080107 Draft
An Assessment of the Effects of Fuel
Treatments and Previous Wildfires on Fire
Behavior and Suppression for the
Day and Zaca Fires on the
Los Padres National Forest
Day Fire photo taken Sept. 17, 2006, courtesy
of NASA, Astronaut photo ISSO13-E-81687,
provided by ISS Crew Earth Observations
experiment and the Image Science & Analysis
Group, Johnson Space Center.
Zaca Fire photo courtesy of NASA.
Taken on Aug. 5, 2007 by the
MODIS Rapid Response Team.
Carol Henson
Fire Management Specialist
U.S. Forest Service
Adaptive Management Services Enterprise Team
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary
3
Introduction
6
Wildland Urban Interface
7
Fire History on the Los Padres National Forest
8
Objectives
9
Methodology
9
2006 Day Fire
9
Description of Fire Environment
10
Fire Danger and Weather
10
Fuels
11
Fuel Treatments
12
Topography
13
Fire Behavior Chronology
13
Fire Effects of Fuel Treatments
15
Fire Behavior
15
Suppression Effectiveness
16
Fire Effects of Non-treatments
16
Fire Behavior
16
2007 Zaca Fire
16
Description of Fire Environment
17
Fire Danger and Weather
17
Fuels
19
Fuel Treatments
19
Topography
22
Fire Behavior Chronology
22
Fire Effects of Fuel Treatments
26
Fire Behavior
26
Suppression Effectiveness
27
Fire Effects of Non-treatments
27
Fire Behavior
27
Summary
28
Acknowledgement
30
Appendices
31
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Executive Summary
The 2006 Day and 2007 Zaca Fires both occurred on the Los Padres National Forest in
California.
The 2006 Day Fire burned over 162,000 acres mostly in rugged terrain with moderate to
heavy chaparral and timber. Repeated episodes of Santa Ana winds kept the fire
moving for six weeks during the months of September and October. The fire burned
mostly National Forest System lands but also threatened or caused damage to the
communities of Pine Mountain Club, Lockwood Valley, and Frazier Park.
The 2007 Zaca Fire burned over 240,000 acres in drought stressed and frost-killed
chaparral and drought stressed timber. This “fuels driven” fire burned for almost nine
weeks during the months of July, August, and the first few days of September. Most of
the fire burned on National Forest System lands threatening homes near Los Olivos,
Santa Barbara, and Montecito. It also threatened and impacted municipal watersheds
that supply water to the communities of Santa Barbara, Montecito, Santa Ynez, Lompoc,
Cuyama, and Santa Maria.
Tim Sexton, USFS, Washington Office Fire Use Program Manager requested Adaptive
Management Services Enterprise Team assess the effectiveness of fuel treatments on
the 2006 Day Fire and 2007 Zaca Fire.
The objectives for the assessment were to evaluate:
ƒ
ƒ
Effects of hazardous fuel treatments on
o
Fire behavior
o
Fire suppression
Fire behavior in non-treatment areas
Fuel treatments within the Day Fire perimeter included hand piling and pile burning, and
broadcast burning near the Sespe Wilderness. Fuel treatments reduced fire intensity in
timbered areas but did not aid in fire suppression due to their isolated locations.
Fuel treatments in the Zaca Fire perimeter included prescribed burning in the Santa
Ynez and Cuyama Watersheds. These prescribed burns did not aid firefighters in fire
suppression; however, fuelbreaks and road systems were successfully utilized by
firefighters in containing the fire.
Key findings:
•
Fuel treatments projects were designed to meet resource
objectives and not hazardous fuels objectives.
•
Fuel treatments designed with resource objectives provided no
benefit to fire suppression efforts.
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•
Firefighters that were interviewed felt that a minimum of 70% of a
prescribed burn project area needed to burn to be effective in
modifying fire behavior during a wildfire.
•
Prescribed burn projects may have slowed fire backing down into
Buckhorn Canyon in the Santa Ynez Watershed; however, once
the fire reached the bottom of Buckhorn Canyon in the Santa
Ynez Watershed the fire realigned itself and made rapid runs back
up the canyon in fuels not consumed by the backing fire.
•
Firefighters felt that the regrowth in the older prescribed burn
projects in the Santa Ynez Watershed were near a rotational age
of 30 years and retreatment of those projects was needed to be
successful in modifying fire behavior.
•
Fuel treatments were not designed for and were not effective in
extreme conditions such as record low live fuel moistures or
extreme fire behavior such as plume dominated fire.
•
Previous wildfires provided barriers and opportunities for fire
suppression. The 1994 Marre and the 1998 Ogilvy Fires acted as
barriers to the Zaca Fire even under extremely dry conditions.
The 2003 Piru and 2002 Wolf Fires acted as barriers for the Day
Fire. In addition, fire scars within the Day Fire area burned with
lower intensity leaving standing vegetation. Vegetation was
completely consumed in areas outside of those wildfires.
•
Isolated fuel treatment projects, such as the Alamo Prescribed
Burn Project, need to be landscape level treatments covering
larger areas in order to modify fire behavior for large fires such as
the Day Fires. The Alamo Prescribed Burn Project, even if all
units had been treated, would not have been adequate to aid
firefighters.
•
Fuelbreaks have historically been effective in assisting fire
suppression resources in fighting fires. Fuelbreaks have been
deteriorating due to inadequate budgets and the need to meet
large acre targets. The long-term investment of identifying and
maintaining strategic fuelbreaks across the forest would reduce
suppression costs in the future (i.e. using 1 dozer for fuelbreak
maintenance over several years versus using 6 to 12 dozers to
reopen fuelbreaks during a wildfire).
•
Road systems have historically been effective in assisting fire
suppression resources. Many of these road systems have been
deteriorating due to inadequate budgets. The long-term
investment of identifying and maintaining critical road systems
would provide the needed access for firefighters and provide cost
savings for fire suppression.
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•
Road systems that were widened by removing vegetation or
masticating fuels from roadsides during the wildfires provided
opportunities for crews to hold roads. The long-term investment of
identifying and maintaining vegetation along strategic road
systems will increase opportunities for crews to hold fires and
reduce suppression costs in the future (i.e. 2 masticators
maintaining road systems versus multiple masticators during a
wildfire).
•
Understory burning in timber on Alamo Fuel and Vegetation
Management Project Units 1 and 4 reduced fire intensity and
provided protection to timber stands; however, the treatments did
not assist in the suppression effort.
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I. Introduction
The Los Padres National Forest encompasses approximately 1.76 million acres in the
Coast and Transverse Ranges of California. The forest is located south of San
Francisco, west of the San Joaquin Valley, and north of Ventura.
The forest stretches almost 220 miles from north to south and consists of two separate
land divisions. The northern division is within Monterey County and northern San Luis
Obispo County and includes the Big Sur Coast and scenic interior areas. The southern
division of the forest includes lands within San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura and
Kern Counties.
The Los Padres serves an enormous population base including the San Francisco Bay
Area, the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area, the southern San Joaquin Valley and
the many communities along the south and central coast. The forest provides the scenic
backdrop for many communities and is a significant component of the quality of life in
this area. The forest also supplies a substantial portion of the water needs of several
downstream communities including Santa Barbara and Montecito.
