(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:CAB/23/5
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Director of Military Qnsratfoni 5 0
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
Printed for the War Cabinet,
March
1918.
SECRET.
14
WAR C A B I N E T ,
383.
Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.,
on Monday, March 11, 1918, at 12 noon.
Present:
The P R I M E M I N I S T E R (in the Chair).
T h e Right Hon. the E A R L
KEDLESTON, K G . , G . O . S . I . ,
The
CURZON OP
G.C.I.E.
Right Hon. the VISCOUNT M I L N E R ,
G.C.B.,
T h e R i g h t Hon. A. BONAR L A W , M.P.
Lieutenant-General the Right Hon. J . 0 .
SMUTS,
K.C.
G.C.M.G.
The Right Hon. G . N . B A R N E S , M . P .
The following w( re also p r e s e n t : —
The
Right
Hon. A. J . BALFOUR,
M.P., Secretary of State for
Affairs.
Rear-Admiral
G.
P.
W.
Deputy First Sea Lord.
O.M., I T h e R i g h t Hon. the E A R L OF DERBY, K.G.,
Foreign I
HOPE, C . B . ,
G.C.V.O., C.B., Secretary of State for
War.
General
S I R H.
H.
WILSON,
K.O.B.,
K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial
General Staff.
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Captain E . A B R A H A M , Assistant
Secretary.
Captain L. F . B U R G I S , Assista?it
Secretary.
Secretary.
The Western Front.
1. T H E Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff reported t h a t on
the 9 t h i n s t a n t t h e G e r m a n s h a d made two attacks, one on t h e
M e n i n R o a d a n d t h e other a t H o u t h u l s t Forest.
Both these
a t t a c k s took place on t h e front of about a battalion, a n d were p r e ­
ceded by a heavy a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n .
T h e a t t a c k s h a d both
been repulsed a n d o u r lines regained.
T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l
General Staff w a s of opinion t h a t t h e object of t h e G e r m a n s w a s t o
p r e v e n t o u r w i t h d r a w i n g troops from t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e line.
T r a n s f e r of G e r m a n
Divisions.
2. W i t h reference to W a r Cabinet 361, M i n u t e 6, t h e Chief of
t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff reported t h a t t h e r e were n o w 186
G e r m a n divisions on t h e W e s t e r n front.
*
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3
3. W i t h reference to W a r Cabinet 360, M i n u t e 4., t h e Chief of
t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff s t a t e d t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n looked very
"5 / j . much a s if t h e G e r m a n s meant t o a t t a c k t h e B r i t i s h line, as they
were concentrating on o u r front a n d h a d 92 divisions opposed to
[1365-363]
B
Possible G e r m a n
Attack.
^/
our 57.
Some of these 92 divisions, however, were concentrated a s
f a r back a s N a m u r , a n d m i g h t therefore be moved to t h e F r e n c h
front.
I n c l u d e d in the above number were four divisions of which
one h a d come from t h e A r g o n n e , one from. Russia, one from I t a l y ,
a n d one from Alsace.
General Wilson also r e p o r t e d t h a t civilian traffic h a d been
entirely suspended in Belgium.
On t h e other hand, from V e r d u n
to t h e south, t h a t is t o say, on t h e F r e n c h front, traffic w a s r e p o r t e d
as normal.
Civilians were being moved out of all towns between
Lille a n d L a Bassee, b u t so f a r Lille itself h a d not been evacuated.
T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff a d d e d t h a t t h e r e w e r e
heavy-artillery movements t h r o u g h Belgium towards our front.
S t r e n g t h of G e r m a n
Divisions.
4. I n a n s w e r to a question, t h e Chief of the I m p e r i a l General
Staff stated, t h a t a G e r m a n division consisted of n i n e battalions,
each battalion being about 850 strong.
The German divisions
were, roughly, of the same s t r e n g t h as ours, although, p e r h a p s , ours
m i g h t be a little stronger.
Armistice at
Easter :
5. T h e W a r Cabinet h a d u n d e r consideration telegram No. 15
from the V a t i c a n , which proposed t h a t there should be an armistice
of one or two weeks for all belligerents in t h e W e s t e r n a n d I t a l i a n
fronts a t E a s t e r .
I t w a s pointed o u t t h a t a n y acceptance of this proposal would
be bound to i n t e r r u p t a e r i a l reconnaissance work, a n d t h a t t h i s
would be of g r e a t assistance to the enemy in p r e p a r i n g a sudden
attack.
Consequently, even t h o u g h acceptance might give some
clue t o the date of the enemy's offensive, t h e W a r Cabinet felt t h a t
it w a s inadvisable to accept t h e appeal.
The W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
Proposal by the
Vatican.
2 /
o.
The question should be discussed w i t h our Allies a t the forth­
coming meeting of t h e Supreme W a r Council.
Man-Power.
6. T h e Secretary of S t a t e for W a r undertook t o give t h e W a r
Cabinet a statement on t h e present position in r e g a r d to man­
power.
- '
Poison Gas.
