THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
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for the Cabinet.
March
1948
SECRET
Copy No.
C P . (48) 96
VAth March. 1948
CABINET
THE
BRUSSELS
TREATY
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN A F F A I R S
I circulate h e r e w i t h , for t h e i n f o r m a t i o n of my colleagues, records of a
conversation I h a d i n Brussels on 17th M a r c h w i t h the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s of
F r a n c e , Belgium, N e t h e r l a n d s a n d L u x e m b o u r g on a number of subjects a r i s i n g
from t h e T r e a t y . T h e r e is one p o i n t to w h i c h I should like to d r a w particular­
attention.
2. A r t i c l e V I I of the T r e a t y provides for a p e r m a n e n t Consultative Council.
T h i s Council is a novel conception to w h i c h I a t t a c h considerable i m p o r t a n c e .
I t is proposed t h a t the Council shall consist of the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s of the
five P o w e r s , or of other M i n i s t e r s , if the subject a n d occasion so require. T h e
M i n i s t e r s should meet from time to time, but meanwhile the p e r m a n e n t w o r k
of t h e Council should be c a r r i e d on by Deputies. T h e first meeting of t h e
D e p u t i e s is to t a k e place i n Brussels on 24th M a r c h . T h e i r first task will be
t o make recommendations in r e g a r d t o t h e seat of the Council, i t s agenda a n d
the f o r m a t i o n of a secretariat. They will also have to consider the establishment
of specialised sub-committees as a n d w h e n they are required. There a r e a number
of subjects w h i c h i n my view should come before t h e Consultative Council as
soon as sub-committees have r e p o r t e d . These include social security, defence,
co-operation between intelligence services a n d economics. I n r e g a r d to the l a t t e r
care will have to be taken not to cut across the work of the C o n t i n u i n g O r g a n i s a ­
tion for the E u r o p e a n Recovery P r o g r a m m e , but I do not a n t i c i p a t e difficulty here.
3. I w a s impressed i n Brussels by t h e fact t h a t the other F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s
s h a r e d my desire to t a k e energetic steps to m a k e this T r e a t y a p r a c t i c a l i n s t r u m e n t
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation i n every field. I hope t h a t the use of the Consultative
Council on the lines outlined above will enable us to realise this aim.
E. B .
Foreign Office, S. W. 1, 24cth March, 1948. 35115
B
Record.of a private conversation between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg at
the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on 17th March, after the signature
of the Brussels Treaty
Present :
United Kingdom
MR. BEVIN.
France
M.
...
GEORGES BIDAULT.
Belgium...
M . P A U L - H E N R I SPAAK.
Netherlands
BARON VAN BOETZELAAR.
Luxembourg
M . BECH.
(The B r i t i s h A m b a s s a d o r (Sir G. Rendel) a n d the "French a n d N e t h e r l a n d s
A m b a s s a d o r s were also present. Mr. F . K. Roberts acted as i n t e r p r e t e r . )
M. S-paak said t h a t they h a d h a d very good results from the negotiations of the
p a s t few weeks a n d asked the Secretary of S t a t e , who h a d suggested this meeting,
to set out his ideas.
The Secretary of Slate explained t h a t he t h o u g h t i t would not m a k e a very
o-ood impression nor be consistent w i t h the urgency of the s i t u a t i o n if the Foreign
M i n i s t e r s merely signed the T r e a t y a n d then p a r t e d company immediately after­
w a r d s . H e t h o u g h t i t i m p o r t a n t t h a t they should t a k e a d v a n t a g e of then­
presence together in Brussels to consider how to proceed w i t h the constructive
tasks foreseen in the T r e a t y .
