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M A J E S T Y ' S
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t h e 139
t h e
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h a v e
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i
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t h e S e c o n d
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1
and I therefore preface i t with a short statement of the-main p o i n t s , ,
cross-referenced t o the f u l l memorandum. , If the, War Cabinet decide
t h a t t h e Second Report: of the Beveridge Committee should- be published
I would i n v i t e the::'' to approve p u b l i c a t i o n a l s o of both the memoranda
attached t o t h i s -paper; the s h o r t e r one w i l l cover most of the ground
for the purposes of the P r e s s ; the longer memorandum contains a
reasoned statement of what i s , I submit, a strong case f o r ' t h e Army to
r e c r u i t the ranks of i t s s k i l l e d personnel from industry to a much,
g r e a t e r e x t e n t than the Beveridge Corxiittee were w i l l i n g to concede.
The War Office,
29th January, 19^-2.
D.M.
(This Summary should be read in conjunction w i t h the more
detailed. Memorandum annexed, t o which, i t i s - c r o s s - r e f er enced),
(
(Paragraph l )
The Second Report of the Beveridge,Committee expresses the view
t h a t i n the Army:-:
(a)
S k i l l e d manpower i s n o t y e t being used with
due economy and e f f e c t and s u b s t a n t i a l ?
changes of, o r g a n i s a t i o n and machinery are
necessary...
(b)
Subject t o minor improvements, Army arrangements
for t r a i n i n g s k i l l e d men a r e adequate, but as they
have l a r g e l y had t o be improvised they need c l o s e r
i n t e g r a t i o n with Army o r g a n i s a t i o n s as a whole,
together with a b e t t e r s e l e c t i o n of t r a i n e e s .
(c)
There i s a c l e a r p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the. Army's
requirements- in tradesmen can be met from w i t h i n
the Army i t s e l f , a p a r t from a c e r t a i n number of.
highly s k i l l e d men needed as armament a r t i f i c e r s .
During the l a s t e i g h t months a d e t a i l e d s c r u t i n y of the
(Paragraph 9, whole manpower resources of the Army has been undertaken by the
page 4)
War Office with the purpose of r e l a t i n g the forces a v a i l a b l e t o
the o p e r a t i o n a l requirements of the t h e a t r e s of war and a t the
same time of economising manpower and of s u b s t i t u t i n g women f o r
men, where p o s s i b l e .
Recognising the room f o r improvement i n the p o s t i n g arrangements
(Paragraph 13) of men with s k i l l e d q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , the War Office, before the
Beveridge Committee was s e t up, had already experimented with a
t r i a l system.of intake for General Service with a view to t e s t i n g
p o s s i b i l i t i e s and measuring d i f f i c u l t i e s .
Thus., a t r a i n i n g centre
has been s e t up i n Scotland, the intake i n t o which w i l l be e n l i s t e d
f o r General Service, but where r e c r u i t s w i l l be r e t a i n e d for the
p e r i o d of t h e i r b a s i c t r a i n i n g , during which they w i l l undergo
s e l e c t i o n t e s t s with a view to f i n d i n g out the arm, corps and
employment i n the Army for which they are most s u i t e d . . If i t i s
;
found p r a c t i c a b l e , t h e War Office w i l l introduce e n l i s t m e n t for the
Army i n s t e a d of for corps.
Meanwhile improved methods of s e l e c t i o n
(Paragraph l l ) and p o s t i n g , such as the experiment i n Scotland, are being applied t o
Army i n t a k e s of men,- and a l i e u t e n a n t r c o l o n e l with the necessary
t e c h n i c a l knowledge has been appointed to" the s t a f f of each Command
t o advise oh and to supervise the subject of t r a d e t e s t i n g and
t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g i n the Army.
In a d d i t i o n , the s t a f f for
i n s p e c t i n g and supervising the v a r i o u s t r a d e t r a i n i n g establishments
i s being strengthened.
The question as t o whether a l l mechanical maintenance i n the
(Paragraph 12) Army should be concentrated in one corps i s being considered by a
Committee of t h r e e senior members of tho War Office s t a f f who are of
high standing and long experience i n the business world.
Their r e p o r t
w i l l be considered i n the l i g h t of p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
,
(Paragraph 9,
- page 5)
Two f u r t h e r measures have been introduced to reduce the number
of " m i s f i t s " i n the Army and to economise s k i l l e d manpower.
In the
f i r s t p l a c e , Tradesmen's Interview Boards have been s e t up in each Corrimand t o interview a l l s k i l l e d men, a c t u a l or p o t e n t i a l , and t o secure t h a t they are a p p r o p r i a t e l y graded and employed in the Army, or where necessary given f u r t h e r s k i l l e d t r a i n i n g . In p a r t i c u l a r , these/
these Boards w i l l , look i n t o the cases of men whose names are being
supplied to the War Office by employers and t r a d e unions, through
the Beveridge Committee.
Secondly,. a s t r o n g Committee has been s e t
up with the purpose of reviewing Army e s t a b l i s h m e n t s : t h e . numbers of
s k i l l e d men employed m i l be reduced t o a minimum, s e m i - s k i l l e d men
w i l l be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r s k i l l e d where p o s s i b l e , and the r e s o u r c e s
of h i g h l y - s k i l l e d men w i l l be pooled among corps and u n i t s so f a r
as i s p r a c t i c a b l e .
In both these a c t i v i t i e s , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of
the Ministry of Labour w i l l be a s s o c i a t e d .
