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C A B
I BE
T
58/28.
COHCLUSIOBS of a meeting of the Cabinet
held at lo. 10 Downing street, S.W., on
Friday,- 6th October, 1922, at 11-15 a.m.
P R E S E K T
The Prime Minister
(In the c h a i r ) .
Sight Hon. A, Chamberlain. M . P .
lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. The Earl of Balfour,
E.G.,0,M., Lord President of the
Council
Right HOn. Viscount Birkenhead,
lord Chancellor.
The Eight Hon. Sir Robert H o m e , G.B.E
K.C,,M,P., Chancellor of the Exchequer
fhe Right Hon. E, Shortt, K.C,,Ii.P.
Secretary of State for Home
iff airs. ,
The Most Eon. The Marquess Curzon of
Eedlestou, X. G., G.C. S. I., G.C. I.E.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
She Right Hon. W . S . Churchill, M . P .
Secretary of State for the Colonies,
The Eight Eon Viscount Peel, G.B.E.,
Secretary of State for India.
She Right H o n . Sir L. Worthingt on*The Right H o n . Lord Lee of Fareham,
Evans, fifrt, G.B.E., M.P., Secretary G.B.E. ,X.C.B,, First Lord of the
of State for War,
Admiralty.
The Right Hon. Sir A. Mond, Bart.,
K.P.,, Minister of Health.
Bit Right Hon. S. Baldwin, M.P.,
President of the Board of Trade.
ile Right Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P., The Right Hon. Sir A , Griffith­
resident of the Board of Education. Boscawen, M.P., Minister of Agriculture
and Fisheries.
Hie Right Hon, T.J. Macnamara, M . P .
fdnister of Labour.
The Eight Hon. R . Munro, K.C. ,M.P.,
Secretary for Scotland.
fee Right Hon. Sir Haisar Greenwood,
The Right Hon. The Earl of Crawford]
jfert., K.C., T.P., Chief Secretary for & Balcarres, K.T., First Commissioner
Ireland,
of works.
T
The foljo.wing \vere also present:­
&e Right Hon. F.E. Guest, CtB.E.,'S,0. w.P., Secretary of State for
Sir Edward Grigg,K.C.V.O., C.TT.G.,
J
f
^eut.-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey,
R.B. Howorth,
,
o
a
G.C.B.
o
3
e
*
& * a
*
S
A
*
*
*
O
Secretary.
Assistant Secretary.
KHJAfXQIS
$0, B A S T .
for Horace
ybold*e
[glegx-ame.
1 . W i t h reference to Cabinet 5? ( 8 2 ) . the Cabinet srere
informed that the' Foreign Office and W a r Office had,, during
the night, received very important telegrams from Sir Horace
Humbcld and General Harington, w h i c h , on the whole, answered
the enactions w h i c h had been raised at the Cabinet*s previous
meeting,
(Siscwssion was adjourned for ten minutes
pending the arrival of the Lord President
.of the"Council.)
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs re;ad to
the Cabinet telegram N o . 523 (gee, Appendix I) received from
Sir Horace Humbold. giving a description o f the proceedings
at the i&idania Conference, in the course o f which lamet Pasha
had, at the last moment, demanded, contrary to the terms of
the Paris Hots, that Eastern Thrace should h e handed over to
the Turks before the Peace Treaty, and that all the Allied
contingents and missions should be withdrawn, and ted inti*­
mated that h e would set hie troops in motion unless this
proposal was at once agreed t o .
This development had neees­
sitated an adjournment of the Conference, and lamet Pasha had
agreed not to move his troops until 11-30 a.m.,
time, today.
Greenwich
Tho French General had announced that he. had .
been authorised by his Government not only to sign the
Protocol, giving groat and important concessions..to the
Turks, but, also to agree to the restitution to the Turkish
authorities o f Eastern Thrace before the Peace Treaty, and
without Allied supervision.
The view o f General Harington
and Admiral Brock was that the only way to avoid a conflict
was for His Majesty's Government to authorise General
Harington to tell the Turks that His l&jesty*s
Government
would summon the. Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace., and Allied
troops would be 3snt there forthwith to replace the G r e e k s .
A further telegram
(No. 524.) from Sir Horace Rumbold
Appendix II) was also read to the Cabinet^ giving a
(See
Cl fx
i"1
(CD /
1 . W i t h raf&renee to Qsfcinet 57 ( 8 2 ) , the Cabinet were
(fir I E
!IR B A S S .
info rased that the Foreign Office and W a r Office had,. during
jy Horace
miiboM*e
the night, received very important telegrams from Sir Horace
eiegrams.'
