are they? Category Phase/ Requirement How are they categorised? SYSTEM REPLACEMENT Priority System Industry NIR MED EASY MED CIRAS LOW EASY MED How are they prioritised? CCIL (control logging) MED MED DIFF TOC/ FOC/ Supplier systems LOW EASY MED a) in terms of demand; Health & Wellbeing HIGH EASY MED Data/ tools/ profile/ models HIGH MED MED Bowties MED DIFF MED Asset Management LOW MED MED British Transport Police MED MED MED Predictive analytics MED EASY MED Lessons learned MED MED MED RSSB SYSTEMS Sharepoint/ RSSB LOW EASY MED REPLACEMENT SPARK MED MED MED RMDB consultation LOW MED MED Freedom of Information MED MED MED Good practice/ Community MED EASY MED LOW EASY EASY b) capacity of the system and; c) engagement from industry What could the timeline look like from 2017? 15 Presentation title RISK MANAGEMENT INTEGRATION INTELLIGENT ALERTS OTHER 20 April 2016 Social media Confidentiality level SMIS+ Future Phases …Continued SMS FUNCTIONALITY INTERFACES 16 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Training and competence MED EASY EASY Audit & Inspections MED EASY EASY Improvement plan MED EASY EASY Compliance to Group Standards MED EASY EASY Document Management MED EASY EASY Building interfaces to organisations’ bespoke SMS systems HIGH MED EASY Confidentiality level Thank you How do we use SMIS+ to improve reporting quality and scope? Presented by Siona Vass 20 April 2016 Current reporting requirements • Group Standard GE/RT8047 • ROGS • RAIB • RIDDOR (Health and Safety at Work) 2 DRSG 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Future reporting requirements • Standards Policy are currently reviewing RGSs. • Potential to mandate reporting requirements with a conditions of use of SMIS+. • Close call events to be entered in SMIS+ (non‐ mandatory). 3 DRSG 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Scope Undesired event (SMIS) Accident (injury/damage/failure/loss) Includes any undesired circumstances which give rise to ill‐health or injury; damage or failure to property, plant, products or the environment; production losses or increased liabilities. No injury or damage Near miss In relation to trains with people or road vehicles and other events that do not result injury or damage to persons involved. 4 DRSG 20 April 2016 Operational incident Incidents affecting or with the potential to affect the operation of trains and the safety and health of persons involved. Confidentiality level SMIS+ Close call A circumstance or behaviour that has the potential to cause injury, damage, failure or loss to persons involved. Group discussions – 10 minutes Green Q. What guidelines will achieve better reporting compliance in SMIS+? Blue Q. Who should have access to SMIS+ and what data should be made available? Red Q. What areas of SMIS+ can strengthen or weaken an open reporting culture? Black Q. What opportunities are available to improve reporting scope within SMIS+? 5 DRSG 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Thank you Find‐IT Mr Joseph Januszewski HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Data Analytics Health and Safety Laboratory • Founded in 1911 to study explosions in coal mines Health & Safety at Work etc Act 1974 Science Directorate of HSE • Support HSE mission to protect health and safety in the workplace by providing incident response support plus proactive health and safety research • Support Improvements in regulation across government • Large laboratory and test site at Harpur Hill, Buxton HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Data Analytics Health and Safety Laboratory • HSL is Britain’s leading industrial health and safety facility • Employs almost 400 staff of which more than a third hold doctorates. Experience across all sectors, including: • – – – – – – – Behavioural Change (nudge) Fire & process safety Computational modelling Mechanical engineering Metallurgy Exposure control Toxicology HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Data Analytics HSE ‐ Data Analytics Centre DataAnalyticsCentre 70 Team members ‐ Data scientists, Software Developers, Statisticians, Epidemiologists, Mathematicians, Economists, Project Managers, Database Architects. Picture here HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Data Analytics Context • HSL has been working in this area for 10 years • Initially population & demographics work for HSE • Have developed key, even unique, expertise Algorithms Text Mining Advanced Statistics HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory Link rather than combine Start with the questions Rapid access to data © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Data Analytics Creating Intelligent Solutions Concept ‐ combining different data to create systems to provide intelligence Better use of existing data Population Data Regulatory Data Health Data Evidence for decision making Information Creation Engine Audit trail Better Regulation Transparent Regulation Business Data Better Emergency