Transcript Shlomo Shamir R. 79 Latrun TRT: 30:17:03
Interviewer: First off, tell me again as concisely as you can about some of the
descriptions of the preparation and the preliminary training that happened at the sequence
of Tel Ha’Shomer, Nan and Hulda. The three places the gathering, the outfitting, and
then the training before the battle
Shamir: The different parts of the brigade were actually prepared slightly in a different
manner in different places. If we go by battalions, the 71st battalion which was formed in
Ein Shemer, Ein Shemer which was an ex British airfield camp, a very big camp, a lot of
housing so you can easily bring in there five hundred thousand people, enough room to
form them and drill them if necessary. They were brought up I think on the twenty eh on
the fifteenth or sixteenth of May, the last call of conscription. They mainly came from
groups of pre-trained people cause these were people that sometimes were on guard, they
were held back from conscription to the last minute. So generally speaking, they were
not newcomers completely, no immigrants, they were not completely green. Generally
speaking they were already people with already some background of standing in line,
being in a military formation. They were trained about so you had to equip them, clothe
them, normally clothing, delivering arms, registering, dividing by platoons and sections
that takes at least a day to find everyone to his position, decide what position he takes in
the company itself, a good part of the day goes away with it. If everything is really
organized, if you have enough commanders to command them cause selecting a
command from them and detailing this is part of an organizing operation that took a day.
Then there are two days to train. What does it mean to train? In this sense, organize
them, drill them, basically, make them aware of orders which come out. By the way,
orders were published immediately what they call battalion orders, company orders, but
no very delicate training that fits in. As far as arms, what they had is rifles. In fact, half
of them had rifles. We got 200 rifles for that battalion in those few days. Equipped,
equipped with grenades, equipped with sub-machines, so those that didn’t know how to
handle a rifle were given. There was no live range there. They couldn’t fire, the best of
what I remember, they couldn’t fire there, mostly drill. But the firing of arms there was
not very important. It became much more important at Nan for another battalion. So this
is 71, they moved over, they didn’t have their own transport, they asked for transport we
sent them transport. The battalion was moved from Ein Shemer quite a long way in those
days, straight to Ekron. And then to Hulda, but they were already moved in military form.
Convoy leading the convoy, good distances between trucks, well put up checked who is
traveling. You knew already who was your company commander, platoon commander,
section commander. In that sense within the two days, it really already got some military
form. Ok. This is 71. Now, 72 is a different story completely. 72 was built by the
training command of the army. The major decision was that we are closing the training
command there because it is impossible; we don’t have enough men power neither
enough command for the creation of such an urgent brigade as we were. So the whole
command of that training center plus the people that came to be trained to become
platoon commanders and some of them specialized “training.” They were all a priority,
considered to the nucleus to command two battalions: one for us and leave another group
for another brigade to be formed after us, which eventually became the 8th brigade a little
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later. So for this brigade we required I don’t remember now the number something 150
or 140 people in command that means section commanders, platoon commanders,
company commanders, battalion commanders etc., plus specific jobs that are required in
an infantry. All of them were taken from this group. Now when you took already from
this regular staff of that school, then you know exactly what you are taking. That’s where
Gilad Tzvika Horowitz was appointed battalion commander; Koppel was appointed his
second command and different company commanders were appointed because they were
the staff of that school. But when it came to the platoon commanders, then we really
took those that came to study to become platoon commanders. Admittedly, those that
were sent from all the different brigades in the country to study platoons commanders
course, were already some sort of commanders. They were section commanders. Maybe
they were already platoon commanders but without official training. This was a course
that normally I think took about a month that you had to train people to become formal
platoon commanders. They were appointed to become platoon commanders, so this was
the skeleton of that battalion. Simultaneously with the appearance of that skeleton and
Telatvinsky, Tel Ha’Shomer, came in the people. So in that same camp was already a
mobilizing camp where people mobilized them into the army were pouring in. But this is
the same camp where also new immigrants were pouring in. In other words, if you talk
to new immigrants that arrived on Saturday, the 15th from that famous ship, Tetti, then
these immigrants were sent to Telatvinsky to the mobilizing camp and from there they
were distributed to different brigades. We only got a part of them, not all of them. So we
got from that group, bout 50 or 60. But there were other immigrants from an older time
in Israel which were slowly brought in to this camp. So, what happened is, factually, that
buses came in, after they were registered in Tel Aviv, mainly in the registration camp.
