Route knowledge:
Evaluating and optimising train crew route
knowledge competence processes
Project overview
▪ Undertaken for ATOC Operations Council
▪ Aiming to deliver a step change in Route Knowledge
competence management processes in the GB rail
industry by proving the benefits of a new approach
▪ Planning to complete in November 2016
Phases of work
Understanding current RK
processes (GB AND EU)
Framework
Development
Literature review
Final Industry Guidance
Review of Technologies
Modelling current training practices
Route Knowledge definition:
SSS - Route
information Main
Features
Route Pack
Route Media
Scientific Trials
Route Risk
Assessment Operations and
Standards
“Route knowledge is information stored in long term
memory and facilitated by documentation and is necessary
for the prediction, identification or interpretation of
route-specific cues to achieve an operational railway task.
Route Knowledge competency ensures safe, and supports
productive, operation of GB railways. A necessary enabler
for route knowledge when traveling a route is knowledge of
your location at any point in time.”
Associated
Risks
Rail
Familiarisation
Task-based
competencies
defined by TNA/
RBTNA
Route
Familiarisation
Route Knowledge
Task
NTS
Find out more – go to
www.rssb.co.uk or contact
us at
enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk,
telephone 020 3142 5400
Helping ERTMS, AWS and
TPWS to coexist
Project overview
As ERTMS is rolled out in Great Britain and ETCS is installed
in trains, suppliers have the option to integrate AWS and
TPWS indications and controls with the ETCS Driver Machine
Interface (DMI).
Many trains will move from having a standalone TPWS DMI
with physical buttons to one that is displayed to the driver on
the ETCS DMI.
We are conducting research to inform the update of Railway
Group Standard GE/RT 8075 (and others) to take account
of how drivers will take in and operate these safety critical
systems.
‘... conducting
research to
inform...’
Traditional AWS and TPWS panel
Integrated ERTMS, TPWS and AWS panel
This work is being carried out as research project ‘The
coexistent operation of ERTMS and Class B (AWS and TPWS)
safety systems’ (reference T1079).
More information
Find out more – go to www.rssb.co.uk or contact us at
enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk,
telephone 020 3142 5400
Managing the risk from
fatigue
Find out more – go to
www.rssb.co.uk
or contact us at
enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk,
telephone 020 3142 5400
1988
Clapham Junction rail accident
1989
‘Hidden Limits’ introduced
2000
Southall inquiry
2006
Human factors study of fatigue and shiftwork published by RSSB (T059)
2006
ROGS came into force
2006
ORR guidance: Managing Fatigue in Safety Critical Workers published
2010
Fatigue and shift work for freight locomotive drivers and contract trackworkers published
(T699)
2012
RSSB guidance: Managing Fatigue – A Good Practice Guide published
2012
Managing occupational road risk associated with road vehicle driver fatigue – research published
by RSSB (T997)
2016
Developing fitness for duty checks
and predicting the likelihood of
experiencing fatigue (T1082)
Can we use science and technology
to help people make more accurate
fitness for duty decisions in relation
to fatigue?
Preparing rail industry guidance on
biomathematical models (T1083)
What are the merits and limitations
of the various tools that are
available, and how should we use
them to manage fatigue risk?
Preparing guidance for fatigue
control options for first night shifts
(T1084)
Is there anything that companies
and individuals can do, or should
do, in order to manage fatigue risk
related to the transition to night
work?
Non-technical skills (NTS)
NTS Category
1 Situational awareness
2 Conscientiousness
3 Communication
4 Decision making and action
Cooperation and working with
5
others
6 Workload management
7 Self-management
NTS Skill
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
2.1
2.2
2.3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
6.1
6.2
6.3
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
Attention to detail
Overall awareness
Maintain concentration
Retain information (during shift)
Anticipation of risk
Systematic and thorough approach
Checking
Positive attitude towards rules and procedures
Listening (people not stimuli)
Clarity
Assertiveness
Sharing information
Effective decisions
Timely decisions
Diagnosing and solving problems
Considering others’ needs
Supporting others
Treating others with respect
Dealing with conflict / aggressive behaviour
Multi-tasking and selective attention
Prioritising
Calm under pressure
Motivation
Confidence and initiative
Maintain and develop skills and knowledge
Prepared and organised
Want to know more about non-technical skills and their
application?
Come to one of our Train-the-trainer courses in 2016:
▪ 22-25 February
▪ 16-19 May
▪ 19-22 September
▪ 21-24 November
Find out more – go to
www.rssb.co.uk or contact
us at
enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk,
telephone 020 3142 5400
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150 dpi
150 dpi
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150 dpi
150 dpi
Platform
Safety
The facts and your role
Risk-based training needs analysis
(RBTNA) toolkit
What is it?
What does it help you to do?
We have developed an Excel-based toolkit to make it easier
and quicker for you to carry out risk-based training needs
analyses.
