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THIS D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H I S B R I T A N N I C MAJESTY'S
GOYERNMENT
.
m
Printed for the Cabinet. April 1946.
T h e circulation of this paper h a s / been sUjpto
limited
for the persona] use of ..
TOP
Copy N o .
SECRET.
CP. ( 4 6 ) 139.
15th April, 1946.
CABINET.
THE RUHR AND WESTERN
GERMANY.
M E M O R A N D U M BY THE SECRETARY OF S T A T E FOR F O R E I G N A F F A I R S .
I H A V E already circulated to my colleagues t w o papers dealing respectively
with t h e F u t u r e of Germany a n d the R u h r a n d w i t h the Saar Territory
(CP. (46) 156). I have been g i v i n g a n x i o u s t h o u g h t to these problems and n o w
ask m y colleagues for authority to proceed on the f o l l o w i n g lines —
1
2. I ask for authority to explore the situation w i t h the interested foreign
Governments o n the f o l l o w i n g general lines, t h o u g h I would not propose t o make
any final commitment until the D o m i n i o n s have been consulted at the forthcoming
Imperial C o n f e r e n c e : —
(a) The Ruhr.—(i) T o explore the situation on the basis of international
control over the R u h r industries w i t h o u t political separation of the territory
from Germany on t h e general lines s u g g e s t e d i n p a r a g r a p h 5 of this paper.
Meanwhile officials w o u l d be instructed to prepare a detailed plan as a matter
of urgency.
(ii) A s a n essential prelude to a n y long-term arrangement, t o proceed
within the B r i t i s h zone w i t h the interim measures outlined in paragraph 6.
(b) The Rhineland.—To support t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t s proposal that
French, B e l g i a n a n d D u t c h forces should be stationed in German territory west
of t h e R h i n e for a n indefinite period, but to resist their proposal for the
detachment of the territory from Germany.
(c) The Saar.—To agree that the ownership of the Saar mines should be
transferred to France, the territory included i n the French customs and currency
system, French m i l i t a r y forces stationed permanently in the territory, and the
territory itself transferred f o r t h w i t h to French a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p e n d i n g a final
settlement. T h e assets so transferred should be debited to France on reparation
account.
(d) The A merican Draft Treaty.—To inform the U n i t e d States Government
that H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government welcome their proposal for a treaty as a most
useful basis for discussion.
3. M y o w n original proposal w a s that t h e R u h r should remain part of
Germany, but that i t s industries should be internationally controlled along the
lines of a plan prepared by the Economic a n d I n d u s t r i a l P l a n n i n g Staff and shown
in A n n e x A t o Gen. 1 2 1 / 1 ( C P . (46) 156). T h e following points were raised on
that p r o p o s a l : —
(a) W o u l d my s u g g e s t i o n that the R u h r should concentrate on semi-finished
products a n d t h a t the finishing industries should be located elsewhere
in Europe be acceptable to other countries and indeed t o our o w n ? (b) W o u l d it be possible to confine to the Ruhr the proposed control over
German heavy industries ? M i g h t not a central German Government,
if left free to d o so, build up outside the Ruhr heavy industries which
were not subject t o international control ? 13263 [ 3 1 6 6 1 ]
B
3g
id) W h a t w o u l d be the relation between the s t a n d a r d of l i f e in the R u h r and
t h a t i n the rest of G e r m a n y ?
id) W o u l d the local a d m i n i s t r a t i v e officials a n d the German workers in the
R u h r be likely to adopt a policy of obstruction a n d passive resistance
towards the I n t e r n a t i o n a l H o l d i n g Corporation and to be supported
in t h i s policy by the G e r m a n Government or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and by
workers elsewhere in G e r m a n y ?
4.
These p o i n t s have n o w been considered w i t h the f o l l o w i n g results :—
(a) There is general agreement that from t h e security a n g l e there w o u l d be
every a d v a n t a g e i n e n c o u r a g i n g the basic i n d u s t r i e s of the R u h r up
to the semi-finishing stage, l e a v i n g the finishing i n d u s t r i e s to be set
u p in other p a r t s of G e r m a n y a n d elsewhere i n Europe. There is also
general agreement t h a t this should be our a i m as soon as the
redevelopment of those basic i n d u s t r i e s is allowed. B u t for the time
being w e are bound by the level of i n d u s t r y p l a n approved by the
Control Council w h i c h restricts production to a level t h a t w i l l bring
serious unemployment to the area.