They came in, landed in the camp and by then it was important that there should be
already some skeleton of people to handle them. Ok, a busload could be 30 or 40, I don’t
know, there weren’t too many, not more than small buses. They were normally lined up,
this is normally how you come into a military came, you line up the people. You check
who is there by a list and immediately you start asking questions: Who there is a
professional? Maybe he used to be a gunner? Maybe he used to be a mortar man? A
signal man? To find out if there is a nucleus of people with some sore of military training
that have winded. If there were such, take them out, put them aside. The rest you simply
line up and you create your sections: 7 people, 8, 9, 10 people per section. Three
sections in a platoon and you appoint immediately a section commander and if possible,
this is what happened a deputy or a second in command to the section commander. If
you go through the list in the book you will see section commander so and so but also a
second. And then a platoon commander. When you had a platoon, normally you were
looking for another additional two or three people added to the platoon commander;
maybe a runner, maybe a signal, maybe somebody to support, maybe a light mortar man,
etc. Having formed this, the next question was to bring them somewhere where they can
put their heads down. Bring them into a big hall, which you know in Telatvinsky there
were pretty big tin huts, big tin huts. You bring them into a tin hut where they are going
to be supplied with beds which were nothing (?). In those days we had either trestles,
planks, or beds made out of like boxes where you sell your chickens, you I don’t know
how you say it, it’s a made out box not of wood but of not straw but something; anyway,
something to sleep on and mattresses. If you didn’t have mattresses, so give them bags
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so that you can fill in with material for a mattress and something to cover up.
Independently, give arms. The 72nd battalion then already got their clothing. By the way,
you know, to clothe an army is quite a big business. You have to distribute pants, each
one to check if it generally suits him, we didn’t have all the numbers to fit in exactly, and
no tailors to amend them. Everything, there were six, seven pieces. Then there are
pieces that you take with you to put your arms and equipment with, mostly American
stuff. You have to teach people how to put it on and how to redistribute it. It’s all time
consuming operations, you had to do it. If any time was left, by the way a group of
people happen to be taken away to try and organize a central battalion cookhouse.
[Interruption]
So this is the second battalion and that took about a day of organizing everything and
equipping that, and their training was at Nan, when they came to Nan, they had two days,
really two days and then they could drill, go out into a range, fire five rounds from rifles,
and throw one live grenade which was a terrific preparation for the battle; in that sense,
great success. The third battalion was the 70 armored one, which was formed. Their
problem was they didn’t have the arms yet. That only came in, flew in, actually after
they were already in Ekron, already near Hulda. They, it’s only there that there was
enough communication equipment brought in together. And they didn’t have enough
time to train with the arms. They had sub-machine guns. Most of them were pre-trained;
either that group that came from the Palmach that were joined or ex British army,
technical people that were there. Now, the independent problem was naturally
communication people that you had to get through. Now put the whole thing in one goal.
[Interruption]
Now, the brigade had to put through about 2,000 people in only about three days.
[Interruption]
Interviewer: The truck is competing with you. Let’s let him…
Shamir: The problem we were facing in fact we had about three days to get 2,000
people together clothe them, equip them, organize them into military groups, appoint
their commanders, check what they know, try and drill them, if possible get them to
arrange to fire, check out exactly their abilities, make sure there is a hierarchy of
command to execute things, publish orders, put the whole thing into a system whereby
you can go into a battle. An operation like this, with so many minute details normally
calls for many months of organization, it had to be done quickly, it was done the way it
was done. Ok.