▪ Identify key tasks related to any safety critical role
▪ Map underpinning knowledge, technical, non-technical
and functional skills to each task
▪ Prioritise training and assessment based on task demand
and the severity of task failure
▪ Determine the most appropriate approaches for training
and assessment
What are the benefits?
▪ More effective management of risk through competence management
▪ Improved integration of non-technical skills into your organisation
▪ Enhanced content, structure and focus of your training, encouraging a move away from a
‘chalk and talk’ approach
The process
Role definition
This is achieved by scoping out the role, breaking it down into tasks
and mapping skills (including non-technical skills) and knowledge
requirements to them.
Training priority
assessment
Different training priorities can then be assigned to the tasks
through an enhanced version of DIF (difficulty, importance,
frequency) analysis which incorporates objective safety risk data.
Training options
analysis
The potential and feasibility of various learning and assessment
methods and media can be explored during the training options
analysis.
“Training is only
beneficial if it is based
on an analysis of
requirements and
designed to ensure
they are met.”
More information
Find out how to download the tool on our website –
search for ‘RBTNA’
Find out more – go to www.rssb.co.uk
or contact us at
enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk,
telephone 020 3142 5400
Reviewing the human factors of
signals passed at danger
The overall risk from signals passed at danger (SPADs) has
come down a long way over the last 15 years but they are
still highly significant incidents for the GB rail industry, with
around 300 SPADs taking place every year. The Industry
Human Factors SPAD Review, supported by a cross-industry
steering group, looked at SPAD management from a
human factors perspective.
What are
we
going
What are
to
do
next?
we
going
What
The 10 Incident
Factorsare
to
do
next?
we going
to do next?
Workload
Personal
Equipment
From looking at SPAD underlying causes and human
performance there is not one ‘silver bullet’ which will fix
the SPAD issue, but a need to focus and prioritise SPAD
management around the key underlying causes of SPAD
incidents.
Theatgreatest
influence causes
on these
factors
will be at the
From
looking
SPAD underlying
and
human
company level,
andisitnot
is atone
this‘silver
levelPractices
that SPAD
management
will
performance
there
bullet’
which
will
fix
The 10 incident factor approach aims to encourage
and process
be
most
effective.
The
review
has
also
us to ‘look around’ thethe
individual
to
see
how
SPAD issue, but a need to focus Information
andidentified
prioritise that
SPADcompany
they have been supported
in the task they areprocesses could be improved to more consistently
investigation
undertaking. The trainmanagement
driver is at the centre ofaround the key underlying causes of SPAD
these pictures but the 10
incident factors
mapped
identify
underlying
causes
and causes
promote
safety
learning
From
looking
atrole.SPAD
underlying
and
human
incidents.
The
greatest
influence
on these
factors
will be through
at the
out around the driver
support
them in their
developing
a just
culture
for
SPAD
incidents.
Therefore,
the key
Some of these factors we
can see (eg equipment
performance
there
is
not
one
‘silver
bullet’
which
will
fix
company
level,
and
it
is
at
this
level
that
SPAD
management
will
such as signals outside the cab, work environment
proposed
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(illustrated
graphically
opposite)
for
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factors such as the weather,
practices and
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the
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issue,
but
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and
prioritise
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be most effective. The review has also identified that company
such as dispatching a train), others we can hear (eg
companies
are
to: thecould
communications). Other
factors such as workload,
management
around
key underlying
causes
of SPAD
investigation
processes
be improved
to more
consistently
Key findings
▪ SPAD investigations are often very detailed and show
basic awareness of human factors.
▪ SPADs have multiple causes and there is not one ‘silver
bullet’ which will fix the issue in the short to medium
term. The study identified a set of key SPAD underlying
causes using the ten incident factors approach which are
planned to feed in to the Industry SPAD Risk Reduction
Strategy.
▪ The greatest influence on SPAD risk will be at the
company safety management level, and it is here that
SPAD management needs to improve and mature. Also,
company investigation processes could be improved to
identify the true underlying causes more consistently,
Step 1: Re-balance the approach to SPAD investigation
and promote safety learning through developing a ‘just
culture’ for SPAD incidents.
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g
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nderlying
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company
RSSB
will aim to support
companies
if with
they the
do decide
to
adopt
recommendations
and
local
actions,
aim
of
focusing
SPAD
incidents.
The
reviews
are to have
the obejctive
of
this
approach
and
existing
guidance
is
available
from
RSSB to
SPAD
management
on
company
underlying
cause
profiles.
identifying
andinvestigation
prioritising improvements
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2
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incident
.
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RSSB
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incidents.
reviews
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More information
this
approach
and
existingimprovements
guidance is available
from RSSB
to
identifying
and
prioritising
to the company
SPAD
2
support
incident
investigation
.
management
processes.
You can download the report from the Industry Human
Factors SPAD
Review,
with
a workshop
and
a
RSSB
will aim along
to support
companies
if they report
do decide
to adopt
guide for directors
from
SPARK
www.sparkrail.org
this approach
and
existing– guidance
is available from RSSB to
2
support
incident
investigation
. or contact us at
Find out more – go to www.rssb.co.uk
enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk,
telephone 020 3142 5400
Immedia
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teamwork, and the personal factor ‘fatigue’
are not so tangible but are critical influences on
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itunderlying
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companies
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aseach
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underlying
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one
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at a time.