Planning Creating Solutions to improve government and wider services HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Find‐IT Process Transformation User Requirements Data Modelling HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory Extract Transform Load (ETL) Address & Organisation Matching Find‐IT UI & Data Analytics © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Data Analytics Regulatory Intelligence • • • Concept - combining data to create systems to provide intelligence to improve regulation and intervention Aim - more efficient, effective, transparent regulation Addressing key challenges – data sharing, Red Tape challenge IRIS Cross Regulatory Intelligence Tool 2014 HSE Regulatory Intelligence tool 2011 National Population Database 2005 Cabinet Office Hidden Economy Intelligence tool 2015 DEFRA Farm Regulation tool 2014 Common issues Identifying and Prioritising Based on Risk HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory Under Discussion Interested parties Welsh Government Home Office Office of Rail and Road HM Revenue & Customs Food Standards Agency Environment Agency Defence Safety Authority Gangmaster Licensing Authority Wales & West Utilities © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Data Analytics Regulatory Intelligence - Find-IT Drivers behind current ‘Find‐It’ project HSE ‐ Requirement to ‐ Reduce pro‐active inspection ‐ Target inspection to high risk sectors Used to answer ‐ Is company still operating and doing what HSE thinks it does? ‐ Is it in a high risk sector? ‐ Why should we be going there? • Defra ‐ One complete overview of compliance landscape of a farm • Better Regulatory Delivery Office (BRDO) – sharing regulatory information across different sectors, view of cross compliance • Cabinet Office/DCLG – Joint tasking to address illicit economy issues • DSA – joining of regulatory data to improve decisions based on risk HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Data Analytics Find‐IT Find‐IT • • 1 Web Application > 6 Data Views 1. Filter ‐ Expandable filters that enable the user to create complex queries to run against the business intelligence database 2. Results ‐ Paged results of sites and companies that allows the user to access different areas of the application, save results and create reports 3. Details ‐ Expandable tables that hold the combined detailed data that is held about a site or company. 4. Network ‐ Navigable network of inferred connections between companies and sites. 5. Map ‐ Interactive map that allows the user to explore sites and companies spatially 6. Dashboard ‐ Interactive statistics that present useful graphics to end user Predictive models Text mining HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Data Analytics ORR Find‐IT Exploratory phase of work with ORR looking to help contribute improvements to : – – – – – – Reassurance that resource is being used appropriately Target resources where they will have greatest effect Base strategic decisions on sound evidence Prioritise interventions and resource based on risk Forecast the future impact of actions taken now Improve organisational efficiency and cost‐effectiveness RSSB Involvement – – – – – Key stakeholders Data experts and owners Help in utilising key safety performance datasets Early engagement from RSSB to make sure that success can be achieved Identifying long term benefits of the work for RSSB HSL: HSE’s Health and Safety Laboratory © Crown Copyright, HSL 2016 Enlighten Overview and Future My Role Product Management The role of the Product Manager Product manager Validate with stakeholders customers sales Product manager One product manager for each of Gael’s main products. Lives and breathes the product. Gather product feedback Talks to customers, sales, consultants and stakeholders Gathers feedback, listens to pains, and understands real life scenarios. Consultants Validate requirements etc Validates requirements with stakeholders, consultants and customers. Rapid prototypes Brief rapid prototyping team and validate solution with customers. Organise prototypes with development Product backlog Update backlog Once requirements are validated, they are broken down into user stories and added to the backlog along with acceptance criteria. Overview • Designed for Enterprise & built for the cloud • Risk based approach to Quality, Safety and Risk • Reliable, scalable and secure • Hugely accessible • Single point of maintenance and roll out, reducing operating costs • Extensible Platform that can integrate with other systems Seamless Functional Integration • Policy and Procedure repository with full Change Control • Full Audits Management from scheduling to closure • Corrective/Preventive Action (CA/PA) Management • Extensive Incident and Near Miss Reporting, Investigation and Action Tracking • Wide ranging, intuitive and highly visual Risk Management capability • Dashboards, Analysis and Business Intelligence to provide extensive oversight Enlighten Product Strategy