Such are some of the steps the War Office i s t a k i n g as a r e s u l t
of i t s r e c o g n i t i o n of the value of the c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m contained
i n . t h e Second Report of the Beveridge Committee.
In considering the R e p o r t ' s c r i t i c i s m s , however, i t should be
remembered t h a t since the Army i s l i k e l y t o be more .fully engaged i n
overseas operations i n t h e / n e a r f u t u r e , the Report (framed l a s t summer)
i s already"dated".
I t was addressed mainly to conditions i n which
Army u n i t s and establishments operated"at home.
Furthermore, the
Committee, composed as i t i s , has n a t u r a l l y a p p l i e d t o the questions
under review the standards.of c i v i l i n d u s t r y ; whereas the Army i s
f i r s t and foremost a f i g h t i n g machine and must be organised to the
b e s t advantage as such.
Operational requirements impose l i m i t a t i o n s
on the most economical use of s k i l l e d manpower i n the Army -judging
The. Army problem of
by the standards of i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n .
organising maintenance i s f a r more d i f f i c u l t than t h a t of the Navy
and R.A F. who normally operate from organised b a s e s .
"Echeloned"
s e r v i c e i s imposed on the Army by the conditions, of land warfare - thus
s k i l l e d tradesmen must be d i s t r i b u t e d i n small u n i t s to most forward
f i g h t i n g formations from the r e a r maintenance workshops.
This
echeloned chain of r e p a i r and maintenance i n e v i t a b l y use up more
tradesmen than concentrated Base Workshop o r g a n i s a t i o n s .
The campaign
i n Libya i s a s t r i k i n g proof of t h i s ,
;
0
A main f a u l t found by the Committee i s t h a t the Army allows too
many.skilled men to stand by unused a t any one time.
Though i t i s
admitted t h a t ' t h e r e may be room for s l i g h t improvement (which w i l l be
made), the Report of the Committee i t s e l f answers i t s own objection
i n paragraph 31:- "War i n c e r t a i n phases involves standing by to a c t
r a t h e r than a c t i n g ; i n war, engineers l i k e others must be kept w a i t i n g
e i t h e r not f u l l y occupied or occupied otherwise than as e n g i n e e r s , but
ready to use t h e i r s k i l l i n emergencies a t a moment's n o t i c e .
We
c e r t a i n l y do hot r e j e c t a claim to hold power i n r e s e r v e for emergencies.
The Beveridge Committee examined 139 serving s o l d i e r s and placed
36 of these men in Category Vl(a) as men who though i n Service t r a d e s
s u i t e d t o t h e i r c i v i l i a n s k i l l , had. not been working a t those t r a d e s to
any s u b s t a n t i a l e x t e n t ; ' and 38 men in Category Vl(b) as men not
mustered in a Service t r a d e or wrongly mustered.
The Committee did
not have before them these men's "trade h i s t o r i e s " since j o i n i n g the
Army and they did not r e l a t e t h e i r employment a t the time of the
interviews, to the o p e r a t i o n a l background of t h e i r u n i t s .
The Yfer
Office, re-examining each i n d i v i d u a l case i n the l i g h t of t h e i r
knowledge on these p o i n t s , reduced the numbers of men to l6 i n
On
Category Vl(a) and 20 i n V l ( b ) , a r e d u c t i o n of about $Ofo.
t h e other hand, in Category 1 ( a ) , composed of men making f u l l use
of t h e i r c i v i l i a n s k i l l i n . a Service t r a d e , the War Office included,
*
as a r e s u l t of f u l l e r information, k-9 men as against 13 so a l l o c a t e d
by the Committee.
I t does not seem t h a t an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of 139
cases ( i n yvhich, in f a c t , lack of information was r e s p o n s i b l e for a
5Q$ i n a c c u r a t e assessment of " m i s f i t s " ) i s a s u f f i c i e n t body of evidence
on which to base -"the adverse judgment of the Army's use of i t s s k i l l e d
personnel given by the Committee.
In e f f e c t , the argument t h a t the Army has had two y e a r s i n which
t o segregate i t s s k i l l e d men i s i n v a l i d , since u n t i l the Russian
campaign has momentarily reduced the threats of invasion, the Army
has/
has never "been more-than a dangerously s l e n d e r f i g h t i n g f o r c e ,
every member of which has to be a t r a i n e d f i g h t i n g s o l d i e r i f
invasion i s to be r e p e l l e d . - Even to-day, when a p o t e n t i a l
tradesman i s taken from the ranks of f i g h t i n g u n i t s t c be t r a i n e d
as such, he must be replaced by a f i g h t i n g s o l d i e r who r e q u i r e s
between 6 and 8 months' t r a i n i n g before he i s f i t t e d for h i s p l a c e
in a fighting unit.
The f i g h t i n g s o l d i e r himself, i n these days
of complicated weapons, i s no mere i n t e l l i g e n t ' u n s k i l l e d man, b u t
must be a highly t r a i n e d "tradesman" in the use of h i s weapons.
Nevertheless over 80,000 men, before the Beveridge Committee was
s e t up, had b e e n r c - a l l o c a t e d t o employment a p p r o p r i a t e to t h e i r
s k i l l , while since the outbreak of war 58,000 highly s k i l l e d
personnel, o f f i c e r s and men, had been r e l e a s e d from the Army for
work of n a t i o n a l importance.
:iS.iORANDtH Bt THE WAR OFFICE Oft THE SECOND REPORT
OF SIR.WILLIAM BEVERIEGE'S COMMITTEE ON SKILLED
MEN IN THE SERVICES.