Los Padres National Forest is a major supplier of wildland recreation for southern
California and the Bay Area. Visitors are attracted to the variety of terrain, vegetation,
and recreational settings. Forest recreation has increased yearly. There are 1,257
miles of maintained trails that provide both day-use and extended backpacking
opportunities. The Forest has 459 miles of roads and trails designated for off-highway
vehicle use. Road systems within the forest, other than county or state roads, have
been poorly maintained due to lack of funding.
Much of Los Padres National Forest is unroaded and primitive. Approximately 68% of
the forest is inaccessible by vehicles, including fire suppression resources. It has 10
congressionally designated wildernesses comprising approximately 875,000 acres or
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about 48% of the forest. These include the Ventana, Silver Peak, Santa Lucia,
Machesna, Garcia, San Rafael, Dick Smith, Sespe, Matilija and Chumash Wildernesses.
The forest provides habitat for approximately 468 species of wildlife and 26 listed
threatened and endangered plant and animal species.
Ecosystems in Los Padres National Forest range from semi-desert in interior areas to
redwood forest on the coast. Six major vegetation types cover the Forest's landscape:
chaparral, mixed evergreen and oak forest, oak woodland, pinion-juniper woodland,
conifer forest, and grassland. Cover types recorded in early 2006 are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Cover Types in Los Padres National Forest
Cover Type
Estimated Cover (%)
Chaparral
Mixed evergreen and oak forest
Oak woodland
Pinion and juniper woodland
Coulter, Jeffrey, and Ponderosa Pine
Grassland (natural and type conversion)
68
6
3
13
8
2
Historic fire-return intervals in chaparral likely ranged from 40 to 60 years (Minnich
1988). As a result of increased human-caused ignitions there has been a decrease in
the average fire return interval to 30 to 40 years or less in some areas (Keeley and
others 1999a). In much of southern California, human-caused ignitions have increased
commensurate with population growth (Keeley and others 1999a).
II. Wildland Urban Interface
A large portion of the forest is considered a "wildland-urban interface." The forest has
1,728 miles of private land that borders national forest land. The forest has a number of
communities that that lie within, directly adjacent to, or are in a “wildland fire threat zone”
of the forest boundary. The communities threatened by the 2006 Day Fire and 2007
Zaca Fire includes:
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
Santa Barbara Ranger District - Goleta, Santa Barbara, Montecito,
Summerland, and Carpenteria.
Ojai Ranger District - Meiners Oaks, Oakview, Ojai, Santa Paula,
Fillmore, and Piru.
Mt. Pinos Ranger District - Pine Mountain Club, Lockwood Valley, and
Frazier Park.
A number of fires on the Los Padres pose an imminent threat to communities within and
along the forest boundary, especially on the southern division. This threat is magnified
during periods of high wind, high temperatures, low humidity, low live fuel moistures, and
drought.
III. Fire History on the Los Padres National Forest
The Los Padres National Forest is one of the most fire prone forests in the National
Forest System. Wildfire has burned over 2.7 million acres in the forest since 1912, with
historic averages of about 28,000 acres per year. Most wildfires in the forest are humancaused with the remaining caused by lightning. The average annual wildfires have
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increased steadily over the last 60 years. This increase in fire occurrence is attributed to
urban encroachment and expanded recreational use of the forest.
Some of the largest wildfires in California’s history have occurred within or adjacent to
the forest (see Table 2). In addition, multiple large fires can occur during the same
period of time on the forest. An example of this was in 1985 when the forest had three
large fires that started within six days of each other. The Wheeler Fire on the Ojai
Ranger District (119,361 acres) and the Las Pilitas Fire on the Santa Lucia Ranger
District (74,640 acres) started on July 1st, and the Gorda-Rat Fire on the Monterey
Ranger District (55,700 acres) started on July 6th.
Table 2. CAL FIRE 20 Largest California Wildland Fires
The terrain, vegetation and weather patterns are such that wildfires in the forest's interior
can and do move rapidly. Major fire runs of up to 8.5 miles in a burn period do occur,
and these can quickly burn into adjacent communities. An example of this was the 1990
Paint Fire that traveled 5 miles into Santa Barbara and Goleta destroying over 600
homes within a 2-hour period.
Since peak rainfall follows the fire season, the forest and adjacent communities are also
often at risk from a fire-flood cycle and attendant erosion after wildfires.
IV. Objectives
The objectives for the assessment were to evaluate:
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ƒ
Effects of hazardous fuel treatments on
o
o
ƒ
Fire behavior
Fire suppression
Fire behavior in non-treatment areas and other vegetation management
treatments units.
V. Methodology
Interviews with firefighters and fire behavior experts on the Day and Zaca Fires were
conducted; ground and aerial reconnaissance of both fires occurred before, during and
after the fires; video and photographs of both fires were reviewed; and data that was
collected by staff on the Los Padres National Forest were all utilized for this report.
VI. 2006 Day Fire
The Day Fire started on September 4, 2006 at 1:55 p.m. in upper Piru Creek,
approximately 16 miles north of Castaic, California. The fire was caused by an individual
burning a small amount of material within the Los Padres National Forest. It was
contained on October 13, 2006 and burned a total of162,702 acres.
a. Description of Fire Environment
i. Fire Danger and Weather
1. Fire Danger
The Los Padres NF had experienced normal to above normal rainfall in the
winter and spring of 2005 – 2006. The U.S. Drought Monitor for September 5,
2006 showed that the area was not affected by drought.
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However, temperatures in California from May through July were above normal
with a return to normal temperatures in August. The increase in temperatures for
the three-month period caused fuel moistures in the area to drop significantly. In
May, the live fuel moistures at Rose Valley were 80% and at Ozena were 73%,
but by the first of September the fuel moistures had dropped to 63% and 57%
respectively.
On September 4th the Energy Release Component (ERC) 1 was 76, which was at
the 97th percentile 2 . This indicated that although it appeared the area was rated
moderately moist on the PDSI chart, the fuels were extremely dry and ready to
burn.
1
The Energy Release Component (ERC) is a National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS) index related to how hot a fire could
burn. The ERC serves as a good characterization of fire season as it tracks seasonal fire danger trends well. The ERC is a function
of the fuel model and live and dead fuel moistures. Fuel loading, woody fuel moistures, and larger fuel moistures all have an
influence on the ERC, while the lighter fuels have less influence and wind speed has none. ERC has low variability, and is the best
fire danger component for indicating the effects of intermediate to long-term drying on fire behavior.
2
th
The 97 percentile was developed from statistical analysis of historical fire weather data and serves as a breakpoint for agencies
to determine staffing levels. Percentile levels give an indication of the current situation compared to previous years in the database.
If a day has an index at the 97th percentile level, it means that only 3 percent of the days in the historical database had an index
higher than this.
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The Los Padres NF uses the Burning Index (BI) 3 as a basis for determining
staffing levels. The National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS) BI for
September 4th on the Mt. Pinos Ranger District ranged from 70 with an adjective
rating 4 of Very High to 89 with an adjective rating of Extreme. Each of the
indices indicated that there was high potential for very active fire behavior and
large fire growth.
