Annual Safety
Performance Report
A reference guide to safety trends
on GB railways
2014/15
Copyright
© RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD LTD. 2015 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
This publication may be reproduced free of charge for research, private study or for internal
circulation within an organisation. This is subject to it being reproduced and referenced accurately
and not being used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as the copyright of
Rail Safety and Standards Board and the title of the publication specified accordingly. For any other
use of the material please apply to RSSB’s System Safety Director for permission. Any additional
queries can be directed to enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk. This publication can be accessed by authorised
audiences, via the RSSB website: www.rssb.co.uk
Published: September 2015
If you would like to give feedback on any of the material contained in this report, or if you have any
suggestions for future editions, please contact:
Liz Davies
Head of Safety Performance
020 3142 5475
liz.davies@rssb.co.uk
Additional hard copies may be ordered at cost price by contacting the RSSB enquiry desk on 020
3142 5400.
Contents
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Contents
Executive summary .................................................................................................................... v
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
2 Safety overview ................................................................................................................... 5
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
Risk in context ............................................................................................................ 6
Trend in overall harm .................................................................................................. 8
Passenger safety ......................................................................................................... 9
Workforce safety ...................................................................................................... 11
Members of the public .............................................................................................. 13
Long-term historical trends ....................................................................................... 14
Common Safety Targets and National Reference Values ............................................ 18
Industry collaboration in safety management ........................................................... 24
2.8.1
2.8.2
2.8.3
The System Safety Risk Group and its subgroups ............................................................. 25
Where industry collaboration targets risk......................................................................... 27
Other industry groups ....................................................................................................... 29
2.9 Key safety statistics: safety overview ........................................................................ 32
3 Benchmarking railway performance ................................................................................... 33
3.1 Transport risk in general ........................................................................................... 34
3.1.1
Transport accidents with multiple fatalities ...................................................................... 35
3.2 Comparing the railway with other modes of transport .............................................. 36
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: fatality risk ................................. 37
Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: total risk..................................... 38
Safety trends in car and train travel .................................................................................. 39
Comparing the mainline railway and London Underground ............................................. 40
3.3 International comparisons ........................................................................................ 41
3.3.1
3.3.2
Comparing rail safety within the EU .................................................................................. 41
Railway safety worldwide .................................................................................................. 42
3.4 Occupational risk: comparisons with other industries ................................................ 43
3.4.1
3.4.2
3.4.3
Safety at work: train drivers and station staff ................................................................... 43
Safety at work: infrastructure workers ............................................................................. 44
Safety at work: comparing the mainline railway and LUL ................................................. 45
4 People on trains and in stations.......................................................................................... 47
4.1 Passengers and public ............................................................................................... 48
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
4.1.5
4.1.6
4.1.7
Risk profile by accident type ............................................................................................. 48
Passenger/public fatalities and injuries in 2014/15 .......................................................... 49
Trend in passenger/public harm by injury degree ............................................................ 50
Passenger/public slips, trips and falls in stations .............................................................. 54
Passenger/public accidents at the platform-train interface ............................................. 55
Passenger/public assaults.................................................................................................. 58
On-board injuries............................................................................................................... 59
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4.1.8
4.1.9
Contact with object/person in stations ............................................................................. 60
Other injuries on trains or in stations................................................................................ 61
4.2 Workforce ................................................................................................................ 62
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
4.2.4
4.2.5
4.2.6
4.2.7
4.2.8
4.2.9
Risk profile by accident type ............................................................................................. 62
Workforce injuries in 2014/15 .......................................................................................... 63
Trend in workforce harm by injury degree........................................................................ 64
Workforce slips, trips and falls in stations......................................................................... 68
Workforce accidents at the platform-train interface ........................................................ 69
Worker injuries due to contact with object ...................................................................... 71
Worker injuries due to manual handling ........................................................................... 72
Workforce on-board injuries ............................................................................................. 73
Workforce assaults ............................................................................................................ 74
4.3 Key safety statistics: people on trains and in stations ................................................ 75
5 Working on or about the running line ................................................................................. 77
5.1 Risk profile by accident type ..................................................................................... 78
5.2 Fatalities and injuries in 2014/15............................................................................... 79
5.3 Trend in harm by injury degree ................................................................................. 80
5.4 Trends in running line harm by accident type ............................................................ 84
5.5 Injuries to infrastructure workers away from the running line ................................... 88
5.6 Key safety statistics: working on or about the running line ........................................ 89
6 Road driving risk ................................................................................................................ 91
6.1 Required scope of road driving risk ........................................................................... 92
6.1.1
Recording data about road driving accidents and injuries ................................................ 92
6.2 Fatalities and injuries in 2014/15............................................................................... 94
6.3 Trends in workforce injuries from road driving .......................................................... 95
6.3.1
6.3.2
Trend in injuries by type of worker ................................................................................... 96
Trend in injuries by industry sectors ................................................................................. 97
6.4 Key safety statistics: road driving risk ........................................................................ 99
7 Train operations ............................................................................................................... 101
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
Train accidents ........................................................................................................ 102
Train accident risk profile ........................................................................................ 103
Train accident fatalities and injuries ........................................................................ 104
Potentially higher-risk train accidents in 2014/15 .................................................... 105
Trend in potentially higher-risk train accidents ........................................................ 106
7.5.1
7.5.2
7.5.3
7.5.4
7.5.5
Derailments ..................................................................................................................... 108
Collisions between trains ................................................................................................ 109
Collisions between trains and road vehicles ................................................................... 110
Buffer stop collisions ....................................................................................................... 113
Large falling objects and train explosions ....................................................................... 113
7.6 Trend in other types of train accident...................................................................... 114
7.7 The Precursor Indicator Model ................................................................................ 115
7.7.1
Trend in the PIM .............................................................................................................. 118
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7.7.2
7.7.3
7.7.4
Trend in the PIM for passengers ..................................................................................... 119
SPADs ............................................................................................................................... 120
Changes in other PIM groupings ..................................................................................... 122
7.8 Injuries to the workforce from activities related to train operations ........................ 125
7.8.1
7.8.2
7.8.3
Risk profile ....................................................................................................................... 125
Injuries during 2014/15 ................................................................................................... 125
Trend in workforce harm related to train operations ..................................................... 126
7.9 Key safety statistics: train operations ...................................................................... 127
8 Level crossings ................................................................................................................. 129
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
Level crossing risk profile ........................................................................................ 130
Level crossing fatalities, injuries and train accidents in 2014/15............................... 131
Types of level crossings ........................................................................................... 133
Trend in harm at level crossings .............................................................................. 134
Potentially higher-risk train accidents at level crossings........................................... 136
Near misses with road vehicles and pedestrians ...................................................... 137
8.6.1
8.6.2
8.6.3
Near misses with road vehicles by crossing type ............................................................ 137
Near misses with pedestrians and cyclists by crossing type ........................................... 138
Near misses by time of day ............................................................................................. 139
8.7 Factors affecting the risk at level crossings .............................................................. 140
8.8 Initiatives to reduce the risk at level crossings ......................................................... 142
8.9 Key safety statistics: level crossings ......................................................................... 144
9 Trespass ........................................................................................................................... 145
9.1 Trespass risk profile by event type .......................................................................... 146
9.2 Trend in harm to trespassers ................................................................................... 147
9.3 Analysis of the motivation behind trespass ............................................................. 149
9.3.1
Trespass fatalities at stations .......................................................................................... 151
9.4 Vandalism ............................................................................................................... 152
9.4.1
Cable theft ....................................................................................................................... 153
9.5 Key safety statistics: trespass .................................................................................. 155
10 Suicide ............................................................................................................................. 157
10.1 Classification of fatalities ........................................................................................ 158
10.2 Trend in suicide fatalities ........................................................................................ 159
10.2.1 Suicide attempts and workforce harm ............................................................................ 160
10.2.2 Trends in suicide by location ........................................................................................... 161
10.3 Suicide prevention initiatives .................................................................................. 162
10.4 Railway suicides in the wider context ...................................................................... 163
10.5 Key safety statistics: suicide .................................................................................... 164
11 Yards, depots and sidings ................................................................................................. 165
11.1 YDS risk profile by accident category ....................................................................... 166
11.2 Fatalities and injuries in YDS in 2014/15 .................................................................. 167
11.2.1 Workforce fatalities and injuries ..................................................................................... 167
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Contents
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11.2.2 Injuries to passengers and members of the public ......................................................... 167
11.3 Trend in workforce harm in yards, depots and sidings ............................................. 168
11.4 Key safety statistics: yards, depots and sidings ........................................................ 171
12 Freight operations ............................................................................................................ 173
12.1
12.2
12.3
12.4
Freight harm profile by accident category ............................................................... 174
Trend in harm to the workforce .............................................................................. 175
Trend in harm to the passengers and public ............................................................ 176
Trend in train accidents involving freight trains ....................................................... 177
12.4.1
12.4.2
12.4.3
12.4.4
Potentially higher-risk train accidents ............................................................................. 177
Other train accidents ....................................................................................................... 178
Trend in freight SPADs ..................................................................................................... 179
Dangerous goods incidents ............................................................................................. 180
12.5 Key safety statistics: freight operations ................................................................... 181
Appendix 1. Key safety statistics.......................................................................................... 183
Appendix 2. Fatalities in 2014/15 ........................................................................................ 199
Appendix 3. Scope of RSSB safety performance reporting and risk modelling ....................... 201
Appendix 4. Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways ..................................................... 205
Appendix 5. Level crossing types ......................................................................................... 207
Appendix 6. Accident groups used within the ASPR ............................................................. 211
Appendix 7. Definitions ....................................................................................................... 213
Appendix 8. Glossary........................................................................................................... 221
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Executive summary
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Executive summary
Welcome to RSSB’s Annual Safety Performance Report (ASPR) for 2014/15.
The ASPR provides a wide range of safety-related information for our Members, to support the rail
industry in its aim of reducing risk so far as reasonably practicable. This aim is a requirement of
legislation, embodied in the Railway Safety Directive.
The information contained in the report is also of use and interest to others, such as those public
bodies that are involved in our industry’s funding and regulation, as well as those who use the
railway, or who are employed by the rail industry.
Changes to the report for Control Period 5
We would like to highlight a few important changes to the report this year. The first change is a
change in reporting scope to include non-fatal injuries in yards, depots and sidings (YDS). Fatal
injuries in YDS have been reported into the industry’s Safety Management Information System (SMIS)
on a long-standing basis. While there is no mandatory requirement to report non-fatal injuries, the
collection of data to support safety analysis of YDS sites has been carried out on a voluntary basis,
through agreement of the industry. This was formalised in a railway group standard in April 2010. As
a result, we now have sufficient data to incorporate YDS into the scope of reporting of safety
performance and risk estimation on an on-going basis, which we have done in the current report.
The second change is in the structure of the part of the report that focuses on safety analysis in
detail. These chapters (4 to 10) are now separated into the topic areas where industry collaboration
takes place through national stakeholder groups. We have taken this step to enable the report to be
more useful at a working level for those involved in managing these areas of risk. To ensure that the
report still targets those users of the report who want to see high-level trends – overall risk to
passengers, workforce and members of the public – the Safety Overview section of the report has
been expanded to include this level of analysis.
We hope that you find the changes beneficial, and would welcome any feedback that you have.
Headline statistics for 2014/15
•
There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train accidents. This is the eighth year in
succession with no such fatalities: the longest sustained period on record.
•
Thirty-nine people were fatally injured in other types of accidents during the year.
•
−
Three passengers and one member of the public died in accidents at stations.
−
Ten members of the public died in accidents at level crossings; two were drivers whose
vehicles were involved in collisions with trains.
−
Two members of the workforce were fatally injured in road traffic accidents and one
worker died in an accident in a train depot.
−
Twenty-two people were fatally injured while trespassing on the railway.
In 2014/15, there were 1.66 billion passenger journeys recorded, which is 4% higher than
2013/14. The overall level of harm to passengers, also taking into account non-fatal injuries,
showed a reduction compared to the previous year when normalised by the number of
passenger journeys. There were 0.21 billion workforce hours reported, which is 3% lower than
2013/14. The overall level of harm to the workforce remained stable when normalised by the
number of workforce hours.
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Executive summary
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•
Although there were no train accidents with on-board fatalities, there were 25 events that
carried potentially high risk. This is a reduction of seven on the previous year’s total of 32. For
the past five years, the number of potentially higher-risk train accidents has remained lower than
levels seen prior to this period.
•
For the second year running, there were no passenger train derailments; this is the longest
sustained period on record. In contrast, there were 16 non-passenger train derailments, 14 of
which were freight train and two of which were empty coaching stock. In recent years, the
number of freight train derailments has been increasing.
•
The Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) provides a measure of trends in the underlying risk from
potentially higher-risk train accidents. At the end of 2014/15, the overall indicator stood at 6.7
fatalities and weighted injuries (FWI) per year, compared with 7.6 FWI per year at the end of
2013/14. The reduction was partly the result of fewer failures of cuttings and embankments
during the relatively mild winter of 2014/15. The proportion of the PIM most relevant to
passenger risk stood at 2.8 FWI per year, compared with 3.3 FWI per year at the end of the
previous year.
•
At 299, the number of signals passed at danger (SPADs) occurring during 2014/15 was a 4%
increase on the 287 occurring during 2013/14. At the end of 2014/15, the estimated level of risk
from SPADs was 66% of the September 2006 baseline, compared with 73% at the end of
2013/14.
•
At 293, the number of suicides was an increase of 15 on 2013/14, and represents the highest
level on record.
•
Excluding suicide, the total level of accidental harm recorded as occurring on the railway was
114.5 FWI, compared with 111.1 FWI during 2013/14. Although a small rise on the previous year,
the level was below the average of 125.3 FWI for the decade as a whole.
Public
Public
Suicide
(non-trespass)
(trespass)
2013/14 2014/15 2013/14 2014/15 2013/14 2014/15 2013/14 2014/15 2013/14 2014/15
Passengers
Workforce
4
3
3
3
8
11
22
22
278
293
Major injuries
276
296
177
175
20
31
25
19
54
38
Minor injuries
6353
6842
6203
6116
142
155
21
24
23
19
Shock/trauma
236
253
1024
818
1
3
1
0
3
1
FWI
43.8
44.7
32.4
31.4
10.4
14.4
24.6
24.0
283.5
296.9
Normalised FWI
2.75
2.70
1.47
1.47
-
-
-
-
-
-
Fatalities
Train accidents
The past eight financial years have seen no fatalities to passengers or workforce from train accidents.
In the past 10 years, there has been one train accident with an on-board fatality: the derailment at
Grayrigg in February 2007, which resulted in the death of one passenger. Over time, there has been a
falling trend in the rate of train accidents involving train occupant fatalities.
The types of train accident with the greatest potential to cause harm are termed ‘potentially higherrisk train accidents’, or PHRTAs. These account for around 6% of the total number of events that are
classed under RIDDOR as train accidents, but contribute around 91% of the train accident risk. In
2014/15, there were 25 PHRTAs, a decrease of seven on the previous year.
While for the second year running there were no passenger train derailments, there were 14 freight
train derailments. A cross-industry working group has been established to focus on this area, and
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Executive summary
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over the next year, will work towards a better understanding of how the precursors to freight
derailment influence each other to increase risk, and what further measures could be taken to
address the risk.
As serious train accidents are rare, RSSB also analyses trends in accident precursors, using the PIM.
The PIM indicates that the overall risk from PHRTAs has reduced significantly over the past decade.
The most rapid improvement occurred in the period up to the end of 2005/06, and was mostly due
to the large reduction in SPAD risk brought about by the implementation of the Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS). At the end of 2014/15, the PIM stood at 6.7 FWI per year, compared with
7.6 FWI year at the end of 2013/14. The main reason behind the overall reduction was a decrease in
the number of cutting and embankment failures.
The portion of the PIM related to the risk to passengers from train accidents also reduced; at the end
of 2014/15, it stood at 2.8 FWI per year, compared with 3.3 FWI per year at the end of 2013/14.
At 299, the number of SPADs during the year was an increase on the 287 for the previous year, but
due to a lower number of higher-risk SPADs, the level of SPAD risk fell. At the end of 2014/15, it
stood at 66% of the September 2006 baseline level.
Passengers and public in stations
Although passengers and public may visit stations for different purposes, such as making a journey by
train or visiting shops and other facilities, they are exposed to similar types of risk. When assessing
safety in stations, we therefore group them together.
There were four fatalities occurring in stations during 2014/15. Two were passengers who fell from
the platform edge: in one event, the person was electrocuted and in the other event the person was
hit by a train entering the station. One fatality occurred to a passenger who fell while running down a
flight of stairs, receiving fatal head injuries. The fourth fatality was a member of the public, a young
boy who was hit by a train during an incident where his mother accessed the track with the apparent
intention of committing suicide. The boy’s mother was also fatally injured, but that event is counted
in the suicide/suspected suicide category.
When non-fatal injuries are also taken into account, the total level of harm to passengers and public
in stations was 41.6 FWI in 2014/15, compared with 40.6 FWI for 2013/14. The normaliser used for
station injuries is passenger journeys; it is not a perfect normaliser, as it will not reflect the
contribution to station usage made by non-travelling members of the public, but it is the best
available. When normalised, the level of harm in stations decreased by 2% in 2014/15.
More than half of the harm in stations is from slips, trips and falls, which occur while people are
moving around the concourse and other areas, and while using stairs and escalators. Using stairs
seems to present a particular hazard; around 20% of all station harm over the past five years has
arisen from slips, trips and falls on stairs, and the fatality occurring during the current year highlights
the serious potential these accidents can have. Through one of its key stakeholder groups, the People
on Trains and Stations Risk Group (PTSRG), the industry is focussing on the risk from slips, trips and
falls.
The focus by the PTSRG on slips, trips and falls follows on from industry focus on risk at the platformtrain interface. This resulted in the publication of a cross-industry strategy, in January 2015. The core
aim of the strategy is for the industry to work together to reduce safety risk, and optimise both
operational performance and availability of access.
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Accidents at the platform edge can occur while boarding or alighting trains, but also at other times,
when people fall from the platform edge, which carries the subsequent risk from electrocution or
being struck by a train. The overall level of harm is similar, but the fatality risk differs greatly; it is rare
for fatal accidents to occur while getting on or off trains, but each year there are typically fatalities
occurring when people fall from the platform edge. In 2014/15 there were two such events. At 5.5
FWI, the level of harm from boarding/alighting trains was lower than the 6.1 FWI for 2013/14. The
level of harm from other accidents at the platform edge was 3.8 FWI, which is also a reduction from
last year’s total of 5.6 FWI.
Assaults on passengers and members of the public
We look at the trends in passenger and public assaults using data from British Transport Police (BTP),
as this is the main body for recording these incidents. The data from BTP shows an increase in the
number of assaults for 2014/15 of 10%, with a total of 2,888 being recorded on trains and stations,
compared with 2,615 last year. When normalised by the growth in passenger journeys, there is a
smaller increase of 6%. This is the first increase in rate since 2008/09. Assaults in station and train
locations both increased in 2014/15.
Workforce on trains and in stations
The level of workforce harm on trains and in stations for 2014/15 was 8.5 FWI compared with 9.3
FWI for 2013/14. The harm is fairly evenly split between locations, although the injury profile is
somewhat different. Stations see a higher number of major injuries (from slips, trips and falls and
boarding/alighting events) and trains see a higher level of shock/trauma (from witnessing fatalities
on the line).
The number of assaults on the workforce leading to harm has remained essentially level for the past
three years at around 850 per year; the associated level of FWI has also remained fairly level, at
around 1.6 FWI. A slightly higher proportion of assaults is consistently seen in stations rather than
trains, which may reflect differences in the frequency and type of interaction between staff and
public in the two environments.
Infrastructure workers
Working on or about the running line carries risk. Work can be taking place near electrified rail and
lines open to trains and it is important that safe systems of work are established and maintained.
Track work often involves working with machinery, tools and equipment, which also brings exposure
to hazards. Infrastructure workers do not just work on the running line; staff working on station
buildings or other railway property are also considered as engaged in infrastructure work. In
addition, along with other staff, infrastructure workers are exposed to risk from road driving, while
travelling on duty.
The total level of harm to infrastructure workers during 2014/15 was 14.0 FWI. Of this, 9.7 FWI
occurred on or around the track, 2.2 FWI occurred in yards, depots and sidings, 1.4 FWI occurred
while driving on duty, and 0.8 FWI occurred at other locations. This compared with 16.3 FWI for
2013/14.
In the most recent years, two-thirds of workforce fatalities have occurred as a result of road traffic
accidents, and road driving risk is another area that has been growing in focus for our industry. We
have established a dedicated cross-industry project group, to increase awareness, understanding and
industry engagement in this area.
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Level crossings
Eight pedestrians (including one cyclist) and two road vehicle occupants died in accidents at level
crossings in 2014/15. The total level of harm was 10.7 FWI, which is higher than the 8.8 FWI (eight
fatalities) that happened in 2013/14.
There were seven collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings during the year,
which is three fewer than the figure seen in 2013/14. The latter half of the past 10 years has seen
notably fewer level crossing collisions than the first half, which provides evidence that the underlying
rate of collisions at level crossings has reduced.
Trespass and suicide
Where available, coroners’ verdicts are used as the basis for categorising public fatalities as suicide or
accidental. Where a coroner’s verdict is returned as open or narrative, or where it is not yet
returned, the industry applies the Ovenstone criteria to determine the most probable circumstances,
ie either trespass or suicide. In 2013/14, a greater amount of information about fatalities related to
trespass and suicide was made available by BTP to the industry, through the enhanced co-operation
taking place under the National Suicide Prevention Steering Group, which resulted in improved
information on railway fatalities as far back as 2009/10. An outcome of this increased data sharing is
that while trespass and suicide data should be more accurate over the past six years, the analysis of
separate trends in suicide and trespass across the decade as a whole cannot be done on a consistent
basis.
The number of accidental public fatalities due to trespass was 22 in 2014/15, the same number as in
2013/14.
The number of public fatalities due to suicide or suspected suicide was 293, compared with 278 in
2013/14. This is the highest number on record.
Yards, depots and sidings
During the year, there was one workforce fatality in a depot: a train cleaner was electrocuted after
coming into contact with the live rail after an apparent fall. The level of workforce harm occurring in
YDS during 2014/15 was 8.1 FWI, which is one quarter of the total workforce harm for the year.
Summary
Safety performance has been maintained or improved in a number of areas. The normalised level of
passenger harm decreased while the normalised level of workforce harm remained level. The
duration of time since the last train accident with passenger or workforce fatalities is unprecedented.
While the possibility of a train accident remains a real and continuing risk, it is in the context of
historically low numbers of PHTRAs and train accident precursors.
Rail safety in Great Britain is amongst the safest in Europe. The most recent comparison available
from the European Rail Agency puts GB rail as the top of the ranking for passenger and workforce
fatality rates, and our level crossing performance is the best in Europe. But good performance is not
a signal for complacency. Our industry continues to work collaboratively through a range of
stakeholder groups to seek to reduce risk further, and the commitment and activities of individual
companies play an equal part in this mutual aim, which is to ensure that those that use or work for
the railway get home safe, every day.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Introduction
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1
Introduction
Welcome to RSSB’s Annual Safety Performance Report (ASPR) for 2014/15.
The ASPR provides a wide range of safety-related information for our Members, to assist in the
management of safety.
The information contained in the report is also of use and interest to others, such as those public
bodies that are involved in our industry’s funding and regulation, as well as those who use the
railway, or who are employed by the rail industry.
The overriding purpose of the ASPR is to support the rail industry in its aim of reducing risk so far as
reasonably practicable. This aim is a requirement of legislation, embodied in the Railway Safety
Directive.
RSSB is the main source of mainline rail safety statistics in Great Britain, and its figures are
reproduced in the Office of Rail and Road’s (ORR) publication National Rail Trends and the
Department for Transport’s (DfT) Transport Statistics Great Britain.
In addition to the ASPR, we also produce a ‘sister publication’, the Learning from Operational
Experience Annual Report (LOEAR), which summarises some of the learning points arising from
accident investigations and other sources of information that have arisen during the year.
Scope of the report
The scope is predominantly focused on incidents connected with the operation of the mainline
railway in Great Britain, but is extended to include fatalities and injuries to the workforce occurring in
road traffic accidents while driving on duty.
In addition, we would like to highlight a further change in reporting scope to include non-fatal
injuries in yards, depots and sidings (YDS). Fatal injuries in YDS have been reported into the industry’s
Safety Management Information System (SMIS) on a long-standing basis. While there is no
mandatory requirement to report non-fatal injuries, the collection of data to support safety analysis
of YDS sites has been carried out on a voluntary basis, through agreement of the industry, which was
formalised in a railway group standard in April 2010. We now have sufficient data to incorporate YDS
into the scope of reporting of safety performance and risk estimation on an on-going basis, which we
have done in the current report.
A more detailed outline of the scope can be found in Appendix 3.
Where the data comes from
Most of the analyses in the ASPR is based on data from the industry’s Safety Management
Information System (SMIS). It is supplemented where appropriate with data from other sources, such
as British Transport Police (BTP), the ORR and Network Rail.
Charts or tables that are based on sources in addition to SMIS will have this noted in a footnote.
How safety is analysed in the report
The rail industry collects a vast amount of safety-related information during each year: more than
75,000 records were entered into SMIS during 2014/15, around 15,000 of which related to injuries
ranging from the very minor to the very serious. Each injury record contains information on what
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
_________________________________________________________________
1
Introduction
_________________________________________________________________
happened and where, and who was involved. This allows detailed analysis to be carried out, looking
at risk from a number of different ways.
Because of the range in severity of injuries, it is useful to have a way of combining the range of
different consequences that can occur from a particular activity or event, so that a decision can be
made on how important it is to address. For example, a small number of events with more serious
consequences can be weighed against a large number of events with less serious consequences, to
inform at a systematic decision of where resource should be spent.
The agreed industry approach to combining injuries of differing levels of seriousness into one
composite measure is based on ‘weighting’ a multiple number of less serious events as being ‘equal’
to one fatality. The following table shows the weightings that are currently in use within the industry.
They were derived following extensive research and consultation using public focus groups.
The composite measure is termed ‘fatalities and weighted injuries’ or FWI, for short.
Injury degree 1
Weighting
Fatality
Number of injuries weighted
as equal to a fatality
1
1
Major injury
0.1
10
Minor injury
0.005 (Class 1)
200
injury)
0.001 (Class 2)
1000
Shock/trauma
0.005 (Class 1)
200
0.001 (Class 2)
1000
(Class depends on seriousness of
(Class depends on seriousness of
event resulting in shock/trauma)
Modelled risk versus recorded harm
It is important to understand the distinction between modelled risk and recorded harm. Many of the
analyses in this report are based on actual data recorded over the past 10 years, and so they present
the observed level of harm that was recorded during that time. Recorded levels of harm can provide
an indication of what the underlying level of safety is, but how good an indication they provide is
influenced by a number of factors. ‘Statistical fluctuation’ is one such factor. This is a normally
occurring phenomenon, which reflects the amount of variability you might reasonably expect to see,
if you pick two different samples of data (eg from two different years). For some types of risk, where
the typical event occurs less frequently and with generally more serious consequences, you would
expect to get a high level of statistical fluctuation. On the other hand, for other types of risk, which
happen frequently and generally with less serious consequences, the level of statistical fluctuation
would be expected to be lower.
This is an important point because often what we want to know as an industry is ‘Are things getting
better or worse?’. And this is normally a more complicated question to answer than just looking at
how recorded levels of harm have changed from one year to the next. Train accidents offer the most
1
Fuller descriptions of the different classes of injury are provided in Appendix 7.
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2
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Introduction
_________________________________________________________________
ready example of this effect; a year without a train accident does not necessarily indicate an
improvement in safety risk, and a year with such an accident does not necessarily imply a
deterioration. Answering the ‘better/worse’ question normally needs to involve looking at trends
averaged over a longer period (moving averages), considering how harm has changed in relation to
other system factors such as usage (normalisation), and risk modelling.
RSSB’s Safety Risk Model (SRM) is the primary means of carrying out risk modelling for GB rail. The
SRM is based on a mathematical representation of all the events that could lead directly to an injury
or fatality, and provides a comprehensive snapshot of the underlying level of risk on the mainline
railway. The SRM is updated periodically, and is based on a combination of observed data,
mathematical modelling and expert judgement. The current version of the SRM is version 8.1, and
was published in June 2014.
Within the SRM, each injury is categorised by the hazardous event that caused it, and the major
precursor to that event. The ASPR uses the same set of hazardous events and precursors as the SRM,
so that both sides of the ‘risk coin’ can be presented – an estimate of the underlying level of safety
and information on how trends are varying.
There are around 133 hazardous events within the SRM, ranging from slips, trips and falls to
collisions between trains. In ASPR analyses, hazardous events of a similar type are often grouped
together; Appendix 6 provides a list of groupings that are commonly used through the report.
Report structure
The structure of the current report marks a change from previous ASPRs. The approach has been
taken in discussion with the rail industry to provide a more useful document for informing safety
management.
The Safety overview chapter immediately follows this introduction. It sets the overall context by
presenting the current industry risk profile, as based on SRMv8.1, together with an overview of the
high-level trends in passenger, public and workforce safety performance during 2014/15. The
chapter also contains information on the long-term changes in railway usage and performance, and
provides an update of how GB rail is meeting the requirements set out by the legislation related to
Common Safety Methods for Monitoring.
The chapters following the Safety overview are divided into the main risk areas where industry
collaborates in support of safety management:
The Benchmarking chapter looks at railway safety in the wider context. It uses a range of data
sources to examine the safety of other transport modes, of railways in other countries, and in other
industries, and compares them with the mainline railway in Britain.
The People on trains and in stations chapter focuses on the ways in which people could be injured
while travelling on trains or using stations. It excludes both the risk to people from train accidents
and the risk from people who commit acts of trespass or suicide. We have separated the analysis in
the chapter to look at members of the workforce separately from passengers and members of the
public. This is because the types of activities that the workforce carry out on trains and in stations are
different from those of passengers and the public. Passengers and the public are grouped together,
because they use the railway in similar ways and are exposed to the same types of risk.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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3
Introduction
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The Working on or about the running line chapter examines the risk from the types of accident that
affect infrastructure workers while working on or about the running line.
The Road driving risk chapter reviews the risk to members of the workforce travelling by road vehicle
while on duty. The chapter investigates the impact of this activity on the wide variety of railway
roles, from station staff to infrastructure worker sub-contractors.
The Train operations chapter looks at RIDDOR-reportable and potentially higher-risk train accidents,
focussing on those that occur away from level crossings, which are covered in a separate chapter.
The chapter also presents information on the risk presented to shunters, train crew or other staff
when they are on or about the track and engaged in activities to do with the movement of trains.
The Level crossings chapter looks at the risk arising from train accidents at level crossings, and also
examines the risk experienced by pedestrian users.
The Trespass chapter looks at incidents that involve access of prohibited areas of the railway and are
as a result of deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. The trespass category is limited to events where the
person involved did not intend to cause harm to themselves, even if their behaviour clearly carried
risk, and so it excludes people who access the railway to take their life. The chapter also looks at
some types of railway crime that frequently involve trespass on the railway.
The Suicide chapter presents trends and analysis of events that have been categorised as suicide or
suspected suicide, occurring on railway infrastructure.
The Yards, depots and sidings chapter looks at injuries to the workforce that occur in these locations,
and have been reported into SMIS.
The Freight operations chapter provides information and analysis across a range of risk areas directly
or indirectly affecting the freight community.
In addition, there are a number of appendices, which include statistical summaries, definitions of key
terms and supporting information for the chapters.
Data cut-off
RSSB bases the analyses in the ASPR on the latest and most accurate information available at the
time of production. We also continually update and revise previous years’ data in the light of any
new information. The data cut-off date for the 2014/15 ASPR was 28 April 2015 for SMIS data.
_________________________________________________________________
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Safety overview
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2
Safety overview
Over the past decade, industry initiatives have brought about improvements in many areas of
passenger and workforce safety. Over the same period of time, passenger journeys and passenger
kilometres have risen by 54% and 46% respectively, and train kilometres by 8%.
The industry continues to satisfy the safety requirement placed on it by the Railway Safety Directive,
which is to maintain safety and improve it where practicable.
2014/15 Headlines
•
There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train accidents. This is the eighth year in
succession with no such fatalities. The average rate of train accidents with on-board fatalities
over the last 10 years now stands at its lowest level of 0.1 per year.
•
In total, there were 39 accidental fatalities, 521 major injuries, 13,137 minor injuries and 1,074
cases of shock/trauma. The total level of harm (excluding suicide) was 114.6 FWI, compared with
111.1 FWI recorded in 2013/14.
•
Of the 39 fatalities, three were passengers, three were members of the workforce and the
remaining 33 were members of the public, 22 of whom were engaged in acts of trespass and 10
of whom were level crossing users. The remaining public fatality is recorded under the category
of assault.
•
Passenger harm stands at 44.7 FWI overall. This is an increase on the 43.8 FWI for 2013/14, but
represents a reduction of 2% when normalised by passenger journeys.
•
Workforce harm stands at 31.4 FWI. This is a decrease on the 32.4 FWI for 2013/14, but
remained almost exactly level when normalised by workforce hours.
•
In addition to the injuries above, which were accidental in nature, a further 293 people died as a
result of suicide or suspected suicide. This is the highest number recorded for the past decade.
System safety at a glance
35.1
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
31.8
26.7
32.5
33.5
31.4
29.2
31.0
29.8
32.4
31.4
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
42.2
43.4
38.6
38.4
38.8
42.8
42.5
46.5
43.8
44.7
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
51.6
47.7
34.9
38.4
Fatalities
61.6
61.2
66.0
65.0
60.4
Weighted injuries
Passengers
Workforce
Public
Note: The trend in workforce harm includes fatalities and injuries recorded for yards, depots and sidings, from 2007/08
onwards
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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5
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.1
Risk in context
Understanding the overall profile of risk on the railway helps with its management, by enabling focus
to be given to areas that are identified as priority. The SRM is a useful tool for this, as it provides a
stable estimate of the underlying level of risk from different sources.
The SRM risk information can be cut in a number of ways. For example, the information can be split
up to show the risk from train accidents separately to the risk from personal accidents (such as slips,
trips and falls). It can also be broken down by location, accident type, or the type of person the risk
occurs to.
The following chart shows the risk split by whether or not the injured person was intentionally trying
to harm themselves (take their life). The remaining risk, which is termed ‘accidental risk’ is broken
down by person type and location.
Chart 1.
Risk in context (SRMv8.1)
Injuries in yards,
depots and sidings,
7.6 FWI/year
Passenger injuries on
the mainline railway,
58.4 FWI/year
Suicide,
244.1 FWI/year
Workforce injuries on
the mainline,
26.1 FWI/year
Public injuries on the
mainline railway,
47.5 FWI/year
Note: For harm in yards, depots and sidings, 96% involves the workforce with nearly all of the remaining 4% being members of the
public
•
The total level of accidental risk on the mainline railway is 132.0 FWI per year, of which 44%
occurs to passengers, 20% occurs to the workforce, and 36% occurs to members of the public.
•
A further 7.6 FWI per year occurs in yards, depots and sidings (YDS). Most of this risk (96%)
affects the workforce, with nearly all of the remainder involving members of the public
trespassing. More on this topic is included in Chapter 9 Trespass.
•
The largest proportion of risk on the railway comes from people committing, or attempting to
commit, suicide. A substantial number of people a year decide to end their lives this way, and the
industry puts much effort into preventing these tragic events from occurring. More on this topic
is included in Chapter 10 Suicide.
In any given year, the observed levels of harm may differ from the SRM modelled risk. One reason for
this is statistical variation of frequently occurring events. Another is that the SRM provides an
estimate of the risk from low-frequency, high-consequence events that may not have occurred
during the year, such as train accidents with on-board injuries.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Safety overview
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The railway’s risk profile
The next chart uses information from the SRM to show the types of accident that result in harm. The
information is shown for different person types separately. The scope of the risk is all accidental risk
on the mainline railway or in YDS.
Information like this is useful for making decisions about where to focus effort, taking into account
that a number of factors will influence these decisions. Considering business or reputational risk may
lead you to focus on the risk from train accidents. Looking at how people are most likely to be fatally
injured would lead you to focus on accidents at the interface between the platform and trains or
track, whereas looking at the total level of risk would lead to a focus on slips, trips and falls in
stations.
The industry needs to take into account these factors, as well as the costs and benefits of potential
ways of reducing risk, when making decisions about its management.
Slips, trips and falls
Platform-train interface
Assault and abuse
On-board injuries
Train accidents
Other accidents
Slips, trips and falls
Contact with object
On-board injuries
Platform-train interface
Struck by train
Assault and abuse
Road traffic accident
Train accidents
Falls from height
Electric shock
Other accidents
Public
Passengers
SRMv8.1 accidental risk profile (139.6 FWI per year): mainline and YDS combined
Workforce
Chart 2.
27.2
12.1
9.6
4.0
2.8
2.6
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
10.1
5.4
2.8
2.5
1.9
1.8
1.3
1.1
0.6
0.5
5.3
Trespass
Struck by train
Train accidents
Slips, trips and falls
Other accidents
33.5
6.5
4.0
1.6
2.1
0
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
5
10
15
20
25
30
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
35
40
_________________________________________________________________
7
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.2
Trend in overall harm
Chart 3 shows the trend in accidental FWI since 2005/06. Since 2009/10, there has been a better
classification of fatalities to members of the public; more information from BTP has enabled more
accuracy in distinguishing between suspected cases of trespass and suspected cases of suicide.
Chart 3.
Accidental fatalities and weighted injuries
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
160
140
135.5
120
19.8
131.4
19.1
137.1
136.8
19.9
20.1
Improved classification of
fatalities to members of the public
130.6
20.2
FWI
43.7
43.4
124.0
22.2
21.8
47.1
43.8
51.7
70
67
64
20
52.1
49.8
44.5
60
66
21.2
21.6
47.1
69
114.5
111.1
21.1
80
40
125.1
107.2
100
44.3
Fatalities
53
39
48
37
39
2013/14
2014/15
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
•
There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train accidents during 2014/15.
•
Thirty-nine people died as a result of other accidents. Three were passengers, three were
members of the workforce and the remaining 33 were members of the public, 22 of whom were
engaged in acts of trespass. When non-fatal injuries are taken into account, the total harm
occurring during the year was 114.5 FWI, compared with 111.1 FWI for 2013/14.
•
A further 293 people died as a result of suicide or suspected suicide. This is the highest number
recorded over the past decade. Since 2009/10, there has been better information available for
the classification of suspected suicide, but it is unlikely that this alone is the factor behind the
most recent higher levels.
Fatalities and major injuries due to suicide or suspected suicide
Improved classification of suicide/trespass figures
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Fatalities
225
225
207
219
243
209
250
246
278
293
Major injuries
32
34
28
34
26
36
23
35
54
38
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Safety overview
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2.3
Passenger safety
Around 1.66 billion passenger journeys were made in 2014/15 2. The following section summarises
the fatalities and injuries that were recorded:
Fatalities
•
There were no passenger fatalities in train accidents during 2014/15. This is the eighth financial
year in succession with no such fatalities.
•
There were three passenger fatalities in incidents at stations.
Passenger fatalities in 2014/15
Date
Location
Accident type
Territory
07/04/2014
Horley
station
Platform-train
interface (not
boarding/alighting)
South East
05/08/2014
Hampstead
Heath
station
Slip, trip or fall in
station
South East
17/01/2015
Southall
station
Platform-train
interface (not
boarding/alighting)
Western
Description of incident
A teenage boy fell from the platform edge
and was electrocuted after coming into
contact with the conductor rail. Alcohol was
reported as a potential factor in the incident.
A passenger fell while running down stairs at
the station, and received head injuries. He
died in hospital from his injuries several days
later. Alcohol was reported as a potential
factor in the incident.
A male passenger fell from the platform edge
onto the track and was struck by a train
entering the station, receiving fatal injuries.
Alcohol was reported as a potential factor in
the incident.
Major injuries
•
There were 296 passenger major injuries in 2014/15.
•
84% occurred at stations, and around three-quarters of these were slips, trips and falls.
Minor injuries
•
There were 6,842 recorded minor injuries, 1,247 (18%) of which were Class 1 (ie the injured party
went straight to hospital).
•
Of the Class 1 minor injuries, 92% occurred at stations, with around three-quarters of these again
being due to slips, trips and falls.
Shock and trauma
•
2
There were 253 recorded cases of passenger shock or trauma, five of which were Class 1: one
occurred in a train accident and four involved witnessing a fatality.
This includes both franchised and non-franchised passenger services.
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9
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in accidental harm to passengers
The last 10 years have seen an average level of harm of 42.2 FWI per year. This is somewhat lower
than the SRM risk estimate of 58.4 FWI per year, but the SRM risk value includes estimates for
passenger risk arising from train accidents and passenger risk arising from assaults. Over the past
decade, the actual level of passenger harm from train accidents has been much lower than the
estimate, but because train accidents are low-frequency high-consequence events, this is not
unusual. With regard to passenger assaults, these injuries are mainly recorded by BTP rather than
SMIS.
Chart 4.
Passenger harm by injury degree
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
Normalised rate
70
70
60
60
42.2
FWI
40
9.8
9.4
30
20
24.1
46.5
43.4
38.6
38.4
42.8
42.5
10.6
11.5
38.8
9.6
9.9
10.2
21.6
23.2
23.4
12.0
43.8
44.7
11.9
11.8
50
40
30
24.7
25.0
25.8
31.3
27.6
29.6
10
20
FWI per billion passenger journeys
50
10
8
9
7
5
5
7
5
3
4
3
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
0
0
•
The level of passenger harm recorded for 2014/15 was 44.7 FWI. This was higher than the level
recorded for 2013/14, but when normalised by passenger journeys there was a 2% reduction in
the rate of FWI.
•
There were three passenger fatalities in 2014/15, which is the joint lowest number of passenger
fatalities recorded over the ten-year period.
•
Weighted major injuries dominate total passenger harm. The number of major injuries recorded
in 2014/15 was 296; this is an increase of 20 on the previous year.
•
The trend in passenger harm should be seen against the context of rising passenger usage. Over
the decade as a whole, there has been a reduction of around a third in the rate of harm,
normalised by passenger journeys.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Safety overview
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2.4
Workforce safety
More than 200 million hours of work were performed throughout the railway during the year. The
following injuries were recorded:
Fatalities
There were three workforce fatalities within scope during the year.
Workforce fatalities in 2014/15
Date
Location
Accident type
01/05/2014
A7,
Craighall
24/05/2014
10/02/2015
Territory
Description of incident
Road traffic
accident
Scotland
An infrastructure worker employed on the
Borders Project was fatally injured after the
tractor and trailer he was driving, whilst on duty,
was involved in a collision with a lorry.
St
Leonards
West
Marina
depot
Electric shock
South
East
A train cleaner, working in a depot, was
electrocuted after coming into contact with the
live rail, after an apparent fall.
Waterloo
Road traffic
accident
South
East
An office-based worker, who was travelling by
motorbike to a meeting in a location different
from his normal place of work, was involved in a
road traffic accident and was fatally injured. 3
Major injuries
There were 175 major injuries in 2014/15, of which 100 (57%) were to infrastructure workers.
Minor injuries
There were 6,116 recorded minor injuries, 705 (12%) of which were Class 1. These affected the full
range of railway employees and had a wide variety of causes.
Shock and trauma
There were 818 reports of shock or trauma of which 288 (35%) were Class 1.
Although accidents while commuting to work do not normally fall within scope, HSE guidance (INDG382 Driving At Work –
Managing Work Related Road Safety) indicates that “Health & safety law does not apply to people commuting (ie.
Travelling between their home and their usual place of work), unless they are travelling from their home to somewhere
which is not their usual place of work…”.
3
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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11
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in accidental harm to the workforce
Over the past decade, the average level of harm to members of the workforce has been 31.0 FWI per
year.
Chart 5.
Workforce harm by injury degree
Shock and trauma
Major injuries
Fatalities
Normalised rate
50
45
45
40
40
31.8
32.5
30
2.6
2.4
25
9.7
20
33.5
2.4
26.7
2.6
10.0
9.8
31.4
2.3
29.2
2.4
9.6
10.0
9.3
31.0
2.6
10.2
32.4
29.8
2.5
2.3
9.2
9.3
31.4
2.0
30
8.9
25
20
15
10
15
15.4
18.1
18.3
16.5
12.9
15.9
17.2
16.2
17.7
17.5
5
0
35
FWI per 200 million hours
35
FWI
Minor injuries
50
10
5
4
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
3
3
0
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
•
The level of workforce harm for 2014/15 was 31.4 FWI. This was lower than the level for 2013/14
on an absolute basis and almost exactly level with the previous year on a normalised basis; the
industry recorded 3% fewer hours for 2014/15 than for 2013/14.
•
At three, the number of fatalities was the same as the number occurring last year. Looking at
non-fatal injuries, there were small reductions across all categories.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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2.5
Members of the public
Fatalities
•
There were 33 fatalities to members of the public from accidental causes
•
Twenty-two people were engaged in trespass at the time of the accident
•
Ten people were users of level crossings
•
One person died as a result of other causes:
Public fatalities in 2014/15 not due to suicide, trespass or level crossings
Date
Location
23/09/14
Slough
station
Accident
type
Assault
and
abuse
Territory
Description of incident
A young child died after being struck by a train
during an incident where his mother is believed to
have accessed the track to take their life.
Western
Non-fatal injuries
Very few non-fatal injuries to members of the public are recorded. Many types of accidents that
occur to members of the public have a high likelihood of fatality. In addition, injuries occurring during
acts of prohibited behaviour such as trespass are not likely to be reported.
•
Fifty major injuries were recorded in 2014/15, of which 19 were to trespassers. There were 179
minor injuries (24 to trespassers), as well as three cases of shock or trauma (none to trespassers).
Trend in accidental harm to members of the public
From 2009/10 the classification of trespass has been based on an improved data set; the overall
levels of harm to members of the public before and after this date are not directly comparable. The
average level of harm to members of the public over the period 2009/10 to 2014/15 was 44.7 FWI
per year.
FWI
Chart 6.
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Trend in public harm by accident type
Weighted injuries (all types)
Other fatalities (not trespass or LC)
61.6
11
44
2005/06
61.2
9
43
2006/07
66.0
8
52
2007/08
65.0
12
46
2008/09
Level crossing fatalities
Trespass fatalities
Improved classification of
public fatalities
60.4
13
42
2009/10
51.6
35.1
6
23
2010/11
4
47.7
9
40
33
2011/12
2012/13
34.9
38.4
7
10
23
22
2013/14
2014/15
•
At 38.4 FWI, the harm to members of the public recorded in 2014/15 was higher than for
2013/14, but below the six-year average of 44.7 FWI.
•
The number of level crossing fatalities for 2014/15 was 10; eight were pedestrian users of level
crossings (one of whom was a cyclist) and two were car occupants.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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13
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.6
Long-term historical trends
Train accidents
Over the past 50 years, there have been many improvements in rail operations and management,
such as multi-aspect signalling and increased application of the Automatic Warning System (AWS). In
more recent years, there have been developments in the areas of signals passed at danger (SPAD)
risk, including the implementation of the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS),
improvements in track quality, and increased crashworthiness of rolling stock. These have all led to
further reductions in train accident risk.
Chart 7.
Fifty-year trend in train accidents with passenger or workforce fatalities
10
Train accidents with passenger or workforce fatalities
Average number over preceding 10 years
Fatal train accidents
8
6
4
2
2014/15
2012/13
2010/11
2008/09
2006/07
2004/05
2002/03
2000/01
1998/99
1996/97
1994/95
1992/93
1990/91
1988/89
1986/87
1984/85
1982/83
1980/81
1978/79
1976/77
1974/75
1972/73
1970/71
1968/69
1966/67
1964/65
0
•
There were no train accidents resulting in passenger or workforce fatalities during 2014/15. This
is the eighth year in succession with no such fatalities. In the past decade, there has been one
year that had a train accident with on-board fatalities; the current ten-year rate for this type of
fatal train accident is now 0.1 per year. This is the lowest level ever achieved.
•
The chart does not show train accidents that result solely in fatalities to members of the public,
for example as might result from a train collision with a road vehicle at a level crossing.
Data source: ORR for historical data; SMIS for recent statistics.
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Causes of historic train accidents
Historically, SPADs and train operations (a category that covers a wide range of workforce errors and
misjudgements) have accounted for most of the fatal accidents.
The expected time interval between multi-fatality events is increasing. The first version of the SRM
calculated in 2001 that a train accident with at least 10 fatalities would be expected about once
every three years. The latest version (SRMv8.1, 2014) shows that such a serious accident is now
expected only once in 21 years. This reflects the industry’s success in tackling train accident risk,
including the system improvements that have taken place over the past decade such as TPWS, the
removal of Mark I rolling stock, and improvements in train crashworthiness and track quality.
The risk from train accidents is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 Train operations and Chapter 8 Level
crossings.
Trend in the causes of train accidents with passenger or workforce fatalities
4.5
4.0
3.5
Decade to 1975
to 1985
to 1995
to 2005
to 2015
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0
0
0
Train operations
and failures
SPADs
and adhesion
Infrastructure
failures
0
Objects
on the line
0
0.0
Level
crossings
0.5
Infrastructure
operations
Fatal accidents per billion train km
Chart 8.
Data source: ORR for historical data; SMIS for recent data.