1.
The Committee under S i r William Beveridge, s e t up "by t h e
M i n i s t e r of Labour and National Service.:.in June l a s t , were asked
" t o advise, i n the l i g h t of the. o p e r a t i o n a l and maintenance requirements
of the t h r e e Services" whether : ­
(a)
the s k i l l e d manpower i n t h e Services was "being used
economically and e f f e c t i v e l y ;
(b)
whether the S e r v i c e s ' arrangements f o r t r a i n i n g s k i l l e d
men were adequate; and
(c)
whether the S e r v i c e s ' demands f o r s k i l l e d tradesmen for
t h e p e r i o d ending 31st March, 1942, should be
modified.
So f a r as the Army i s concerned, the Committee answered these
t h r e e questions as follows
:
(a)
s k i l l e d manpower i s not yet. being used with due economy
and e f f e c t , and s u b s t a n t i a l changes of o r g a n i s a t i o n
and machinery are necessary;...
(b)
subject to minor improvements Army arrangements for .
t r a i n i n g s k i l l e d men are adequate, b u t as they have
largely, had t o be improvised they need c l o s e r
i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h Army o r g a n i s a t i o n as a whole,
t o g e t h e r - w i t h a b e t t e r s e l e c t i o n of t r a i n e e s ;
(c)
t h e r e i s a c l e a r p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the Army^ requirements
i n tradesmen can be met from w i t h i n the Army i t s e l f ,
a p a r t from a c e r t a i n number of highly s k i l l e d men
needed as armament a r t i f i c e r s . ­
2.
The Beveridge Committee have c a r r i e d out a valuable survey of
s k i l l e d manpower i n the Array-.
Composed of members with wide
experience of i n d u s t r y , and containing r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of both the
employers and the Trade Unions' i n t e r e s t , they have perhaps n a t u r a l l y
a p p l i e d t o the questions under t h e i r review the standards of c i v i l
industry.
But the Army cannot be f i t t e d e n t i r e l y i n t o the mould of
c i v i l i n d u s t r y ; i t i s f i r s t and foremost a f i g h t i n g machine and must be
organised t o the b e s t advantage as such..
Operational requirements
impose i n many ways r e s t r i c t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n s on the most economical
use of s k i l l e d manpower i n t h e Army, judged by the standards of a well
conducted i n d u s t r i a l establishment,; and i n the l a s t r e s o r t the success
or f a i l u r e of the Army o r g a n i s a t i o n of i t s resources i n s k i l l e d manpower'
must t u r n on the Army s e f f i c i e n c y as a f i g h t i n g machine.
1
The Committee themselves (Para. 55-of t h e i r Second Report) put
the matter i n a n u t s h e l l when they say
"The f i r s t p r i o r i t y i n war i s for whatever i s needed t o
keep the machines of war i n a c t i o n . -. Breakdown of a
machine of war i n a c t i o n means more than the l o s s of
t h a t p a r t i c u l a r machine; i t means as a r u l e the l o s s
of/
a
of the f i g h t i n g men; i t may mean the loss: of a
battle . . , .
I t i s not s u f f i c i e n t to produce the
machines of war; they must be maintained continuously
i n a c t i o n under a l l c o n d i t i o n s . "
The conditions of land warfare do n o t allow of the o r g a n i s a t i o n
of the maintenance of Army v e h i c l e s , equipment, e t c . , , on the b a s i s of
e l a b o r a t e c e n t r a l workshops: armoured f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s , guns, etc., have
t o be r e p a i r e d under conditions of a c t u a l warfare as hear as p o s s i b l e t o
the f r o n t ; a l l . warlike s t o r e s must be kept effective, for a c t i o n as long
as p o s s i b l e , and only vtiien major r e p a i r or overhaul i s r e q u i r e d can the.
Army-afford t o b r i n g the-equipment back t o a. c e n t r a l base: workshop f o r
treatment.
In t h i s respect .the Army problem i s d i f f e r e n t from and f a r
more d i f f i c u l t than t h a t of the Navy and the .R.A.F., who normally operate
from e l a b o r a t e l y organised b a s e s ; "echeloned s e r v i c e " i s imposed on the
Army by these conditions, of land warfare, i . e. s k i l l e d tradesmen must. .oe
d i s t r i b u t e d .in small u n i t s r i g h t up to the most forward f i g h t i n g formations,
as well as w i t h the rearward maintenance' workshops.
This echeloned chain
of r e p a i r and maintenance i n e v i t a b l y uses up more tradesmen than a
concentrated base workshop o r g a n i s a t i o n ; the p r e s e n t campaign i n Libya,
even more than i t s forerunner a year ago, .has p o i n t e d the moral of t h i s for
the Army i n no uncertain terms, and i t i s not going too f a r t o say t h a t t h e ­
success achieved by General Auchlnleck's f o r c e s has been very l a r g e l y due t o
the r a p i d r e p a i r and replacement' i n the f i g h t i n g l i n e of armoured f i g h t i n g
v e h i c l e s temporarily knocked out i n b a t t l e . . . This i s one of the outstanding
lessons we have, learned from our enemies; we may hope that-we have
improved upon i t i n the p r o c e s s .
"It has been necessary t o s e t out t h i s
o p e r a t i o n a l background to the 'Army use of i t s s k i l l e d men since the
Beveridge Committee do not appear t o have paid s u f f i c i e n t regard t o t h i s
a l l - i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r , although t h e i r terms of r e f e r e n c e , as mentioned above,
drew s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o i t .