T h i s unemployment would be
increased still further if w e w e r e now to exclude from the area all the
existing fabricating industries.
(b) A l l heavy industries d e p e n d on coal or power, and the R u h r is the only
i m p o r t a n t source of these i n Germany a p a r t from t h e brown coal
fields in S a x o n y w h i c h cannot provide coking coal for steel production.
B y controlling the R u h r coal o u t p u t w e shall control the development
of the steel i n d u s t r y not only in the R u h r area but all over Germany.
Moreover, it has never been s u g g e s t e d that if a special system of
control is a p p l i e d i n the R u h r , the development of i n d u s t r y in the
rest of Germany should be l e f t entirely uncontrolled.
The peace
treaty w i l l , it i s hoped, provide for a thorough system of industrial
inspection.
(c) I t w a s agreed at P o t s d a m that G e r m a n y ' s s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g should,
d u r i n g the i n i t i a l period of control, not exceed t h a t of the European
average e x c l u d i n g the U n i t e d K i n g d o m and R u s s i a . T h e reparation
p l a n agreed at B e r l i n w i l l ensure that t h i s p r i n c i p l e is strictly
observed. I t is not possible t o p r e d i c t at this s t a g e h o w the standard
of l i f e i n t h e various p a r t s of G e r m a n y w i l l develop after the repara­
tion plan h a s been completed. A l l t h a t can be s a i d is that it w i l l be
essential to the success of i n t e r n a t i o n a l control of the R u h r t h a t the
s t a n d a r d of l i f e in the area should be a t least as h i g h as that p r e v a i l i n g
i n the rest of Germany.
(d) A l l political p a r t i e s i n Germany are deeply hostile to any idea of the
political s e p a r a t i o n of the R u h r from Germany. T h e i r a t t i t u d e to
i n t e r n a t i o n a l control of the i n d u s t r i e s is less clear. T h e best estimate
of o p i n i o n is that, w h i l e t h e Communists w o u l d follow R u s s i a n
g u i d a n c e w h a t e v e r it m i g h t be, the democratic p a r t i e s m i g h t be brought
t o accept a plan of the k i n d w o r k e d out by E . I . P . S . if i t were
accompanied by some i m m e d i a t e a d v a n t a g e s and could be represented
as a step t o w a r d s G e r m a n y ' s re-establishment i n the W e s t e r n Inter­
n a t i o n a l framework. T h e i r acceptance m i g h t be f a c i l i t a t e d if the
p l a n were modified in t h e sense set out in the n e x t p a r a g r a p h .
5. F u r t h e r consideration h a s been g i v e n to the E . I . P . S . p a p e r d u r i n g the
p a s t f e w weeks, and I am led to t h i n k t h a t the basic conception of international
control w i t h i n the G e r m a n S t a t e m i g h t be better i m p l e m e n t e d on the following­
lines. A n e w German province w o u l d be formed i n the a r e a affected by the scheme.
I n s t e a d of the industries b e i n g o w n e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y they w o u l d be made into
a socialised German corporation w h o s e relation to the P r o v i n c i a l Government
w o u l d be the same as that of the N a t i o n a l Coal B o a r d i n t h i s country to H i s
M a j e s t y ' s Government.
G e r m a n y ' s o b l i g a t i o n s i n regard to the transferred
i n d u s t r i e s w o u l d be l a i d d o w n i n such detail as w a s necessary, in the peace
treaties, a n d an i n t e r n a t i o n a l control o r g a n i s a t i o n w o u l d be formed to supervise
the performance of these obligations. T h u s political control, w i t h of course the
p o s s i b i l i t y of political and m i l i t a r y sanctions, w o u l d be substituted for industrial
control t h r o u g h ownership. M y impression is t h a t a scheme of t h i s nature, w i t h
its e m p h a s i s on political rather t h a n i n d u s t r i a l control, w o u l d be more acceptable
to the French, w h i l e German o p i n i o n w o u l d certainly p r e f e r to see German
i n d u s t r i e s i n German socialised o w n e r s h i p rather than owned by an international
corporation. The actual direction of the products of the area into the channels
we desire would have to be brought about by the various interested Governments
applying appropriate commercial policies.
