United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Committees
November 2008
NORTHERN BORDER
SECURITY
DHS’s Report Could
Better Inform
Congress by
Identifying Actions,
Resources, and Time
Frames Needed to
Address
Vulnerabilities
GAO-09-93
November 2008
NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Highlights
Highlights of GAO-09-93, a report to
congressional committees
DHS’s Report Could Better Inform Congress by
Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames
Needed to Address Vulnerabilities
Why GAO Did This Study
What GAO Found
Covering nearly 4,000 miles of land
and water from Washington to
Maine, the U.S.-Canadian border is
the longest undefended border in
the world. Various Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)
component agencies share
responsibility for northern border
security, primarily U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), in
collaboration with other federal,
state, local, tribal, and Canadian
entities. The Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Act
of 2007 required the Secretary of
Homeland Security to submit a
report to Congress that addresses
the vulnerabilities along the
northern border, and provides
recommendations and required
resources to address them. The act
also required GAO to review and
comment on this report. In
response to this mandate, GAO
examined (1) the extent to which
the DHS report to Congress is
responsive to the legislative
requirements and (2) actions that
may be necessary to address
northern border vulnerabilities in
addition to the actions addressed in
the report. To conduct this work,
GAO reviewed DHS plans, reports,
and other documents, and
interviewed DHS officials.
The DHS February 2008 report to Congress is not fully responsive to
legislative requirements in providing information for improving northern
border security. In particular, DHS provided a listing of northern border
vulnerabilities and initiatives to address them, but did not include
recommendations and additional resources that are needed to protect the
northern border. DHS officials provided several reasons for the lack of
specificity and gaps in reported information, including the fact that the
component agencies’ priorities for action and resources are reflected in the
existing budget process, and that they had nothing further to recommend or
request through this report. However, budget documents do not reflect the
resources needed over time to achieve control of the northern border. The
lack of this information makes it difficult for Congress to consider future
actions and resources needed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the
Secretary of Homeland Security
provide more specific information
in future reports on actions and
resources needed to achieve
northern border security, and in
what time frame they are needed.
DHS and CBP concurred with our
recommendation.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on GAO-09-93.
For more information, contact Richard Stana
at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management
process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully
implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also
provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. DHS is
currently developing strategic plans that are intended to provide overall
direction in addressing vulnerabilities in northern border security. DHS is also
developing a risk-management process to assist in prioritizing efforts and
resources that will provide greatest benefit to national security. DHS officials
have said that the success of various pilot projects, such as DHS’s testing of
new technology, will likely change the level and mix of resources needed to
protect the northern border. In the meantime, DHS could take action to
reduce vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past
evaluations. DHS has implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to
improve border security, but 39 recommendations are yet to be fully
addressed. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within the
last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving use of air and marine
assets, improving screening processes at the ports of entry, and deploying
nuclear detection equipment—which DHS and other agencies generally
agreed to take action to implement—have remained open for at least 1 year
and, in some cases, over 3 years. GAO believes these outstanding
recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented.
Vehicle Inspections and Agent Patrols at and between Northern Border Ports of Entry
Source: GAO.
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Appendix I
Appendix II
Appendix III
1
Results in Brief
Background
DHS Report Is Not Fully Responsive to Congress in Providing
Information for Improving Northern Border Security
DHS Is Taking Action to Improve Northern Border Security, and
Implementing Past GAO Recommendations Would Also Provide
Benefit
Conclusions
Recommendation for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
12
18
18
19
Selected Open Recommendations from GAO
on Various Border Security Issues
21
Comments from the Department of Homeland
Security
28
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
30
Related GAO Products
3
5
8
31
Tables
Table 1: Department of Homeland Security Components with a
Primary Mission to Secure the Northern Border
Table 2: Selected GAO Recommendations Relevant to Border
Security That Have Not Been Fully Implemented
Table 3: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding General
Border Security Issues with Potential Implications for
Northern Border Security
Table 4: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Nuclear
Security with Potential Implications for Northern Border
Security
Page i
6
17
21
24
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Table 5: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding SBInet
with Potential Implications for Northern Border Security
Table 6: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding
Partnerships and Joint Operations with Potential
Implications for Northern Border Security
26
27
Abbreviations
9/11 Act
ASP
CBP
DEA
DHS
DNDO
DOE
DOJ
FBI
HSPD-7
HSPD-11
IBET
ICE
NFCCG
OBP
OES
OMB
PM-ISE
PNNL
POE
RCMP
SBI
USCG
US-VISIT
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007
advanced spectroscopic portal
Customs and Border Protection
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department of Homeland Security
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Department of Energy
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11
Integrated Border Enforcement Team
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
National Fusion Center Coordination Group
Office of Border Patrol
Office of the Executive Secretariat
Office of Management and Budget
Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
port of entry
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Secure Border Initiative
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further
permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or
other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to
reproduce this material separately.
Page ii
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
November 25, 2008
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
The Honorable Peter T. King
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The U.S.-Canadian border stands as the longest undefended border in the
world, covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water,1 most of which is
sparsely populated with limited law enforcement presence. Historically,
U.S. attention and resources have been focused primarily on the U.S.
border with Mexico, which continues to experience significantly higher
levels of drug trafficking and illegal immigration than the U.S-Canadian
border. However, the extensive volume of trade and travel between the
two countries, and large expanse of areas with limited law enforcement
presence, provide potential for terrorists and other criminal elements to
enter the United States undetected at or between the northern ports of
entry.
Securing the northern border is the primary responsibility of various
components within DHS, in collaboration with other federal, state, local,
tribal, and Canadian entities. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) is the frontline agency responsible for interdiction of
persons and contraband crossing the border illegally; U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for investigating the
source of cross-border crimes and dismantling their operations; and the
1
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines the U.S.-Canadian border as
stretching from the state of Washington to Maine, and does not include the Alaskan border
with Canada.
Page 1
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) executes its maritime security mission on all
navigable waterways on the northern border, including the Great Lakes.
DHS submitted a report to Congress in February 2008, discussing ongoing
initiatives of these agencies to improve security along the northern border,
as required by law. Specifically, the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required the Secretary of
Homeland Security to submit a report within 180 days of enactment that
was to (1) address the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and
(2) provide recommendations to address such vulnerabilities, including
required resources needed to protect the border.2
The 9/11 Act also directed us to submit to Congress, within 270 days of
DHS’s report, a report that reviews and comments on the DHS report, and
to provide recommendations regarding any additional actions necessary to
protect the northern border.3 In response to this mandate, we prepared
this report to answer the following key questions:
•
•
To what extent is the DHS report to Congress responsive to the
legislative requirements to report on ongoing initiatives to improve U.S.
northern border security, address the vulnerabilities along the northern
border, and provide recommendations to address these vulnerabilities
and required resources to protect the northern border?
In addition to the actions addressed in the report, what actions may be
necessary to address northern border security vulnerabilities?