Rumbold and General Harington, w h i c h , on the whole, answered
the Questions w h i c h had been raised at the C a b i n e t e previous
1
meeting.
(Discussion was adjourned for ten minutes
pending the arrival of the Lord President
.of the Geuneil.)
The Secretary of State for For sign Affairs read to
the Cabinet telegram H o , 523 (See Appendix I )
received from
Sir Horace Rumbcld, giving a description o f the proceedings
at the Modania Conference, in the course o f which Ismst Pasha
had, at the last moment, demanded, contrary to the terms of
the Paris Mote, that Eastern $brace should b e handed over to
tho Turhs before the Peace Treaty, and that all the Allied
contingents and missions should be withdrawn, and had i n t i ­
mated that he woo Id set M s
troops in motion unless this
proposal was at once agreed t o .
This development had neees­
sitated an adjournment of the Conference, and Ismet Pasha had
agreed not to move his troops until 11-30 a.m., ' Greenwich
time, today.
The French General had announced that h e had
been authorised by his Government not only to sign the
Protocol, giving great and important concessions.to the
Turks, but also to agree to the restitution to the "Turkish
authorities of Eastern Thrace before the Peace Treaty, and
without Allied supervision.
The view of General Harington
and Admiral Brock was that the only way to avoid a conflict
was for His Majesty's Government to authorise General
Harington to tell the Turks that His ?&jesty's
..
Government
would summon the Greeks to leave Pastern Thrace, and Allied
troops would be sent there forthwith to replace the Greeks.
A further telegram (Ho. 524,) from Sir Horace Rumbold
Appendix II) was also read to the Cabinet^ giving a
-1­
(See
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m e e t i n g o f t h e A l l i e d H i g h Gommis a i o n s - r e
and G e n e r a l s to d i e ones the d e a d l o c k r e a c h e d a t
ftidania.
I n t h e c o a r s e of t h i s m e e t i n g t h e French High Commissioner
had intimated t h a t , according to M. Pranklin-Bouillon*s
instmotions, it
was d e s i r a b l e ,
if
possible,
to
maintain
t h a A l l i e d Commissions and c o n t i n g e n t s - i n E a s t e r n
until
Thrace
the conclusion of p e a c e , which i n d i c a t e d t h a t
maintenance,
their
i n t h e v i e w of t h e F r e n c h Government,, w a s n o t
indispensable.
were strongly
The F r e n c h a n d I t a l i a n H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r s
i n f a v o u r o f y i e l d i n g t o a l l t h e T u r k i s h tmm.
d e m a n d s , a n d m a d e it c l e a r t h a t t h e Questions o f K a r a j & g a t c h
a n d $ a s t e r n T h r a c e w e r e n o t s u c h as w o u l d j u s t i f y
hostilities
The F r e n c h High C o m m i s s i o n e r h a d u r g e d t h a t s e v e r a l
Battalions
Allied
should a t once be despatched i n t o Thrace as
o f good f a i t h ,
proof
and the G e n e r a l s had a g r e e d t h a t without
some
s u c h g e s t u r e t h e Turks would not a g r e e to f u r t h e r d e l a y s
would o r d e r t h e i r troops to a d v a n c e .
Commissioner had r e p r e s e n t e d
and
The B r i t i s h H i g h
that there were l i m i t s
to
the
f o r b e a r a n c e o f His M a j e s t y ' s Government, a n d t h a t t h e more
t h a t w a s y i e l d e d t o t h e T u r k s t h e more w o u l d b e demanded.
He h a d a l s o r e q u e s t s d G e n e r a l R a r i n g t o n t o m a k e e v e r y
effort
to gain further time.
tele­
The c o n c r e t e p r o p o s a l i n t h e s e
g r a m s . Lord Cur s o n p o i n t e d o u t , w a s t h a t we s h o u l d
announce
o t i r i n t e n t i o n t o s e n d A l l i e d t r o o p s t o T h r a c e a n d summon
t h e Greeks t o w i t h d r a w behind t h e M & r i t z a .
The c o n t e n t s
of
t h e s e t e l e g r a m s , h o w e v e r , r a i s e d a much l a r g e r
question,
namely,
maintenance,
that of Allied s o l i d a r i t y
in letter
and i n s p i r i t ,
and t h e f u l l
of t h e P a r i s H o t s .