6. I f this sdheme is generally agreed, I should propose to proceed by the
following stages. T h e first step would be to create a n e w German province
covering the area to w h i c h the scheme is to apply. I am advised that this could
be done w i t h o u t difficulty by unilateral action on the part of the B r i t i s h Com­
mander-in-Chief. T h e next step w o u l d be to set u p a provincial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
of that province, which would have the necessary powers over the proposed German
corporation to which the industries in t h e area w o u l d be transferred. T h i s w i l l
take some time to achieve, and i n the meantime I would propose to follow in
regard to the other i n d u s t r i e s in t h i s area the same policy t h a t has already been
carried o u t i n regard to the Ruhr mines, namely, to vest them as a temporary
measure i n the Commander-in-Chief, a n n o u n c i n g at the same time t h a t while
their u l t i m a t e disposal remains t o be decided they w i l l not be returned to their
previous owners. A l t h o u g h it is part of the plan that these assets should sub­
sequently be transferred to the proposed German corporation, there is some
doubt whether t h i s transfer could be effected by the Commander-in-Chief under
the powers w h i c h he exercises a s a zone commander or whether it would not need
the quadripartite approval of the Control Council.
T h i s , however, is being
further examined a n d w i l l not affect my i m m e d i a t e proposal. I t follows that
during the early stages the direct control over these i n d u s t r i e s would be exercised
solely by the B r i t i s h zone commander, though he w o u l d of course be subject to
quadripartite control at Berlin i n so f a r a s the legislation to deal w i t h these
industries is a matter affecting Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, to prepare
the w a y for my ultimate objective of international control I would from the ontset
associate the W e s t e r n P o w e r s most closely affected a n d the U n i t e d States by
i n v i t i n g them to a p p o i n t i n the first place advisers to the B r i t i s h officials
nominated as custodians of these industrial assets, a n d later, when the German
corporation has been formed, to the B r i t i s h body w h i c h w i l l control it. B u t
when the quadripartite control of Germany comes to an end this B r i t i s h body
would change into an international o r g a n i s a t i o n on the lines set out in para­
graph 5 and at that stage the advisers a p p o i n t e d by our A l l i e s would become
fully associated w i t h the control.
1
7. A h i g h l y important p o i n t for decision is whether the R u s s i a n s should
be admitted i n t o the scheme suggested. M y o w n v i e w is t h a t we should not offer
to the R u s s i a n s in W e s t e r n Germany any greater f a c i l i t i e s than they m i g h t be
prepared to g i v e u s i n E a s t e r n Germany, e.g., p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the international
control of the industrial area of Saxony. One may assume that they would not
w i s h to set u p such an international control i n their own zone. If, therefore, at
any time d u r i n g the evolution of t h i s p l a n the R u s s i a n s were to claim the right
to a p p o i n t an adviser or an u l t i m a t e share in the international controlling body,
I should only be prepared to accept this provided that they were to give us similar
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the international control of a similar organisation in their zone.
8. I n considering t h i s whole problem w e must, however, bear in mind that
we have g i v e n our agreement in B e r l i n to a plan for the future level of German
industry the effect of w h i c h w i l l be to reduce the level of German industry as a
whole to about 50 or 55 per cent, of the 1938 level. The heavy industries are to
be more drastically reduced than others, the productive capacity remaining to
them being of the order of a third of pre-war. T h i s w i l l i n particular affect the
Ruhr where the heavy industries chiefly lie. The plan w a s accepted by the
B r i t i s h representative on the clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t it w o u l d be open to review
if any of the basic assumptions of the p l a n were modified.
One of these
assumptions related to the German western frontier and it would clearly be
modified if the French plan of s e p a r a t i n g the R u h r from Germany were accepted.