Customers Why we built it • Combination of 23 years learning & feedback across industries • Partnering with enterprise organisations across the globe • Taking a risk based approach to managing quality and safety • Goal: to build a world class Quality, Safety & Risk Management solution The aviation approach • Risk Based Approach to Safety Management • Industry traction from: • ICAO SMS framework • UK CAA Significant 7 • UKCAA Significant 7 • Loss of Control, Runway Excursion, Controlled Flight into Terrain, Runway Incursion, Airborne Conflict, Ground Handling & Fire • Rail is catching up Enlighten Vision T972: Piloting a GeoSRM for the rail network in GB Namrita Kohli 20 April 2016 Background 2 What are the origins of the GeoSRM? It’s an output from T972: Piloting a geo‐referenced safety risk model for the rail network in Great Britain. Making network‐wide safety improvements is no longer reasonably practicable. We now need to understand localised risk profiles. We need to identify areas where safety measures are disproportionate to the risk they are mitigating. We need to identify areas where safety measures could be improved and justified on a location specific basis. The GeoSRM is a pilot model demonstrating the capability of the model concept. 3 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Scope of the pilot GeoSRM? Geographical Risk areas Derailments ~10% network 193 stations 1755 km track Suicides 44 million passenger train km / year Slips, trips and falls London Exeter Southampton 4 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level What is the GeoSRM? Based on the Safety Risk Model (SRM) It provides geo‐referenced safety risk estimates SRM GeoSRM Single national estimate of risk for each precursor/hazard Calculates risk distributed across the network Modelling assumptions based on national averages Uses local infrastructure asset data and timetable information Results disseminated through reports/spreadsheets Results disseminated through web‐based interface 5 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Outputs of the model Allows users to pan, zoom in and out Allows users to filter display Allows interrogation of contributory factors 6 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Compare results and breakdown of risk by person type Trialling the pilot model The GeoSRM was briefed to representatives from South West Trains, Network Rail and the steering group. The sessions conceptually described how the model works and demonstrated how the tool could be used. A three month trial followed the briefing sessions. Feedback was collected throughout the trial. 7 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Lessons learnt 8 Lessons learnt part 1 Data Lesson 1: Managing large volumes of data. Lesson 2: Managing issues with data quality and availability. Lesson 3: Processing big data sets. Interface Lesson 4: Querying large databases. 9 Presentation title Lesson 5: Improving the GeoSRM user interface. 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Lessons learnt part 2 Process Lesson 6: Developing the models. Lesson 7: Improving the process. Lesson 8: Applying the outputs of the model. Collaboration Lesson 9: Managing and organising briefing sessions. 10 Lesson 10: Gathering and specifying data requirements. Lesson 11: Building the GeoSRM models and interface. Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Conclusions & next steps 11 Conclusions Project has shown the feasibility of a GeoSRM. Developed new approaches to modelling risk. Good feedback on the concept of modelling and visualising risk distributed geospatially. Possible benefits have been identified: – The potential to be able to inform and justify local safety decisions on the basis of quantified risk rather than judgement. – It enables the consideration of asset configuration and interrelation and the impact this has on risk. – Visual aid to start an informed conversation about safety risk – The potential to link this to driver training by identifying key risk areas and raising awareness if the tool can include or match the training requirements 12 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Conclusions (continued) Issues currently prevent the GeoSRM from being scaled to cover more of the network or risk profile: – Ability to automatically analyse train movements – Suitable availability, quality and format of asset and causal factor data Not all hazards benefit from visualising risk in this way. Require improvement to the quality of geospatial data and adjustments to the user interface. 