In h i s
opinion
t h e t i m e h a d now a r r i v e d "when i t w a s n e c e s s a r y t o s e n d
i m m e d i a t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o t h e F r e n c h Government
an
pointing
e u t that t h e p o l i c y which France was pursuing i n the Hear
Fast was w h o l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e solemn p l e d g e s
which
h a d b e e n g i v e n t o t h e A l l i e d and e m b o d i e d i n t h e P a r i s
-2­
Hots?
03
pointing out to her the consequences that must inevitably
follow from h e r action?
and ashing her definitely to state ­
whether she w a s prepared to stand side by side with. Great
Britain in carrying out the policy agreed u p o n i n the Parts
Hots.
It would be necessary. In the proposed
ccmmunteatioii.
to acquaint "the "French Gevexament with the fact that the
British Government fully realised the trend o f French policy,
and the French Government would have to ba told that Great.
Britain would be prepared, in the event o f the Greeks retiring
from Has tern Thrace, to sand British troops into
Thrace for control purposes.
B&stem
The French Government should
be asked whether they w e r e prepared to join w i t h Great Britain,
and, if not, how they could justify such a refusal. the
consequences of which mast inevitably be the end to all
Allied eo-operation in the Bast and possibly alsswhara.
communication of this character should be made t o
A
the French
Government at once, as i t was essential to bring homo to IS,
Poincare himself the very serious situation which had arisen
in consequence of
the inexplicable attitude adopted by France
in the last few d a y s .
The terms o f the Paris Note (Paper G.P.-4SS8) were, read
to the Cabinet, and particular attention was directed t o
paragraph 3, in which the Allied Governments stated their
willingness to support at the Conference the attribution of
the Maritza-Adrianople frontier to Turkey.
The whole tenemr
of the Mote was unmistakable, and it was most difficult to
see h o w the French Government
conduct w i t h its terms.
could reconcile - their present
It was not likely that M . Poincare
would, be prepared, when faced with t h e facts, to give a
direct negative to Great Britaln*s request for co-operation.
peral
pington's
flegrams.
The Cabinet, were then informed of the contents o f tele­
grams M o s . B-3 and 15-4 (Bee Appendix I I I ) , which had just
been received from General Harington, and which confirmed
2 i (l
the information contained in S i r Horace Basfcold^ telegrams.
In part S of D - 4 , .General Harington intimated that he had
no doubt that unlees the Allied Governments acted at once
the nationalists weald march on Constantinople "and can crocs
into our area in three or four days".
This referred to the
small perimeter at Scutari at present held b y the British
troops, and not, o f course, to the Ismid neutral so n a .
In
Part S o f the same telegram General Harington ashed whether
he was to defend Scutari and Constantinople as long as he
could w i t h five Battalions and a few batteries and aeroplanes,
assisted by the Navy, in the hole of holding on until-rein­
for cements arrived, or whether he should evacuate at once to
Gallipoli and Chanak, leaving a fait, aeoomolj in Constantly
nopla.
The Cabinet at this point were informed that a telegram
(No .514) (See Av)penAl%. .1?) had just been received from Sir
Horace Humbold, giving particulars of the present
administration in Eastern T h r a c e .
Greek, and
civil
This administration was
the Police and Gendarmerie were also Greek.
If
the Greek Army withdrew from Eastern Thrace it would be most
difficult, if not impossible, to persuade the officials to
remain unless they had very definite guarantees of Safety,
It would be impracticable
for the Allies' to organise a civil
administration in the time available, nor could the Gonstan­
tinople Government provide such a n administration.
Trie only
alternative, therefore, appeared to be to allow the Kemalists
to take over the civil administration, the Allies taking Steps
to avoid disturbance and panic.
These visa.'a were shared by
the British C o m m i s s i o n e r s French and Italian colleagues,
and in this connection Sir Horace Rumbold referred to his
telegram Ko.506.
It seemed clear that the British Commissloner
contemplated a Turkish military occupation of Eastern Thrace
to prevent fighting and disorder, and a civil administration
which, i n the elroums taneae', aa martial law would b e in
operation, w o u l d be' of" a subordinate character;
that
Allied forces should be sent Into Eastern Thrace, i f avail­
able?
and that-, purely from the point of view o f the m a i n ­
tenanca o f order, the country would not be worse off under
a Kernel 1st civil administration than under a Greek re aims
deprived o f fresk military h e l p .
disposed, therefore^
Sir Horace Bumbo Id w a s
to advise that Great Britain should
yield to the Turkish demand and admit a number of Turkish
officials into Eastern Thrace.