In conducting our work, we reviewed the DHS report structure and
content against requirements in the 9/11 Act. We also reviewed whether
the DHS report content was complete and consistent with information
provided in its key management documents including strategic plans,
performance and accountability reports, budget requests, and other
documentation produced by relevant DHS agencies. We interviewed DHS
officials from CBP, ICE, and USCG located at headquarters and Detroit,
Michigan, who had roles and responsibilities for northern border security
to obtain their perspectives on documented information. For this reason,
we also interviewed Department of Justice (DOJ) officials with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), which has national responsibility for
2
Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 731(a)-(b), 121 Stat. 266, 351.
3
Id. § 731(c), 121 Stat. at 351.
Page 2
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
drug enforcement, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which
has national responsibility for terrorism. We selected Detroit, Michigan,
among CBP’s Office of Border Patrol’s (OBP) eight northern border
sectors based on factors including relative threat and vulnerabilities,
priority for resources, and demonstration site for new technology. Our
observations from the Detroit sector cannot be generalized across the
other seven sectors; however, we believe that they were sufficient for the
purposes of this report in comparing the headquarters and field
perspective. While in Detroit, we also spoke with state and Canadian
officials involved in northern border security to obtain their perspectives
on northern border security threats and vulnerabilities, DHS actions to
address them, and the effectiveness of binational and national
partnerships. To determine actions that could help address northern
border security vulnerabilities, we reviewed whether the information
reported by DHS reflected a strategic risk–informed approach as required
in the Homeland Security Act of 20024 and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 (HSPD-7). We also identified report recommendations for
strengthening national border security from past GAO evaluations from
fiscal years 2005 through 2008 that when fully implemented have potential
to help address northern border vulnerabilities.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through November
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief
The DHS report to Congress is not fully responsive in providing
information for improving northern border security as required in the 9/11
Act. DHS provided a listing of northern border vulnerabilities and
initiatives to address them, but did not include recommendations and
additional resources that are needed to protect the northern border. DHS
officials responsible for preparing the report provided several reasons for
the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information, including the fact
that DHS reflects its priorities for action and resources in the existing
budget process, and that they had nothing further to recommend or
4
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
Page 3
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
request. However, the budget process provides Congress with a 5-year
plan to meet prioritized needs within projected resource constraints, not
the time frame and resources needed to achieve control of the northern
border. The lack of information regarding the extent that vulnerabilities
remain unaddressed on the northern border and the time and resources it
will take to address them makes it challenging for Congress to consider
future actions and resources necessary for the northern border in the
broader context of national security. DHS has an opportunity to increase
the value of information it provides to Congress in fulfilling other
reporting requirements established in law.
DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management
process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully
implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also
provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. DHS
officials are currently developing strategic plans that are intended to
provide its component agencies with overall direction in addressing
vulnerabilities in northern border security, as well as more-targeted
direction specific to vulnerabilities in the air and water environments. DHS
is also developing a risk-management process to assist in prioritizing
efforts and resources that will provide greatest benefit to national security.
DHS officials said the success of various pilot projects will likely change
the level and mix of resources needed to protect the northern border. For
example, DHS is testing new technology that, if successful, may change
the mix of technology and personnel deployed along the border, and
partnerships among federal, state, and local agencies to coordinate
information and operations may also create efficiencies that change
resource requirements. DHS can also act to timely implement
recommendations made in recent and past GAO evaluations. At the time of
our review, DHS had implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to
improve border security, but 39 recommendations had not been fully
implemented. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within
the last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving screening
processes at the ports of entry, expediting deployment of nuclear
detection equipment, and improving the use of air and marine assets have
not been fully implemented in the course of at least 1 and, in some cases,
over 3 years. Internal control standards for the federal government state
that agencies are to ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are
promptly resolved. We believe that these outstanding recommendations
continue to have merit and should be implemented.
We are making a recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security
to provide more specific information in addressing future reporting
Page 4
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
requirements to Congress, including planned actions, resource
requirements, and time frames for increasing and achieving northern
border security, and the basis used for prioritizing such action and
resources in the context of other national security risks. In commenting on
a draft of this report, DHS and CBP concurred with this recommendation
and stated that CBP will work with the department to implement the
recommendation through the approved budget process. Written comments
from DHS are in appendix II.
Background
The United States shares nearly 4,000 miles of border with Canada
stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts, and the U.S.-Canadian
border is considered to be the world’s longest open border between two
nations. There is a great deal of trade and travel across this border, and
approximately 90 percent of Canada’s population lives within 100 miles of
the U.S. border. While legal trade is predominant, DHS reports networks of
illicit criminal activity and smuggling of drugs, currency, people, and
weapons between the two countries. Annually, CBP reports making
approximately 4,000 arrests and interdicts approximately 40,000 pounds of
illegal drugs at and between the northern border ports of entry.
Historically, these numbers have been significantly lower than those of the
southwest border;5 however, DHS reports that the terrorist threat on the
northern border is higher, given the large expanse of area with limited law
enforcement coverage.
DHS agencies are charged with protecting the nation and its citizens from
threats of terrorism, as shown in table 1. CBP is the lead federal agency in
charge of securing our nation’s borders, and has three components with a
mission to interdict illegal contraband and persons seeking to enter
illegally at and between the land ports of entry. Two other DHS agencies,
ICE and USCG, also have key roles. The ICE mission includes investigating
and dismantling criminal organizations that transport persons and goods
across the border illegally, while USCG executes its maritime security
mission by providing patrol presence and operational response for all
navigable waterways on the northern border, including the Great Lakes.
5
For example, OBP data shows that in fiscal year 2008, apprehensions of inadmissible
aliens along the northern border were approximately 1.1 percent of apprehensions along
the southwest border, and pounds of illegal narcotics seized along the northern border
were about 0.6 percent of pounds seized along the southwest border.
Page 5
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Table 1: Department of Homeland Security Components with a Primary Mission to
Secure the Northern Border
Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)
components
Role and responsibility on northern border
U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP)
Lead federal component agency in charge of securing
U.S. borders
Office of Border Patrol
(OBP)
Prevents terrorists, terrorist weapons, inadmissible aliens,
smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from entering
the U.S. between ports of entry
Office of Field Operations
Prevents terrorists, terrorist weapons, inadmissible aliens,
smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from entering
the U.S, while facilitating legitimate trade and travel, at the
nation’s air, land, and sea ports of entry
Office of Air and Marine
Operates integrated air and marine forces to detect,
interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful
movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband
toward or across U.S. borders
U.S. Immigration and
Enforces federal immigration and customs laws—along
Customs Enforcement (ICE) with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—in relation to
activities occurring at, or with a nexus to, the border
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
Executes maritime security mission on and over the major
waterways using marine and air assets
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
DHS agencies leverage their border security efforts through partnerships
with state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement agencies to share
intelligence, information, and conduct joint operations for interdiction and
investigation of cross-border crime. DHS considers these collaborative
efforts particularly important for the northern border in remote, sparsely
populated areas.