•
There have been steady reductions in the frequency of train accidents with on-board fatalities
over the past 50 years. These reductions have been caused by a number of the factors that are
largely within the industry’s control, namely SPADs, infrastructure operations, and train
operations and failures. A reduction in accidents due to infrastructure failures has been notable
in the last two decades.
•
The trend is less clear for causes over which the industry can exert some influence, but which are
often not under its direct control, particularly level crossing risk. The chart above lists only those
level crossing collisions that have resulted in on-board fatalities, but members of the public bear
the brunt of train accidents at level crossings; there are a notable additional number of level
crossing collisions that have resulted in fatality to members of the public only.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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15
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Fatalities
Chart 9.
Trends in fatalities over the past 50 years
400
350
300
Fatalities
250
200
Passenger
Workforce
Public (mainline railway)
Public (all railways)
150
100
50
2014/15
2012/13
2010/11
2008/09
2006/07
2004/05
2002/03
2000/01
1998/99
1996/97
1994/95
1992/93
1990/91
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
0
•
The trend in fatalities for both passengers and workforce has shown marked long-term
improvement.
•
The greatest improvement over the past 50 years has been in the number of workforce fatalities,
which exceeded 100 per year in the early 1960s, but is now typically lower than five per year. The
amount of maintenance work being performed in the early 1960s, as well as the more labourintensive methods used, contributed to the higher-risk environment. Subsequent technological
and operational improvements not only reduced the railway’s maintenance requirement, but
also helped create better working conditions.
•
The trend in public fatalities (mainly trespass, suicide and suspected suicide) is shown for the
whole railway system (ie including London Underground and other non-mainline railways) up to
2001/02 and for the mainline railway only from 1990/91 onwards. The ten-year period of overlap
indicates that the shape of the trend is similar, with or without the inclusion of non-mainline
data.
•
In contrast to trends for passengers and workforce, there has been no sustained reduction in the
number of public trespass and suicide fatalities. Causes of trespass and suicide are not directly
influenced by technological or methodological advancements in railway operations. The number
of public fatalities recorded for the mainline railway in 2014/15 is at its highest point.
Data source: Passengers and workforce – ORR data for mainline railway up to 1993/94, RSSB data from 1994/95 onwards.
Public (all railways) – ORR data. Public (mainline railway) – ORR up to 1993/94, RSSB data from 1994/95 onwards.
_________________________________________________________________
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_________________________________________________________________
Rail usage
In 2014/15, there were 1.66 billion passenger journeys (4% increase on 2013/14), 62.8 billion
passenger kilometres (4% increase), and 47.2 million freight train kilometres (3% decrease).
Chart 10.
Trends in rail usage over the past 50 years
250%
Passenger km
Passenger journeys
Freight moved (tonne km)
Index (base year 1965/66 = 100)
200%
Total passenger & freight train km
150%
100%
50%
2014/15
2012/13
2010/11
2008/09
2006/07
2004/05
2002/03
2000/01
1998/99
1996/97
1994/95
1992/93
1990/91
1988/89
1986/87
1984/85
1982/83
1980/81
1978/79
1976/77
1974/75
1972/73
1970/71
1968/69
1966/67
0%
Data source: ORR National Rail Trends and DfT Transport Statistics Great Britain. Passenger journeys include both franchised and nonfranchised passenger services.
•
Between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, passenger journeys and passenger kilometres
showed decreasing or flat trends, largely as a result of the increasing ownership of road vehicles.
•
Since privatisation began in 1994/95, there has been a general growth in passenger kilometres
and journeys, reflecting changes in society, transport policy and the economic climate.
•
In 2009/10, the economic recession led to a slowing down in the growth in rail usage; passenger
journeys briefly showed a small decrease. However, figures since then indicate that this was a
temporary effect, with usage again showing rising trends.
•
Up until around 2006/07, freight usage showed a similar trend to passenger usage, although it
has never regained the volumes seen in the early 1960s and earlier. Following 2006/07, there
was a short period of decreasing usage, which now appears to be reversing.
•
Over the past decade (2005/06 to 2014/15):
−
Passenger journeys have increased by 54%
−
Passenger kilometres have increased by 46%
−
Freight tonne kilometres have increased by 2%
−
Train kilometres have increased by 8%
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.7
Common Safety Targets and National Reference Values
The Railway Safety Directive states the requirement for Member States to ensure that safety is
generally maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously improved. The European
Railway Agency (ERA) is mandated to develop Common Safety Targets (CSTs) and National Reference
Values (NRVs) to monitor the performance of Member States in this area.
The NRVs are designed to reflect observed baseline levels of safety in each Member State. NRVs are
calculated based on a form of weighted average performance over a period of time; this reduces the
effect of ‘outliers’, in recognition of the potentially distorting effect of a single multi-fatality event.
The current (second) set of NRVs are based on the six-year period 2004 to 2009; the first set were
based on the four years from 2004 to 2007.
The ERA is monitoring each Member State’s performance against its NRVs to determine whether
levels of safety are at least being maintained in each category. The level of performance is assessed
using the Common Safety Indicators (CSIs) that National Safety Authorities submit to the ERA as part
of their annual safety reports. 4
While the rest of the ASPR presents statistics on data for GB mainline railway, the analysis in this
section covers UK as a whole, as it is at this level that the CSIs, CSTs and NRVs are set.
RSSB co-ordinates the collation of UK CSIs by identifying potentially relevant events from SMIS and
validating them with the transport operators involved. It provides CSI data to the ORR on behalf of
the industry, which satisfies the requirements set out in the Railways and Other Guided Transport
Systems (ROGS) Regulation 20(1)(c) for transport operators to produce an annual set of safety data.
The CSTs apply to all Member States. The CST in each category is equal to the lower of (i) the highest
NRV value and (ii) 10 times the average NRV for all Member States. Meeting the second set of CSTs is
unlikely to be of concern to countries with relatively strong safety performance, such as the UK. In
the longer term, the ERA is likely to set more challenging CSTs that apply to all Member States and
are targeted to the higher-risk parts of the rail system. 5
The second set of NRVs
NRVs and CSTs are defined in terms of fatalities and weighted serious injuries (FWSI), divided by a
suitable normaliser, and specified for six categories, pertaining to different groups of people. A
serious injury, which occurs if the victim is hospitalised for a period of longer than 24 hours, is given
one-tenth the weighting of a fatality.
The person type categories align with those used by RSSB, with the exception of passengers. The ERA
defines a person as a passenger only if he or she is on, or in the act of boarding or alighting from, a
train; this is more restrictive than the RSSB/RIDDOR definition. The ERA category others covers other
Because CSIs are available only from 2006, and because of concerns about the quality of the CSI data being provided by
some Member States, the ERA based its NRV calculations on data supplied to Eurostat under European Commission (EC)
Regulations No 91/2003 and 1192/2003. Prior to 2006, UK data submitted to Eurostat aligns with that published by the ORR
(ie only confirmed suicides are omitted), whereas from 2006 onwards the data are based on an application of the
Ovenstone criteria. This resulted in an inflated number of reported trespasser fatalities for 2004 and 2005, relative to
subsequent years. RSSB and ORR work together to ensure the consistency of the annual ERA and Eurostat submissions.
5 ERA plans to develop a revised set of CSTs by mid-2015 based solely on CSI data. It will also revise the assessment method,
which has shown limitations when assessing risk levels in States with very low numbers of accident victims in particular
categories.
4
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_________________________________________________________________
(RSSB) passengers – such as a person who falls from a platform and is struck by a train – as well as
members of the public who are neither trespassing nor using a level crossing.
It is important to note that the NRVs, CSTs and accident-related CSIs only cover significant accidents
that involve railway vehicles in motion (collisions, derailments, persons struck by trains etc). The CSIs
therefore only represent a subset of the accidents that take place on the railway, and measuring
against the NRVs does not provide a complete assessment of overall safety performance.
Table 5 shows the second set of NRVs and CSTs, as they apply to the UK. The column NRV rank shows
where the UK’s NRV ranks among the EU-25 countries. 6
For the UK, the second set of NRVs present much more challenging targets than the first set,
especially in the area of passenger safety. The level of harm specified by NRVs 1.1 and 1.2 is now less
than the SRMv8.1 estimate of the risk to passengers from accidents that are within the scope of
European reporting.
NRV and CST definitions and values 7
NRV Category
Passengers
Employees
UK NRV
NRV
number
NRV 1.1
NRV 1.2
NRV 2
NRV 3.1
Level crossing users
NRV 3.2
Others
NRV 4
Unauthorised
persons on railway
premises
NRV 5
Whole society
NRV 6
Definition
Number of passenger FWSI per billion
passenger train kilometres.
Number of passenger FWSI per billion
passenger kilometres.
Number of employee FWSI per billion
train kilometres.
Number of road vehicle occupant and
pedestrian FWSI per billion train
kilometres.
Number of road vehicle occupant and
pedestrian FWSI per billion train
traverses over a crossing.
Number of other person FWSI per
billion train kilometres.
Number of unauthorised person FWSI
per billion train kilometres. Note: This
excludes suicides.
Total number of passengers,
employee level crossing user, other
and unauthorised person FWSI per
billion train kilometres.
NRV
rank
in
EU-25
CST
Second
set
First
set
2.73
6.22
1
207
0.0276
0.0623
1
1.91
5.17
8.33
3
77.9
23.5
23.0
1
710
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
7.00
6.98
n/a
35.5
84.5
94.7
5
2045
120.0
131.0
2
2587
Norway, which sits outside the EU but collaborates with the ERA and EU member states on matters of railway safety, has
NRVs that are lower than the UK’s in the categories of employees, level crossing users and whole society.
7 NRV 3.2 has been omitted from the assessments of the first and second set of NRVs because of concerns about the quality
and consistency of normalising data across the member states. For NRV 4, assessment was first published in the 2013
report. It is not appropriate to rank the UK on this NRV because the data behind its calculation was not based on the UK
(there being insufficient events for the UK over the period of its calculation). The NRV for Ireland is based on the UK, as
insufficient data for Ireland was available.
6
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19
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Assessing performance against the NRVs
The ERA assesses performance against each NRV on the basis of the latest available calendar year’s
performance and a moving weighted average (MWA) over a defined period. The periods used for the
calculation of the NRVs/CSTs and MWAs are shown in the diagram below.
Second set of NRVs/CSTs
(amended)
2015
assessment
MWA (5 yrs)
2012
MWA (5 yrs)
2011
2014
assessment
Second set of NRVs/CSTs
(amended)
MWA (5 yrs)
2010
2013
assessment
Second set of NRVs/CSTs
2009
MWA (5 yrs)
2008
2012
assessment
Second set of NRVs/CSTs
2007
MWA (4 yrs)
2006
2011
assessment
First set of
NRVs/ CSTs
2005
MWA (4 yrs)
2004
First set of
NRVs/ CSTs
2010
assessment
2013
To make allowance for statistical uncertainty, the ERA will only consider flagging up concerns about
safety to a Member State if its level of performance falls outside the NRV plus a 20% tolerance limit,
and if this apparent deterioration cannot be attributed to a single high-consequence accident.
In such cases, and in relation to the NRV in question, the ERA will then ask whether this is the first
time that the state has been in this position in the last three years, and whether the number of CSIreportable events has remained stable or decreased.
•
If the answer to both questions is yes, the ERA will still conclude that performance is acceptable,
and the Member State will not be required to take specific action.
•
If the answer to both questions is no, then the ERA will conclude that there has been a probable
deterioration of safety performance. The Member State will be required to provide a written
statement explaining the likely causes and – where needed – submit a safety enhancement plan
to the European Commission (EC).
•
In the remaining cases, the ERA will conclude that there has been a possible deterioration of
safety performance, and the Member State will be required to provide a written explanatory
statement.
The DfT is accountable to the EC for the UK’s performance. If there were to be a genuine
deterioration in safety, then the DfT would initially look to ORR, as the safety regulator, to ensure
that the industry was taking remedial action. ORR would aim to work in co-operation with the
industry to understand the cause of the poor performance, and to ensure that the appropriate action
was taken. However, if enforcement action were needed, the relevant legislative tools would be:
•
Health and safety enforcement powers, which might be applicable if safety levels were
deteriorating.
•
ROGS regulations, which require each transport operator to have a safety management system
that ensures the mainline railway can achieve its CSTs.
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Current performance against the NRVs
The second set of NRVs are based on the six years of data from 2004 to 2009. The ERA’s results of the
fourth assessment of the second set of NRVs, published in March 2015 was based on the five-year
period 2009 to 2013, and showed that all states met their NRVs in all categories, apart from:
•
Bulgaria (level crossing users)
•
Italy (unauthorised persons)
•
Romania (employees)
•
Slovakia (employees; whole society)
ERA states, in the report, that the results determined for the category of ‘others’ are judged to be
unreliable, due to poor data quality, but goes on to say that despite continued limitations on the data
used for assessments, the results of the report should be considered valid, and the above states
should carry out further investigation into the results.
UK data for 2014 has not yet been submitted to the ERA (it will feature in the ERA’s 2016
assessment), but the following charts present provisional performance estimates based on the data
that has been collated by RSSB on behalf of transport operators. If the green line (the weighted
moving average of normalised FWSI) lies below the dashed red line (the NRV plus a 20% tolerance
limit) then safety performance is judged to be at an acceptable level. The provisional estimates
indicate that UK’s safety performance continues to be at an acceptable level in all measured NRV
categories.
NRVs for passenger safety
•
•
The NRVs relating to passenger safety cover
passenger FWSI from train accidents and
from other accidents involving railway
vehicles in motion (for example, a fall on
board a train caused by sudden braking).
The highest FWSI values for passengers were
recorded in 2004 and 2007. These reflect the
injuries that occurred in the train accidents at
Ufton and Grayrigg respectively.
The second set of NRVs represent a level of
passenger risk that is substantially lower than
the SRMv8.1 estimate. Consistently meeting
these NRVs will therefore be a considerable
challenge for the UK railway. Nevertheless,
performance since 2008 has been within the
NRVs.
18
FWSI per billion passenger train km
•
The UK has the lowest NRVs for passenger
safety of all EU states.
Passenger safety: NRV 1.1
Normalised FWSI (actual)
Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
NRV
NRV plus 20% tolerance
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Chart 12.
0.18
FWSI per billion passenger km
•
Chart 11.
0.16
0.14
Passenger safety: NRV 1.2
Normalised FWSI (actual)
Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
NRV
NRV plus 20% tolerance
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
NRV for employee safety
•
Most FWSI in this category arises from infrastructure workers being struck by trains.
•
Performance in 2014 was within the NRV
(there was one workforce fatality during
the year within European reporting scope,
which was an infrastructure worker who
was struck by a train).
•
In 2004, there were particularly high
numbers of both fatalities and serious
injuries to infrastructure workers.
Employee safety: NRV 2
20
Normalised FWSI (actual)
Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
NRV
NRV plus 20% tolerance
18
FWSI per billion train km
•
Chart 13.
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
When compared to estimates from
0
SRMv8.1, the employee NRV is a good
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
estimate of the underlying level of risk to
employees from accidents within the scope of European reporting.
NRV for level crossing safety 8
•
The UK has the lowest NRV for level
crossing safety of all EU Member States.
This NRV covers both pedestrians and
road vehicle occupants involved in
collisions with trains on level crossings
(but not train occupants).
Chart 14.
Level crossing safety: NRV 3.1
35
30
FWSI per billion train km
•
25
20
15
•
10
There were a relatively low number of
Normalised FWSI (actual)
Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
level crossing user fatalities in 2010 to
5
NRV
NRV plus 20% tolerance
2012, and performance remains currently
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
within the NRV. In some previous years,
the weighted moving average of
normalised FWSI had exceeded the NRV but fallen within the 20% tolerance limit.
•
When compared to estimates from SRMv8.1, the values of the level crossing NRVs are a
reasonable estimate of the underlying level of risk to level crossing users from accidents within
the scope of European reporting.
•
The ERA has not set values for NRV 3.2 because of concerns about the quality of normalising
data. NRV 3.2 will measure FWSI at level crossings normalised by the number of times that trains
are estimated to traverse level crossings during the year. There are currently no plans in place to
normalise by the volume of road traffic and the number of pedestrians using level crossings.
Although ERA notes that data quality is improving, because of on-going concerns about the quality of information being
supplied by some member states, it continues to use Eurostat data to assess performance against the NRVs. The
classifications used by Eurostat do not differentiate between level crossing users, unauthorised persons and others. ERA
analyses are based on the assumption that anyone in this combined category who is injured in an accident at a level
crossing is a level crossing user, anyone injured in a rolling stock in motion accident is an unauthorised person, and anyone
else is classed as other. This results in a number of casualties being misclassified (for example, people who are struck by
trains at, or after falling from, the platform edge will feature as unauthorised persons in the ERA statistics and in the charts
in this section). ERA will begin using CSI data once they have sufficient confidence in its quality. See also the footnote 4 on
page 18.
8
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_________________________________________________________________
NRV for other persons 9
•
This NRV covers the risk to people who do not fall into any other category. This includes people
who are struck by trains in stations (when not trespassing or boarding or alighting from trains)
and members of the public who are not trespassing or using level crossings. However, because of
the limitations on the data classifications of the Eurostat data used by ERA (see footnote 8 on
page 22), the ERA data does not accurately reflect the numbers falling into this category.
•
The NRV of 7.0 FWSI per year was not based on UK data because there were too few incidents
for its calculation.
NRV for unauthorised persons 10
•
This NRV covers the risk from trespassers being struck by trains, and from ‘train surfers’.
•
Performance since 2012 has been within
the NRV. This follows 2011 where
performance was above the NRV, but
within the 20% tolerance limit: the
number of trespass fatalities in that year
was relatively high. The weighted moving
average has consistently been within the
NRV since 2008.
Some of the Eurostat data used to set the
NRV was based on a different suicide
classification than is being applied to CSI
data (see footnote 4 in Section 2.7).
160
Safety of unauthorised persons: NRV 5
Prior to 2006, in the data supplied to Eurostat, fatalities were
treated as accidental in the absence of a coroner's verdict of
suicide. This led to an inflated number of trespasser fatalities
compared with later years, when the Ovenstone criteria were
used.
140
FWSI per billion train km
•
Chart 15.
120
100
80
60
40
Normalised FWSI (actual)
Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
NRV
NRV plus 20% tolerance
20
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
NRV for the whole of society
•
The UK NRV value in this category is the second lowest of all Member States.
•
This NRV represents the overall impact of
the railway on its passengers, staff and
members of the public (excluding suicides
but including trespassers).
Performance in 2014 was within the NRV.
•
Unauthorised persons (that is,
trespassers) are the dominant contributor
to this risk category. Changes in the risk to
passengers, staff, level crossing users and
others are likely to have relatively little
impact.
250
FWSI per billion train km
•
Chart 16.
200
Whole society safety: NRV 6
Prior to 2006, in the data supplied to Eurostat, fatalities were
treated as accidental in the absence of a coroner's verdict of
suicide. This led to an inflated number of trespasser fatalities
compared with later years, when the Ovenstone criteria were
used.
150
100
50
0
Normalised FWSI (actual)
Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
NRV
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
See footnote 8. The analysis of performance against this NRV is insufficiently meaningful for review, given the limitations
on the data behind it.
10 See footnote 8.
9
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Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.8
Industry collaboration in safety management
A wide variety of groups, forums and arrangements have been established both nationally and
regionally between train operators, freight operators, Network Rail, infrastructure contractors and
RSSB to help understand system safety risk, review performance and sponsor improvement actions.
These meetings all play a part in delivering the legal ‘duty of co-operation’ obligation on rail
companies.
Subgroups of System Safety Risk Group (SSRG)
Other industry
Mainline
The current stakeholder collaborative group structure, at a national level, is outlined in the diagram
below:
Yards, depots
and sidings
11
People on Trains and in Stations Risk Group (PTSRG): Personal
injuries to passengers, workforce and members of the public on
trains and in stations (incl. assaults, excl. trespass)
67.8 FWI
Train Operations Risk Group (TORG): Train accidents due to any
cause (excl. at LC); personal injuries on the running line during train
operation
5.1 FWI
Level Crossing Strategy Group (LCSG): All harm from train accidents
and from personal accidents occurring at LC
11.4 FWI
Trespass Risk Group (TRG): All accidental harm arising from trespass
at all locations
33.4 FWI
Road Driving Risk Project Steering Group (RDR PSG): Injuries to
workforce while travelling in road vehicles for work-related purposes
1.2 FWI
National Suicide Prevention Steering Group (NSPSG) 11: Injuries to
suicidal persons, and personal injuries to third parties (eg witnesses
to the suicidal act)
245.3 FWI
Network Rail / Infrastructure Safety Liaison Group (ISLG): Injuries
to infrastructure workers on the running line or elsewhere on
mainline railway property (excl. trains, stations, LC and RTAs)
10.1 FWI
Network Rail / single duty holder: Injuries that occur on mainline
railway, not covered by any other group
1.7 FWI
Network Rail / single duty holder: Accidents and injuries to
workforce and members of the public in yards, depots and sidings
7.6 FWI
The risk under the remit of NSPSG also includes the indirect (accidental) risk from suicides eg workforce shock/trauma.
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2.8.1
The System Safety Risk Group and its subgroups
System Safety Risk Group (SSRG)
The purpose of SSRG is to have sight of how system safety is being managed within the industry and
through this, to identify areas for improvement, including the sharing of good practice and the
identification of potential threats and opportunities through horizon scanning. The group has
representation from across the rail industry, including Network Rail, train operating companies
(TOCs) and freight operating companies (FOCs), infrastructure companies and ROSCOs. The group is
facilitated by RSSB, and has observer membership from BTP, ORR and trade unions.
SSRG reports to the RSSB Board and has a number of subgroups that report to it, described briefly
below. In addition, it works co-operatively with the wider industry, through other existing groups.
Data and Risk Strategy Group (DRSG)
The purpose of DRSG is to develop and oversee the delivery of the industry-wide strategy for the
collection, analysis and reporting of safety related data, and the development and use of risk tools
and models.
People on Trains and in Stations Risk Group (PTSRG)
The purpose of PTSRG is to consider risks to the workforce, passengers and public in stations and on
board trains on Network Rail controlled infrastructure, resulting from assault and other crime and
anti-social behaviour, train despatch and the PTI, on-board injuries, and slips, trips and falls. The part
of the ASPR of most relevance to this group is Chapter 4 People on trains and in stations.
Train Operations Risk Group (TORG)
The purpose of TORG is to understand and review the proportion of total system risk relevant to its
scope. The group is required to: monitor the effectiveness of current control arrangements, identify
and sponsor improvement opportunities including research and RSSB-facilitated products and
services; learn from and promote good practice; facilitate co-operation; respond to requests from
SSRG and other co-operative forums; and consider future developments that may impact its risk. The
part of the ASPR of most relevance to this group is Chapter 7 Train operations.
Level Crossing Strategy Group (LCSG)
The LCSG meets on an eight-weekly basis and is attended by Network Rail, train operators, BTP, DfT,
railway unions and ADEPT (local highway Authority). Its terms of reference include reviewing the risk
to users of level crossings and train occupants. Some of the group’s objectives include; reviewing
current control arrangements and risk mitigations in place, to sponsor and govern research, learning
and promotion of good practice/co-operation and responding to SSRG. The part of the ASPR of most
relevance to this group is Chapter 8 Level crossings.
Trespass Risk Group (TRG)
The TRG is a new cross-industry group that covers trespass of the mainline railway and of YDS. It will
monitor the effectiveness of current control arrangements, identify and sponsor improvement
opportunities, including research and relevant products and services; learn from and promote good
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_________________________________________________________________
practice; facilitate cooperation; and consider future developments that may impact its risk (horizon
scanning).
An event is considered to be trespass if it involves access to prohibited areas of the railway and
involves deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. Such behaviour includes deliberately alighting a train in
running in circumstances other than as part of a controlled evacuation procedure, and getting down
from the platform to the tracks to retrieve an item that has been dropped. Events involving incorrect
usage of level crossings are not categorised as trespass, unless the person goes on to access the
running line via the crossing. The part of the ASPR of most relevance to this group is Chapter 9
Trespass.
Road Driving Risk Project Steering Group (RDR PSG)
The RDR PSG was established by the RSSB Board in May 2013. The purpose of the group was to
engage with the rail industry and increase awareness and understanding of road driving risks to
workers and the business, such as by the provision of guidance to improve driving behaviour. Since
its inception, the group has published briefings on Arriva Trains taxi arrangements, Network Rail
Safety Trucks, driverless cars, and produced an A5 leaflet Driving down the risk. Work planned by the
group during 2015/16 includes defining what constitutes a ‘work journey’ and agreeing the reporting
scope of road traffic accidents. The main part of the ASPR of interest to this group is Chapter 6 Road
driving risk.
National Suicide Prevention Steering Group (NSPSG)
The overarching purpose of NSPSG is to reduce the train delays, and the distress to rail staff and
passengers, from suicides. It meets on an eight-weekly basis, with membership comprising Network
Rail, train operators, BTP, Samaritans, RSSB, ORR, Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC),
Transport for London (TfL), and railway unions.
The primary delivery vehicle is the Suicide Prevention Programme, for which NSPSG provides
strategic direction, a forum for relevant information to be shared between appropriate groups and a
joined-up approach to be adopted, and a means of promoting the Programme and overcoming any
difficulties in its delivery. It also acts as the sponsor for research activities in the area of suicide. The
part of the ASPR of most relevance to this group is Chapter 10.
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2.8.2
Where industry collaboration targets risk
By addressing key areas of risk on the railway, each industry stakeholder group helps in the
management of the risk to people using or working on the railway. The following shows where this
happens, for passengers, workforce and members of the public.
Passengers
The SRMv8.1 estimate of risk to
passengers is 58.4 FWI per year.
Chart 17.
The majority of this risk (55.0 FWI per
year) falls within the remit of PTSRG.
Analysis of this risk area is shown in
Chapter 4 Passengers and public.
Collaboration about passenger risk
People on Trains
and Stations Risk
Group,
55.0 FWI/year
A further 2.6 FWI per year occurs in train
accidents such as train collisions or
derailments. This risk is under the remit
of TORG, and is analysed in Chapter 7
Train operations.
Train Operations
Risk Group,
2.6 FWI/year
Level Crossing
Steering Group,
0.8 FWI/year
The remaining 0.8 FWI per year occurs
at level crossings. Of this, 0.2 FWI per year occurs to passengers on trains, from collisions with road
vehicles and 0.6 FWI per year occurs to passengers on station crossings, struck by trains. This area of
risk is discussed further in Chapter 8 Level crossings.
Members of the public
The SRMv8.1 estimate of risk to members of the public is 47.5 FWI per year (excluding suicide).
The majority of this risk (33.6 FWI per
year) falls within the remit of TRG.
Most of this (33.3 FWI per year) occurs
as trespass on the mainline. Analysis of
this risk area is shown in Chapter 9
Trespass. The remaining 0.3 FWI per
year being trespass in YDS.
Chart 18.
Collaboration about risk to the public
Network Rail /
single duty
holder,
0.8 FWI/year
Trespass Risk
Group,
33.6 FWI/year
People on Trains
and Stations Risk
Group,
2.4 FWI/year
A notable proportion (10.3 FWI per
year) occurs at level crossings. Of this,
Level Crossing
Train Operations
3.3 FWI per year are injuries to road
Steering Group,
Risk Group,
10.3 FWI/year
0.7 FWI/year
vehicle occupants as a result of
collisions with trains, and 7.0 FWI per
year are injuries to pedestrian users,
mostly from accidents involving being
hit by trains. This risk is under the remit of LCSG, and is analysed in Chapter 8 Level crossings.
A small proportion of risk to members of the public arises from train accidents away from level
crossings. This mostly comprises train collisions with road vehicle incursions from bridges or
embankments. Train accident risk is discussed in Chapter 7 Train operations.
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Around 2.4 FWI per year occurs in accidents in stations, and falls under the scope of PTSRG. These
accidents are very similar in nature to those occurring to passengers in stations, and are covered in
Chapter 4 People on trains and in stations.
The remaining 0.8 FWI per year comprises the relatively small risk from accidents elsewhere on
railway property, such as people who fall from bridges onto railway property (but not as a result of
trespass) or third parties who are affected by fires or other hazards within railway bounds. These
accidents do not fall within the collaborative scope of an SSRG group, but remain the responsibility of
the duty holder.
Workforce
The SRMv8.1 estimate of risk to the workforce is 33.4 FWI per year, with 26.1 FWI per year occurring
on the mainline railway, and 7.3 FWI per year occurring in YDS. This is considered in Chapter 11.
Of the mainline risk:
•
•
10.4 FWI per year falls under the scope
of PTSRG. This comprises accidents such
as slips, trips and falls in stations,
workforce assaults, and on-board
injuries; these risk areas are also
discussed in Chapter 4 People on trains
and in stations.
1.8 FWI per year falls under the scope
of TORG. This comprises injuries as a
result of train accidents such as
derailments and train collisions; train
accident risk is discussed in Chapter 7
Train operations.
Chart 19.
Industry groups collaborating in the
management of workforce risk
Yards, depots and
sidings,
7.3 FWI/year
People on Trains
and Stations Risk
Group,
10.4 FWI/year
Network Rail /
single duty holder,
0.9 FWI/year
Network Rail /
Infrastructure
Liaison Safety
Group,
10.1 FWI/year
Train Operations
Risk Group,
1.8 FWI/year
Level Crossing
Steering Group,
0.3 FWI/year
National Suicide
Prevention
Steering Group,
1.2 FWI/year
Road Driving Risk
Project Steering
Group,
1.2 FWI/year
Trespass Risk
Group,
0.1 FWI/year
•
0.3 FWI falls within the scope of LCSG,
and arises mainly from train collisions
with road vehicles at level crossings. This is covered in Chapter 8 Level crossings.
•
Road driving risk is an area that has rightly received increased attention lately, and has resulted
in the establishment of the RDR PSG, a new subgroup of SSRG. SRMv8.1 estimates 1.2 FWI per
year from this cause; more information is presented in Chapter 6 Road driving risk.
•
Members of the workforce, particularly train drivers, are at risk of shock/trauma from incidents
where members of the public take their life, or are injured while trespassing. Amounting to 1.3
FWI per year in total, this source of risk is mainly being considered by NSPSG, and in discussed in
Chapters 9 Trespass and 10 Suicide.
•
A notable proportion of risk to the workforce on the mainline involves infrastructure work.
Around 10.1 FWI per year is estimated to affect infrastructure workers involved on track work.
Although not covered by a subgroup of SSRG, both Network Rail and ISLG are focused on this
area of risk, which is discussed further in Chapter 5.
•
A much smaller proportion of work on the mainline has no specific focus group, as it relates to
causes of risk falling within the remit of single duty holders, such as slips, trips and falls in signal
boxes.
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2.8.3
Other industry groups
In addition to SSRG and its subgroups, there are a large number of other industry bodies that work
together in support of current and future GB rail operations. A selection are outlined below, but for a
full overview, the reader is referred to the RSSB website: http://www.rssb.co.uk/groups-andcommittees.
Infrastructure Safety Liaison Group (ISLG)
Infrastructure Safety Liaison Group (ISLG) is a leading forum for GB railway contractors to work
together and with the wider industry to improve health, safety and environmental performance,
share experiences, good practice and knowledge. ISLG specifically aims to: review health, safety, and
environmental performance; review legislation and standards; clarify and prioritise risk issues;
Identify good practice and wider intelligence; facilitate solutions; influence and lobby industry; and
sponsor RSSB research, projects, and initiatives.
Rail Delivery Group and the Industry Strategic Business Plan
The Rail Delivery Group (RDG) comprises the owners of passenger and freight train operating
companies and Network Rail. It provides leadership to the rail industry on system-wide issues and coordinates the objectives of cross-industry groups, including the Technical Strategy Leadership Group
(see below), the National Task Force and the Planning Oversight Group, which is the industry’s senior
planning body.
Under the aegis of the RDG, the railway published its Industry Strategic Business Plans (ISBPs) in
January 2013: one covers England and Wales, the other Scotland.
These documents set out the industry’s plans for CP5. The plans are designed to deliver the
requirements set out by the Government in its High Level Output Specification (HLOS) and to align
with the shared long-term vision for the railway.
The HLOS for CP5 does not include quantified safety targets, but:
“..requires the industry to continue to improve its record on passenger and worker safety through
the application of the ‘so far as reasonably practicable’ approach and to ensure that current safety
levels are maintained and enhanced by focusing domestic efforts on the achievement of European
Common Safety Targets.”
It also states the government’s desire for a reduction in risk from accidents at level crossings, with
ring-fenced funding being made available for that purpose.
The ISBPs summarise the key challenges facing the industry, the strategies and plans it will
implement over the five-year period, and the outputs it expects to deliver. Some of the main
messages in terms of safety are:
•
Investment in new rolling stock and infrastructure, including station improvement works, is
expected to reduce the risk to passengers by around 9% on a per-journey basis during the course
of CP5.
•
Investment in safe access equipment for those working on the track, improved isolations of
traction power, and investment in plant safety will contribute to a reduction in workforce risk.
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•
Risk-based interventions to improve level crossing safety, including crossing closures, increased
use of enforcement cameras, and the replacement of whistle boards with local warning systems
at higher-risk locations are expected to result in an 8% reduction in the risk from level crossing
accidents.
The ISBPs are available from the Network Rail website:
http://www.networkrail.co.uk/publications/industry-strategic-business-plan-for-cp5/.
Technical Strategy Leadership Group and the Rail Technical Strategy
The Rail Technical Strategy (RTS) sets out a 30-year vision for the railway. It aims to assist the
industry’s strategic planning processes, informing policy makers and funders about the potential
benefits of new techniques and technologies and provide suppliers with guidance on the future
technical direction of the industry. A new edition of the RTS was launched in December 2012 (RTS
2012) based around the ‘4C’ challenges of increased capacity, reduced carbon, lower costs and
improved customer satisfaction.
The Technical Strategy Leadership Group (TSLG), a cross-industry expert body facilitated by RSSB, is
charged with developing and championing the implementation of the RTS. TSLG oversees the work of
the industry’s Systems Interface Committees and supports the Future Railway Programme and
strategic research.
The implementation of RTS 2012 involves the sustained application of effort across the whole of the
railway sector, including its suppliers, over the 30-year period. This cannot be done by one single
company, so TSLG brings together experts from the whole industry as well as government and
academia to ensure it can reflect consensus on the future strategy. TSLG provides leadership and
support, focusing on the gaps and maintaining the momentum for change, although it is expected
that most of the initiatives will flow through regular company and industry business planning
structures.
For more information on the 30-year vision for the railway, see the future railway website:
http://www.futurerailway.org/strategy/about/Pages/DownloadtheRTS.aspx
Or, for the RTS video illustrating the future railway see:
http://www.futurerailway.org/strategy/vision/Pages/On-Video.aspx
The Future Railway programme
The Future Railway programme is a collaboration between Network Rail and RSSB, which has been
established to support innovation in the delivery of the RTS. It has cross-industry support through the
TSLG and is run by RSSB.
Working with the industry and supply chain it promotes innovation by supporting cross-industry
demonstrator projects and seeks innovative ideas and proposals from across the industry.
It aims to see innovation embedded as part of everyday business within the rail industry,
concentrating on system-wide innovation opportunities where the parties involved are not able to
proceed on their own.
The approach is to: understand the challenges that industry faces; connect potential innovators with
these challenges; and, where necessary, allocate potential funding in order to identify the technology
and activity needed to deliver the railway of the future.
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Research and development
RSSB manages a cross-industry programme of research and development (R&D) on behalf of the
railway industry. It is funded by the DfT and aims to assist the industry and its stakeholders to
achieve the key objectives of improving performance and increasing capacity while reducing cost.
The R&D programme focuses on industry-wide research that no individual company or sector of the
industry can address on its own. It therefore includes research covering 'systems issues’ across the
whole railway, the engineering interfaces within the railway, and the interfaces with other parts of
the community. The programme supports industry and its stakeholders in the delivery of 'step
changes' in industry strategy within 30 years, as outlined in the RTS.
For more information on the R&D programme, see the R&D section of the RSSB website:
www.rssb.co.uk.
The Rail Research UK Association (RRUKA - http://rruka.org.uk/.) is a partnership between the
railway industry and UK universities, which seeks to enhance the already strong collaborative
relationship between academia and the industry. A RRUKA event in March 2013 brought together 18
industry organisations and 18 universities to explore methods for predicting the future risk profile for
the railway in order to allow rail companies to plan for and mitigate the effects of new or changing
hazards. Participants were encouraged to propose creative solutions to the problem of risk
prediction, and funding is being made available for those feasibility studies and projects with the
most promise. For more information see
http://www.sparkrail.org/Lists/Records/DispForm.aspx?ID=3902
The Sustainable Rail Programme
The Sustainable Rail Programme (SRP) supports the industry in addressing the risks and opportunities
of sustainable development. It focuses on key strategic issues and embedding sustainability at the
heart of the industry. In 2009, it published the Rail Industry Sustainable Development Principles.
These 10 principles are fundamental to the role that rail can play in a sustainable transport system,
and fundamental to the sustainability of rail itself. The Principles are now embedded in franchising,
HLOS and the ISBP for CP5. The Programme has also developed tools to support the industry in
achieving its sustainability goals including:
•
An online self-assessment tool to enable organisations from across the industry to judge
their own performance against the principles and help them plan their future strategy. This
can be found at: www.sustainablerailprogramme.co.uk
•
An online embodied carbon tool, which can be used for carbon footprinting, analysis and
optioneering. This can be found at: www.railindustrycarbon.com
The programme is currently developing industry plans for sustainable development in CP6 and a
programme to increase industry capability and understanding of sustainable development. For
further information please contact sustainablerailprogramme@rssb.co.uk
The Health and Wellbeing Programme
The Workforce Health and Wellbeing Programme supports railway industry cooperation and
collaboration to proactively improve health and wellbeing management within rail companies. The
programme works to a strategy and priorities identified by over 100 rail industry constituents and
health and wellbeing experts during workshops. The Roadmap developed was agreed by the RSSB
Board in March 2014. The roadmap identifies five strategic themes that guide the programmes
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activities, which are: Industry Leadership, Health and Engagement, Health Knowledge, Monitoring
and Reporting, and Behavioural Change. The Roadmap is overseen by the Health and Wellbeing
Policy Group (HWPG), which is the senior client group for health and wellbeing within rail. The HWPG
provides active support, direction, and guidance, on behalf of the RSSB board, on the development of
the Railway Health and Wellbeing Roadmap. The HWPG coordinates a variety of health activities at
an industry level, so that legal requirements, cost benefits, and improvements of industry health
provision within organisations can be universally achieved. Details about the Health and Wellbeing
Programme can be found at: http://www.rssb.co.uk/improving-industry-performance/workforcepassenger-and-the-public/workforce-health-and-wellbeing.
2.9
Key safety statistics: safety overview
Safety Overview
Fatalities
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Major injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Minor injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Incidents of shock
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Harm from suicides and attempted
suicides
Suicides
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
39
53
48
37
39
7
5
3
4
3
1
1
2
3
3
31
47
43
30
33
445
471
517
498
521
250
258
313
276
296
159
172
162
177
175
36
41
42
45
50
12625
12965
12761
12719
13137
5600
5954
6379
6353
6842
6837
6824
6202
6203
6116
188
187
180
163
179
1396
1511
1217
1262
1074
226
262
238
236
253
1166
1246
973
1024
818
4
3
6
2
3
107.20
125.10
124.02
111.14
114.53
42.85
42.54
46.55
43.76
44.70
29.24
30.97
29.78
32.44
31.41
35.11
51.59
47.70
34.95
38.42
212.67
252.39
249.57
283.52
296.89
209
250
246
278
293
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3
Benchmarking railway performance
This chapter looks at railway safety in the wider context. It uses a range of data sources 12 to examine
the safety of other transport modes, of railways in other countries, and in other industries, and
compares them with the mainline railway in Britain.
2014/15 Headlines
•
Competition between different modes of transport remains intense. The factors that increasingly
influence transport choices include speed, cost, comfort, convenience, safety and environmental
impact. Many regard the relative safety of rail travel compared to other modes as one of its
strengths.
−
Public transport is generally safer than private transport.
−
Rail travel is generally safer than road travel. There have been marked improvements in
road safety in recent years, with a 49% reduction in fatality rate between 2006 and 2013.
•
Safety on the UK’s railways compares favourably with other EU countries. International railways
differ in terms of infrastructure, rolling stock, working practices and the external hazards to
which they are exposed.
•
Train drivers, infrastructure workers and station staff appear to be exposed to a broadly similar
level of risk to workers in comparable occupations. Data quality varies between different
occupational groups.
Benchmarking at a glance
1500
Fatality risk per traveller
km as a multiple of rail
1292
1000
500
0
1
4
22
Mainline railway
Bus or coach
Car
387
395
Pedestrian
Pedal cycle
Motorcycle
Sources: See Section 3.2.1
All analyses in this chapter use the latest data available. In a number of cases – for example, when the source is Transport Statistics Great
Britain – this is from the calendar year 2013.
12
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Benchmarking railway performance
__________________________________________________________________________
3.1
Transport risk in general
According to the National Travel Survey (NTS), the average Briton spends just under one hour per day
travelling. According to the Office of National Statistics (ONS) transport accidents account, in total,
for around 13% of all accidental deaths, with accidents accounting for just over 2% of the total
number of deaths.
Chart 20.
Proportion of deaths due to accidents, by age and cause, 2013
Proportion occurring within each age group
100%
Proportion of accidental deaths due to causes not related to transport
Proportion of accidental deaths due to causes related to transport
Proportion of deaths due to accidents
Proportion of all deaths by age group
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
>89
85-89
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
All ages
0%
•
Among the population as a whole, accidents cause 2.4% of the total number of deaths. Other
deaths are due mostly to natural causes (eg illness, disease, or existing health conditions), but
also include suicide and unlawful killing.
•
The rate of accidental death within different age groups varies considerably from the population
average of 2.4%. Nearly one third (29% in 2013) of deaths in the 20-24 age group are accidental,
the highest proportion within any age group; of these, just over half are due to some form of
transport.
•
Over 80% of all deaths are to those aged 65 or
over. Within these older age groups, only a small
proportion of deaths are accidental (<2%). Of
those that are accidental, the proportion resulting
from transport accidents decreases with age; as
people get older, there is a tendency to travel less,
and an increasing vulnerability to accidents in
other locations, such as the home.
•
Chart 21.
Accidental transport fatalities,
2013
Other transport
Rail (passengers)
Rail (workforce)
Rail (public)
4%
13%
97.1%
Of all the accidental fatalities that involved
transport in 2013, 2.9% involved rail transport; the
majority of these deaths were members of the
public engaged in trespass.
2.9%
83%
Data sources: Office for National Statistics for accident rates by age (in Mortality statistics – deaths registered in 2013) and population
estimates. Figures in Chart 20 relate to England and Wales only.
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3.1.1
Transport accidents with multiple fatalities
A single accident with a large number of casualties can have a profound effect on public opinion.
Since 1964, 291 passengers have died in train accidents. In contrast, 785 car occupants died in road
accidents in 2013 alone, yet there is a disproportionate amount of media coverage of railway
accidents. One reason is that a single train accident has the potential to result in many casualties.
Chart 22.
Transport accidents with 10 or more fatalities 1964 to 2013
200
Road
Water
Air
Rail (tube)
Rail (mainline)
175
Fatalities
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
Rail (mainline) accidents: Hither Green (1967), Hixon (1968), West Ealing (1973), Taunton (1978), Polmont (1984), Clapham Junction
(1988), Ladbroke Grove (1999), Great Heck (2001)
•
Since 1964, there have been eight accidents on the mainline railway that have resulted in 10 or
more fatalities. These represent around 13% of all such transport accidents, and roughly 7% of
the resulting casualties.
•
The two accidents with the highest consequences were the air crash in Tenerife, Canary Islands
in 1980, and the capsize of Herald of Free Enterprise at Zeebrugge, Belgium in 1987.
•
In recent years, high-consequence accidents in all modes have become less frequent. There has
been one transport accident between 2003 and 2013 with 10 or more fatalities; this was an
accident involving North Sea helicopters
Chart 23.
Accidents with five or more fatalities
carrying off-shore workers.
•
Most accidents with five or more fatalities
occur on the roads; there was one in 2013.
•
There have been two train accidents with
3
1
3
3
passenger fatalities since 2003: Ufton level
2
4
4
3
crossing in November 2004, where five
1
2
passengers and the train driver died; and
1
1
1
0
Greyrigg in February 2007, where one
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
passenger died. The train accident at Ufton
level crossing was due to a car deliberately parked on a level crossing by a driver intent on
committing suicide. 13
6
5
Rail (mainline)
Road
Air
Accidents
4
1
2013
Data sources: A W Evans (HSE Research Report 073) Transport fatal accidents and FN-curves 1967-2001, Railways Archive, Aviation Safety
Network and Stephen E. Roberts Fatal work-related accidents in UK merchant shipping 1919 - 2005 for historical data; MAIB annual
reports, DfT (Road Casualties Great Britain, various years) and Civil Aviation Authority (CAP 800, UK Safety Performance - Volume I) for
more recent data. Land transport statistics are for accidents in Great Britain. Aviation and shipping accidents are to British-registered craft
involved in accidents anywhere in the world. Confirmed acts of terrorism have been excluded. No accidents with 10 or more fatalities were
found to have occurred on the road network between 1963 and 1968.
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3.2
Comparing the railway with other modes of transport
It can be difficult to compare different modes of transport on a like-for-like basis. The following
outlines some of the reasons.
Rail
The risk estimate for rail travellers presented on the following page covers train accidents and
individual accidents that occur on board trains, while boarding or alighting from trains, or in falls
from trains. To allow a like-for-like comparison with other modes, other elements of individual risk,
such as falls in stations, are excluded. The SRM provides a more robust estimate of the underlying
risk than the events that have occurred over a fixed period, as it takes account of the expected
frequency and consequence of rare, multi-fatality, accidents. At current usage levels, the SRMestimated risk of around 0.05 passenger fatalities per billion traveller kilometres corresponds to
fewer than three fatalities per year.
Road
In 2013, 1,713 people were killed in road traffic accidents. This reflects the widespread usage of road
transport (which accounts for more than 90% of the total distance covered by journeys within
England) as well as its comparatively higher level of risk. The volume of data means that fairly robust
estimates of risk can be obtained from observed events.
The risk estimates apply to the ‘average’ person making the ‘average’ journey by each mode.
Differences in risk levels can be seen in the accident statistics for different demographic groups.
Proportionately, around three times as many 18- and 19-year-olds are killed in car accidents as those
in the 40-59 age group. Driving on motorways is around six times safer than driving on urban roads
on a per kilometre basis. The data obtained only contains statistics for England. It has been assumed
that these reflect the figures for Britain as a whole, in order to compare with rail risk figures.
Air
It is very difficult to obtain a robust estimate for the safety of air travel on British carriers. Civil
aviation in Britain has had a very good safety record in recent years. The risk from commercial air
travel is dominated by accidents that are very rare, but of very high consequence. Given the limited
number of accidents, safety cannot be satisfactorily estimated from historical data alone, so a
modelling approach is required. The 2007 ASPR attempted to quantify the risk from air travel on
British-registered airlines by considering worldwide accident rates and making adjustments to
account for the superior safety records of ‘first world’ carriers. However, the uncertainty in such
models is very large, particularly as they take no explicit account of factors such as the relatively
clement British weather, the widespread use of English in aviation, the lack of high ground near
British airports, and the greater use of landing aids. For this reason, no estimate of aviation safety
has been provided in this report. Most existing estimates put air safety either on a par with, or
somewhat safer than (but of the same order of magnitude as) rail travel on a per kilometre basis.
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3.2.1
Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: fatality risk
From the user’s perspective, the risk from using a mode of transport can be assessed on the basis of
fatalities per traveller kilometre. In theory, this allows him or her to compare the risk from
undertaking the same journey using different modes.
Chart 24.
Traveller fatality risk for different transport modes (relative to rail) 14
1400
1292
Fatality risk per traveller km
as a multiple of rail
1200
1000
800
600
400
387
395
Pedestrian
Pedal cycle
200
0
1
4
22
Mainline railway
Bus or coach
Car
Motorcycle
•
The motorcycle is by far the highest risk mode of popular transport, with a fatality risk per
kilometre three orders of magnitude greater than rail.
•
Car travel is around 20 times less safe, on average, than making a rail journey of the same length.
•
Bus and coach travel is around five times safer than making the same journey by car, but less
safe than rail.
•
Rail transport has the lowest traveller fatality risk per kilometre. It has a similar level of risk, per
trip or per hour, to bus and coach travel. While a measure such as fatalities per kilometre is the
best metric for comparing the risk from making the same journey using different modes,
fatalities per hour is useful for comparing
Chart 25.
Traveller fatality risk – other metrics
travel with other activities.
Mainline railway
Bus or coach
Car
Pedestrian
Pedal cycle
Motorcycle
Fatality risk per bn traveller…
km
hours
trips
0.05
3
2
0.22
4
2
1.23
49
17
21.21
91
23
21.65
304
112
70.81
2981
1152
14 Aviation risk is omitted, due to difficulties in obtaining robust estimates (see previous page).
Data source: SRMv8.1 for rail (based on data to September 2014), DfT for other modes (Transport Statistics Great Britain 2013 for headline
rates and Reported Road Casualties Great Britain 2013 for casualties to other road users, normalised by data obtained from the NTS). A
three-year average (2011-2013) was used to estimate casualty rates for bus and coach occupants, a single year (2013) was used for other
forms of road transport. In 2013, there were 1,713 road accident fatalities: 398 pedestrians, 109 pedal cyclists, 331 motorcyclists (including
12 passengers), 785 car occupants (including 236 passengers), 10 bus and coach passengers and 80 other road users (mostly occupants of
goods vehicles).