13 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Potential next steps This approach to modelling aligns with the DRSG objective to develop models and tools to support localised risk assessments. We need to prioritise the areas of risk modelling that can be taken forward and how. We also need to ensure that the enabling technologies are available for future phases of the tool: – Capturing future data requirements with SMIS+ – Work with industry programmes to deliver supporting data and architecture We need to revisit modelling requirements, as these have evolved since the project started. – Understand the impacts of a decentralised rail industry – Align development with SRM and Network Rail tools 14 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level DRSG is asked to: Approve the closure of the project – Provide comments any on the project brief by 25th April 2016 Advise on a suitable group for a workshop on the next steps of localised risk modelling 15 Presentation title 20 April 2016 Confidentiality level Thank you Integrated Safety Risk Platform Broken Rail, ECM1 156m 858y, 29/08/2013, LNE Track Buckle, BML1 0m 573y, 15/07/2013, Wessex ALCRM CRSM4S CCT Cajetan Chukwulozie (Head of Risk Management - STE) 20-Apr-16 1 Current State (Issues) Multiple operational safety risk tools (ALCRM, SORAT, LCMP, TSERAT, CCT, CRSM4S, CBA, Track Worker Safety Risk Tool, Temporary Speed Restriction (TSR), Risk assessment mobile app). Different risk ratings (ALCRM (A1 – M13), SORAT (A – M; 1 – 4 in each band); non-uniformed use of the same data sources, non-streamlined administration and technical support, no synergy in design, development, and management of risk tools, and look and feel are all different). Multiple suppliers and maintenance contracts (Small, knowledge transfers, costly, updating and modernising to new environment (recommendations, SRM). Inefficient allocation of resources (Costs, people and time, training workshops and assessors, and steering groups not aligned to proper governance arrangements). Diverse/Duplication of risk calculating algorithms e.g. CBA tool is also duplicated in SORAT, vs Corporate, CCT exists in ALCRM vs CCT, difficulty in updating and modernising algorithms. RSSB risk tools (CBA, SRM, PTI, Red Aspect Approach Tool System (RAATS), SPAD Risk Ranking (SRR), Suicide Prevention, Network Model Framework (NMF)). Generally, there has been a lack of a strategic vision that those responsible for scoping / design / specification for risk tools can align and work towards. 20-Apr-16 2 Integrated Safety Risk Platform (Future state) A modular operational safety risk platform with risk engines in areas like Signalling, Temporary Speed Restriction, Track Worker Safety, Irregular Working, Level Crossing, Station Interface, Route Crime & Asset Failures. Will build on current tools like ALCRM & SORAT but will link to a single database library of all risk assessments or risk outputs, with warehousing functionality to ensure historic risk profiles and look back ability to allow accurate and consistent trend analysis and predictive modelling. The Safety Risk Platform should take into consideration related aspects of programmes like ORBIS, SMIS+ and have a link (be joined up) with organisations strategic risk. The Safety Risk Platform will share key data like Common Consequence and Safety Risk Model (SRM) and will provide a single version of operational safety risk information critical for decision making (including KPI dashboards, narrative risk assessments, business object reporting and hazard log, forecasting & trend Analysis). The solution should be extensible following deployment i.e. this will not be a ‘one-off’ development and there must be capability to evolve the solution and easily make changes going forward. / Visionary Modular Integrated Safety Risk Platform (please note that this is only a vision to demonstrate what can be achieved) 20-Apr-16 4 Outcome/Benefits One stop shop – ease of usage and knowing where to go. Establish common currency / language for risk understanding (standardisation). Removal of possibility of double counting of risk. Reduced resources required and duplication of effort (people and funds). Reduced supplier base – potentially for financial savings. Improved ability to compare / benchmark with other industries. Appropriate contracting structures are in place for implementation. In-house capability to update the tool i.e. not reliant on external parties to apply changes. Tool is easily configurable (i.e. principle is for configuration not customisation of the solution). Rationalisation of existing tools undertaken. Visible linkage between this (safety) platform and the organisational risk tools. The ability to predict safety risk on the network (however this may not be a phase 1 deliverable). Scope encompasses full auditing capability. 20-Apr-16 5 Improvement Plan Methodology 1. Undertake a study to better understand the plethora of “risk tools” and the type of modular integrated safety risk platform stakeholders will want. 2. As part of the study, establish a strategic vision for the future management of safety operational risk tools in the form of an “integrated safety risk platform”. 3. Work with the necessary internal and/or external stakeholders to develop the “integrated safety risk platform”. 