Tbe Cabinet were reminded that one of the /fundamental
conditions o f the Paris Mote had been that the Kemalist
forces should evacuate the neutral zones.
Was it now p r o ­
Such
posed to w a t e r down this most important condition?
a decision might have to be taken, but the full
consequences
should be weighed before Great Britain lightly abandoned the
position which she had up to the present maintained
through
the negotlations.
The view was then expressed that the responsibility for
the consequences would rest w i t h our Allies;
that
public
opinion in Great Britain was not prepared in any event to
undertake a w a r with Turkey,, a n d particularly was not p r e ­
pared to fight to keep the Turks out of Europe.
Xn t h e a s
circumstances, it was asked, ought the British Government
to take the responsibility of adopting military action in
the Near East when her French and Italian Allies had decided
that the issues at stake w e r e not w o r t h the contest?
question put o n the previous evening (Cabinet
was repeated:-
The
5?
"Suppose a decision is taken to instruct
General Harington to allow the Turks to occupy Thrace, and
suppose the Greeks decline to accept;
in those circumstances
to what lengths should the British Government be pzepared to
go to put pressure o n Greece?"
The reply was made that no'
pressure should he put on Greece, but that Mustapha Kemal
should be all or ed -
S i m s we could not prevent him '— to
cross into Europe and fight it out with the Greeks .
There
had, it was pointed, out, been Balkan Ware in the past in
w h i c h Great Britain had not been involved, and we ought
to limit ourselves strictly to securing the freedom o f the
Straits .
On the other hand, it was pointed out that i f
Great Britain should now surrender to the Turkish demands
and allow the Turks to re-occupy Eastern Thrace, the
Greeks would rightly represent that the terms of the Paris
Note; had b e e n violated.
It should be remembered that - the
Greeks were now prepared to agree to the evacuation of
Eastern Thrace provided that the Allies took over the
control of that country.
Was it proposed, in these s i r ­
cumstances, to allow the Kemslists to cross the Bosphorus
and fight out their quarrel with the Greeks in Europe?
It was one thing to say to the Turks that Great Britain
would not. allow the invasion of Europe.
It might be
doubtful whether Great Britain alonw had the
/power
-5
a­
9 '1 9
r
power to prevent such an invasion, "but it was quite another thing
after the neutral sones had been violated for Great Britain to put
pressure on the Greeks to evacuate Eastern Thraoe.
She most she
could be excepted to do in the circumstanoes was to remain strictly
neutral.
It was then urged that instead of ending a written coinmunica­
tion to the French Government it would "be far hatter, if such a
course were practicable, for the Secretary of state for foreign
Affairs £imself to go over to Paris this afternoon and state to
Monsieur poincare in person the British objections to and critic
a isms of the- French line of policy and also to speak very plainly
to him on the subject of the activities of Monsieur Franklin Bouillon.
It should "be made clear to the French Government that Great Britain
had gone to the very furthest limit in promising Eastern Thraoe to
the Turks, and it should also he made clear that the British Govem­
ment recognised that it was no longer possible for Great Britain
alone to carry out the jpull policy of the Paris Hots in the absence
of French and Italian support.
In these circumstances it was
necessary for Great Britain to separate herself from her Allies in
this and perhaps in othef questions and she would proceed to occupy
and hold Gallipoli and Ohanak with such assistance as she could
obtain from other quarters.
In other respects she ceased to interesl
herself or taice any responsibility for what might happen in
Constantinople or in the Balkans and in Thraee.
Through the
treachery of Mrar allies Great Britqin had been rendered powerless ti
agreed
carry out the axigiHHl policy and the only course consistent with
her honour was the one proposed.
It was generally accepted that
lord Curaon must have authority to speak to Monsieur poincare in
some such terms if khe found that the situation required it.
Some discussion then tookmplace as to the action to be taken
in the not impossible event of hostilities breaking out with the
Turks in the next few days.
General agreement
was/
was expressed with the view that in any event Chanak and the
Gallipoli Peninsula would have to be defended.
With regard
to the Scutari position it was urged the situation was very
difficult.
The view was expressed that if it became necessary
for Great Britain to adopt a neutral attitude towards the
Turks and to permit them to cross the Straits, it would be
essential to adopt a correspondingly neutral attitude towards
the Greeks and to permit their forces, both naval and military,
to enter the neutral zones for the purpose of defending the
territory allotted to them under the Treaty of Sevres. Further,
it might be necessary to take steps to secure that other powers
maintained an equally neutral attitude towards both combatants.