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3.2.2
Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: total risk
If the risk to users of other modes of transport is considered, for example pedestrians struck by road
vehicles, rail maintains its safety advantage over other forms of motorised transport. This remains
the case, even when trespass injuries are included.
Chart 26.
Traveller total risk for different transport modes
12
9
183.8
Fatalities
Trespassers
Pedestrians and other transport users
Travellers using named mode
200
160
Weighted major injuries
Trespassers
Pedestrians and other transport users
Travellers using named mode
104.1
120
88.9
6
47.9
3.2
1.5
0.9
0.8
1.0
0.5
1.3
1.2
0.8
1.2
21.6
21.2
Mainline railway
Bus or coach
Car
Pedal cycle
Pedestrian
3
0
80
4.8
62.4
26.6
70.8
40
Fatalities and weighted injuries per billion traveller km
Fatalities and weighted injuries per billion traveller km
15
0
Motorcycle
•
Buses and coaches present a relatively high risk to pedestrians and other transport users. They
are heavy vehicles that often operate on busy streets.
•
Bus and coach travellers also have a higher rate of major injury than those on trains.
•
Excluding trespassers, more pedestrians and other road users are killed in accidents involving
cars than accidents involving trains, even when normalised by usage. Interactions between
people and trains (other than for those travelling on them) tend to be limited to level crossings
and stations. The situation reverses if trespassers are included as interactions between them and
trains occur more frequently on the running line.
•
The fatality rate of other road users in accidents involving motorcycles (2.9 fatalities per billion
traveller kilometres) is the highest of the six modes analysed. This rate includes pedestrians hit
by motorcycles and injuries to other road users who may have had a secondary collision.
Data source: See Section 3.2.1
Other transport users includes people injured in accidents that involved one or more users/vehicles other than the named mode. In this
analysis, there is no indication as to which user caused the accident, or the existence of a secondary accident.
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3.2.3
Safety trends in car and train travel
Safety has improved on most modes of transport – and in many other areas of life – over recent
decades. There are many reasons for this, including technological developments, a better
understanding of human behaviour, changing attitudes towards risk, increasing wealth and
improvements in medical care.
Safety trends in rail and car travel 1963 to 2013
12
Rail (mainline)
10
Cars
8
6
4
2
1983
Front seat belts
made mandatory
1966
Blood alcohol limit
introduced
←1950s & 60s
Introduction of continuously welded rail
Introduction of AWS
2013
2011
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
1963
0
1961
Traveller fatalities per billion kilometres
Chart 27.
1991
Rear seat belts made
mandatory for all
early 2000s
TPWS fitment programme (completed 2003)
Mark I stock replacement (completed 2005)
•
There have been substantial improvements in the safety of both road and rail transport over the
past five decades, although car travel has only recently reached a level of safety similar to that of
rail travel around 30 years ago.
•
The safety of car travel improved at a faster rate than rail safety between the early 1970s and the
early 1990s.
•
From the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, the gap widened again (in relative terms). There were
major safety improvements on the railway, while the safety of car occupants improved at a much
slower rate (around 1% per year).
•
Improvement has generally been gradual rather than via any step change. Although it is possible
to identify significant safety developments, their effects tend to be spread over a number of
years and many other factors have also played a part.
•
There was substantial improvement in car safety between 2006 and 2010, which has since been
consolidated, with the result that, in 2013, the fatality rate for car occupants was 49% lower than
in 2006, and was at the lowest level seen in modern times.
Data sources: DfT for historical car safety data. Like car safety, rail safety is based on actual fatalities per year (using ORR data for historical
rates and RSSB data for recent years). This differs from Chart 24, in which rail safety is based on data from SRMv8.1. For rail, a single event
can have a substantial effect on that year’s fatality rate. For example, the chart shows peaks in 1988 and 1999, reflecting the major train
accidents at Clapham Junction and Ladbroke Grove.
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3.2.4
Comparing the mainline railway and London Underground
Users of tram and metro systems are exposed to hazards similar to those found on the mainline
railway. The number of journeys made each year on London Underground (LUL) is broadly similar to
the number made on the national rail network. Each was used for more than one billion journeys in
2013/14.
Chart 28.
Fatality/weighted injury profile for the mainline railway and LUL 2009/10-2013/14
20
40
15
30
12.4
21.3
10
9.1
20
15.2
5.7
5
10
On-board
accidents
Assaults
Train accidents
0
Other
accidents and
incidents
LUL
LUL
LUL
Mainline
LUL
Mainline
LUL
Mainline
Mainline
LUL
Slips, trips and Platform-train
falls
interface
accidents
0.5 0.5
Mainline
0.1
0
Mainline
1.1 0.9
LUL
1.7 1.7
Mainline
2.8
Passenger FWMI per billion journeys
Passenger FWMI per billion journeys
Darker shades represent fatalities
Lighter shades represent weighted major injuries
Total
•
Measured by fatalities and weighted major injuries (FWMI) per passenger journey, LUL is safer
than the mainline railway. This may be due to different passenger profiles and the frequency and
regularity of services (people tend to spend less time waiting for trains in tube stations and trains
calling at a platform tend to serve the same, or a smaller set of, destinations). Tube journeys tend
to be shorter, and station areas smaller, with fewer retail outlets.
•
During the period covered by the chart (2009/10 to 2013/14) there were no passenger fatalities
in train accidents on either the Underground or mainline railway.
•
Overall, the total level of passenger FWMI have decreased since last year for both the LUL and
mainline railway.
Data sources: Accident data for LUL supplied by TfL. Data for both the mainline railway and LUL is based on the five-year period 2009/102013/14. Normalising data is from ORR (NRT) and DfT (Transport Statistics Great Britain 2013). Major injuries are given a weighting of onetenth (of a fatality). Deaths and injuries resulting from natural causes, trespass, suicide and terrorism have been omitted. Assaults on
passengers are under-represented in SMIS data, so the chart may underestimate this component of mainline risk.
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3.3
International comparisons
3.3.1
Comparing rail safety within the EU
The European Railway Agency (ERA) assesses the safety performance of European railways against a
set of Common Safety Targets (CSTs) and state-specific National Reference Values (NRVs). See
Section 2.7 for more information.
Chart 29.
Passenger and workforce fatality rates on European Union railways 2009-2013
140
110.5
Normalised passenger fatalities
100
EU average
14.3
12.0
11.5
11.3
9.8
7.9
5.1
2.9
0.7
Austria
Germany
Ireland
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Netherlands
United Kingdom
21.0
Portugal
France
22.3
24.5
Luxembourg
23.7
20
Latvia
27.7
25.6
Italy
27.8
Greece
Lithuania
28.0
Czech Republic
32.5
40
36.1
41.7
54.5
60
59.4
67.6
80
63.7
86.1
Fatalities per billion train km
120
Normalised workforce fatalities
Slovenia
Hungary
Slovakia
Romania
Belgium
Bulgaria
Poland
Estonia
Spain
0
•
Passenger and workforce fatality rates in the UK were well below the EU average over the fiveyear period 2009-2013. There have been no
UK NRV rank
passenger fatalities in train accidents on the UK
mainline since 2007. The ERA uses data from a
NRV Category
NRV Number NRV rank in EU 25
NRV 1.1
1
rolling five-year period to assess performance
Passengers
NRV 1.2
1
against the NRVs and CSTs.
Employees
NRV 2
3
•
In general, countries in northern and western
parts of Europe have safer railways than those
further south and east.
Level crossing users
Others
Unauthorised persons
Whole society
NRV 3.1
NRV 3.2
NRV 4
NRV 5
NRV 6
1
n/a
n/a
5
2
•
A single multi-fatality accident can have a
significant effect on the fatality rate. This is especially noticeable for Spain, where a derailment
occurred at Santiago de Compostela in July 2013, killing 79 people.
•
Table 6 shows that the UK ranks highly among the EU-25 countries across all NRVs.
Data source: Eurostat. The data covers the five-year period 2009-2013. Figures are normalised by train kilometres. Only accidents relating
to railway vehicles in motion are included, and the ERA definition of a passenger differs from that used for the UK (see Section 2.7) so the
UK figures do not match those presented elsewhere in this report. There are issues with data quality for some states, for example as a
result of the different member states’ interpretations of scope and definitions. ERA is currently working with member states to ensure that
the data they submit is as complete as possible. The chart covers 25 members of the EU; the other two member states, Malta and Cyprus,
no longer have railways.
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3.3.2
Railway safety worldwide
Though railways beyond Britain differ in terms of infrastructure, rolling stock, working practices, and
the external hazards to which they are exposed, lessons can still be learnt from international events.
They can reveal accident scenarios that are rare in Britain, identify possible vulnerabilities and show
the potential for harm if effective controls are not maintained. More information on learning from
accidents outside of GB is contained in the Learning from Operational Experience Annual Report.
Table 7 lists all identified train accidents in 2014/15, in which five or more passengers or workforce
were killed.
The table excludes the majority of collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings, as
most casualties in these accidents are road users.
Worldwide train accidents in 2014/15 with five or more fatalities
Date
Place, country
Fatalities
Accident type
Key issues
Overspeeding on curve; train
surfing.
22/04/2014
Katanga,
Congo
48
Freight train
carrying ‘surfers’
derails
04/05/2014
Nidi,
India
18+
Derailment
(passenger)
Possible track maintenance.
20/05/2014
Moscow,
Russia
6
Collision (passenger
with derailed
freight)
Track maintenance; poor
communication with drivers.
26/05/2014
Chureb,
India
20+
Derailment and
collision
Signal failure.
15/07/2014
Moscow,
Russia
21
Derailment
(passenger)
Points failure (inadequate
wiring).
03/02/2015
Valhalla,
USA
5
Collision
(passenger-road
vehicle)
User behaviour; height of third
rail; use of polycarbonate
windows.
13/02/2015
Karnataka,
India
11
Derailment
(passenger)
Object on line
Note: Excludes train accidents with fewer than five passenger or workforce fatalities.
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3.4
Occupational risk: comparisons with other industries
The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 requires employers to ensure, so far as is reasonably
practicable, the health, safety and welfare of employees at work. 15
3.4.1
Safety at work: train drivers and station staff
Although no other jobs are exactly comparable to railway occupations, bus and lorry drivers face
hazards similar to train drivers. Train crew and station staff experience some of the same hazards as
others in customer-facing roles, plus other hazards specific to the railway environment.
Chart 30.
Train crew and station staff risk compared with other occupations in 2012-2014 16
FWI per 100,000 workers per year
(RIDDOR-reportable only)
80
Weighted RIDDOR-reportable minor injuries
Weighted major injuries
Fatalities
60
43.3
15.8
12.5
7.7
19.1
6.3
8.6
Elementary services occupations
13.5
Sales and retail assistants
8.8
10.6
Train driver
20
Bus and coach drivers
40
Customer care occupations
Elementary security operations
Station staff
Revenue protection staff
Other on-board train crew
HGV drivers
0
Rail workers
Data sources: see footnote for Section 3.4.2.
RIDDOR-reportable minor injuries in this chart relate to injuries comprising more than seven days incapacitation. See footnote 16 for more
information.
•
Train drivers have a lower level of risk than the drivers of large road vehicles. HGV drivers have a
higher fatality rate than bus and coach drivers as they are involved in more road accidents. Many
major injuries to HGV drivers occur while loading and unloading or moving around depots and
loading bays.
•
Revenue protection staff also have a comparable level of risk to similar occupations involving
security. This group is split between those that work on trains and in stations.
The Act also requires employers to look after the safety of passengers and the public.
Due to the change to the RIDDOR-reportable minor injury criteria, the analysis in this section has been created using only three years’
worth of data. As a result, it is sensitive to annual fluctuations, particularly for occupations with relatively few workers. In future, more
years will be added, which will decrease this sensitivity. This change will also affect the data in comparison with previous years.
15
16
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3.4.2
Safety at work: infrastructure workers
Infrastructure workers are exposed to many of the hazards associated with general construction
work, as well as railway-specific hazards, such as proximity to moving trains and unguarded
electricity supplies.
Chart 31.
Rail infrastructure worker risk compared with other occupations 2012-2014 Weighted RIDDOR-reportable minor injuries
42.2
40
Weighted major injuries
38.1
34.5
30
Fatalities
25.9
17.3
20
18.8
10
0.2
Mobile machine drivers and
operatives
Rail workers
Telecomms engineers, line
repairers etc
Infrastructure worker
Elementary construction
occupations
Plant and machine operatives
Road construction operatives
0
Engineering professionals
FWI per 100,000 workers per year
(RIDDOR-reportable only)
50
RIDDOR-reportable minor injuries in this chart relate to injuries comprising more than seven days incapacitation. See footnote on page
Error! Bookmark not defined. for more information.
•
Infrastructure workers appear to be exposed to a level of risk that is lower than road
construction operatives, and plant and machine operatives, and greater than mobile machine
drivers, telecoms engineers and other engineering professionals. However, there is a substantial
element of uncertainty in the estimates for non-rail workers, due to differences in data quality.
Data sources: HSE for non-rail occupations, with bus, coach and HGV driver rates amended to include fatalities and serious injuries in road
traffic accidents (using DfT’s Road accident statistics 2013). Other injuries in road traffic accidents are excluded because the statistics
contain no equivalent to RIDDOR-reportable injuries. The categories correspond to occupations and occupation groups defined under the
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 2010. Safety comparisons must be viewed with caution because (i) some groups (especially the
rail occupations) cover a relatively small number of workers so there is a large element of statistical variation, especially for fatality risk,
and (ii) there are known problems with the under-reporting of injuries, which may disproportionately affect the statistics for those working
in less regulated industries than the railway. This may also explain the much larger risk contribution from RIDDOR reportable minor injuries
to train crew and revenue protection staff. In April 2012 HSE extended the period for reporting injuries that lead to a worker being
incapacitated for work from more than three days to more than seven days. This may have improved levels of reporting. In the combined
measure of FWI, major injuries are given a weighting of one-tenth and other RIDDOR-reportable injuries are given a weighting of one-twohundredth. These weightings differ from those that DfT usually apply to fatalities and serious injuries when considering road accidents.
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3.4.3
Safety at work: comparing the mainline railway and LUL
Three workforce categories have been identified as comparable between LUL and mainline railway:
similar daily duties and responsibilities mean that staff members face similar safety hazards.
However the contrasting working environments and reporting methods lead to variability in the
observed risk for each workforce category. Further steps are being taken to align and share more
data in future.
Chart 32.
Workforce fatalities and weighted injuries for the mainline and LUL 2009/10 to
2013/14 3.0
Workforce FWI per 10 million workforce hours
Minor injuries
2.5
Major injuries
Fatalities
1.94
2.0
1.70
1.53
1.44
1.5
1.50
1.33
1.13
1.0
0.79
0.5
Revenue
protection
staff
Station
Staff
Train
drivers
Mainline
Tube
Mainline
Tube
Mainline
Tube
Mainline
Tube
0.0
All workforce
All workforce
•
Overall, mainline railway staff have lower rates of harm, measured by FWI per million workforce
hours, than LUL staff. This is the case for station staff and train drivers, but not revenue
protection staff.
•
Some of the differences between the rates of harm for staff working stations may be explained
by differences between working environments on LUL and mainline infrastructure, particularly
the effects on the potential for assault. Mainline revenue protection staff also work on board
trains, as well as in stations and so are exposed to hazards while walking through the train.
•
The differences seen in the rates of harm for train drivers may be explained by differences in the
frequency of journeys; LUL drivers have shorter, more frequent journeys than mainline drivers,
meaning they enter and exit the cab more often, increasing their exposure to hazards at the PTI.
Data
sources: LUL data is supplied by TfL.
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People on trains and in stations
_________________________________________________________________
4
People on trains and in stations
This chapter focuses on the ways in which people could be injured while travelling on trains or using
stations. It excludes both the risk to people from train accidents (which is covered in Chapter 7 Train
operations) and the risk from people who commit acts of trespass (which is covered in Chapter 9
Trespass).
We have separated the analysis to look at members of the workforce separately from passengers and
members of the public, which we have grouped together. This is because the types of activities that
the workforce carry out on trains and in stations are different from those of passengers and the
public. Passengers and the public are grouped together, because they use the railway in similar ways
and are exposed to the same types of risk.
2014/15 Headlines
•
There were 1.66 billion passenger journeys in 2014/15, a 4% increase from 2013/14. There has
been a 54% increase in passenger journeys, a 46% increase in passenger kilometres, and an 8%
increase in train kilometres over the past 10 years.
•
Injuries in stations and on board trains account for nearly half of the accidental risk profile, as
estimated by SRMv8.1. The largest risk proportion is passenger and public station injuries.
•
There were four fatalities in stations: three passengers and one member of the public. When the
number of non-fatal injuries is taken into account, the total level of harm occurring to passengers
and the public in stations was 41.6 FWI, compared with 40.6 FWI for the previous year. The total
level of passenger and public harm on board trains was 6.3 FWI compared with 4.4 FWI for
2013/14.
•
There were no fatalities to members of the workforce in stations or on board trains. The total
level of workforce harm recorded in stations in 2014/15 was 5.3 FWI, compared with 6.1 FWI for
the previous year. The total level of workforce harm on board trains was 3.2 FWI, the same as in
2013/14.
Train and station safety at a glance
Passengers and
public in stations
(48.6 FWI; 35%)
Passengers
and public on
trains
(8.8 FWI; 6%)
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Weighted injuries
Fatalities
42.4
41.3
38.8
39.6
39.6
45.7
47.2
48.6
45.0
47.9
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
13.7
11.9
12.6
12.1
11.2
10.2
12.0
9.4
9.3
8.5
Other
accidental
risk
(71.7 FWI;
51%)
Workforce on
trains
(4.1 FWI; 3%)
FWI
Workforce in
stations
(6.3 FWI; 5%)
Trends in harm
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Risk in context (SRMv8.1)
Passsengers/public
Workforce
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47
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
4.1
Passengers and public
4.1.1
Risk profile by accident type
Chart 33 shows the breakdown of risk to passengers and the public on trains and in stations. It is
based on information from SRMv8.1 and represents the modelled estimate of the underlying risk.
The purpose of the chart is to give some context about how the risk from different sources differs in
magnitude. In the remainder of this section, the charts are based on recorded levels of harm and will
therefore differ year on year from the SRM modelled values. The types of events that are included in
each category are shown in Chart 33 are described in Appendix 6.
Chart 33.
Risk to passengers/public on trains and in stations, by accident type: 57.4 FWI per year
In stations
Assault and abuse
5.5
Slips, trips and falls
28.4
Platform-train interface
12.8
Contact with object or person
1.6
On trains
Other accidents
0.3
Assault and abuse
4.5
On-board injuries
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
4.0
Other accidents
0.3
0
5
15
20
25
10
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
30
35
Source: SRMv8.1
•
Slips, trips and falls to passengers/public in stations account for around 28.4 FWI per year on
average. Most of this risk arises in the form of major injuries.
•
Accidents at the platform-train interface (PTI) equate to less than half of the FWI risk from slips,
trips and falls. This category includes injuries during boarding and alighting, but also injuries
when no train is present, such as falls from the platform edge. Accidents at the PTI contribute a
relatively high level of fatality risk, but it is important to note that boarding or alighting is very
rarely the cause of a fatal injury. A fatality is much more likely to happen as a result of someone
falling from the platform edge for other reasons.
•
The SRM estimates assaults to passengers/public at 10.0 FWI per year. Unlike most other SRM
estimates, this is not based on data from SMIS, as SMIS is not the primary system for recording
assaults to passengers or the public. The primary system for these events is the BTP CRIME
database, and the SRM estimate is based on this source. The assault figure of 10.0 FWI per year
covers both assaults on trains and in stations, and is roughly evenly split between the two site
types.
•
The on-board injuries category consists of a range of different types of events, such as people
tripping over, bumping into objects and getting scalded by hot drinks, and amounts to 4.0 FWI
per year. People bumping into objects or other people in stations amounts to 1.6 FWI per year.
The remaining category or other injury includes events such as those arising from falls from
height, manual handling injuries and station fires, which are generally either rare in nature, or
lower in consequence.
_________________________________________________________________
48
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
4.1.2
Passenger/public fatalities and injuries in 2014/15
Fatalities
•
There were four fatalities within the scope of this chapter, all occurring in stations. Two were
passengers who fell from the platform edge; one person was electrocuted and one person was
struck by a train. A third passenger was fatally injured as a result of falling down a flight of stairs
to a platform. The fourth fatality involved a young child, who died along with his mother, who it
is believed deliberately accessed the track in a station to take their life.
Major injuries
•
There were 316 passenger/public major injuries in 2014/15.
•
85% occurred at stations, and nearly three-quarters of these were slips, trips and falls.
Minor injuries
•
There were 6,936 passenger/public minor injuries, 1,271 (18%) of which were Class 1 (ie the
injured party went straight to hospital).
•
Of the Class 1 minor injuries, more than 90% occurred at stations, with more than three-quarters
of these again being due to slips, trips and falls.
Shock and trauma
•
There were 245 recorded cases of passenger/public shock or trauma, none of which were Class 1
(ie involved witnessing a fatality).
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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49
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
4.1.3
Trend in passenger/public harm by injury degree
The average level of passenger/public harm in stations or on board trains over the last 10 years has
been 43.6 FWI per year, of which 6.2 FWI per year relates to fatalities. As SMIS data does not contain
complete information on passenger/public assault, it is likely that the level of harm is somewhat
higher than this. The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from assault to passenger and public is 10.0 FWI per
year, and is based on data obtained from BTP; trends in BTP assault data are analysed in Section
4.1.6.
Chart 34.
Trend in harm to passengers/public on trains and in stations, by injury degree
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
Normalised FWI rate
60
6
50
FWI
40
41.3
9.8
38.8
39.6
9.7
10.1
10.3
22.8
24.3
24.1
9.5
30
20
24.4
22.5
8
9
39.6
47.2
48.6
10.8
11.7
12.2
45.0
12.1
47.9
5
12.0
4
3
25.6
27.2
32.1
2
31.6
28.7
FWI per 100m journeys
42.4
45.7
1
10
0
6
5
9
5
8
4
4
4
0
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
•
The total level of harm to passengers/public on trains and in stations for 2014/15 was 47.9 FWI.
The most readily available normaliser for the trends is passenger journeys. It is not perfect, as it
does not cover members of the public visiting stations for the purposes of shopping, eating or
other activities, but this data is not available. When normalised by passenger journeys, the rate
of passenger/public harm in 2014/15 increased slightly on the rate for the previous year, but still
the second lowest rate over the past 10 years.
•
The amount of harm occurring on trains is around a tenth of that occurring in stations. Chart 35
shows that the 2% increase in the FWI shown in Chart 34 is due to an increase in harm on trains,
not stations; the rate of harm in stations showed a decrease.
Chart 35.
Passenger/public harm by injury degree and location
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
Normalised rate
60
10
2.8 1.5
4.6
2014/15
4.4
1.6
6.3
2013/14
3.5
2012/13
1.5
2.5 1.5
2011/12
3.1 1.5
2010/11
2009/10
3.1 1.4
2.4 1.4
2014/15
4.6 4.7 4.1
2008/09
2013/14
3.8 3.9
2.4 1.3
2012/13
In stations
1
5.1
2007/08
4
3.1 1.6
27.0
4
2006/07
25.9
4
4.4
2.7 1.6
28.6
8
5.8
2005/06
24.7
9
2011/12
10.4
22.5
5
2010/11
10.5
21.0
5
2009/10
10.7
21.9
10.2
41.0 43.1 43.5 40.6 41.6
9.4
2008/09
8.9
6
8.7
8
8.4
20.4
8.2
8
2007/08
0
19.4 7.9
10
2006/07
20
21.7
30
2005/06
40
38.0 35.5
35.0 35.7 35.0
8
6
4
Train FWI
Station FWI
50
12
2
0
On trains
_________________________________________________________________
50
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in passenger/public fatalities
There has been an average of 6.2 passenger/public fatalities per year on trains and in stations over
the last 10 years.
Chart 36.
Passenger/public fatalities in stations or on trains, by accident type
10
9
8
8
9
9
1
1
2
2
Other injury
Assault and abuse
Slips, trips and falls
Platform-train interface
8
1
7
Fatalities
3
6
6
3
1
5
5
1
4
5
1
4
2
4
4
1
3
6
6
2
3
5
2
4
1
4
4
1
3
1
2
1
1
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Scope: Accidental injuries in stations or on board trains. Excludes train accidents; trespass
•
Most fatalities over the last 10 years have been at the platform-train interface, with slips, trips
and falls being the next highest category. There have been nine fatalities in the category of
assault and abuse 17; SMIS is more likely to have records of this level of consequence than it is to
have records of less serious events, which will be held by BTP.
•
The injury in 2005/06, in the category other injury, was a member of public who fell over the
railings of a station overbridge.
•
Over the past 10 years, there have been no fatalities as a result of accidentally falling from
moving trains. 18 The risk associated with falls from moving trains has reduced significantly since
the removal of Mark 1 (slam door) rolling stock and the use of central door locking on any
remaining manually operated doors.
The category of assault and abuse includes any incidence of unlawful killing, murder or manslaughter.
Passengers who deliberately decide to exit a train in running are classed as engaging in trespass; these events are therefore covered
under Chapter 9 Trespass.
17
18
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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51
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in passenger/public major injuries
There has been an average of 263 passenger/public major injuries in stations or on trains over the
past 10 years.
Chart 37.
Passenger/ public major injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type
350
Other injury
Contact with object or person
Slips, trips and falls
Normalised rate
300
Assault and abuse
On-board injuries
Platform-train interface
272
Major injuries
200
244
225
228
243
23
20
29
21
241
26
26
256
316
30
287
28
35
25
20
24
20
210
150
158
100
140
147
166
154
163
193
182
198
15
10
50
Major injuries per 100m journeys
250
35
321
5
43
38
41
41
43
46
48
65
53
51
0
0
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Scope: Accidental injuries in stations or on board trains. Excludes train accidents; trespass
•
Over the past 10 years, the number of passenger/public major injuries on trains and in stations
has been generally increasing. However, this has been in line with generally increasing usage of
the railway, as can be seen by the flatter shape of the normalised number of major injuries.
•
The most notable recent variation in the generally flat rate occurred in 2012/13, which was the
year of the London Olympics. The increase in number and rate was analysed at the time that it
occurred, and found not to be specific to the time of the event itself, but it is possible that there
was some contributory effect during the year as a whole.
•
The majority of major injuries are due to slips, trips and falls in stations. There were 198 major
injuries due to slips, trips and falls in 2014/15, a 3% increase from 2013/14.
_________________________________________________________________
52
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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_________________________________________________________________
Trends in passenger/public minor injuries
Minor injuries are categorised as Class 1 if the person is taken to hospital from the scene of the
accident, and as Class 2 otherwise. Minor injuries that are Class 2 are generally of a less serious
nature than those that are Class 1, and are consequently given a lesser weighting when calculating
weighted injuries.
Chart 38.
Passenger/public minor injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type
7000
4425
4171
3974
Normalised rate
4000
3771
3637
Platform-train interface
5003
600
500
400
1271
1418
1439
1413
1280
1229
1181
200
1147
2000
1137
300
1223
3000
1000
100
Class 1
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
0
2005/06
0
Minor injuries per 100m journeys
Slips, trips and falls
4163
On-board injuries
5000
4645
Contact with object or person
5034
5665
Assault and abuse
6000
Minor injuries
700
Other injury
Class 2
Scope: Accidental injuries in stations or on board trains. Excludes train accidents; trespass
•
The 1,271 Class 1 minor injuries occurring in 2014/15 represent a decrease of 10% compared
with 2013/14. When normalised by passenger journeys, the Class 1 minor injury rate decreased
by 14% in 2014/15 and is at the lowest level in the ten-year period.
•
The number of Class 2 minor injuries has increased steadily over the past 10 years but, similar to
major injuries, when normalised by passenger journeys the trends have been reasonably stable.
The rate for 2014/15 shows a rise of 9% compared with 2013/14, but is not disproportionately
high in comparison with the decade as a whole.
•
For different types of accident, the proportion of Class 1 and Class 2 injuries varies. For some
types of accident there appears to be a greater propensity for minor injuries to be more severe.
However, there may also be a difference in the propensity for reporting different types of
accident, which would affect the observed ratios. Examples of differences are on-board injuries,
where 10% of minor injuries since 2005/06 have been Class 1, and slips, trips and falls, where
29% have been Class 1.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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53
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
4.1.4
Passenger/public slips, trips and falls in stations
The average level of harm from slips, trips and falls in stations over the last 10 years has been 25.1
FWI per year, which is over half the average total harm to passengers/public in stations and on trains
over this period. Of the 25.1 FWI per year, 9.2 FWI per year has occurred on stairs, 7.1 FWI per year
on the platform, 3.8 FWI per year on the concourse, 3.1 FWI per year on escalators, with the other
areas of the station making up the remaining 1.9 FWI per year.
Chart 39.
Trends in harm from passenger/public slips, trips and falls, by location
14
Shock and trauma
12.6
Minor injuries
12
Major injuries
10.5
10
9.3
Fatalities
10.0
8.4
7.7
FWI
8
7.5
7.9
7.2
6.3
6
4.8
4
4.3 4.3
4.0
3.3
2.7
3.3
3.8
4.2
2.7
2.5
3.1
2.2 2.0 2.0
2
Stairs
Platform
Concourse
Escalator
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
0
Other
•
Over the last five years, the greatest proportion of harm from slips, trips and falls in stations
occurred on stairs (37%), with platforms being the next most common location (27%).
•
Escalators typically contribute a lower level of harm, although this is not normalised by usage;
there are fewer escalators than stairs on the rail system. However fatalities can occur; there has
been one fatality resulting from a slip, trip or fall on an escalator in the last five years.
•
The location other covers ramps and benches. The flat sections of subways and footbridges are
included in the platform category.
•
After normalisation by passenger
journeys, the FWI rate of slips, trips
and falls in 2014/15 increased by 1.4 %
compared with 2013/14. The driver of
the overall increase in normalised rate
was the occurrence of the fatality; the
rates for other injury degrees all fell.
Chart 40.
50
20
21.5 21.6
24.6
22.3
24.5
4
28.0 29.5 26.5 28.1
3
2
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
0
2008/09
0
2007/08
1
2006/07
10
2005/06
FWI
24.5
5
Minor injuries
Fatalities
FWI per 100m journeys
Shock and trauma
Major injuries
Normalised FWI rate
40
30
Slips, trips and falls FWI
_________________________________________________________________
54
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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_________________________________________________________________
4.1.5
Passenger/public accidents at the platform-train interface
An accident is considered to have occurred at the PTI if the incident resulted in the person wholly or
partially crossing the boundary between the platform and the track, or the platform and the train (if
present). The PTI presents a number of potential hazards for station users, which can be exacerbated
by their own behaviour, such as rushing, or being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Risk at the
PTI is the focus of a dedicated industry stakeholder group, the PTI strategy implementation group,
which is chaired by Network Rail. The strategy was launched in January 2015, and the group of
industry representatives selected to generate the strategy will continue to oversee its deployment
and champion its implementation. This is in order to maintain the momentum of the strategy and
ensure it delivers benefits to industry.
RSSB, supported by industry stakeholders, is also developing a risk assessment tool for assessing the
PTI, which reflects the principles set out in Industry Standards
Chart 41.
Passenger/public harm at the platform-train interface
14
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
12
11.5
Major injuries
10.5
10.0
9.1
Fatalities
10
FWI
6
5.0
4.2
5.3
5.8
6.3
6.9
6.1
4.7
4.3 4.4
4
6.0
5.7
5.5
3.0
11.7
9.8
9.3
5.6
5.2
12
10
8
7.2
7.1
6.5
14
6
3.8
4
3.0
2
0
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2
FWI per billion journeys
Normalised FWI rate
8
12.9
12.3
Platform edge incidents
(boarding/alighting)
Platform edge incidents (not
boarding/alighting)
All platform edge incidents
•
The overall level of harm at the PTI decreased by 21% in 2014/15 compared with the previous
year (24% on a normalised basis).
•
When considered separately, the levels of harm for boarding/alighting events and for other
accidents at the PTI have both decreased, by 10% and 32% respectively.
•
While the levels of harm from boarding and alighting events and from other events at the PTI are
broadly similar in terms of overall FWI, the injury profile is very different. Fatalities while
boarding or alighting are extremely rare (there has been one during the past 10 years) while
fatalities due to other accidents at the PTI have occurred each year.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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55
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
Accidents during boarding and alighting trains
Over the past 10 years, there has been an average of 5.4 FWI per year to people while boarding or
alighting trains. While most of these will be passengers, a small number of members of the public will
board or alight trains while assisting passengers.
Chart 42.
Passenger/public harm from boarding and alighting accidents
4
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
3.1
3
2.5
2.3
2.3
1.9
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
1.5
1.2
1.2
2014/15
1
2013/14
1.4
2012/13
1.3
1.4
1.4
2013/14
1.7
1.6
2011/12
2
2010/11
FWI
2.3
0.6
Fall between train and
platform
Caught in train doors
Other alighting accident
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
0
Other boarding accident
•
The categories fall between train and platform and caught in train doors include both boarding
and alighting injuries.
•
The category with the largest amount of harm covers events termed other alighting accidents.
Overall, alighting accidents account for around 1.7 times the amount of harm as boarding
accidents, despite accounting for only around half the number of accidents.
•
The events within the other alighting accident and other boarding accident categories are largely
falls from the train onto the platform, or trips while getting onto the train.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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_________________________________________________________________
Other accidents at the PTI
Over the past 10 years, other accidents at the PTI (those not occurring during boarding or alighting)
have accounted for an average of 5.1 FWI per year. A large proportion of the total FWI have been
fatalities (around 69%).
Chart 43.
Other passenger/public accidents at the platform-train interface
5
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
4
3.1
2.2
2.1 2.1
2.1
2.1
2
1.2
Struck by train after
fall from platform
Struck by train at
platform edge
0.9
0.5
2011/12
2010/11
>0.1
2014/15
2011/12
2010/11
2013/14
0.2
0.1
2014/15
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
Electric shock from
traction supplies
2012/13
>0.1
0
2013/14
0.1
0.7
0.5
0.5
0.2
2012/13
1
1.2
2012/13
1.3
1.0
1.0
2014/15
2.1
2013/14
FWI
3
Fall between train and Fall from platform
platform
with no train present
and no contact with
conductor rail
•
Since 2005/06, there have been 11 injuries due to a person falling from the platform and coming
into contact with the conductor rail; six of these were fatal, one of which was in 2014/15. The
likelihood of fatality is comparatively high when this type of accident occurs.
•
A number of fatalities result from being too close to the edge of the platform such that contact
with a train entering or exiting the station occurs. 19 When the contact is sufficiently serious, or
the person subsequently loses balance and falls between the train and platform, the likelihood of
fatality is again comparatively high.
19
This category includes people standing, walking, running, or otherwise being too close to the platform edge.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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57
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
4.1.6
Passenger/public assaults
Assaults occur on the railway, as they can in any public environment. The modelled risk from assaults
to passengers/public on trains and in stations is estimated by SRMv8.1 to be 10.0 FWI per year, of
which 0.6 FWI per year relates to fatalities. While SMIS is a good source of information on workforce
assaults, the BTP CRIME database is the primary source for non-workforce assaults.
Chart 44.
Passenger/public assault and abuse by location
2500
Other violence
Harassment
Common assaults
1923
1785
Actual bodily harm
GBH and more serious cases of violence
359
703
339
2014/15
307
330
2013/14
602
568
335
2012/13
249
568
356
2011/12
239
481
339
2010/11
213
466
166
1280
364
150
1196 1187
2009/10
501
1036 1082
511
408
2008/09
177
404
2007/08
181
541
423
2006/07
154
519
2005/06
556
756
389
2014/15
221
672
419
2013/14
184
662
417
2012/13
145
607
460
2011/12
137
1123 1109
572
178
1192
464
607
2008/09
481
666
2007/08
767
933
500
1276
2010/11
139
1142
1442
454
166
1286 1272 1286 1335
1446
2009/10
557
1000
1383
541
173
1457
736
Assaults
1500
729
194
168
2000
2006/07
2005/06
0
In stations
On trains
Source: BTP CRIME data
•
The number of assaults is roughly evenly split between those occurring on trains and in stations,
with around 55% of assaults having occurred in stations over the past decade.
•
The number of passenger and
public assaults rose in 2014/15 to
2,888, compared with 2,615 for
2013/14, which is a rise of 10%.
When normalised by passenger
journeys, the increase is smaller in
magnitude, at 6%. This is the first
increase in normalised rate for
more than five years.
Chart 45.
Overall trend in assault and abuse
Harassment
Common assaults
Other violence
Actual bodily harm
GBH and more serious cases of violence
Normalised rate
7000
5000
4000
3000
3199
2977
2580 2492
2000
2178 2368
2468 2473
2615 2888
7
6
5
4
3
2
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
0
2008/09
0
2007/08
1
2006/07
1000
2005/06
Assaults
6000
8
Assaults per million journeys
8000
_________________________________________________________________
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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_________________________________________________________________
4.1.7
On-board injuries
The category of on-board injuries does not include train accidents, falls from trains, or assaults,
which are considered under separate categories. On-board injuries have accounted for an average of
3.8 FWI per year over the last 10 years, none of which have been fatalities.
Chart 46.
Trend in FWI from on-board injuries
10
8
FWI
6
5.0
4.3
4
3.6
3.3
3.3
3.8
3.6
3.3
10
8
6
4.1
4.0
4
2
FWI per billion journeys
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
Normalised rate
2
0
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
•
While there has been no obvious trend in the overall harm from on-board accidents, over the
ten-year period, there have been increases for the past three years, and the level of harm is now
at its highest in the ten-year period. PTSRG will focus on this area of risk during the coming year.
•
When normalised by passenger journeys, the rate is variable, due to the low level of harm. The
rate of harm is currently the same as it was in 2009/10, but still lower than it was in 2006/07.
Chart 47.
Fainting
(due to
conditions
on train)
Caught by
internal
doors
On-board injuries and train movement
Other onboard
injury
Other onboard
injury
Scald or
burn
Other accidents
85%
Falls and
contact with
objects
Accidents due to
sudden train
movement
15%
Scald or
burn
Falls and contact
with objects
•
Injuries attributable to sudden movements of the train due to lurching or braking have
accounted for around 15% of on-board harm since 2005/06. However, it is not always
straightforward to determine whether train movement was a causal factor in an accident.
Therefore, some other accidents may also be a result of train movement.
•
On average, over the past 10 years, falls and contact with objects within the train have
accounted for 63% of harm on board trains (excluding injuries from train accidents, falls from
trains and assault). Fainting accounts for a relatively large proportion of on-board FWI, as loss of
consciousness (which includes fainting) is categorised as a major injury.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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59
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
4.1.8
Contact with object/person in stations
During their time in a station, passengers and members of the public can be injured by coming into
contact with the many types of object that exist within stations, and with other people. This type of
accident has accounted for an average of nearly 1.5 FWI per year over the last 10 years, but no
fatalities have arisen.
Chart 48.
Trend in passenger/public injuries from contact with objects in stations
2.5
Shock and trauma
2.3
2.5
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
2.0
2.0
Normalised rate
0.9
FWI
1.2
1.4
1.3
0.6
1.0
0.4
0.5
1.4
1.1
0.7
1.4
0.8
0.8
0.8
1.5
0.8
0.7
0.5
0.8
0.8
1.5
1.0
FWI per billion journeys
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.4
0.5
0.9
0.7
0.4
0.6
0.7
0.6
0.7
0.0
0.0
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
•
Around half of the harm over the last 10 years has been from major injuries.
•
The level of harm in 2014/15 is at its highest level in the ten-year period. This is mainly due to the
increase in major injuries, which doubled from
Chart 49.
Passenger/public injuries from
seven in 2013/14 to 14 in 2014/15.
•
The rate of harm (at 1.4 FWI per billion
passenger journeys) is also at its highest level in
the ten-year period.
•
Chart 49 shows a breakdown of this type of
accident. Contact with other objects includes
instances where people have walked into an
object, such as station sign. Moving objects
include closing lift doors, objects thrown up by
passing trains, and objects thrown by other
people.
contact with objects in stations
(2005/06 to 2014/15)
Struck by moving
objects while on
platform
6%
Struck by moving
objects not on
platform
7%
Trapped/
injured in ticket Contact with
other object on
gates
railway
21%
premises
35%
Struck accidentally
by other people in
station
31%
_________________________________________________________________
60
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
4.1.9
Other injuries on trains or in stations
Types of injuries occurring to passengers/public in stations or on trains, not already covered in this
chapter, are included in this section.
Harm from other injuries on trains or in stations
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Fatalities
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Major injuries
3
1
0
2
1
2
0
2
0
6
Minor injuries
28
24
26
20
16
29
29
27
40
31
Shock/trauma
1
2
0
1
3
4
7
8
9
12
FWI total
1.3
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.7
•
This type of accident has accounted for an average of 0.3 FWI per year over the last 10 years.
•
There has been one fatality in this category; a member of the public, who had fallen from a
footbridge onto a platform at Coventry station in October 2005.
•
The Other category contains a wide variety of
relatively rare incidents such as animal/insect
bites, exposure to hazardous substances, burns,
and electric shocks that do not involve traction
supplies.
•
Most of these accidents recorded in the table
above have been either falls from height or
manual handling/awkward movement injuries,
with a small number of people getting injured
while leaning or falling from trains.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Chart 50.
Passenger/public injuries from
other injuries on trains or in
stations (2005/06 to 2014/15)
Manual
handling/awkward
movement
42%
Lean or fall
from train in
running
10%
Falls from
height
38%
Other
10%
_________________________________________________________________
61
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
4.2
Workforce
4.2.1
Risk profile by accident type
The breakdown of workforce risk in Chart 51 is taken from SRMv8.1, and therefore represents the
modelled estimate of the underlying risk to the workforce. In the remainder of this chapter, the
charts are based on the levels of harm reported into SMIS, which, in any given year, may differ from
SRM modelled values. One reason for this is statistical variation; another is that the SRM includes an
estimate of the risk from events that may not have occurred during the year, such as train accidents
involving workforce injuries. Descriptions of the types of event that are included in each accident
type grouping are shown in Appendix 6.
Chart 51.
Risk to workforce on trains and in stations, by accident type: 10.4 FWI per year
Slips, trips and falls
1.9
In stations
Platform-train interface
1.5
Contact with object or person
1.2
Assault and abuse
1.0
Manual handling/awkward movement
0.3
Falls from height
0.1
Other accidents
0.2
On trains
On-board injuries
2.8
Assault and abuse
0.7
Manual handling/awkward movement
0.4
Lean or fall from train in running
0.1
Other accidents
0.1
0.0
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
2.5
3.0
Source: SRMv8.1
•
The majority of workforce risk on trains and in stations is made up of minor injuries (46%) and
major injuries (44%). Fatality risk in these locations is relatively low.
•
On-board injuries account for around 2.8 FWI per year on average. These are the largest
contributors to minor injury risk, but do not contribute to fatality risk.
•
At 1.9 FWI per year, slips, trips and falls comprise the largest source of workforce risk in stations.
Most of the risk arises from major injuries.
•
Risk at the PTI accounts for 1.5 FWI per year. More than 90% of this risk occurs during
boarding/alighting, rather than falls from the platform edge.
•
Assault and abuse accounts for 1.7 FWI per year in total, with more harm typically occurring in
stations rather than on trains. Assault and abuse contributes the greatest proportion of minor
injury risk.
_________________________________________________________________
62
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
4.2.2
Workforce injuries in 2014/15
Fatalities
•
There were no workforce fatalities in stations or on trains in 2014/15.
Major injuries
•
There were 37 workforce major injuries in 2014/15.
•
76% occurred at stations, of which 32% were slips, trips and falls.
Minor injuries
•
There were 3,083 recorded minor injuries, 301 (10%) of which were Class 1 (ie the injured party
was off work for more than three days, not including the day of the injury).
•
Of the minor injuries, 52% occurred at stations, of which 30% were contact with object injuries.
Shock and trauma
•
There were 506 recorded cases of workforce shock or trauma, 2 of which were Class 1 (ie
involved witnessing a fatality).
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
_________________________________________________________________
63
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
4.2.3
Trend in workforce harm by injury degree
The average level of workforce harm in stations or on board trains over the past 10 years has been
11.1 FWI per year; there have been no fatalities. The average level of harm in stations has been 6.8
FWI per years, with 4.3 FWI per year occurring on trains.
Chart 52.
Trend in harm to workforce on trains and in stations, by injury degree
16
14
1.2
11.9
12
1.2
12.6
1.2
12.1
12.0
11.2
1.1
0.9
10.2
0.9
10
0.8
6.5
FWI
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
13.7
5.7
8
5.7
6.5
5.4
5.5
5.5
6
9.4
9.3
0.7
0.6
4.6
4.3
4.1
4.3
3.7
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
8.5
0.5
4.3
4
5.9
4.2
2
5.6
5.7
5.3
4.8
2008/09
2009/10
3.8
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2010/11
2011/12
•
The level of harm recorded for 2014/15 was 8.5 FWI. This was the lowest recorded over the
period shown. The number of major injuries recorded in 2014/15 was 37, which is the lowest
level for the ten-year analysis period.
•
The amount of harm occurring in stations is greater than on trains (at around 60% compared
with 40%). The injury profile in each location differs, with 76% of major injuries occurring in
stations.
Workforce harm by injury degree and location
3.5
3.2
3.2
2012/13 1.0 2.2
2013/14 0.7 2.1
2014/15 0.9 2.0
4.6
2.7
4.1
2011/12 1.4
2.8
2007/08 1.5
4.1
2010/11 0.9 2.7
2.4
2005/06
3.9
2009/10 1.0 2.6
2.8
2014/15
2011/12
5.0
2008/09 0.7 2.6
2.2
3.6
2013/14
5.0
0
In stations
Fatalities
6.3
2.4
5.3
3.1
6.1
2012/13
4.2
2.9
2010/11
2.8
2.7
5.8
Major injuries
3.1
7.3
6.1
3.8
2.9
7.1
2009/10
4.6
2008/09
3.1
8.2
4.1
2.9
7.5
2007/08
3.4
3.1
2006/07
2
3.3
4
6.9
3.5
6
7.4
2005/06
FWI
8
Minor injuries
2006/07 1.1
Shock and trauma
10
3.2
12
2.3
Chart 53.
On trains
_________________________________________________________________
64
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
Trends in workforce harm by worker type
Different types of work on the railway expose personnel to different levels of risk. This is partly due
to the nature of the roles, but also due to the different environments where the work takes place.
Chart 54.
Trends in workforce harm on trains and in stations, by worker type
6
Shock and trauma
5.0
5
Minor injuries
Major injuries
4.4
Fatalities
3.9
4
FWI
3.3
3.5
3
2.0
2
1.5 1.5
2.1 2.2
1.9
2.2
1.8
1.7
1.5
1.0 1.1
1.1 1.1
0.6 0.7 0.6
1
0.9 0.9
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.1
0.1
Infrastructure
workers
Train drivers
Other on-board
train crew
Station staff
Revenue
protection staff
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2010/11
2011/12
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
0
Other workforce
•
Other on-board train crew suffer the greatest proportion of harm, with 37% of the total
workforce harm over the period shown. Harm rose by 0.2 FWI in 2014/15, but remains lower
than historical levels. Minor injuries make up a much larger proportion of harm to this sector of
the workforce than others.
•
Revenue protection staff have seen a reduction of 0.5 FWI in 2014/15 when compared to
2013/14. Although the reduction was mostly influenced by major injuries, this group also
experienced their lowest levels of harm from minor injuries and shock/trauma in the last five
years.
•
Infrastructure workers have accounted for 8% of harm over the period shown in the chart. Their
injury profile is dominated by major injuries, and comprises injuries while carrying out repair and
maintenance work around stations.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
_________________________________________________________________
65
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in workforce major injuries
Workforce major injuries comprise a set of injuries originally listed in RIDDOR, and include losing
consciousness (as a result of the injury), fractures (other than fingers and toes), major dislocations
and hospital stays of 24 hours or more. 20
Chart 55.
Workforce major injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type
80
70
60
Major injuries
50
59
21
40
30
20
Falls from height
Assault and abuse
Contact with object or person
Platform-train interface
On-board injuries
Other accidents
Manual handling/awkward movement
Slips, trips, and falls
56
12
42
10
12
5
5
5
10
7
7
57
53
4
7
6
38
9
9
9
15
11
19
13
0
2005/06
4
2006/07
2007/08
8
9
2008/09
2009/10
10
8
43
6
37
4
4
8
4
6
16
6
17
9
18
6
2010/11
41
8
10
9
12
8
7
14
10
9
48
2011/12
8
6
2012/13
2013/14
10
2014/15
•
At 37, the number of workforce major injuries in 2014/15 decreased by six compared with
2013/14, and is at its lowest level seen over the past 10 years.
•
Since 2005/06, 28% of major injuries have been caused by slips, trips and falls. At nine, the figure
for 2014/15 was the lowest in the past 10 years.
•
On-board incidents have the next highest contribution to major injuries, accounting for 22% over
the period shown.