2. Weather
During the duration of the Day Fire, the local Remote Automated Weather
Stations (RAWS) reported temperatures ranging from 53 to 104 degrees
Fahrenheit and relative humidity ranging from 6 to 100 percent. For the most
part, temperatures were in the mid to high 80s and relative humidity was in the
mid teens to low twenties. Local weather thresholds developed for firefighters on
the Los Padres NF to alert them to potential extreme fire behavior are
temperatures above 90 degrees and relative humidity of less than 25%.
Winds were a significant problem on the Day Fire, switching between a marine
influence with west-southwesterly winds, lower temperatures, higher humidity,
and lower wind speeds to a very dry north-northeasterly flow or Santa Ana Wind
event with high temperatures, single digit humidity, and strong winds with gusts
to 70 mph.
ii. Fuels
The Day Fire burned approximately 90,000 acres of mostly dense mature
chaparral. The major shrub types were dominated by sagebrush, buckwheat,
chamise, manzanita, scrub oak, and canyon live oak. It also burned
approximately 7,000 acres of Big-Cone Douglas fir, approximately 23,000 acres
of Ponderosa Pine and Jeffery Pine, and about 25,000 acres of Pinion Pine
woodland.
There was very little fire history within the perimeter of the Day Fire. Much of the
vegetation was mature with a high dead component and large accumulations of
live and dead fuels. Approximately 1/3 of the area that had burned in the Day
Fire had no recorded fire history, about 1/3 of the area had not burned since the
1932 Matilija Fire (220,000 acres), and about 1/5 of the area hadn’t burned since
1960. There were other smaller fires within the perimeter of the Day Fire,
including the 1980 Lockwood Fire (5,640 acres) and the 1987 Fish Fire (4,205
acres). Along the southern edge of the Day Fire was the 2002 Wolf Fire (21,638
acres) and on the western edge was the 2003 Piru Fire (63,720 acres).
Live fuel moisture levels taken in chamise were normal for the time of year (See
Day Fire Fuel Moistures, Table 3). A rule of thumb for critical fuel moisture levels
3
The Burning Index (BI) is an NFDRS index relating to the flame length at the head of the fire. BI is an estimate of the potential
difficulty of fire control as a function of how fast and how hot a fire could burn. It has been scaled so that the BI value divided by 10
predicts the flame length at the head of a fire. For example, a BI of 75 would predict a flame length of 7.5 feet. BI is a function of the
Spread Component (how fast a fire will burn) and the Energy Release Component, and has moderate variability. It is sensitive to
fuel models, and can trace seasonal trends reasonably well for fuel models with heavy dead or live components.
4
The adjective rating is a public information component of the NFDRS specific to the rating of fire danger. Adjective ratings are: low
(L), moderate (M), high (H), very high (VH) and extreme (E).
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are 60% in chamise. This level indicates that live fuels will burn as if they are
dead and fire can exhibit extreme fire behavior.
Table 3.
Day Fire Live Fuel Moisture.
Date
September 1
September 15
Location
Hardluck
Ozena
Rose Valley
Hardluck
Ozena
Rose Valley
Live Fuel Moisture
67%
57%
63%
66%
55%
58%
1. Fuel Treatments
Thinning of timber in the upper portions of Alamo Mountain had occurred in the
early 1990s. The Alamo Fuel and Vegetation Management Project consisted of
four units, which covered all of Alamo Mountain. This project was part of a series
of projects that would treat hazardous fuels around the perimeter of the Sespe
Wilderness to provide protection to the communities of Frazier Park, Pine
Mountain Club, and Lockwood Valley (See Appendix 1).
Unit 1 encompassed the entire west side of Alamo Mountain down into Piru and
Alamo Creek. Implementation of the hazardous fuels project in Unit 1 began in
2002 with hand cutting and burning piles along the upper portion of the unit.
Subsequent treatment in 2003 consisted of using prescribed fire to create a
patchwork or islands of burned and unburned vegetation. Approximately 40% of
the area (4,840 acres) was treated creating a mosaic pattern with burned and
unburned islands. The timber in the upper portion of Alamo Unit 1 was treated
by understory burning while the lower portion of chaparral was ignited using a
helitorch.
Treatment of Unit 4, located above the Alamo Mountain Loop Road, began in
2005 with approximately 350 acres treated with understory burning. The Forest
had planned to complete Unit 4 treatment when conditions allowed. The forest
had planned to implement Units 2 and 3 in subsequent years.
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iii. Topography
The terrain is convoluted and complex, with the main river valley drainages running west
to east, significant secondary drainages running north to south, and tertiary drainages
running at varying angles from both of these. Slopes are very steep, averaging 50
percent, with some rising from 1,100 feet to 6,000 feet in less than a mile (over 90
percent). Elevations encompassed by the fire ranged from 1,100 feet to 8,000 feet.
b. Fire Behavior Chronology
The Day Fire started on September 4, 2006 at 1:55 p.m. southwest of Pyramid Lake in
upper Piru Creek. High temperatures, low humidity, and wind gusts of up to 27 miles per
hour pushed the fire very quickly in heavy chaparral up Piru Creek, which is extremely
steep and inaccessible. Aerial attack was made using water and retardant but crews
were unable to access the fire until September 6th. The fire made rapid advances to the
southwest and northeast driven by hot temperatures, low humidity, steep slopes, and
heavy fuels. 100-foot flame lengths with rapid rates of spread were reported. On
September 7th the southern portion of the Day Fire burned into the scar of 2003 Piru Fire
area. Fire behavior modified in the Piru Fire scar providing opportunities for firefighters
to put handline directly on the fire’s edge.
Fire behavior moderated on September 8th through September 11th as the marine layer
pushed into the area from the south and west bringing slightly cooler temperatures and
higher humidity. The southern perimeter of the fire continued to hold along the 2003
Piru Fire perimeter, which had lighter fuels. The combination of weather and lighter fuels
provided opportunity for firefighters to construct handline directly along the southern
perimeter. Although fire behavior moderated on the southern portion, the northern edge
of the fire continued to move in a northerly direction in heavy fuels and steep,
inaccessible terrain.
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On September 12th another Santa Ana wind event occurred and fire activity picked up
significantly to the south and west. Rates of spread were estimated around 10 mph with
spotting distances of up to 200 yards. On the southwest edge of the fire, a spot fire
quickly established in Aqua Blanca Creek and grew to 1,000 acres.
A return of the marine layer occurred on September 13th through 15th, which again
moderated fire behavior. Little fire activity was reported during this time. Firefighters
took advantage of the conditions to construct handline directly on the fire’s edge.
On September 16th, the return of the Santa Ana winds increased fire behavior
substantially. The fire made rapid runs to the west, where it crossed Sespe Creek and
then moved west and southwest beyond the Topatopa Mountains.
The Santa Ana winds diminished by early afternoon on September 17th slowing the
westward spread of the fire but the fire remained active. Firefighters were able to take
advantage of the lower wind speeds and dropped retardant along the southern edge
holding the fire in check.