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at a time.
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causes across company
SPAD incidents.
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causes across company
SPAD incidents.
Step 3: Build on company SPAD management processes
ACT: Build on company SPAD management processes
Manage one SPAD
at a time.
Goal
Step 3: Build on company SPAD management processes
Include front line staff (particularly
drivers), managers and directors
Goal
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in the review of underlying causes
across company SPAD incidents.
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of identifying and prioritising
and
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drivers),
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in the review of underlying causes
across company SPAD incidents.
Managing drivers on routes
undergoing significant change
1
Good practice
in managing
collaborative working
to create briefing
materials
2
Understanding how
people react to
change
What do I need to think about when I
manage drivers on routes undergoing
significant change?
6
The human factors
performance
implication of
change
3
How to structure an
effective brief
4
Consider the Common
Safety Method for
risk evaluation and
assessment
5
How to plan and
manage change
More information
This work has been carried out as research project
‘Supporting drivers on routes undergoing significant
change’ (reference T1045).
You can find out more about the research as well as
download the good practice guide ‘Managing drivers on
routes undergoing significant change’ (ref RS800) on the
RSSB website.
Find out more – go to www.rssb.co.uk or contact us at
enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk, telephone 020 3142 5400
Transitions to/from ERTMS operation
– impact on operations
The roll out of ERTMS in the UK has the potential to expose
drivers to numerous and frequent transitions between ERTMS
and Class B (AWS/TPWS) conventional signalling operation
during the course of a journey or a work shift.
▪ How drivers adapt to a new method of operation and the
factors that would affect adaptation
On the approach to a transition border, the driver is required
to prepare to apply the rules for the new method of operation
and may also be required to acknowledge the transition.
These tasks are in addition to the normal driving task. After
the transition there may be a period of adjustment before the
driver is completely secure in the new method of operation.
During this adjustment period, there is the potential for
degradation in the effectiveness of the driving task which may
impact on safety and performance.
▪ The effect of the amount of time spent in the previous
method of operation on the ability of the driver to adapt to
the new method of operation
The research will seek to identify safety and performance
issues that can be attributed, either directly or indirectly, to
frequent transitions between ERTMS and Class B (AWS/TPWS)
signalling systems employed on GB mainline and give an
understanding of:
▪ The effect of increasing the number of transitions on the
ability of the driver to adapt to that method of operation
▪ The effect of the speed of the train during transition on the
ability of the driver to adapt to the new method of operation
▪ The impact of the presence of transition borders near to
infrastructure features (eg level crossings, junctions, stations)
on driver workload and driving performance post transition
▪ The effect of the new method of operation (eg level NTC,
pure ERTMS or ERTMS overlay) on the ability of the driver to
adapt to this method of operation
▪ Mitigations for any hazards arising from any degradation in
driver performance caused by transitions
More information
You can find the guidance on our website – search
reference T1091
Find out more – go to www.rssb.co.uk or contact us at
enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk,
telephone 020 3142 5400
Guidance and good practice on safety
culture and behavioural development
First ever guidance written specifically for
the GB rail industry
▪ Our new guidance proposes a coordinated, industry
approach to reduce costs and avoid duplication
▪ A common safety culture across industry can improve
performance, increase productivity and ensure everyone
is engaged and enthusiastic about the work they do
▪ Will help duty holders meet Office of Rail and Road
(ORR) expectations for continuous improvement against
the Rail Management Maturity Model (RM3)
▪ We demystify the subject and consolidate the many
lists, definitions and models that define a strong safety
culture
▪ Offers a step-by-step improvement process to help
companies who may have assessed their safety climate
but are unsure about next steps
▪ No ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach but there are common
principles
▪ 10 key organisational values and associated behaviours
can drive workforce development and sustainability
Assess the gap
Develop a plan
10 common values for lasting
improvement
1
A strong reporting culture
2
Putting people first
3
Employee consultation and engagement
4
Effective communications
5
Effective resourcing and work planning
6
Business objectives and target setting consider
safety
7
A learning culture
8
A competent and compliant culture
9
Strong safety performance monitoring and review
10 Systems safety approach
Implement
the plan
Monitor and
review
What personal
responsibilities should
everyone take?
What do
you expect
from
everyone
you work
with?
Hu
decision make
r
s
Key
a
n
g
d
n
i
wor
t
r
o
p ith othe kin
p
r
u
g
s
w
S
My role
What do you
need from
these people
in order to
carry out your
role safely?
Ability, Opportunity
and Motivation
e
c
man
n
a
Perform
‘drivers’
More information
You can find the guidance on our website – search
reference T1023
Find out more – go to www.rssb.co.uk or contact us at
enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk,
telephone 020 3142 5400