It was also pointed out that if the French Government maintained
their present attitude it would be most difficult for Great
Britain to justify the continuance of those provisions of the
Treaty of jSeuilly under which Bulgaria was not allowed to
maintain an effective army, and indeed that all the peace
treaties would be in jeopardy.
It was agreed:­
(l) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
should be requested to proceed to Paris that
afternoon for the purpose of laying before
Monsieur Poincare the views of the British Govern­
ment on the lines indicated in the dicussion.
(2) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
should cause a telegram to be despatched to Sir
Horace Kumbold informing the latter that the
position was regarded as so grave that he (lord
Curzon) was leaving for Paris to discuss the
position with the French Government and that
arrangements should be made to secure that General
Harington should not return to Mudania or if he
had already left for that place he should be warned
not to commit himself on any important point without
further instructions.
(3) That the Secretary of State for War should send a
telegram to General Earington to the effect that
unless he could rely on the French troops standing
with the British troops at Scutari he was not to
fight at Scutari but was to have the fullest dis­
cretion to withdraw from that position and from
Constantinople at the moment when he was satisfied
that such withdrawal was required by the military
situation.
(4)
That the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs should arrange for an informal
message to be sent to Monsieur Teniselos
in Paris inviting Monsieur Veniselos to
remain in Paris in, order that he might he
available in the forthcoming discussions
between Lord Ourson and Monsieur Poinoard.
(5)
fhat the Secretary of State for Air should
arrange for an aeroplane to be available
in Paris to bring Lord Ourson a account
of his interview with Monsieur Poineard
to the Cabinet.
1
pi 1
'
QNSTAHIISOPLE.
2.
ilitary
ran sport
arrangements.
Conclusion
.
$1th reference to Cabinet 58 (22), Appendix
( a ) , the Cabinet' were informed by the
Secretary of State for War that h e had received
an assurance from General Harington that he had
secured all the transport which he required, for
the effective evacuation of the British forces at
Scutari and Constantinople.
'She Cabinet took note of this
communicat io a.
CONSTANTINOPLE.
w
w
2.
With reference to Cabinet 52 (22), Appendix V,
NB
Military
£ran sport
Arrangements.
Conclusion
(a), the Cabinet wore informed by the
Secretary of State for War that he had
received
an assurance from General Harington that he had
secured all the transport which he required for
the effective evacuation of the British foroes at
Scutari and Constantinople.
The Cabinet took note of this
co Hirauni c at io a.
ROU-ANIA.
Request
for
Munitions.
3.
The Cabinet were informed that M. Diamandy had
expressed a wish to discuss with the Secretary of State for
War the question whether Great Britain could furnish
Roumania with certain arms and ammunition.
In this connection reference was made to the fact
that the Serbian and Polish Governments had already made
arrangements with France for the supply of munitions, and
to the desirability at the present juncture of encouraging
the maintenance of close and friendly relations between
the British and Roumanian Governments.
The Cabinet agreed
To request the Chancellor of the
Exchequer and the Secretary of State
for War to discuss the question of
the supply of arms and munitions with
M. Diamandy, with discretion to deal
with this- requests as-they thought fit.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.,1.1.
October 6, 1922.
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be
returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]
POLITICAL
m
Decypher.
m
Sir Ii. Rumbold, (Constantinople).
October 5th 192,
D.
3,0 a.m.
October 5th 1922.
R.
5.30 a.m.
October 6th 1922,,
No. 523.
SUB-CQTyTMITTKE.
General Harington has returned from Mudania
and has explained situation.
He has shown me protocol drafted by Allied
generals as result of three days discussion with
Ismet Pasha,
This protocol gives very great and
Important concessions to Turks.
Generals hoped
that this protocol would have been signed to-day but
at the last moment Ismet pasha demanded that Eastern
Thrace should "be handed over to the Turks before
peace treaty and that all the allied contingents and
missions should he withdrawn.
This demand is of
course entirely at variance with allied proposal
of September 23rd.
Ismet Pasha intimated that he would set his
troops in motion if allied generals did not agree
to this proposal, which annuls the whole basis of
the conference.
General Harington proposed that (? conference,
omitted) should adjourn until 2.30 tomorrow afternoon
in order that generals should have time to refer
to their governments and High Commissioners.