Interviewer: It was beautiful.
Shamir: Thank you. Who know? Half a minute the whole of Zionism? [chuckles].
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Interviewer: Tell me how many people…so there were 2,000 people total in the seventh
brigade?
Shamir: Yeah.
Interviewer: Tell me how many people if you can...how many people fought in Bin Nun
1 and why so few out of the 2,000? Again keeping it as brief as you can.
Shamir: Normally, in every brigade, in every normal battalion, not everyone in there is
coming out to the front line. What happened in this is for the time when we went out to
go to Jerusalem, not for a battle, about 400 people were in the field. When the position
became worse, there was a retreat. Additional 300 or 400 addition were actually brought
into an activity which was relevant to fighting. In other words, the armored brigade was
brought in to send the trucks, to pick up wounded or stragglers on there. Headquarters
was put on there to try and make a round defense if the Jordanians come near to it. This
is about the amount of people. Normally this is a high percentage because the totality is
people you have cooks, you have runners, you have office, you have…there is a whole
line of people that are not going in to the front line and normally you all say even if you
send people you don’t send…assume you have three battalions you send only two, you
don’t send three. You keep always your reserve. Within the battalion also you send two,
you keep a company on reserve. In the company you send two platoons…so the principle
of reserve is generally maintained in the army. Here we didn’t have to keep reserves
because went things the way they developed, you just put everything but if you for
example, this is extending the answer, the second battle when you see what happened for
instance in the eastern side where Prulov battalion...he had three companies, two went out
one to Dir Ayoub (?) and one to the hill, one was in reserve. Because the question of a
reserve forces was extremely important and very small formations like a platoon or a
section this is not vital but the whole principle of a bigger force from battalion on to
brigade, the whole thing which is in the hands of the commander reserve wither people or
arms. This is what explains the fact that 2,000 people but when it comes from shooting
proper its only 400, 500, 600 at the most, hardly, if its at real…again it could be a
difference if it’s a static war and people are in trenches maybe you can in defense, extend
the percentage of people fighting to a bigger, to a higher number. But, if it’s a mobile
warfare, generally speaking, you have to have your reserves trailing behind you. Ok.
Interviewer: We’ve heard a couple different explanations for the late start to the first
operation, Bin Nun Alef, Bin Nun 1. Some saying weapons weren’t arriving yet, others
saying that the artillery support was not ready; in fact some person said that the person
who was commanding in the artillery fell asleep and they couldn’t find him. Somebody
said that the buses were late, lots of different explanations. What is your explanation as
the commander for the late start of Bin Nun 1? It was supposed to start 10am, or 10pm,
didn’t actually leave until closer to midnight.
Shamir: Well the explanation lays in the fact that we were supposed to be there at 9 o
clock you came at 9:15 not during war. How do you explain it? You were late fifteen
minutes. Today, fifty years after when I come to a meeting with someone or to
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something, people are late. Why are they late? Good question. They are late. Your
being late today fifteen minutes I am sure is composed of 1,000 details. Either it was the
last minute telephone or there was a traffic urgency or something happened on the road or
somebody was asleep. This is what happened: it’s a miracle that in those days in that
way after being organized in a day we were late only what? Two hours? Wonderful.
Now I will come back without all this shtoch and where is he there?
Interviewer 2: It was my fault we were late this morning.