20
These regulations were first published in 1985, and have been amended and updated several times. In the latest version
of RIDDOR, published 2013, the term ‘major injury’ was dropped; the regulation now uses the term ‘specified injuries’ to
refer to a slightly different scope of injuries than those that were classed as major. For consistency in industry safety
performance analysis, the term major injury has been maintained, along with the associated definition from RIDDOR 1995.
_________________________________________________________________
66
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
Trends in workforce minor injuries
Workforce minor injuries are categorised as Class 1 if they are not major injuries but result in the
staff member being incapacitated for their normal duties for more than three consecutive calendar
days, not including the day of the injury.
Chart 56.
Workforce minor injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type
4500
3500
3000
Minor injuries
4090
On-board injuries
Falls from height
Lean or fall from train in running
Other accidents
Assault and abuse
Manual handling/awkward movement
Contact with object or person
Slips, trips, and falls
Platform-train interface
4000
2500
2000
3895
3613 3570
3412 3441 3391
2804 2830 2782
1500
1000
500
491 523 421 425 425 419 407
361 303 301
Class 1
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
Class 2
•
The number of Class 1 minor injuries has seen a constant reduction since 2009/10, due mainly to
a fall in the number of on-board injuries. Class 1 minor injuries now sit at the lowest level in the
reporting period.
•
The number of Class 2 minor injuries also stands at its lowest level over the reporting period. The
past three years have seen notably lower numbers of Class 2 injuries being recorded for the
majority of accident types.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
_________________________________________________________________
67
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
4.2.4
Workforce slips, trips and falls in stations
The average level of harm from slips, trips and falls over the last 10 years has been 1.9 FWI per year.
Chart 57.
Workforce harm from slips, trips and falls, by location
1.8
Shock and trauma
1.48
1.6
Minor injuries
Major injuries
1.4
1.13
1.2
0.73
0.03
0.07
0.13
0.49
0.36
0.25
0.16
2012/13
0.28
0.17
0.2
2011/12
0.24
0.24
0.4
0.18
0.52
0.60
0.6
0.63
0.8
0.66
1.0
0.46
FWI
Fatalities
Station concourse
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2010/11
2011/12
Stairs or escalators
Other
•
Over the last five years, the greatest proportion of harm from slips, trips and falls in stations
occurred on the platform (49%), with stairs/escalators being the next most common location
(27%).
•
There was a 36% decrease in harm from
workforce slips, trips and falls in 2014/15
compared to 2013/14.
3.5
3.0
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
2.1
2.2
1.9
1.7
1.5
1.5
1.5
2011/12
2.1
2010/11
2.5
2.0
Fatalities
2.6
2.2
1.4
1.0
0.5
2013/14
2012/13
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
0.0
2005/06
Slips, trips and falls to the workforce have
fluctuated over the reporting period, and
currently sit at their lowest level in the last 10
years. Harm is dominated by major injuries,
which have driven the fluctuations seen in Chart
58.
Slips, trips and falls FWI
4.0
FWI
•
Chart 58.
2014/15
On platform
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
0.0
_________________________________________________________________
68
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
4.2.5
Workforce accidents at the platform-train interface
An accident is considered to have occurred at the PTI if the incident resulted in the person wholly or
partially crossing the boundary between the platform and the track, or the platform and the train (if
present).
Chart 59.
Workforce harm at the platform-train interface
3.0
Shock and trauma
2.5
2.4
2.0
0.5
Minor injuries
FWI
Major injuries
1.5
1.7
1.7
0.6
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.7
1.0
0.5
1.1
2005/06
•
1.2
0.9
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
The overall level of harm at the PTI increased by 0.3 FWI
in 2014/15 compared with the previous year. The
numbers are quite low, so small changes appear to cause
large fluctuations in the chart above.
•
Harm to train drivers and other on-board train crew
accounts for 86% of workforce harm at the PTI.
•
Most of the harm to workforce at the PTI occurs during
boarding and alighting trains, rather than from other
causes such as falls from the platform edge.
Chart 61.
1.1
1.8
0.5
0.8
2011/12
2012/13
Chart 60.
2013/14
2014/15
PTI
Infrastructure
workers
<1%
Train drivers
22%
Other
workforce
3%
Revenue Station staff
protection
9%
staff
3%
Other onboard train
crew
63%
Workforce harm at the platform-train interface
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
2.0
1.3
1.5
1.0
1.0
1.3
1.3
0.9
0.9
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.4
2011/12
1.4
1.4
2010/11
2.0
FWI
1
0.6
Workforce harm at the
2.5
1.5
0.4
0.5
0.6
2010/11
1.4
1.4
1.2
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.0
1.5
0.5
0.6
Fatalities
0.1
0.0
0.3
0.1
Boarding/alighting
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0.0
Not boarding/alighting
_________________________________________________________________
69
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
Accidents during boarding and alighting trains
Over the past 10 years, there has been an average of 1.3 FWI per year to staff while boarding or
alighting a train.
Chart 62.
Workforce harm from boarding and alighting accidents
1.4
Shock and trauma
1.2
1.2
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
1.0
0.8
FWI
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
2014/15
0.2
2013/14
0.2
0.4
2012/13
0.2
0.2
0.4
2011/12
0.2
2014/15
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.3
2013/14
0.4
0.1
Fall between train and
platform
Caught in train doors
Other alighting accident
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
0.0
Other boarding accident
•
The level of harm from boarding and alighting increased by 52% in 2014/15 compared with the
previous year. This is the second highest value during the five year time period covered in the
chart.
•
The categories fall between train and platform and caught in train doors include both boarding
and alighting injuries.
•
Although the level of FWI increased in 2014/15 the number of minor injuries has decreased by
12% since 2013/14 and is now at its lowest value within the five year period.
•
In contrast to passengers and the public, the level of workforce harm from other accidents at the
PTI is relatively low. For the workforce, around 90% of harm at the PTI arises during boarding or
alighting.
_________________________________________________________________
70
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
4.2.6
Worker injuries due to contact with object
The category contact with object includes injuries while lifting, moving or carrying objects (eg
dropping or striking injuries) but does not include manual handling injuries (eg strains or sprains),
which are categorised separately.
Chart 63.
Workforce harm due to contact with object
2.0
Shock and trauma
1.8
1.6
1.6
FWI
Fatalities
1.5
0.7
1.1
0.7
1.1
1.2
0.7
0.7
0.7
1.0
0.8
Major injuries
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.2
0.6
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.8
0.5
0.6
0.9
0.4
0.2
Minor injuries
1.7
0.9
0.7
0.5
1.0
0.6
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.2
0.0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
•
The level of FWI for 2014/15 was at its lowest level over the period shown, due to a lower than
average number of major injuries. The level of harm from minor injuries has stayed reasonably
constant over the period shown.
•
The injury profile for contact with object injuries is
shown in Chart 64. Areas with darker shading
represent the most commonly injured parts of the
body; in this case these are fingers, hands and the
head.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Chart 64.
Contact with object injury
profile (2005/06 to 2014/15)
_________________________________________________________________
71
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
4.2.7
Worker injuries due to manual handling
Manual handling injuries include sprains and strains while lifting or carrying objects.
Chart 65.
Worker FWI due to manual handling
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
Shock and trauma
Major injuries
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.7
FWI
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.5
0.6
0.6
Fatalities
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.3
Minor injuries
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
2006/07
2007/08
0.3
0.3
0.0
2005/06
0.2
0.1
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
0.1
0.1
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
•
The number of major injuries due to manual handling in 2014/15 is at its lowest seen in the last
10 years, with no major injuries being incurred.
•
Minor injuries have remained at a fairly consistent level over the last 10 years, with annual
fluctuations being largely driven by major injuries.
•
Over the reporting period, the injuries have come from a variety of sources, including assisting
passengers on and off the train, lifting ramps for train access, lifting luggage for passengers,
rubbish clearance and closing gates.
•
The injury profile for manual handling injuries is
shown in Chart 66. Areas with darker shading
represent the most commonly injured parts of the
body. As might be expected in this case, the most
commonly injured parts are shoulders and the back.
Chart 66.
Manual handling injury
profile (2005/06 to 2014/15)
_________________________________________________________________
72
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_________________________________________________________________
4.2.8
Workforce on-board injuries
The category of on-board injuries does not include train accidents, falls from trains, or assaults,
which are considered under separate categories. On-board injuries have accounted for an average of
3.0 FWI per year over the last 10 years.
Chart 67.
Trend in workforce harm from on-board injuries
6
Shock and trauma
5
4
FWI
Minor injuries
4.5
Major injuries
3.4
Fatalities
3.4
2.4
3
2.6
2.4
2
2.8
2.2
2.2
2.2
3.2
3.0
2.5
2.2
2.1
1.7
2.1
1
1.0
1.2
2006/07
2007/08
1.6
2.4
1.6
0.4
0.6
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.6
0.8
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
0
2005/06
2.2
•
While there been fluctuations in the overall level of FWI from on-board accidents over the tenyear period, the level for recent years has been consistently lower.
•
Chart 68 looks at on-board injuries, broken down by whether or not a causal factor was identified
as sudden train movement. Injuries attributed to sudden movements of the train due to lurching
or braking have accounted for around 26% of on-board workforce harm since 2005/06. However,
it is not always straightforward to determine whether train movement was a causal factor in an
accident.
•
On average, over the past 10 years, slips, trips and falls and contact with objects within the train
have accounted for 61% of the harm from workforce on-board injuries.
Chart 68.
On-board injuries and train movement (2005/06 to 2014/15)
Scald
or burn
Other on-board
injury
Scald or
burn
Falls and
contact with
objects
Caught by
internal
doors
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Other
accidents
74%
Accidents due
to sudden train
movement
26%
Other onboard
injury
Falls and contact
with objects
_________________________________________________________________
73
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
4.2.9
Workforce assaults
Our industry’s workforce is exposed to risk from assault, as are many outward-facing industries. The
risk from assault to workforce in stations or on trains, as modelled by SRMv8.1, is 1.7 FWI per year, of
which 0.02 FWI per year relates to fatalities.
Workforce assaults leading to injury or shock/trauma, by location and worker type
1400
Other workforce
1217
1200
1033 1032
1000
Revenue protection staff
Station staff
946
875 881
774
800
Other on-board train crew
810
699 704
Train drivers
701
530 508 529
600
Infrastructure workers
483 471 490
332 368 311
400
200
In stations
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
0
2005/06
Assaults leading to injury or shock/trauma
Chart 69.
On trains
•
The reported number of assaults to workforce on trains and in stations have shown notably
decreasing trends over the reporting period. In 2014/15 the number of assaults leading to injury
or shock were at 40% of the level seen in 2005/06.
•
Over the last 10 years, around 60% of
assaults have occurred in stations.
Harm from assaults
5
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
3.8
2.9
2.6
2.3
2.2
1.7
2
1.5
1.4
1.6
2014/15
2.9
3
2013/14
4
2012/13
Harm from assaults has also seen a generally
reducing trend over the last 10 years.
Weighted injuries
•
Chart 70.
1
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
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_________________________________________________________________
4.3
Key safety statistics: people on trains and in stations
Passengers and public on trains and in
stations
Fatalities
On-board injuries
Assault and abuse
Platform-train interface
Slips, trips and falls
Other accidents
Major injuries
On-board injuries
Assault and abuse
Platform-train interface
Slips, trips and falls
Other accidents
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
On-board injuries
Assault and abuse
Platform-train interface
Slips, trips and falls
Other accidents
Passenger kms (billions)
Passenger journeys (millions)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Passenger and public assaults on trains
and in stations (BTP data)
Total
Actual bodily harm
Common assault
GBH and more serious cases of violence
Other violence
Racially aggravated harassment
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
9
0
1
6
2
0
256
24
15
46
163
8
5705
1280
4425
223
1
222
45.65
3.61
3.01
12.93
24.46
1.64
54.48
1355.56
2368
803
1053
84
37
391
8
0
0
5
3
0
272
20
15
48
182
7
6058
1413
4645
255
0
255
47.17
3.32
1.99
12.29
27.99
1.58
57.11
1461.51
2468
816
1175
72
29
376
4
0
2
1
1
0
321
26
12
65
210
8
6473
1439
5034
235
0
235
48.56
3.99
3.61
9.83
29.49
1.64
58.23
1502.63
2473
752
1230
65
32
394
4
0
0
4
0
0
287
28
6
53
193
7
6421
1418
5003
230
1
229
45.03
4.14
1.07
11.73
26.53
1.55
60.18
1588.32
2615
749
1274
79
22
491
4
0
1
2
1
0
316
35
12
51
198
20
6936
1271
5665
245
0
245
47.87
4.95
2.60
9.28
28.06
2.98
62.97
1656.73
2888
728
1459
99
22
580
_________________________________________________________________
75
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
Workforce on trains and in stations
Fatalities
Major injuries
Electric shock
Falls from height
Assault and abuse
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
On-board injuries
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Electric shock
Falls from height
Assault and abuse
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
On-board injuries
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
0
0
0
0
38
57
41
43
37
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
3
8
4
4
6
0
0
0
0
0
6
18
8
6
10
9
9
8
6
8
8
10
4
6
2
9
10
16
17
9
1
2
1
1
0
3860
3798
3165
3133
3083
419
407
361
303
301
3441
3391
2804
2830
2782
802
855
617
621
506
10
7
10
7
2
792
848
607
614
504
10.18
12.01
9.37
9.29
8.50
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.31
0.21
1.73
2.27
1.47
1.44
1.61
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
1.19
2.37
1.37
1.11
1.43
3.15
3.05
2.51
2.24
2.42
1.47
1.72
0.91
1.16
0.79
1.50
1.52
2.23
2.17
1.39
0.93
1.07
0.86
0.86
0.67
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Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
5
Working on or about the running line
This chapter investigates the types of accident that affect infrastructure workers while working on or
about the running line.
A detailed breakdown of statistics related to workforce fatalities and injuries is presented in the key
safety statistics table at the end of this chapter.
2014/15 Headlines
•
There were no workforce fatalities involving infrastructure staff working on or about the running
line. The total level of harm arising from running line work during 2014/15 was 9.7 FWI, which is
a decrease of 10% compared with 10.8 FWI occurring in 2013/14. The total harm comprised 76
major injuries, 1,359 minor injuries and seven cases of shock/trauma.
•
Although no infrastructure workers were fatally injured while working on or about the running
line, one infrastructure worker died as a result of a road traffic accident while on duty. This event
is covered in more detail in Chapter 6 Road driving risk.
•
Slips, trips and falls account for the largest proportion of harm. At 4.2 FWI, the level of harm for
2014/15 was a reduction on the 5.1 FWI occurring during 2013/14, but since 2007/08 the trend
in harm from slips, trips and falls has been generally increasing.
•
Contact with objects is the next largest contributor to running line harm. The recorded level for
2014/15 was 2.8 FWI, and marks the continuation of a gradual increasing trend since 2011/12.
Nevertheless, the level of harm over this period remains generally lower than at the beginning of
the decade.
•
Although this chapter focuses on injuries to infrastructure workers on and about the running line,
infrastructure workers also carry out work in other locations, such as stations, and are also
subject to risk while travelling between sites. The level of harm from areas away from the
running line shows a generally increasing trend over the period shown. This corresponds with
initiatives to improve incident reporting in YDS and road driving incidents.
Working on the running line at a glance
Risk in context (SRMv8.1)
Trend in harm
16
14
12
9.2
10
FWI
Other accidental
risk
(129.4 FWI;
92.8%)
Working on or
about the
running line
(10.1 FWI;
7.2%)
Weighted injuries
Fatalities
13.8
10.4
11.4 10.9
10.8
9.1
8
8.1
9.3
9.7
6
4
2
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
_________________________________________________________________
77
Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
5.1
Risk profile by accident type
The breakdown of infrastructure worker risk in Chart 71 is taken from SRMv8.1, and therefore
represents the modelled estimate of the underlying risk to the workforce working on the running
line. In the remainder of this chapter, the charts are based on the levels of harm reported into SMIS,
which, in any given year, may differ from SRM modelled values. One reason for this is statistical
variation; another is that the SRM includes an estimate of the risk from events that may not have
occurred during the year. Descriptions of the types of event that are included in each accident type
grouping are shown in Appendix 6.
Chart 71.
Infrastructure worker risk on the running line by accident type: 10.1 FWI per year
Slips, trips, and falls
3.8
Contact with object or person
2.4
Struck by train
1.6
Machinery/tool operation
0.8
Other accidents
0.5
Falls from height
0.4
Workforce electric shock
0.4
Manual handling/awkward movement
0.3
0.0
0.5
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
FWI modelled risk (FWI per year)
4.0
4.5
Source: SRMv8.1
•
At 3.8 FWI per year, slips, trips and falls on or about the running line pose the greatest risk to
infrastructure workers in this environment. Around 38% of the total running line risk is from this
source, although the contribution to the fatality risk is relatively low, at below 1%.
•
The greatest source of fatality risk is being struck by a train, which accounts for 70% of the
fatality risk profile on the running line. The estimated total harm to infrastructure workers is 1.6
FWI per year, but nearly all of this is fatality risk.
•
Electric shock risk amounts to 0.4 FWI per year. Infrastructure workers are exposed to electrical
sources of varying power, such as the third rail, overhead lines, non-traction supplies and
machinery. Overall, it accounts for 4% of the FWI risk profile on the running line, but 12% of the
fatality risk profile.
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_________________________________________________________________
5.2
Fatalities and injuries in 2014/15
Fatalities
•
There were no fatalities on or about the running line in 2014/15.
Major injuries
•
There were 76 infrastructure worker major injuries in 2014/15.
•
46% of these were slips, trips and falls, while almost a third were contact with objects.
Minor injuries
•
There were 1,359 recorded minor injuries, 167 (12%) of which were Class 1 (ie the injured party
was off work for more than three days, not including the day of the injury).
Shock and trauma
•
There were seven recorded cases of shock or trauma, six of which were Class 1 (ie involved
witnessing a fatality, or an incident likely to lead to a fatality).
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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79
Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
5.3
Trend in harm by injury degree
Over the past decade, the average level of harm to infrastructure workers engaged in track work has
been 10.2 FWI per year, of which 2.0 FWI per year have been fatalities.
Chart 72.
Working on the running line: FWI by injury degree
16
14
12
13.8
2.5
11.4
FWI
10.4
10
9.2
8
2.0
1.6
6.9
6
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
10.9
1.4
10.8
9.3
9.1
1.6
8.3
8.1
6.5
6.3
7.4
7.6
6.1
2
2006/07
2.0
2.0
3
3
1
0
2005/06
9.7
6.5
7.2
3
2.4
1.9
6.7
4
2
1.5
Shock and trauma
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
1
1
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
•
The level of harm recorded for 2014/15 was 9.7 FWI. This was 10% below the 10.8 FWI for
2013/14 and 6% below the ten-year average of 10.2 FWI.
•
There were no infrastructure worker fatalities during work on the running line in 2014/15.
•
The number of major injuries recorded in 2014/15 was 76. This is very similar to 2013/14. Major
injuries predominate in the injury profile for running line work, accounting for 68% of the harm
since 2005/06.
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_________________________________________________________________
Fatalities
The broad category of ‘infrastructure worker’ encompasses those whose work involves inspecting,
maintaining and renewing the track, signalling and telecommunications equipment, and other
railway infrastructure, such as earthworks and bridges. The majority of workforce fatalities occur to
those involved in work on the infrastructure, reflecting the higher-risk environments in which this
work takes place.
Chart 73.
Working on the running line: fatalities by accident type, 2005/06 – 2014/15
Contact with object, 1
Falls from height, 2
Lean or fall from train in
running, 1
Struck by train, 9
Asphyxiation, 1
•
Since 2005/06 there has been a total of 14 fatalities to infrastructure workers on or about the
running line.
•
Most fatalities have resulted from workers being struck by trains. Nine workers have been killed
in this way since 2005/06. The last fatality due to this cause was in 2013/14, and involved a
member of a gang working on the track near Newark Northgate station.
•
The variation in tasks carried out presents many different risks to infrastructure workers. Since
2005/06 two workers have fallen from height: one was working on a bridge and another was
working on a ‘cherry picker’ that toppled over. One worker died after getting overcome by fumes
while engaged on bridge maintenance work near the running line. The Contact with object
fatality was a worker who received fatal crush injuries when becoming trapped between non-rail
vehicles. The remaining event was a worker who fell from a road-rail vehicle (which is classed as
a train for reporting purposes) when the crane basket failed.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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81
Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
Major injuries
Workforce major injuries are defined in RIDDOR 1995 Schedule 1, and include losing consciousness
(as a result of the injury), fractures (other than fingers and toes), major dislocations and hospital
stays of 24 hours or more. 21
Chart 74.
Working on the running line: major injuries by accident type
120
Other accidents
Falls from height
Machinery/tool operation
Slips, trips, and falls
Train accidents
100
Manual handling/awkward movement
Workforce electric shock
Contact with object or person
Struck by train
83
Major injuries
80
6
5
60
72
5
34
28
29
31
40
20
67
5
29
24
69
6
26
27
74
65
65
5
6
5
19
19
12
15
29
29
35
32
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
61
6
63
9
7
14
42
76
3
6
22
35
6
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2013/14
2014/15
•
Between 2005/06 and 2012/13, the trend in major injuries was one of gradual reduction, but the
last two years have seen a return to higher numbers.
•
Since 2005/06, 46% of major injuries have resulted from slips, trips and falls. The annual
contribution from slips, trips and falls has shown little variation over the last 10 years, with an
average of 31 major injuries for this cause.
•
Contact with object has the next highest proportion of major injuries, accounting for 29% of all
major injuries over the period shown. The increase in 2014/15 marks the end of a reducing trend
seen over the past decade.
•
There were six incidents of electric shock during 2014/15, which is the highest number seen over
the period shown. Two involved contact with the conductor rail, two with the overhead line, and
two with non-traction electricity supply.
•
The injuries in the category Train accidents refer to cases such as those where infrastructure
workers at the trackside have been struck by small pieces of debris thrown up by trains that have
hit objects on the track, or where rail vehicles that have derailed in possessions and have
subsequently come into contact with workers at the site.
21 These regulations were first published in 1985, and have been amended and updated several times. In the latest version of RIDDOR,
published in 2013, the term ‘major injury’ was dropped; the regulation now uses the term ‘specified injuries’ to refer to a slightly different
scope of injuries than those that were classed as major. For consistency in industry safety performance analysis, the term ‘major injury’ has
been maintained, along with the associated definition from RIDDOR 1995.
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_________________________________________________________________
Minor injuries
Workforce minor injuries are categorised as Class 1 if they are not major injuries but result in the
staff member being incapacitated for their normal duties for more than three consecutive calendar
days, not including the day of the injury.
Chart 75.
Working on the running line: minor injuries by accident type
1800
Struck by train
1536
Falls from height
1600
Workforce electric shock
1400
Machinery/tool operation
1200
Minor injuries
1264
Manual handling/awkward movement
Contact with object or person
1060 1076 1065
Slips, trips, and falls
1000
1304
1214
1192
1120 1101
Other accidents
Train accidents
800
600
84
79
67
102
2010/11
139
2009/10
187
2008/09
200
2007/08
400
174 169
215
167
Class 1
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2006/07
2005/06
0
Class 2
•
Class 1 minor injuries have fluctuated over the reporting period, with the higher levels in recent
years being driven by slips, trips and falls, contact with object or person, and manual
handling/awkward movement.
•
The number of Class 2 injuries decreased compared with 2013/14 and remains just below the
average of 1193.2 for the last 10 years. The increased numbers seen in the last two years have
been affected by the number of injuries from contact with object or person.
•
Over the last 10 years, the average ratio of total Class 1 to Class 2 minor injuries stands at 1:9 but
varies between causes, ranging typically from 1:14 to 1:4.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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83
Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
5.4
Trends in running line harm by accident type
Slips, trips and falls
The average level of harm from slips, trips and falls over the last 10 years has been 3.8 FWI per year,
which is just over a third of the average total harm to infrastructure workers on the running line, over
this period.
Chart 76.
6
Slips, trips and falls on the running line
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
5
5.1
Major injuries
Fatalities
0.9
4.2
4
3.8
FWI
0.9
3.7
0.6
3
3.3
3.0
0.6
3.4
3.5
0.5
0.6
4.2
4.0
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.6
4.2
2
2.9
3.1
2005/06
2006/07
3.5
2.4
1
2.7
2.9
2.9
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
3.5
3.2
0
•
•
2007/08
Over the period 2007/08 to 2013/14, there was
an increasing trend in harm from slips, trips and
falls. The level for 2014/15 shows a reduction
from the previous years, but is still relatively
high for the period as a whole.
Chart 77.
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Slips, trips and falls injury profile
(2005/06 to 2014/15)
The injury profile for slip, trip or fall injuries is
shown in Chart 77. Areas with darker shading
represent the most commonly injured parts of
the body; in this case these are ankles, legs and
arms.
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_________________________________________________________________
Contact with object
The category contact with object includes injuries while lifting, moving or carrying objects (eg
dropping or striking injuries), but does not include manual handling injuries (eg strains or sprains),
which are categorised separately.
Chart 78.
Contact with objects while working on the running line
5
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
4.2
4
0.8
4.1
3.6
0.8
0.5
0.6
FWI
3
3.5
Major injuries
Fatalities
2.8
2.6
2
2.4
2.4
0.5
0.5
2.0
1.8
3.4
2.8
0.5
2.2
0.6
0.8
0.6
2.9
1
1.9
2.2
1.9
1.2
1
1.5
1.4
2012/13
2013/14
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2014/15
•
Although major injuries form the largest part of the injury profile, there has been one fatality
from this cause over the period shown: an infrastructure worker suffered fatal crush injuries as a
result of becoming trapped between two non-rail vehicles.
•
The level of harm has increased for the last three years, but remains generally lower than at the
beginning of the period.
•
The injury profile for contact with object injuries is
shown in Chart 79. Areas with darker shading
represent the most commonly injured parts of the
body; in this case these are fingers, hands and feet.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Chart 79.
Contact with object injury
profile (2005/06 to 2014/15)
_________________________________________________________________
85
Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
Machinery/tool operation and manual handling/awkward movement
As well as the risk from contact with objects, carrying, moving or otherwise interacting with
equipment carries the potential for musculoskeletal injury. Where the equipment is a machine or
works tool, then other risk may be introduced by its operation, such as cuts, bruises, fractures and
amputations.
Running line injuries involving machinery/tool operation or manual
handling/awkward movement
1.1
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.5
0.2
0.6
Fatalities
0.2
0.6
0.9
0.6
0.2
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.7
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.2
Machinery/tool operation
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.1
2014/15
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.7
2011/12
0.2
0.7
2010/11
FWI
0.6
0.7
Major injuries
2009/10
0.8
0.8
0.9
2008/09
1.0
0.8
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
2013/14
1.2
2012/13
Chart 80.
Manual handling/awkward movement
•
Machinery/tool operation harm is dominated by major injuries, which contributed 75% of harm
to this injury category over the past 10 years. Manual handling/awkward movement harm is
dominated by minor injuries. Minor injuries have contributed 73% of harm to this injury category
over the past 10 years.
•
The trend in either category is quite variable, and is influenced by the number of major injuries
that have occurred.
Struck by train
Running line injuries as a result of being struck by train
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock/trauma
Total FWI
•
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
3
0
2
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
2
6
1
3
1
3
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.11
0.11
2.22
1.60
1.10
0.31
0.10
1.30
1.00
0.10
Being struck by a train is a low-occurrence event, but with a high likelihood of a fatal injury. This
category accounts for less than 1% of injuries, 11% of harm, and 64% of fatalities on the running
line. Over the period shown, there have been nine fatalities due to this cause.
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Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
Falls from height
Running line injuries as a result of falls from height
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
6
2
2
2
2
5
1
2
2
3
12
9
15
6
5
4
8
3
1
3
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.61
0.22
0.23
0.21
1.21
1.50
0.12
0.21
0.20
0.30
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock/trauma
Total FWI
•
Falls from height are another low-occurrence event, with the potential for serious outcome.
There have been two fatalities due to falls from height since 2005/06.
•
There is a wide range of locations and equipment that involves working at height, including
scaffolding, gantries, cherry pickers and bridges. The most common falls over the last 10 years
have been from scaffolding and into holes and pits.
Electric shock
Running line injuries as a result of electric shock
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock/trauma
Total FWI
•
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
2
0
5
1
1
0
1
6
7
12
4
2
3
18
11
14
20
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
4
3
0.31
0.11
0.21
0.01
0.51
0.13
0.12
0.01
0.14
0.65
There are various electrical hazards for infrastructure workers, including the third rail and
overhead lines. The majority of electric shock incidents involved non-traction supplies (60%),
which are less likely to result in fatality or major injury than contact with the third rail or
overhead line equipment (OLE).
Other accidents on or about the running line
Running line injuries as a result of other causes
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock/trauma
Total FWI
•
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
5
2
0
2
4
4
4
2
93
67
66
68
65
62
98
114
111
84
0
0
1
2
0
2
2
5
2
3
0.32
0.39
0.58
1.31
1.08
0.27
0.54
0.56
0.56
0.32
The types of injuries covered under ‘other causes’ include infrastructure workers falling from rail
vehicles or on-track plant in running, being injured while getting on or off these vehicles when
they are stationary, and exposure to hazardous substances. The two fatalities during the period
shown were one worker who died after being overcome by fumes while engaged on bridge
maintenance work near the running line, and one worker who fell from a road-rail vehicle (which
is classed as a train for reporting purposes) when the crane basket failed.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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87
Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
5.5
Injuries to infrastructure workers away from the running line
The topic of this chapter has been injuries to infrastructure workers on the running line. However,
infrastructure workers also carry out work in other locations, such as stations, and are also subject to
risk while traveling between sites. For completeness, the following chart presents the additional
injuries that have occurred to infrastructure workers away from the running line.
Chart 81.
Trend in infrastructure worker injuries away from the running line
6
5.5
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
5
Fatalities
4
FWI
0.7
Major injuries
3.6
2.3
0.4
2
2.6
2.6
0.5
0.6
1
0.6
0.6
2005/06
2006/07
0
2.1
1.8
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2.8
0.8
2.5
2.2
1.7
3.1
0.8
0.7
0.8
3.6
0.8
0.5
3
4.3
4.0
2
1.9
2010/11
1
1
2011/12
2012/13
1
2013/14
2014/15
•
The level of harm from areas away from the running line shows a generally increasing trend over
the period shown. This corresponds with initiatives to improve incident reporting in yards,
depots and sidings and road driving incidents.
•
The fatalities shown above occurred in road driving incidents. More information is available in
the road driving chapter.
•
Half of the harm from other locations has arisen from accidents in YDS, as shown in Chart 83.
•
YDS saw reporting introduced as a voluntary procedure by TOCs around 2007. More information
is available in Chapter 11.
Chart 82.
25
Shock and trauma
Major injuries
FWI
20
15
All infrastructure worker harm
14.5
12.6
15.0
16.3
13.5
12.8
11.6 12.1
14.0
Yards, depots and
sidings
11%
In stations and
on trains
6%
5
Road driving
5%
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
0
2005/06
FWI by location
Other location
7%
Minor injuries
Fatalities
9.9
10
Chart 83.
Running line
71%
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Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
5.6
Key safety statistics: working on or about the running line
Infrastructure work
Fatalities
Slips, trips and falls
Contact with object
Struck by train
Machinery/tool operation
Falls from height
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Other accidents
Major injuries
Slips, trips and falls
Contact with object
Struck by train
Machinery/tool operation
Falls from height
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Other accidents
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Slips, trips and falls
Contact with object
Struck by train
Machinery/tool operation
Falls from height
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Other accidents
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
65
61
63
74
76
29
35
32
42
35
19
12
15
14
22
3
1
3
0
1
4
6
7
9
4
5
1
2
2
3
1
1
0
1
6
1
1
0
1
3
2
4
4
4
2
1167
1294
1270
1519
1359
102
174
169
215
167
1065
1120
1101
1304
1192
4
6
6
7
7
0
2
3
1
6
4
4
3
6
1
9.08
8.10
9.26
10.79
9.66
3.48
4.16
3.98
5.08
4.24
2.39
1.78
2.01
2.16
2.82
0.31
0.10
1.30
1.00
0.10
0.57
0.83
0.87
1.12
0.61
1.50
0.12
0.21
0.20
0.30
0.13
0.12
0.01
0.14
0.65
0.33
0.47
0.33
0.43
0.61
0.27
0.54
0.56
0.56
0.32
_________________________________________________________________
89
Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
Page intentionally blank
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Road driving risk
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6
Road driving risk
Within this report, road driving refers to any member of the workforce travelling by means of a
motorised vehicle between sites while on duty, or travelling to and from their home to a non-regular
place of work, including door-to-door taxi provision.
This chapter investigates the impact of this activity on the wide variety of railway roles, from station
staff to infrastructure worker sub-contractors.
A breakdown of statistics related to workforce fatalities and injuries is presented in the key safety
statistics table at the end of this chapter.
2014/15 Headlines
•
There were two workforce fatalities in separate road traffic accidents in 2014/15. One was an
infrastructure worker travelling between sites, and the other was an office worker travelling to a
non-regular place of work.
•
In total, during 2014/15, there were: two fatalities, four major injuries, 104 minor injuries and 10
cases of shock/trauma reported. This equates to 2.7 FWI, which is almost level with the 2.8 FWI
occurring in 2013/14.
•
There is a clearly increasing level of reported harm from road driving incidents over the last 10
years: this is likely to reflect increased awareness and reporting rather than increased risk.
•
Although road driving risk has come under focus within the industry, with a consequent
improvement in reporting levels, there is still work to be done to ensure that all injuries not
currently covered by the Railway Group Standard, but covered by HSE guidance are recorded.
Since 2005/06, there have been six fatalities recorded in SMIS as being work-related, but a
number of other fatalities are known to have occurred, which have not been reported.
Road driving risk at a glance
3.5
Weighted injuries
Fatalities
3.0
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
2.7
0.3
1.3
0.6
2010/11
<0.1 <0.1 <0.1
0.3
2009/10
0.0
2007/08
0.5
2008/09
1.0
1.4
2012/13
1.5
2011/12
2.0
2006/07
Risk to the
workforce
from driving
whilst on duty
(1.2 FWI; 1%)
2005/06
Other
accidental risk
(138.4 FWI;
99%)
FWI
2.5
2.8
2014/15
Trend in harm
2013/14
Risk in context (SRMv8.1)
_________________________________________________________________
91
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
6.1
Required scope of road driving risk
Within this report, reference to road driving risk and
accidents refers to any member of the workforce
travelling for work purposes. This is defined as
travelling from their home to somewhere else that is
not their usual place of work, and from their usual
place of work to somewhere that is not their usual
place of work. This does not include commuting,
which is from their home to their usual place of work.
The diagram on the right indicates the current
required scope of reporting for road driving risk.
Although accidents while commuting to and from
work do not fall within the scope of the Standard, HSE
guidance (INDG382 Driving At Work – Managing
Work Related Road Safety) indicates that “Health &
safety law does not apply to people commuting (ie.
Travelling between their home and their usual place
of work), unless they are travelling from their home to
somewhere which is not their usual place of work….”
6.1.1
Home
Temporary
places of
work
Usual place
of work
Journeys in scope
Recording data about road driving accidents and injuries
SMIS was created for building commonality in incident reporting among rail companies, and has
identified a number of key safety concerns across the industry since its implementation, but we have
not benefitted to the same extent in understanding road driving risk.
The industry is required by the relevant Railway Group Standard to record in SMIS any incidence of
fatalities or injuries to the workforce occurring as a result of a road traffic accident while driving on
duty between sites, to carry out work in association with the maintenance or working of the
operational railway. Companies have tended to develop their own databases, recording these
incidents at various levels of detail, but we are now seeing a concerted effort throughout the
industry to collate these reports centrally in SMIS to enable increased analysis and understanding.
The Road Driving Risk Project Steering Group (RDR PSG) was established by the RSSB Board in May
2013. The purpose of the group was to engage with the rail industry and increase awareness and
understanding of road driving risks to workers and the business, such as by the provision of guidance
to improve driving behaviour. Since its inception, the group has developed the RSSB RDR webpage 22,
published briefings on Arriva Trains taxi arrangements, Network Rail Safety Trucks, driverless cars,
and produced an A5 leaflet Driving down the risk.
Some initial objectives set for the group included developing reliable arrangements for reporting and
analysing road traffic accidents, evaluating and developing work-related road driving principles for
measuring safety management system (SMS) performance across the industry, and providing a
resource centre on road driving risk to help rail managers understand and share good practice and
continually raise awareness.
22
http://www.rssb.co.uk/pages/improving-industry-performance/road-driving-risk.aspx
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The group was formed with cross-industry representation, with the structure shown below:
RSSB
Board
Principal
Contractors
RIAG
External
Parties
(HSE,ORR, RoSPA,
ACPO, RMT)
ATOC
Train Operating
Companies
SSRG
TSA
ISLG
Agency Staff
Suppliers
RSSB
Road Driving Risk
Project
Steering Group
RICA
RPA
NR
NFSG
Road Risk
Steering Group
(IP/NSC/S&SD)
Rail Plant
Suppliers
Note: Scope is GB mainline railway
Safety Forum
Freight Operating
Companies
Network Rail
Infrastructure Managers
The scope of the project goes beyond the scope of this report, and includes the following:
•
All employees of rail duty holders, contractors and subcontractors
•
The consequences of their actions (third parties and damage)
•
All travel, including commuting
•
All modes of transport including cycling
•
‘Door-to-Door’ taxi provision (eg Eurostar business class)
•
Bus or taxi replacement services
•
NOT passenger journeys to and from stations where not provided by a duty holder
In March 2015 a cross-industry meeting, supported by Institution of Occupational Safety and Health
(IOSH), was held to discuss road driving risk. The day saw talks given by industry representatives,
ORR, RSSB, European transport group and an interactive session conducted by Dr Will Murray.
Another event is planned for November 2015.
Further work planned by the group during 2015/16 includes:
•
Defining what is a work journey
•
Agreeing the reporting scope of road traffic accidents
•
Defining and updating SMIS so all road driving incidents and accidents are reported
The group is trialling a dashboard format to present road driving risk in the industry, which has the
potential to be used to develop a template for risk areas in other industry sectors.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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93
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
6.2
Fatalities and injuries in 2014/15
Fatalities
There were two workforce fatalities in two separate incidents in 2014/15 23.
•
On 1 May 2014, on the A7 at Craighall in Scotland, an infrastructure worker, who was driving a
tractor and trailer, was involved in a collision with a lorry, and was fatally injured.
•
On 10 February 2015, near Waterloo in the South East, an office-based worker, who was
travelling by motorbike to a meeting in a location different from his normal place of work, was
involved in a road traffic accident and fatally injured.
Major injuries
•
There were four major injuries from road driving in 2014/15.
Minor injuries
•
There were 104 recorded minor injuries, 24 (23%) of which were Class 1 (ie the injured party was
incapacitated from normal duties for more than three days, not including the day of the injury).
Shock and trauma
•
There were 10 recorded cases of shock or trauma, all of which were Class 1 (ie occurred in an
accident that had a notable risk for a fatal outcome).
In June 2014, there was a road traffic accident that tragically resulted in the deaths of a number of infrastructure workers. The event
occurred when the workers were not on duty, and were not reported into SMIS. The issue of scope, with particular reference to road
driving risk, is currently being reviewed by the industry in the RDR PSG.
23
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6.3
Trends in workforce injuries from road driving
The increasing trend in the reported number of road driving injuries is striking, but it is likely to
reflect an improvement in reporting rather than an increase in risk. We can see evidence for an
improvement in reporting when we look at how the recorded number of injuries has changed for
lesser degrees of injury, particularly minor injuries.
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
Chart 84.
15
10
Road driving injuries by injury degree
Shock and trauma
5
2
0
120
80
23
7
6
69
67
74
2
1
1
1
2011/12
2012/13
11
10
97
104
18
6
45
51
2
2
5
4
2
2
2013/14
2014/15
Major injuries
4
Fatalities
2005/06
•
9
Minor injuries
40
0
10
8
6
4
2
0
4
3
2
1
0
6
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
At 120, the number of road driving injuries in
2014/15 was similar to the 115 recorded in
2013/14. Over a third of the recorded road
driving injuries have been in the last two
years, in line with the increasing focus this
area is receiving.
2010/11
Chart 85.
Trend in road driving harm by injury
degree
3.0
2.8
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
2.5
2.0
2.7
Since 2005/06 there have been a total of six
fatalities recorded in SMIS.
•
0.6
The SRMv8.1 estimate for the risk to the
0.5
0.3 0.3
workforce from road driving is 1.2 FWI per
<0.1 <0.1 <0.1
0.0
year, but this was averaged over a four-year
period up to September 2013, and later years
have been notably in excess of this. There is a
clearly increasing level of reported harm from road driving incidents over the last 10 years: this is
likely to reflect increased awareness and reporting rather than increased risk. However, there is
still work to be done to ensure that all injuries not currently covered by the Railway Group
Standard, but covered by HSE guidance (see section 6.1) are reported.
1.4
1.5
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
1.3
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
1.0
2005/06
FWI
•
_________________________________________________________________
95
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
6.3.1
Trend in injuries by type of worker
The next chart shows the trend in harm for each type of worker.
Chart 86.
Harm from road driving injuries by type of worker
3.0
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
2.4
2.5
FWI
2.0
1.5
1.3
1.4
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.4
0.4
Infrastructure workers
Train crew
Station staff
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
<0.1<0.1
2011/12
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
Revenue protection
staff
2010/11
0.1
<0.1
2011/12
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
<0.1<0.1<0.1 <0.1<0.1 <0.1
2010/11
0.1
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
0.0
2011/12
<0.1 <0.1 <0.1<0.1
2010/11
0.5
Other workforce
•
All but one of the recorded fatalities were infrastructure workers. The exception, which
happened in 2014/15, was an office-worker, travelling to a non-regular place of employment.
•
The nature of infrastructure work involves a relatively large amount of driving to or from
different sites of work, which may be some distance away. Although there are rules and
guidelines which are there to avoid fatigue, there are challenges to managing such risks out in
the field. Even with good practice in this area, the risk from road driving cannot be eliminated
and (as Chapter 3 Benchmarking railway performance shows) is not a negligible hazard.
•
Train crew and station staff are also exposed to road driving risk, but will travel less frequently by
road between sites, and their transport will more generally be provided by external companies,
so they are not as likely to be exposed to the risk from fatigue.
•
The Other workforce category comprises people delivering to site, signallers, mobile operations
managers (MOMs), as well as non-operational staff. One of the two fatalities during 2014/15 was
in this category, and was an office-based worker travelling to a meeting.
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6.3.2
Trend in injuries by industry sectors
The chart below shows the number of road driving injuries over the last 10 years, this time broken
down by industry sectors.
Network Rail
Contractors
TOC
FOC
Other
Chart 87.
25
20
15
10
5
0
10
8
6
4
2
0
20
15
10
5
0
15
12
9
6
3
0
100
80
60
40
20
0
Road driving injuries by industry sector
7
5
4
13
17
19
4
4
4
4
2
4
17
4
18
11
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
34
40
2008/09
2009/10
20
5
56
47
2010/11
2011/12
8
13
14
15
13
79
72
2013/14
2014/15
6
62
2012/13
•
Over the past 10 years, the greatest proportion of road driving incidents has involved staff
working for Network Rail (67%). The majority of these events have involved infrastructure
workers; the nature of infrastructure work requires travel to, from and between work sites. The
Contractors category also comprises infrastructure workers, and accounts for 7% of reported
injuries.
•
The categories TOC, FOC and Other account for around one quarter of reported injuries. A
number of these events involve train drivers, station staff and other members of the workforce
travelling by taxi to work locations.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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97
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
The following chart shows the trends in harm for each industry sector.
Chart 88.
Harm from road driving injuries by industry sector
2.5
Shock and trauma
2.2
Minor injuries
Major injuries
2.0
Fatalities
1.5
1.3
FWI
1.2 1.2
1.0
1.0
0.5
0.4
Contractors
TOC
FOC
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
<0.1 <0.1<0.1<0.1
2010/11
2013/14
2012/13
<0.1<0.1<0.1
0.1
2014/15
<0.1
2011/12
2013/14
2012/13
<0.1
0.2
2010/11
0.1
2014/15
0.2
2011/12
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2010/11
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
Network Rail
2010/11
0.1
<0.1 <0.1
0.0
2011/12
0.5
Other
•
The groups most prominent in the charts are Network Rail and the Contractor sector. These
groups have the highest number of staff engaged in road driving as part of carrying out their
work, and are therefore more exposed to this area of risk.
•
While TOCs and FOCs also have staff driving on duty, the numbers are much lower for these
groups. These staff are more likely to be sent via taxi than to drive the vehicles themselves, while
on duty.
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_________________________________________________________________
6.4
Key safety statistics: road driving risk
Road driving
Fatalities
Network Rail
Contractors
FOC
TOC
Unknown
Major injuries
Network Rail
Contractors
FOC
TOC
Unknown
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Network Rail
Contractors
FOC
TOC
Unknown
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
1
1
2
2
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
2
1
5
4
4
1
1
2
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
69
67
74
97
104
18
23
15
30
24
51
44
59
67
80
9
7
6
11
10
9
7
6
11
10
0
0
0
0
0
0.59
1.39
1.26
2.77
2.65
0.50
1.21
1.23
0.40
1.26
0.00
0.00
0.01
2.22
1.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.10
0.06
0.16
0.01
0.14
0.04
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.23
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99
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
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7
Train operations
The term ‘train accident’ covers a very wide range of events, from potentially higher-risk train
accidents (PHRTAs) such as passenger train derailments to those with typically less serious
consequences, such as trains being struck by stones. Train accidents are reportable under RIDDOR if
they affect or occur on the running line. Additional criteria apply to different types of accident and
these are summarised in Appendix 7. This chapter looks at RIDDOR-reportable and PHRTAs, focussing
on those that do not occur at level crossings; these are covered in detail in the following chapter.
The chapter also presents information on the risk presented to shunters, train crew or other staff
when they are on or about the track and engaged in activities related to the movement of trains.
2014/15 Headlines
•
There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train accidents. This is the eighth year in
succession with no such fatalities.
•
There were two fatalities to members of the public as a result of train collisions with road
vehicles at level crossings: these are discussed in the Chapter 8 Level crossings.
•
The total harm from train accidents in 2014/15 comprised two fatalities, no major injuries, 23
minor injuries and 20 cases of shock or trauma. This equates to 2.1 FWI.
•
There were 25 PHRTAs; seven fewer than last year. Sixteen of the PHRTAs were train
derailments; none involved passenger trains. Two of the PHRTAs were collisions between trains:
both involved passenger trains and occurred at low speed during permissive working in stations.
•
The remaining seven PHRTAs were collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings:
these are covered in the Chapter 8 Level crossings.
•
The Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) measures the changing risk from PHRTAs. At March
2014/15, it stood at 6.7 FWI per year, compared with 7.6 FWI per year at the end of 2013/14.
•
There were 299 SPADs during the year; 12 more than in 2013/14. At the end of 2014/15, the
estimated risk from SPADs was 66% of the September 2006 baseline level, compared with 73% at
the end of 2013/14.
Train accident risk at a glance
10
10.0
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
9.6
9.2
8.5
8
Level crossings
Not level crossings
7.4
8.2
7.4
7.9
7.6
6.7
6
4
2
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
0
2006/07
Train
accidents
(8.0 FWI; 6%)
12
2005/06
Other
accidental risk
(131.6 FWI;
94%)
Trend in PIM indicator
PIM modelled risk (FWI per year)
Risk in context (SRMv8.1)
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101
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
7.1
Train accidents
Accidents are usually categorised by their initial event. For example, a derailment that resulted in a
collision between trains would be classed as a derailment, even if it was the subsequent collision that
caused most of the harm.
Train accidents occurring within YDS sites or within possessions are not reportable under RIDDOR
unless they result in injury or they affect the running line. Train accidents occurring wholly within YDS
or possessions, and which do not result in injury, are not included in the statistics in this chapter.
Measuring the risk from train accidents
The SRM models all sources of risk on the railway, including the risk from train accidents. The SRM
contains models of the causes and consequences of train accidents, encompassing 23 hazardous
events and more than 1,700 separate accident precursors. It provides an estimate of the underlying
level of risk associated with accident types that have not occurred for many years, or have never
occurred.
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from train accidents is 8.0 FWI per year, which is 6% of the total
accidental risk profile. This includes an estimate of the harm from train accidents in possessions and
on YDS sites.
Potentially higher-risk train accidents (PHRTAs)
Many train accidents carry little risk. The types of train accidents occurring on or affecting the
running line, and with the most potential to result in harm, are known as potentially higher-risk train
accidents (PHRTAs). All PHRTAs are reportable under RIDDOR.
The PHRTA category comprises:
•
derailments on the running line (other than whilst shunting), or which affect an unprotected
running line;
•
collisions between trains on the running line (excluding roll backs and open doors);
•
buffer stop collisions which cause any damage;
•
trains striking road vehicles;
•
large objects falling onto trains; and
•
train explosions.
Tracking the risk from PHRTAs
The PIM provides a measure of underlying train accident risk by tracking changes in the occurrence
of accident precursors. It uses risk weightings derived from the SRM and enables risk to be
monitored on an on-going basis.
The PIM and its outputs are discussed in more detail in Section 7.7.