T h e first problem w a s to decide on the constitution of the Consultative
Council. Should they advise t h e i r Governments t h a t t h i s should consist of the
Foreign M i n i s t e r s themselves w i t h D e p u t i e s a n d officials u n d e r them for the
p e r m a n e n t a n d detailed work ? There w a s an u r g e n t necessity to begin discussions
on several questions soon. For example, they m u s t consider how best to a p p r o a c h
the question of defence. H e t h o u g h t t h a t the Foreign M i n i s t e r s should consider
i t in its broadest aspects, w i t h a view to g i v i n g a general directive to their m i l i t a r y
experts, who should t h i n k in terms not of the last w a r b u t of a n y f u t u r e w a r .
They should a r r a n g e a time for the full consideration of such a question.
T h e second question was t h a t of Communist infiltration. T h i s h a d been
considered by the B r i t i s h Cabinet j u s t before Mr. Bevin left London a n d h i s
colleagues a t t a c h e d the g r e a t e s t i m p o r t a n c e to it. T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r s state­
m e n t in the House of Commons on 15th M a r c h showed the d a n g e r s in the U n i t e d
Kingdom, where infiltration h a d taken place in some scientific a n d research
i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d even in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n itself. H e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e i r chief
intelligence e x p e r t s should concert together w i t h a view to o v e r h a u l i n g all
security questions, i n c l u d i n g a study of the methods to p r e v e n t sudden
disturbances i n factories a n d workshops by Communist cells. H e w a s convinced
t h a t they could l e a r n a g r e a t deal from each other on how to proceed.
T h e t h i r d question w a s finance, which h a d also been considered by some of
his colleagues j u s t before he left London. H e did not w i s h to i n t e r f e r e i n a n y
way w i t h the m e e t i n g of the sixteen countries u n d e r the Committee of E u r o p e a n
Economic Co-operation a n d the C o n t i n u i n g O r g a n i s a t i o n , b u t they could p e r h a p s
a r r a n g e for e x p e r t s t u d y between the five Brussels T r e a t y countries of the whole
balance of payments problem. H e h a d t h o u g h t t h a t the five F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s
m i g h t meet to see w h e t h e r a r r a n g e m e n t s could not be m a d e as between the five
countries to avoid a n y dollar or gold p a y m e n t s among themselves. T h i s would
help to establish equilibrium.
T h e fourth question concerned social security, which w a s the subject of one
of the clauses in the T r e a t y a n d to which M r . Bevin a t t a c h e d g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e .
H e t h o u g h t we should a i m as time w e n t on a t h a r m o n i s i n g and developing o u r
respective social services, since real social a n d economic security was the best
antidote to communism.
T h e above were the m a i n points which Mr. Bevin t h o u g h t the F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r s should consider before they left Brussels. H e d i d not suggest they
could be fully discussed to-day, b u t they m i g h t have a p r e p a r a t o r y talk w i t h a
view to meeting l a t e r to consider all these problems w i t h i n the framework of
the constructive edifice of the Brussels T r e a t y .
M. Bidault a g r e e d t h a t all these were i m p o r t a n t questions. T h e p e r m a n e n t
Consultative Council w a s an essential i n s t r u m e n t of the T r e a t y . H i s own general
idea w a s t h a t i t would have a very good effect if t h e F o r e i g n -Ministers themselves,
met from t i m e to time in a d d i t i o n to the w o r k of the p e r m a n e n t body, which
should i n his view a r r a n g e for a t least monthly meetings of Deputies.
The
M i n i s t e r s would themselves meet whenever necessary, a n d i n any case a t least
once a year. M . B i d a u l t a t t a c h e d special i m p o r t a n c e i n present circumstances
to defence a n d security questions. H e t h o u g h t t h a t now they h a d signed this
T r e a t y of m u t u a l assistance they m u s t a t once consider the necessary measures
to s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r security.
H e h a d no objection to these general defence
questions being discussed first on a political basis between the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s
w i t h a view to g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s to t h e i r respective General Staffs. H e hoped
t h u s t h a t our defences could be organised if we were given time to do this, which
he hoped we should, b u t there w a s of course no assurance of this.