After
some discussion Ismet agreed that he would not move
his troops until 2.30 p.m. i,e. 11.30 G.M.T. tomorrow.
French
(2)
French general then announced that he was authorised
by his government not o:.ly to (group omitted) protocol
but to restitution to Turkish authorities of Eastern
Thrace, before peace treaty, end without allied
supervision.
Ke had informed General Harington of
these instructions before (? this) last sitting.
In view of this situation which hopelessly weakens
the allied front, the generals had no alternative but
to return to ask for instructions.
Allied generals had no knowledge of reply from
Angora accepting peace conference until after they
had left Mudania this afternoon.
You will have
noticed that reply is entirely silent on the subject
of acceptance by Mustapha Kemal of conditions attaching
to promise of support of Turkish claims to Eastern
Thrace.
Turkish claim to consider Eastern Thrace before
peace treaty seems difficult of acceptance.
I
imagine that Paris proposals contemplated setting up
of machinery by peace conference for adequate pro­
tection of minorities.
This would go by the board
under new Turkish claim.
Turks (? have, omitted) just requested per­
mission to transport to Eastern Thrace an unlimited
force of gendarmerie which might in effect be an
army.
They also claim Karagach and the right to
carry on military operations even (? after) signature
of military convention until latter is ratified by
governments concerned.
Allied High Commissioners are meeting allied
generals
generals immediately to consider deadlock (group undec.)
at Mudania.
My colleagues will probably wish unofficially
to advise in an identic telegram to three governments.
In view of French attitude which can only "be characteriz
ed as a treacherous surrender inspired by Franklin
Bouillon it was necessary for me to send this separate
telegram.
In view of General Harington and Admiral
Brock the only way to avoid a conflict (? is) for
His Majesty'B Government to authorise General Harington
to tell Turks that His Majesty's Government will summon
Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace at once and allied troops
will he sent there forthwith to replace Greeks.
Please get Admiralty to send your instructions
to General Harington by wireless tomorrow to "Iron
Duke".
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and/ slioul
returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.
POLITICAL
TURKffY
Decypher.
y
Sir H^Rumboli, (Constantinople);
October Bth 1922,
Do
4.30 a.m.
October 6th 1922.
R.
8.30 a.m.
October 6th 1922.
No.524. ( D ) .
Very Urgent.
My immediately preceding telegram.
Allied High Commissioners and Generals met to­
night to discuss deadlock reached at Mudania.
I asked French High Commissioner whether French
government was as stated by Franklin Bouillon really
ready to agree to Turkish demand for restoration of
Eastern Thrace in full sovereignty previous to entry
into force of peace treaty and without adequate guaran­
tees through allied commissions for minorities there.
If so it was quite contrary to Paris decisions.
French High Commissioner said that Franklin
Bouillon was very affirmative on this point and that
his own instructions to the effect that it was de­
sirable if possible to maintain allied commissions
and contingents there till conclusion of peace in­
dicates that their maintenance in view of French
government was not indispensable.
I immediately
said that I did not recognise Franklin Bouillon as
representing my government and that I considered his
impolicy had been pernicious.
Italian High Commissioner having said that
Franklin Bouillon had had no authority to speak for
Italian government at Smyrna argued strongly in
favour
(2)
favour of yielding to Turks.
er took the same line.
French High Commission­
They said that two points
left outstanding namely Karagatch and maintenance un­
til conclusion of peace of allied commissions in Thrace
did not constitute justification for possible world
war;
question of Karagatch was of comparative un­
importance and as a suburb of Mrianople Paris note
might be interpreted as including it in that city
while Thrace was in any case to be restored in a few
months time to full Turkish sovereignty and that during
that time conference would be sitting,
French High Commissioner pointed out that at base
of Turkish demands was their distrust of vague promises
of Allies and suggested that it might be possible to
allay this by some immediate gesture giving proof of
our good faith such as despatch forthYfith of several
allied battalions into Thrace.