B u t it w o u l d be impossible to call for review on t h i s ground if a system were
introduced on the lines favoured by the Committee on German Industry, under
which the German western frontier w o u l d not be changed. Unless, therefore, we
are prepared to denounce the P o t s d a m A g r e e m e n t — a n d this is a matter w h i c h
I propose to discuss in a separate paper on our general policy towards Germany—
it seems to me that we must proceed on the assumption that the level of industry
plan w i l l be carried out. T h i s , I fear, w i l l inevitably postpone for some years any
hope of fulfilling one of my principal ideas, which is that the R u h r should be
turned into a positive element of E u r o p e a n reconstruction. I have not, however,
abandoned this conception and hope that the proposal for controlling the Ruhr
w h i c h I have outlined w i l l enable me to persuade the R u s s i a n s that a prosperous
and e x p a n d i n g i n d u s t r y in the E u h r m a y hold out g r e a t a d v a n t a g e s for them as
well as for the rest of E u r o p e . The full association of the G e r m a n s in the
d e v e l o p m e n t of their o w n i n d u s t r y under international control, as t h i s modified
p l a n contemplates, seems to m e better calculated to achieve t h i s objective than
does t h e i d e a of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o w n e r s h i p w h i c h deprives the Germans of an
interest in the w e l f a r e a n d w e l l - b e i n g of their o w n industries.
9. I took the o p p o r t u n i t y of the period required for consideration of the
p o i n t s mentioned in p a r a g r a p h 3 above, to i n v i t e the v i e w s of the C h i e f s of Staff
on the strategic aspect of t h i s problem. T h e i r report, of w h i c h a copy is attached,
m a y be briefly s u m m a r i s e d as follows :—
Our m a i n s t r a t e g i c a i m s i n W e s t e r n E u r o p e are that no p o t e n t i a l l y hostile
P o w e r should be in a p o s i t i o n to dominate W e s t e r n E u r o p e and, secondly, that
on the outbreak of any f u t u r e conflict our strategic frontier should be as far east
a s possible. Our policy t o w a r d s G e r m a n y should be g u i d e d by the consideration
t h a t R u s s i a is our most likely p o t e n t i a l enemy a n d is a more serious danger than
a revived Germany.
Three proposals for the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the R u h r are
considered a n d none is t h o u g h t wholly satisfactory for m e e t i n g these a i m s . The
first, namely, t h a t the R u h r should simply, remain for the time b e i n g as part of
our zone of occupation w i t h the control of its i n d u s t r y in our hands, h a s many
a d v a n t a g e s since it gives us for t h e i m m e d i a t e future the m a x i m u m freedom of
a c t i o n and leaves the a r e a a n d i t s i n d u s t r y under our control for so long as
the occupation of Germany is m a i n t a i n e d . B u t the necessary corollary of this
proposal is that the R u h r should be returned to German control w h e n occupation
ceases. T h i s w i l l be dangerous i f Germany is d r a w n i n t o the R u s s i a n orbit.
T h e C h i e f s of Staff regard the French proposals as unacceptable. T h e y regard
the E . I . P . S . p l a n as a possible compromise but d r a w a t t e n t i o n t o several serious
d i s a d v a n t a g e s i n it. T h e C h i e f s of Staff see n o objection to the occupational
c o m m i t m e n t involved i n the E . I . P . S . p l a n w h i c h w ould amount to 10,000 British
troops and w h i c h they consider w o u l d probably be less t h a n that involved in
the F r e n c h p l a n .
T
10. There remain the questions of the R h i n e l a n d , the S a a r a n d the draft
t r e a t y proposed by the U n i t e d S t a t e s Government, the t e x t of w h i c h is contained
in A n n e x C of Gen. 1 2 1 / 1 ( C P . (46) 156).
11. A s r e g a r d s the R h i n e l a n d , economic a n d m i l i t a r y arguments have been
advanced a g a i n s t t h e F r e n c h proposal that German territory west of the Rhine
should be set u p as a separate S t a t e or S t a t e s detached from Germany. French
i d e a s on t h i s p o i n t have been f a r less definite than their ideas about the Ruhr,
a n d there should not be so much difficulty in reaching agreement w i t h them on
t h i s aspect of their p l a n provided w e can accept their m a i n proposal that their
forces, and those of the B e l g i a n s a n d D u t c h , should be stationed permanently
i n the area. I w o u l d propose t h a t this should be our policy. I t is not thought
necessary that any B r i t i s h troops should be stationed in this area.
12. A s r e g a r d s the Saar, I s u g g e s t that H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government should
support the French proposals and t h a t the assets of the territory transferred to
French a d m i n i s t r a t i o n should be debited to the French Government on reparation
account. I submit these recommendations to my colleagues' approval.