7. W i t h reference to W a r Cabinet 355, M i n u t e 10, the a t t e n ­
t i o n of the W a r Cabinet w a s d r a w n to a suggestion i n
M r . C h u r c h i l f s M u n i t i o n s P r o g r a m m e for 1919 ( P a p e r G.T.-3835)
to supplement our m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s in 1919 by provision for a
g a s a t t a c k on a very l a r g e scale.
The Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff stated t h a t he h a d
t h e whole of t h e questions r a i s e d in Mr. C h u r c h i l f s r e p o r t u n d e r
consideration.
L i m i t a t i o n s , h e pointed out, were placed on t h e
offensive employment of poison gas by t h e fact t h a t t h e force
employing it was prevented from p e n e t r a t i n g into t h e gassed a r e a
for a period of time sufficient to enable t h e enemy t o o r g a n i s e h i s
defence.
I t w a s suggested t h a t t h e views of t h e F i e l d - M a r s h a l Com­
manding-in-Chief in F r a n c e should be ascertained on t h i s subject.
Tanks
8. W i t h reference t o t h e discussion on T a n k s which took place
a t 10, D o w n i n g Street, on t h e 8th March, t h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l
General Staff p o i n t e d out t h e difficulties which t h e defence would
oppose to T a n k s .
Low-flying aeroplanes might be defeated by o u r
-u^j-i
' 3'
own aeroplanes; " camouflaged " guns m i g h t be circumvented by
smoke a n d n i g h t a t t a c k ; b u t l a n d mines presented a problem of the
utmost difficulty.
The Italian Front.
9. The Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff r e p o r t e d t h a t a
good deal of snow h a d fallen on the I t a l i a n front. General P l u m e r
h a d h a n d e d over h i s command to L o r d Cavan on t h e 10th instant,
a n d h a d r e t u r n e d to F r a n c e .
Palestine.
10. T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff reported t h a t
General Allenby h a d pushed on another t w o or three miles, in p u r ­
suance of t h e development of h i s plans.
Mesopotamia.
11. The Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff reported t h a t H i t
h a d been c a p t u r e d w i t h o u t fighting, t h e T u r k s h a v i n g evacuated
the place and r e t i r e d to a position some 20 to 25 miles in rear.
Submarines.
12. T h e Deputy- F i r s t Sea L o r d reported t h a t a t r a w l e r h a d
dropped ten depth charges on a n enemy submarine off t h e coast of
C o r n w a l l ; l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of oil a n d bubbles were seen coming t o
the surface.
Fie also s t a t e d t h a t a r e p o r t h a d been received from
Dover t h a t on t h e 10th M a r c h a p a t r o l boat felt a heavy explosion
u n d e r the water, a n d l a t e r a large oil patch was s i g h t e d ; also
wreckage, which a p p e a r e d to be the internal fittings of a sub­
marine. I n a d d i t i o n , documents were picked u p giving p a r t i c u l a r s
of t r i a l s of " U . B . 5 8 . "
Chant Enemy
Aeroplane Bombed.
13. T h e D e p u t y F i r s t Sea L o r d stated t h a t d u r i n g a bombing­
r a i d carried out by t h e D u n k i r k p a t r o l a g i a n t enemy aeroplane,
which had made a forced l a n d i n g , was sighted on t h e ground a n d
bombed.
Attack on Hospital
Ship.
14. T h e D e p u t y F i r s t Sea L o r d stated t h a t the hospital s h i p
Guildford Castle " w a s attacked by a n enemy submarine on t h e
evening of t h e 10th i n s t a n t i n t h e Bristol Channel, a t about t h e
same spot where t h e " G l e n a r t Castle " w a s torpedoed.
Fortu­
nately, the torpedo which struck the " Guildford Castle " did not
explode. T h e ship h a d a full complement of sick on board. T h e
D e p u t y F i r s t Sea L o r d w a s ascertaining further particulars, with
a view to publication.
Iiiot at Antigua.
15. T h e D e p u t y F i r s t Sea L o r d stated t h a t a r e p o r t h a d been
received from t h e F r e n c h A d m i r a l a t Kingston t h a t a riot h a d
occurred a t A n t i g u a .
Loss of
Mediterranean .
Convoy. / 3^7.
16. W i t h reference to W a r Cabinet 340, M i n u t e 6, t h e DeputyF i r s t Sea L o r d undertook to ascertain t h e composition of t h e force
which escorted t h e convoy out of which five ships were torpedoed i n
t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n on t h e 6th F e b r u a r y .
Russia.
17. T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff r e p o r t e d t h a t h e
h a d received some evidence which showed t h a t G e r m a n a n d
A u s t r i a n troops were moving on Odessa.
The D e p u t y F i r s t Sea L o r d stated t h a t h e h a d received a
telegram from t h e N a v a l A t t a c h e , P e t r o g r a d , which said t h a t t h e
R u s s i a n ice-breaker " T a r n o " deserted to R e v a l on the 5 t h March,
4
thus leaving t h e Fleet w i t h only two ice-breakers. T h e battleships
h a d been ordered to Cronstadt, but t h e crews wished to g o by
train. Orders h a d been issued to p r e p a r e t h e ships for deisitruc­
tion, but definite action could not be relied upon.