Baron van Boetzelaar
then suggested t h a t the first t h i n g to do was to
establish the Consultative Council which should itself in the first place consider
all the problems r a i s e d by M r . Bevin. M. S p a a k agreed w i t h this a n d suggested
t h a t they should decide to set u p the Consultative Committee in one of t h e i r
c a p i t a l s w i t h a view to p u t t i n g the T r e a t y into effect i n all i t s aspects—military,
social, economic, &c. M i n i s t e r s would then meet when necessary. The immediate
decision r e q u i r e d from them, therefore, w a s the form the Council should take
a n d the place i n w h i c h i t should be established.
Mr. Bevin said he h a d no desire to r u s h his colleagues into any quick decisions.
H e t h o u g h t they should t h i n k over these questions a n d then meet to consider them.
H e h a d merely w a n t e d to p u t the issues before his colleagues a t this meeting.
They would n a t u r a l l y each of t h e m have to consult t h e i r Governments on t h e i r
r e t u r n . M. B i d a u l t agreed t h a t no decisions could be taken to-day as they h a d
not yet r e f e r r e d these m a t t e r s to t h e i r respective Governments. I t occurred to
him t h a t possibly different sections of the Consultative Committee—political,
economic, social, &c.—might be set u p in different places. M. S p a a k suggested
t h a t these questions could be gone into when the D e p u t i e s met.
I t w a s then agreed t h a t the Deputies should be a p p o i n t e d to meet in Brussels
early n e x t week. I t w a s , however, also felt t h a t some p r e l i m i n a r y discussion of
the various problems could usefully take place a t t h i s meeting.
M. Bidault then t u r n e d to the question of co-operation a g a i n s t Communist
infiltration. T h e r e h a d a l r e a d y been discussions between M. S p a a k a n d the F r e n c h
M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r w i t h a view to dealing w i t h undesirable characters, con­
trolling foreigners, a n d generally s t u d y i n g how effectively to counter Communist
tactics. H e w a s sure t h a t there would be no difficulty about such consultations,
M. S p a a k agreed, but said t h a t i t remained to decide on the method by which the
consultations should be held.
M. B i d a u l t t h e n t u r n e d to the financial question. H e w a s entirely in favour
of considering all such questions which could contribute to b r i n g i n g the five
countries closer together. H e thought, however, t h a t it w a s most i m p o r t a n t to
p r e p a r e the g r o u n d before the F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s met as these were complicated
questions a n d they did not wish to a r r a n g e m i n i s t e r i a l meetings which m i g h t prove
a failure. W i t h t h a t one reserve he was entirely i n favour of the meeting proposed
by Mr. Bevin. A f t e r M r . Bevin h a d suggested t h a t the m a t t e r m i g h t be considered
first by the Deputies, M. S p a a k said t h a t he w a s very much in favour of early
meetings between M i n i s t e r s concerned w i t h financial a n d also economic questions.
Such meetings should not have too definite an objective, b u t should aim a t a f r a n k
examination of t h e ways a n d means by which we could help one another a n d see
how much we could do in common. H e w a s sure t h a t there would be really useful
results from such meetings. F o r example,- they m i g h t study the respective
resources of the five countries w i t h a view to saving dollars. This, after all, was a
crucial problem for them all, however g r e a t t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p w a s w i t h the U n i t e d
States. T h e responsible M i n i s t e r s could begin by e x a m i n i n g j u s t t h i s one ques­
tion. T h i s in itself would be extremely useful as there h a d been g r e a t economic
difficulties in recent weeks between some of the countries represented a t t h i s
meeting. I t h a d emerged t h a t t h e i r economic a n d financial policies m i g h t diverge
or even become opposed a n d if they each went a h e a d on their own lines, they m i g h t
have g r e a t difficulty in g e t t i n g t h i n g s r i g h t a g a i n . H e t h o u g h t t h a t it would be
helpful for the M i n i s t e r s concerned to meet a n d examine a general -approach to
these problems. These i n s t r u c t i o n s should be given to the Deputies w i t h a view
to removing so f a r as possible these differences.
