(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/56
Image Reference:0045
Printed for the Cabinet,
November
1952
CONFIDENTIAL Copy N o . 6 7
C. (52) 395
6th November,
1952
CABINET
ANZUS
A N D
THE
UNITED
KINGDOM
N O T E BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
M y colleagues
of State recording
Zealand Ministers
about t h e A N Z U S
m a y be interested to read the attached letter from the Minister his conversations in N e w Y o r k with the Australian a n d New of External Affairs a n d the U n i t e d States Secretary of State Pact. A . E.
Foreign Office, S.W. 1, 6th November,
1952.
It h a s been impossible for m e to avoid some discussion o n A N Z U S . Casey
constantly reverts to it, W e b b has mentioned it m o r e t h a n once and Acheson has
discussed it once. I have endeavoured to avoid any argument, on the ground that
you would be talking to them a b o u t it when you came, preparatory to the discus­
sions during the C o m m o n w e a l t h Conference in L o n d o n . I have, however,
mentioned the following p o i n t s : —
(1) O u r exclusion was felt to impair our C o m m o n w e a l t h ties with Australia
and N e w Zealand and also to impair our relations with the U n i t e d
States.
(2) W e are in a completely different position from F r a n c e and the Philippines
in the Pacific. W e will go to war if Australia a n d N e w Zealand are
attacked, whereas neither F r a n c e nor the Philippines would necessarily
d o so.
(3) W e are a great naval power with possessions in t h e Pacific and have a great
deal t o contribute.
(4) A n y defence planning nowadays must be affected by global considerations.
In the Atlantic the U n i t e d States plan with us within N o r t h Atlantic
Treaty Organisation. In the Middle East, we h o p e to have an organi­
sation in which the U n i t e d States, Australia a n d N e w Zealand will plan
with us. A n y South-East Asian planning obviously involves the four
of us. Therefore, it seemed to me illogical t h a t we should be excluded
from defence planning in the Pacific. Of course, we knew that they
would tell us w h a t they h a d planned after they h a d planned it, but
that was quite different from us being in on the planning.
I w a n t to m a k e it quite clear that I have not p u t forward these ideas as if they
were the official presentation of H e r Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t s case, but merely
the Way in which I myself see the matter.
Casey is obviously m u c h worried, a n d says that this controversy is more
dangerous to relations between Australia a n d the U n i t e d K i n g d o m than any other
that he h a s known.
T h e history of the matter, according to him, is t h a t when in J a n u a r y 1950
the need for a Pacific Pact was first mooted by Australia at the Colombo Confer­
ence, n o support was given b y the United Kingdom. T h r o u g h o u t 1950 Australia
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on a n u m b e r of occasions reverted to the idea. Neither the United States nor
the United K i n g d o m gave any support. In the a u t u m n of 1950 Australia made
it clear to the United States that she would not sign the Japanese Peace Treaty
unless she was given a guarantee ^gainst possible future aggression.
The U n i t e d States Government t p n began to consider some arrangement
to which the U n i t e d K i n g d o m would "be a partner. Mr. Dulles came to Tokyo
to discuss it. T h e United Kingdom G o v e r n m e n t refused to have any p a r t ; there­
fore the idea of a pact limited to the United States, Australia and N e w Zealand
was put forward at C a n b e r r a by M r . Dulles. F r o m February to September 1951
the United K i n g d o m Government were kept informed of the negotiations and at
no time suggested that the United K i n g d o m should become a party. Casey
added that in his view the United K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t were perfectly correct
in that attitude. It was n o t necessary for all the members of the Commonwealth
to be parties to all the treaties made by other members. H e said that he could
not understand the United Kingdom attitude and why we were " making a fuss."
N o one was keener than he upon the E m p i r e a n d it was wounding to be accused
of being lukewarm towards the British connection.
H e further said that this treaty was essential for Australian security. It helped
the United K i n g d o m because it relieved t h e m of anxiety in the Pacific. If there
was a war, it was unlikely that we would be able to send forces to the Pacific.
It was geographically m o r e appropriate that the F a r East should be a United States
responsibility.
If the U n i t e d K i n g d o m persisted in its present actions the consequences would
be either that the treaty would become a dead letter or that the U n i t e d States
would withdraw altogether. Australia could not afford to allow either of these
contingencies to arise. The United States were determined not to have the United
K i n g d o m in as observers, because they have been told that if they did, France
and the Philippines would at once request similar status. The United States felt
that if the U n i t e d K i n g d o m came in, it was impossible to stop F r a n c e and the
Philippines. U n d e r n o circumstances would the United States have either France
or the Philippines present at any realistic military discussions. Therefore the
United States must refuse our request.
Casey t h o u g h t t h a t the United States were correct in this attitude because for
security reasons it was impossible to have military talks of any value with the French
and Philippines present. If the United K i n g d o m attended without the Philippines,
it would be represented as a white man's pact, i.e., a pact
a colour bar.
Webb has been m u c h less definite about the matter. As you know, he
combines the Ministry of External Affairs with the Ministry for Island Territories
a n d the Attorney-Generalship. I would guess that u p to now, his other respon­
sibilities have taken up most of his time. His attitude, putting it crudely, is that
N e w Zealand is very sorry that there should be this trouble between friends. H e
regards A N Z U S not as a substitute in any way for the C o m m o n w e a l t h Association,
but simply as complementary to it.
Acheson wants us to appreciate the difficulty of his position vis-a-vis the French
a n d the Philippines. H e said that in his view b o t h the F r e n c h cyphers and the
Q u a i d'Orsay were hopelessly insecure and therefore realistic military planning
could not. take place at present. So far as the Philippines were concerned they
h a d objected strongly t o their exclusion from A N Z U S and had only been placated
on the ground that the U n i t e d Kingdom a n d F r a n c e were also excluded. Then
there were the recent Five-Power ( A N Z U S plus United K i n g d o m and France)
discussions on South-East Asian defence. When that was announced, R o m u l o , of
the Philippines, h a d come to Acheson's office a n d h a d wept and said that no
Government friendly to the West could now survive in the Philippines. Acheson
felt that if the U n i t e d K i n g d o m came in any capacity to the A N Z U S meetings it
would seriously weaken the position of the present Philippines Government and
t u r n the Asians even m o r e against the United States. H e just could not d o it.
It may be that w h a t is really worrying the Americans is the feeling that our
participation will imply their automatic involvement in South-East Asia, but that
point has not been stressed to me. In fact, Casey has said that Admiral Radford
is all the time telling the U n i t e d States authorities that any Pacific planning which
does not include South-East Asia is a waste of time.
with