3.
One of the main f a u l t s which t h e Committee find w i t h the Army
o r g a n i s a t i o n of i t s s k i l l e d men i s t h a t t h e r e i s too much s k i l l "standing
by" unused i n the Army a t any one time, and t h a t b e t t e r use.could be made of
s k i l l e d men who, for v a r i o u s reasons, are not f u l l y e x e r c i s i n g . t h e i r s k i l l . .
While some improvement (as i s mentioned l a t e r ) can and w i l l be made'in
t h i s r e s p e c t , the Committee have again p a i d i n s u f f i c i e n t r e g a r d t o t h e
o p e r a t i o n a l reasons responsible for t h i s r e s u l t ,
In t h i s m a t t e r , t o o , the
Committee have themselves (paragraph 31) put the p o i n t very c l e a r l y
"war i n c e r t a i n phases involves standing by t o a c t r a t h e r than
a c t i n g ; i n war, engineers, l i k e o t h e r s , must be kept w a i t i n g
e i t h e r not f u l l y occupied or occupied otherwise than as
engineers, but ready to use t h e i r s k i l l i n emergencies a t a
- moment's n o t i c e .
We c e r t a i n l y do not r e j e c t a claim t o hold
power i n r e s e r v e f o r emergencies".
I t i s a c l e a r deduction from the Committee's statement j u s t
quoted t h a t men who, by reason of the Army's commitments are "standing,
by to act" should not be counted as " m i s f i t s " i n the Army o r g a n i s a t i o n .
This p a r t i c u l a r l y applies to Royal Engineer u n i t s , who contain a higher
proportion of such men than other corps which have a more s t a t i c r o l e i n
war.
3
The Royal Engineer u n i t engaged i n f i e l d operations must have a t
i t s d i s p o s a l s k i l l e d men competent t o t a c k l e many v a r i e d forms of s k i l l e d
work a t s h o r t n o t i c e i n an emergency., when t h e r e i s no time,, vfithout holding
up o p e r a t i o n s , to summon s k i l l e d men from the resources of a c e n t r a l p o o l ;
the Beveridge Committee confined t h e i r . e n q u i r i e s t o Engineer u n i t s under the
p r e v a i l i n g conditions i n this- country, but i f - t h e y had reviev/ed the work of
Royal Engineer u n i t s under war conditions i n the Middle E a s t , f o r example, i t
i s safe t o say t h a t a very d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e would have emerged.
Further,
the c o n d i t i o n s of an invasion of t h i s country would c a l l i n t o f u l l use t h a t
o p e r a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n of. Royal Engineer u n i t s which, while p r e s e n t
conditions continue a t home, may i n some ways appear wasteful of s k i l l e d
Men; and i t must be remembered t h a t i f invasion happens, t h e Army w i l l be
granted no margin of tSme i n which to r e p a i r d e f i c i e n c i e s of o r g a n i s a t i o n .
w
4.
Again, the'Array oannot escape holding pools of tradesmen to* meet
wastage i n t h e many overseas t h e a t r e s of war. The problem of employing
these t o t h e f u l l e s t advantage while they are waiting"despatch i s a
d i f f i c u l t one, f o r . t h e s a i l i n g arrangements of troopships and t h e i r convoys
preclude such long term planning as would enable these w a i t i n g men t o be. a t
the l a t h e u n t i l the l a s t moment before embarkation. But t h e War Office
are doing what i s p o s s i b l e by d e c e n t r a l i s i n g the arrangements f o r t h e use of
such w a i t i n g men t o Commands a t home; b e t t e r r e s u l t s a r e probable from such
l o c a l arrangements, p a r t i c u l a r l y as l o c a l s o l u t i o n s of accommodation
d i f f i c u l t i e s ( a big f a c t o r i n t h i s connection) can usually, be a r r i v e d at
more quickly.
5.
The generally adverse v e r d i c t returned by the Beveridge Committee
t o t h e question whether t h e Ansy makes f u l l use of i t s s k i l l e d men i s
based on personal interviews which the Committee held with 139 serving
s o l d i e r s , whose names were s e l e c t e d i n roughly equal numbers from l i s t s
furnished by employers and t r a d e unions, with one or two from other sources.
The Committee have c l a s s i f i e d these men i n the various c a t e g o r i e s s e t out i n
Appendix A o f . t h e i r Report;. these c a t e g o r i e s are not repeated here, b u t
r e l a t e t o t h e degree t o which the Army i s . using t h e i r s k i l l i n t h e i r p r e s e n t "
employment. The gravamen of t h e charge made by the Beveridge Committee
l i e s i n t h e -large proportion of the 139 men whom they placed i n category VI,
which they divided i n t o two s u b - d i v i s i o n s : ­
( a ) men who though mustered i n a Service t r a d e s u i t e d
t o t h e i r c i v i l i a n s k i l l have not been working, a t t h a t
trade t o any s u b s t a n t i a l e x t e n t , and
(b)
men not mustered i n a Service t r a d e or wrongly mustered.