20-Apr-16 6 Agenda item 7c Augmented bow ties Safety – Coen Van Gulijk, UOH 1 Institute of Railway Research Augmented Bow Tie or Getting the Enterprise Research line up and running RSSB-HUD partnership: Part of SMIS+ delivery mechanism Institute of Railway Research Digital transformation of SMS Institute of Railway Research TO SUPPORT • The risk intelligence that a world class railway needs, efficiently provided to the right people in the right format and at the right time. BY WORKING ON • Risk models that are easy to access and use and support the development of local and predictive risk profiles WHERE WE FOCUS ON FUTURE SYSTEMS FOR • Risk profiles Now working on Application development for • Text analysis (CC & Ontology) • Numbers (RAATS & OTMR) Institute of Railway Research Close Call text analysis Institute of Railway Research With NR have worked together to map Close Call reports to bowtie diagrams and report trends. Visualization CC text to identify risksInstitute of Railway Research OTMR Data Analysis: Braking Curve Institute of Railway Research In the Pipeline Close Call support: • TAVIZON Safety Enterprise architecture • Middleware for Economic Modeling • BDRA pilot • Augmented Bow-Tie for PTI Institute of Railway Research TAVIZON: extracting ontology from text using Visual Analytics to support CC Institute of Railway Research Enterprise Research Line Institute of Railway Research Safety Enterprise Architecture: to map Institute of Railway Research digital business requirements Data Linking for Economic Evaluation Institute of Railway Research based on Evans’ financial model Digital SMS support: SMIS+ aligned Augmented Bow-Tie Institute of Railway Research Multiple real-time input data Real-time reports Trend reporting Alerts SMIS Close Call Timetables Train movements Track work Signal aspects Ticket sales Delays BTP data - It is about: Creating a backbone for integrated risk & barrier monitoring The engine for easy navigation through hundreds of safety controls Collated safety control engine Flexible and scalable bow-tie adjustment Coordinated industry discussion about risks and safety controls through basic safety-science tool Augmented Bow-Ties support process • • • • • • • • • • • Institute of Railway Research Asset name (safety control) Background documentation Responsible persons/workers Interface with suppliers Relevant databases Support processes for asset Reporting: • Condition monitoring • Management reports • KPI’s Implementing existing risk models Numbers for risk calculations Interface with suppliers £££££££££ • Online instantaneous for all nodes in the bow-ties BDRA Production Pipeline for risk models and SMIS+ aligned SMS Institute of Railway Research Added value for digital transformation Institute of Railway Research • • • • • • • • • Unprecedented operational insight in risk factors Wider span-of control Alignment with SMIS+ processes Reduces time to respond The organization of safety-relevant documents is easier: they are directly attached to bow-tie nodes Facilitates quick identification risk trouble areas Viewpoint in existing Enterprise Architectures Superior control makes safety cheaper and better at the same time Game changer in safety business process/management But next to RSSB’s input Institute of Railway Research We require direct industry involvement for developing: • Safety Enterprise Architecture • Augmented bow-tie • BDRA Production process ENGAGE Institute of Railway Research Considering cyber security risk in safety Presented by Maria Grazia Vigliotti 20 April 2016 Why cyber security? Critical systems are increasingly dependent on remote computing applications. European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) new signalling is autonomous and potentially at risk. Several control systems and interlocking will be remotely connected (IP). As the railway will get more digitalised, security will become a more prominent issue. Cyber security is about the protection and the resilience of digital systems. 2 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public Vulnerabilities Two categories of vulnerabilities: • Vulnerabilities in people and procedures • Technical vulnerabilities i.e. ways to gain digital access • • • • • • 3 authentication windows UBS port IP/TCP connections specialised connections (Bluetooth,.Citrix,.), Email browsers (Explorer, Safari, Firefox),… Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public Impact of digital vulnerabilities An attacker exploiting vulnerabilities could: • Stop the computing device from running • Destroy or changing data – could lead to safety incidents • Send information to other unauthorised parties ( Violation of privacy –SMIS+ ?) 4 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public Why should we consider cyber risk in safety? • I went to visit a maintenance depot last week • I saw a lot of PCs and Tablets used to maintain the trains. • Is the impact of the digital equipment fully understood and considered in the safety management system? • With the digital railway programme coming, is the safety community prepared to consider safety hazards caused by cyber attacks? 