There has been growing concern within Congress over the number of
personnel assigned to the northern border, the increasing amount of illegal
activity, and the potential for terrorists to gain unlawful entry into the
United States. There has also been concern with respect to the adequacy
of facilities and physical infrastructure to accommodate the increasing
volume of traffic.6 Congress has shown increasing interest in issues
6
For example, see Congressional Research Service, Border Security: U.S.-Canada
Immigration Border Issues, RS21258 (updated Dec. 28, 2004).
Page 6
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
surrounding security of the northern border—first authorizing, and later
directing—resource allocations to the northern border for personnel and
improved technology.7 Congress has also established various reporting
requirements in laws that are to provide updates on the status of northern
border security. In addition to the 9/11 Act, for example, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008,8 directs DHS to prepare and submit a biennial
National Land Border Security Plan. This plan is to include a vulnerability,
risk, and threat assessment of each port of entry located on the northern
border or the southern border, beginning in January 2009.
The DHS report—issued to Congress on February 29, 2008—was overseen
and facilitated by CBP’s Office of the Executive Secretariat (OES). OES
was formed in August 2007 to assign responsibilities for and coordinate
the development of all CBP congressional reports, correspondence, and
external requests for information. OES tasked the CBP Office for Secure
Border Initiative with taking the lead in coordinating information
gathering from the relevant CBP components.9 OES also received input
from ICE and USCG in formulating the report. The information from these
sources was compiled and reviewed within CBP, DHS, and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) before submission to Congress.
7
For example, the United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) authorized
funding to triple the number of border patrol and inspection personnel along the northern
border and to improve technology for monitoring the northern border. See Pub. L. No. 10756, § 402, 115 Stat. 272, 342-43. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to assign to the northern border no less
than 20 percent of the net increase in border patrol agents each year for fiscal years 2006
through 2010. See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 5202, 118 Stat. 3638, 3734. Also, in March 2007, the
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations both wrote to the Secretary of DHS
expressing the committees’ expectation that DHS redirect $20,000,000 of its Border
Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology expenditure plan to begin addressing
security needs along the northern border.
8
Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, § 604, 121 Stat. 1844, 2095-96 (2007) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §
1403).
9
OES tasked the following CBP components to provide input to the Report to Congress:
Office of Field Operations, OBP, Office of Air & Marine, the Office of Intelligence and
Operations Coordination, and the Office of Information Technology.
Page 7
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
DHS Report Is Not
Fully Responsive to
Congress in Providing
Information for
Improving Northern
Border Security
While the DHS report to Congress discusses northern border
vulnerabilities and ongoing initiatives in place as required in law,
information is missing that identifies the extent that various vulnerabilities
remain unaddressed, and recommendations and resources to address
these security gaps. Without this information, it is difficult for Congress to
consider future actions and resources needed on the northern border in
the broader context of national security.
The DHS Report Discusses
Vulnerabilities and
Initiatives Reflected in Key
Management Documents,
but Does Not Link This
Information to Identify
Security Gaps
The DHS report to Congress discusses northern border vulnerabilities and
ongoing initiatives to improve northern border security consistent with the
content of its planning, performance, and budget documents, but DHS
does not link this information to show the extent that security gaps remain
on the northern border. The DHS report states that the northern border is
vulnerable to the primary threats of terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal
immigration. These facts were consistently supported by threat
information obtained from Canadian officials, and officials from DHS and
CBP.10 According to these sources, northern border vulnerabilities are
most actively exploited to smuggle illegal drugs and contraband; illegal
immigration is a lesser problem. While DHS reports significant concern
that terrorists can enter the United States undetected at or between the
northern ports of entry, U.S. and Canadian officials agree that there is
currently no credible intelligence or evidence indicating that there are
terrorists in Canada planning an attack on U.S. soil.
The DHS report lists initiatives its component agencies have underway to
address vulnerabilities and achieve operational control of the border but
does not mention progress made in this regard, or how many border miles
are under operational control.11 CBP reports on these indicators—border
miles under effective (or operational) control, and border miles with
increased situational awareness—as two of its key performance measures
and reports that it plans to increase and achieve control of the northern
10
Our discussions with FBI officials on the terrorist threat, and DEA officials on the drug
trafficking threat, were generally consistent with DHS-reported information.
11
OBP defines operational control as the ability to detect entries when they occur, identify
the entry and classify its level of threat, effectively and efficiently respond to the entry and
bring the situation to the appropriate law enforcement resolution. OBP data from fiscal
year 2008 showed that few northern border miles were under operational control, but that
a greater number of miles have shown progress toward this goal.
Page 8
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
border by deploying a proper mix of personnel, technology, facilities, and
partnerships at and between the ports of entry. While the DHS report lists
initiatives in each of these areas, they are not linked to the reported
vulnerabilities, and the extent that these initiatives mitigate or eliminate
vulnerabilities at and between the ports of entry is not mentioned. Also not
mentioned in the report is the timeline DHS is using to request and deploy
resources necessary to increase the levels of control of the northern
border. The absence of such information makes it difficult for Congress to
consider future action and resources needed on the northern border in the
context of other areas of national security.
Personnel
In terms of personnel, DHS lists ongoing initiatives for adequately staffing
the northern ports of entry, and hiring initiatives to increase staffing
between the ports of entry by 2010. For the ports of entry, DHS describes
its implementation of a workload staffing model that considers workload
and processing times to help identify the number of personnel that should
be deployed at each location, which has resulted in the deployment of 190
CBP officers. Between the ports of entry, DHS does not provide its
methodology for identifying adequate staffing, but does describe initiatives
to more than double the number of border patrol agents from fiscal years
2007 to 2010, in response to direction from Congress. It is unclear,
however, to what extent these staffing initiatives will result in obtaining
effective control of the border. For example, the report states that 190
CBP officers have been deployed to ports of entry as indicated in part by
the workload staffing model; however, DHS reports in its strategic plan for
fiscal years 2008-2013 that additional CBP officers are needed at many
ports of entry. Similarly, while DHS reports a commitment to meet
statutory staffing goals between the ports of entry by the year 2010, OBP
officials indicated that a greater number of agents would be needed to gain
operational control of the northern border.
Technology
In discussing technology initiatives, CBP reports that technology has been
employed at the northern ports of entry to address a number of
vulnerabilities, but between the ports of entry, discussion is focused on
pilot projects intended to test capabilities for potential use on the northern
border. At the ports of entry, CBP reports that much technology is in place
to address vulnerabilities related to the transport of illegal radiological and
nuclear materials, illegal contraband, and misrepresentation of identity
through the use of fraudulent documents. Between the ports of entry, pilot
projects address vulnerabilities related to the inability to detect low-flying
aircraft; the inability to detect unauthorized border crossings in areas
without law enforcement patrol; and to share communications. The report
does not discuss when the results of the projects will be available or the
Page 9
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
extent that DHS would use these technologies, if successful, to address
existing vulnerabilities. DHS also does not discuss initiatives to address
the vulnerabilities cited in the report related to maritime security, such as
the lack of video capabilities in marinas, unregulated access that small
private vessels have on the Great Lakes and other border waterways, and
insufficient resources to access boats on the open water. Subsequent to
the report issued to Congress, DHS provided a thorough discussion of the
vulnerabilities and challenges in addressing these aspects of maritime
security in the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, issued April 2008.