13. T h e C h i e f s of Staff h a v e reported favourably on the A m e r i c a n draft
t r e a t y and, t h o u g h certain clarifications are required, I am convinced that this
A m e r i c a n i n i t i a t i v e is of great importance and potential a d v a n t a g e to ourselves.
I w o u l d accordingly propose t o i n f o r m the U n i t e d S t a t e s Government that we
welcome their proposal and consider i t provides a most useful basis for further
discussion, subject to the clarification of certain points.
E. B.
Foreign Office, S.W. 1, lbth April, 1946. ANNEX. CCS.
(46) 105 ( O ) .
C H I E F S OF S T A F F
THE FUTURE
COMMITTEE.
OF G E R M A N Y
AND
THE
RUHR.
Report.
W E have examined the F o r e i g n Secretary's p a p e r * a n d the questions you
put f o r w a r d m your letter, t I t i s not possible to deal w i t h these w i t h o u t con­
s i d e n n g wider questions of our strategic interests in Western Europe.
2. I t m u s t be assumed that the Silesian industrial area is permanently
lost to Germany. From the p o i n t of view of future w a r potential, the Ruhr
is by f a r the most i m p o r t a n t area of Germany. D e p r i v e d of both the Ruhr and
Silesia, Germany could h a r d l y count as an independent factor in Europe.
From the m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view, therefore, the future of the R u h r and the
R h i n e l a n d w i l l largely determine the future of Germany.
T h u s is becomes
necessary to consider w h a t our long-term policy w i t h regard to Germany a s a
whole should be.
Long-Term Policy regarding Germany. 3.
Our m a i n s t r a t e g i c aims in W e s t e r n Europe are t h a t : —
(a) N o p o t e n t i a l l y hostile P o w e r should be in a position to dominate Western
Europe.
(b) On the outbreak of any future conflict, our strategic frontier should be
a s far east a s possible.
T h e deduction from the above is that w e must do our utmost to ensure
that F r a n c e a n d the L o w Countries remain friendly to us. Our position w o u l d
be greatly strengthened by the creation of a western democratic Germany. F a i l i n g
this, i t is essential that the authority in control in Germany should not be hostile
to us.
T h i s authority m u s t be that, either of a revived and independent Germany,
or of w h a t e v e r P o w e r m i g h t be i n a position to exert a controlling influence in
Germany. A t present it seems that, once the e x i s t i n g system of A l l i e d occupation
is terminated the only foreign P o w e r which could establish a controlling influence
in Germany w o u l d be R u s s i a . Our policy towards Germany should therefore be
shaped by whether, i n the long run, we regard a revived a n d independent Germany,
or R u s s i a as likely to be the greater danger to our security.
I t is clear that the worst s i t u a t i o n of all, and one which we must try to
avoid a t all costs, i s that of a revived Germany dominated by R u s s i a , since we
m i g h t then be f a c i n g the combined w a r potential of both P o w e r s .
4. I f w e consider that the principal danger to our security is eventually
likely t o come from a revived and independent Germany, then our policy towards­
her should be g u i d e d principally by the necessity of k e e p i n g her w a r potential
as low as possible. A t the same time, however, w e must not drive Germany into
the arms of R u s s i a .
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , if R u s s i a is considered the more serious danger, our policy
towards Germany should be such as would not prevent us from building her up
a g a i n i f t h i s becomes necessary. I n addition, so t h a t we could count on effective
German assistance in the event of conflict w i t h Russia, w e should try to avoid
arousing permanent German antagonism towards us.
5. The above are questions of the highest policy and are to a great extent
political. W e consider t h a t it is still too early to decide these issues finally, but,
if w e have to shape our policy n o w w e can, from the military point of view, choose
only the second alternative since R u s s i a appears, at present, our most likely
potential enemy.
I n the event of conflict w i t h R u s s i a we cannot, in view of the man-power
and w a r potential at her disposal, afford to exclude any method of redressing the
* Gen. 121/1 (Annex I to C.O.S. (46) 93 ( 0 ) ) .
[31661]
t C.O.B. (46) 93 (O).
C
balance. Moreover, G e r m a n y is so placed s t r a t e g i c a l l y that, if she w a s prepared
to resist, she m i g h t be able to g a i n the necessary time for us to develop our own
effort, and for t h e resources of the U n i t e d S t a t e s to be brought i n t o play.