5 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public Cyber risk in safety 6 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public Activities taking place • High Integrity systems Group (HISG) commissioned an R&D project on: Security informed safety case general methodology • Department for Transport has promoted another project in this direction to produce a code of practice. 7 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public How prepared is the safety community for managing cyber risk? 8 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public What support does the safety community need? 9 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public Framework for cyber security Identify vulnerabilities and threats Protect/Prevent (technical and procedures) Recover/Report Detect/monitor critical systems Respond 10 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public Cyber security risk‐based approach Security cyber risk assessment Hazard identification Hazard mitigation Risk evaluation Risk management Risk acceptance Risk assurance Cyber security competencies Commercial and other drivers Monitoring Identify vulnerabilities Detect attacks Risk identification Security incidents Logs or audit trail entries ng of information – SMIS+? Cyber security concern? Yes Implement No Review Scope problem Analyse Monitor Monitoring safety 11 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Analyse options Determine cyber security measures Select options Define change Make change? No Analysing and selecting options Public Assurance process Yes Making a change How can the safety community and the cyber security community communicate better? 12 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public Should incidents related to cyber security be reported in SMIS+? 13 Considering cyber security risk in safety 18 April 2016 Public Thank you RSLU survey update Ian Moreton DRSG – 18 April 2016 Background • The RSLU has evolved over time to become a document circa 70 pages • RSSB wanted to ensure industry was served in the most effective way, and sought DRSG approval to proceed with gaining industry feedback. • The RSLU was reviewed in detail by RSSB’s H&S Mgt and Comms teams, and a survey questionnaire was developed to gain industry views • Survey sent to current 200 Users plus Heads of Safety of RSSB members • Received 58 responses which were reviewed by the H&S Mgt Team • Overall feedback was highly positive, reaffirming the value of the RSLU • Some points were identified as easy ‘quick fix’ improvements and so incorporated into Issue 78 e.g. removal of some legacy information • Others points now form recommendations for endorsement by DRSG 2 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Recommended future changes based on industry feedback • Distribution: Heads of Safety and Heads of Operations and where RSSB has contact details to public affairs managers. Users, who are not any of the above, will be given the option to continue to receive the RSLU. • Frequency: Continue with quarterly issues, but to supplement these with alerts as significant legal changes / policy developments become known. • Format/style: Continue existing approach over offered options (website, social media, video), but with a notification email for each update. Note: RSSB continues to improve its website so this may be an option to revisit. • Archive: Older, legacy information to be removed, and a summary will contain a reference to the previous RSLU Issue where it will be retained. • Opting in/out: To be introduced with clear instructions, starting Issue 79. Note: Feedback that RSSB need to maintain an up to date list of key safety contacts which has been passed to RSSB’s Engagement team for action. 3 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 End Leading health & safety on Britain’s railway A strategy for working together Ian Moreton DRSG – 18 April 2016 The purpose of the strategy 1. To provide a focus for leadership in key areas where collaboration will deliver health and safety performance benefit 2. To be a reference point for how health and safety is managed on the railway 3. To identify collaborative strategies where cross industry action will deliver improved management of health and safety risk 2 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Update on progress 1. Identified the need for a strategy 2. 