All three generals
agreed that without some such gesture Turks would not
agree to further delays and would order their troops
to advance,
Italian High Commissioner urged that if war
resulted world would attribute it to unwillingness of
allied High Commissioners and generals to take re­
sponsibility for concessions which were of small account
in comparison with issues involved,,
w
3 *-
I replied, that world would attribute it to intracti­
bility of Turks
a
that the more we yielded to Turks the
more demands they would make and that the next might well
be evacuation of constantinople
that General Haringbon,
s
Admiral Brock and I had done our utmost to avoid war,
that there were limits to forbearance of His Majesty's
Government and that I must now report facts to my Govern-,
mont and leave it to them to appreciate whether in refusing
these demands they were prepared to contemplate war
e
In the meantime ponding the receipt of your views
I have requested General Harington to make every effort
to gain time to point out to Ismet Pasha on his return to
5
Mudania tomorrow that powers have now received reply of
Angora Government and to ask him how he can reconcile
readiness of that Government to attend conference with
threat to recommence military operations.,
Repeated to Athens No
B
175
a
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Received 8op.au
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To:-
far Office '
Bag. a ifher
first of 3 parts.
To-day at oon&renere after Generals bad done utmost
te strain their powers on points of detail with a view
to meeting the national is te Ismet reverted suddenly to
has is of conference.
He maintained that putting together
the Allied note of 20th and Angora s reply seems to he the
1
concoction of franklin Bouillon.
The basis in the event
of a Conference taking place la that Eastern Thrace shall
he restored fully to the nationalists fey Treaty of Peace
without say foreign control when the Greeks have left.
Charpy stated he
mm
empowered to
sign
to this effect.
Mombelli, however, and I declared our inability to make any such
contract.
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meats besides the French and authorise the Generals to make
political decisions.
It was decided by the Generals after
they had consulted together to adjourn Conference until
October 6th at 14.30 hours so that they might have time to
return to Constantinople and to consult High commissioner and
exchange telegrams with their respective Governments.
Part 2*
3.
1 think that the net result of the sboge is good
as it has nowbesn made clear that Mombeili and I do not take
orders from franklin Bouillon.
We have undertaken to obtain
Instructions on the following points by 1000 hours G.M.T.
October 6 th:­
(a)
San we commit ourselves to basis that Eastern Thrace
is to be restored to Turkish severeignty before ratification
. of peace treaty?
A,
n irA
(o)
Without ateittlng full Turkish sovereignty in Eastern
Thrace oan we consent to withdrawal of Allied ?representatives
and troops immediately Turkish authority has boon restored
in each locality!.
(o)
Can Adrianopie on return of forks be considered to
include the ring of forts (one group un&ex) the Marltsa
and also Kara Agatoh railway station and village?
forks
make a strong military point of this and require Greek
Administration removed from Kara Agatch.
fd)
Can pressure be exercised on Greeks to restore civil
hostages e vacua tod by them from Anatolia?
(a)
If Greeks refuse t o sign convention are we still to
endeavour to reach agreement with nationalists,
Last Part. May tho replies to the above questions be expedited,
pis ass. t o 11*1*3* Iron Bmke so as t o reach as before 1 0 0 0 hoars
G.M-T. October 6th ?
Franklin Bouillon lias bean propagan&iag heavily regarding
the military prowess and strength o f Sirkey*
ismet tried to
bluff ? into freedom to renew hostilities but ended by giving
his assurance to refrain at least until 1 4 3 0 hours local time
on October &th*
The Tar .& are worried about report which
they received yesterday regarding Greek atrocities In Thrace
and they are anxious that the- Allies should immediately send
troops -into Eastern Thraoe to ensure security.
1 have not yet
received any confirmation o f tho report that forty villages
wers burnt in Thrace the other day.
in fact. Colonel Saryanis
who is ^FSm there denies it emphatically.
A copy of this telegram will be conveyed to the High
Commissioner by bond.
Circulated to the Cabinet,
CLEAR THE LIKE.
SECRET.
From;- General Harington H,M,S. IRON DUKE.
To:-
Tar Office',
D.4,
cipher 5 / 1 0 .
Pour Parts.
C.H.H, 114 Personal for C.I.G.S.
P.11,55
5.10.22.
R.01.00
6,10.22.
First.
Have had most difficult task.
After ?3 days inoessant work in a network of political intrigue we
had reached stage when I hoped to sign 2 conventions today (a)
- Convention dealing with evacuation of Greeks behind MARIT5A and
arrangements for ?installing Turkish administration subject to
approval of Allied Governments,
(b) Convention ensuring security
of neutral zone with modifications in case of Zone ?at Chanak to
amount of SANDJAK which has already been in British occupation and
a marking on ground of a safety line for immediate future.
In
course of todays discussion Ismet no doubt prompted by Hamid, Angora
and Franklin Bouillon demanded that Eastern Thraoe and sovereignty
thereof he handed over to Nationalists as soon as Nationalist
administration is installed and Allied Missions and troops withdrawn
that is in 1 month and without ws,iting treaty of peace.