On September 18th through 19th the fire was very active again, especially on the
northwest perimeter near Mutau Flat, Snowy Peak, and Alamo Mountain; and the
southern perimeter near Topatopa Bluffs. Fuels in the area included chaparral, mixed
conifer, and a pinion-pine/juniper mix. The fire moved steadily towards Lockwood Valley
and a spot fire was detected on Alamo Mountain. The east, south, and southeast
section of the fire had minimal fire activity, especially in the area that had burned in the
2002 Wolf Fire where fuels were light.
The main fire activity on the 20th and 21st was on the north side of the fire in chaparral at
the lower elevations and mixed conifer at the higher elevations. Intense backing fire on
Alamo Mountain occurred with interior uphill runs on the main mountain ridge. An
attempt to slow fire spread utilizing aerial ignition along Alamo Mountain towards Black
Mountain occurred on the 21st.
Mid day on September 22nd and through the 23rd Santa Ana Winds occurred over the fire
with wind speeds reaching 15 – 30 mph and gusts at 50 to 70 mph. The fire made
significant runs of about 3.5 miles to the west in the Lockwood Valley area. Spot fires
occurred to the southwest.
On September 24th the wind event ended and a more typical onshore weather pattern
returned. Fire behavior moderated through the day but picked up on the 25th and the
26th on the northwest perimeter near the community of Lockwood Valley. Nine
structures and five vehicles were destroyed. Rapid rates of spread and 300-foot
firewhirls were reported.
Fire behavior moderated and was for the most part terrain driven on September 27th as
winds were light but conditions remained very dry with relative humidity in the single
digits. A Red Flag Warning was issued due to the low humidity which extended through
the 28th.
Winds remained light through October 2nd allowing firefighters to get line around the fire.
The fire was declared contained on October 2nd. The fire burned an area that was
162,702 acres in size.
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c. Fire Effects of Fuel Treatments
i. Fire Behavior
The timbered areas that were treated in the 2002 Alamo Unit 1 and the 2005
Alamo Unit 4 along the upper portions of Alamo Mountain, burned less severely
than portions that were not treated. Flame lengths measured by scorch heights
on individual trees had dropped to about 3-feet once fire moved into the treated
areas. Although the fire did make several significant runs up into both units, the
treatments provided protection to a significant portion of the timber in both units.
Untreated
Treated
Several green islands remained in the lower portions of Alamo Mountain because
of pockets of chaparral treated in the 2002 Alamo Unit 1 Prescribed Burn.
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ii. Suppression Effectiveness
The Alamo Fuel and Vegetation Management Project Units 1 and 4 were not
utilized by fire suppression resources in holding, firing, or containing the Day
Fire. Both projects were isolated on Alamo Mountain, which allowed fire to burn
around the fuel treatments.
d. Fire Effects of Non-treatments
i. Fire Behavior
The Day Fire burned as a stand replacing fire in most of the chaparral covered
areas with over 100-foot flame lengths and rapid rates of spread of up to 3.5
miles per hour.
The fire burned into several recent wildfires including the 1980 Lockwood Fire
and the 1987 Fish Fire. More vegetation was left standing in the Lockwood and
Fish Fire scars, which indicates that the fire burned at lower intensity in those
areas. On the southern edge of the fire where the 2002 Wolf and the 2003 Piru
Fires burned fire, suppression resources were able to hold the fire due to lighter
fuels. The fire burned only 353 acres into the Wolf Fire and only 1,816 acres
into the Piru Fire.
VII. 2007 Zaca Fire
The Zaca Fire started on July 4, 2007 at 10:52 a.m. near Zaca Creek west of Zaca Lake
north of Los Olivos, California. The fire was human caused. The fire was contained on
September 2, 2007 and burned a total of 240,207 acres.
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a. Description of Fire Environment
i. Fire Danger and Weather
1. Fire Danger
The Los Padres NF had experienced little rainfall in the winter of 2006 – 2007.
Most areas of the forest were the driest on record. Precipitation measurements
at three rain gages in or near the fire area are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Precipitation During 2006/2007 Rain Year
Rain Gage Rainfall Oct. 1, 2006 to Rank among
Location
May 25, 2007 (inches)
Driest Years
Cuyama
3.06
4
Cachuma
7.18
1
Ojai
5.68
1
Years of
Record
53
55
91
Source: Ventura Co Watershed protection District and County of Santa Barbara
The Palmer Drought Severity Index for July 2007 indicated that the fire area was
in extreme drought conditions.
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Adding to the dead fuel load, record to near record cold temperatures in
December 2006 and January 2007 resulted in freeze-killed chaparral throughout
the forest.
Two fuels and fire behavior alerts were issued in May and June of 2007 to alert
firefighters that very low fuel moistures were at least two months early in most
areas and the samples collected exhibited the lowest fuel moistures on record.
The alerts warned firefighters that they would experience increased rates of
spread and spotting along with more active nighttime burning in the area.
The ERC for the area was 84, which greatly exceeded the 97th percentile and set
a new record for ERC’s. The NFDRS BI for the Santa Lucia Ranger District on
July 4th was rated at 77, Very High.
2. Weather
During the Zaca Fire, the RAWS reported temperatures during the daytime
ranging from 70 to 102 degrees Fahrenheit with relative humidity ranging from 2
to 67%. For the most part, temperatures were in the high 80s to mid 90s and
relative humidity was in the low to high teens and mid twenties. Local weather
thresholds used by firefighters to indicate high potential for extreme fire behavior
on the Los Padres NF are set at temperatures above 90 degrees and relative
humidity of less than 25%.
The winds were generally light throughout the life of the fire. Wind direction
varied due to a combination of terrain, coastal and San Joaquin Valley
influences, and general weather patterns.
The main weather influence was the interaction of the marine layer and the
strong thermal trough over the San Joaquin Valley. The marine layer is created
when high temperatures in the inland valleys cause air to rise, pulling in moist,
cool air from the coast. Lower slope and valley winds were primarily terrain
driven but occasionally wind speeds were enhanced along west-to-east oriented
terrain in the afternoon due to a westerly onshore flow.
Occasionally, a strong marine wind from the west would bring slightly stronger
gusty northwest winds across the mountains. This occurred on August 4th and
resulted in a significant increase in fire growth to the south and southeast. A light
offshore flow occurred almost every night, through the morning hours along
ridgetops, and at some sites winds would gust to 20 mph before sunrise.
A typical shallow morning temperature inversion was present over most valley
and canyon bottoms but would dissipate by late morning. A mid to upper slope
inversion also occurred, indicating a thermal belt at around 4,500 to 5,000 feet.
At and above this layer the overnight relative humidity recovery was poor and the
nightly low temperatures only got down to the mid 60s.
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ii. Fuels
Fuels within and adjacent to the fire consisted of grasses and chaparral species
including sage, rabbit brush, whitethorn, manzanita, and chamise. Tree species
include scrub oak, pinion pine, and juniper at lower elevations; with Jeffrey Pine
and mixed conifer islands at the higher elevations.
Vegetation was extremely stressed due to the drought. Many species of
chaparral had begun to drop leaves and needles. In addition, abnormal frost
conditions during the winter had killed large areas of chamise and other
chaparral species across much of the forest.
Another factor contributing to chaparral combustibility was the amount of
extractives that occurred in various chaparral species as the summer
progressed. Increasing ether extractives, oils, ash, or mineral content results in
increasing combustibility in the various species (Philpot and Mutch 1971). Ether
extractives in many species can rise from 8.3 to 15% during the summer, making
foliage more easily ignited (Philpot 1969). An extractive content over 10%
indicates high crowning potential (Philpot and Mutch 1971). It is unknown what
the levels of extractives were before or after the Zaca Fire.