The Committee placed r e s p e c t i v e l y 36 and 38 men i n c a t e g o r i e s Vl(a) and V l ( b ) ;
but they did not have before them the man's "trade h i s t o r y " since he joined
t h e Army, and they did not r e l a t e h i s employment at the time of the i n t e r ­
view t o the operational background of h i s u n i t . I n two d i f f e r e n t ways the
o p e r a t i o n a l ' r o l e of the u n i t d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s the conditions of the s k i l l e d
man's employment: h i s u n i t may (unknown t o him) be earmarked for early
despatch overseas, or again i t may be a l l o t t e d t o a v i t a l o p e r a t i o n a l r o l e i n
t h e defence of t h i s country. I n e i t h e r case, the p o i n t i s t h a t t h e r e must
i n e v i t a b l y be some p r o p o r t i o n of the s k i l l e d men of a u n i t who are "standing
by t o a c t " and are not f u l l y and continuously employed a t t h e i r ' s k i l l e d
t r a d e . The War Office have re-examined each i n d i v i d u a l case, and i n
doing so have taken account both of the f a c t o r s . j u s t mentioned, which were
not known t o the Beveridge Committee when they interviewed, t h e men, and.
also of the r e s u l t of subsequent t r a d e - t e s t i n g of the men - where t h i s was
necessary f o r correct c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
In the r e s u l t , i t i s found t h a t
only 16 and 20 men r e s p e c t i v e l y should be c l a s s i f i e d i n c a t e g o r i e s Vl(a)
and Vl(b) - a reduction of some 50 p e r cent. On t h e other hand category l ( a ) ,
t o which t h e Committee assigned those men already in a Service t r a d e and
making f u l l use of t h e i r c i v i l i a n s k i l l i n t h a t t r a d e ; includes 1+9- men as
reviewed by the War Office i n t h e l i g h t of f u l l e r information, as a g a i n s t 13
so a l l o c a t e d by the Committee. The small number of cases of a l l e g e d misuse
of s k i l l i n the Army enquired i n t o by the Committee was, i n any case, perhaps
a slender foundation t o carry t h e f a r - r e a c h i n g conclusions based upon i t , and
i n view of t h e careful check-up of, each case by the Amy A u t h o r i t i e s , i t
seems possible" t h a t more exhaustive examination would have l e d the Committee
i n t o p l a c i n g a very much higher percentage of the men examined i n t o c a t e g o r i e s
denoting t h a t t h e i r s k i l l was being reasonably used.
1
1
6,
, The o r i g i n a l request placed before the. Beveridge Committee on
behalf of the Army was f o r a small number of highly s k i l l e d men, of the
armament a r t i f i c e r type. Following r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s by S i r William
Beveridge, a t a subsequent conference, as t o the e x t e n t of d i l u t i o n of
s k i l l e d men i n the Army, t h e numbers asked for were r a i s e d considerably.
As a r e s u l t of f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s following the i s s u e of t h i s Second Report
of t h e Committee, the-War Office have r e v e r t e d to the' o r i g i n a l r e q u e s t for a
small number of highly s k i l l e d men only. War i s not s t a t i c , and as the
Army becomes.involved i n operations i n o t h e r t h e a t r e s of. war, and as armoured
formations take an i n c r e a s i n g part" i n these o p e r a t i o n s , the demand for
s k i l l e d men for r e p a i r and maintenance work w i l l i n e v i t a b l y i n c r e a s e .
1
7.
I n the foregoing paragraphs i t i s suggested t h a t the Beveridge
Committee have f a i l e d to give due weight to the o p e r a t i o n a l and maintenance
commitments of a n Army organised as a n e f f i c i e n t f i g h t i n g machine, and
f u r t h e r , t h a t i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g the 139 c a s e s , on the r e s u l t s of which the
Committee p r i m a r i l y "based t h e i r adverse judgement on t h e Army's use of i t s
s k i l l e d p e r s o n n e l , the Committee lacked information on c e r t a i n important
aspects which might well have r e s u l t e d i n reducing t h e assessed " m i s f i t s "
by a t l e a s t ; 50 p e r c e n t .
The Beveridge Committee have n e v e r t h e l e s s
performed a most useful p i e c e of work in p o i n t i n g t o weak p l a c e s i n the
Army system of u s i n g i t s s k i l l e d men, and the Committee"s recommendations
and suggestions are i n a l l i n s t a n c e s being followed up and implemented as
r a p i d l y . a s p o s s i b l e , having regard to those overriding c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of
m i l i t a r y e f f i c i e n c y mentioned above.
The more important of these
recommendations, and the a c t i o n which i s being taken on them are s e t out
below.
(References are t o paragraphs of t h e Second R e p o r t ) .
8. Review of Amy Establishments,
(paragraphs ,31 t o 33.)
The Committee have suggested such a review w i t h the dual aim of
reducing t h e number of tradesmen i n a p a r t i c u l a r establishment and a l s o of
s u b s t i t u t i n g s e m i - s k i l l e d for s k i l l e d men where p o s s i b l e .
The Committee
also consider t h a t t h i s review should take account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of
economising men of r a r e s k i l l by pooling r e s o u r c e s between d i f f e r e n t cdrps
and U n i t s .
Such a review should produce u s e f u l r e s u l t s and the Y/ar Office
have appointed a committee t o - u n d e r t a k e t h e t a s k ; t h i s committee has been
i n s t r u c t e d t o l a y down the broad l i n e s of p o l i c y t o b e applied t o a l l u n i t
establishments embodying tradesmen; the d e t a i l e d work of examining the very
l a r g e number of u n i t establishments a f f e c t e d , i n o r d e r t o t r a n s l a t e t h i s
p o l i c y i n t o terms of ranks and t r a d e s i n each u n i t , i s boxing pursued by an
appropriate sub-committee which w i l l co-opt the necessary t e c h n i c a l experts
for t h e p a r t i c u l a r arms under examination.