2015 – created by industry for industry 3. RSSB Board approval – Jan 2016 4. ORR Endorsement 5. Securing industry endorsement, recognition and alignment 6. IHSM 21st April ‐ launch of the strategy 7. Material development to support and deliver the telling of the health and safety story 3 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Roles and interfaces on the mainline railway 4 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 12 priority areas 1. Workforce health and wellbeing 2. Public behaviour 3. Station operations 4. Road risk 5. Level crossings 6. Fatigue 7. Workforce safety 8. Infrastructure asset integrity 9. Workforce assaults and trauma 10. Train operations 11. Freight 12. Rolling stock asset integrity 5 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 12 priority areas 1. Workforce health and wellbeing 2. Public behaviour 3. Station operations 4. Road risk 5. Level crossings 6. Fatigue 7. Workforce safety 8. Infrastructure asset integrity 9. Workforce assaults and trauma 10. Train operations 11. Freight 12. Rolling stock asset integrity 6 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Areas of influence over the safety risk profile 7 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Health and safety risks 8 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Health and safety risk gaps 9 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Areas we already have identified as improvement areas 10 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Alignment of industry groups to the Strategy # 12 priority areas Industry Group 1 Workforce health and wellbeing Health Policy Group 2 Public behaviour Suicide Reduction Group Trespass Risk Group 3 Station operations People on Trains and at Stations Group 4 Road Risk Road Risk Group 5 Level crossings Level Crossing Risk Group 6 Fatigue System Safety Risk Group Train Operations Risk Group 7 Workforce safety No central group yet identified 8 Infrastructure asset integrity Technical Strategy Leadership Group 11 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Lead Alignment of industry groups to the Strategy # 12 priority areas Indsutry Group 9 Workforce assaults and trauma People on Trains and at Stations Group 10 Train operations Train Operations Risk Group 11 Freight National Freight Safety Group 12 Rolling stock asset integrity No central group yet identified 12 Rolling stock asset integrity No central group yet identified Lead Similar mapping will need to take place for each of the 9 management capability areas, significant elements of which relate to the existing remit of DRSG and so should be identified in DRSG’s own strategy. 12 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Identified 9 management capability priority areas to improve on 13 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 How is it all going to work? RSSB board is accountable for governance ‐ System Safety Risk Group ToR to be amended to align activities within industry. Monitoring progress will take place against: 3 stated purposes; Leadership commitments; 12 risk priority areas; 9 capability areas – RSSB board will receive updates from duty holders, SSRG , national, sector and regional groups. Twice‐yearly Industry Health and Safety Meetings will engage leaders and review progress on the different. Responsibility for working together to deliver this strategy lies with the duty holders, RSSB, and other relevant organisations. This strategy recognises that delivery of some of its components will be through other cross‐industry strategies and groups eg Rail Technical Strategy and Rail Supplier Group 14 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 Summary • Soft launch to trade press is underway – feature in the latest edition of Railway Strategies magazine • All industry leaders have been sent a letter to ask for their endorsement in writing. Names/logos will be on the website alongside the final version • External launch 21st April at the Industry Health and Safety Meeting, and at the Regional Engagement days during May • SSRG has begun the process of reviewing its scope in relation to the strategy, and will be seeking responses from each sub‐group as to their role and specific actions in delivering the strategy. DRSG’s response? • Stakeholders committed to communicate the strategy within their own organisations and to suppliers • Promotion of strategy to parliament in the summer 15 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 16 DRSG ‐ Update 18 Apr 2016 End Data and Risk Strategy Marcus Dacre, RSSB 18th April 2016 Data and Risk Strategy This strategy identifies where collaborative industry effort is required to develop the tools, processes and competence that will deliver the Data and Risk Strategy Group’s vision for “the risk intelligence that a world class railway needs, efficiently provided to the right people in the right format and at the right time”. • First draft presented to DRSG Strategy Sub‐Group on 29th January • Updated in response to their comments Data and Risk Strategy 18th April 2016 Alignment to Rail Health and Safety Strategy Data and Risk Strategy 18th April 2016 DRSG is asked to • DISCUSS the strategy (at a high level) – Any remaining concerns? • COMMENT by correspondence – Deadline: Friday 29th April. • APPROVE the Strategy – Subject to comments being addressed. • SCHEDULE time in its next meeting to prioritise objectives / activities and develop its road map for delivering them. Data and Risk Strategy 18th April 2016