Part Two,
Allied Generals have had identical instructions until today when
French Government or Franklin Bouillon have given Charpy authority
to agree. Mombelli and 1 refused and I have adjourned conference
till tomorrow afternoon while- we refer to Governments and am return­
ing to see Rumbold.
After disoussion Ismet agreed to withhold
operations till reply received.
If unsatisfactory operations will
oommenoe again ?at once against Greeks via Constantinople with
diversion no doubt against CHANAK *- Greek representatives are
here.
Had conference with them today.
build up force to hold Eastern Thraoe.
They are trying to
There is no doubt in
my mind that unless Allied Governments act at once Nationalists
will march on Constantinople and oan cross into our area in 3
or 4 days.
part Three.
Government has to say at. once whether they will take action to
evacuate.Greeks immediately and send Allied troops into Eastern
Thrace or whether they will engage Nationalist Army.
It is very
serious situation and I request to know whether I tm to defend
Scutari and Constantinople as long as I can with five Battalions
and a few batteries and aeroplanes assisted by Navy in the hope of
holding on till reinforcements arrive or whether I shall evacuate
at once to Gallipoli and Chanak leaving ?fait accompli in
Constantinople.
Irt reality Government havd got 24 hours in which
to say whether they will give Mustapha Kemal his terms regarding
Thrace or whether England is to fight him for Constantinople which
it has already been agreed that he shall have.
Last part*
It is direct threat and at leaet 3 times during conference Ismet has
said that he must oancel stoppage of movements.
Charpy behaved
very ?well throughout conferenoe and it was black treachery
forcing him to desert me and agree to Mustapha Kemal's terms.
?If date of peace conference is actually fixed I think I could hold
on at Scutari as he will probably come up against us as he has done
at Chanak and see what happens.
Per our prestige it is best to be here at time of Conference if we
can but it will be some time-before I can get reinforcements and
I cannot take much from Gallipoli and Chanak.
Received 7 am. 6.10*22.
o
0
A P P E N D I X
POLITICAL
TUSKEY.
De cypher.
Sir H. Surabold. (Constantinople)
October 5th 1922*
7,20 p.m*
October 5th 1988
1.45
October 6th 1022.
10.514.
URGENT
Your telegram No, 464.
All my information shows that present civil administration
of Eastern Thrace is run by Greek superior officials many of whom
come from old Greece and that
Greek.
subordinate staff also is mainly-
Police and gendarmerie are directly controlled by military
authorities.
If Greek army were to evacuate and existing civil adminis­
tration were retained difficulty would be to get officials to remain
unless their lives were assured by complete allied occupation.
Proceedings of first day at Mudania show that Kemalists
would never accept such proposal.
Greek administration and more
particularly police and gendarmerie cannot fail to go to pieces once
Greek army evacuates.
Problem is to provide substitute.
cannot organise temporary administration of their own.
government has been ruled out.
let Kemalists take over.
Allies
Constantinople
There remains no alternative but to
This will certainly not of itself tend to
pacify the country or appease racial animosity but it will not
defeat these objects any more than would the maintenance of Greek
administration.
It is better anyhow than chaos.
My proposal is
that Kemalists should take over administrative services generally,
that
that we should not attempt to establish control of all such
services, but that we should endeavour to obviate panic and
mutual vengeance by continued presence of allied commissions,
b y attaching allied officers to gendarmerie and by reserving
the right to send allied detachments to Eastern Thrace.
Question of officials is one of detail.
Principal
officials would doubtless come from Anatolia but Kemalists
can if they like draw on local notables and unemployed
officials here to fill
subordinate posts.
Jiy French and my Italian colleagues share views
indicated in my telegram Io* 50G.
While expressing readiness
to join me in elaborating scheme for civil administration as
proposed in your telegram Ho.456 they have both stated that
this procedure does not seem to them to answer the require­
ments of the situation which necessitates speed above all.
French High Commissioner states in this as in all other
matters agreement with Turks is necessary and that he has
empowered General Gharpy to settle question on which agreement
depends.
In these circumstances it is useless to attempt
to formulate scheme until general principles are settled as
result of Mudania meeting as contemplated in your telegram
10.441.
I realise my proposal prejudges future of Thrace to
greater extent than yotir note contemplated but w e have
promised Eastern Thrace to Turks and expediency seems to be
only possible guide on this question.
Repeated to Athens ito.169.