35115
B 2
Mr. Benin said this w a s exactly his own idea. H e did n o t w a n t the F i n a n c e
M i n i s t e r s to meet w i t h the idea of s i g n i n g a n o t h e r agreement. W h a t he- w a s
a i m i n g a t w a s a long a n d c o n t i n u i n g process of discussion by which we should
g r a d u a l l y s t r e n g t h e n our co-operation a n d create some means of lessening our
present heavy financial commitment to the W e s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e .
M. Bidault agreed t h a t it w a s quite r i g h t to give consideration to these
questions. Indeed, a t first sight some of the economic a n d social clauses i n t h e
Treaty, for example Articles 1, 2 a n d 3, m i g h t a p p e a r odd i n the context of a
p a c t of m u t u a l assistance. H e t h o u g h t t h a t a study should a t once be given t o
the problems of p u t t i n g really solid content i n t o these Articles. H e hoped t h a t
some really solid s t r u c t u r e would be built u p r o u n d the economic a n d social
clauses.
M. B i d a u l t then t u r n e d to A r t i c l e 9, the accession clause. H e t h o u g h t t h i s
w a s a n excellent clause enabling S t a t e s which were invited to accede to the T r e a t y
to do so under t h e i r own conditions w h i c h m i g h t differ in each case. F o r example,,
I t a l y m i g h t in present circumstances accede to the economic clause only. U n i t e d
States m i g h t be brought into the m u t u a l defence a r r a n g e m e n t s . B u t he t h o u g h t
i t absolutely essential to get to work as quickly as possible w i t h a view to o b t a i n i n g
U n i t e d States s u p p o r t for the T r e a t y which would certainly provoke counter­
action from the Soviet side.
Mr. Bevin agreed. H e t h o u g h t t h a t i m m e d i a t e consideration should be given
t o these issues of m i l i t a r y security. A s r e g a r d s the accession of other P o w e r s , i t
must be considered who i t would be advisable to b r i n g in a n d w h a t p a r t any new
Member should play. H e h a d not a r r i v e d a t a n y definite conclusions himself, b u t
he t h o u g h t the Deputies should s t u d y these m a t t e r s a n d report.
M. Bidault a g a i n said t h a t he t h o u g h t we should move very fast. T h e most
essential issue in p r e s e n t circumstances w a s t h a t of defence, i.e., the security of
E u r o p e a n d of W e s t e r n E u r o p e i n p a r t i c u l a r . None of those present could fail
to realise the g r a v i t y of the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n . T h e reason M a s a r y k h a d committed
suicide was because he feared t h a t w a r w a s i m m i n e n t . H e considered t h a t the
U n i t e d States Government were a l r e a d y considering how to give s u p p o r t to
W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n d the s i g n a t u r e of the T r e a t y to-day w a s its essential p r e ­
l i m i n a r y condition.
M. Spaak then informed the m e e t i n g t h a t the N e t h e r l a n d s A m b a s s a d o r
h a d j u s t told him t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n h a d come i n to the effect t h a t the T r u m a n
speech would contain some really definite statement. I t w a s agreed, therefore,
t h a t the M i n i s t e r s should meet a g a i n a t M. S p a a l d s reception when they h a d
been able to consider M r . T r u m a n ' s speech, M. B i d a u l t then informed the
M i n i s t e r s of certain contacts which h a d a l r e a d y t a k e n place between M r . M a r s h a l l
on the one side and himself a n d M r . Bevin on t h e other. The s i t u a t i o n f a c i n g us
w a s t h a t R u s s i a m i g h t either go to w a r s t r a i g h t a w a y a n d the W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n
countries would find g r e a t difficulty i n meeting such a t h r e a t , or R u s s i a m i g h t
p e r h a p s be so confident of a n economic crisis w e a k e n i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d
so f u r t h e r weakening W e s t e r n E u r o p e t h a t they were r e a d y to w a i t for the
r i p e f r u i t to fall into t h e i r lap. However t h a t m i g h t be, W e s t e r n E u r o p e above
all needed s u p p o r t in the shape of real s t r e n g t h w h i c h could alone be found
i n the U n i t e d States.