USCG stated that an implementation plan would be finalized at the end of
December 2008, to guide agency actions in implementing the strategy, but
this plan would not be released to the public due to its security
classification.12
Facilities
In discussing facilities, the DHS report describes ongoing initiatives to
systematically review the port of entry inspection facilities to identify the
need for upgrade or replacement, and to develop a new standard station
concept13 to accommodate the growth in number of border agents between
the ports of entry. The report describes the age and condition of some
facilities and volume of traffic and use. However, while the DHS strategic
plan states that the department’s secure border program depends
significantly on modernizing the ports of entry, there is no discussion in
the report to Congress on the status of these efforts, when they will be
completed, and how they currently affect northern border security. 14
Partnerships
The DHS report lists various initiatives underway that establish binational
partnerships or partnerships among U.S. federal, state, and local agencies
to share information and improve communication and cooperation among
12
USCG also stated that a public strategic communication plan regarding the
implementation plan would be released sometime in the spring of 2009.
13
The standard station concept is a base design that may be utilized at multiple locations to
reduce design costs and time frame. The standard station being implemented on the
northern border is capable of supporting 50 agents and their support personnel, and allows
for addition or expansion as needed.
14
CBP officials commented that CBP conducts strategic resource assessments for ports of
entry to gather facility and planning data, assess the facilities to determine critical needs in
support of the mission, and make facility recommendations for budgeting and
programming. CBP completed an initial round of these assessments at all land ports of
entry from 2004 through 2006, and plans to soon begin a second round of expanded
assessments that will include air and sea ports. CBP anticipates completing this second
round of assessments within 3 years and repeating the process on a 2 to 3 year cycle.
Page 10
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
agencies working along the border. Five binational partnerships were
discussed, four with a broad focus on cross-border law enforcement
efforts,15 and one with a specific focus on preventing illegal air incursions.16
Six U.S. partnerships were also mentioned, one specific to smuggling on
Indian reservations,17 two related to drug trafficking,18 two related to
intelligence gathering,19 and one related to augmenting enforcement
capacity by cross-designating federal authority to other agencies.20 DHS
and CBP management documents support the report’s discussion of these
partnerships as a key strategy for northern border security; however, there
is no discussion of the extent that these partnerships were responsible for
increasing the level of control across the border or how they will do so in
the future.
15
The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) are a multi-DHS-agency law
enforcement initiative with Canada with a goal to ensure comprehensive and permanent
coordination of cross-border law enforcement, antiterrorism efforts, and information
sharing between the two countries. The Border Enforcement Security Task Force is an
interagency task force designed to enhance border security and combat violence related to
smuggling through coordinated effort involving federal, state, local, and Canadian law
enforcement agencies. Upon completion of a bilateral agreement currently under
negotiation, Shiprider operations will support IBETs and include joint cross-border
maritime patrols of USCG and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). In this effort,
designated USCG and RCMP maritime law enforcement officers will embark on the other
party’s vessels for patrolling and enforcing U.S. and Canadian law on either side of the
maritime border. Project North Star provides Canadian and U.S. law enforcement
managers a mechanism to enhance communications, cooperation, and partnership.
16
The Airfields Initiative is a binational partnership between federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies of the United States and Canada involving the aviation community
and the public as sources of information and intelligence on aircraft incursions.
17
ICE patrol officers, known as Shadow Wolves, were established by congressional
mandate to remedy smuggling of narcotics across Indian reservations.
18
The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program is an antidrug support program
providing a mechanism for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to share
information and intelligence. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force is a
mechanism to promote cooperation and coordination among federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies engaged in narcotics and money laundering investigations.
19
Border Security Evaluation Teams gather intelligence from state and local law
enforcement agencies, local civic leaders, and the public to determine if suspected crossborder activities indicate a need for deployment of border patrol resources in those areas.
Operation Last Call was created by the ICE Office of Deportation and Removal Operations
to maximize intelligence collection through systematic debriefing of ICE detainees.
20
ICE reports cross-designating other federal, state, and local officers to supplement the
ICE investigative mission and participate on task forces.
Page 11
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
DHS Report Does Not
Provide Recommendations
or Resource Requirements
to Improve Northern
Border Security
The DHS report contains a section for recommendations to address
northern border vulnerabilities, but the information provided is a
restatement of initiatives in place without mention of recommendations
for further action or additional resources as required by law. Officials from
DHS component agencies provided several reasons this information was
missing from the report. One reason was that the Secure Border Initiative
(SBI) office—which was tasked with coordinating component agency
contributions to the report—directed them to discuss their resource needs
in terms of the existing budget; therefore, they did not discuss actions or
resource requirements for future years. A second reason was that some
components were satisfied with their current budget allocation. CBP
officials stated that they supported the President’s budget and had nothing
further to recommend or request in the report to Congress.21 A third reason
is that some components did not have the information necessary to
identify recommendations or additional resources. USCG officials
indicated that the lack of departmentwide strategic direction for the
northern border has made it difficult to identify specific resource needs.
Similarly, ICE officials said that information was lacking to compare and
assess overall resources devoted across various northern border agencies,
initiatives, and border locations.
DHS Is Taking Action
to Improve Northern
Border Security, and
Implementing Past
GAO
Recommendations
Would Also Provide
Benefit
DHS is developing strategic plans, a risk-management process, and new
initiatives that could change the level and mix of resources needed to
protect the northern border; however, most efforts were incomplete and
unavailable for our review. Over the years, we have conducted evaluations
of various border security activities and our reports included a number of
recommendations for improvement. DHS action to fully implement these
recommendations would provide benefit in addressing northern border
vulnerabilities.
21
The budget process provides Congress with a 1-year President’s budget, and a 5-year plan
to meet prioritized needs within projected resource constraints. However, these documents
do not reflect the resources and time frame needed to achieve control of the northern
border.
Page 12
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
DHS Is Developing
Strategic Plans and a RiskManagement Process
DHS and CBP have reported the need to provide a coherent framework to
coordinate federal, state, local, and tribal northern border security efforts,
and are developing northern border strategic plans, as well as a riskmanagement process to further these goals. Completion of these efforts
should provide DHS with useful information in developing future reports
to Congress on northern border security.