Historically, a number of large fires had burned in the area of the Zaca Fire.
These fires included: the 1923 Oso Canyon Fire, 1932 Matilija Fire, 1933 Indians
Canyon Fire, 1964 Coyote Fire, 1965 Rancho Fire, 1966 Wellman Fire, 1985
Wheeler Fire,1994 Marre Fire, 1998 Ogilvy Fire, and the 2006 Perkins Fire
However, almost half of the fire area had no recorded fire history and areas
burned prior to 1985 had recovered fully. The fuels in the area had an extremely
high dead component and high accumulation of live and dead fuels.
Live fuel moisture samples taken in chamise prior to the fire were well below
normal for the time of year (See Table 5), and in fact, were at record low-levels.
Critical fuel moisture levels of 60% in chamise indicate that live fuels will burn as
if they are dead and that fire can exhibit extreme behavior.
Table 5. Live Fuel Moisture Table.
Date
Location
Live Fuel Moisture
July 1
Upper Oso
58%
Ozena
48%
July 15
Upper Oso
51%
Ozena
47%
1. Fuel Treatments
There were four fuel treatment projects within the Zaca Fire perimeter. These
included the 1988 Little Pine, 1988 Buckhorn C, 1989 Buckhorn D, and 2002
Diablo A Prescribed Burns. In addition, there were five projects directly adjacent
to the fire perimeter including the 1985 Buckhorn B, 1986 Oso, 1992 Pendola,
1996 Cuyama 1, and the 1997 Cuyama 2 Prescribed Burns. (See Appendix 3 for
list of all prescribed burns in or near the Zaca Fire).
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All but the Cuyama 1 and 2 Prescribed Burns, which sit along the northern
perimeter of the Zaca Fire, were part of a large-scale watershed project called
the Santa Ynez Flood Prevention Project. These projects were conducted in an
effort to reduce erosion and flooding caused by high severity wildfires that would
negatively affect urban areas and reservoirs in or below the watershed.
These projects targeted burning 50 to 70% of the project areas. The remaining
vegetation was left to provide wildlife habitat, to protect riparian areas, and to
regenerate vegetation in the burned areas more quickly. The Diablo A
Prescribed Burn had an additional constraint in that firing would not occur within
1,000 feet of the riparian areas (See Appendix 2). This reduced the number of
acres that were available to burn. The actual burned areas for all of the projects
ranged from 40 to 50% of the project areas.
Cuyama 1 and 2 Prescribed Burn projects were designed to support the Sierra
Madre Fuelbreak, which runs across the top of the ridge above the project units.
Objectives for these projects were to burn 50 to 70% of the unit but only about
40% of each unit was burned.
All of the prescribed burn projects were burned in the late fall, winter, and early
spring under cooler conditions in order to reduce the intensity and severity of the
burns.
The Sierra Madre Fuelbreak is an existing fuelbreak along the Sierra Madre
Ridge, which borders the San Rafael Wilderness. Although this fuelbreak had
not been maintained since the 1980s it was still in very good shape. Historically
this fuelbreak has held every fire that has burned to it.
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Photo of Sierra Madre Ridge
The Monte Arido Fuelbreak is an existing fuelbreak that runs along the border of
the Santa Barbara and Ojai Ranger Districts. This fuelbreak had some
maintenance work done in 2002 but needed maintenance along other sections of
the fuelbreak. This fuelbreak has been successful in assisting firefighters with
holding past wildfires.
Photo of Monte Arido Fuelbreak
There were a number of old fuelbreaks and preattack lines that had been
abandoned within and outside the Zaca Fire. Most of these fuelbreaks and
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preattack lines had not been maintained since the 1960s and 1970s and were in
poor condition.
iii. Topography
This area is located where the Sierra Madre Mountains and the San Rafael
Mountains meet, creating very complex and extremely rugged topography.
Elevations range from 1,800 to 6,500 feet. A large saddle shaped area is located
to the east between Big Pine Mountain and Monte Arido. The primary drainages
are the west and east forks of Santa Cruz Creek and Coche Creek and the upper
drainage of the Sisquoc River In the northwestern half of the “saddle” the
drainages run north to south including Pie Canyon, Indian Creek, Alamar Creek,
Don Victor Creek; while in the southeastern half they run from east to west Mono Creek, Aqua Caliente Creek, and the upper Santa Ynez River.
b. Fire Behavior Chronology
The Zaca Fire was reported on July 4, 2007 at 10:52 a.m. in an area north of Los
Olivos, California near Zaca Lake. The fire established itself quickly running
through a mix of light and heavy fuels moving rapidly to the east-northeast
upslope to the San Rafael Mountains.
From July 5th through the 12th the Zaca Fire moved north towards the Sisquoc
River and east into the San Rafael Wilderness. Hot, dry conditions with steep,
rugged terrain and drought-stressed fuels created extreme fire behavior with
spotting as the fire burned. The fire would make significant runs, backing into
canyon and drainage bottoms then make runs when the fire would align with
slope and wind. The southern edge of the Zaca Fire moved into and skirted
along the 1993 Marre Fire perimeter, but because of lighter fuels within the Marre
Fire area, firefighters were able to keep the fire spread in check along that
perimeter. The Marre fire continued to act as a barrier to fire spread even during
times of active burning.
2007 Zaca Fire
1994 Marre Fire Scar
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During July 13th through the 14th, crews were able to use a trail system in the San
Rafael Wilderness to backfire from, which held the east flank of the fire. The fire
was out of alignment with slope and wind but would back down into canyons and
drainages then realign itself and make major runs upslope. Due to the
inaccessibility of the terrain and the uncertainty of containment opportunities in
the San Rafael Wilderness, firefighters began using up to twelve dozers to
reopen abandoned fuelbreaks and preattack lines north toward the community of
Tepusquet. Six dozers were used to rebuild fuelbreaks to the south of the fire
toward Santa Cruz Peak. The Camino Cielo Fuelbreak was also reopened just
north of Santa Barbara as a contingency. Vegetation along road systems that
could be used by fire suppression resources were widened using multiple
masticators and handcrews, and roadbeds were improved for better access. The
1994 Marre Fire continued to act as a barrier to fire spread even during times of
active burning.
On July 15th through the 18th, winds pushed the fire to the south making a
significant run toward Cachuma Saddle. This triggered an evacuation of homes
in Peachtree Canyon, Happy Canyon, Tunnel Ranch, Sedgwick, and Rancho de
los Vistadores. The fire was also very active to the east and north moving
deeper into the San Rafael Wilderness. The northern flank of the fire continued
to hold due to the efforts of firefighters. Contingency work continued on
abandoned fuelbreaks and preattack lines north of the Santa Ynez River.
Fire spread moderated during July 18th to the 25th but the fire remained active to
the south and east. Firefighters were able to gain ground along southwest, west,
northwest, north, and northeastern flanks of the fire but the fire continued to push
east. The northern and western flanks continued to hold well.
Warmer and drier conditions during July 26th through the 27th caused an increase
in fire activity. Humidity was in the single digit range, but containment lines held.