Other train accidents (non-PHRTAs)
The majority of train accidents carry a notably lower potential for serious consequences. This group
includes train fires; trains that strike objects on the line without subsequently derailing; roll-back
collisions and open door collisions.
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7.2
Train accident risk profile
The SRM models the overall risk from train accidents by modelling each type of train accident
separately, taking into account the characteristics of all possible potential precursors. Chart 89 shows
the categories of train accidents covered in this chapter, and the risk associated with each, broken
down by injury degree. It indicates which types of accident constitute PHRTAs (and are thus modelled
by the PIM).
Chart 89.
Train accident risk by accident type and injury degree
Train accidents at Level Crossings
3.61
PHRTAs
Train
Accidents
Train to train collision
1.15
Train struck by large falling object
Train striking buffer stops
0.14
Train striking a road vehicle other than at a LC
0.34
Train explosion
0.07
Train derailment
1.91
Non-PHRTA train accidents
0.69
0
Source:
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
0.06
1
2
3
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
4
SRMv8.1
•
At 7.3 FWI, PHRTAs comprise 91% of train accident risk (including possessions and YDS).
•
Most of the risk from train accidents occurs at level crossings; this is discussed more fully in
Chapter 8 Level crossings. The next largest contributions to risk come from derailments and train
collisions. Chart 90 looks at the types of people exposed to these risks, and shows that, while
accidents at level crossings affect members of the public, collisions and derailments result in the
greatest risk exposure to passengers and workforce. Most of the risk to passengers arises from
train derailments, which are estimated to account for 1.5 FWI to passengers per year, on
average.
Chart 90.
Train accident risk by accident type and person type affected
Train accidents at Level Crossings
3.61
PHRTAs
Train
Accidents
Train to train collision
1.15
Train struck by large falling object
Train striking buffer stops
Public
0.14
Train striking a road vehicle other than at a LC
Workforce
0.34
Train explosion
0.07
Train derailment
1.91
Non-PHRTA train accidents
0.69
0
Source:
Passenger
0.06
1
2
3
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
4
SRMv8.1
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103
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__________________________________________________________________________
7.3
Train accident fatalities and injuries
There were two fatalities in train accidents during 2014/15, both of which resulted from train
collisions with road vehicles at level crossings:
•
On 7 May 2014, a passenger train struck a car on a UWC-T crossing at Ivy Lea Farm, near
Rillington. The road vehicle occupant was fatally injured.
•
On 11 May 2014, a passenger train struck a motorcyclist on a UWC-T crossing at Frampton
Mansell, near Stroud.
There were no major injuries in train accidents during 2014/15.
There were 23 reports of minor injuries and 20 reports of shock/trauma.
Chart 91.
Fatalities and weighted injuries in train accidents (excluding suicides)
10
Workforce weighted injuries
Public weighted injuries
Passenger weighted injuries
Public fatalities
Passenger fatalities
9.0
9
8.2
8
7
6.4
FWI
6
5
4
3.9
7
3
2.6
4
6
2
3
1.0
1
1.4
2.6
1.8
2
1
2.1
2
2
2013/14
2014/15
1
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
•
At 2.1 FWI, the level of harm from train accidents was below the ten-year average of 3.9 FWI.
•
The level of harm to passengers from train accidents varies considerably from year to year, and a
single major accident can dominate that year’s figures. The single passenger fatality during the
period covered by the chart occurred in
Chart 92.
FWI in train accidents, by location
2006/07, in the Grayrigg derailment,
Workforce weighted injuries
Public weighted injuries
which also resulted in 29 major injuries.
Passenger weighted injuries
Public fatalities
•
The remaining fatalities on this chart
are members of the public in road
vehicles which were struck, either on a
level crossing, or (much more rarely)
after their vehicle strayed onto the line
at another location.
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
FWI
Passenger fatalities
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
At a level crossing
Not at a level crossing
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7.4
Potentially higher-risk train accidents in 2014/15
During 2014/15, there were seven PHRTAs involving passenger trains and 18 involving non-passenger
trains. Five derailments are subject to Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) investigation.
Table 13 lists the 25 PHRTAs that occurred in 2014/15 (except those involving level crossings, which
are detailed in Chapter 8 Level crossings). The events coloured red are those that the RAIB is
investigating, or for which it has published a report.
PHRTAs in 2014/15
Derailments (excluding level crossings)
Non-Passenger
Date
16
Location
Territory
Train Operator
16
Description
A freight train derailed on the Down goods line due to
gauge spread.
26/04/2014
Ripple Lane
South East
Colas
09/04/2014
Westbury South
Western
DB Schenker
30/05/2014
Doncaster
15/07/2014
Brocklesby Jcn
23/07/2014
Lostwithiel
Western
DB Schenker
02/10/2014
Porthkerry No.2 Tunnel
Western
DB Schenker
13/11/2014
Ashburys
17/11/2014
West Sleekburn
13/12/2014
Briggs Sidings GF
21/12/2014
Perth TMD/CSD
Scotland
First ScotRail
02/04/2014
Angerstein Wharf
South East
Freightliner
23/10/2014
Heworth
23/03/2015
Washwood Heath No.1
02/12/2014
West Sleekburn
25/05/2014
Paddington
Western
Heathrow Express
An empty coaching stock train derailed in the station
due to track twist and imbalanced wheel loading.
05/02/2015
Angerstein Wharf
South East
Unknown
A freight train wagon derailed causing track damage.
London North
Eastern
London North
Eastern
London North
Western
London North
Eastern
London North
Western
London North
Eastern
London North
Western
London North
Eastern
DB Schenker
DB Schenker
DB Schenker
DB Schenker
DB Schenker
Freightliner
Freightliner
GB Railfreight
A freight train derailed on the Down reception line.
A freight locomotive derailed on trap points after a
SPAD.
A freight train ran away, passed a signal at danger and
derailed on trap points.
Wagons of a freight train derailed on trap points after
running away from a locomotive.
Two wagons of a freight train derailed and caused
extensive track damage.
A freight train derailed due to a fractured wheel as it
departed the sidings.
A freight train derailed on plain line and some of its
vehicles slid down an embankment.
A freight locomotive derailed over the ground frame
on a single line.
An empty coaching stock train passed a signal at
danger whilst shunting and derailed.
A freight train derailed on a single line and caused
significant infrastructure damage.
A freight train locomotive and 25 empty wagons ran
derailed for 2.4km, possibly due to cyclic top.
A freight train derailed in an area suspected of
containing under-track voids.
A freight train derailed on trap points after the points
were set incorrectly.
Collisions between trains
Passenger
Date
08/05/2014
12/12/2014
2
2
Location
Glasgow Central High
Level
Glasgow Central High
Level
Territory
Scotland
Scotland
Train Operators
Description
A low-speed collision occurred between units being
First ScotRail (both)
uncoupled in the station.
A passenger train coming into the station struck an
First ScotRail (both)
empty coaching stock train.
Buffer stop collisions
0
Trains struck by large falling objects
0
Collisions with road vehicles not at level crossing (excl derailments)
0
Collisions with road vehicles on level crossings (see Chapter 8 Level Crossings )
7
Passenger
5
Non Passenger
2
Total PHRTAs
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
25
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105
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__________________________________________________________________________
7.5
Trend in potentially higher-risk train accidents
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from PHRTAs is 7.3 FWI per year. While PHRTAs comprise the types of
train accident that have the greatest potential to result in higher numbers of casualties, the majority
result in few or no injuries.
Chart 93.
Trend in the numbers of PHRTAs
80
Trains striking road vehicles at level crossings
Train struck by large falling object
Trains striking buffer stops
Trains running into road vehicles not at level crossings & no derailment
Train derailments (excludes striking road vehicles on level crossings)
Collisions between trains (excluding roll backs)
70
60
Accidents
50
40
46
45
16
13
30
3
49
42
8
26
10
0
21
2
8
20
24
42
20
33
34
9
10
18
3
2
3
5
2
13
14
4
2
4
16
20
4
2
4
6
4
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
8
2
2010/11
32
10
25
4
7
16
11
16
6
5
6
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2
2014/15
•
The 25 PHRTAs occurring in 2014/15 represent an improvement on the previous few years, and is
a relatively low total compared with the ten-year average of 36.6 and with the lower totals of
more recent years.
•
At 16, the number of derailments is around the same as the ten-year average of 17, but relatively
high in comparison with recent years.
•
There were two collisions between trains, both of which were at low-speed. There were seven
collisions with road vehicles at level crossings, but none away from level crossings. There were no
buffer stop collisions.
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PHRTAs by type of train and type of accident
The breakdown of PHRTAs by train type shows that, away from level crossings, non-passenger trains
predominate.
Chart 94.
Trend in PHRTAs by train type
35
Accidents
Level crossings
26
23 24
Not Level crossings
19
20
18
18
17
14
15
Normalised rate
20
20
13
10
8
7
5
0.30
11 12
10
8
3
2
0.50
0.40
15
12
0.60
0.20
7
5 6 6
3 3 3
2
0.00
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
0
0.10
Accidents per million train km
30
25
0.70
31
Passenger trains
Freight trains
Other trains
•
When the number of train accidents is normalised by train kilometres, there is a notable
difference in rate, with accident rates for non-passenger trains being an order of magnitude
higher. In addition, while the rate for passenger trains shows a broadly reducing trend over the
past decade, the rate for freight trains appears to be increasing.
•
Although the overall number of passenger train PHRTAs and non-passenger train PHRTAs is not
dissimilar, the profile of PHRTAs that occur differs. Accidents at level crossings figure more
prominently in the passenger train category than for non-passenger trains. For freight and
passenger services, this is most likely due to the different time bands that the trains run in, with
most passenger trains running during the day, and much of the freight traffic taking place at
night. Some of the trains in Other trains (which comprise empty coaching stock, on-track plant
and road-rail vehicles) are less likely to operate over level crossings.
Chart 95.
PHRTAs by train type and accident type
1%
0%
7%
7%
4% 0%
2%
5%
17%
7%
12%
11%
13%
22%
47%
80%
Passenger trains
Freight trains
65%
Other trains
Collisions between trains (excluding roll backs)
Derailments (excluding collisions with road vehicles on level crossings)
Collisions with road vehicles at level crossings
Collisions with road vehicles not at level crossings (without derailment)
Buffer stop collisions
Trains struck by large falling objects
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107
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__________________________________________________________________________
7.5.1
Derailments
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from derailments on or affecting the mainline is 1.9 FWI per year. When
the additional risk of derailments wholly within possessions and YDS sites is included, the risk rises to
2.2 FWI per year.24 The last train accident with a train occupant fatality was the derailment at
Grayrigg in 2007, which was caused by points failure.
Trends in derailments by train type
18
Level crossings
17
16
15
Not Level crossings
13
15
17
13
12
7
16
13
3
9
11
2014/15
2013/14
2011/12
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
Passenger
2012/13
3
2
2013/14
2008/09
2
2012/13
3
6
18
7
2011/12
3
8
2010/11
3
2009/10
3
2007/08
11
6
7
1
11
9
2010/11
8
6
13
12
11
2006/07
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2005/06
Accidents
Chart 96.
Non-passenger
•
There were 16 derailments in 2014/15, which is five more than the previous year. As with the
prior year, none of the derailments involved a passenger train. Fourteen freight trains derailed,
plus two empty coaching stock (ECS) trains. Freight train derailments have reduced from a typical
rate of around 40-50 per year in the late 1990s but have shown signs of increasing somewhat in
the last few years. Various factors – including improvements in the quality of both track and
rolling stock – have contributed to the success over the longer term.
•
Chart 97 shows the primary causes of train derailments over the past 10 years. Whilst train
accidents have numerous causal factors, this basic approach remains useful for identifying
general trends.
•
Track issues account for the
majority of freight derailment
causes, though operational
incidents and SPADs (which
share some human factors
elements) would contribute
the majority if taken together.
•
Chart 97.
Derailments by cause (2005/06–2014/15)
Passenger Trains
Collision
with object
Rolling
stock
Non-Passenger Trains
Collision
with object
Track
Rolling stock
Train runaway
Track
Environment
Operational
Incident
SPAD
Passenger train derailments in
SPAD
Operational
Environment
the past 10 years have
Incident
included 15 with an
environmental factor: one train ran into a block of ice in a tunnel, two struck trees on the line,
and the remaining 12 involved landslips. Ten derailments were caused by collisions with objects,
five involved road vehicles at level crossings, two were cows on the line, two involved debris on
the line, and one was the result of a large object falling on the train.
In this section the number of derailments includes derailments following collisions with road vehicles at level crossings or
trains being struck by large falling objects; these events are listed solely under the initial event in the key safety statistics
sheet.
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24
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
7.5.2
Collisions between trains
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from collisions between trains is 1.2 FWI per year. Roll back collisions and
open door collisions (each of which accounts for a risk of less than 0.01 FWI per year) are excluded
from this section and covered in Section 7.5.5. Although collisions between trains are reported every
year, but most carry little risk, either because they occur at low speed, or because the trains are on
adjacent lines and make contact via an out-of-gauge item.
Chart 98.
Trends in collisions between trains by train type
6
6
5
5
4
4
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2013/14
1
1
2
2012/13
2
2011/12
2
2010/11
2
Not Level crossings
4
2007/08
3
Level crossings
5
2006/07
Collisions (PHRTAs)
7
Passenger
2014/15
2009/10
2008/09
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
Non-passenger
•
There were two collisions between trains in 2014/15. This is fewer than the previous year and
lower than the annual average (4.1) for the period shown on the chart. Each of the collisions
involved a passenger train and an ECS train in occupied station platforms, and each occurred at
very low speed.
•
Of the 33 passenger train collisions in the past 10 years, 26 were collisions at low speed in
stations. The remaining seven, occurred in running on open track and comprised five instances of
passenger trains striking out-of-gauge parts of other trains and two occasions on which an
engineering trolley had been placed on an open section of line rather than within the adjacent
work area.
•
Non-passenger train collisions in running on open track included two freight collisions whilst
shunting, one train colliding with an out-of-gauge part of an approaching train, and one collision
between a runaway road-rail vehicle, which left the section of track under possession, before
colliding with a non-passenger train. Three of the remaining four non-passenger train collisions
occurred in possessions and the final event occurred in a station at low speed.
Chart 99.
Collisions between trains by location (2005/06–2014/15)
Passenger Trains
Non-Passenger Trains
In running
on open
track
In running
on open
track
In
possession
In station low speed
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7.5.3
Collisions between trains and road vehicles
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from collisions between trains and road vehicles is 4.0 FWI per year. 25
Accidents at level crossings account for 91% of this, and Chapter 8 Level crossings contains discussion
of that risk.
Chart 100.
Trend in collisions between trains and road vehicles
30
Darker shades represent derailments;
lighter shades where there was no derailment
24
Collisions between
trains and road vehicles
25
20
17
19
17
16
14
15
11
11
10
7
5
5
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
•
Away from level crossings, there have been 28 collisions with encroaching road vehicles over the
past 10 years.
•
Apart from at level crossings, no trains collided with road vehicles in 2014/15.
•
The number of collisions with road vehicles away from level crossings has been lower in the
latter half of the last decade, providing some evidence that the underlying rate of collision with
encroaching vehicles has reduced.
Chart 101.
Trends in collisions between trains and road vehicles, by location
25
Collisions between
trains and road vehicles
20
21
16
15
14
13
10
Darker shades represent derailments;
lighter shades where there was no derailment
9
8
10
10
5
8
7
5
4
3
1
5
2
4
1
At a level crossing
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
Not at a level crossing
This excludes the risk from derailments that result from trains striking road vehicles at locations other than level
crossings, which are covered under the derailment SRM category. It also excludes the risk from road vehicles falling onto
trains (as opposed to running into the side of them or being struck by them): these events are covered under the category
struck by large falling object.
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Train operations
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Road vehicle incursions
Although most incursions result in little harm to people on board the train, they have the potential to
cause a serious train accident, and frequently result in serious harm to road vehicle occupants. The
accident at Great Heck in February 2001 occurred when a road vehicle towing a trailer came off the
M62 motorway near a road-over-rail bridge and ran down the embankment onto the East Coast
Main Line. The vehicle was struck by a high-speed passenger train, which derailed and collided with a
freight train travelling in the opposite direction. Ten people on board the trains, comprising four
members of staff and six passengers, lost their lives in the accident.
Chart 102.
Vehicle incursions by entry point
60
Darker shades represent incursions that resulted in
contact between a train and the road vehicle
50
47
40
Incidents
40
39
37
31
30
26
23
20
25
24 23
21 21
18
12
10
30 30
21
15
11
10
5 4 6
7
10
7
3 3
1 2
1 2 1
10
19
12
9
1 1
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
0
Access gate
Road over rail bridge
Boundary fence
Level crossing (and did not
remain on it)
•
There were 57 road vehicle incursions in 2014/15, which is below the average of 61 per year over
these 10 years but an increase on the previous year’s total of 43.
•
Most of these vehicles accessed railway property via fences, often as a result of a road traffic
accident. Those incidents categorised with a level crossing being the access point relate to road
vehicles which have moved off the crossing, along the line, to some extent.
•
None of the incursions in 2014/15 resulted in a train accident.
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Road vehicle incursions and track obstruction
Vehicles that enter the railway environment do not always obstruct the line. In some cases, the
vehicle may come to rest on the embankment, or may simply cause damage to the railway boundary
protection.
The categorisation below is based on the final resting point of the vehicle. In some cases, the vehicle
will have momentarily obstructed the line, in transit to its final resting point.
Chart 103.
Consequence of vehicle incursions, by entry point (2005/06 to 2014/15)
Boundary fence
Struck by train
Level crossing
(with subsequent incursion of track)
Not foul of
the line
Foul of the
line (not
struck)
Foul of the
line (not
struck)
Not foul of
the line
Access Gate
Road over rail bridge
Struck by
train
Struck by
train
Not foul of
the line
Not foul of
the line
Foul of the
line (not
struck)
Foul of the
line (not
struck)
•
Overall, the consequences of a vehicle incursion are that just over half result in the vehicle being
foul of the line. Of these, a relatively small proportion – around 5% – come into contact with a
train.
•
Considering the vehicles within each entry-point group shows that those entering via the
boundary fence are less likely to reach the line than those entering by other means, and that
relatively few vehicles which go onto the line from a level crossing do so without remaining foul
of the line.
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Trends in road vehicle incursions by cause
Vehicles can intrude onto the railway as a result of road traffic accidents, deliberate acts of vandalism
or trespass, and errors due to the in-car navigation equipment. Also, railway personnel sometimes
leave vehicles too close to the line, or not properly secured. Furthermore, there is also the small, but
present, risk from aircraft crashing onto the railway. 26
Chart 104.
Vehicle incursions by cause
70
Boundary fence
58
48
Road over rail bridge
30
47 47 45
46
36
Access gate
40
44
34
4
7
5
1
5
4
2
4
6
2014/15
5
2013/14
7
2012/13
5
2011/12
6
2010/11
5
2014/15
11
5
2010/11
10
2013/14
15
13 11
2012/13
21
2009/10
Incidents
50
20
61
Level crossing
60
Vandalism and other causes with
harmful intention
Accidents involving rail owned
vehicles
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2011/12
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
Accidents involving public vehicles
•
Most incursions are the result of road traffic accidents.
•
There has been a long-term reduction in the number of these incidents. The long-term reduction
is most evident in road vehicle incursions resulting from vandalism and intentional acts (primarily
vehicles deliberately placed on the infrastructure). This reflects a general reduction in railway
vandalism (see Section 9.4). The number of incursions caused by vandalism and other intentional
acts remained low in 2014/15, and was below the ten-year average of 9.9 per year.
7.5.4
Buffer stop collisions
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from buffer stop collisions is 0.1 FWI per year. Most buffer stop collisions
occur at very low speeds and carry little risk. The most common cause of buffer stop collisions in
recent years has been driver error, usually involving misjudgement of braking distance, loss of
concentration, or error using the couple/uncouple button. There were no buffer stop collisions in
2014/15.
7.5.5
Large falling objects and train explosions
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk estimates from large falling objects and from train explosions are both
lower than 0.1 FWI per year, and are both extremely low frequency events. There have been no train
explosions in the past 10 years. The sole PHRTA involving a large falling object occurred in 2010/11,
when a road vehicle fell from a road-over-rail bridge, onto a passenger train travelling on the line
below.
26 Aircraft incursions are included in Chart 102 under the category Boundary fence. There was one such incident during the
past 10 years (in 2008/09) in which a light aircraft crashed onto the railway.
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7.6
Trend in other types of train accident
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from types of train accident other than PHRTAs is relatively low, at
0.7 FWI per year. Of this, 0.3 FWI relates to RIDDOR-reportable train accidents on or affecting the
running line.
Chart 105.
Trend in the number of RIDDOR-reportable non-PHRTAs on or affecting the running
line
1000
Accidents (non-PHRTAs)
800
753
779
737
Striking level crossing gate or barrier
Striking other object
Train fire
Open door collision
Struck by missile
Striking animal
Roll back collision
659
647
600
274
284
285
535
245
400
200
163
185
140
72
502
98
200
218
139
512
67
146
2005/06
2006/07
0
599
55
54
214
179
294
325
184
199
179
127
126
129
160
187
190
95
81
74
62
51
51
36
35
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
346
139
143
604
•
Over the past 10 years, there has been a generally decreasing trend in all types of non-PHRTAs
apart from train collisions with animals. In particular, the past three years have seen notably high
numbers recorded for these types of events. The trend in animal strikes has been driven mostly
by incidents involving deer; such incidents represent a low risk in terms of serious injury, but
have implications for driver shock/trauma and rolling stock damage.
•
The risk from train fires has reduced in recent years, largely due to the increased use of fireresistant materials. The frequency of train fires is about a quarter of that seen 10 years ago.
•
Reports of trains struck by missiles have also fallen by a similar proportion over the decade. This
reflects a general reduction in vandalism (see Section 9.4) and the laminated glass that is used on
modern rolling stock.27
•
Open door collisions have been virtually eliminated by the removal of Mark I ‘slam door’ rolling
stock, which was completed in 2005.
Missiles striking trains are reportable under RIDDOR if they result in damage that requires immediate repair.
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7.7
The Precursor Indicator Model
The PIM measures the underlying risk from PHRTAs by tracking changes in the occurrence of their
accident precursors. It was first developed in late 1999, and has since been subject to a series of
modelling improvements.
The PIM monitors train accident risk to passengers, workforce and members of the public such as
motorists on level crossings. The PIM value is an annual moving average, so it reflects precursors that
have occurred during the previous 12 months. It is also normalised by train kilometres, to account for
changes in the level of activity on the railway.
The PIM uses the basic equation risk = frequency x consequence to quantify the knowledge gained
from precursor events.
Frequency estimates are based on accident precursor data and consequence estimates are derived
from the SRM. The SRM provides an estimate of the risk at a particular point in time and is updated
every eighteen months or so. It is disaggregated and mapped onto the precursors that could lead to
each hazardous event’s occurrence. The shifting risk associated with each hazardous event is
estimated because of its varying precursor event frequency, and the results are presented in terms of
FWI per year.
To calculate the PIM, the number of occurrences each month of each accident precursor is multiplied
by the average consequence per event for that precursor (as estimated from the most recent version
of the SRM). This gives an estimate of the associated risk from that precursor, to be used in the PIM.
Hazard rankings, assigned to certain types of precursor events by technical specialists, are used to
understand the risk from them. The PIM uses risk rankings derived from these to lend weight to the
potentially most severe events. The risk from all precursors over the previous 12 months is then
summed and scaled to reflect the increased risk exposure due to increases in rail traffic. The results
are quoted as an estimate of FWI per year.
The PIM monitors the risk from PHRTAs: train derailments; train collisions, including those with other
trains, buffer stops and road vehicles (both at and not at level crossings); trains struck by large falling
objects; and train explosions.
The precursors covered by the PIM can be arranged into various grouping schemas, depending on
the use to which the model is being applied. Whichever grouping is used for examining the results,
the underlying contributions from the precursor event types are unchanged and provide the same
total risk estimate.
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Comparing the PIM index with other measures of train accident risk
As the number of PHRTAs declines, the statistical variation in their number from one year to the next
becomes greater, in relative terms.
The different risk modelling tools should not be equated, even though FWI per year is the common
measurement unit. SRMv8.1 provides an estimate of 7.3 FWI per year for PHRTAs (out of the 8.0 FWI
per year for all train accidents) based on long-term event monitoring and expert judgement. This
includes some very rare scenarios which have a chance of occurring but may not yet have done so,
and hence the observed safety performance (harm) can often be less than the modelled risk. This
was particularly the case with the unusually low number of PHRTAs occurring in 2010/11. The PIM
uses understanding taken from the SRM as a baseline of its risk knowledge and as such will give a
closely aligned value at the points nominally at the completion of each SRM version’s assessment
period.
Changes in the total number of RIDDOR-reportable accidents are unlikely to accurately reflect
changes in train accident risk, because many of them are relatively low-risk events. Although PHRTAs
form a subset of accidents with a high average consequence, it is also unlikely that changes in their
overall frequency will be proportional to changes in risk.
Year-on-year changes can be difficult to interpret because factors such as the weather and chance
play a role. The following points should be borne in mind when considering the different indicators of
train accident risk:
•
The PIM aims to provide an indication of changes in train accident risk by tracking frequently
occurring precursors, and mapping frequencies to risk using information on average
consequences. Nevertheless, some components of the PIM are sensitive to a relatively small
number of incidents, and the available precursors may not always correlate directly with the risk
they are being used to track. RSSB continues to examine the PIM precursors to ensure they
remain good indicators of underlying train accident risk.
•
The SRM provides the most thorough assessment of train accident risk, but the train accident
part of the model is updated only every 18 months to two years.
•
Overall, the PIM provides the best measure of short-term changes in underlying train accident
risk. It may not always be consistent with changes in number of PHRTAs because – in a given year
– there is a degree of providence determining which precursors materialise into train accidents.
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PIM grouping structure
The current grouping structure is based on that used by Network Rail and the Train Operations Risk
Group (TORG) to monitor train accident risk. It groups PHRTA precursors based on the type of cause
and management area that they fall into.
Chart 106.
PIM structure
Infrastructure failures
Track faults
Structural
failures
Embankment
failures
Bridge strikes
Cutting
failures
Signalling
failures
SPADs
Infrastructure
Objects on the
Level crossings
operations
line
SPADs
Infrastructure
operational
incidents
Level crossing
incidents
Train
operations
and failures
Animals
Train speeding
Trees
Runaway trains
Vehicle
incursions
Brake
faults and
failures
Objects blown
onto the line
Other train
faults and
failures
Low adhesion
events
Objects on the
line due to
vandalism
Flooding
Large falling
objects
Train accident risk broken down by PIM grouping structure
Chart 107 shows the modelled contribution to train accident risk from each PIM group, together with
the risk from non-PHRTAs, which are not covered by the PIM.
Chart 107.
Train accident risk by PIM group and person type (SRMv8.1)
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
4.0
3.37
Public
Workforce
Passenger
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.93
0.74
0.79
0.82
0.64
0.69
0.0
Infrastructure
failures
SPADs
Infrastructure Level crossings
operations
Objects on
the line
Train operations Not covered by
and failures
the PIM
•
While level crossings contribute most to overall risk, they have a relatively low impact on
passenger and workforce safety when compared to other PHRTA types. Chapter 8 Level crossings
contains more detail on this risk area.
•
The SRM shows that when grouping the risks in this way, the largest contribution to passenger
risk comes from events that are classed as infrastructure failures.
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7.7.1
Trend in the PIM
Due to improvements in PIM methodology, it is possible to show day-to-day estimates of the
underlying risk from PHRTAs, back to April 2010. Prior to this date, the data sources driving the PIM
are not sufficiently detailed. In the chart below, the period prior to April 2010 is shown for illustrative
purposes; while the overall PIM value across this date is unchanged, there will be discontinuities in
some of the groupings, because of the limitations on data prior to April 2010.
Chart 108.
Ten-year trend in the overall PIM
Infrastructure failures
Level crossings
Infrastructure operations
Train operations and failures
Current PIM trend
New version of
modelling and grouping
Historical PIM trend
Previous version of
modelling and grouping
12
PIM modelled risk (FWI per year)
SPADs
Objects on the line
10
8
6
4
2
Mar 15
Sep 14
Mar 14
Sep 13
Mar 13
Sep 12
Mar 12
Sep 11
Mar 11
Sep 10
Mar 10
Sep 09
Mar 09
Sep 08
Mar 08
Sep 07
Mar 07
Sep 06
Mar 06
Sep 05
Mar 05
0
•
At the end of 2014/15, the PIM estimate of PHRTA risk was 6.7 FWI per year, compared with
7.6 FWI per year at the end of 2013/14.
•
The main reason behind the reduction is a decrease in the risk due to earthworks. This reflects
that the winter of 2014/15 was relatively mild: there were fewer failures of cuttings and
embankments than in the previous, wetter, winter. This contributed to a modelled risk reduction
of almost 0.5 FWI per year.
•
Other notable changes were a 0.2 FWI per year reduction due to fewer track failures; a 0.2 FWI
per year reduction due to improving train operations; and a 0.3 FWI per year reduction due to
public actions at level crossings.
•
These were countered by slightly worse performance in respect of infrastructure operations
(0.1 FWI per year).
•
The PIM grouping Level crossings accounts for the greatest share of PHRTA risk; the majority of
this risk affects members of the public in road vehicles. This element of the risk is considered in
Chapter 8 Level crossings rather than as part of this chapter.
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7.7.2
Trend in the PIM for passengers
The PIM can be split into layers describing the risk to passengers, the public, and workforce. The risk
to passengers is a key subset used when managing train accident risk, and is examined in more detail
here.
Chart 109 shows the trend in the overall PIM indicator (the topmost line), and trends in the
contribution of the PIM groups to passenger risk.
Chart 109.
Ten-year trend in the PIM for passengers
Infrastructure failures
Level crossings
Risk to the Public
Infrastructure operations
Train operations and failures
Current PIM trend
New version of
modelling and grouping
Historical PIM trend
Previous version of
modelling and grouping
12
PIM modelled risk (FWI per year)
SPADs
Objects on the line
Risk to the Workforce
10
8
6
4
2
Mar 15
Sep 14
Mar 14
Sep 13
Mar 13
Sep 12
Mar 12
Sep 11
Mar 11
Sep 10
Mar 10
Sep 09
Mar 09
Sep 08
Mar 08
Sep 07
Mar 07
Sep 06
Mar 06
Sep 05
Mar 05
0
•
At the end of 2014/15, the passenger proportion of the PIM stood at 2.8 FWI per year, compared
with 3.3 FWI at the end of 2013/14.
•
The greatest share of the risk to passengers (0.8 FWI per year) is from SPADs. This is somewhat
higher than estimated by SRMv8.1, showing that events since the most recent SRM was
published are indicating the need for the industry to refocus on this area. An industry-wide SPAD
strategy group is indeed actively engaged in seeking improved methods to mitigate SPAD risk.
•
Infrastructure operations contribute almost as much (0.6 FWI per year), as do infrastructure
failures (also 0.6 FWI per year when groups 1 to 4 are taken together). The recent reductions in
the PIM’s estimated risk, particularly regarding earthworks, have brought this below the estimate
provided by the SRM.
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7.7.3
SPADs
Historically, SPADs have been the cause of some of the most serious train accidents. The last fatal
accident due to this cause occurred at Ladbroke Grove in 1999, where 31 people lost their lives. The
industry subsequently focused much effort on reducing the risk from SPADs. An important strand of
work was the TPWS fitment programme, completed at the end of 2003. This was supplemented by a
wide range of other initiatives aimed at improving driver performance and addressing signalling
issues.
This year, a SPAD strategy group has been established, reporting to TORG, in order to examine in
detail, the current underlying causes of SPADs, to model their risk more effectively, and ultimately to
develop further countermeasures against them.
The estimated risk, labelled Underlying risk in Chart 110, is based on the number and characteristics
of SPADs that have occurred during the previous 12 months.
Chart 110.
Trend in SPADs and SPAD risk
200%
400
Underlying risk (annual moving average)
299
150%
September 2006
baseline = 100%
300
287
100%
200
73%
SPADs
Risk (percentage of risk at Sep 2006)
SPADs (annual moving total)
66%
50%
100
Mar 2015
Sep 2014
Mar 2014
Sep 2013
Mar 2013
Sep 2012
Mar 2012
Sep 2011
Mar 2011
Sep 2010
Mar 2010
Sep 2009
Mar 2009
Sep 2008
Mar 2008
Sep 2007
Mar 2007
0
Sep 2006
0%
•
There were 299 SPADs in 2014/15, compared with 287 during the previous year.
•
At the end of 2014/15, SPAD risk stood at 66% of the September 2006 baseline level, compared
with 73% at the end of 2013/14.
•
There were 14 SPADs with a ‘potentially severe’ risk ranking, which is two fewer than in 2013/14;
this is the main reason behind the fall in SPAD risk, which is driven by the occurrence (or not) of
SPADs with the highest risk ranking.
•
Since TPWS was introduced, there have been a number of events where the driver has reset
TPWS and continued forward without the signaller’s authority. Although such events are
relatively rare, they are potentially serious because they negate the safety benefits of TPWS.
There was one TPWS reset and continue incident following a SPAD in 2014/15, in which a depot
driver shunted empty coaching stock past a signal on the main line.
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SPAD risk: comparison between 2013/14 and 2014/15
In contrast to the reduction in SPAD risk presented in Chart 110, the PIM estimates a small increase
in the underlying risk due to SPADs. This is due to difference in methodology. The PIM approach is
more simplistic than the full SPAD Risk Ranking (SRR) methodology, and is based on the number of
SPADs that reach the conflict point. The SRR methodology is similarly based on the number of SPADs
that reach the conflict point, but also takes into account the potential consequences of such events,
with those that could result in collisions with passenger trains being weighted more heavily.
The total number reaching the conflict
point increased for 2014/15: this has
driven the reported slight increase in
the PIM SPAD grouping.
Chart 111.
40
Potential consequences for SPAD trains
which reached the conflict point
Other potential consequence
Potential for collision involving passenger train
30
Incidents
Chart 111 shows the number of SPADs
over the past three years that reached
the conflict point, and highlights the
proportion of those which had the
potential for collision with a passenger
train.
22
31
24
20
10
The number of SPADs reaching the
0
conflict point and also having potential
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
for collision with a passenger train
reduced in 2014/15: this has driven the reported decrease in SPAD risk, as measured by the SRR
methodology.
The SRR methodology provides the more accurate assessment of the trend in underlying SPAD risk,
and it can be concluded that SPAD risk reduced over 2014/15.
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7.7.4
Changes in other PIM groupings
Table 14 presents information on changes in all groupings of the PIM over the past five years. Due to
the change in grouping schema, the current groups will match those in this chapter but not those
reported in previous ASPRs.
Infrastructure failures
The category of infrastructure failures comprises failures of the physical track environment: the track
itself; the earthworks supporting it; the tunnels through which it passes; the bridges and structures
spanning or supporting it; and the signalling system controlling train movements along it.
At 0.77 FWI per year, these failures contribute about half as much modelled risk as they did last year.
Infrastructure failures have decreased across the board for nearly all categories: track faults,
structural failures, earthworks and signalling failures. The only area to have shown an increase is
bridge strikes, but these contribute a small risk to this category as a whole.
Last winter was comparatively mild. The prior two winters were characterised by extensive wet
weather effects, leading to increased infrastructure damage, for example, as embankments and
cuttings gave way in landslips. The winter of 2014/15 resulted in much fewer such earthwork failures,
and the management by Network Rail in this area concerns both the infrastructure itself and
mitigating the effects should it fail. The extensive cutting failure at Harbury in January 2015 was
judged to present a lesser risk than one might initially expect. Despite the dramatic nature of the
slippage, the site conditions meant that it was already under very close monitoring at the time, and
systems were standing ready to protect trains as soon as the slip began.
Infrastructure operations
The category of infrastructure operations comprises the human side of managing the infrastructure,
specifically errors with the potential to leave the infrastructure less safe than it should be. This could
result from either the maintenance, or the operation of the infrastructure.
Having increased around 15% from last year, this now contributes 0.99 FWI/year to the modelled
risk.
A 0.12 FWI per year reduction in the risk associated with operating level crossings over the year has
been overtaken by a five-fold increase (amounting to an additional 0.18 FWI per year) from the
hitherto much lower risk area of infrastructure operations that result in items left foul of the line.
This would include, for example, events such as a maintenance trolley being placed on an open line
adjacent to a worksite. Signalling errors, such as wrong routing, contribute less than either of these,
but have increased their small contribution by about 60% since last year.
Level crossings
The category of level crossings comprises everything relating to this interface (except for anything
which falls under the infrastructure operations category). Typically, the precursor events here include
the public’s interaction with level crossings, and any failures of the crossing hardware.
This is the largest single slice of the modelled risk, when examined in these groupings, at 2.45 FWI
per year. The reduction seen in the prior year has been consolidated by a further 11% reduction since
the end of 2013/14.
The modelled risk from failures of crossings is very small and has reduced by a fifth in the last year.
The bulk of the risk – from public behaviour – is predicted by a fairly small number of events and thus
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the model can be somewhat volatile, however it is encouraging to note reductions in this large risk
area. The consequences of a train accident with a road vehicle at a level crossing are often severe for
that vehicle’s occupants as well as presenting a material risk to the passengers and workforce on
board the train.
Objects on the line
The category of objects on the line comprises the incursion onto the line of animals, trees, non-rail
vehicles, large falling objects, flood waters, and any other objects which cause an obstruction (other
than anything placed there in error and identified within the infrastructure operations category).
The risk from objects on the line has remained fairly steady for the past couple of years, and
contributes 0.86 FWI per year to the total.
This year, an increase of about a third in the dominant area – non-rail vehicles on the line, which now
contributes an extra 0.14 FWI per year – has been offset by reductions in each of the other areas.
Train operations and failures
The category of train operations and failures comprises both failures of rolling stock and of the
human side of managing train operations. Failures of brakes and control systems fit here, along with
other defects and failures, as do any errors leading to trains speeding.
The modelled risk in this category has reduced by a quarter since last year and is now 0.53 FWI per
year.
The risk is dominated by runaway trains. The model shows a reduction of 0.2 FWI per year in this
area, which accounts for almost all of the improvement, the other items in this category having
changed little over the year.
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PIM precursors
PIM precursors
Track
Broken fishplates
Broken rails
Buckled rails
Gauge faults
S&C faults
Twist and geometry faults
Structures
Culvert failures
Overline bridge failures
Rail bridge failures
Retaining wall failures
Tunnel failures
Bridge strikes
Earthworks
Embankment failures
Cutting failures
Signalling
Signalling failures
SPAD and adhesion
SPAD
Adhesion
Infrastructure operations
Operating incidents - affecting level crossing
Operating incidents - objects foul of the line
Operating incidents - routing
Operating incidents - signaller errors other than
routing
Operating Incidents - track issues
Level crossings
LC failures (active automatic)
LC failures (passive)
LC incidents due to weather (active automatic)
LC incidents due to weather (active manual)
LC incidents due to weather (passive)
Public behaviour (active automatic)
Public behaviour (active manual)
Public behaviour (passive)
Objects on the line
Animals on the line
Non-passenger trains running into trees
Passenger trains running into trees
Non rail vehicles on the line
Non-passenger trains running into other obstructions
Passenger trains running into other obstructions
Non-passenger trains striking objects due to
vandalism
Passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism
Flooding
Train operations and failures
Rolling stock failures (brake/control)
Runaway trains
Train speeding (any approaching bufferstops)
Train speeding (non-passenger)
Train speeding (passenger)
Displaced or insecure loads
Non-passenger rolling stock defects (other than
brake/control)
Passenger rolling stock defects (other than
brake/control)
2010/11
1309
402
199
41
2
646
19
1632
4
9
12
2
9
1596
49
10
39
10115
10115
502
296
206
2718
83
366
2110
2011/12
1085
362
129
12
3
571
8
1583
3
10
21
4
5
1540
33
3
30
9440
9440
358
276
82
2679
81
332
2073
2012/13
1045
431
180
10
4
412
8
1570
6
14
32
5
8
1505
202
52
150
8839
8839
403
248
155
2612
74
305
2057
2013/14
884
332
120
19
3
398
12
1776
27
31
66
7
11
1634
172
41
131
9076
9076
567
287
280
2493
87
271
1989
2014/15
707
268
95
14
2
316
12
1754
3
23
44
6
7
1671
61
21
40
8421
8421
483
299
184
2956
98
696
2014
23
21
19
18
24
136
1590
863
578
4
4
3
43
12
83
1823
1529
17
62
57
11
61
172
1478
731
610
2
4
0
40
6
85
2056
1543
30
242
62
19
84
157
2103
981
981
3
4
0
48
19
67
2359
1667
39
232
53
21
97
128
1880
839
922
1
5
1
40
7
65
2644
1622
125
551
43
17
129
124
1798
821
876
1
4
0
29
1
66
1820
1298
45
238
57
14
82
4
7
7
3
2
43
39
258
23
6
11
55
79
27
38
31
260
33
6
10
60
73
29
20
223
236
19
2
12
42
81
19
33
121
233
6
5
14
40
105
27
27
57
209
5
3
10
30
81
33
6
7
10
5
6
51
42
51
31
41
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124
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
7.8
Injuries to the workforce from activities related to train
operations
The types of activities considered under this area include the shunting or preparation of trains, and
ad-hoc and planned access of the track by train crew, for example to investigate a problem with a
train in running, or to change ends of a train.
7.8.1
Risk profile
Workforce personal injuries, as a result of train operations, contribute 0.9 FWI per year to the risk
profile. The fatality risk is dominated by the risk from being struck by a train. Slips, trips and falls
contribute the greatest amount of harm overall. While none of this is fatality risk, such an occurrence
may lead to another event that can cause fatality, such as electric shock.
Chart 112.
Train operations: workforce personal injury risk (SRMv8.1)
Struck/crushed by train
0.22
Personal
Accidents
Slips, trips, and falls
0.31
Other accident
0.03
Electric shock
Fatalities
0.04
Major injuries
Contact with object or person
Boarding and alighting
0.19
0
Source:
7.8.2
Minor injuries
0.09
Shock and trauma
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
0.5
SRMv8.1
Injuries during 2014/15
During 2014/15, there were:
•
No workforce fatalities associated with train operations.
•
Three major injuries: A driver and a shunter each suffered an arm/wrist fracture having tripped
on or near the line, and one driver suffered an electric shock whilst on the line near a fallen
overhead wire.
•
68 minor injuries: 53 were to drivers and shunters, most frequently suffering slips, trips and falls
(35) but also boarding and alighting injuries (9), contact with objects (6) and injuries whilst
pulling points (3). The remaining 15 workers similarly suffered mostly from falls and
boarding/alighting injuries.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
_________________________________________________________________
125
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
7.8.3
Trend in workforce harm related to train operations
In the last 10 years, there have been two fatalities, both involving train drivers. In one case the driver
was struck by a train, while changing ends of his own train. In the other case, a train driver suffered a
fatal electric shock after coming into contact with the third rail. Chart 113 shows the trend in harm
over the past 10 years.
Chart 113.
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.4
Minor injuries
Major injuries
0.3
0.2
1.0
Shock and trauma
0.2
0.2
1.2
FWI
Workforce harm from personal accidents related to train operations
Fatalities
0.8
0.8
0.2
0.6
1
0.4
1
0.6
0.2
0.5
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.4
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.2
2013/14
2014/15
Chart 114 shows the types of accidents that have occurred to the workforce in relation to operating
trains, and the types of workforce involved.
Train drivers have experienced the highest amount of harm, with most of this arising from slips, trips
and falls. Slips, trips and falls have also formed the greatest contribution to harm for other workforce
types, such as train guards and shunters.
Chart 114.
Workforce personal accidents related to train operations, by accident type, 2010/11
to 2014/15
3.5
Train maintenance staff
Train guards
2.9
3.0
Train drivers
Track maintainence
2.5
Station staff
Shunters
2.0
FWI
Other
1.5
1.3
Onboard train crew
2.1
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.1
Struck by train
Electric shock
1.0
0.5
1.1
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.0
Contact with
object or person
Boarding and
alighting
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
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126
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
7.9
Key safety statistics: train operations
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
1
6
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
6
2
2
11
5
1
2
0
6
1
0
1
0
3
1
0
1
0
2
3
1
0
0
51
55
52
76
23
23
19
19
52
7
28
31
31
22
15
0
5
2
2
1
36
44
39
39
20
3
5
3
5
1
33
39
34
34
19
0
0
2
0
0
1.41
1.85
6.40
2.56
2.14
0.71
0.16
0.05
0.23
0.02
0.51
0.37
0.23
0.32
0.11
0.20
1.32
6.12
2.01
2.01
Train accidents
Fatalities
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Major injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Minor injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Incidents of shock
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Workforce train operations (excluding
train accidents)
Fatalities
Major injuries
Contact with object or person
Boarding and alighting
Slips, trips and falls
Struck by train
Electric shock
Other accident
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Contact with object or person
Boarding and alighting
Slips, trips and falls
Struck by train
Electric shock
Other accident
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
4
0
1
3
0
0
0
107
23
84
0
0
0
0.60
0.02
0.17
0.39
0.00
0.00
0.03
0
4
0
1
2
0
0
1
76
20
56
3
1
2
0.56
0.01
0.15
0.28
0.00
0.00
0.12
0
4
0
1
3
0
0
0
82
13
69
1
0
1
0.54
0.01
0.13
0.39
0.00
0.00
0.01
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
72
11
61
5
1
4
0.33
0.02
0.03
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.02
0
3
0
0
2
0
1
0
68
14
54
6
0
6
0.43
0.01
0.02
0.29
0.00
0.10
0.02
_________________________________________________________________
127
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
Train accidents 28
Total train accidents
PHRTAs
Involving passenger trains
Collisions between trains
Derailments
Collisions with RVs not at LC
Collisions with RVs at LC (not derailed)
Collisions with RVs at LC (derailed)
Striking buffer stops
Struck by large falling object
2010/11
520
18
14
2011/12
545
33
18
2012/13
693
34
20
2013/14
636
32
17
2014/15
624
25
7
1
5
0
4
1
2
1
5
0
2
7
2
2
0
4
7
2
7
0
0
0
5
0
1
8
0
3
0
2
0
0
5
0
0
0
Not involving passenger trains
4
15
14
15
18
Collisions between trains
Derailments
Collisions with RVs not at LC
Collisions with RVs at LC (not derailed)
Collisions with RVs at LC (derailed)
Striking buffer stops
Struck by large falling object
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
13
0
0
0
1
0
1
9
1
3
0
0
0
1
11
0
2
0
1
0
0
16
0
2
0
0
0
Non-PHRTAs
Involving passenger trains
502
440
512
432
659
561
604
524
599
544
Open door collisions
Roll back collisions
Striking animals
Struck by missiles
Train fires
Striking level crossing gates/barriers
Striking other objects
0
6
168
90
53
7
116
0
1
169
57
43
2
160
0
4
324
66
40
1
126
0
0
268
52
31
5
168
1
1
304
52
32
3
151
0
0
22
6
11
1
58
2012/13
7.95
1.55
0.72
0.85
3.29
0.86
0.68
3.30
1.27
0.52
0.53
0.24
0.34
0.40
0
0
26
3
5
0
46
2013/14
7.56
1.52
0.86
0.86
2.75
0.85
0.71
3.31
1.26
0.63
0.52
0.20
0.39
0.32
0
0
21
2
3
1
28
2014/15
6.66
0.77
1.07
0.99
2.45
0.86
0.53
2.76
0.62
0.79
0.63
0.17
0.29
0.27
Not involving passenger trains
Open door collisions
Roll back collisions
Striking animals
Struck by missiles
Train fires
Striking level crossing gates/barriers
Striking other objects
PIM
Total
Infrastructure failures
SPAD and adhesion
Infrastructure operations
Level crossings
Objects on the line
Train operations and failures
Passenger proportion
Infrastructure failures
SPAD and adhesion
Infrastructure operations
Level crossings
Objects on the line
Train operations and failures
62
0
2
19
8
9
1
23
2010/11
8.23
1.24
1.04
1.00
3.47
0.85
0.64
3.24
1.01
0.75
0.62
0.26
0.26
0.33
80
0
0
21
10
8
2
39
2011/12
7.41
0.96
0.72
0.80
3.05
1.15
0.74
2.84
0.77
0.52
0.51
0.23
0.41
0.40
98
80
55
28 The category collisions with road vehicles (not at LC) excludes accidents that result in a derailment; these incidents are included in the
derailments category. Similarly the derailments category excludes derailments resulting from collisions between trains, collisions with road
vehicles at level crossings and trains struck by large falling objects.
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Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8
Level crossings
This chapter covers the risk related to level crossings and the majority of risk is caused by public
behaviour with most casualties occurring to road vehicle 29 occupants and pedestrians. Network Rail
put significant resource into reducing the risk at level crossings and, after reaching a target of 25%
reduction in risk at the end of Control Period 4 (March 2014), the total level of FWI for CP4 was 28%
lower than the CP3 total. The SRM modelled risk of 11.4 FWI per year falls within the remit of the
Level Crossing Strategy Group (LCSG); this comprises 8% of the total mainline system FWI risk.
2014/15 Headlines
•
Excluding suicides, eight pedestrians, including one cyclist, and two road vehicle occupants died
in accidents at level crossings in 2014/15. There were five major injuries, 52 reported minor
injuries and 27 cases of shock or trauma. This equated to a total of 10.7 FWI, which is higher than
the 2013/14 figure and just above the average over the past 10 years.