DHS has completed, or begun efforts to develop, three strategic plans that
will help address vulnerabilities on the northern border. Strategic plans
help ensure that missions requiring a multiagency response are firmly
aligned with articulated goals and objectives, and help keep agencies
focused on the desired “end state.” While DHS has developed a broad
strategic plan to outline the department’s overall mission and objectives, it
has begun to focus on the need to develop coordinated and unified
strategies to address more specific concerns, such as northern border
security. A key effort under development is an overall northern border
strategic plan that will, for the first time, take all DHS component agencies
into account in efforts to address vulnerabilities necessary for control of
the northern border. CBP did not indicate when this plan may be
completed. A second strategic plan under development will address
security vulnerabilities in the air environment, such as the inability to
detect low-flying aircraft. CBP officials stated that they were working on
performance measures for this plan, and estimate that it will be released in
April 2009. DHS issued its third strategic plan, the Small Vessel Security
Strategy, in April 2008 to help close existing maritime security gaps on
waterways such as the Great Lakes, related to the small vessel
environment.
To help component agencies achieve the major goals outlined in each of
these strategic plans, DHS plans to develop implementation plans that are
to describe specific actions component agencies will take in support of
each objective, identify lead component agencies for these actions, and
provide target completion dates. USCG has stated that the implementation
plan for the small vessel strategic plan is scheduled to be issued for use by
component agencies at the end of December 2009, but will be considered
security sensitive.22 Dates are not yet available for implementation plans to
follow the remaining two strategic plans.
22
An unclassified notice to the public is to be published sometime in spring 2009.
Page 13
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Some DHS component agencies have acted to incorporate riskmanagement principles that provide information to prioritize and allocate
resources for their individual programs and activities as required by law
and presidential directive,23 but DHS has not yet completed efforts to
implement this approach departmentwide. Risk management is important
for strengthening homeland security resource allocations, as the nation
cannot afford to fully protect against every type of threat. Therefore, an
approach is needed that considers how best to allocate resources based on
factors such as probability and adverse consequence. The DHS goal is to
develop a risk-management process that will assess risk and inform
strategic planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes
across all of its component agencies and that will evaluate the riskreduction effects among relevant DHS programs. However, achieving this
goal has been difficult. While risk management has been used in the
private and public sectors for decades, its application for homeland
security and combating terrorism is relatively new and without a
precedent framework.24 As such, the effort to assess risk across DHS
component agencies and programs is still in its very early stages of
development.
Future DHS Action to
Improve Northern Border
Security Is Influenced by
Success of Pilot Projects,
Partnerships, and External
Factors
DHS component agencies have identified resources to increase and
achieve northern border security, but the need for these resources
constantly evolves in response to various factors. For example, the DHS
report described many pilot projects for new technology. If successful,
OBP officials report that these projects could reduce security
vulnerabilities and current needs for other resources, such as existing
technology, personnel, or infrastructure. However, these officials also
indicate that new technology must be fully tested for operational
effectiveness, and delays coupled with uncertainties of success have made
it difficult to balance future resource investments in new technology with
23
This requirement is found in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7).
24
Our previous work pointed out the challenges DHS faces in developing its riskmanagement process. See GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure,
GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005), and GAO, Highlights of a Forum Convened
by the Comptroller General of the United States: Strengthening the Use of Risk
Management Principles in Homeland Security, GAO-08-627SP (Washington, D.C.: April
2008).
Page 14
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
current investments in existing technology. Such balance is necessary to
ensure security as well as effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
Similarly, DHS officials discussed partnerships among federal, state, and
local agencies to coordinate information and operations—either newly
created or still in development—that could result in greater efficiencies in
border security. However, time will tell if these partnerships are
sustainable and warrant a decrease or change in current estimated needs
for personnel.
External factors—such as the interplay among private parties,
governments, and agencies—also influence actions in addressing security
vulnerabilities. In Detroit, for example, CBP officials said that action to
improve facilities at northern ports of entry was stymied by private
ownership of property and landlocked facilities. In addition, the Small
Vessel Security Strategy indicates that efforts to address maritime
vulnerabilities were challenged by different practices or views among
federal, state, and Canadian governments in balancing security needs with
the freedom of the waterways expected by the small-vessel community.
Further, ICE officials said that the scope of their authority in pursuing
narcotics investigations influenced their actions in addressing some crossborder crimes.
DHS Action to Implement
Past GAO
Recommendations Would
Strengthen Northern
Border Security
DHS has an opportunity to address some northern border vulnerabilities
by fully implementing recommendations made in past evaluations of its
security efforts. Over the past few years, we have conducted evaluations
and issued a number of reports related to the security of the U.S. border
both at and between ports of entry (see Related GAO Products section at
end of this report). In some instances, our reports included
recommendations addressing vulnerabilities in border security—including
the northern border—while in other cases, our reports and
recommendations were more general, but when implemented, would
provide benefit to the northern border.
We reviewed recommendations resulting from GAO evaluations conducted
from fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and identified 11 reports containing 50
recommendations that had potential to address vulnerabilities in border
security, or to address weaknesses in key initiatives. At the time of our
review, DHS had implemented 11 of these 50 recommendations. For
example, DHS implemented a recommendation to formalize a
performance measure for the traveler inspection program that would help
Page 15
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
agency management and Congress monitor effectiveness in apprehending
inadmissible aliens and other violators.
However, 39 recommendations from the 11 GAO reports are still open. In
some cases, recommendations were open because DHS and other federal
agencies25 had not yet had time to implement them. For example, 18 of the
39 open recommendations were from GAO reports issued within the last
fiscal year. In regard to the remaining 21 recommendations, DHS and other
agencies agreed to take action, but at least 1 and, in some cases, over 3
years have passed without full implementation.26 Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government state that agencies are to ensure that
findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved.27 The time
necessary to resolve recommendations varies depending on the type of
action required. However, DHS does not have a transparent process to
show how long it will take to implement each recommendation
considering the resources, risk level, and complexity of effort required.
Timely implementation of recommendations would help address
vulnerabilities related to a variety of border security initiatives. Some of
the older recommendations that have not been fully implemented include
those to improve screening of travelers at ports of entry to ensure legal
entry, preclude cross-border transport of illicit nuclear materials, reduce
risks in delivering key technology for border surveillance and for
information sharing, and increase information sharing and coordination
among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, as shown in
table 2 and appendix I. We believe that these outstanding
recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented.
25
Other federal agencies included the FBI, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and Counter Terrorism, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Fusion Center
Coordination Group (NFCCG), Department of State, and Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL).
26
DHS officials provided us with reasons why two of the 21 GAO recommendations had not
been implemented. DHS did not implement these fiscal year 2005 recommendations
regarding coordination of its air and marine assets due to inadvertent exclusion of these
recommendations from the agency tracking system. DHS and the Department of State
report making progress towards implementing seven of the remaining pre–fiscal year 2008
recommendations.
