Do Intergenerational Land Transfer Motives Induce Conservation?
Theory and Plot-Level Evidence
Anteneh T.Tesfaw* and Edward B. Barbier**
Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate the notion that, when land markets are imperfect or missing,
intergenerational land transfer motives can explain conservation investments that require a
longer planning horizon than is typical of poor farm households in risky fragile areas. The paper
presents a simple theoretical model with different intergenerational (parent to child) land transfer
motives (altruistic and exchange motive) and examines their implication for conservation
investment. A frequent policy recommendation is to improve tenure security to stimulate
conservation investments. The model predicts that long-term conservation investment can rise
with tenure security in the case of altruistic as opposed to the exchange motive, where tenure
security improvement alters the bargaining power in favor of the attention seeking parent. The
predictions of the theoretical model are then tested using plot-level data from Ethiopia, where
land sale is outlawed, uncompensated eviction from land is common, and land degradation has
been widespread. The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Key
conclusion, then, emerges from this analysis: while policy makers can improve farm household’s
incentives to conserve by boosting tenure security, the presence of exchange transfer motive can
potentially thwart the effectiveness of this policy.
*Economics Department, Oberlin College (atesfaw@oberlin.edu)
**Economics Department, University of Wyoming