Bech then r a i s e d the question of the ratification of the T r e a t y a n d a
dischssion took place from which the following p o i n t s emerged :—
U n d e r the F r e n c h C o n s t i t u t i o n i t was not necessary for the T r e a t y to be
ratified by P a r l i a m e n t . N e i t h e r t h e Franco-Soviet T r e a t y nor the
T r e a t y of D u n k i r k h a d been submitted to P a r l i a m e n t , which h a d
not i n a n y w a y affected t h e i r validity. M . B i d a u l t p r e f e r r e d not to
raise the m a t t e r in P a r l i a m e n t because i t would provoke a very
bad-tempered debate in w h i c h the Communists would h u r l i n s u l t s .
T h e final vote would, of course, be the usual 419 i n favour a n d 184
Communists against.
I n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m the P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a d a l r e a d y m a d e his
statement a n d the text of the T r e a t y would be l a i d before the House.
F o r m a l p a r l i a m e n t a r y ratification w a s not required, a l t h o u g h of
course there m i g h t be a demand for a debate. T h e r e was, however,
no reason a t all to f e a r t h a t the T r e a t y would not be approved.
M r . Bevin informed his colleagues t h a t the" K e e p L e f t movement, who
h a d criticised h i m in the past, h a d now changed their m i n d s a n d
were u r g i n g him to go even f u r t h e r a n d faster in the direction of
W e s t e r n Union.
(c) T h e Belgian position w a s t h a t the T r e a t y w a s a l r e a d y in force. M . S p a a k
had, of course, l a i d i t before P a r l i a m e n t a n d there m i g h t be a d e m a n d
for a debate, but there was no need to fear its rejection.
(d) T h e N e t h e r l a n d s Foi'eign M i n i s t e r said t h a t his P r i m e M i n i s t e r was
m a k i n g a s t a t e m e n t in the N e t h e r l a n d s Chamber t h a t afternoon.
P a r l i a m e n t h a d of course received the text of the T r e a t y as a measure
of courtesy, but the T r e a t y was, i n effect, i n force.
(e) T h e L u x e m b o u r g F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r explained t h a t he w a s in r a t h e r a
special position because A r t i c l e 1 of the L u x e m b o u r g C o n s t i t u t i o n
provided for p e r m a n e n t n e u t r a l i t y in accordance w i t h the a r r a n g e ­
ments imposed on L u x e m b o u r g by the P o w e r s in the 19th century. H e
m u s t therefore place the T r e a t y before P a r l i a m e n t , but he would
u n d e r t a k e to get i t discussed very soon a n d he w a s quite sure t h a t
the L u x e m b o u r g P a r l i a m e n t would approve the T r e a t y a n d the change
in the Constitution.
M. Bidault said i t would be difficult for h i m to avoid a debate if there were
debates i n other P a r l i a m e n t s , but it w a s equally clear from the discussions that,
while there w a s no question of the T r e a t y not h a v i n g entered i n t o force, i t
m i g h t be possible to avoid such debates.
I t w a s agreed t h a t the five M i n i s t e r s should meet a g a i n later in the evening
to consider M r . T r u m a n s statement a n d i t w a s left to M. S p a a k to d r a f t a
communique. The t e x t as approved by the Foreign M i n i s t e r s for issuing a t
10.30 on 18th M a r c h is annexed.
ANNEX
T h e s i g n a t u r e of the T r e a t y between Belgium, France, the G r a n d Duchy of
L u x e m b o u r g , the N e t h e r l a n d s a n d the U n i t e d K i n g d o m w a s followed by a
conversation between the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s . I t was decided t h a t their deputies
should meet in Brussels a t the b e g i n n i n g of n e x t week, in order to take the
necessary steps for the definite establishment of the p e r m a n e n t consultative
council mentioned in A r t i c l e 7 of the T r e a t y a n d for this o r g a n i s a t i o n to function.
5