•
Anecdotal evidence, and a qualitative review of accident data, suggests that dog walkers may be
particularly vulnerable to accidents at level crossings. Two pedestrian fatalities involved dog
walkers and a pedestrian suffered minor injuries when their dog pulled them into the side of a
train 30.
•
There were seven collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings during the year,
which is three fewer than the figure seen in 2013/14. There has been an average of 11.3
accidents per year since 2005/06. There is evidence that the underlying rate of collisions at level
crossings has reduced over this period.
•
The number of near misses with road vehicles at level crossings decreased from the previous
year, and has fallen over the past decade. Conversely, there was an increasing trend in the
number of reported near misses with cyclists and pedestrians, which has since slightly decreased.
Level crossing performance at a glance
Risk in context (SRMv8.1)
Trend in harm
16
14
13.6
13.2
14.0
Weighted injuries
Fatalities
10.7
9.9
8.8
11.0 10.9
12
Other
accidental risk
(128.2 FWI;
92%)
FWI
10
Level crossing
risk (11.4 FWI;
8%)
7.4
8
5.2
6
4
2
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
29 The term road vehicle is used in this report to describe a range of vehicles, including farm machinery, motorcycles and off-road vehicles
such as quad bikes. It does not include pedal cycles, whose users are grouped with pedestrians.
30
Network Rail and RSSB are working to raise awareness of the dangers of level crossings and improve safety amongst the most at risk user
groups such as dog walkers, cyclists, farmers and commercial drivers, with a series of targeted campaigns.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
_________________________________________________________________
129
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.1
Level crossing risk profile
The SRM modelled risk at level crossings is 11.4 FWI per year, and this accounts for 8% of the total
system FWI risk of 139.6 FWI (including YDS and excluding suicide). Level crossings are an open
interface between the road and the railway, so there is increased potential for pedestrian and road
user behaviour to affect train operations.
Collisions at level crossings are the largest single cause of train accident risk (see Chapter 7 Train
operations). However, level crossing safety in the UK compares favourably with that in other
European countries.
A considerable amount of research has been undertaken on level crossing safety, covering station
and footpath crossings, as well as road crossings. Details of the research carried out can be found on
the RSSB website at http://www.rssb.co.uk/research-development-and-innovation.
Chart 115.
Level crossing risk by injury degree and accident type (11.4 FWI per year)
Public pedestrian struck by train
6.5
Road vehicle occupants in collisions with trains
3.3
Passenger pedestrian struck by train on station crossing
0.5
Slips, trips and falls
0.5
Train occupants
0.4
Struck or trapped by crossing equipment
0.1
Other
0.1
0
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
1
2
3
4
5
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
6
7
Source: SRMv8.1
•
Most of the risk at level crossings (62%) is to pedestrians, with pedestrian members of the public
accounting for 57% and passenger pedestrians on station crossings accounting for the remaining
5%.
•
Train collisions with road vehicles contribute 32% of the risk at level crossings, of which 29%
affects members of the public in road vehicles, and 3% affects people on board trains.
•
Slips, trips and falls on level crossings account for around 4% of the total level crossing risk, and
accidents in which people are struck by level crossing equipment account for 1%.
•
The remaining 1% of the risk arises from road traffic accidents that occur in relation to level
crossings, but do not result in train accidents (eg collisions with barriers) and members of the
workforce injured at level crossings.
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Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.2
Level crossing fatalities, injuries and train accidents in 2014/15
Fatalities
Excluding suicides and suspected suicides, 10 people (eight pedestrians, including a cyclist, and two
road vehicle occupants) died in accidents at level crossings in 2014/15. Table 15 shows details of the
pedestrian fatalities; the road vehicle fatalities are described alongside other collisions between
trains and road vehicles in Table 16.
Pedestrian fatalities at level crossings in 2014/15
Date
Location
Territory
Type
31/05/14
Wharf Road
(Hertfordshire)
South East
AHB
26/06/14
Wharf Road
(Hertfordshire)
South East
AHB
27/08/14
Fishermans Path
(Sefton)
London
North
Western
UWC-T
03/09/14
Dibleys
(Kent)
South East
Footpath
16/09/14
Wyke
(Calderdale)
London
North
Eastern
Footpath
04/11/14
Sandhill
(Cambridgeshire)
South East
AHB
13/12/14
Hipperholme
(Calderdale)
London
North
Eastern
Footpath
08/02/15
Glebe Way
(Kent)
South East
Footpath
Description
A 77-year-old cyclist was struck by a train at the level crossing.
The cyclist crossed whilst the barriers were down. It is not
known if he was unaware of the meaning of the tone warning
that a second train was coming.
A 39-year-old pedestrian was struck by a train at the level
crossing. The member of the public walked around the
lowered barriers despite the barriers and warning lights
operating correctly.
A 22-year-old pedestrian was struck by a passing train on the
crossing while attempting to retrieve their dog from the line.
A 20-year-old pedestrian was struck by a passenger train at the
crossing. The early morning conditions were foggy and the
user may have been wearing headphones which may have
contributed to the accident. The driver was not required to
sound the horn due to the night time quiet period.
A 67-year-old pedestrian walking their dog was struck by a
passenger train at the crossing. The user was unaware that
there was a second train coming and crossed immediately
after one train had passed and was struck by another.
An 86-year-old pedestrian was struck by a passenger train at
the level crossing. The crossing was working correctly at the
time of the accident.
A 16-year-old pedestrian was struck by a passenger train while
sitting on the crossing in the very early hours of the morning.
The person was reported to have been listening to a mobile
device with a friend and was not expecting trains to be running
at the time. The train driver was not required to sound their
horn due to the night time quiet period.
A 14-year-old child was struck by a passenger train at a level
crossing. It is unclear why the person was on the crossing at
the time.
Major injuries
There were five major injuries at level crossings in 2014/15. Four were slips, trips and falls and one
was due to contact with an object (a member of the public, who was struck by a lowering barrier).
Minor injuries and shock & trauma
There were 52 reported minor injuries, most of which resulted from falls or being struck by crossing
equipment. There were 27 reports of shock or trauma, mostly affecting train drivers involved in
accidents.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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131
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
Collisions between trains and road vehicles
There were seven collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings during the year.
Two of the events resulted in fatalities to occupants of the road vehicle (shown in italics). In all cases,
the crossing equipment was working correctly at the time of the accident. One of these two
collisions, shown in red, is subject to a RAIB investigation.
Collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings in 2014/15
Date
Location
Territory
Type
07/05/14
Ivy Lea Farm
London North
UWC-T
(North Yorkshire)
Eastern
11/05/14
Frampton Mansell
(Gloucestershire)
Western
UWC-T
01/08/14
Meusydd Mill
(Carmarthenshire)
Western
UWC-T
16/09/14
Mays
(Berkshire)
South East
MCBCCTV
13/11/14
Downham By-pass
(Norfolk)
South East
AHB
25/11/14
St David's Golf
Club
(Gwynedd)
Western
UWC-T
16/03/15
Kelby Lane
(Lincolnshire)
London North
Eastern
AHB
Description
A passenger train struck a car on a crossing near Rillington. The
road vehicle occupant was fatally injured. There were no
injuries to passengers on board the train, although the train
driver suffered shock. At the time of the incident the signaller
was dealing with a phone call from Lilac Farm crossing and
therefore was unable to answer Ivy Lea. When the signaller
finished the call from Lilac Farm he answered the phone to Ivy
Lea, but there was no reply.
A passenger train struck a motorcyclist on a crossing near
Stroud. The motorcyclist was with two companions, when he
was struck and fatally injured, having failed to notice the train.
The crossing was later found to be in order, with signage and
gates in place.
A passenger train struck a road vehicle on a crossing near
Ffairfach. There were no reported injuries and the train did not
derail. The road vehicle driver admitted to failing to contact
the signaller before crossing.
A road vehicle crashed through the lowered barriers at the
level crossing and struck the side of an empty coaching stock
train. There were no reported injuries to passengers, although
the train driver suffered shock. The road vehicle driver was
charged with dangerous driving and taken into custody.
A freight train struck a lorry with a glancing blow at the level
crossing. The lorry driver was arrested for road traffic offences.
There were no reported injuries on board the train.
A passenger train struck a car at a level crossing near Harlech.
The telephone was not used to contact the signaller prior to
the collision. The driver of the road vehicle suffered minor
injuries.
A passenger train struck a road vehicle at the crossing. There
were no reported injuries on board the train.
Trains striking level crossing gates or barriers
Usually, trains strike barriers only when a previous incident, such as a road traffic accident, has
caused the barrier to be foul of the line immediately prior to the train’s arrival. Crossing gates may be
struck when high winds cause them to blow open, either due to defective clasps or users failing to
close or secure them properly after passing.
There were four instances of trains striking level crossing gates in 2014/15, and no occasions where
barriers were struck. This represents a decrease of one compared to the previous year.
None of the collisions resulted in injury.
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Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.3
Types of level crossings
Level crossings vary in the level of protection they offer. There are two broad groups:
•
Passive crossings: where no warning of a train’s approach is given other than by the train driver
who may use the train horn. The onus is on the road user or pedestrian to determine whether or
not it is safe to cross the line. Instructions for proper use must be provided at each location,
along with other appropriate signage.
•
Active crossings: where the road vehicle or pedestrian is warned of the approach of a train
through closure of gates or barriers and/or by warning lights and/or alarms. The operation of an
active crossing can either be automatic (eg barriers that are raised and lowered automatically) or
manual, where a rail operator will work the crossing protection.
An illustrated guide to the different level crossing types, may be found in Appendix 5.
Automatic
Active
Manual
Passive
Level crossing categories by class and type (June 2015)
UWC-T
UWC
OC
FP
MCG
MCB
MCB-OD
MCB-CCTV
AHB
ABCL
AOCL-B
AOCL/R
UWC-MWL
FP-MWL
Crossing type
User-worked crossing with telephone
User-worked crossing
Open crossing
Footpath crossing
Manually controlled gate
Manually controlled barrier
Manually controlled barrier with obstacle detection
MCB monitored by closed-circuit television
Automatic half-barrier
Automatic barrier locally monitored
Automatic open crossing locally monitored with barrier
Automatic open crossing locally or remotely monitored
User-worked crossing with miniature warning lights
Footpath crossing with miniature warning lights
Total
Number
1670
505
49
2106
151
181
61
421
444
56
63
33
106
128
5974
Source: Network Rail, June 2015
•
Generally, automatic barrier and manually controlled crossings (including those monitored by
CCTV) are installed on public roads with high levels of traffic.
•
Automatic half-barrier crossings, which cause less disruption to road traffic for each train
traverse, also tend to be heavily used and, compared with manually controlled crossings, have a
relatively high average risk per crossing. Automatic open crossings, which have lights but no
barriers, have a higher average risk from collisions with road vehicles.
•
Passive crossings for road vehicles are generally used in rural areas. These crossings tend to be
either on private roads, for example to provide access between a farm and fields, or on roads
that provide access to a farm. In general, user-worked crossings (UWCs) tend to be
comparatively high-risk relative to the volume of traffic passing over them.
•
Crossings that are not designed for vehicles are grouped under the single category of footpath
crossings for the purposes of this report, because detailed information about them is not well
captured in incident reports. The category also includes bridleway crossings and barrow
crossings.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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133
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.4
Trend in harm at level crossings
Most of the harm at level crossings arises from pedestrians, cyclists and road vehicles being struck by
trains. Some people are also injured each year as a result of slips, trips and falls, or striking, or being
struck by crossing barriers.
Chart 116.
Harm at level crossings (excluding suicides)
16
14
Shock and trauma
14.0
13.6
Minor injuries
13.2
Major injuries
Fatalities
12
11.0
10.9
10.7
9.9
FWI
10
8.8
8
6
7.4
13
12
10
13
5.2
10
9
4
10
8
6
2
4
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
•
The total level of harm at level crossings in 2014/15 showed an increase compared with the
previous year, and was just above the ten-year average of 10.5 FWI per year.
•
Level crossing harm tends to be dominated by a relatively small number of fatalities, so figures
from a single year should be interpreted with caution. The relatively small number of fatal events
makes it difficult to identify trends in harm. However, there is some evidence of improvement in
safety: the average level of harm in the latter half of the decade is lower than in the first half, and
other indicators also point towards reductions, such as collisions and near misses with road
vehicles, and the output of Network Rails Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model (LCRIM). The other
indicators are reviewed later in this chapter.
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Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossing fatalities
The 10 years to March 2015 have seen 95 fatalities on level crossings, excluding suicides. This figure
comprises 72 pedestrians (including five passengers using station crossings) and 23 road vehicle
users.
The last level crossing accident resulting in train occupant fatalities occurred at Ufton in 2004, when
a passenger train derailed after striking a car that had been deliberately parked on the crossing by its
driver, as a suicidal act. The train driver and five passengers were killed, in addition to the car driver.
Chart 117.
Fatalities at level crossings
20
16
Fatalities
13
12
12
2
3
8
10
10
1
2
2
13
Passenger pedestrian struck by train on station crossing
Road vehicle occupants in collisions with trains
Public pedestrian struck by train
5
3
4
8
6
8
6
10
8
4
Chart 118.
UWCMWL
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2
2
5
8
6
3
4
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Fatalities at level crossings by crossing type (excluding suicides) (2005/06–2014/15)
UWC-T
MCB
2006/07
8
1
6
0
2005/06
10
9
UWC
MCBCCTV
AOCL/R
Pedestrian
76%
Footpath
AHB
UWCMWL
MCB
Road vehicle
occupant
24%
AHB
UWC-T
AOCL/R
SPCMWL
SPC
•
Four pedestrian fatalities in 2014/15 occurred on footpath crossings, three on automatic halfbarrier (AHB) crossings and one on a user-worked crossing with telephones (UWC-T). Since
2005/06, more than half of pedestrian fatalities have occurred on footpath level crossings.
•
Six accidents at level crossings over the past 10 years have resulted in more than one fatality:
three accidents where multiple road vehicle occupants died, and three accidents where two
pedestrians were struck. The last multi-fatality accident occurred in 2013/14: two people were
killed when a train struck a car on Great Coates level crossing on 9 April 2013.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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135
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.5
Potentially higher-risk train accidents at level crossings
Historically, most collisions at level crossings have occurred on AHBs, AOCLs and UWCs. The
proportion of collisions that result in a fatality varies by crossing type, reflecting factors such as
differences in train speed. For example, many AHBs are situated on faster lines and, as a result,
collisions with road vehicles are more likely to result in fatalities to road vehicle occupants.
Chart 119.
Train accidents at level crossings and other locations (proportion by crossing type)
60
OC
5%
UWC
13%
50
49
46
45
42
Incidents
40
28
30
30
32
MCG UWC-T
19%
1%
MCB-CCTV
42 2%
MCB
2%
UWC-MWL
4%
Footpath
1%
Other location
Level crossing
AHB
30%
AOCL/R
22%
34
33
ABCL
1%
32
28
25
34
24
24
18
20
22
18
10
16
13
21
13
14
8
5
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
9
10
10
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
7
2014/15
•
There is some evidence that the underlying rate of collisions at level crossings has reduced over
the past 10 years. Because the number of accidents that occur each year is relatively small, it is
difficult to distinguish trends from ‘statistical fluctuations’. However, grouping the decade into
two five-year periods shows a notable reduction in the number of collisions from the period
2005/06 to 2009/10 (72) to the period 2010/11 to 2014/15 (41).
•
Most collisions involve cars or vans, as
shown in Chart 120. There has been no
significant trend in the types of vehicles
involved in collisions at level crossings.
The crossing types at which the accidents
occurred in 2014/15 were reasonably typical
of previous years. Of the 113 collisions in the
10 years from April 2005, 25 (22%) occurred
at AOCL crossings, 34 (30%) at AHB crossings
and 36 (32%) at UWCs (with or without
telephones). The remaining types of crossing
each contribute between 1% and 5% of
events.
Road vehicles in collisions at level
crossings (2005/06–2014/15)
90
80
70
Incidents
•
Chart 120.
60
81
Passive
Active - manual protection
Active - automatic protection
26
50
40
30
20
10
51
14
11
9
7
0
Cars and Tractors and Lorries and Motorcycles
vans
trailers
LGVs
2
Other
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Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.6
Near misses with road vehicles and pedestrians
Due to the relatively small number of accidents at level crossings, it is hard to monitor trends and
identify patterns from accident data alone. The industry also collects data on near misses. Near
misses are typically reported by train drivers who feel that they have had to take action to avoid a
collision, or that they came close to striking a road vehicle or pedestrian. Near miss reporting is
necessarily subjective, and is likely to be influenced by factors such as the ease of making a report
and its perceived effect. It is also likely that many near misses go unobserved due to prevailing light
and visibility conditions.
8.6.1
Near misses with road vehicles by crossing type
Chart 121.
Trend in reported near misses with road vehicles
90
Not recorded
Near misses
80
Passive
70
Active - manual protection
60
Annual moving average
Active - automatic protection
50
40
30
20
10
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
•
The number of near miss reports in 2014/15 decreased from the previous year. There appears to
be a long-term downward trend in near misses with road vehicles.
•
Chart 122 shows that the majority of near
misses occur on UWCs (with or without
telephones). The chart also shows that a
disproportionate number of near misses occur
at AOCL crossings.
•
31
There is clear seasonality in near miss reporting,
with a higher incidence in spring and summer.
This may be due to heavier traffic (particularly
on farm crossings around the times of
haymaking and harvest), and train drivers may
be more likely to identify that a near miss has
occurred during daylight hours.
Near misses with road vehicles
(2005/06-2014/15) 31
Percentage breakdown
•
Chart 122.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Other
UWC-T
UWC-MWL
Footpath
MCG
AOCL/R
Road vehicle near misses
OC
MCB-CCTV
ABCL
UWC
MCB
AHB
Road vehicle crossing
population
Other seasonal factors that affect level crossing risk include ice and snow and sunlight, which can
make it harder for the motorist to see warning lights.
The incidents at footpath crossings include near misses with mopeds and other motorcycles.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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137
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.6.2
Near misses with pedestrians and cyclists by crossing type
Chart 123.
120
100
Trend in reported near misses with pedestrians and cyclists
Not recorded
Passive
Active - manual protection
Active - automatic protection
Annual moving average
Near misses
80
60
40
20
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
After a period of increase up to 2011/12, the trend has been gradually decreasing.
•
As with road vehicle near misses, reporting is highly seasonal. It is likely that there are more
pedestrians and cyclists using level crossings during spring and summer when the weather tends
to be better, and – as with road vehicle near
Chart 124.
Near misses with pedestrians and
misses – train drivers are more likely to see
cyclists (2005/06-2014/15)
crossing users during daylight hours.
•
Around 10% of the near misses shown in the
chart involve cyclists.
Percentage breakdown
•
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Not recorded
UWC
MCB-CCTV
Footpath
UWC-T
MCB
OC
MCG
UWC-MWL
•
Anecdotal evidence, and a qualitative review of
accident data, suggests that dog walkers may be
particularly vulnerable to accidents at level
crossings. In 2014/15 around 17% of reported
near misses mention that the person was
Pedestrian near misses
Pedestrian crossing
walking a dog (the 10-year average is 12%).
population
Along with the two fatalities involving dog
walkers (on 27 August and 16 September) a pedestrian suffered minor injuries on 9 February at
Hard Platts No. 2 footpath crossing, when their dog pulled them into the side of a train.
•
Auditory distractions, such as personal stereos, also have the potential to increase the risk to
level crossing users and have been mentioned in relation to a number of events over recent
years.
•
Around one in three reported near misses with pedestrians/cyclists occur on footpath crossings,
compared with more than half the fatalities.
•
UWCs (with or without telephones) account for a significant proportion of near misses with both
pedestrians and road vehicle users. Telephones may be provided at crossings where there is a
high number of near misses reported or where sighting times are reduced.
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Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.6.3
Near misses by time of day
Chart 125 shows the proportion of accidents and near misses at level crossings reported in each hour
of the day over the period 2005/06 to 2014/15.
Chart 125.
Accidents and near misses by time of day (2005/06 to 2014/15)
14%
Collision with a road vehicle
Person struck and killed by a train
Percentage of reported events
12%
Near miss
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
Road vehicles
22:00
20:00
18:00
16:00
14:00
12:00
10:00
08:00
06:00
04:00
02:00
00:00
22:00
20:00
18:00
16:00
14:00
12:00
10:00
08:00
06:00
04:00
02:00
00:00
0%
Pedestrians and cyclists
Each block represents one event
•
Accidents and reported near misses with road vehicles tend to peak in the late morning and early
afternoon. Accidents and near misses with pedestrians most often occur a little later in the day,
although the peak hour for pedestrian fatalities over the past 10 years has been between 11:0012:00 and 14:00-15:00.
•
Accidents and reported near misses tend to occur at broadly similar times of the day. The main
exception to this is that a higher proportion of pedestrian/cyclist fatalities occurs in the late
evening (21:00 to 23:00) than would be anticipated from near miss reporting. One explanation is
that many near misses go unseen (and therefore unreported) during hours of darkness.
In April 2007 a night time ‘quiet’ period, between 23:00 and 07:00, was introduced. Between these
hours train drivers are no longer required to routinely sound their horns at whistle boards
approaching crossings.
Chart 126.
Near misses on footpath
crossings
16%
2005/2006 to 2006/2007
2007/2008 to 2014/2015
14%
12%
Night time
quiet period
10%
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
20:00
18:00
16:00
14:00
12:00
10:00
08:00
06:00
04:00
02:00
6%
There have been four fatalities in the night time
4%
quiet period, in instances where the horn was not
2%
sounded, since April 2007; the first occasion was in
0%
2009/10 and the second in 2013/14. The remaining
two quiet-period fatalities both occurred in 2014/15.
One occurred at Dibleys footpath crossing and the other at Hipperholme footpath crossing.
22:00
8%
00:00
•
Chart 126 shows near misses at footpath crossings
by time of day both before and after the quiet period
was introduced. There is little evidence that a higher
proportion of near misses is occurring during the
quiet period.
Percentage of near misses
occurring during hour
•
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139
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.7
Factors affecting the risk at level crossings
Level crossing equipment failure
Equipment failure can range from minor component defects to more serious disruptions caused by
power cuts and technical faults. Damage to equipment is also caused by vandals, thieves, road traffic
accidents and the weather (particularly wind, floods and lightning).
Equipment failure accounts for a small proportion of the risk at level crossings, the risk being
mitigated by the fact that equipment is designed to ‘fail safe’. For example, if the equipment fails at
an automatic level crossing, the warning lights operate and the barriers lower.
•
The number of level crossing equipment failures reported into SMIS that are identified as
RIDDOR-reportable has increased dramatically over the past few years (from 332 in 2005/06 to
1,567 in 2014/15). This is due to improved reporting and does not reflect a genuine increase in
equipment failure rates. The trend in all reported level crossing equipment failures, which
includes those that are not reportable under RIDDOR, reduced in 2014/15 compared with the
previous year (see the Train accident PIM precursors key safety statistics sheet in Table 14).
•
In 2014/15, around 65% of RIDDOR-reportable equipment failures related to telephones, and
16% to level crossing barriers.
Railway crime
Crime at level crossings is a serious issue, which has the potential to cost lives, as well as cause delays
and cost to the industry. These incidents include the defacing of signs and criminal damage to gates,
barriers, and telephones.
Recorded instances of interference with crossing equipment
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
68
99
38
40
44
14
28
28
32
26
•
The number of incidents of reported interference with crossing equipment decreased in
2014/15, and is the second lowest over the period. There has been a general downward trend in
railway vandalism (see Section 9.4) but data quality issues mean that the scale of the reduction
should be interpreted with some caution.
Suicide
Suicides are not included in the statistics in this chapter, but are covered in Chapter 10 Suicide; since
April 2005, around 11% of railway suicides have taken place at level crossings. The number of
suicides recorded at level crossings was six fewer in 2014/15, and is the third highest number in the
last 10 years. There has been a continued increase in the number of railway suicides since 2010/11
(see Chapter 10).
Suicides and suspected suicides at level crossings
Pedestrian
Road vehicle occupant
Total
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
23
21
20
22
32
26
25
25
37
31
2
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
25
22
20
23
33
26
25
25
37
31
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140
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_________________________________________________________________
Actions by level crossings users
Although the majority of crossing events take place safely, each year there are a number of events
where this is not the case, and the crossing event does not take place safely. Reasons include:
•
Deliberate action on the part of the user, who was aware the action was incorrect and carried
risk.
•
Deliberate action on the part of the user, who was not aware that the action was incorrect, or
was not aware of the risk-related consequences of the action.
•
Unintentional action of the part of the user, which was not compliant with the crossing rules.
The following chart looks at user action, but does not distinguish between underlying causes.
Trends in reported level crossing events by type of user action
2800
537
2014/15
562
2011/12
606
529
2010/11
580
472
2009/10
2013/14
435
2008/09
2012/13
503
439
2007/08
502
2006/07
2005/06
1316
1248
1207
2013/14
1486
1208
1077
1058
2012/13
836
825
2009/10
765
2007/08
800
2008/09
847
829
2006/07
1200
1204
1755
1791
1759
1288
1600
2005/06
Reported events
2000
1638
2158
2400
Other
User fails to contact signaller / Phone left off the hook
Gate/barrier left open/raised
Pedestrian / cyclist crosses when unsafe
RV crosses when unsafe
1109
Chart 127.
400
Manually protected
User-worked
2014/15
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2005/06
2006/07
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
0
Other
•
Around 41% of reported events occur at UWCs. Overall the most commonly recorded type of
event is the user leaving the gates open. Additionally, for UWC-T, the most common occurrence
is the user failing to contact the signaller, either before using the crossing, or once they are clear
of the crossing.
•
The number of reported events at UWCs in 2014/15 showed a small increase compared to the
previous year. This is largely due to the number of pedestrians/cyclists reported to have crossed
unsafely doubling from 166 to 323. This in turn relates to an increase in the reporting levels of
this type of user action at UWC-MWL crossings. There has been little variation in the reporting
levels of the other user action types.
•
Around 42% of reported events occur at manually protected crossings. The majority of these
events relate to users crossing while it is unsafe to do so. Events at these crossings are more
likely to be observed (and therefore reported) by railway personnel.
•
There has been a significant increase in the number of reported events at manually protected
crossings since 2010/11. This trend is dominated by increased reports of users crossing unsafely.
In 2014/15 the number of reported road vehicles crossing unsafely increased by 201, compared
with the previous year.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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141
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.8
Initiatives to reduce the risk at level crossings
Improving level crossing safety is currently a major focus for the industry. Network Rail has put a
level crossing risk reduction programme in place, and has met the targeted reduction in level crossing
risk of 25% over the course of CP4. A further substantial safety improvement is planned for CP5,
which runs from April 2014 to March 2019.
Among the safety projects currently underway are:
•
The 100+ dedicated Level Crossing Managers and Route Level Crossing Managers continue to
support asset inspections as well as data collection for risk assessment and modelling. Their role
includes building relationships with authorised users and in the wider local community to
understand local risks. A comprehensive training course was developed and introduced for the
level crossing teams with over 2,000 days of training provided to support the delivery of the
operating regime.
•
The programme of level crossing closures closed 804 crossings and downgraded a further 48 in
CP4. A total of 256 crossings are scheduled to be closed during CP5. There are 383 crossings
planned for renewal over the period and an additional 360 wig-wags upgraded to LED lights.
•
High-risk footpath crossings are being replaced by footbridges, in line with a policy decision to
remove the need for pedestrians to cross high-speed main lines unprotected by barriers. Across
the network, nine modular footbridges were erected in 2013/14 which led to crossing closures.
•
Work has continued in the development of red light safety cameras (RLSE) with number plate
recognition technology. The aim of this is is to deter users from traversing the crossing when
they are not permitted to do so. One RLSE system has been Home Office Type Approved with
equipment now in place at 10 level crossings, a further two RLSE systems are currently seeking
Home Office Type Approval. An assessment before and after the trial will be carried out to
determine if users have adapted their behaviour.
•
Fifteen mobile safety vehicles continue to operate. The vehicles are staffed by BTP and they have
detected and prosecuted more than 1,500 motorists responsible for red light violations since
2012.
•
Audible warning devices have been developed, which provide a spoken warning which advise
pedestrians; “Warning: another train is approaching”. They have been installed at 117 level
crossings. This is to ensure that pedestrians understand that it is not safe to cross when the
crossing sequence continues after the first train has entered, or passed through, the station.
•
Network Rail continues to develop a range of technologies to locate trains in long signal sections,
including GPS and sound wave based solutions. A new overlay system, Vamos, is currently
operating in shadow trial mode and is awaiting product approval in 2015/16.
•
Power operated gate openers are being installed at 82 UWCs. These devices avoid the need for
users to leave their vehicles and make multiple traverses over a crossing on foot. Training is to be
provided to ensure users are aware of how they work.
•
Half-barrier overlays (AOCL+B) have been installed at 64 AOCL crossings. A further two
installations will be completed in 2015. The provision of additional half-barriers enhances user
safety.
•
Covtec technology uses wayside train horns, which trigger on the approach of a train. Radar picks
up the train in the vicinity and provides a localised warning at the crossing.
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_________________________________________________________________
Network Rail level crossing risk tools
Network Rail uses the All Level Crossing Risk Model (ALCRM) within its wider level crossing risk
management process to:
•
Evaluate safety risks associated with individual level crossings, based on characteristics such as
usage, road speed and layout, train speed and frequency, and the level of protection provided by
the crossing, as well as factors such as the duration of warnings and closures.
•
Support cost-benefit analyses of the options for reducing risk at level crossings.
Network Rail developed a model called the Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model (LCRIM) to track risk
at level crossings and regularly monitor progress towards control period targets.
Chart 128 shows the LCRIM and the progress made during CP4 (12.6 FWI) and the current figure of
12.8 FWI at the end of 2014/15.
Chart 128.
20
18
Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model – FWI benefit
18.3 FWI
16
12.8 FWI
FWI benefit
14
12
12.6 FWI
10
8
6
4
2
Apr-09
May-09
Jul-09
Sep-09
Nov-09
Jan-10
Mar-10
May-10
Jul-10
Sep-10
Nov-10
Jan-11
Mar-11
May-11
Jul-11
Sep-11
Nov-11
Jan-12
Mar-12
May-12
Jul-12
Sep-12
Nov-12
Jan-13
Mar-13
May-13
Jul-13
Sep-13
Nov-13
Jan-14
Mar-14
May-14
Jul-14
Sep-14
Nov-14
Dec-14
Mar-15
0
Data source: Network Rail
•
The LCRIM uses data from ALCRM and is updated every four weeks.
•
The benefits associated with the delivery of level crossing initiatives are calculated using the
‘optioneering’ capability within ALCRM. For example, when initiatives such as closure or
diversion and improvements such as installation of barriers are implemented, the risk reduction
is reflected in ALCRM and also the LCRIM.
•
Network Rail sets targets for the implementation of risk reduction initiatives. These targets are
based on achieving risk reduction benefits which amount to percentage decreases in FWI.
Currently these are based on the CP4 exit point.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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143
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
8.9
Key safety statistics: level crossings
Level crossings
Fatalities at LC (level crossings)
Pedestrians
Passenger on station crossing
Member of public
Road vehicle occupants
Train occupants
Passenger on train
Workforce on train
Weighted injuries at LC
Pedestrians
Road vehicle occupants
Train occupants
Suicide and attempted suicide
Suicide
Attempted suicide
Collisions with road vehicles at LC
Resulting in derailment
Collisions with gates or barriers at LC
Gates
Barriers
Reported near misses
With pedestrians
With road vehicles
Reported incidents of crossing events
With pedestrians
With road vehicles
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
6
4
9
8
10
6
3
4
6
8
0
0
0
0
0
6
3
4
6
8
0
1
5
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.35
1.22
0.92
0.78
0.66
0.58
0.58
0.70
0.66
0.60
0.10
0.32
0.12
0.01
0.01
0.67
0.32
0.10
0.11
0.05
26.30
25.11
25.22
37.22
31.10
26.00
25.00
25.00
37.00
31.00
0.30
0.11
0.22
0.22
0.10
5
9
10
10
7
1
2
0
0
0
8
4
2
5
4
6
3
2
2
4
2
1
0
3
0
454
470
439
409
379
306
322
294
279
276
148
148
145
130
103
2926
3807
3492
3578
4011
1355
1786
1782
1809
2117
1571
2021
1710
1769
1894
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_________________________________________________________________
9
Trespass
We categorise incidents as trespass if they involve access of prohibited areas of the railway and are
as a result of deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. Such behaviour includes deliberately alighting a
train in running (other than as part of a controlled evacuation procedure), and getting down from the
platform to the tracks, for example to retrieve an item that has been dropped. An exception to the
rule of classing the deliberate access of a prohibited area as trespass is at level crossings. This is
because level crossings are areas of the railway that are legitimately accessible by people for most of
the time.
The trespass category is limited to events where the person involved did not intend to cause harm to
themselves, even if their behaviour clearly carried risk, and so it excludes people who access the
railway to take their life: these events are analysed in Chapter 10 Suicide.
2014/15 Headlines
•
There were 22 fatalities to trespassers during 2014/15, the same figure as for 2013/14. When
non-fatal injuries are taken into account, the total level of public harm was 24.1 FWI, compared
with a total of 24.6 FWI recorded last year.
•
Around 41% of trespass fatalities have occurred in stations. Of the 59% that have occurred in
other locations, the majority occurred on the running line. While trespassing on the running line
is likely to involve those who have deliberately chosen to enter a prohibited railway
environment, those that occur in stations may involve passengers acting on the impulse of the
moment. During 2014/15, two passengers died while taking shortcuts between platforms.
•
People may be motivated to commit trespass for the purposes of criminal damage or theft. Over
the past 10 years, the trend in reported vandalism has fallen by 62%. Following on from great
efforts to tackle the issue of cable theft by Network Rail and BTP, the number of minutes of delay
caused by this crime continues to fall.
•
Through the enhanced co-operation taking place under the National Suicide Prevention Steering
Group, BTP have been able to share more information on railway fatalities, going back to
2009/10. For this reason, caution must be taken when comparing trespass fatalities over the last
six years of the decade with the first four years.
Trespass at a glance
Risk in context (SRMv8.1)
Trend in harm
70
60
Other
accidental risk
(106.2 FWI;
76%)
Risk from
trespass (33.4
FWI; 24%)
FWI
50
54.9
46.9 46.9
49.5
Weighted injuries
Fatalities
44.0
41.6
40
30
35.9
24.9
24.6 24.1
20
10
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
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145
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_________________________________________________________________
9.1
Trespass risk profile by event type
The breakdown of trespasser risk in Chart 129 is taken from SRMv8.1, and therefore represents the
modelled estimate of the underlying risk to trespassers.
The risk to trespassers is dominated by fatality risk, with weighted injuries accounting for a very small
part of the FWI total. This is partly because non-fatal injuries to the trespassers are less likely to be
reported to rail companies, and partly because the hazards that account for most of the risk (in
particular, being struck by trains) are more likely to result in fatality than injury.
Chart 129.
Trespass risk by accident type: 33.4 FWI per year
Struck by train
23.5
Electric shock
4.9
Fall from height
3.5
Jump from train in service
0.5
Train surfing
0.4
Fatalities
Major injuries
Other
Minor injuries
0.6
0
Shock and trauma
5
10
15
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
20
25
Source: SRMv8.1
•
The main source of risk arising during trespass is being struck by a train, which accounts for
around 70% of the total risk from trespass.
•
Electric shock accounts for 15% of total trespass risk and falls from height account for 10%.
•
Around 3% of trespass risk involves people deliberately exiting a train in running or sustaining
injuries while ‘train-surfing’.
•
The remaining category, Other, comprises around 2% of the total risk to the trespassers, and
covers events such as slips, trips and falls in areas of the railway, away from the running line.
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_________________________________________________________________
9.2
Trend in harm to trespassers
Over the past 10 years, more than 360 people have lost their lives while trespassing on the railway.
From 2013/14 onwards, a greater amount of information about fatalities related to trespass and
suicide has been made available by BTP to the industry through the enhanced co-operation taking
place under the National Suicide Prevention Steering Group (NSPSG). A specific team was established
within BTP, and has worked with Network Rail and RSSB to look at classification of fatalities. As part
of this partnership, BTP have been able to share more information on railway fatalities as far back as
2009/10. This enabled the industry to review a number of cases where the Coroners’ verdict has not
yet been returned, or was recorded as open or narrative, and re-assess them against the Ovenstone
criteria. An outcome of this increased data sharing is that while trespass and suicide data should be
more accurate over the past six years, the analysis of separate trends in trespass and across the
decade as a whole cannot be done on a consistent basis. The same limitations apply to trends in
suicide.
Chart 130.
Trend in trespasser FWI by injury degree
70
Shock and trauma
60
50
Minor injuries
Major injuries
54.9
46.9
Improved classification of
trespass fatalities
49.5
46.9
44.0
41.6
40
FWI
35.9
30
52
20
Fatalities
44
43
24.9
46
42
24.6
24.1
22
22
2013/14
2014/15
40
33
23
10
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
•
At 22, the number of trespasser fatalities recorded in 2014/15 was joint lowest over the period
shown.
Chart 131.
Trend in reported trespass
•
The trend in reported trespass, which
shows a clear seasonal variation, has been
generally stable over the past five years.
The seasonal trend could be partly due to
the effects of weather or shorter days, as
well as decreased visibility to drivers or
others potentially witnessing the trespass.
•
After a plateau in the level of reported
trespass, the trend for 2014/15 has been
slightly increasing.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Reported quarterly trespass
5000
4500
Events per quarter
4000
Annual moving average
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15
_________________________________________________________________
147
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
Trespasser fatalities by cause and location
Being struck by trains has accounted for 72% of all trespasser fatalities over the last 10 years.
Electrocution has accounted for a further 17%, with falls from height accounting for 7% and people
deliberately exiting trains during running, or falling from them while train-surfing, accounting for the
remaining 4%. The proportions based on actual data are very similar to those estimated by the SRM
(Chart 129).
Trespass fatalities by accident type and location
Train surfing
Electric shock
28
26
24
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
4
In stations
2
4
24
23
2
18
2
1
17
15
1
5
16
11
9
6
16
13
4
21
2008/09
7
10
1
9
6
15
14
9
13
3
9
20
4
2007/08
16
5
8
19
21
14
2006/07
5
10
3
2005/06
14
17
2014/15
6
25
24
1
5
2013/14
2
19
2012/13
15
18
2
1
2011/12
20
22
5
2010/11
Fatalities
25
7
2014/15
29
2012/13
30
Improved classification of
trespass fatalities
2013/14
Improved classification of
trespass fatalities
2011/12
35
Jump from train in service
Struck by train
2010/11
Other accidents
Fall (including from height)
2009/10
Chart 132.
Not in stations
• Around 41% of trespass fatalities have occurred in stations. Of the 59% that have occurred in
other locations, the majority of these have occurred on the running line.
• While trespassing along the running line is likely to involve those who have deliberately chosen to
enter a prohibited railway environment, those that occur in stations may involve passengers
acting on the impulse of the moment. There have been a number of occasions where passengers
waiting for trains have dropped an item on the track and then got down to retrieve it, only to be
fatally injured by a train entering the station. Other examples include passengers taking short-cuts
between platforms, rather than using the footbridges or other provided means of access.
• A number of events have involved people deliberately forcing the doors open on moving trains,
and jumping out onto the track. Passengers on trains that have failed or are delayed due to other
problems on the line may also put themselves at risk by forcing the doors open, or using the
emergency release handles to open the doors and alight onto the track, for example to stretch
their legs, smoke or simply out of frustration against the necessary confinement of the train. No
fatalities have yet resulted from this type of event.
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_________________________________________________________________
9.3
Analysis of the motivation behind trespass
People commit trespass for a variety of reasons. For some, it may be convenience – taking a shortcut
along the tracks, or walking the dog. For others, it may be a spur of the moment decision – for
example if something has been mistakenly dropped from the platform edge. In other cases, such as
playing ‘chicken’, there may be a thrill-seeking element to the behaviour.
The following analysis is based on all accidental injuries due to trespass recorded over the past 10
years.
Chart 133.
Trespass injuries by motivation, 2005/06 to 2014/15 (869 events in total)
Theft/damage
7%
Retrieving
item
9%
58%
Other
6%
Shortcut
42%
42%
Evading third
party
17%
Horseplay/thrill
seeking
19%
Reason identified
Reason not identified
•
In more than half of incidents, the reason for the trespass is not known or not identified.
•
In those events where the motivation for the trespass is identifiable, the most common reason is
for the purpose of taking a shortcut. Other reasons where the trespass is incidental to the main
motivation of the person include retrieving an item, evading a third party, or committing criminal
theft/damage. For those engaged in horseplay or thrill-seeking behaviour, the trespass itself may
be part of the motivation.
•
During the past 10 years, there have
been 508 trespass injuries for which no
reason for the trespassing has been
identified or recorded; 75% involved
people on the running line. The majority
of the remainder involved people
jumping/falling from bridges.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Activity where reason is not identified
Person on line
75.0%
Jump/fall from bridge
19.1%
Invalid railway access/egress
4.8%
Climbing on railway property
0.8%
Train surfing/jumping from train
0.4%
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149
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
Chart 134.
50%
40%
36%
30%
25%
20%
10%
A sizeable proportion are characterised by
invalid station access or egress; it is possible
that some of these are for the purpose of
fare evasion, although that was not recorded.
11%
4%
•
The events where people were engaged in
some sort of horseplay or thrill-seeking
behaviour are split between people accessing
the track, surfing on trains, climbing on
buildings or other structures, or deliberately
attempting to make contact with the
overhead electricity supply.
For trespass injuries as a whole, the
proportion of children involved is 5%.
However, in the case of horseplay/thrillseeking, the proportion is much higher, at
25%.
Chart 135.
Along tracks
Climbing on
railway
property
43%
Person on
tracks
32%
Of the events recorded as involving evasion
of a third party, more than half occurred in
stations, and most of these were for the
purposes of fare evasion.
For those cases not involving fare evasion,
about half involve people attempting to
escape from police, and the other half from
other members of the public.
Horseplay/thrill-seeking (68 events)
Train surfing
16%
Evading third party (61 events)
60%
Fare evasion
Other evasion
50%
2%
40%
Events
•
Not at stations
Overhead line
9%
Chart 136.
•
Invalid railway
access/egress
Across tracks
Along tracks
Invalid station
access/egress
At stations
•
15%
9%
0%
Between platforms
•
The majority of people engaged in taking
shortcuts do so in stations. Most of these are
shortcuts between platforms.
Events
•
Shortcuts (151 events)
30%
43%
20%
10%
39%
13%
2%
0%
In stations
Running line
2%
On trains
•
Retrieving items (34 events): Around three-quarters of cases involved people retrieving personal
items, such as phones, cigarette lighters, or items of clothing. The remaining quarter involved
people running after dogs or other pets.
•
Theft/damage (24 events): Around half concerned incidents of cable theft, with the remainder
comprising graffiti, and other theft/damage.
•
Other (23 events): 35% of these events involved people trying to board or alight trains in an
invalid manner, for example by pulling the emergency cord when they have missed their stop, or
attempting to train surf when they have just missed their train.
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_________________________________________________________________
9.3.1
Trespass fatalities at stations
Each year, a number of fatalities and injuries occur at stations involving people who, for a variety of
reasons have decided to deliberately access the track. In a number of cases, these people are
passengers; in the ASPR’s analysis and accident statistics, these events are covered under trespass
risk. There were two fatalities recorded in 2014/15 recorded as passenger trespass in stations. Both
cases involved people taking a shortcut across the tracks to change platforms. In one case the person
was electrocuted and in the other event the person was struck by a train.
Whether passengers or members of the public, the management of people in stations is of
continuing importance to the industry. In particular, the prevention of behaviour likely to result in
harm to the individual is an issue for the railway. The following analysis is based on all accidental
fatalities due to trespass originating at stations. It does not distinguish between passengers or public,
since the intention to travel does not change the railway’s approach to the subject, or its legal duty
under health and safety law.
Chart 137.
Trespass fatalities at stations, 2005/06 to 2014/15 (144 events in total)
Retrieving item
from track
18%
42%
58%
Reason
identified
Shortcut
between
platforms
45%
Fare evasion
3%
Other identified
motivation
34%
Reason not
identified
•
Of the trespass fatalities occurring at stations over the past 10 years, 58% do not have sufficient
information recorded to determine the motivation.
•
Of the remaining station trespass fatalities where the motivation is recorded, 45% were
shortcuts between platforms, 18% were people retrieving items from the track, and 3% were
people evading fares. These types of events may involve passengers, perhaps acting on the spur
of the moment.
•
The other identified motivation category covers horseplay/thrill-seeking, theft/damage and
evading police or members of the public.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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151
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
9.4
Vandalism
Vandalism on the railway encompasses any kind of deliberate damage or defacement to the property
of the railway. ‘Superficial’ vandalism, like graffiti, may result in greater levels of passenger anxiety
about their safety and security on the railway. ‘Structural’ vandalism may include the real potential
to cause an accident.
With all kinds of vandalism, there is also the personal risk that the vandals may expose themselves to
when committing unsafe acts, or when trespassing on the track to commit vandalism.
Chart 138.
Trends in reported vandalism
1400
Total
Annual moving average
Other vandalism
Missiles thrown or fired
Obstruction on the line
Arson
Recorded incidents per month
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
Dec
Aug
Apr
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Aug
Apr
Dec
Aug
Apr
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
0
2014/15
•
Over the past 10 years, the trend in reported vandalism has fallen by 62%. All types of vandalism
shown in the chart have seen reductions over this period, although it is the incidence of missilethrowing and line obstructions that have seen the greatest absolute decreases, and have driven
the overall reduction over the decade as whole.
•
Looking more recently, the reduction in risk that has occurred over the past three years has been
due to a fall in the number of incidents in the Other vandalism category. The main contributor to
this has been a fall in the number of equipment
Chart 139.
Seasonal trend in vandalism
thefts, including cable theft (see next section).
•
A clear seasonal pattern is generally evident:
reported vandalism usually peaks around April
at over twice the number of incidents seen in
December. Chart 139 shows how the current
reporting year compares with the average
variation seen over the past decade.
1200
Reported vandalism
events per month
1000
Reported vandalism per month - 2014/15
Reported vandalism per month - 10 year average
800
600
400
435 403
317 348 322 324 308 311
363
257 242 270
200
0
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
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_________________________________________________________________
9.4.1
Cable theft
The theft of lineside cable causes significant operational delay, creates reinstatement cost and
necessitates criminal investigation. Where the cables that are cut or damaged are either live, or near
to other live sources of electricity, there is serious potential for injury or death.
In 2012 and 2013, legislation was introduced as a result of cross-industry lobbying highlighting the
need for changes to the law regarding scrap metal dealers. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment
of Offenders Act 2012 received Royal Assent on 1 May 2012 prohibiting scrap metal dealers from
paying for scrap metal in cash. The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 received Royal Assent on 28
February 2013; this comprised an update of the 1964 legislation.
Network Rail’s strategy for dealing with cable theft has continued over the past four years. This
includes ‘target hardening’ of hot spot locations to make thefts more difficult to commit and easier
to identify, and funding for additional BTP officers. Network Rail develops relationships with crossindustry stakeholders including the BTP and Highways England as part of the Fusion Intelligence Unit.
Chart 140.
Recorded thefts
$14,000
Price of copper
300
$12,000
250
$10,000
200
$8,000
150
$6,000
100
$4,000
50
$2,000
Price of copper per tonne (USD)
Recorded cable theft incidents
350
Incidents of cable theft and trend in copper price
$0
0
.
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Source: BTP
• Up to around the
Total cable theft delay minutes
middle of 2011/12,
the incidence of cable
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
theft showed a fairly
Delay 293,156 321,610 365,395 344,685 160,172 68,497 37,687
close correlation with
Source: Network Rail
the price of copper.
Since then, although copper prices have stabilised, there has been a decreasing trend in the
recorded incidence of theft, which provides evidence that the national and industry-specific
initiatives are having an effect. The total number of delay minutes for 2014/15 was the lowest
recorded for the period shown.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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153
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
Cable theft by BTP area
As of March 2015, BTP is divided into three divisions which are made up of eight territorial areas,
seven covering mainline rail operations, and one covering London Underground and the Docklands
Light Railway. More than 4,000 police officers, special constables, police community support officers
and police staff provide a specialist policing service across these areas.
Chart 141.
350
Recorded cable theft incidents
300
Incidents of cable theft by BTP mainline areas
BTP Scotland
BTP Western
BTP Wales
BTP Pennine
BTP Midlands
BTP TFL
BTP South
BTP East
250
200
150
100
50
0
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2012/13
2011/12
2013/14
2014/15
Source: BTP
•
All BTP areas have recorded a reduction in incidents in the last financial year, against a
background of stable copper prices.
•
BTP Pennine area and BTP Midlands are the areas recording the highest number of thefts, but
areas differ in their size and operational characteristics, such as length and type of track, as well
as other factors such as population density and demographics. All of these factors are likely to
influence the occurrence of cable theft.
Chart 142.
BTP mainline rail areas
Chart 143.