9. S c r u t i n y of Army man-power w i t h a view t o employing a l l s k i l l e d men on
s k i l l e d t a s k s (paragraphs 16, 39, 40? 41 and 62 of the Report are
relevant).
Much has already been done i n t h e d i r e c t i o n i n d i c a t e d by the
Beveridge Report,
I n t h e course of the l a s t eight months a d e t a i l e d
s c r u t i n y of the whole man-power r e s o u r c e s of the Army has been undertaken
i n order t o r e l a t e t h e forces a v a i l a b l e t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l requirements of
each s e v e r a l t h e a t r e of war,
and t h i s l a r g e - s c a l e review has been under­
taken from the prime standpoint of economising -man-power and
( i n c i d e n t a l l y ) of s u b s t i t u t i n g women for men -whore p o s s i b l e .
The review
was not intended, of c o u r s e , t o go i n t o t h e d e t a i l s of t h e i n t e r n a l make-up
of t h e personnel of u n i t s and the. a p p r o p r i a t e numbers of s k i l l e d men
employed; b u t i t w i l l have ensured t h a t t h e numbers of u n i t s r e q u i r e d for
the o p e r a t i o n a l commitments of t h e Army a r e no more than a r e . a b s o l u t e l y
necessary.
I n the course of t h a t review, many new u n i t s using tradesmen have
been, and are s t i l l being formed, e s p e c i a l l y R.A.0.0. units:, thus t h e r e a r e
at times small surpluses i n a t r a d e , r e q u i r e d for t h e s e newly-formed u n i t s
and soon absorbed by them.
Such s u r p l u s e s are a t t a c h e d , pending absorption,
to e x i s t i n g u n i t s where accommodation e x i s t s ; any form of "holding" u n i t s
for such men would waste man-power i n "overheads".
The Beveridge Committee have arranged t o f u r n i s h the War Off ice
with l i s t s of s k i l l e d men now s e r v i n g , r e c e i v e d from employers and t r a d e
unions, where a man s "skill i s s a i d not t o be e f f e c t i v e l y used (paragraph 16).
The Committee have suggested t h a t t h e machinery for f i n d i n g and s e l e c t i n g
men f o r Service t r a d e s should be strengthened and should make use of
personal i n t e r v i e w s by experts r a t h e r than examination of paper records
(paragraph 40). Again, they suggest t h a t too often laymen i n t h e Army have
been asked t o do the job of an expert engineer i n t h i s connection
(paragraph 41)- Where enquiry r e v e a l s t h a t a man's s k i l l i s not being
f u l l y employed i n h i s present p o s t , they suggest t h a t t h e many b a r r i e r s
operating a g a i n s t t h e i r f r e e t r a n s f e r to p o s t s inhere t h e i r s k i l l can be
b e t t e r employed should be removed.
1
A word may be said on t h i s l a s t question. I t must be remembered t h a t
the Army of today i s made up of v a r i e d elements: t h e pre-war T e r r i t o r i a l
Army/
Army i n which?- except for s p e c i a l i s t u n i t s , , n o attempt was normally made
t o f i t a man's s k i l l i n h i s c i v i l t r a d e i n t o s i m i l a r s k i l l e d work i n t h e Array; the m i l i t i a i n f l u x j u s t "before t h e war, t o which broadly speaking a
s i m i l a r remark a p p l i e s ; and t h e huge i n t a k e of men which t h e Army had
perforce to take i n t h e period immediately a f t e r Dunkirk, who had t o b e
formed into u n i t s and organised and t r a i n e d to meet a d i r e and ijmiinent
p e r i l of invasion, a process which c l e a r l y precluded t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
carefully placing square pegs i n t o square holes a ' F u r t h e r , t h e s e c o n d - l i n e
T e r r i t o r i a l u n i t s r a i s e d when the T e r r i t o r i a l Army was doubled, before t h e
War, comprised many u n i t s , r a i s e d , on t h e i n v i t a t i o n of t h e "War Office^ by
large public u t i l i t y undertakings and big business' f i r m s , e t c . , and i t vra.s
i m p l i c i t i n t h e oonditions of t h e i r formation t h a t t h e men of these u n i t s
should continue t o serve t o g e t h e r .
So f a r as s k i l l e d men were concerned,
before t h e Beveridge Committee was set; up, t h e - Army had t r i e d hard t o
overtake these accumulated handicaps and had, i n f a c t , oombed out upwards of
80,000 men who. have been r e - a l l o c a t e d t o employment a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e i r
skill.
In i n d i v i d u a l c a s e s , a higher N.0.0. rank'which a man has acquired
i s a bar t o h i s p l a c i n g i n a tradesmen's post i n t h e lowest rank; but t h i s
bar i s not a b s o l u t e .
F u r t h e r , i n i n d i v i d u a l cases t h e Army may l o s e more
i n i t s f i g h t i n g e f f i c i e n c y by d i s p l a c i n g a man who i s a key man i n a
f i g h t i n g s u b - u n i t than i t would gain by p u t t i n g t h a t man i n t o a tradesmen's
jobs i t i s c l e a r l y not expedient i n - e x c e p t i o n a l cases t o apply t h e accepted
p r i n c i p l e b l i n d l y without regard t o t h e e f f e c t on f i g h t i n g u n i t s *
Two other p o i n t s should be mentioned.