6. I t w o u l d clearly be p o l i t i c a l l y unacceptable, nor is it m i l i t a r i l y necessary,
to a d o p t a policy of r e b u i l d i n g G e r m a n y i n the i m m e d i a t e future. W e consider!
however, that our policy should be s h a p e d to give u s m a x i m u m freedom to do
t h i s later in case it should prove to be necessary. S u c h a course w i l l be subject
a l w a y s to the f o l l o w i n g provisos : —
(a) W e m u s t be able to carry the U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h us in any proposals
we make.
(&) W e m u s t not so offend F r a n c e a n d the L o w Countries t h a t w e alienate
them permanently.
(c) A n y arrangement w h i c h allows the s t a t i o n i n g of R u s s i a n forces in
W e s t e r n G e r m a n y or e x t e n d s R u s s i a n influence is undesirable.
(d) W e w i s h to reduce our occupational commitment as far a s possible a n d to
avoid a p e r m a n e n t commitment on the continent.
(e) A n y settlement w h i c h d o e s not conform to the spirit of the Atlantic
Charter is u n l i k e l y to s t a n d the test of time.
7. I n the l i g h t of the above oyerall considerations, we e x a m i n e the points
raised by the F o r e i g n Office.
Proposed Methods of Control of the Ruhr. Method 1.^Eventual Return of the Ruhr to Germany. 8. T h i s g i v e s us for the i m m e d i a t e future the m a x i m u m freedom of action
in t h a t it w o u l d avoid the necessity of d e c i d i n g now u p o n any special long-term
r e g i m e for the Ruhr, and w o u l d leave i t under our control as long as the
o c c u p a t i o n of G e r m a n y is m a i n t a i n e d . Moreover, the prospect of the eventual
r e t u r n of the R u h r m i g h t d i v e r t G e r m a n attention to the question of the recovery
of her n e x t most i m p o r t a n t lost province, Silesia, and therefore incline Germany
to a p o l i c y of collaboration w i t h the W e s t rather t h a n the East. T h e fact that we
w o u l d remain i n occupation of the area u n t i l it w a s considered safe to abandon
the occupation of the whole c o u n t r y w o u l d g i v e us, at any rate for some time, a
considerable degree of security a g a i n s t a revived and hostile Germany.
9. O n the other hand, t h i s p l a n contains, as a long-term policy, a n element
of risk in that, should it not achieve its object and should W e s t e r n Germany in I !,
s p i t e of it be d r a w n into the R u s s i a n orbit, R u s s i a w o u l d g a i n t h e w a r potential ­
of t h e w h o l e of Germany, i n c l u d i n g her most important i n d u s t r i a l area. Whether
or n o t t h i s p l a n w o u l d bring us solid a d v a n t a g e s must therefore depend upon
its being accompanied by a p o s i t i v e policy t o w a r d s Germany w h i c h w i l l hold j
out real hope for the f u t u r e t o her, a n d so combat despair a n d i t s accompanying
o p p o r t u n i t i e s for Communist p r o p a g a n d a . T h i s policy should ensure keeping ^
at least W e s t e r n Germany outside the " iron c u r t a i n . "
W e w o u l d relate t h i s policy to the F o r e i g n Secretary's remarks on the forma- ,
tion of a W e s t e r n " z o n e , " * a n d t o our v i e w s on areas of strategic importance.t
I t m u s t not be overlooked t h a t t h i s p l a n may be expected to be vigorously ^
opposed by France. T h e risk of a l i e n a t i n g her that it involves w o u l d have to be
faced, and a m e a n s f o u n d to p e r s u a d e her that it will be in her long-term interests
to a c c e p t it.
10. A s regard occupational commitments, this p l a n reduces our long-term F
occupational t a s k s t o a m i n i m u m , since, once the occupation of Germany as a
w h o l e hand been abandoned, there w o u l d be no need for forces of occupation ^
east of t h e R h i n e . The reluctance to evacuate the R u h r m i g h t prolong the occupat i o n a l commitments as a whole. On the other hand, it seems to us that the
decision w h e t h e r or not to abandon the occupation of G e r m a n y as a whole is likely
to be influenced p r i m a r i l y by other factors.
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1
Method 2.-E.I.P.S. Plan.