Cable theft by area (2008/09 –
2014/15)
BTP
Western
4%
BTP
Wales
7%
Source: BTP
BTP
Pennine
40%
BTP
Scotland
6%
BTP East
9%
BTP
South
12%
BTP TFL
4%
BTP
Midlands
18%
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Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
9.5
Key safety statistics: trespass
Trespass
Fatalities
Electric shock
Fall (including from height)
Jump from train in service
Struck by train
Train surfing
Other accidents
Major injuries
Electric shock
Fall (including from height)
Jump from train in service
Struck by train
Train surfing
Other accidents
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Electric shock
Fall (including from height)
Jump from train in service
Struck by train
Train surfing
Other accidents
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
23
40
33
22
22
5
5
5
3
6
3
3
1
2
3
0
1
0
2
0
13
30
26
15
13
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
18
15
28
25
20
0
2
0
6
5
10
7
16
14
9
0
0
1
0
0
7
6
9
4
5
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
31
26
32
21
26
21
17
22
12
19
10
9
10
9
7
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
24.92
41.60
35.93
24.57
24.10
5.02
5.22
5.01
3.61
6.50
4.07
3.77
2.68
3.45
3.99
0.00
1.00
0.12
2.00
0.00
13.72
30.61
26.92
15.41
13.51
1.10
1.00
0.10
0.00
0.10
1.01
0.00
1.10
0.10
0.00
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Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
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Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
10
Suicide
When categorising fatalities, it is important to try to distinguish between suicides and accidental
deaths, because the means of addressing these issues will be different. The criteria that the railway
uses to differentiate between suicides and accidental fatalities are explained in Section 10.1 and
Appendix 4.
Over the past 10 years, there has been an average of 240 suicides per year on the railway, although
that number has been increasing in recent years. Any passengers, members of the public, or
members of the workforce who take their life are included in the analysis in this section.
The National Suicide Prevention Steering Group (NSPSG) is responsible for managing the risk
associated with suicide. The SRM modelled risk in the NSPSG remit consists of 1.2 FWI per year of
accidental risk, primarily shock and trauma to drivers as a result of witnessing suicide. There is also
244.1 FWI per year of non-accidental risk from suicide and attempted suicides.
2014/15 Headlines
•
There were 293 suicide fatalities during 2014/15. There were also 38 major injuries and a smaller
number of lesser injuries sustained by people attempting to take their life. The total level of
harm was 296.9 FWI, compared with 283.5 FWI recorded in 2013/14, which is a 5% increase.
•
In addition to the non-accidental harm resulting from suicide and suicide attempts, 235 members
of the workforce suffered shock or trauma as a result of witnessing or otherwise being involved
in suicide-related events, and one member of the workforce suffered a minor injury. The level of
harm to the workforce from involvement in suicidal events was 1.2 FWI in 2014/15, compared
with 1.5 FWI for 2013/14.
•
By the end of 2014/15, more than 8,000 staff have been trained on the Managing Suicidal
Contacts course, and more than 1,200 have received trauma support training.
•
There were a total of approximately 600,000 delay minutes recorded during 2014/15 as a result
of suicide.
•
The Suicide Prevention and Support on the Railway: Learning Tool went live on 12 December. The
tool provides guidance on how to intervene in a suicide, and support on how to deal with the
trauma associated with them.
Suicide at a glance
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
296.9
2014/15
249.6
2012/13
283.5
252.4
2011/12
212.7
2010/11
245.7
222.5
2008/09
2009/10
209.8
2007/08
228.4
2006/07
Weighted injuries
Fatalities
228.3
Suicide (nonaccidental:
244.1 FWI)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2005/06
Third-party
risk from
suicide
(accidental
risk: 1.2 FWI;
1% )
FWI
Other
accidental risk
(138.4 FWI;
99%)
Trend in suicide harm
2013/14
Risk in context (SRMv8.1)
_________________________________________________________________
157
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
10.1 Classification of fatalities
For the rail industry, determining whether a fatality was accidental or suicide is straightforward
where a coroner’s inquest has been held, and a verdict reaching either of those two conclusions has
been returned. Where the coroner has yet to return a verdict, or returns an open or narrative
verdict, some judgement must be applied.
Most coroners’ reports take around six months to complete, and some verdicts are not returned until
several years after the event. A coroner will then only return a suicide verdict if there is evidence that
shows beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased intended to take his or her own life. If the cause
of death cannot be confirmed to this extent, an open or narrative verdict will be returned. In these
cases, and those where the inquest is still awaited, the industry applies rules known as the
Ovenstone criteria (see Appendix 4) to determine on the balance of probability, whether a fatality
was the result of an accident or suicide. The decision is based on all the information available, which
might include evidence gathered by the local Network Rail manager and/or BTP. This approach
enables the industry to implement timely preventative measures applicable to the appropriate
problems of both suicide and trespass incidents. Fatalities that have been judged by the industry to
have been suicides, but have not been classed as such by the coroner, are referred to as suspected
suicides.
To ensure that statistics are as accurate as possible, the classification of suicide and accidental
fatalities is reviewed and reclassified on an on-going basis. Work is currently taking place to review
previous years’ open/narrative events, in the light of increased information from BTP, as well as the
availability of coroners’ reports.
During 2013/14, a greater amount of information about fatalities related to whether they were
accidental or suicide, was made available by BTP to the industry, through the enhanced co-operation
taking place under the National Suicide Prevention Steering Group. The Suicide Prevention and
Mental Health team within BTP was established and has worked with Network Rail and RSSB to look
at the classification of fatalities. As part of this partnership, BTP have been able to share more
information on railway fatalities, going back as far as 2009/10. This has enabled the industry to
review a number of cases where the Coroners’ verdicts are not yet returned, or are recorded as open
or narrative, and re-assess them against the Ovenstone criteria. An outcome of this increased data
sharing is that there is a discontinuity in the charts in this chapter, and also Chapter 9 Trespass;
classifications up to and including 2008/09 have been based on a reduced amount of information.
This means that trespass figures for years prior to 2009/10 may be overestimates of the true level,
while suicide figures may be underestimates. Caution must therefore be taken in comparing the last
six years with the first four years of the last decade.
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_________________________________________________________________
10.2 Trend in suicide fatalities
Chart 144 presents the trend in harm from suicide and suspected suicide for the past 10 years. The
dark bars represent the number of events with a coroner’s confirmed verdict. The light bars
represent the number of verdicts that were open, narrative, or not yet returned, which are currently
classed as suspected suicide, based on application of the Ovenstone criteria.
The discontinuity resulting from greater information being available from 2009/10 onwards is
reflected in the chart. Later years have greater proportions of unconfirmed categorisations, while
coroners’ inquests or verdicts are still awaited.
Chart 144.
Trend in suicide fatalities and weighted injuries
350
Improved classification of fatalities
Weighted injuries
300
250
Suspected suicide
283.5
Confirmed suicide
228.3
228.4
222.5
Fatlities
209.8
200
252.4
245.7
48
212.7
47
41
36
296.9
249.6
75
134
84
42
46
245
150
100
177
184
196
183
161
175
167
162
144
50
48
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Note: For 2009/10 onwards, the classification of open, narrative and unreturned coroners’ verdicts has based on an improved amount
of information.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Trend in trespass and suicide fatalities
500
Confirmed suicide
Suspected trespass
400
300
267 267 259 264 282
Suspected suicide
Confirmed trespass
231
315
289 278 300
200
100
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
0
2006/07
Chart 145 shows that over the past
decade there has been an
increasing trend in fatalities due to
trespass or suicide, with 2014/15
being the highest recorded for the
period.
Chart 145.
2005/06
•
Given the proportion of cases that
are open, narrative or unreturned,
where judgement needs to be
applied, it is useful to look at the
trend in trespass and suicide
fatalities as a whole.
Fatlities
•
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159
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
10.2.1 Suicide attempts and workforce harm
When a suicide attempt takes place on the railway, the effects are not limited to the person carrying
out the attempt. As well as the emotional effect on any family or friends of the person, people
witnessing the event may well be traumatised.
Chart 146.
Trends in suicide and workforce shock/trauma
450
Non-fatal injuries from attempted suicide
Suicide fatalities
Workforce cases of shock/trauma arising from suicide/attempted suicide
400
Injuries
350
285
300
279
269
250
54
44
225
225
207
219
243
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
271
245
42
52
38
200
150
100
262
295
297
45
51
250
246
2011/12
2012/13
360
352
82
59
278
293
2013/14
2014/15
53
209
50
0
2010/11
•
At 352, the number of suicides and attempted suicides during 2014/15 was a decrease on the
360 occurring last year, but still well above average for the decade as a whole. Around 20% of
suicide attempts do not result in fatality; some people are left to face life with serious and
debilitating injury.
•
Chart 146 also shows the associated trend in the number shock or trauma events experienced by
the workforce in relation to suicide events; Chart 147 presents the information in FWI format.
This has also been increasing, at an apparently greater rate than the number of suicides. One
reason for this is likely to be the greater level of understanding, care and support now in place
for members of the workforce following their involvement in a suicide. Each member of the
workforce will react differently to being involved in a suicide-related event; for all it will be
upsetting, but for some it may result in severe post-traumatic stress and affect their ability to
return to their former role. Chart 148 shows the time lost by the workforce who have had the
traumatic experience of being involved in a suicide incident. Around 50% of people return within
four weeks of the incident, and around 75% have returned within eight weeks.
Chart 147.
Workforce harm caused by suicide-
Chart 148.
Workforce time lost due to suicide
related events
1.6
1.2
1.0
0.9
0.8
1.0
0.8
1.1
1.2
1.3
70
1.2
60
Absences
FWI
1.0
80
1.5
1.4
0.8
0.6
0.4
50
40
30
20
0.2
10
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0.0
0
0
4
8
12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52
Weeks off
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160
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Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
10.2.2 Trends in suicide by location
Chart 149.
Trend in suicide harm by location
151
128
121
115
106
102
2014/2015
91
2013/2014
100
93
2012/2013
95
83
77
80
72
85
100
90
104
111
Level crossings
120
FWI
123
Stations
140
131
Running line
150
Other
160
2013/2014
180
31
25
2012/2013
37
26
25
2011/2012
2007/2008
2010/2011
20
2006/2007
20
23
25
22
2005/2006
40
33
60
Level crossings
•
•
Stations
Network Rail and the Samaritans have
completed the fifth year of their long-term
programme to reduce the number of suicides.
To date, over 8,000 railway staff have attended
a training course on how to manage suicidal
contacts and there have been outreach working
meetings taking place between priority locations
and Samaritans branches across the country.
The success of initiatives taken by the industry
will be partly influenced by what is taking place
on a wider societal basis, and railway suicide
trends need to be considered in the context of
societal suicide trends. This is reviewed in
section 10.4.
Chart 150.
2012/2013
2011/2012
2010/2011
2009/2010
2008/2009
2007/2008
2006/2007
2005/2006
2014/2015
2011/2012
2010/2011
2009/2010
2008/2009
2007/2008
2006/2007
2005/2006
2014/2015
2013/2014
2009/2010
2008/2009
0
Running line and other locations
Map of suicide occurrence
500
0
Note: Colours indicate number of suicides in region over the
past 10 years.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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161
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
10.3 Suicide prevention initiatives
In 2010, Network Rail entered into a contractual, five-year partnership with Samaritans to reduce
suicide on the railways. The partnership involves the roll out of a programme of prevention and
post-incident support initiatives to reduce the impact of suicide. These include multi-agency
partnership working at national and local level, bespoke training of railway industry staff, a national
public awareness poster campaign, a volunteer call-out service providing emotional support to
people in distress at railway locations, post-incident support provided by local Samaritans branches,
and work to encourage responsible media reporting of suicides. Table 22 presents a general overview
of the national and local activities covered by the programme.
By the end of 2014/15, over 8,000 frontline railway personnel had been trained on how to intervene
in suicide attempts and there have been outreach working meetings taking place between priority
locations and Samaritans branches across the country. In addition, around 1,275 personnel have had
Trauma Support Training.
During 2014/15, BTP recorded a total of 848 interventions that had been made in situations judged
as having the potential to result in suicide. This compares against 573 during 2013/14.
Summary of programme activities
AT NATIONAL LEVEL
AT A LOCAL LEVEL
Partnership working
• National suicide prevention steering and
• Local engagement/development of local suicide
working groups
prevention plans
• Development of guidance and policies
• Station audits
• Third party engagement and outreach activities
• Appointment of programme support teams and
leads in key organisations (Samaritans, Network
Rail, TOCs)
• Collation and dissemination of data centrally (by
Network Rail, Samaritans, RSSB and ATOC
Prevention activities
• Design and delivery of public awareness
campaigns and information materials for
stations and rail staff
• Design and delivery of Managing Suicide
Contacts and ESOB (Emotional Support Outside
Branch) training (for local Samaritan branches)
• Coordination of the ESOB service
• Launch of the Suicide Prevention and Support
on the Railway: Learning Tool
• Priority location identification
• Recruitment of station staff to Managing Suicide
Contacts training
• Public awareness (poster) campaign, Samaritans
metal signs and distribution of information for
station and Network Rail personnel
• Physical mitigation measures
• Call-out of Samaritans on identification of a
vulnerable person
Post-event activities
• Development and delivery of Trauma Support
Training for management and unions
• Development of driver fatality guidance
• Development of guidance to prevent copycat
suicides (media guidance, memorials policy)
• Recruitment to Trauma Support Training
• Post-incident visits to stations by Samaritans to
support staff and public who have witnessed or
been involved in fatal and non-fatal incidents
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_________________________________________________________________
10.4 Railway suicides in the wider context
Suicides on the railway represent by far the largest proportion of railway-related fatalities, but they
represent a relatively small percentage of suicides on a national level. National suicide figures are not
available as recently as railway figures, and are published on a calendar year basis; the chart shows
the latest available calendar year comparisons. The national figures used are based on the year when
the death was registered.
Chart 151.
Railway suicide trend in the wider context
400
350
300
5850
5671
Railway suicides
5675
206
204
232
6000
5000
223
4000
4.4%
3.4%
207
225
7000
3.6%
3.8%
3.6%
4.0%
4.5%
4.1%
4.5%
3000
National suicides
196
150
100
5706
5377
244
250
200
5554
8000
All suicides
On railway property
Railway suicides as % of national total
6233
6045
5981
5608
279
267
3.7%
2000
50
1000
0
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Source: SMIS and ONS
Over the period shown in the chart, the number of national suicides has been variable around an
average of 5,770, but the latter years have all been quite notably higher than this. This increased
number of suicides at a national level is in line with the increased number seen on the railway in
recent years.
•
The proportion of the national total occurring on railway property has been 4.0% over the
analysis period; the most recent
Chart 152.
Suicides by age and gender 2004 to
comparable years have shown a slightly
2013
higher proportion, of 4.5%.
•
Chart 152 indicates that the age and gender
demographics of railway suicides vary
somewhat from national suicides.
Compared with the national profile, a
greater proportion of railway suicides are
male; this is particularly the case in the 1544 years age group. In contrast, a smaller
proportion of railway suicides are female.
The 75+ years age group is underrepresented for both genders.
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
15-44
yrs
45-74 75+ yrs 15-44
yrs
yrs
Male
1%
2%
10%
10%
9%
9%
36%
2%
5%
33%
% of railway suicides within age group
% of all suicides within age group
45%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
37%
Railway suicides
•
45-74 75+ yrs
yrs
Female
_________________________________________________________________
163
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
10.5 Key safety statistics: suicide
Suicide
Fatalities
Struck by train
Other
Major injuries
Struck by train
Other
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Struck by train
Other
Injuries to others
Majors
Minors
Shock and trauma
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
209
250
246
278
293
199
238
234
268
288
10
12
12
10
5
36
23
35
54
38
26
17
24
39
24
10
6
11
15
14
15
20
16
23
19
13
15
13
19
15
2
5
3
4
4
0
1
0
3
1
0
1
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
212.67
252.39
249.57
283.51
296.88
201.66
239.75
236.46
271.97
290.43
11.01
12.63
13.11
11.55
6.45
229
236
251
291
236
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
228
235
251
291
235
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Yards, depots and sidings
_________________________________________________________________
11
Yards, depots and sidings
Railway companies are required to manage risk and carry out risk assessments on areas away
from the mainline operational railway, such as yards, depots and sidings (YDS).
Fatal injuries in YDS have been reported into SMIS on a long-standing basis. While there is no
mandatory requirement to report non-fatal injuries, the collection of data to support safety
analysis of YDS sites has been carried out on a voluntary basis, through agreement of the
industry; this was formalised as an appendix to a railway group standard (GE/RT8047 Standard
for Safety Information Reporting) in April 2010.
We now have sufficient data to incorporate YDS into the scope of reporting of safety
performance and risk estimation on an on-going basis, which we have done in the current
report.
2014/15 Headlines
•
There was one workforce fatality, when a train cleaner was electrocuted.
•
When non-fatal injuries are taken into account, the overall recorded harm to the
workforce was 8.1 FWI in 2014/15, compared with 6.9 FWI in 2013/14.
•
There were no passenger or public fatalities in YDS sites in 2014/15, but a small number
of lesser injuries. The majority were visitors to site, suffering slips, trips and falls. Of the
remainder, two were over-carried passengers and one was a person trespassing, who
was injured after coming into contact with an OLE. The total level of harm to passengers
and public was 0.3, compared with 0.001 (one minor injury) recorded for 2013/14.
•
An off-duty member of staff died from a suspected suicide. This fatality is not covered in
this chapter, which looks only at accidental risk, but is included in Chapter 10 Suicide.
YDS risk at a glance
Risk in context (SRMv8.1)
Trend in YDS workforce harm
12
Weighted injuries
Fatalities
10
6.6
2013/14
6.0
6.9
2012/13
6.3
6.9
2011/12
6.3
8.1
2010/11
6
7.2
2009/10
Risk in yards,
depots and
sidings
(7.6 FWI; 5%)
8
FWI
Other
accidental risk
(132.0 FWI;
95%)
4
2
2014/15
2008/09
2007/08
0
_________________________________________________________________
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
165
Yards, depots and sidings
_________________________________________________________________
11.1 YDS risk profile by accident category
The provision of this data has allowed RSSB to develop an extension to the SRM to cover YDS
sites. This was first published as version 7.2 of the Safety Risk Model (SRM) and is now fully
incorporated into the SRM from SRMv8 onwards. The project has achieved a detailed analysis of
the nature of risk on YDS sites. Based on the data collected, the modelled risk in YDS to
workforce is estimated to be 7.3 FWI per year. When the small amount of risk to other person
types (ie passengers and public) is taken into account, the total modelled YDS risk based on the
participating companies is estimated to be 7.6 FWI per year (these figures are from SRMv8.1 and
exclude direct suicide risk).
Chart 153.
SRM modelled risk in YDS (Workforce: 7.3 FWI; Passengers and public: 0.3 FWI)
Slips, trips and falls
3.48
Contact with object
1.51
Workforce
Boarding/alighting trains
0.68
Manual handling/awkward movement
0.44
Electric shock
0.10
Falls from height
0.08
Struck/crushed by train
0.07
Train accidents
0.13
Passengers and
public
Other accidents
0.78
Trespass
0.25
Train accidents
0.04
Other accidents
0.05
0.0
0.5
Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
3.5
4.0
Source: SRMv8.1
•
Slips, trips and falls are the largest single contributor to workforce risk in YDS locations,
followed by contact with objects, injuries while getting on or off trains, and injuries due to
incorrect manual handling or awkward movement.
•
Injuries from electric shock or being struck by train are rare, but carry the potential for
fatality.
•
For the workforce, the group Other accidents includes exposure to fire or hazardous
substances, machinery and tool operation, and accidents involving non-rail vehicles.
•
For members of the public and passengers, the greatest risk arises from trespass of YDS
locations. Injuries from this cause are covered in Chapter 9 Trespass.
•
Train accidents in YDS account for around 0.2 FWI and mostly refers to the risk from train
fires and explosions.
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_________________________________________________________________
11.2 Fatalities and injuries in YDS in 2014/15
11.2.1 Workforce fatalities and injuries
The majority of injuries recorded on YDS sites are those suffered by members of the workforce.
Fatalities
There was one workforce fatality during 2014/15:
•
On 24 May 2014, a train cleaner, working in St Leonards West Marina depot, was
electrocuted after coming into contact with the live rail after an apparent fall.
Non-fatal injuries
In 2014/15, there were:
•
Fifty major injuries
•
1,354 minor injuries, 176 (13%) of which were Class 1
•
One reported case of shock/trauma.
11.2.2 Injuries to passengers and members of the public
Injuries to passengers and members of the public also occur in YDS sites, albeit with a much
lower frequency.
There were no passenger or public fatalities in YDS in 2014/15.
There were:
•
Three major injuries. One was to a young girl who was engaged in trespass, and two were to
visitors to YDS sites.
•
Five Class 2 minor injuries. Four were visitors to sites and one was a passenger who was
over-carried on a train.
•
One case of shock/trauma, to an over-carried passenger.
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Yards, depots and sidings
_________________________________________________________________
11.3 Trend in workforce harm in yards, depots and sidings
Workforce fatalities in YDS have been reported for some years, but non-fatal injuries have only
recently been reported consistently.
Chart 154.
Trend in workforce harm in YDS
10
9
Shock and trauma
Only fatalities
required to be
reported
Minor injuries
Major injuries
8
7.2
7
6.3
FWI
6.3
2.1
6
2.1
5
8.1
Fatalities
2.1
6.6
6.9
6.9
2.1
2.0
2.1
6.0
2.2
2.2
4
5.0
3
5.1
4.2
2
4.2
3.7
4.9
4.8
4.4
1.0
1
1
1
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
•
The increase in workforce YDS harm for 2014/15 was driven mostly by the occurrence of the
single fatality, although there were small increases in the major and minor categories of
injury also.
•
There has been a gradually increasing trend since 2008/09, but it is possible that improved
reporting is partly the reason for this.
•
Since 2007/08, workforce harm in YDS has
comprised around 22% of the total harm to
the workforce. The proportion for 2014/15
was slightly higher, at 26%.
Chart 155.
Proportion of workforce harm
occurring in YDS
Mainline
100%
YDS
74%
79%
77%
79%
80%
80%
78%
60%
81%
80%
22%
20%
20%
21%
23%
21%
26%
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
0%
19%
20%
2007/08
40%
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_________________________________________________________________
Major injuries
Chart 156.
Trend in major injuries by accident type
70
Electric shock
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Manual handling/awkward movement
Contact with object or person
Platform-train interface
60
51
Major injuries
8
42
44
42
3
40
11
9
9
9
30
5
9
7
37
50
49
48
50
7
32
23
20
21
26
10
0
2007/08
30
33
6
5
4
4
3
4
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
27
30
3
3
5
6
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
6
2011/12
•
The number of major injuries has been essentially stable for the past three years.
•
The majority of major injuries are due to slips, trips and falls, with contact with objects
forming the next largest category.
Minor injuries
Chart 157.
Trend in minor injuries by accident type
1400
1282 1285
Manual handling/awkward movement
1200
1207
1266
1178
Electric shock
1086
Contact with object or person
1000
Minor injuries
1241 1264
Slips, trips and falls
Platform-train interface
800
Other injury
600
Train accidents
190
175
175
176
2013/14
2014/15
2009/10
196
2012/13
163
2011/12
162
2010/11
165
2008/09
200
2007/08
400
Class 1
•
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
0
Class 2
The number of Class 1 minor injuries has been essentially stable for the last three years;
there has been more variability in the Class 2 minor injuries. The current year shows an
increase on 2013/14, but is still the second lowest total over the period shown.
_________________________________________________________________
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169
Yards, depots and sidings
_________________________________________________________________
Workforce harm in YDS by worker type
Chart 158.
4.0
FWI
3.0
Trend in harm by worker type
3.5
2.7
2.5
1.8
2.0
2.2 2.0
2.3 2.3
2.4 2.2
2.3
1.5
1.5
1.5
2.3
1.8
1.8
1.7
1.3 1.4 1.4
1.1
1.0
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
1.0
0.7
1.7
1.7
0.7
0.9 0.9
1.1
0.9
1.2
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
0.0
Other
Engineering staff
Infrastructure worker
Drivers / Shunters
•
Engineering staff have shown the highest proportion of injuries over the period as a whole,
although in recent years the level has been very similar to that for infrastructure workers.
Differences in hours worked in YDS will also be a factor in the number of injuries occurring.
•
The injury profile for engineering staff has the greatest proportion of minor injuries (38%)
and the profile for infrastructure workers has the least proportion (23%). This may be due to
differences in activities, or may also indicate differences in reporting.
Workforce harm in YDS by industry sector
Trend in harm by company type
6.0
4.8
5.0
Shock and trauma
4.5
TOC
Minor injuries
Major injuries
3.7
Fatalities
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7
2011/12
2009/10
2007/08
0.6 0.5
0.4
2008/09
1
0.1
2014/15
2.4
2013/14
2.6
2012/13
2.5
2011/12
2.8
2010/11
2.5
2009/10
2.8
2008/09
3.1
2.1
2014/15
2007/08
2.0
2013/14
1.5
2012/13
NR/Other
4.0 3.9
2.4
2.5
4.3
2.8
1.3
1.3
2007/08
0.0
1.8
2.1
2011/12
1.4
2009/10
1.7
1.8
1.0
1.4
2008/09
2.0
2.1
2010/11 0.8
3.0
1.1
FWI
4.0
4.1
4.6
2010/11
Chart 159.
FOC
•
Passenger train operating companies have shown the greatest proportion of harm over the
period shown. The freight sector has recorded comparatively low levels of harm, but this is
reflective of lower levels of reporting within the freight community, rather than lower levels
of risk.
•
Network Rail shows increasing levels of reported harm over the past five years, driven by
the occurrence of major injuries, which have increased year-on-year over the same period.
_________________________________________________________________
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Yards, depots and sidings
_________________________________________________________________
11.4 Key safety statistics: yards, depots and sidings
Yards, depots and sidings (Workforce)
Fatalities
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Train accidents
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Major injuries
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Train accidents
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Train accidents
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Yards, depots and sidings (Other)
Fatalities
Public
Passenger
Major injuries
Public
Passenger
Minor injuries
Public
Passenger
Incidents of shock
Public
Passenger
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Public
Passenger
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
37
0
2
0
3
7
21
4
1460
196
1264
11
1
10
5.96
0.01
0.54
0.01
0.42
1.51
2.86
0.61
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
44
0
0
0
2
7
33
2
1397
190
1207
6
3
3
6.58
0.02
0.27
0.02
0.38
1.40
4.02
0.48
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
48
0
0
0
6
9
30
3
1441
175
1266
7
0
7
6.95
0.02
0.35
0.00
0.77
1.54
3.70
0.57
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
49
0
5
0
3
9
27
5
1261
175
1086
7
1
6
6.87
0.02
0.75
0.01
0.48
1.59
3.30
0.74
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
50
0
2
0
1
11
30
6
1354
176
1178
1
0
1
8.06
1.01
0.52
0.00
0.26
1.79
3.67
0.81
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0.01
0.01
0.00
0
0
0
1
1
0
3
2
1
0
0
0
0.11
0.10
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
1
0
1
0.01
0.01
0.00
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0
0
3
3
0
5
4
1
1
0
1
0.31
0.30
0.00
_________________________________________________________________
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
171
Yards, depots and sidings
_________________________________________________________________
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172
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
12
Freight operations
Over the past 10 years, freight operations have contributed around 9% of the total train miles
on the network. In 2014/15, there were 47 million freight train miles, and in excess of 22 billion
freight tonne km was moved. There are currently six freight operators in Great Britain. They are
DB Schenker, Freightliner, Direct Rail Services, GB Railfreight, Colas, and Devon and Cornwall
Railways.
A good proportion of freight operations take place in YDS, and although some freight companies
have started using SMIS to record incidents of workforce injury in these sites, there is no
mandatory requirement to do so and some under-reporting appears likely.
2014/15 Headlines
•
This chapter includes events in SMIS, where the train operator, responsible organisation, or
event owner is identified as a freight company. It is important to note that this does not
necessarily imply that the cause of the event rests with the companies identified in this way.
•
In total during 2014/15, there were no workforce fatalities, 11 workforce major injuries, 194
workforce minor injuries and four cases of shock/trauma reported. The total level of
workforce harm in connection with freight operations was 1.6 FWI, compared with 1.0 FWI
for 2013/14.
•
Looking at passengers and public, there were two fatalities, 15 major injuries, 199 minor
injuries and six cases of shock/trauma reported. The total level of passenger/public harm in
connection with freight operations was 2.2 FWI, compared with 7.2 FWI (seven fatalities) for
2013/14.
•
During 2014/15, there were 15 PHRTAs involving freight trains, compared with 12 for
2013/14. The number of freight PHRTAs is high in comparison to the proportion of freight
train miles, and freight PHRTAs are dominated by derailments. A cross-industry working
group has been established to work towards a better understanding of freight derailment
risk.
Freight operations at a glance
Trends in freight-related harm
9.6
12
2
7.2
7.0
Weighted Injuries
2.2
2.3
2.6
4.1
1.3
1.0
4
3.0
6
Fatalities
0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Other
accidental
harm,
95%
FWI
8
Average harm
arising in
connection
with freight
operations,
5%
3.1
6.6
10
0.7
0.9
0.8
0.6
1.2
1.3
1.0
1.6
Harm in context (SMIS)
Passenger & Public
Workforce
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
173
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
12.1 Freight harm profile by accident category
Due to the current structure of the SRM, it is not possible to extract a risk profile applicable to
freight operations alone. In the absence of an SRM-based risk profile for freight operations, we
present an analysis of the harm arising from freight operations.
The breakdown of harm to workforce in connection with freight operations is shown in Chart
160 and that for passengers and the public is shown in Chart 161. Both charts have been based
on data for the past 10 years. The purpose of the chart is give some context about how the harm
from different sources differs in magnitude. The types of events that are included in each
category of these two charts are described in Appendix 7.
Chart 160.
Average workforce harm per year in connection with freight operations 2005/06 to
2014/15
Struck/crushed by train
0.10
0.01 0.11
Electric shock
0.10
0.10
Platform edge incidents
0.07
0.05
Train accidents
0.02
0.01 0.03
Slips, trips and falls
0.02
0.03
Manual handling/awkward movement
0.02
0.02
On-board injuries
0.02
0.02
Contact with object
0.01
Other accidents
0.01
Major injuries
0.01
Minor injuries
Shock and trauma
0.05
0.04
0.00
Chart 161.
Fatalities
0.06
FWI
0.03
0.09
0.12
Average passenger and public harm per year in connection with freight operations
2005/06 to 2014/15
Trespass
Platform edge incidents
0.5
0.5
Struck/crushed by train
0.3
Train accidents
Other accidents
3.6
3.4
0.3
Fatalities
0.1
Major injuries
Minor injuries
<0.1
0.0
Shock and trauma
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
FWI
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
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Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
12.2 Trend in harm to the workforce
This section provides some analysis of the incidents involving the workforce recorded in SMIS
over the last 10 years.
Chart 162 includes all injuries recorded in SMIS, where the train operator, responsible
organisation or event owner is identified as a freight company. It is important to note that this
does not necessarily imply that the cause of the accident rests with the companies identified in
this way.
Chart 162.
Trend in harm to the workforce associated with freight operations
3.0
2.5
2.0
Shock and trauma
2.6
Minor injuries
0.1
Major injuries
Fatalities
2.3
0.5
0.1
0.2
FWI
1.6
1.5
1.2
1.0
2
0.9
2
0.7
0.1
0.2
0.8
0.3
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.3
1.3
0.3
1.0
0.3
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.9
1.0
2011/12
2012/13
1.2
0.7
0.5
0.2
0.0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2013/14
2014/15
Note: The chart includes all injuries where the train operator, responsible organisation or event owner is identified in SMIS as a
freight company
•
In total during 2014/15, there were no fatalities, 11 major injuries, 194 minor injuries and 4
cases of shock/trauma reported. The total level of harm during the year was 1.6 FWI.
•
Workforce fatalities are relatively rare, and the injury profile is typically dominated by major
injuries. There were four fatalities during the analysis period:
o
On 13 April 2005, a freight train driver was struck by a passing passenger service
whilst changing ends of this train.
o
On 11 June 2005, a hand signaller strayed onto the running line and was struck
by a freight train.
o
On 17 July 2006, a shunter was fatally injured while ‘calling back’ a loco onto a
rake of wagons in a siding.
o
On 29 July 2006, a freight train driver was electrocuted whilst investigating a
smoking wagon of his train.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
175
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
12.3 Trend in harm to the passengers and public
This section provides some analysis of the incidents involving passengers or public recorded in
SMIS over the last 10 years.
Chart 163 includes all injuries recorded in SMIS, where the train operator, responsible
organisation or event owner is identified as a freight company. It is important to note that this
does not necessarily imply that the cause of the accident rests with the companies identified in
this way.
Chart 163.
Trend in harm to passengers or public associated with freight operations
12
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
9.6
10
Fatalities
8
6.6
FWI
7.2
7.0
6
3.1
3.0
2
4.1
9
4
6
1.3
0
2006/07
7
2.2
3
2005/06
7
2007/08
1.0
1
1
2008/09
2009/10
4
3
2010/11
2
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Note: The chart includes all injuries where the train operator, responsible organisation or event owner is identified in SMIS as a
freight company
•
In total during 2014/15, there were two fatalities, 15 major injuries, 199 minor injuries and
six cases of shock/trauma reported. The total level of passenger/public harm during the year
was 2.2 FWI. Both of the fatalities were incidents of trespass, one in a station and one on
the running line.
•
The passenger and public injury profile is dominated by fatalities. There were 43 fatalities
during the analysis period, comprising:
o
34 incidents of trespass: 9 in stations and 25 on the running line
o
Five fatalities at the platform edge who were struck by trains after falling from,
or standing too close to, the platform edge: four passengers and one member of
the public.
o
Four fatalities at level crossings: three were pedestrian users, and one was a
road vehicle user.
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Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
12.4 Trend in train accidents involving freight trains
Chapter 7 Train operations covers the risk from all types of train accident and gives an update on
safety performance of train accidents in the last 10 years. This section looks at train accident
safety performance in the freight sector. A detailed list of freight train PHRTAs occurring in
2014/15 can be found in Chapter 7 Train operations.
12.4.1 Potentially higher-risk train accidents
Chart 164.
Trend in the number of PHRTAs, broken down by train type
Trains striking road vehicles at level crossings
Trains struck by large falling objects
Buffer stop collisions
Collisions with road vehicles not at level crossings (without derailment)
Derailments (excluding collisions with road vehicles on level crossings)
Collisions between trains (excluding roll backs)
50
20
23
25
32
24
12
2013/14
10
11
2
8
2012/13
12
10
10
15
16
18
13
20
26
30
20
PHRTAs
32
37
40
Freight
•
•
During 2014/15, there were 15 PHRTAs involving
freight trains. This is higher than the ten-year
average of 12.1.
Of the 15 freight train PHRTAS, 14 were
derailments and there was one collision with a
road vehicle at a level crossing. The number of
derailments in 2014/15 is the highest recorded
since 2007/08. Derailments dominate the freight
train PHRTA profile.
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
Passenger trains and other trains
Chart 165.
Freight expressed as a
proportion of PHRTAs
Freight
33%
Non-freight
67%
•
At 33%, the percentage of freight train PHRTAs
over the past 10 years has been disproportionately
high when compared with the percentage of train
miles (9%).
•
The freight PHRTA profile is dominated by derailments. A cross-industry working group has
been established to focus on this area, and over the next year will work towards a better
understanding of how the precursors to freight derailment influence each other to increase
risk, and what further measures could be taken to address the risk.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
177
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
12.4.2 Other train accidents
The chart below shows the number of non-PHRTA train accidents involving freight trains.
Chart 166.
Trend in the number of non-PHRTAs, broken down by train type
Striking level crossing gate or barrier
Striking other object
Train fire
Open door collision
Struck by missile
Striking animal
Roll back collision
580
573
619
476
470
40
19
20
600
400
31
32
40
36
40
495
60
588
651
666
800
59
690
86
80
Non-PHRTAs (Other trains)
Non-PRHTAs (Freight trains)
89
1000
87
100
200
Freight
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
0
2005/06
0
Passenger trains and other trains
•
During 2014/15, there were 19 non-PHRTAs involving freight trains. This is the lowest level
seen over the period shown.
•
There has been a marked reduction in the
number of freight non-PHRTAs over the period
shown, due solely to a fall in the recorded
number of incidents of trains being struck by
missiles. A similar (but smaller) reduction in this
category of train accident is also observed for
other types of train (mostly passenger).
•
At 8%, the percentage of freight train nonPHRTAs over the past 10 years has been
proportionate to the percentage of train miles
(9%).
Chart 167.
Freight expressed as a
proportion of non-PHRTAs
Freight
8%
Non-freight
92%
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
12.4.3 Trend in freight SPADs
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from non-passenger train SPADs is 0.33 FWI per year 32.
Chart 168.
Trend in the number of SPADs, broken down by train type
300
3.0
249
250
258
270
230
239
218
2.0
188
150
100
2.5
1.5
79
74
1.0
79
62
54
50
57
56
60
64
72
SPADs per million train km
200
SPADs
223 227
220
0.5
0.0
Freight trains
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
2014/15
2013/14
2012/13
2011/12
2010/11
2009/10
2008/09
2007/08
2006/07
2005/06
0
Passenger trains and other trains
•
In 2014/15, there were 299 SPADs in total, 72 of which involved freight trains. Of the 72
freight SPADs, none were risk-ranked ‘potentially severe’ (ie 20 or higher) but 14 were riskranked ‘potentially significant’ (ie between 16 and 19).
•
When normalised by the number of train miles, the rate of freight SPADs is consistently
higher than for passenger and other trains combined. In recent years, the normalised trend
in freight SPADs has been increasing for freight, but this needs to be seen in the context of
greater volatility, due to the smaller number of events that occur.
32 The figure is calculated from SRMv8.1 and this modelling includes the potential consequences of a SPAD involving a non-passenger
train; for example, a potential collision involving a passenger train and a freight train. It is not possible to disaggregate freight only
SPAD risk due to the current definition of precursors.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
179
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
12.4.4 Dangerous goods incidents
The consequences of a train accident are potentially more severe if dangerous goods are
involved. In 2014/15, none of the dangerous goods events were PHRTAs and no dangerous
goods incidents were reportable under RID (the Regulations Concerning the International
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail, part of the Convention Concerning International Carriage
by Rail - COTIF). In recent years, there have been significant dangerous goods accidents outside
Great Britain; some of these are discussed in the 2014/15 Learning from Operational Experience
Annual Report.
The industry prioritises and addresses issues arising from trains conveying dangerous goods by
identifying incidents (ie those events where personal injury, material damage, or loss of
dangerous goods occurs) and irregularities (ie those events where, typically, a procedural error
such as incorrect documentation occurs). Incidents account for around one-fifth of reported
events, and irregularities for the remaining four-fifths. A hazard ranking system is used to reflect
criteria including the type of goods carried, the nature of the event and the location. Hazard
Rank 1 is used for the least serious events, and Hazard Rank 5 is used for the most serious. Over
the past 10 years, incidents and irregularities of all hazard rankings have generally been
declining.
Chart 169.
Incidents and irregularities involving trains conveying dangerous goods
70
60
53
7
44
43
3
40
9
11
10
1
80
15
60
21
46
32
32
100
40
9
30
20
44
120
29
29
7
14
22
3
40
17
7
13
2
3
11
2
10
8
9
19
0
20
0
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
•
There were no incidents ranked 3+ in 2014/15. There were two incidents of this ranking in
2013/14. A single incident of ranking 4 was recorded over the last 10 years, in 2008/09, and
there were no incidents with a ranking of 5.
•
A common type of Hazard Rank 2 event is dragging brakes, caused by either a technical
defect or human error, such as a handbrake left on. The heat from dragging brakes is
frequently detected by hot axle box detectors (HABD). These are track-mounted systems
intended to identify excessive heat generated in axle bearings (indicative of the potential for
an imminent axle failure in running, which could lead to a derailment) rather than the lowerrisk situation of a dragging brake.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Irregularities
Incidents
50
140
Incident hazard ranking 5
Incident hazard ranking 4
Incident hazard ranking 3
Incident hazard ranking 2
Incident hazard ranking 1
Total Irregularities
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
12.5 Key safety statistics: freight operations
Freight injuries
Fatalities
Electric shock
Train accidents
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Major injuries
Electric shock
Train accidents
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Electric shock
Train accidents
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
3
7
4
7
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
7
2
6
2
3
9
11
9
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
2
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
5
5
5
7
0
1
3
3
6
249
193
195
177
198
42
23
27
32
34
207
170
168
145
164
6
10
11
11
6
2
5
7
6
3
4
5
4
5
3
3.73
8.22
5.44
8.24
3.75
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
1.03
0.01
0.01
1.01
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.24
0.25
1.14
1.05
0.03
0.18
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.18
0.18
0.60
0.61
0.61
0.85
2.13
7.18
2.39
6.38
2.68
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
181
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
Freight train accidents
Total freight train accidents
PHRTAs
Collisions between trains
Derailments
Collisions with RV not at LC
Collisions with RV at LC (not derailed)
Collisions with RV at LC (derailed)
Striking buffer stops
Struck by large falling object
Non-PHRTAs
Open door collisions
Roll back collisions
Striking animals
Struck by missiles
Train fires
Striking level crossing gates/barriers
Striking other objects
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
34
44
51
43
34
2
8
11
12
15
0
0
0
1
0
2
8
7
8
14
0
0
3
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
32
36
40
31
19
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
8
12
11
10
10
6
7
5
2
1
6
5
5
3
1
1
1
0
0
0
10
11
18
16
7
_________________________________________________________________
182
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 1.
Key safety statistics
Safety overview
Safety Overview
Fatalities
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Major injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Minor injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Incidents of shock
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Harm from suicides and attempted
suicides
Suicides
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
39
53
48
37
39
7
5
3
4
3
1
1
2
3
3
31
47
43
30
33
445
471
517
498
521
250
258
313
276
296
159
172
162
177
175
36
41
42
45
50
12625
12965
12761
12719
13137
5600
5954
6379
6353
6842
6837
6824
6202
6203
6116
188
187
180
163
179
1396
1511
1217
1262
1074
226
262
238
236
253
1166
1246
973
1024
818
4
3
6
2
3
107.20
125.10
124.02
111.14
114.53
42.85
42.54
46.55
43.76
44.70
29.24
30.97
29.78
32.44
31.41
35.11
51.59
47.70
34.95
38.42
212.67
252.39
249.57
283.52
296.89
209
250
246
278
293
_________________________________________________________________
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
183
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
Passengers and public on trains and in
stations
Fatalities
On-board injuries
Assault and abuse
Platform-train interface
Slips, trips and falls
Other accidents
Major injuries
On-board injuries
Assault and abuse
Platform-train interface
Slips, trips and falls
Other accidents
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
On-board injuries
Assault and abuse
Platform-train interface
Slips, trips and falls
Other accidents
Passenger kms (billions)
Passenger journeys (millions)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Passenger and public assaults on
trains and in stations (BTP data)
Total
Actual bodily harm
Common assault
GBH and more serious cases of
violence
Other violence
Racially aggravated harassment
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
9
0
1
6
2
0
256
24
15
46
163
8
5705
1280
4425
223
1
222
45.65
3.61
3.01
12.93
24.46
1.64
54.48
1355.56
8
0
0
5
3
0
272
20
15
48
182
7
6058
1413
4645
255
0
255
47.17
3.32
1.99
12.29
27.99
1.58
57.11
1461.51
4
0
2
1
1
0
321
26
12
65
210
8
6473
1439
5034
235
0
235
48.56
3.99
3.61
9.83
29.49
1.64
58.23
1502.63
4
0
0
4
0
0
287
28
6
53
193
7
6421
1418
5003
230
1
229
45.03
4.14
1.07
11.73
26.53
1.55
60.18
1588.32
4
0
1
2
1
0
316
35
12
51
198
20
6936
1271
5665
245
0
245
47.87
4.95
2.60
9.28
28.06
2.98
62.97
1656.73
2368
803
1053
2468
816
1175
2473
752
1230
2615
749
1274
2888
728
1459
84
72
65
79
99
37
391
29
376
32
394
22
491
22
580
_________________________________________________________________
184
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
People on trains and in stations: workforce
Workforce on trains and in stations
Fatalities
Major injuries
Electric shock
Falls from height
Assault and abuse
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
On-board injuries
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Electric shock
Falls from height
Assault and abuse
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
On-board injuries
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
0
0
0
0
38
57
41
43
37
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
3
8
4
4
6
0
0
0
0
0
6
18
8
6
10
9
9
8
6
8
8
10
4
6
2
9
10
16
17
9
1
2
1
1
0
3860
3798
3165
3133
3083
419
407
361
303
301
3441
3391
2804
2830
2782
802
855
617
621
506
10
7
10
7
2
792
848
607
614
504
10.18
12.01
9.37
9.29
8.50
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.31
0.21
1.73
2.27
1.47
1.44
1.61
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
1.19
2.37
1.37
1.11
1.43
3.15
3.05
2.51
2.24
2.42
1.47
1.72
0.91
1.16
0.79
1.50
1.52
2.23
2.17
1.39
0.93
1.07
0.86
0.86
0.67
_________________________________________________________________
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
185
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Working on or about the running line
Infrastructure work on or about the
running line
Fatalities
Slips, trips and falls
Contact with object
Struck by train
Machinery/tool operation
Falls from height
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Other accidents
Major injuries
Slips, trips and falls
Contact with object
Struck by train
Machinery/tool operation
Falls from height
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Other accidents
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Slips, trips and falls
Contact with object
Struck by train
Machinery/tool operation
Falls from height
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Other accidents
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
65
29
19
3
4
5
1
1
2
1167
102
1065
4
0
4
9.08
3.48
2.39
0.31
0.57
1.50
0.13
0.33
0.27
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
61
35
12
1
6
1
1
1
4
1294
174
1120
6
2
4
8.10
4.16
1.78
0.10
0.83
0.12
0.12
0.47
0.54
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
63
32
15
3
7
2
0
0
4
1270
169
1101
6
3
3
9.26
3.98
2.01
1.30
0.87
0.21
0.01
0.33
0.56
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
74
42
14
0
9
2
1
1
4
1519
215
1304
7
1
6
10.79
5.08
2.16
1.00
1.12
0.20
0.14
0.43
0.56
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
76
35
22
1
4
3
6
3
2
1359
167
1192
7
6
1
9.66
4.24
2.82
0.10
0.61
0.30
0.65
0.61
0.32
_________________________________________________________________
186
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving
Road driving
Fatalities
Network Rail
Contractors
FOC
TOC
Unknown
Major injuries
Network Rail
Contractors
FOC
TOC
Unknown
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Network Rail
Contractors
FOC
TOC
Unknown
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
1
1
2
2
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
2
1
5
4
4
1
1
2
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
69
67
74
97
104
18
23
15
30
24
51
44
59
67
80
9
7
6
11
10
9
7
6
11
10
0
0
0
0
0
0.59
1.39
1.26
2.77
2.65
0.50
1.21
1.23
0.40
1.26
0.00
0.00
0.01
2.22
1.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.10
0.06
0.16
0.01
0.14
0.04
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.23
_________________________________________________________________
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
187
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations: train accidents
Train accidents
Fatalities
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Major injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Minor injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Incidents of shock
Passenger
Workforce
Public
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Passenger
Workforce
Public
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
1
6
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
6
2
2
11
5
1
2
0
6
1
0
1
0
3
1
0
1
0
2
3
1
0
0
51
55
52
76
23
23
19
19
52
7
28
31
31
22
15
0
5
2
2
1
36
44
39
39
20
3
5
3
5
1
33
39
34
34
19
0
0
2
0
0
1.41
1.85
6.40
2.56
2.14
0.71
0.16
0.05
0.23
0.02
0.51
0.37
0.23
0.32
0.11
0.20
1.32
6.12
2.01
2.01
_________________________________________________________________
188
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Train accidents 33
Total train accidents
PHRTAs
Involving passenger trains
Collisions between trains
Derailments
Collisions with RVs not at LC
Collisions with RVs at LC (not derailed)
Collisions with RVs at LC (derailed)
Striking buffer stops
Struck by large falling object
2010/11
520
18
14
2011/12
545
33
18
2012/13
693
34
20
2013/14
636
32
17
2014/15
624
25
7
1
5
0
4
1
2
1
5
0
2
7
2
2
0
4
7
2
7
0
0
0
5
0
1
8
0
3
0
2
0
0
5
0
0
0
Not involving passenger trains
4
15
14
15
18
Collisions between trains
Derailments
Collisions with RVs not at LC
Collisions with RVs at LC (not derailed)
Collisions with RVs at LC (derailed)
Striking buffer stops
Struck by large falling object
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
13
0
0
0
1
0
1
9
1
3
0
0
0
1
11
0
2
0
1
0
0
16
0
2
0
0
0
Non-PHRTAs
Involving passenger trains
502
440
512
432
659
561
604
524
599
544
Open door collisions
Roll back collisions
Striking animals
Struck by missiles
Train fires
Striking level crossing gates/barriers
Striking other objects
0
6
168
90
53
7
116
0
1
169
57
43
2
160
0
4
324
66
40
1
126
0
0
268
52
31
5
168
1
1
304
52
32
3
151
Open door collisions
Roll back collisions
Striking animals
Struck by missiles
Train fires
Striking level crossing gates/barriers
Striking other objects
0
2
19
8
9
1
23
0
0
21
10
8
2
39
0
0
22
6
11
1
58
0
0
26
3
5
0
46
0
0
21
2
3
1
28
Not involving passenger trains
62
80
98
80
55
33 The category collisions with road vehicles (not at LC) excludes accidents that result in a derailment; these incidents are included in
the derailments category. Similarly the derailments category excludes derailments resulting from collisions between trains, collisions
with road vehicles at level crossings and trains struck by large falling objects.