Every p o t e n t i a l tradesman
withdrawn from,the ranks of f i g h t i n g u n i t s for t h e purpose of being t r a i n e d
must be r e p l a c e d . i n t h a t u n i t by a t r a i n e d f i g h t i n g s o l d i e r s
It, is hot
s u f f i c i e n t l y a p p r e c i a t e d t h a t i t takes, on t h e average, between s i x and eight
months to t r a i n a f i g h t i n g soldier*-. - This f a c t o r should be considered ao
being' one of t h e necessary brakes upon the wholesale withdrawal of t r a i n e d
s o l d i e r s from, u n i t s f o r long courses of s p e c i a l i s e d t r a d e t r a i n i n g .
The
other point t o be borne i n mind i s t h i s .
I t may be urged t h a t t h e Army has .
had over two y e a r s i n which t o put i t s house i n order as t o making t h e b e s t
use of i t s s k i l l e d men.
This i s q u i t e wrong.
The army was not i n a
p o s i t i o n t o tamper i n any way with i t s dangerously s l e n d e r fighting,
resources u n t i l t h e imminent r i s k of i n v a s i o n , which p e r s i s t e d from June,
194-0, had somewhat receded with t h e outbreak of t h e Russian war i n June,
1941* The i n t r i c a t e and l a r g e s c a l e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e arrangements, coupled
with t h e i n c r e a s e i n n o n - f i g h t i n g overheads, which a r e necessary for. t h e
big ta.sk of s e l e c t i n g and t r a i n i n g many thousands of p o t e n t i a l t r a i n e e s , could
not be put i n t o f u l l e f f e c t u n t i l q u i t e r e c e n t l y .
This v/as t h e main reason
why t h e Army accepted S i r William Beveridge's i n v i t a t i o n t o i n c r e a s e i t s
demand for tradesmen.
I f t h e s e could have been found from c i v i l l i f e i t
would have s u i t e d the.Army b e t t e r a s , a p a r t from avoiding t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
confusion caused by r e - t r a i n i n g i t s own men, i t would have avoided t h e waste
of purely m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g which had been given t o t h e p o t e n t i a l tradesmen
already i n t h e Army.
I t must not be overlooked t h a t 58,000 o f f i c e r s and men have been
r e l e a s e d from t h e Army since t h e outbreak of war f o r work of n a t i o n a l
importance,. and t h e bulk of these were highly s k i l l e d personnel i n v a r i o u s
walks of l i f e .
With t h e s e r e s e r v a t i o n s , t h e r e i s , however, an admitted need for
improving t h e machinery f o r d e a l i n g w i t h those cases of "misfit" tradesmen
which are brought t o n o t i c e .
The War Office a r e s e t t i n g up TradesmetiVs
Interview Boards i n each Command which w i l l i n t e r v i e w a l l such cases f a l l i n g
within the p a r t i c u l a r Command..
Each man s t r a d e mustering *in t h e Army w i l l
be s c r u t i n i s e d i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s s k i l l e d t r a d e and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i n c i v i l
l i f e ; and where - i t i s expedient h i s t r a d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w i l l be upgraded,
or i f necessary he w i l l be t r a n s f e r r e d t o more s u i t a b l e employment i n
another u n i t .
'.
.
.
1
These e n q u i r i e s w i l l i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e be oonfined t o men of
engineering and e l e c t r i c a l t r a d e s .
These/
* 6
1
These Boards w i l l have a permanent president-, a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of
t h e Ministry of Labour and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e arms of t h e Services
immediately concerned, ted they w i l l pay s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o sicillod men ,
The r e p o r t of t h e
whose t r a d e i n c i v i l l i f e . i s " s i n g l e purpose .
interview and any necessary t r a d e t e s t which follows i t w i l l be made d i r e c t
by t h e Board and Testing Centre r e s p e c t i v e l y to t h e War Office, and^the
personnel w i l l then be considered f o r r e - p o s t i n g , t r a n s f e r or r e t u r n t o
c i v i l l i f e as may be e x p e d i e n t
11
0
This procedure has been agreed with S i r William Beveridge* and a
s p e c i a l branch i s being s e t up under t h e Adjutant-General t o d e a l
expeditiously w i t h - t h i s work.
'
lCu
Improvement of Posting Arrangements^.
(Paragraph 36.)
i
There i s admittedly room for improvement h e r e
Attainment of t h e
i d e a l whereby every man with s k i l l e d q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i s placed, on e n t e r i n g
the Army, where ho i s most wanted i s l a r g e l y bound up with t h e a l t e r a t i o n
i n the system of enlistment r e f e r r e d t o i n paragraph 43 of t h e Report and
commented on s e p a r a t e l y below (paragraph 13)*
Pending the major change
t h e r e adumbrated, improved methods of s e l e c t i o n and p o s t i n g have been
introduced by the War Office t o make t h e most of t h e e x i s t i n g Army t r a i n i n g
centre o r g a n i s a t i o n .
9
11.
Improvement of Trade T e s t i n g . "-(Paragraph 3?*),
Improvement of Technical T r a i n i n g 7 ' - (Paragraph 38?)
The Beveridge Committee have given some u s e f u l advice, for
improving t r a d e t e s t i n g and t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g i n t h e Army, and t h e i r
suggestions w i l l be adopted so f a r as they a r e compatible with t h e
o p e r a t i o n a l - c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which must govern the o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h e Army
as a f i g h t i n g machine.