11. T h i s p l a n h a s the f o l l o w i n g a d v a n t a g e s :—-
^
(a) I t ensures t h a t sanctions can be a p p l i e d quickly if the need arises.
(p) Our share i n the control over the industries of the R u h r w i l l offer us
a certain degree of security whoever may be in control of Germany.
(c) French insistence on the s e p a r a t i o n of the Ruhr appears to be weakening,
a n d they m i g h t therefore be brought to accept this p l a n .
(d) I t should ensure that U n i t e d S t a t e s troops remain i n Europe for a
prolonged period.
f D.O. (46) 47.
* D.O. (46) 40. £
(e) I f the R u s s i a n s are included in the plan, they are robbed of their propa­
g a n d a line w i t h the Germans that it is the W e s t e r n P o w e r s who are
screwing down Germany.
12. The plan has, however, considerable disadvantages :—
(a) W e abandon the position w h i c h we hold at present of being the sole
authority in the area.
(b) I t is doubtful whether the Germans would regard the return of the
territory only, w i t h o u t control of the industries w h i c h give it its main
value, as a concession of any great consequence.
I t w o u l d not therefore divert German hostility away from the
W e s t e r n Democracies, a n d if the R u s s i a n s are not included in the plan,
m i g h t drive Germany into the arms of R u s s i a by g i v i n g R u s s i a a
w e a p o n w i t h w h i c h to incite the German population against us.
(c) On the other hand, if the R u s s i a n s do p a r t i c i p a t e in control, it might be
difficult to exclude R u s s i a n troops from the R u h r while a l l o w i n g
forces of the W e s t e r n P o w e r s to be stationed there.
I n the event of our being forced to admit R u s s i a n troops, it is
unlikely t h a t w e shall be able to prevent them establishing a Russian
zone, and w i t h it a secure base for the conduct of Communistic
activities.
(d) I n t e r n a t i o n a l control would be held responsible by the German population
for any distress caused by slumps, unemployment, & c , and a difficult
internal security problem would therefore exist. This unrest might be
exploited to their own ends by the R u s s i a n representatives on the
controlling body in the Ruhr.
(e) There w i l l be a n inevitable danger of conflicting economic interests
between the controlling Powers, and the consequential danger that in
the course of time one or more P o w e r s might w i t h d r a w , causing a
breakdown in control.
(/) The plan produces an indefinite, though small, occupational commitment.
13. W i t h regard to the questions raised by the Foreign Office regarding
occupational commitments, it is not possible to give a firm estimate of the number
of troops required, but the figure of 50,000 quoted for the French P l a n seems
reasonable. Since the other p a r t i c i p a t i n g P o w e r s would presumably provide
contingents, w e should probably have to provide not more than 10,000, and t h i s
is a commitment w h i c h could be accepted.
The fact that the territory would not be politically separated from Germany
should render the task of occupation easier rather than the reverse since such a
regime would presumably be more acceptable to the population than one involving­
complete separation.
I t should be noted that m i l i t a r i l y it would be h i g h l y
desirable that the area should be extended as has already been proposed,* so as to
include an area west of the R h i n e up to the D u t c h frontier. I f t h i s is not clone
the R u h r area would become a n island surrounded by potentially hostile territory.
Method 3.'—French Plan.
14. A c c e p t a n c e of this p l a n should improve our relations w i t h France.
Otherwise it produces no advantages w h i c h we cannot obtain under the E . I . P . S .
plan, and only accentuates the disadvantages of t h a t plan.
The R u h r w i l l be detached permanently from Germany. T h e scheme will
therefore encounter the bitter hostility of the Germans, and in the passage of
time w i l l f a i l to retain the continued support of popular opinion in the
democracies. I t seems to us that German hostility to this plan, combined w i t h
the effect it would have upon German economy, would almost certainly drive
Germany i n t o the arms of R u s s i a . Furthermore, the p l a n would entail an
indefinite occupation commitment which, in view of local hostility, would probably
be larger than that required under the E . I . P . S . plan, w i t h o u t any corresponding
advantage from the security point of view. I n addition, R u s s i a n influence would
be allowed to extend i n t o W e s t e r n Germany.