On the 28th the southeast flank was still uncontained in an area that was
inaccessible to crews. The fire became very active with a 500-acre flare-up and
spot fires ahead of the main fire.
On July 29th the fire made a significant run to the southeast due to continued hot
and dry conditions. The new perimeter was in extremely steep and rocky terrain
making access by firefighters impossible. The fire established itself in Black
Canyon below Santa Cruz Peak. Evacuation orders were again issued for the
Happy Canyon and Peachtree areas due to the renewed threat from the southern
progression of the fire.
During July 30th to August 1st an inversion, which resulted in lower temperatures
in low-lying areas, moderated fire behavior during the late mornings through the
later afternoons at the lower elevations. Fire behavior remained very active
above the inversion especially at night when the top of the inversion dropped to
below 1,000 feet.
On August 2nd the inversion lowered below the fire and fire behavior increased
substantially, moving fire down through Black Canyon and the upper drainage of
Coche Creek that was aligned with the west winds.
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On August 3rd through the 4th the inversion was gone and the weather changed
to drier and more unstable conditions. During this time, the fire raced through
Coche Creek and Santa Cruz Canyon. It burned through Old Man Mountain and
reached Buckhorn Road leading to Little Pine Mountain. The fire also moved to
the northeast into Mission Pine Basin and into the upper portions of the Sisquoc
River. Fire burned at high intensity through chaparral and timber stands at the
higher elevations. The evacuation warning was expanded to include Paradise
Road in the Lower Santa Ynez River up to Gibraltar Dam. Two Type 1 Incident
Management Teams and an Area Command Team were ordered due to the size
and complexity of the fire.
An unseasonably cool mass of air moved across the area on August 5th through
the 7th, causing a cooling and moistening trend. The marine layer or inversion
deepened to 4,000 feet. The cooler, moister air modified fire behavior below the
inversion while the southwest wind flow pushed the fire to the east. Although the
weather was cooler and moister, the extremely dry drought-stressed fuels
continued to burn actively carrying fire into the Dick Smith Wilderness. Observed
fire behavior was mostly backing fire with short intense uphill runs in continuous
fuels. Rolling material contributed significantly to forward fire progression. The
fire would often stall on sparsely fueled ridges for up to two days before rolling
material would ignite another continuous fuel bed.
During this time, firefighters were able to fight the fire directly and start backfiring
operations on the southern flank. The work on secondary and contingency lines
continued to the south and southeast of the fire area.
On August 6th the management of the fire was split into two zones: the
Richardson Zone to the north, and the Live Oak Zone to the south.
From August 8th through the 13th a drying and warming trend occurred as high
pressure built up across central California. This created a prevailing northeast
flow of wind during the night and morning hours that pushed the fire downslope
and down canyon. In the later morning hours, daytime onshore winds would
assist upslope, up canyon winds in pushing the fire up to the tops of ridges where
the fire would slop over into unburned drainages to the east.
In the Live Oak Zone firefighters in Buckhorn Canyon observed that the fire
backed down more slowly in areas that had burned in the Little Pine, Buckhorn
C, and Buckhorn D Prescribed Burns, but realigned itself with slope and wind to
make rapid runs east in Indian Creek and Pie Canyons. Spotting occurred in
areas to the south and north with spotting distances of up to ½ mile observed.
Firing operations were successful along the western and southwestern flanks.
In the Richardson Zone, firefighters started reopening abandoned fuelbreaks and
preattack lines, improving road systems, and improving the Sierra Madre
Fuelbreak to the east and south of the fire. Relative humidity dropped to as low
as 1%, contributing to extreme fire behavior in Rattlesnake and Sisquoc Canyons
with firewhirls and flame lengths of 100 feet observed. Firing from the Sierra
Madre Fuelbreak began as the fire made a significant run up Judell Canyon on
the east side of the Sisquoc River on the 13th.
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On August 14th the fire moved into the 1998 Ogilvy Fire. The Ogilvy Fire scar
was a significant barrier to fire spread. and allowed firefighters to construct direct
line. There was some fire activity in the burn scar, which occurred when the fire
made a run towards the Don Victor Jeepway and spotted into the burn scar, but
these spot fires were easily suppressed due to the fire burning at lower
intensities.
Zaca Fire
1998 Ogilvy Fire
Scar
USFS Photo of the Zaca Fire and Ogilvy Fire Scar
On August 15th through the 16th, the fire was still burning within the secondary or
contingency lines completed by firefighters. The fire had moved into the Narrows
in Mono Canyon and continued moving east towards the Matilija Wilderness.
Firefighters continued with firing operations on a secondary line along the
southern flank of the fire just east of the 1998 Ogilvy Fire.
Fire behavior increased substantially during this period. The combination of the
wildfire and firing operations created plume dominated 5 fire when the fire moved
from Mono Canyon into the upper portion of Aqua Caliente Canyon. This area
had been treated as part of the Diablo Unit A Prescribed Burn, but the treatment
did not slow the fire progression and the fire burned as a high intensity stand
replacing fire.
On August 17th to the 18th the fire was well established in the Aqua Caliente
drainage. A five-acre slopover occurred along the Monte Arido Fuelbreak near
Diablo Canyon but was contained by firefighters. An evacuation order was
issued for Gibraltar Road east to the Santa Barbara - Ventura County line. Firing
continued along the Sierra Madre Fuelbreak down Santa Barbara Canyon toward
Highway 33.
5
Plume dominated fire is a fire whose behavior is governed primarily by the local wind circulation produced in response to the
strong convection currents above the fire rather than by regional wind patterns.
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On August 19th the northwest perimeter was well established in Sweetwater and
Foresters Leap Canyons on the north rim of the Sisquoc Canyon where the fire
continued to burn very actively. Firefighters on the southeast perimeter had to
stop firing along the Pendola Jeepway and in the Ogilvy Ranch area due to
unfavorable winds, hot temperatures and low relative humidity.
During August 20th and 21st firing operations continued. Firefighters in the Live
Oak Zone were successful in completing handline around Aqua Caliente Springs
and firing operations along Pendola Jeepway to the Monte Arido Fuelbreak.
Firing continued in the Richardson Zone along Santa Barbara Canyon to Dry
Canyon toward Brubaker Canyon.
On August 22nd the Live Oak Zone of the Zaca Fire was declared contained and
all evacuation warnings were lifted.
On August 23rd through September 4th, crews constructed direct handline
containing the northern perimeter of the fire from the Sierra Madre Fuelbreak to
the Sisquoc River drainage. Firing was successfully completed from Brubaker
Canyon along Highway 33 to Potrero Seco and the Monte Arido Fuelbreak to
Highway 33. Spot fires and slopovers occurred but firefighters were able to
contain them quickly.
There were minor wind events during the life of the fire but for the most part fire
behavior was described as “fuels driven” 6 , burning in heavy fuels and very
rugged terrain. The fire made significant upslope runs when aligned with slope,
fuels, and wind with spotting distances of up to ½ mile. The fire would then back
more slowly down into drainages.
c. Fire Effects of Fuel Treatments
i. Fire Behavior
The fire burned into the 1985 Little Pine, 1988 Buckhorn C, and the 1989
Buckhorn D Prescribed Burns below Little Pine Mountain in Buckhorn
Creek. Firefighters observed that the fire backed down more slowly in the
area of these fuel treatments than canyons not treated. However once
the fire established itself in the bottom of the canyon it would make
significant runs to the top with flame lengths in excess of 50 feet, making
the treatments ineffective in helping firefighters.