27
GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
Page 16
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Table 2: Selected GAO Recommendations Relevant to Border Security That Have
Not Been Fully Implemented
Number and year of
recommendation
Purpose of recommendations
Traveler Screening
4 (fiscal year 2007)
Achieve benefits from investment in the US-VISIT program at
land ports of entry by developing performance measures for
assessing US-VISIT operations, and ensuring reports to
Congress include information regarding deployment of
biometric exit capabilities, and how these capabilities align with
existing land border security initiatives. (GAO-07-248,
December 2006)
3 (fiscal year 2007)
Prevent fraudulent use of passports and visas by periodically
reassessing and fully utilizing their security features, and
establishing a comprehensive oversight program of passport
acceptance facilities. (GAO-07-1006, July 2007)
5 (fiscal year 2008)
Mitigate vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list screening
processes, enhance the use of the terrorist watch list as a
counterterrorism tool and ensure its effectiveness, and ensure
governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts have
oversight, accountability, and guidance. (GAO-08-110, October
2007)
2 (fiscal year 2008)
Mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry
by developing data on training programs and incorporating
specific tasks and requirements into CBP’s procedures for its
on-the-job training program. (GAO-08-219, November 2007)
Nuclear Security
6 (fiscal year 2006)
Reduce delays in acquisition and deployment of radiation
detection equipment to ports of entry, take steps to increase
the chances that inspection officers find illicit radiological
material, and ensure the reliability and effective use of costbenefit information for risk assessment and acquisition
decisions. (GAO-06-389, March 2006)
4 (fiscal year 2007)
Test the capabilities and limitations of radiation detection
equipment before making production and acquisition decisions.
(GAO-07-1247T, September 2007)
3 (fiscal year 2008)
Better track and detect radioactive materials and ensure that
for materials transported across the U.S. border, personnel at
ports of entry comply with guidance for verifying that materials
licenses are legitimate. (GAO-08-598, June 2008)
Secure Border Initiative Technology (SBInet)
7 (fiscal year 2008)
Page 17
Improve acquisition, testing, and implementation of SBInet
technology for improving surveillance and communications
technologies along U.S. borders, and to permit meaningful
measurement, oversight, and accountability of the SBInet
program to CBP, DHS senior leadership, and Congress.
(GAO-08-1086, September 2008)
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Number and year of
recommendation
Purpose of recommendations
Federal, State, and Local Coordination
2 (fiscal year 2005)
Ensure that air and marine assets among DHS agencies are
effectively coordinated to meet border security needs. (GAO05-543, August 2005)
2 (fiscal year 2007)
Provide guidance and support to enhance collaboration at
operations centers staffed by multiple DHS agencies. (GAO07-89, October 2006)
1 (fiscal year 2008)
Improve efforts to create and support a national network of
state and local information fusion centers. (GAO-08-35,
October 2007)
Source: GAO.
Conclusions
Federal agency reporting requirements, such as those contained in the 9/11
Act, can provide Congress with important information for debating policy
and allocating scarce resources, and the level of agency responsiveness
can either support or hinder these efforts. While the DHS report to
Congress provided information on the status of its efforts, there is little
sense of the relative effect these efforts have had in protecting the
northern border, and what additional action or resources may be needed
in the future. Requirements in law to periodically assess the status of
northern border security provide DHS with additional opportunity to
highlight information that can best meet congressional needs.
Completion of DHS efforts to develop a northern border strategic plan and
risk management process to prioritize action and funding could lead to
better understanding among DHS, its component agencies, and Congress
in determining whether resources are most effectively allocated across
initiatives, border locations, and responsible agencies. However, balancing
current and future funding for border security will remain challenging as
the resource needs for the northern border will continue to evolve in
response to the relative success of new initiatives. In the meantime,
implementing recommendations for improving border security in a more
timely fashion would help reduce the nation’s risk due to unaddressed
vulnerabilities.
Recommendation for
Executive Action
To provide Congress with information that will facilitate policy
discussions and resource decisions for northern border security, we
recommend that for future reporting requirements the Secretary of
Homeland Security include more specific information on the actions,
resources, and time frame needed to improve security of the northern
Page 18
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
border along with any attendant uncertainties, and the basis used to
prioritize action and resources for northern border security relative to
other areas of national security.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
Homeland Security and Attorney General. In its response, DHS and CBP
agreed with our recommendation and stated that CBP will work with the
department to implement it through the approved budget process. DOJ
did not provide formal comments.
In its comments, DHS stated that our report said DHS and other agencies
should proceed to adopt and address all of the recommendations from
previous reports without any assessment of priority based on risk. Our
intent in discussing these recommendations was to point out potential
security vulnerabilities that exist, not to imply that all of these
recommendations were of equal importance, or that risk-based
prioritization should not be applied when addressing them. GAO has
advocated the use of risk management principles, and using them to
sequence actions on open recommendations would seem to be
appropriate. We have added language to clarify that while the definition of
timely implementation will vary across recommendations, DHS lacks a
transparent process to show how long it will take to implement each
recommendation considering the resources, risk level, and complexity of
effort required.
DHS’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS and DOJ also offered
technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where
appropriate.
We are providing copies of this report to the Senate and House committees
that have authorization and oversight responsibilities for homeland
security. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-8777, or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
Page 19
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Richard M. Stana
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Page 20
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations
from GAO on Various Border Security Issues
Appendix I: Selected Open
Recommendations from GAO on Various
Border Security Issues
In the past, GAO has offered numerous recommendations to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) related to border security.
Although previous recommendations are not specific to the northern
border, many touch on different aspects that do affect various elements of
northern border security. Many recommendations made by GAO
concerning general border security, nuclear security, technology, and
interagency cooperation and information sharing, have yet to be
implemented by DHS. Fully implementing these recommendations could
provide great benefits to DHS and the nation in terms of strengthening
general border security, and by extension, security of the northern border.
Tables 3 through 6 detail 39 selected open recommendations related to
border security vulnerabilities.
Table 3: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding General Border Security Issues with Potential Implications for
Northern Border Security
GAO report
Recommendation
GAO-07-248: Border Security:
US-VISIT Program Faces
Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land
Ports of Entry (Dec. 6, 2006)
To help DHS achieve benefits commensurate with its investment in U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) at land ports of entry (POE), and security goals and
objectives, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the US-VISIT Program Director, in
collaboration with the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to:
(1) Develop performance measures for assessing the effect of US-VISIT operations specifically at
land POEs.
As DHS finalized the statutorily mandated report describing a comprehensive biometric entry and
exit system for US-VISIT, the Secretary of Homeland Security should take steps to ensure that
the report include, among other things:
(2) Information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying biometric and nonbiometric exit
capabilities at land POEs.
(3) A discussion of how DHS intends to move from a nonbiometric exit capability, such as the
technology currently being tested, to a reliable biometric exit capability that meets statutory
requirements.
(4) A description of how DHS expects to align emerging land border security initiatives with USVISIT and what facility or facility modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that
technology and process work in harmony.
Page 21
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations
from GAO on Various Border Security Issues
GAO report
Recommendation
GAO-07-1006 : Border Security:
Security of New Passports and
Visas Enhanced, but More Needs
to Be Done to Prevent Their
Fraudulent Use (July 31, 2007)
To improve the integrity of its travel documents, the Secretary of State should:
(5) Develop a process and schedule for periodically reassessing the security features and
planning the redesign of its travel documents.