_________________________________________________________________
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
189
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
PIM precursors
Track
Broken fishplates
Broken rails
Buckled rails
Gauge faults
S&C faults
Twist and geometry faults
Structures
Culvert failures
Overline bridge failures
Rail bridge failures
Retaining wall failures
Tunnel failures
Bridge strikes
Earthworks
Embankment failures
Cutting failures
Signalling
Signalling failures
SPAD and adhesion
SPAD
Adhesion
Infrastructure operations
Operating incidents - affecting level crossing
Operating incidents - objects foul of the line
Operating incidents - routing
Operating incidents - signaller errors other than
routing
Operating Incidents - track issues
Level crossings
LC failures (active automatic)
LC failures (passive)
LC incidents due to weather (active automatic)
LC incidents due to weather (active manual)
LC incidents due to weather (passive)
Public behaviour (active automatic)
Public behaviour (active manual)
Public behaviour (passive)
Objects on the line
Animals on the line
Non-passenger trains running into trees
Passenger trains running into trees
Non rail vehicles on the line
Non-passenger trains running into other
obstructions
Passenger trains running into other obstructions
Non-passenger trains striking objects due to
vandalism
Passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism
Flooding
Train operations and failures
Rolling stock failures (brake/control)
Runaway trains
Train speeding (any approaching bufferstops)
Train speeding (non-passenger)
Train speeding (passenger)
Displaced or insecure loads
Non-passenger rolling stock defects (other than
brake/control)
Passenger rolling stock defects (other than
brake/control)
2010/11
1309
402
199
41
2
646
19
1632
4
9
12
2
9
1596
49
10
39
10115
10115
502
296
206
2718
83
366
2110
2011/12
1085
362
129
12
3
571
8
1583
3
10
21
4
5
1540
33
3
30
9440
9440
358
276
82
2679
81
332
2073
2012/13
1045
431
180
10
4
412
8
1570
6
14
32
5
8
1505
202
52
150
8839
8839
403
248
155
2612
74
305
2057
2013/14
884
332
120
19
3
398
12
1776
27
31
66
7
11
1634
172
41
131
9076
9076
567
287
280
2493
87
271
1989
2014/15
707
268
95
14
2
316
12
1754
3
23
44
6
7
1671
61
21
40
8421
8421
483
299
184
2956
98
696
2014
23
21
19
18
24
136
1590
863
578
4
4
3
43
12
83
1823
1529
17
62
57
172
1478
731
610
2
4
0
40
6
85
2056
1543
30
242
62
157
2103
981
981
3
4
0
48
19
67
2359
1667
39
232
53
128
1880
839
922
1
5
1
40
7
65
2644
1622
125
551
43
124
1798
821
876
1
4
0
29
1
66
1820
1298
45
238
57
11
19
21
17
14
61
84
97
129
82
4
7
7
3
2
43
39
258
23
6
11
55
79
27
38
31
260
33
6
10
60
73
29
20
223
236
19
2
12
42
81
19
33
121
233
6
5
14
40
105
27
27
57
209
5
3
10
30
81
33
6
7
10
5
6
51
42
51
31
41
_________________________________________________________________
190
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
PIM values
Total
Infrastructure failures
SPAD and adhesion
Infrastructure operations
Level crossings
Objects on the line
Train operations and failures
Passengers
Infrastructure failures
SPAD and adhesion
Infrastructure operations
Level crossings
Objects on the line
Train operations and failures
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
8.23
7.41
7.95
7.56
6.66
1.24
0.96
1.55
1.52
0.77
1.04
0.72
0.72
0.86
1.07
1.00
0.80
0.85
0.86
0.99
3.47
3.05
3.29
2.75
2.45
0.85
1.15
0.86
0.85
0.86
0.64
0.74
0.68
0.71
0.53
3.24
2.84
3.30
3.31
2.76
1.01
0.77
1.27
1.26
0.62
0.75
0.52
0.52
0.63
0.79
0.62
0.51
0.53
0.52
0.63
0.26
0.23
0.24
0.20
0.17
0.26
0.41
0.34
0.39
0.29
0.33
0.40
0.40
0.32
0.27
Train operations: workforce personal injuries
Workforce train operations
(excluding train accidents)
Fatalities
Major injuries
Contact with object or person
Boarding and alighting
Slips, trips and falls
Struck by train
Electric shock
Other accident
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Contact with object or person
Boarding and alighting
Slips, trips and falls
Struck by train
Electric shock
Other accident
2010/11
0
4
0
1
3
0
0
0
107
23
84
0
0
0
0.60
0.02
0.17
0.39
0.00
0.00
0.03
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
0
4
0
1
2
0
0
1
76
20
56
3
1
2
0.56
0.01
0.15
0.28
0.00
0.00
0.12
0
4
0
1
3
0
0
0
82
13
69
1
0
1
0.54
0.01
0.13
0.39
0.00
0.00
0.01
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
72
11
61
5
1
4
0.33
0.02
0.03
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.02
2014/15
0
3
0
0
2
0
1
0
68
14
54
6
0
6
0.43
0.01
0.02
0.29
0.00
0.10
0.02
_________________________________________________________________
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
191
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
Level crossings
Fatalities at LC (level crossings)
Pedestrians
Passenger on station crossing
Member of public
Road vehicle occupants
Train occupants
Passenger on train
Workforce on train
Weighted injuries at LC
Pedestrians
Road vehicle occupants
Train occupants
Suicide and attempted suicide
Suicide
Attempted suicide
Collisions with road vehicles at LC
Resulting in derailment
Collisions with gates or barriers at LC
Gates
Barriers
Reported near misses
With pedestrians
With road vehicles
Reported incidents of crossing events
With pedestrians
With road vehicles
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
6
4
9
8
10
6
3
4
6
8
0
0
0
0
0
6
3
4
6
8
0
1
5
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.35
1.22
0.92
0.78
0.66
0.58
0.58
0.70
0.66
0.60
0.10
0.32
0.12
0.01
0.01
0.67
0.32
0.10
0.11
0.05
26.30
25.11
25.22
37.22
31.10
26.00
25.00
25.00
37.00
31.00
0.30
0.11
0.22
0.22
0.10
5
9
10
10
7
1
2
0
0
0
8
4
2
5
4
6
3
2
2
4
2
1
0
3
0
454
470
439
409
379
306
322
294
279
276
148
148
145
130
103
2926
3807
3492
3578
4011
1355
1786
1782
1809
2117
1571
2021
1710
1769
1894
_________________________________________________________________
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
Trespass
Fatalities
Electric shock
Fall (including from height)
Jump from train in service
Struck by train
Train surfing
Other accidents
Major injuries
Electric shock
Fall (including from height)
Jump from train in service
Struck by train
Train surfing
Other accidents
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Electric shock
Fall (including from height)
Jump from train in service
Struck by train
Train surfing
Other accidents
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
23
40
33
22
22
5
5
5
3
6
3
3
1
2
3
0
1
0
2
0
13
30
26
15
13
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
18
15
28
25
20
0
2
0
6
5
10
7
16
14
9
0
0
1
0
0
7
6
9
4
5
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
31
26
32
21
26
21
17
22
12
19
10
9
10
9
7
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
24.92
41.60
35.93
24.57
24.10
5.02
5.22
5.01
3.61
6.50
4.07
3.77
2.68
3.45
3.99
0.00
1.00
0.12
2.00
0.00
13.72
30.61
26.92
15.41
13.51
1.10
1.00
0.10
0.00
0.10
1.01
0.00
1.10
0.10
0.00
_________________________________________________________________
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
Suicide
Fatalities
Struck by train
Not train related
Major injuries
Struck by train
Not train related
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Struck by train
Not train related
Injuries to others
Majors
Minors
Shock and trauma
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
209
250
246
278
293
199
238
234
268
288
10
12
12
10
5
36
23
35
54
38
26
17
24
39
24
10
6
11
15
14
15
20
16
23
19
13
15
13
19
15
2
5
3
4
4
0
1
0
3
1
0
1
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
212.67
252.39
249.57
283.51
296.88
201.66
239.75
236.46
271.97
290.43
11.01
12.63
13.11
11.55
6.45
229
236
251
291
236
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
228
235
251
291
235
_________________________________________________________________
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_________________________________________________________________
Yards, depots and sidings
Yards, depots and sidings (workforce)
Fatalities
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Train accidents
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Major injuries
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Train accidents
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Electric shock
Manual handling/awkward movement
Train accidents
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Yards, depots and sidings (passengers
and public)
Fatalities
Public
Passenger
Major injuries
Public
Passenger
Minor injuries
Public
Passenger
Incidents of shock
Public
Passenger
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Public
Passenger
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
37
0
2
0
3
7
21
4
1460
196
1264
11
1
10
5.96
0.01
0.54
0.01
0.42
1.51
2.86
0.61
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
44
0
0
0
2
7
33
2
1397
190
1207
6
3
3
6.58
0.02
0.27
0.02
0.38
1.40
4.02
0.48
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
48
0
0
0
6
9
30
3
1441
175
1266
7
0
7
6.95
0.02
0.35
0.00
0.77
1.54
3.70
0.57
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
49
0
5
0
3
9
27
5
1261
175
1086
7
1
6
6.87
0.02
0.75
0.01
0.48
1.59
3.30
0.74
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
50
0
2
0
1
11
30
6
1354
176
1178
1
0
1
8.06
1.01
0.52
0.00
0.26
1.79
3.67
0.81
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0.01
0.01
0.00
0
0
0
1
1
0
3
2
1
0
0
0
0.11
0.10
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
1
0
1
0.01
0.01
0.00
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0
0
3
3
0
5
4
1
1
0
1
0.31
0.30
0.00
_________________________________________________________________
Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
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Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
Freight injuries
Fatalities
Electric shock
Train accidents
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Major injuries
Electric shock
Train accidents
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
Minor injuries
Class 1
Class 2
Incidents of shock
Class 1
Class 2
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Electric shock
Train accidents
Struck by train
Platform-train interface
Contact with object
Slips, trips and falls
Other injury
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
3
7
4
7
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
7
2
6
2
3
9
11
9
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
2
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
5
5
5
7
0
1
3
3
6
249
193
195
177
198
42
23
27
32
34
207
170
168
145
164
6
10
11
11
6
2
5
7
6
3
4
5
4
5
3
3.73
8.22
5.44
8.24
3.75
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
1.03
0.01
0.01
1.01
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.24
0.25
1.14
1.05
0.03
0.18
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.18
0.18
0.60
0.61
0.61
0.85
2.13
7.18
2.39
6.38
2.68
_________________________________________________________________
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_________________________________________________________________
Freight train accidents
Total freight train accidents
PHRTAs
Collisions between trains
Derailments
Collisions with RV not at LC
Collisions with RV at LC (not derailed)
Collisions with RV at LC (derailed)
Striking buffer stops
Struck by large falling object
Non-PHRTAs
Open door collisions
Roll back collisions
Striking animals
Struck by missiles
Train fires
Striking level crossing gates/barriers
Striking other objects
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
34
44
51
43
34
2
8
11
12
15
0
0
0
1
0
2
8
7
8
14
0
0
3
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
32
36
40
31
19
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
8
12
11
10
10
6
7
5
2
1
6
5
5
3
1
1
1
0
0
0
10
11
18
16
7
_________________________________________________________________
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Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 2.
Passenger
Date
07/04/2014
Fatalities in 2014/15
3
Event description
On 7 April 2014, a teenage boy fell from the platform edge and
was electrocuted after coming into contact with the conductor
rail. Alcohol was reported as a potential factor in the incident.
Location
Horley
Territory
South
East
Event type
Platformtrain
interface
05/08/2014
Hampstead
Heath
South
East
Slip, trip or
fall
On 5 August 2014, a passenger fell while running down stairs at
the station, and received head injuries. He died in hospital from
his injuries several days later. Alcohol was reported as a
potential factor in the incident.
17/01/2015
Southall
station
Western
Platformtrain
interface
On 17 January 2015, a male passenger fell from the platform
edge onto the track and was struck by a train entering the
station, receiving fatal injuries. Alcohol was reported as a
potential factor in the incident.
Location
Newcraighall
Territory
Scotland
Event type
Road
traffic
accident
Workforce
Date
01/05/2014
3
Description
On 1 May, an infrastructure worker employed on the
Borders Project was fatally injured after the tractor and
trailer he was driving, whilst on duty, was involved in a
collision with a lorry.
24/05/2014
St Leonards
West Marina
Depot
South
East
Electric
shock
On 24 May 2014, a train cleaner, working in a depot, was
electrocuted after coming into contact with the live rail, after
an apparent fall.
10/02/2015
Waterloo
South
East
Road
traffic
accident
On 10 February, an office-based worker, who was travelling by
motorbike to a meeting in a location different from his normal
place of work, was involved in a road traffic accident and was
fatally injured
Public (not including suicide or trespass)
11
Level crossing users (pedestrians)
8
Date
31/05/2014
Location
Wharf
Road AHB
LC
Territory
South
East
LC type
AHB
26/06/2014
Wharf
Road AHB
LC
South
East
AHB
27/08/2014
Fishermans
Path
(UWC-T)
Dibleys
Foot
Crossing
London
North
Western
South
East
UWC-T
03/09/2014
footpath
Description
On 31 May 2014, a 77-year-old cyclist was struck by a train at the
level crossing. The cyclist crossed whilst the barriers were down.
It is not known if he was unaware of the meaning of the tone
warning that a second train was coming.
On 26 June 2014, a 39-year-old pedestrian was struck by a train
at the level crossing. The member of the public walked around
the lowered barriers despite the barriers and warning lights
operating correctly.
On 27 August 2014, a 22-year-old pedestrian was struck by a
passing train on the crossing while attempting to retrieve their
dog from the line
On 3 September 2014, a 20-year-old pedestrian was struck by a
passenger train at the crossing. The early morning conditions
were foggy and the user may have been wearing headphones
which may have contributed to the accident. The driver was not
required to sound the horn due to the night time quiet period.
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_________________________________________________________________
Date
16/09/2014
04/11/2014
Location
Wyke,
Lightcliffe
golf
course
footpath
crossing
Territory
LC type
Description
London
North
Eastern
footpath
On 16 September 2014, a 67-year-old pedestrian walking their
dog was struck by a passenger train at the crossing. The user was
unaware that there was a second train coming and crossed
immediately after one train had passed and was struck by
another.
Sandhill
AHB LC
South
East
AHB
On 4 November 2014, an 86-year-old pedestrian was struck by a
passenger train at the level crossing. The crossing was working
correctly at the time of the accident.
Level crossing users (road vehicle occupants)
Date
Location
Territory
LC type
07/05/2014
Ivy Lea
Farm
London
North
Eastern
UWC-T
11/05/2014
Frampton
UWC
crossing
Western
UWC-T
2
Description
On 7 May 2014, a passenger train struck a car on a crossing near
Rillington. The road vehicle occupant was fatally injured. There
were no injuries to passengers on board the train, although the
train driver suffered shock. At the time of the incident the
signaller was dealing with a phone call from Lilac Farm crossing
and therefore was unable to answer Ivy Lea. When the signaller
finished the call from Lilac Farm he answered the phone to Ivy
Lea, but there was no reply.
On 11 May 2014, a passenger train struck a motorcyclist on a
crossing near Stroud. The motorcyclist was with two companions,
when he was struck and fatally injured, having failed to notice the
train. The crossing was later found to be in order, with signage
and gates in place.
Other
1
Date
Location
Territory
Event type
23/09/2014
Slough
Western
Assault
Description
On 23 September, a young child died after being struck by a train
during an incident where his mother is believed to have accessed
the track to take their life.
Trespass
In station
Not in stations
22
9
13
Coroner's confirmed verdict
Application of Ovenstone criteria
293
48
245
Suicide
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Appendices: Scope
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 3.
Scope of RSSB safety performance reporting
and risk modelling
Railway Group Standard GE/RT8047: Reporting of Safety Related Information lays out the
requirements on mainline infrastructure managers and railway undertakings for reporting safety
related information via the Safety Management Information System (SMIS). It covers
requirements related to injuries and events such as train accidents, irregular working and SPADs.
This appendix describes the scope of RSSB’s safety performance reporting and safety risk
modelling, based on the information reported to SMIS, and other sources.
General:
All events listed in Table A of GE/RT8047, occurring at sites within scope, with the exception of:
•
incidents due to occupational health issues and terrorist actions,
Injuries and incidents of shock/trauma:
Workforce:
All injuries and incidents of shock/trauma to members of the workforce whilst on duty and:
•
involved in the operation or maintenance of the railway at sites within scope, or
•
travelling to or from sites within scope while involved in the operation or maintenance of
the railway, or
•
directly affected by incidents occurring at sites within scope.
Passengers and public:
All injuries and incidents of shock/trauma to passengers and public who are:
•
at a site within scope, or
•
directly affected by incidents occurring at sites within scope.
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Appendices: Scope
_________________________________________________________________
Sites within scope for safety performance reporting:
Sites within and outside scope for all person types comprise:
Within scope
Outside scope
Railway infrastructure and trains on sections
of operational railway under the
management of Network Rail, or where
Network Rail is responsible for the operation
of the signalling.
•
Station car parks
•
Offices (except areas normally accessible
by members of the public)
•
Mess rooms
•
Training centres
•
Integrated Electronic Control Centres and
Signalling Control Centres
•
Outside the entrance to stations
•
Station toilets
•
The table on page 255 details which railway
lines this applies to.
Retail units and concessions in stations
•
Railway infrastructure includes all associated
railway assets, structures and public areas at
stations.
Construction sites at stations which are
completely segregated from the public
areas
•
Track sections closed for long-term
construction, maintenance, renewal or
upgrade
•
Public areas away from the platform-train
interface (PTI) at non-Network Rail
stations34
The operational railway comprises all lines
for which the infrastructure manager and
railway undertaking have been granted a
safety authorisation and safety certificate
(respectively) by the ORR (under Railway
Safety Directive 2004/49/EC).
Yards, depots and sidings managed by
Network Rail or third parties. The reporting
of non-fatal injuries and incidents in third
party yards, depots and sidings in undertaken
on a voluntary basis.
34 The platform-train interface is in scope at non-Network Rail stations on NRMI lines, for example on London Underground and
Nexus. See the following page for details.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Appendices: Scope
_________________________________________________________________
Railway lines in scope:
Heathrow Express:
Paddington to Heathrow
Central
Heathrow Express:
Heathrow Central to
Terminals 4 and 5
Nexus – Tyne and Wear
Metro:
Fellgate to South Hylton
Nexus – Tyne and Wear
Metro:
All sections apart from
Fellgate to South Hylton
LUL Metropolitan Line:
Chiltern services between
Harrow-on-the-Hill and
Amersham
LUL District Line:
Gunnersbury to
Richmond
The entire line, including St Pancras,
is managed, operated and
maintained by NR.


In
In
NR-owned infrastructure.


In
In
Owned by BAA but maintained on
their behalf by NR.


In
In
Owned and managed by NR, but
stations served only by metro trains.


Out
In
Neither managed by NR, nor is the
signalling controlled by NR.


Out
Out
This section is owned and operated
by LUL and its subsidiaries /
operators.


Out
Out 36


Out
In


Out
Out


Out
In


Out
Out


In
In


In
In
Notes
This section was a joint operation
with Silverlink Metro, for which NR is
now responsible.
LUL owns the infrastructure. NR owns
LUL District Line:
the signals, but the signalling is
East Putney to Southfields
operated by LUL.
LUL Bakerloo Line:
Track managed by NR, who also
Services north of Queens
operates the signalling.
Park
The service is wholly operated and
Island Line on the Isle of
managed under a franchise to South
Wight
West Trains.
East London Line
All other NR owned
stations
On or about the
track/at PTI
In stations
High Speed 1 35
NR operate the
signalling?
Line / Section
In / Out of
Scope
Owned by NR?
Criteria
TfL owns and maintains the track, but
NR operates the signalling.
35 The risk from High Speed 1 train operations is modelled in the same way as all other lines, ie as an average railway, rather than
explicit modelling of High Speed 1 characteristics. The contribution of Eurostar services to HEM/HEN risk is included.
36 PTI and on-board injuries on these Chiltern services are in scope, injuries on or about the track are out of scope.
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Appendices: Scope
_________________________________________________________________
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Appendices: Ovenstone criteria
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 4.
Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways
Every railway fatality in Great Britain (including Scotland) is classified as:
•
Accidental, or
•
Suicide (that is, in accordance with the coroner’s verdict – or Scottish equivalent), or
•
Suspected suicide
The classification of suspected suicide is only used when a coroner’s report into the fatality has
not recorded a confirmed verdict of the cause of death. It is a managerial assessment of
whether the cause of death was more likely to be intentional or non-intentional, based on
applying the Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways, and requires objective evidence of
intentional self-harm for the fatality to be classified as suspected suicide rather than accidental.
The classification is wholly for management statistical purposes and is not:
•
For the purpose of passing judgement on the particulars of any case
•
For use outside the Railway Group
•
For any other purpose
The classification is a matter for local railway management judgement, based on all available
evidence (for example, eyewitness accounts of the person’s behaviour – which may be the train
driver’s own account – BTP findings or the coroner’s findings).
The criteria for suspected suicide
Each of the following, on its own, may be treated as sufficient evidence of suspected suicide, in
the case where the coroner has returned an open or narrative verdict, or has yet to return a
verdict.
•
Suicide note
•
Clear statement of suicidal intent to an informant
•
Behaviour demonstrates suicidal intent
•
Previous suicide attempts
•
Prolonged depression
•
Instability; that is, a marked emotional reaction to recent stress or evidence of failure to
cope (such as a breakdown)
In the absence of evidence fulfilling the above criteria, the fatality should be deemed accidental.
A classification should always be reviewed whenever new evidence comes to light (such as
during investigations or at a coroner’s inquest).
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Appendices
_________________________________________________________________
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2014/15
Appendices: Level crossing types
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 5.
Level crossing types
Active crossings: Manual
Manually controlled gate (MCG): This crossing
is equipped with gates, which are manually
operated by a signaller or crossing keeper
either before the protecting signal can be
cleared, or with the permission of the signaller
or signalling system. At the majority of these
crossings, the normal position of the gates is
open to road traffic, but on some quiet roads
the gates are maintained ‘closed to the road’
and opened when required if no train is
approaching.
Manually controlled barrier (MCB): MCB
crossings are equipped with full barriers, which
extend across the whole width of the roadway,
and are operated by a signaller or crossing
keeper before the protecting signal can be
cleared. Road traffic signals and audible
warnings for pedestrians are interlocked into
the signalling system.
Manually controlled barrier with obstacle detection (MCB-OD): MCB-OD are full barrier crossings equipped
with an obstacle detection system as a means of detecting any obstacles on the crossing prior to signalling
train movements. The obstacle detection system comprises of RADAR and scanning laser obstacle detectors.
The lowering sequence is instigated automatically upon detection of an approaching train. MCB-ODs are
equipped with road traffic lights and audible alarms. The barriers, road traffic signals and audible warnings
for pedestrians are interlocked with the signalling system. The signaller no longer normally participates in
operation of the crossing and does not have a view of it. Indications on the state of the crossing warning
lights, barriers and obstacle detection system are provided to the signaller and the barriers can be lowered
and raised manually if required.
Manually controlled barrier protected by
closed circuit television (MCB-CCTV):
Similar to MCB crossings, except that a
closed circuit television (CCTV) is used to
monitor and control the crossing from a
remote location.
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Appendices: Level crossing types
_________________________________________________________________
Active crossings: Automatic
Automatic half-barrier (AHB): AHB crossings are
equipped with barriers that only extend across the
nearside of the road (so that the exit is left clear if the
crossing commences operation when a vehicle is on it).
Road traffic signals and audible warnings are activated a
set time before the operation of the barriers, which are
activated automatically by approaching trains. The
barriers rise automatically when the train has passed,
unless another train is approaching. Telephones are
provided for the public to contact the signaller in case
of an emergency or, for example, to ensure it is safe to
cross in a long or slow vehicle. These crossings can only
be installed where the permissible speed of trains does
not exceed 100mph.
Automatic barrier locally monitored (ABCL): As far as
the road user is concerned, this crossing looks
identical to an AHB crossing. The difference is that
train drivers must ensure that the crossing is clear
before passing over it. Train speed is limited to 55mph
or less.
Automatic open crossing remotely monitored (AOCR): The AOCR is equipped with road traffic signals and
audible warnings only: there are no barriers. It is operated automatically by approaching trains. Telephones
are provided for the public to contact the signaller in an emergency. Only one crossing of this type remains on
NRMI, at Rosarie in the Scottish Highlands.
Automatic open crossing locally monitored (AOCL): Like
the AOCR, this crossing is equipped with road traffic
signals and audible warnings only and is operated
automatically by approaching trains. A physical
difference apparent to the user is that no telephone is
provided. An indication is provided to the train drivers to
show that the crossing is working correctly, they must
ensure that the crossing is clear before passing over it
and train speed is limited to 55mph or less. If a second
train is approaching, the lights continue to flash after the
passage of the first train, an additional signal lights up,
and the tone of the audible warning changes.
Automatic open crossing locally monitored with barriers (AOCL-B): AOCL-B is a simple half barrier overlay to
previously commissioned AOCL crossings.
User-worked crossing with miniature warning lights (UWCMWL): This crossing has gates or full lifting barriers, which the
user must operate prior to crossing. Red/green miniature
warning lights, operated by the approach of trains, inform the
user whether it is safe to cross.
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Passive crossings
User-worked crossing (UWC): This crossing has gates
or, occasionally, full lifting barriers, which the user
must operate prior to crossing. The user is responsible
for ensuring that it is safe to cross; hence there must
be adequate visibility of approaching trains. Once
clear, the user is required to close the gate or barriers.
These crossings are often found in rural areas, for
example providing access between a farm and fields.
They often have an identified user, some of whom
keep the crossing gates padlocked to prevent
unauthorised access.
User-worked crossing with telephone (UWC-T):
These are similar to the standard user-worked
crossing, but a telephone is provided. In some
circumstances (for example when crossing with
livestock or vehicles) the user must contact the
signaller for permission to cross, and report back
when they are clear of the track. They are provided
where visibility of approaching trains is limited, or
the user needs to move livestock over the railway on
a regular basis.
Open crossing (OC): At open crossings, which are
sited when the road is quiet and train speeds are low,
the interface between road and rail is completely
open. Signs warn road users to give way to trains.
Road users must therefore have an adequate view of
approaching trains. The maximum permissible speed
over the crossing is 10mph or the train is required to
stop at a stop board before proceeding over.
Footpath crossing: These are designed primarily for pedestrians
and usually include stiles or wicket gates to restrict access. The
crossing user is responsible for making sure that it is safe to cross
before doing so. In cases where sufficient sighting time is not
available, the railway may provide a ‘whistle’ board, instructing
drivers to sound the horn to warn of their train’s approach, or
miniature warning lights. A variant is the bridleway crossing, which
is usually on a public right of way, although some are private and
restricted to authorised users. Some footpath crossings are in
stations and these can be protected by a white light (which
extinguishes when a train is approaching) and are generally only
used by railway staff. All these crossing types, some of which have
automatic protection, are analysed as a single group in this report
because of concerns over the accuracy of crossing type data in
SMIS.
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Appendix 6.
Accident groups used within the ASPR
Accident grouping
Description of the types of event contained within grouping
Train accidents:
collisions and
derailments
Collisions between trains, buffer stop collisions and derailments
(excluding those caused by collisions with road vehicles at level
crossings).
Train accidents:
collisions with road
vehicles at level
crossings
Includes derailments.
Train accidents:
collisions with objects
Collisions between a train and another object, including road vehicles
not at level crossings and trains hit by missiles. Excludes derailments.
Train accidents: other
Train divisions, train fires, train explosions, structural damage
affecting trains.
Assault and abuse
All types of assault, verbal abuse and threat. Also includes unlawful
killing.
Contact with object
Any injury involving contact with objects, not covered by another
category.
Contact with person
Injuries due to bumping into, or being bumped into by, other people.
Excludes assaults.
Falls from height
Generally speaking, falls of more than 2m. Excludes falls down stairs
and escalators.
Fires and explosions
(not involving trains)
Fires or explosions in stations, lineside or other locations on NRMI.
Lean or fall from train
in running
Injuries resulting from accidental falls from trains, or from leaning
from trains.
Machinery/tool
operation
Injuries from power tools, being trapped in machinery, or track
maintenance equipment. Does not include injuries due to arcing.
Does not include injuries due to being struck by things thrown up by
tools or from carrying tools/equipment.
Manual
handling/awkward
movement
Strains and sprains due to lifting or moving objects, or awkward
movement. Excludes injuries due to dropping items being carried,
which are classed under contact with objects.
On-board injuries
All injuries on trains, excluding train accidents, assaults, and those
occurring during boarding or alighting, or whilst leaning from trains.
Platform-train
interface
(boarding/alighting)
Accidents occurring whilst getting on or off trains. Includes falls
between train and platform where it is not known if the person is
boarding or alighting.
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Accident grouping
Description of the types of event contained within grouping
Platform edge
incidents (not
boarding/alighting)
Accidents that involve falls from the platform (with or without trains
being present) or contact with trains or traction supplies at the
platform edge. Excludes accidents that take place during boarding or
alighting.
Road traffic accident
Accidents occurring directly as a result of road vehicle usage.
Slips, trips, and falls
Generally speaking, falls of less than 2m anywhere on NRMI (except
on trains), and falls of any height down stairs and escalators.
Struck/crushed by
train
All incidents involving pedestrians struck/crushed by trains, excluding
trespass, platform edge and boarding and alighting accidents.
Suicide
All first-party injuries arising from suicide, suspected suicide and
attempted suicide.
Trespass
First-party injuries resulting from people engaging in behaviour
involving access of prohibited areas of the railway, where that access
was the result of deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. This includes
actions such as deliberately alighting a train in running (other than as
part of a controlled evacuation procedure), accessing the track at
stations to retrieve items, or climbing on the outside of overbridges
etc. Errors and violations at level crossings are not included in this
category.
Witnessing suicide or
trespass
Shock/trauma or other third party injuries arising from witnessing or
otherwise being affected by suicide and trespass fatalities.
Workforce electric
shock
Electric shock involving third rail, OLE, or non-traction supply.
Includes burns from electrical short circuits. Does not include injuries
due to arcing, which are classed under ‘other’.
Other
Any other event not covered by another category.
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Appendix 7.
Definitions
Term
Definition
Assault
SMIS records incidents in which ‘in circumstances related to their work,
a member of staff is assaulted, threatened or abused, thereby affecting
their safety or welfare.’
BTP records and categorises criminal assaults in accordance with Home
Office rules. For the majority of RSSBs work, BTP crime codes have been
grouped into higher level categories to facilitate analyses and
comparisons with SMIS records.
Child
A person under 16 years of age.
Fatalities and
weighted injuries
(FWI)
The aggregate amount of safety harm.
One FWI is equivalent to:
one fatality, or
10 major injuries, or
200 Class 1 minor injuries, or
200 Class 1 shock/trauma events, or
1,000 Class 2 minor injuries, or
1,000 Class 2 shock/trauma events.
Fatality
Death within one year of the causal accident. This includes subsequent
death from the causes of a railway accident. All are RIDDOR reportable.
Freight train
A train that is operated by a freight company.
Note that this includes freight locos which do not have wagons
attached.
Hazardous event
An incident that has the potential to be the direct cause of safety harm.
HLOS
A key feature of an access charges review. Under Schedule 4 of the
2005 Railways Act, the Secretary of State for Transport (for England and
Wales) and Scottish Ministers (for Scotland) are obliged to send to ORR
a high level output specification (HLOS) and a statement of funds
available (SoFA). This is to ensure the railway industry has clear and
timely information about the strategic outputs that Governments want
the railway to deliver for the public funds they are prepared to make
available. ORR must then determine the outputs that Network Rail
must deliver to achieve the HLOS, the cost of delivering them in the
most efficient way, and the implications for the charges payable by
train operators to Network Rail for using the railway network.
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Term
Definition
Infrastructure
worker
A member of workforce whose responsibilities include engineering or
technical activities associated with railway infrastructure. This includes
track maintenance, civil structure inspection and maintenance, S&T
renewal/upgrade, engineering supervision, acting as a Controller of Site
Safety (COSS), hand signaller or lookout and machine operative.
Level crossing
A ground-level interface between a road and the railway.
It provides a means of access over the railway line and has various
forms of protection including two main categories:
Active crossings– where the road vehicle user or pedestrian is given
warning of a train’s approach (either manually by railway staff, ie
manual crossings or automatically, ie automatic crossings)
Passive crossings – where no warning system is provided, the onus
being on the road user or pedestrian to determine if it is safe to cross
the line. This includes using a telephone to call the signaller.
The different types of crossing are defined in Appendix 5.
Major injury
Injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public as defined in
schedule 1 to RIDDOR 1995 amended April 2012. This includes losing
consciousness, most fractures, major dislocations, loss of sight
(temporary or permanent) and other injuries that resulted in hospital
attendance for more than 24 hours.
Minor injury
Class 1
Injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public, which are neither
fatalities nor major injuries, and:
- for passengers or public, result in the injured person being taken to
hospital from the scene of the accident (as defined as reportable in
RIDDOR 1995 amended April 2012).
- for workforce, result in the injured person being incapacitated for
their normal duties for more than three consecutive calendar days, not
including the day of the injury.
Class 2
All other physical injuries.
National Reference
Values (NRVs)
NRVs are reference measures indicating, for each Member State, the
maximum tolerable level for particular aspects of railway risk. NRVs are
calculated and published by the European Railway Agency, using
Eurostat and CSI data.
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Term
Definition
Network Rail
managed
infrastructure
(NRMI)
All structures within the boundaries of Network Rail’s operational
railway, including the permanent way, land within the lineside fence,
and plant used for signalling or exclusively for supplying electricity for
railway operations. It does not include stations, depots, yards or sidings
that are owned by, or leased to, other parties. It does, however, include
the permanent way at stations and plant within these locations.
Operational
incident
An irregularity affecting, or with the potential to affect, the safe
operation of trains or the safety and health of persons.
The term operational incident applies to a disparate set of human
actions involving an infringement of relevant rules, regulations or
instructions.
Ovenstone criteria
An explicit set of criteria, adapted for the railway, which provides an
objective assessment of suicide if a coroner’s verdict is not available.
The criteria are based on the findings of a 1970 research project into
rail suicides and cover aspects such as the presence (or not) of a suicide
note, the clear intent to take their life, behavioural patterns, previous
suicide attempts, prolonged bouts of depression and instability levels.
See Appendix 4.
Passenger
A person on railway infrastructure, who either intends to travel on a
train, is travelling on a train, or has travelled on a train. This does not
include passengers who are trespassing or who take their life – they are
included as members of the public.
Passenger train
A train that is in service and available for the use of passengers.
Note that a train of empty coaching stock brought into a terminal
station, for example, becomes a passenger train in service as soon as it
is available for passengers to board.
Pedestrian
This refers to a person travelling on foot, on a pedal cycle, on a horse or
using a mobility scooter.
Possession
The complete stoppage of all normal train movements on a running line
or siding for engineering purposes. This includes protection as defined
by the Rule Book (GE/RT8000).
Potentially higherrisk train accidents
(PHRTA)
Accidents that are RIDDOR-reportable and have the most potential to
result in harm to any or all person types on the railway. They comprise
train derailments, train collisions (excluding roll backs), trains striking
buffer stops, trains striking road vehicles at level crossings, trains
running into road vehicles not at level crossings (with no derailment),
train explosions, and trains being struck by large falling objects.
Precursor
A system failure, sub-system failure, component failure, human error or
operational condition which could, individually or in combination with
other precursors, result in the occurrence of a hazardous event.
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Term
Definition
Precursor Indicator
Model (PIM)
An RSSB-devised model that measures the underlying risk from train
accidents by tracking changes in the occurrence of accident precursors.
See Section 7.7 for further information.
Public (members
of)
Persons other than passengers or workforce members. This includes
passengers who are trespassing (eg when crossing tracks between
platforms), and anyone who commits, or attempts to take their life.
RIDDOR
RIDDOR refers to the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences Regulations, a set of health and safety regulations that
mandate the reporting of, inter alia, work-related accidents. These
regulations were first published in 1985, and have been amended and
updated several times. In 2012, there was an amendment to the
RIDDOR 1995 criteria for RIDDOR-reportable workforce minor injuries
from three days to seven days. For the purposes of the industry’s safety
performance analysis, the more-than-three-days criterion has been
maintained, and the category termed Class 1 minor injury. In the latest
version of RIDDOR, published 2013, the term ‘major injury’ was
dropped; the regulation now uses the term ‘specified injuries’ to refer
to a slightly different scope of injuries than those that were classed as
major. Again, for consistency in industry safety performance analysis,
the term major injury has been maintained, along with the associated
definition from RIDDOR 1995.
(The Reporting of
Injuries, Diseases
and Dangerous
Occurrences
Regulations)
Risk
Risk is the potential for a known hazard or incident to cause loss or
harm; it is a combination of the probability and the consequences of
that event.
Running line
A line shown in Table A of the Sectional Appendix as a passenger line or
as a non-passenger line.
Safety
Management
Information
System (SMIS)
A national database used by railway undertakings and infrastructure
managers to record any safety-related events that occur on the railway.
SMIS data is accessible to all of the companies who use the system, so
that it may be used to analyse risk, predict trends and focus action on
major areas of safety concern.
Safety Risk Model
(SRM)
A quantitative representation of the safety risk that can result from the
operation and maintenance of the GB rail network.
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Term
Definition
Shock/trauma
Shock or traumatic stress affecting any person who has been involved
in, or has been a witness to, an event, and not suffered any physical
injury.
Shock and trauma is measured by the SRM and reported on in safety
performance reporting; it is within the scope of what must be reported
into SMIS. However, it is never RIDDOR-reportable.
Class 1 Shock/trauma events relate to witnessing a fatality, incidents
and train accidents (collisions, derailments and fires).
Class 2 Shock/trauma events relate to all other causes of shock/trauma
such as verbal assaults, witnessing physical assaults, witnessing nonfatality incidents and near misses.
Signal passed at
danger (SPAD)
An incident where any part of a train has passed a stop signal at danger
without authority or where an in-cab signalled movement authority has
been exceeded without authority.
A SPAD occurs when the stop aspect, end of in-cab signalled movement
authority or indication (and any associated preceding cautionary
indications) was displayed correctly and in sufficient time for the train
to stop safely.
SPAD risk ranking
tool
A tool that gives a measure of the level of risk from each SPAD. It
enables the industry’s total SPAD risk to be monitored and it can be
used to track performance, and inform SPAD investigations. The score
for each SPAD ranges from zero (no risk) to 28 (a very high risk) and is
based on both the potential for the SPAD to lead to an accident and the
potential consequences of any accident that did occur. SPADs with risk
rankings between 16 and 19 are classified as potentially significant, and
those with risk rankings of 20 and above are classified as potentially
severe.
Strategic Safety
Plan
This is a joint statement by the companies responsible for Britain’s
mainline rail network that set out an agreed industry approach to
managing safety.
The 2009-2014 plan was developed by bringing together commitments
made by industry companies in their own individual safety plans, thus
creating a linkage with the duty holder planning process.
In the Plan, trajectories were developed which described the industry’s
ambitions in nine identified key risk areas, and identified actions that
were being undertaken to achieve them.
Suicide
A fatality is classified as a suicide where a coroner has returned a
verdict of suicide.
Suspected suicide
The classification used for fatalities believed to be a suicide and which
have not yet been confirmed by a verdict from a coroner.
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Term
Definition
Trackside
A collective term referring to the running line and yards, depots and
sidings.
Train
Any vehicle (with flanged wheels on guided rails), whether selfpowered or not, on rails within the GB rail network.
Train accident
Reportable train accidents are defined in RIDDOR. The main criterion is
that the accident must have occurred on, or affected the running line.
There are additional criteria for different types of accident, and these
may depend on whether the accident involves a passenger train.
Collision between
trains
This term describes collisions involving two (or more) trains. Accidents in
which a collision between trains results in derailment or fire are included
in this category.
Roll back collisions occur when a train rolls back (while not under
power) into a train on the same line (including one from which it has
decoupled).
Setting back collisions occur when a train making a reversing movement
under power collides with a train on the same line, usually as part of a
decoupling manoeuvre.
Shunting movement/coupling collisions arise when the locomotive or
unit causing a collision is engaged in marshalling arrangements. While
they characteristically occur at low speed and involve the rolling stock
with which the locomotive or unit is to be coupled, accidents may
involve a different train that could be travelling more quickly.
Coming into station collisions occur between two trains that are
intended to be adjacent to one another (for example, to share a
platform) but are not intended to couple up or otherwise touch.
Normally, but not always, the collision speed will be low, because one
train is stationary and the approaching train will be intending to stop
short of the stationary train (rather as for a buffer stop). This operation
is known as permissive working.
In running (open track) collisions occur in circumstances where trains
are not intended to be in close proximity on the same line. The speed of
one or both of the trains involved may be high.
Collisions in a possession occur where there is a complete stoppage of
all normal train movements on a running line or siding for engineering
purposes. These collisions are only RIDDOR-reportable if they cause
injury, or obstruct a running line that is open to traffic.
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Term
Definition
Derailment
This includes all passenger train derailments, derailments of nonpassenger trains on running lines and any derailment in a siding that
obstructs the running line. Accidents in which a train derails after a
collision with an object on the track (except for another train or a road
vehicle at a level crossing) are included in this category, as are accidents
in which a train derails and subsequently catches fire or is involved in a
collision with another rail vehicle.
Train fire
This includes fires, severe electrical arcing or fusing on any passenger
train or train conveying dangerous goods, or on a non-passenger train
where the fire is extinguished by a fire brigade.
Train striking road
vehicle
All collisions with road vehicles on level crossings are RIDDORreportable. Collisions with road vehicles elsewhere on the running line
are reportable if the train is damaged and requires immediate repair, or
if there was a possibility of derailment.
Open door collision
This occurs when a train door swings outward, coming into contact with
another train.
Buffer stop
collision
This occurs when a train strikes the buffer stops. Accidents resulting in
only superficial damage to the train are not reportable under RIDDOR.
Trains running into
objects
This includes trains running into or being struck by objects anywhere on
a running line (including level crossings) if the accident had the potential
to cause a derailment or results in damage requiring immediate repair.
Trains striking
animals
This includes all collisions with large-boned animals and flocks of sheep,
and collisions with other animals that cause damage requiring
immediate repair.
Trains being struck
by missiles
This includes trains being struck by airborne objects, such as thrown
stones, if this results in damage requiring immediate repair.
Train Protection
and Warning
System (TPWS)
A safety system that automatically applies the brakes on a train which
either passes a signal at danger, or exceeds a given speed when
approaching a signal at danger, a permissible speed reduction or the
buffer stops in a terminal platform.
A TPWS intervention is when the system applies the train’s brakes
without this action having been taken by the driver first.
A TPWS activation is when the system applies the train’s brakes after
the driver has already initiated braking.
TPWS reset and continue incidents occur when the driver has reset the
TPWS after an activation (or intervention) and continued forward
without the signaller’s authority.
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Term
Definition
Trajectory
A concept developed for the Strategic Safety Plan. There are three
aspects to a trajectory: a statement of current safety performance in a
particular risk area, details of the actions being taken to address the risk
and an estimation of the safety performance improvement that the
actions are expected to deliver.
Trespass/
Trespasser
Trespass occurs when people intentionally go where they are never
authorised to be.
This includes:
Passengers crossing tracks at a station, other than at a defined crossing.
Public using the railway as a shortcut.
Passengers accessing track area at station to retrieve dropped items.
Public using the running lines as a playground.
Public committing acts of vandalism / crime on the lineside.
Passenger / public accessing the tracks via station ramps.
Public inappropriate behaviour on other infrastructure resulting in a fall
onto the railway.
Public jumping onto railway infrastructure.
On train passengers accessing unauthorised areas of the train (interior
or exterior).
Note: Level crossing users are never counted as trespassers, providing
they are not using the crossing as an access point into a permanently
unauthorised area, such as the trackside.
Workforce
Persons working for the industry on railway operations (either as direct
employees or under contract).
Notes:
‘Under contract’ relates to workforce working as contractors to (for
example) a railway undertaking or infrastructure manager (either as a
direct employee or a contractor to such organisations).
Staff travelling on duty, including drivers travelling as passengers, are to
be regarded as workforce. When travelling before or after a turn of
duty, they are to be treated as passengers.
British Transport Police (BTP) employees working directly for a railway
undertaking or infrastructure manager on railway operations should be
treated as workforce.
On-board catering staff (persons on business, franchisees’ staff etc) and
any persons under contract to them on a train (for example, providing
catering services) should be treated as workforce.
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Appendices: Glossary
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Appendix 8.
Glossary
Acronym
Expansion
ABCL
automatic barrier crossing locally monitored
ADEPT
Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport
AHB
automatic half-barrier crossing
ALCRM
All Level Crossing Risk Model
AOCL
automatic open crossing, locally monitored
AOCR
automatic open crossing, remotely monitored
ASPR
Annual Safety Performance Report
ATOC
Association of Train Operating Companies
ATP
automatic train protection
AWS
automatic warning system
BAA
British Airports Authority
BTP
British Transport Police
CAP
Civil Aviation Publication
CCS
contract conditions - safety
CCTV
closed-circuit television
COSS
controller of site safety
COTIF
Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail
CP
control period; we are currently in the fifth period, CP5
CRIME
Control Activity, Risks, Information, Monitoring, Environment (system)
CSI
common safety indicator
CST
common safety target
DRSG
Data and Risk Strategy Group
EC
European Commission
ECS
empty coaching stock
EIT
Enabling Innovation Team
ERA
European Railway Agency
ERTMS
European Rail Traffic Management System
ESOB
emotional support outside branch
EU
European Union
FN
frequency - number
FOC
freight operating company
FWI
fatalities and weighted injuries
FWMI
fatalities and weighted major injuries
FWSI
fatalities and weighted serious injuries
GB
Great Britain
GBH
grievous bodily harm
GE
General Electric
GIS
geographic information system
GPS
Global Positioning System
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Acronym
Expansion
GSM
Global System for Mobile Communications
HABD
hot axle box detector
HEM
hazardous event movement
HEN
hazardous event non-movement
HET
hazardous event train accident
HGV
heavy goods vehicle
HLOS
High Level Output Specification
HSE
Health and Safety Executive
HWPG
Health and Wellbeing Policy Group
ILCAD
International Level Crossing Awareness Day
IOSH
Institution of Occupational Safety and Health
ISBP
Industry Strategic Business Plan
ISLG
Infrastructure Safety Liaison Group
LC
level crossing
LCRIM
Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model
LCSG
Level Crossing Strategy Group
LED
light emitting diode
LENNON
Latest Earnings Networked Nationally Overnight (system)
LIDAR
light detection and ranging
LOEAR
Learning from Operational Experience Annual Report
LSCG
Level Crossing Strategy Group
LUL
London underground
LX
level crossing
MAIB
Maritime Accident Investigation Branch
MCB
manually controlled barrier crossing
MCG
manually controlled gate crossing
MWA
moving weighted average
MWL
miniature warning lights
NHS
National Health Service
NMT
New measurement train
NPS
National Passenger Survey
NR
Network Rail
NRMI
Network Rail managed infrastructure
NRT
National Rail Trends
NRV
national reference value
NSA
National Safety Authority
NSFG
National Freight Safety Group
NSPSG
National Suicide Prevention Steering Group
NTS
National Travel Survey
OC
open crossing
OD
obstacle detection
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Acronym
Expansion
OFG
Operations Focus Group
OLE
Overhead line equipment
ONS
Office for National Statistics
ORBIS
Offering Rail Better Information Services
ORCATS
Operational Research Computerised Allocation of Tickets to Services (system)
ORR
Office of Rail and Road
OTP
on-track plant
PHRTA
potentially higher-risk train accident
PIM
Precursor Indicator Model
PLPR
plain line pattern recognition
PTI
platform-train interface
PTSRG
People on Trains and Stations Risk Group
RADAR
Radio Detection And Ranging
RAIB
Rail Accident Investigation Branch
RDG
Rail Delivery Group
RDR PSG
Road Driving Risk Project Steering Group
RID
Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail
RIDDOR
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995
RLSE
red light safety cameras
ROGS
The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems
RRUKA
Rail Research UK Association
RSSB
Rail Safety and Standards Board
RTS
Rail Transport Service
RV
road vehicle
SMIS
Safety Management Information System
SMS
safety management system
SOC
Standard Occupational Classification
SPAD
signal passed at danger
SPG
Safety Policy Group
SPI
safety performance indicator
SRM
Safety Risk Model
SRP
Sustainable Rail Programme
SRR
SPAD Risk Ranking
SSP
Strategic Safety Plan
SSRG
System Safety Risk Group
TOC
train operating company
TORG
Train Operations Risk Group
TPWS
Train Protection and Warning System
TRG
Trespass Risk Group
TSI
Technical Specification for Interoperability
TSLG
Technical Strategy Leadership Group
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Appendices: Glossary
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Acronym
Expansion
UK
United Kingdom
USA
United States of America
UWC
user-worked crossing
UWC-T
user-worked crossing with telephone
YDS
Yard Depot or Siding
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