Summary. 15
None of the three methods proposed is wholly satisfactory, nor can
we at present see any solution to the problem of tJhe ultimate disposal of the R u h r
territory which fully meets our m i l i t a r y requirements. The French plan we
regard as unacceptable.
* Gen. 121/1, paragraph 42.
F r o m the m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view, w e w i s h t o prevent W e s t e r n Germany
from f a l l i n g under R u s s i a n domination. T h i s requirement w o u l d be most nearly
met by M e t h o d 1, i.e., retention of the R u h r w i t h i n our area of occupation an
i t s u l t i m a t e return to Germany. T h e f e a s i b i l i t y of t i n s must, however, depend
u p o n a political e s t i m a t e of the p o s s i b i l i t y of k e e p i n g at least W e s t e r n Germany
w i t h i n t h e W e s t e r n democratic zone, and the p l a n w i l l clearly raise considerable
p o l i t i c a l difficulties.
I f Method 1 cannot be adopted, the E . I . P . S . P l a n offers a possible compromise.
I t h a s , however, the very g r e a t d i s a d v a n t a g e t h a t it extends R u s s i a n influence
i n t o W e s t e r n Germany, a n d leaves the seed of discontent a m o n g the local popula­
tion, and the d a n g e r of f u t u r e disagreement between the A l l i e s .
The Saar, 16. The F r e n c h h a v e a good claim to o w n e r s h i p of the S a a r m i n e s and
for the inclusion of t h e area i n their Customs U n i o n . W e consider t h a t their
demand w i l l be difficult to refuse, and as there are f e w m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s to
t h i s w e should certainly offer no objection on m i l i t a r y grounds.
Remaining Territory West of the Rhine. 17. From the m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view, w e can see l i t t l e object in s e t t i n g this
area u p a s a separate State, since at best i t can only be a small w e a k u n i t which
w o u l d be a continual source of dispute between France and Germany.
18. I n order to increase our essential security a g a i n s t attack from the east,
w h e t h e r by Germany or R u s s i a , we should support the indefinite maintenance of
French, B e l g i a n a n d D u t c h garrisons throughout the area w e s t of the Rhine.
T h i s w i l l a p p l y whatever solution i s reached w i t h regard to the R u h r .
19. W e see n o necessity to provide a B r i t i s h contingent in t h i s area. If,
however, the provision of such a contingent w o u l d mean t h a t the Americans
w o u l d d o the same, thereby g i v i n g them a n indefinite commitment in Europe, we
t h i n k w e should also be prepared to provide a small force.
Conclusions. 20. W e conclude t h a t : —
(a) Our long-term policy w i t h regard to Germany m u s t take full account of
the fact t h a t R u s s i a i s a much more dangerous p o t e n t i a l enemy than
G e r m a n y ; i t cannot be shaped solely from the p o i n t of view of
p r e v e n t i n g a revival of a threat from Germany.
(6) W e therefore w i s h , from a m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view, to bring about a
s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h W e s t e r n G e r m a n y w i l l not be d o m i n a t e d by Russia.
(c) I n the l i g h t of the above, the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the three solutions proposed
for the R u h r are as follows :—
(i) P r o v i d e d w e can obtain A m e r i c a n co-operation and can convince
the French t h a t it i s in their long-term interest to agree, and
provided t h a t it is coupled w i t h a p o s i t i v e policy towards
Germany t h a t Avill ensure a t least W e s t e r n Germany remaining
w i t h i n the w e s t e r n democratic zone, M e t h o d 1 most nearly meets
our m i l i t a r y requirements,
(ii) M e t h o d 2 ( E . I . P . S . P l a n ) presents a compromise but only at the
price of R u s s i a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n , to w h i c h w e are most strongly
opposed.
(iii) M e t h o d 3 (French P l a n ) i s unacceptable.
(d) There are n o m i l i t a r y objections to acceptance of the French proposals
w i t h regard to the Saar.
(e) W e should only support the French proposals that French, B e l g i a n and
D u t c h garrisons should be m a i n t a i n e d indefinitely in German territory
west of the R h i n e if the R u h r and the adjacent R h i n e l a n d are also to
be occupied by A l l i e d Forces.
(Signed)
ALANBROOKE.
TEDDER.
R H O D E R I C K R.
McGRIGOR,
V.C.N.S. Of/ices of the Cabinet and Minister of Defence, S.W.1, 5th April, 1946.