Shamir: Without that shtoch (laughs). Now I will tell you. No this is serious. Things
like being late happen for many reasons. My analysis of what really happened there is
not that somebody was asleep. I think the major reasons were two. One is the sudden
information that maybe the buses will not be able to go through because there is
something on the road that is… there is some fixtures on the road that will not allow the
buses to turn in. This was last minute information. And you had to send in a bus empty
to go to see whether it can and you had to hold back your everything until they come
back. This was a major thing. The second this was a mistake done by the forerunner that
coming out the first group that came out instead on turning left into the road to leave
from Hulda to the road leading to Latrun he turned right at night and drove after him two
or three or four buses. And then finally they found out they were in the wrong direction,
very difficult to turn around; you had to stop the whole operation. It maybe took more
than half an hour, three quarters of an hour to turn the whole thing. This, these are the
major things. The rest is maybe minor little things that people are late a few minutes so
in that sense I think is what explains but the real explanation is the fifteen minute
explanation from this morning because today fortunately you go to a theatre fifteen
minutes late, you go to the opera, its fifteen minutes late. People are late. Why are they
late? Because either they cannot plan properly or they cannot operate the way they
planned or they don’t give a damn if it’s late or not. This sums up you question. Now,
post factum, I think we were late because of what God, the divine force, was looking
after us. If we were on time, what would have happened? You see, everybody would
have been much further in the field. Asher Levi, his group with Arik would have been
much deeper and mainly what I am worried is the group from 72, Duvdivani and Harari,
would have been much further. They had no chance of winning the battle comparing the
force so I am only afraid of what would have happened that we would have lost an
additional maybe 50 or 100 people so I call it in my way a divine intervention that we
were a little late, but these were the main things. Ok. Take from it whatever you want.
[Cut]
So the idea of synchronizing per minute, everyone was synchronizing their watches on
the command post. This is part of the drill. So the attitude was to do things in time but
what happens, this is what happens.
Interviewer: Where were you during the battle? And why were you where you were?
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Shamir: This in modern days, especially in the modern army, this question is raised
many times. Why isn’t the commander with the troops in the line of battle? Why is he
far away behind? This is asked a million times. So let me answer you a general answer
and I will be specific in my case. In those days, when the front line of a battalion or a
brigade was pretty wide, not like in the army today which is a narrow one. Where
transportation was not available easy to the commanders, where communications were
very difficult because there wasn’t enough communication. Where commanders didn’t
have mobile reserves to intervene into battle, the net result was the preplanned battle
went on and changes could not appear quickly. You had to look at the battle it took many
hours [interruption]. So this is the general picture if you analyze the position
[interruption]. What is all this? So anyways, you recorded the background. The
background is if you look to the position of commanders in that sense what they had in
their hands to control a battle you will find during the War of Independence at least the
first two, three months, the position of brigade commanders even battalion commanders
was very much in the back. The same case happened in Latrun. You see a brigade
commander that didn’t have transport, not enough communication to know where it is
and his position was somewhere where he can help. Now, in what way could a brigade
commander in battle help? He can either have intelligence, supply intelligence; it was
nothing here that one can supply. He can help with arms, have a reserve group to send in,
artillery totaled up, additional forces to be thought up or direct change of position to units.
In any of these, there was not nothing to be done. So the only thing which remains is that
inner sense or feeling, what really happens there to make a decision. Now in this case, I
must say I was lucky that I had two battalion commanders that were very much in front.
That Laskov and Tsvika Horowitz, they didn’t command their troops. They were simply
in front, near the firing line so at least the connection with them could give you the
impression what is happening to make a decision. Without them being there I could not
make a decision. A decision had to be made: either to withdraw, which is a military
decision, it’s an operation or a decision to send something over. There is a struggle with
your personal feelings. You feel you want to be there and not to be sitting behind but you
have to counteract it. So what I specifically in my case did, I went out twice once with a
motorcycle and once with a car as forward as one could, just smell what happened,
although you couldn’t smell much, it’s a big area, it covers about 3, 4 kilometers,
undulating land, you couldn’t see anything, you could only make sure you could a little
bit of firing, a little bit of bombardment and that is all. You couldn’t really do much.
What you could do is only being in Hulda where you had communication you could order.
And this is probably the greatest thing I could have done. Order the battalion 71 to go
and catch Hill 200. This was not a specific order. The order was go forward as much as
you can. Just shows you how the unknown was governing that situation. Unknown what
will the enemy do, how much of an enemy is there and try and help as much as possible
in clearing up the field from wounded people etc., etc. This was my specific position
here on the background generally what was there
Interview continues on R. 80.
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