(6) Establish a comprehensive oversight program of passport acceptance facilities. In doing so,
the Department of State should consider conducting performance audits of acceptance facilities,
agents, and accepted applications and establishing an appropriate system of internal controls
over the acceptance facilities.
To more fully utilize the security features of passports and visas, the Secretary of Homeland
Security should:
(7) Develop a deployment schedule for providing sufficient e-passport readers to U.S. POEs,
which would enable inspection officials to better utilize the security features in the new U.S. epassport.
GAO-08-110 : Terrorist Watch List
Screening: Opportunities Exist to
Enhance Management Oversight,
Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency
Screening Processes, and Expand
Use of the List (Oct. 11, 2007)
In order to mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list screening processes, we
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) should:
(8) Assess to what extent there are vulnerabilities in the current screening processes that arise
when screening agencies do not accept relevant records due to the designs of their computer
systems, the extent to which these vulnerabilities pose a security risk, and what actions, if any,
should be taken in response.
To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to help
ensure its effectiveness, the Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the
heads of other appropriate federal departments and agencies and private sector entities:
(9) Develop guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to support private sector screening
processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security, as called for in Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 6.
To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to help
ensure its effectiveness, the Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the
heads of other appropriate federal departments:
(10) Develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism an updated strategy for a coordinated and comprehensive
approach to terrorist-related screening as called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive
11 (HSPD-11), which, among other things, (a) identifies all appropriate screening opportunities to
use watch list records to detect, identify, track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to
homeland security and (b) safeguards legal rights, including privacy and civil liberties.
(11) Develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism an updated investment and implementation plan that describes the
scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and
schedule of activities necessary for implementing a terrorist-related screening strategy, as called
for in HSPD-11.
To help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts have the oversight,
accountability, and guidance necessary to achieve the administration’s vision of a comprehensive
and coordinated approach, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism should:
(12) Ensure that the governance structure proposed by the plan affords clear and adequate
responsibility and authority to (a) provide monitoring and analysis of watch list screening efforts
governmentwide, (b) respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, and (c) assess progress toward
intended outcomes.
Page 22
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations
from GAO on Various Border Security Issues
GAO report
Recommendation
GAO 08-219 : Border Security:
Despite Progress, Weaknesses in
Traveler Inspections Exist at Our
Nation’s Ports of Entry (Nov. 5,
2007)
To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to
take the following actions:
(13) Develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the individuals who require
training are receiving it so that agency management is in a better position to measure progress
toward achieving training goals.
(14) Incorporate into CBP’s procedures for its on-the-job training program (1) specific tasks that
CBP officers must experience during on-the-job training and (2) requirements for measuring
officer proficiency in performing those tasks.
Source: GAO.
Page 23
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations
from GAO on Various Border Security Issues
Table 4: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Nuclear Security with Potential Implications for Northern Border
Security
GAO report
Recommendation
GAO-06-389: Combating Nuclear
Smuggling: DHS Has Made
Progress Deploying Radiation
Detection Equipment at U.S.
Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns
Remain (Mar. 22, 2006)
Since DHS provides Congress with information concerning the acquisition and deployment of
portal monitors, and since DHS’s procedures to obtain internal agreement on this information are
lengthy and cumbersome—often resulting in delays—the Secretary of Homeland Security,
working with the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and the
Commissioner of CBP, should:
(15) Review these approval procedures and take actions necessary to ensure that DHS submits
information to the Congress early in the fiscal year.
In order to complete the radiation portal monitor deployment program as planned, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO, and in concert with CBP and the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), should:
(16) Devise a plan to close the gap between the current deployment rate and the rate needed to
complete deployments by September 2009.
To ensure that DHS’s substantial investment in radiation detection technology yields the greatest
possible level of detection capability at the lowest possible cost, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, once the costs and capabilities of advanced technology portal monitors are well
understood, and before any of the new equipment is purchased, should:
(17) Work with the Director of DNDO to analyze the benefits and costs of deploying advanced
portal monitors. This analysis should focus on determining whether any additional detection
capability provided by the advanced equipment is worth its additional cost. After completing this
cost-benefit analysis, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO,
should revise its total program cost estimates to reflect current decisions.
To help speed seaport deployments and to help ensure that future rail deployments proceed on
time, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Commissioner of CBP, should:
(18) Develop procedures for effectively screening rail containers and develop new technologies to
facilitate inspections.
To increase the chances that CBP officers find illicit radiological material, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, working with the Commissioner of CBP, should:
(19) Consider modifying the agency’s standard operating procedures for secondary inspections to
include physically opening cargo containers during secondary inspections at all ports of entry
when the external inspection does not conclusively identify the radiological material inside.
To ensure that CBP is receiving reliable cost and schedule data, the Secretary of Homeland
Security should:
(20) Direct PNNL to have its earned value management system validated so that it complies with
guidance developed by the American National Standards Institute / Electronic Industries Alliance.
In addition, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct CBP and PNNL to conduct an
Integrated Baseline Review to ensure its earned value management data is reliable for assessing
risk and developing alternatives.
Page 24
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations
from GAO on Various Border Security Issues
GAO report
Recommendation
GAO-07-1247T: Combating
Nuclear Smuggling: Additional
Actions Needed to Ensure
Adequate Testing of Next
Generation Radiation Detection
Equipment (Sept. 18, 2007)
The Secretary of Homeland Security should:
(21) Delay Secretarial Certification and full-scale production decisions of the advanced
spectroscopic portal (ASP) until all relevant tests and studies have been completed and limitations
to these tests and studies have been identified and addressed. Furthermore, results of these tests
and studies should be validated and made fully transparent to the Department of Energy (DOE),
CBP, and other relevant parties.
(22) Once the tests and studies have been completed, evaluated, and validated, determine in
cooperation with CBP, DOE, and other stakeholders including independent reviewers, if additional
testing is needed.
(23) If additional testing is needed, appoint an independent group within DHS, not aligned with the
ASP acquisition process, to conduct objective, comprehensive, and transparent testing that
realistically demonstrates the capabilities and limitations of the ASP system. This independent
group would be separate from the recently appointed independent review panel.
(24) Report the results of the tests and analyses to the appropriate congressional committees
before large scale purchases of ASPs are made.
GAO-08-598 : Nuclear Security:
NRC and DHS Need to Take
Additional Steps to Better Track
and Detect Radioactive Materials
(June 19, 2008)
Given the repeated delays in implementing improvements to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s ability to monitor and track radioactive sealed sources, the Chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission should take steps, consistent with sound systems development practices,
to:
(25) Ensure that priority attention is given to meeting the current January 2009 and summer 2010
target dates for launching the National Source Tracking System, Web-based licensing system,
and the new license verification system, respectively.