The vt"ar Office consider t h a t t h e necessary
technical^ advice should be r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o higher commanders and
s t a f f s and t o u n i t commanders * , They ore t h e r e f o r e appointing a t once a­
l i e u t e n a n t - c o l o n e l with t h e n e c e s s a r y t e c h n i c a l knowledge to the s t a f f of
each Command t o give such t e c h n i c a l jxdyice and t o supervise t e c h n i c a l
t r a i n i n g and t r a d e t e s t i n g .
I n a d d i t i o n , the s t a f f for inspecting and ­
supervising t h e various t r a d e t r a i n i n g establishments i s being s t r e n g t h e n e d .
I n c i d e n t a l l y , t h e Committee i n t h e i r Report (paragraph 37) mention
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made to them that, t e s t s , f a i r i n themselves, have sometimes
been made u n f a i r by f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of t h e Army t o -provide s u i t a b l e
t o o l s a t i t s t r a d e t e s t i n g c e n t r e s * The s p e c i f i c complaints made t o the
Committee have subsequently been i n v e s t i g a t e d by a j o i n t enquiry of t h e
Beveridge Committee and of the War Office, and have been shown to be
e n t i r e l y devoid of foundation.
12. A cprps of Mechanical Engineers..
(Paragraph 44*)
The.increasing mechanisation, of t h e Army has forced t o the front
the question whether a l l mechanical maintenance should not be" concentrated
i n one c o r p s .
This i s a problem which was explored more than once i n
peacetime, but i s one of i n c r e a s i n g urgency I n an Army where armoured
d i v i s i o n s are assuming an ever l a r g e r r o l e . I t i s , however, necessary t o
bear i n mind whether t h e major changes i n army o r g a n i s a t i o n which would be
involved by, i n t e r a l i a . t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of the mechanical maintenance
duties of a l l e x i s t i n g corps i n one c o r p s , can be undertaken i n t h e ' m i d d l e
of a war.
F u r t h e r , the f a c t t h a t l a r g e p a r t s of t h e B r i t i s h Army a r e
engaged i n a c t i v e operations overseas r e n d e r s the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of a l l
mechanical maintenance d u t i e s i n t o one Corps a matter of g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y .
That i s a matter of high p o l i c y t o b e decided on t h e highest l e v e l .
I n the
meantime, the pros and cans of the question have been r e m i t t e d "to a
committee of t h r e e senior members of t h e "War Office s t a f f who a r e themselves
of high standing and long experience i n the business world.
Their report,,
which w i l l s h o r t l y be made, w i l l have t o be considered i n t h e l i g h t of the
p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s j u s t mentioned*
13.
Enlistment for the Army instead of for a Corps.
(Paragraph 1+3*)
Here again the Army i n h e r i t s a system which i t would he glad to
change. The present system of enlistment for Corps i s , however, one of the
major features of the pre-war Army organisation and i s based upon f e e l i n g s of
local sentiment and t r a d i t i o n about which counties and towns are at l e a s t
as jealous as the regiments of the Army concerned. The present system i s
built up upon a framework of regimental Record Offices and Pay Offices, with
ramifications through every aspect of Army administration. A radical and
sweeping change in t h i s system would involve a large measure of immediate
dislocation and inconvenience and would give r i s e t o legal d i f f i c u l t i e s .
To attempt such a change at the present juncture might bo very dangerous.
Nevertheless, far from adopting a negative attitude t o t h i s proposal, the
War Office had i t under close examination for many months before the
Beveridge Committee was set up, and has already introduced an experimental
system of intake for general service with a view t o t e s t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t i e s
and measuring the d i f f i c u l t i e s . For example, there has been set up i n Scotland
a training centre, the intake into which w i l l be e n l i s t e d for. general service.
Recruits w i l l be retained at the centre for the period of their, basic training,
and during that period they w i l l undergo s e l e c t i o n t e s t s with a view to finding
out the arm, corps and employment -in the Army for which they are most suited.
If i t i s found to be practicable, on administrative and other grounds, the War
Office w i l l introduce enlistment for. the Army instead of for Corps. In the
meantime, improved methods of s e l e c t i o n and posting, as mentioned above,' are
being applied t o Army intakes'of men.
14.
The review of the Arnr^s. organisation of i t s s k i l l e d tradesmen
undertaken by the Beveridge Committee -. a body of experts with a d e t a i l e d
knowledge of the organisation of technical s k i l l i n c i v i l industry - would
almost inevitably bring to i t s task the standards Of industrial practice.
A Committee so constituted could, not be expected t o appreciate the extent t o
which the ideal organisation has t o be subordinated t o serve the ends o f
operational e f f i c i e n c y . In t h i s Paper the War. Office have endeavoured to
supply the necessary corrective from the military standpoint. . This i s not
to say that the Beveridge Committee have not performed a most useful task,
and the very fact that they have thrown up i n sharp r e l i e f those ways i n
which the Army organisation i s wrongly conceived or uneconomical of s k i l l e d
personnel has made i t incumbent on the War Office to examine the Beveridge
Conjmittee's recommendations and suggestions the more c l o s e l y , in order t o
show cause why military exigencies i n some cases preclude their implementation.
It i s therefore i n no "sense of carping c r i t i c i s m that the remarks i n t h i s
Paper are made and the War Office desire t o record t h e i r appreciation of the
very valuable survey of s k i l l e d man-power i n the Army which the Committee
have completed, end which w i l l , i t is,hoped, help to achieve that balanced
compromise between operational needs and economy of s k i l l e d personnel
which w i l l produce the most e f f i c i e n t fighting machine.