The Zaca Fire did not enter the 1996 Cuyama 1 and 1997 Cuyama 2
Prescribed Burns.
The 2002 Diablo A Prescribed Burn did not affect the fire due to extreme,
plume dominated fire behavior as it burned through the treatment area.
6
Fuels driven fires are ones that burn in heavy accumulations of very dry live and/or dead vegetation, becoming very active without
the addition of regional winds. As the fire gains momentum burning upslope it creates its own wind and weather.
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ii. Suppression Effectiveness
The prescribed burn units provided no help for fire suppression
resources. Although the fire backed downslope more slowly in the area
of the fuel treatments, the fire repositioned itself and made significant
runs, which didn’t help firefighters. Reopening and maintaining existing
and abandoned fuelbreaks and preattack lines were more effective in
assisting with suppression efforts.
Firefighters utilized the Sierra Madre Fuelbreak for firing operations. The
Sierra Madre Fuelbreak has historically been successful in assisting
firefighters in holding wildfires, including the 1966 Wellman Fire, the 1997
Spanish Fire, the 2004 Perkins Fire, and the 2006 Bald Fire.
Firing from the Sierra Madre Fuelbreak
The Monte Arido Fuelbreak, although severely tested, held the fire in
check. It too has been a successful fire suppression resource in the past.
The fuelbreak held the 1985 Wheeler Fire assisting firefighters with
holding the fire on the east side of the fuelbreak.
Firefighters were also able to use some of the secondary lines (reopened
fuelbreaks and preattack lines) and road systems to hold the fire. Once
fire moved into road systems that had been widened by hand and
masticators the flame lengths dropped to 1-1/2 feet in height.
d. Fire Effects in Non-treatment Areas
i. Fire Behavior
The fire was a high severity, stand-replacing fire that was driven by
extremely drought stressed and frost-killed fuels. For the most part, the fire
was out of alignment with slopes and winds, backing down into canyons
then realigning itself with slope and wind to make major upslope runs.
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Spotting distances of up to ½ mile were observed and flame lengths of
100+ feet were reported at times.
VIII. Summary
Interviews with firefighters, forest staff, and fire behavior analysts revealed that:
•
Fuel treatments projects were designed to meet resource
objectives and not hazardous fuels objectives.
•
Fuel treatments designed with resource objectives provided no
benefit to fire suppression efforts.
•
Firefighters that were interviewed felt that a minimum of 70% of a
prescribed burn project area needed to burn to be effective in
modifying fire behavior during a wildfire.
•
Prescribed burn projects may have slowed fire backing down into
Buckhorn Canyon in the Santa Ynez Watershed; however, once
the fire reached the bottom of Buckhorn Canyon in the Santa
Ynez Watershed the fire realigned itself and made rapid runs back
up the canyon in fuels not consumed by the backing fire.
•
Firefighters felt that the regrowth in the older prescribed burn
projects in the Santa Ynez Watershed were near a rotational age
of 30 years and retreatment of those projects was needed to be
successful in modifying fire behavior.
•
Fuel treatments were not designed for and were not effective in
extreme conditions such as record low live fuel moistures or
extreme fire behavior such as plume dominated fire.
•
Previous wildfires provided barriers and opportunities for fire
suppression. The 1994 Marre and the 1998 Ogilvy Fires acted as
barriers to the Zaca Fire even under extremely dry conditions.
The 2003 Piru and 2002 Wolf Fires acted as barriers for the Day
Fire. In addition, fire scars within the Day Fire area burned with
lower intensity leaving standing vegetation. Vegetation was
completely consumed in areas outside of those wildfires.
•
Isolated fuel treatment projects, such as the Alamo Prescribed
Burn Project, need to be landscape level treatments covering
larger areas in order to modify fire behavior for large fires such as
the Day Fires. The Alamo Prescribed Burn Project, even if all
units had been treated, would not have been adequate to aid
firefighters.
•
Fuelbreaks have historically been effective in assisting fire
suppression resources in fighting fires. Fuelbreaks have been
deteriorating due to inadequate budgets and the need to meet
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large acre targets. The long-term investment of identifying and
maintaining strategic fuelbreaks across the forest would reduce
suppression costs in the future (i.e. using 1 dozer for fuelbreak
maintenance over several years versus using 6 to 12 dozers to
reopen fuelbreaks during a wildfire).
•
Road systems have historically been effective in assisting fire
suppression resources. Many of these road systems have been
deteriorating due to inadequate budgets. The long-term
investment of identifying and maintaining critical road systems
would provide the needed access for firefighters and provide cost
savings for fire suppression.
•
Road systems that were widened by removing vegetation or
masticating fuels from roadsides during the wildfires provided
opportunities for crews to hold roads. The long-term investment of
identifying and maintaining vegetation along strategic road
systems will increase opportunities for crews to hold fires and
reduce suppression costs in the future (i.e. 2 masticators
maintaining road systems versus multiple masticators during a
wildfire).
•
Understory burning in timber on Alamo Fuel and Vegetation
Management Project Units 1 and 4 reduced fire intensity and
provided protection to timber stands; however, the treatments did
not assist in the suppression effort.
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IX. Acknowledgements
Diane Cross, Forest Fuels Planner, LPF, USFS
Lance Cross, Ojai Division Chief, LPF, USFS
Steve Davis, Forest Fuels Officer, LPF, USFS
Lloyd Simpson, Forest Botanist, LPF, USFS
John Bridgwater, Ojai District Ranger, LPF, USFS
Jay Miller, Remote Sensing Specialist, FAM, USFS
Anthony Escobar, FAM Chief, LPF, USFS
Mark Nunez, Forest Aviation Officer, LPF, USFS
Mark von Tillow, Santa Barbara Battalion Chief, LPF, USFS
Dana D’Andrea, Santa Barbara Division Chief, LPF, USFS
John Abell, Mt. Pinos Division Battalion Chief, LPF, USFS
Martin Hinz, Mt. Pinos Division Prevention Technician, LPF, USFS
Flemming Bertelsen, Fire Prevention Technician, LPF, USFS
Kevin Cooper, Forest Resource Officer, LPF, USFS
Gary Montgomery, Forest Range Program Officer, LPF, USFS
Mark Linane Sr., Santa Barbara County Fire Department
Rob Balfour, IMET, NWS, NOAA
Jeff Tonkin, IMET, NWS, NOAA
Beth Nabors, Fuel Battalion, BDF, USFS
Pam Balazer, Fuels Battalion, LPF, USFS
Joe Pasinato, Public Information Officer, LPF, USFS
Dennis Burns, FBAN, CIIMT 3, Livermore-Pleasanton Fire Department
David Kerr, FBAN, CIIMT 5, USFS
John Newman, IR Mapping
Gail Bakker, Editor, USFS, AMSET
Ray Ford, Reporter, The Independent Newspaper, Santa Barbara, CA
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X. Appendices
Appendix 1.