Because some quantities of radioactive materials are potentially dangerous to human health if not
properly handled, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should:
(26) Complete the steps needed to include all potentially dangerous radioactive sources (category
3 and the larger category 4 sources, as well as categories 1 and 2) in the National Source
Tracking System as quickly as is reasonably possible.
To improve the likelihood of preventing radioactive sources and materials from being smuggled
into the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security should:
(27) Direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to take measures to ensure that
this guidance is being followed.
Source: GAO.
Page 25
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations
from GAO on Various Border Security Issues
Table 5: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding SBInet with Potential Implications for Northern Border Security
GAO report
Recommendation
GAO-08-1086:Secure Border
Initiative: DHS Needs to
Address Significant Risks in
Delivering Key Technology
Investment (Sept. 22, 2008)
To improve DHS’s efforts to acquire and implement SBIneta, we made the following
recommendations:
To permit meaningful measurement and oversight of and accountability for the program, the
Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Commissioner to:
(28) Ensure that the risks associated with planned SBInet acquisition, development, testing, and
deployment activities are immediately assessed.
(29) Ensure that the results, including proposed alternative courses of action for mitigating the risks,
are provided to the Commissioner and DHS’s senior leadership, as well as to the department’s
congressional authorization and appropriation committees.
We further recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the CBP Commissioner to
have the Acting SBInet Program Manager take the following additional actions:
(30) Finalize and approve an integrated master schedule that reflects the timing and sequencing of
the work needed to achieve these commitments.
(31) Revise and approve versions of the SBInet life cycle management approach, including the draft
Systems Engineering Plan and draft Test and Evaluation Management Plan, and in doing so, ensure
that these revised and approved versions are consistent with one another, reflect program officials’
recently described changes to the engineering and testing approaches, and reflect relevant federal
guidance and associated leading practices.
(32) Ensure that the revised and approved life cycle management approach is fully implemented.
(33) Implement key requirements development and management practices to include (1) baselining
requirements before system design and development efforts begin; (2) analyzing requirements prior
to being baselined to ensure that they are complete, achievable, and verifiable; and (3) tracing
requirements to higher-level requirements, lower-level requirements, and test cases.
(34) Implement key test management practices to include (1) developing and documenting test plans
prior to the start of testing; (2) conducting appropriate component level testing prior to integrating
system components; and (3) approving a test management strategy that, at a minimum, includes a
relevant testing schedule, establishes accountability for testing activities by clearly defining testing
roles and responsibilities, and includes sufficient detail to allow for testing and oversight activities to
be clearly understood and communicated to test stakeholders.
Source: GAO.
a
In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar
program to secure the nation’s borders through enhanced surveillance technologies, increased
staffing levels, improved infrastructure, and increased domestic enforcement of immigration laws.
One component of SBI, known as SBInet, is focused on the acquisition and deployment of
surveillance and communications technologies.
Page 26
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations
from GAO on Various Border Security Issues
Table 6: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Partnerships and Joint Operations with Potential Implications for
Northern Border Security
GAO report
Recommendation
GAO-05-543: Border Security:
Opportunities to Increase
Coordination of Air and Marine
Assets (Aug. 12, 2005)
In order to help ensure that the use of available air and marine assets is effectively coordinated to
meet border security needs, the Secretary of Homeland Security should:
(35) Provide guidance that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the United States Coast Guard
(USCG) and CBP, the primary DHS agencies that employ air and marine assets, in their
homeland security missions, as well as how asset use should be coordinated.
(36) Determine whether the Homeland Security Act’s prohibition on diversion of USCG assets, or
any similar restriction in appropriations laws, limits the ability of USCG to coordinate assets with
other agencies, and if so, evaluate the merits, including the costs and benefits of proposing a
change in relevant laws to Congress.
GAO-07-89: Homeland Security:
Opportunities Exist to Enhance
Collaboration at 24/7 Operations
Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS
Agencies (Oct. 20, 2006)
To provide a setting for more effective collaboration among the staff at each multiagency 24/7/365
operations center, the Secretary of Homeland Security should charge the Director of the
Operations Directorate with developing and providing guidance and helping to ensure the
agencies that sponsor the center:
(37) Conduct staffing needs assessments.
(38) Address collaborative efforts at the four multiagency operations centers in plans and reports
on the level of each operation center’s managing agency.
GAO-08-35: Homeland Security:
Federal Efforts Are Helping to
Alleviate Some Challenges
Encountered by State and Local
Information Fusion Centers (Oct.
30, 2007)
To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, the National Fusion Center
Coordination Group (NFCCG), through the Information Sharing Council and the Program
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), should:
(39) Determine and articulate the federal government’s role in, and whether it expects to provide
resources to, fusion centers over the long term to help ensure their sustainability. Particular
emphasis should be placed on how best to sustain those fusion center functions that support a
national information sharing capability as critical nodes of the ISE.
Source: GAO.
Page 27
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
Page 28
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
Page 29
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov
Staff
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant Director,
and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. David
Holt made significant contributions to the work. Amanda Miller and
Michele Fejfar assisted with design, methodology, and data analysis. Linda
Miller provided assistance in report preparation; and Frances Cook
provided legal support.
Page 30
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in
Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1086. Washington, D.C.:
September 22, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges. GAO08-1141T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008.
Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management
Principles in Homeland Security. GAO-08-904T. Washington, D.C.: June
25, 2008.
Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better
Track and Detect Radioactive Materials. GAO-08-598. Washington, D.C.:
June 19, 2008.
Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for
the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007. GAO-08-757. Washington,
D.C.: May 16, 2008.
Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border
Security Program and Operations, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-542T.
Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections
Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.:
January 3, 2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections
Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-219. Washington, D.C.:
November 5, 2007.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some
Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.
GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet
Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T. Washington, D.C.: October 24,
2007.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance
Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening
Processes, and Expand Use of the List. GAO-08-110. Washington, D.C.:
October 11, 2007.
Page 31
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Related GAO Products
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections
Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-123SU. Washington, D.C.:
October 5, 2007, SBU.
Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and
Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations. GAO-07-884T. Washington, D.C.:
September 27, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure
Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.
GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but
More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use. GAO-07-1006.
Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007.
Border Security: Long-term Strategy Needed to Keep Pace with
Increasing Demand for Visas. GAO-07-847. Washington, D.C.: July 13,
2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-378T.
Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248.
Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-56SU.
Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2006 SBU.
Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at
24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies. GAO-07-89.
Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks
of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-1090T. Washington, D.C.: September
7, 2006.
Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the
United States. GAO-06-976T. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2006.
Page 32
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Related GAO Products
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying
Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns
Remain. GAO-06-389. March 22, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. December 15, 2005.
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and
Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. August 12, 2005.
(440721)
Page 33
GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
GAO’s Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of
GAO Reports and
Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO
posts on its Web site newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products,
go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”
Order by Phone
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site,
http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm.
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.
Contact:
To Report Fraud,
Waste, and Abuse in
Federal Programs
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Congressional
Relations
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, DC 20548
Public Affairs
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, DC 20548