Alamo Unit #1
Goals and Objectives
GOALS:
1. Reduce the amount of hazardous vegetation fuels
2. Improve forest health by reintroduction of low intensity fire on a 20 year rotational basis
3. Reduce potential of stand replacement wildfire that would cause damage to wildlife
habitat and timber stands
4. Reduce slash from past salvage sales
5. Rejuvenate forbs and brush to produce browse for wildlife.
6. Provide a buffer of treated hazardous fuels on the perimeter of Sespe Wilderness. To
provide protection for the communities of Frazier Park, Pine Mountain Club, and
Lockwood Valley.
PRESCRIBED BURN OBJECTIVES:
1. Reduce the amount of hazardous vegetation fuels
2. Treat approximately 66% of the area by top killing 50-80% of encroaching brush, and
remove skeletons over multiple entries
3. Consume 75% of the dead and down less than 9-inches in diameter over multiple entries
4. Do not expose more than 50% of the mineral soil
5. Scorch heights of less than 5-feet in timber
6. Tree mortality of less than 30% of tress 1 – 6-inches and 0% in over 6 inches
Alamo Units #2, 3, and 4
Goals and Objectives
GOALS:
1. Improve forest health by reintroduction of low intensity fire on a 20 year
rotational basis.
2. Reduce potential of stand replacement wildfire that would cause damage to
wildlife habitat, timber stands.
3. Reduce natural fuel accumulations created by past fire suppression policies.
4. Reduce slash from past salvage sales.
5. Rejuvenate forbs and brush to produce browse for wildlife.
6. Manage smoke to mitigate impacts to sensitive target areas.
7. Provide treatment of fuels on perimeter of Sespe Wilderness.
PRESCRIBED BURN OBJECTIVES:
1. Top kill 50 to 80% of encroaching brush.
2. Remove skeletons over multiple entries.
3. Consume 75% of the dead and down less than 9 inches in diameter met over multiple
entries.
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4. Do not expose more than 50% of the mineral soil.
5. Scorch heights of less than 5 feet in timber.
6. Tree mortality of less than 30 % of trees 1 to 6 inches and 0% in over 6 inches.
Table 2 Treatment Objectives by Vegetation/Fuels Condition
Vegetation/Fuels Condition
Treatment Objective(s)
Fuels <1 Inch Diameter
70 to 90% Consumption
Fuels 1-3 Inches Diameter
50% Consumption
Burn brush between trees with light fire intensity around trees
Pinyon Woodland
and moderate intensity in brush. Retain approximately 85% of
trees.
Chaparral with Scattered Pinyon and Burn at moderate intensity retaining approximately 50% of
Oaks
trees.
Burn at light to moderate intensity to produce or maintain in an
Jeffrey Pine with No or Light Dwarf
open, park-like stand under tree canopy. Burn approximately
⅓ of the biomass or about ½ of the smaller trees. Retain
Mistletoe Infection
large, older trees.
Jeffrey Pine with Moderate to Heavy Burn at light to moderate intensity ⅓ to ½ of the biomass or ½
Dwarf Mistletoe Infection
to ⅔ of the smaller trees. Retain large, older trees.
Burn approximately ⅓ of the biomass or ½ of the smaller trees
Mixed Conifer Forest with Black Oak
to produce or maintain patchy forest cover.
North-facing slopes will have larger sized patches of unburned vegetation, while south-facing slopes
will have a more complete burn due to drier fuel conditions. Riparian buffer zones will be established
prior to project implementation. Fire will not be directly applied within riparian buffer zones but will be
allowed to back slowly toward riparian zones and go out naturally. This will enable the use of land
features and natural changes of vegetation and associated fire resistances to control the edge of the
burn and mimic naturally occurring conditions.
Unit 2, 3, 4
Table 2 Riparian Buffers for Alamo Mountain II Fuel and Vegetation Treatment
Unit Number
Riparian Buffers
Snowy Creek - 300 feet, Frazier Creek - 150 feet, Piru Creek.- ¼ mile
2
Piru Creek.- ¼ mile
3
No channels requiring buffers.
4
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Appendix 2.
Diablo Unit A Prescribed Treatment Objectives
The following guidelines to insure the implementation of wildlife management direction for this
management area are:
1. Protect identified Cultural Resources by clearing vegetation and sheltering as identified in
environmental documentation. Monitor area after burning.
2. Burning can be conducted after March 15, if a biologist documents the absence of least
Bell's vireo.
3. Establish a specific and safe site for refueling activities on an impenetrable surface and
adequately sign this area with specific instructions to prevent ground contamination by
gasoline and oil.
4. If the prescribed burn escapes into riparian habitat, utilize water drops and direct
suppression activities to limit burning of any riparian habitat to the minimum amount
practicable.
5. Do not wash equipment or vehicles in the creeks.
6. Ensure full compliance with all applicable BMPs.
7. Burn no more than 70% of the targeted area. Burn at a light to moderate intensity.
8. No retardant will be deposited into streams. Utilize water drops as alternate suppression
tactic.
9. A buffer zone will be implemented around riparian areas of approximately 750 feet, to
protect riparian species.
10. Do not fire riparian canopy trees as they can provide potential for habitat for Spotted Owls
and other sensitive species.
11. Protect Air Quality. California Air Resource Board (ARB) designated burn days will be
strictly followed in accordance with the requirements of Santa Barbara County Air Pollution
Control District (APCD) Rule 401.C.4a. and Regulatory Compliance Division policies and
procedures VI.A.1. Burning during fall and winter seasons will minimize impacts for smoke
intrusion into the Dick Smith and Matilijah Wilderness areas.
12. Minimize disturbance to yellow star thistle. Avoid parking in thistle patches. At end of each
day check equipment for seeds and clean out excessive buildup of seed on burn site to
prevent transport of seeds to areas outside of the project.
13. Do not burn before October 1st to avoid red-legged frog development in pool areas.
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14. Avoid vehicular traffic in riparian habitat crossings. Do not allow traffic off roads to protect
burrowing animals, amphibians, and reptiles.
15. No direct firing of non-target areas.
16. Areas used for drafting of water must be approved by a biologist.
Diablo Unit A Prescribed Burn Objectives
Prescribed Fire Objectives: Treat the existing chaparral utilizing management ignited prescribed
fire. Burn 70% of the area removing all of the 1-hour and 10-hour fuels, 50% of the 100-hour
fuels, and 70% of the live fuels. Create coarse mosaic patterns of burned chaparral areas (100
acres +). Avoid direct firing of riparian vegetation.
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Appendix 3.
YEARS
1986
1988
1985
1985
1983
1982
1992
1991
1996
1997
1996
1997
1999
2002
Zaca Fire Prescribed Burns
PROJECT
PROJECT NAME
AREA
Oso
Buckhorn C&D, Little Pine
Buckhorn A
Buckhorn B
Camuesa D & E
Camuesa A & B
Pendola
Camuesa B
Caliente
Buckhorn D
Cuyama Front Phase I
Cuyama Front Phase II
Camuesa D & E
Diablo Unit A
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2700
6557
2950
4825
3980
3400
700
1100
1500
5600
Unk
Unk
3210
6000
DISTRICT
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara
Mt Pinos
Mt Pinos
Santa Barabara
Santa Barabara