Stores a t A r c h a n g e l
and M u r m a n s k .
5
a
' X/-/.
a
Japanese
intervention.
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if/
v-c, \ / ­
lr ' / \\'
18. W i t h reference to W a r Cabinet 346, M i n u t e 4, a n d W a r
Cabinet 357, M i n u t e 1, t h e Secretary of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs
raised the question as to w h a t action h a d been taken by t h e
A d m i r a l t y to protect the Allied stores a t Archangel a n d
Murmansk.
H e was of opinion t h a t this question h a d a big
bearing on t h e general policy of the Allies.
T h e D e p u t y F i r s t Sea L o r d said t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t s were
being m a d e to send a n armed icebreaker to Archangel if required.
This boat would fly the W h i t e E n s i g n .
B r i t i s h and F r e n c h
cruisers were also on t h e i r way to M u r m a n s k ( W a r Cabinet 358,
M i n u t e 8).
T h e Secretary of S t a t e for W a r then r e a d a letter t h a t he
h a d received from t h e F r e n c h M i l i t a r y A t t a c h e , requesting t h a t
we should send ships to b r i n g a w a y t h e most u r g e n t Allied stores
now ci\t Archangel.
The letter i n t i m a t e d t h a t the French con­
sidered t h e i r own stores to be the more i m p o r t a n t , a n d should be
b r o u g h t a w a y first.
T h e W a r Cabinet were informed by the D e p u t y F i r s t Sea
L o r d t h a t the question of the removal of stores at Archangel a n d
M u r m a n s k w a s to be considered by t h e Allied Naval Council, a n d
the subject was therefore adjourned by the W a r Cabinet.
19. W i t h reference to W a r Cabinet 359, M i n u t e 11, the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs explained t h e position a t
the moment r e g a r d i n g J a p a n e s e intervention in Siberia. America
h a d first acquiesced in the proposed enterprise, but had since
reverted to her misgivings.
I n consequence of this change of
a t t i t u d e , our A m b a s s a d o r in Tokyo h a d n o t acted on the instruc­
tions conveyed to him by telegram ( N O . 198 to Tokyo) on t h e 5th
March. T h e J a p a n e s e Government therefore h a d not as yet been
officially a p p r o a c h e d on t h e subject of intervention in Siberia, in
the c h a r a c t e r of m a n d a t o r y of the Allies.. Mr. Balfour had, on the
9th M a r c h , sent a f u r t h e r telegram to S i r C. Greene (No. 216),
a u t h o r i s i n g h i m to proceed at once on t h e instructions conveyed
i n the previous despatch (No. 198). T h e only modification in t h e
instructions w a s t h a t o u r A m b a s s a d o r w a s to r e p o r t to the Foreign
Office t h e results of h i s conversation w i t h the J a p a n e s e M i n i s t e r
for F o r e i g n A^ffairs before t a k i n g p a r t w i t h h i s French a n d
I t a l i a n colleagues in a n y j o i n t i n v i t a t i o n to t h e J a p a n e s e Govern­
ment.
I n t h e discussion t h a t followed, t h e opinion was expressed
t h a t J a p a n w a s unlikely to act, in view of t h e lukewarmness of the
A m e r i c a n a t t i t u d e , a n d t h a t the J a p a n e s e Government's state of
mind could be inferred from Sir C. G r e e n e ' s telegram No. 204, of
t h e 7th M a r c h .
I t seemed t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n was materially
altered. Not only h a d J a p a n e s e eagerness a b a t e d in consequence
of A m e r i c a n reluctance, b u t most of the advice received from
R u s s i a dissuaded us from encouraging or countenancing a
J a p a n e s e invasion - of Siberia, as certain to drive Russia into
league w i t h Germany.
A s a g a i n s t this view, i t was urged t h a t Russia, even if
a n i m a t e d w i t h h a t r e d of Germany, w a s quite unable, w i t h o u t
foreign assistance, to make q j y j sort of resistance to t h e Germans.
General K n o x a n d C a p t a i n P r o c t o r were i n s t a n c e d as among those
who considered the s i t u a t i o n lost unless J a p a n acted, and acted
soon... There w a s little prospect of any h a r d e n i n g of the Russians
if left to themselves; a n d to w a i t for an. i n v i t a t i o n from them to
J a p a n would be to w a i t for a n u n c e r t a i n t y and, in any case, to
w a i t too long.
T h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e W a r Cabinet was d r a w n to a twofold
risk of the policy of J a p a n e s e intervention in Siberia: (a) R u s s i a n
hatred, of Germany, a foundation it m i g h t be possible to b u i l d on,
would be t r a n s f e r r e d to us, for l e t t i n g loose A s i a on a t e m p o r a r i l y
p r o s t r a t e R u s s i a ; (b) There was a possibility of a r i f t on a m a t t e r
of c a r d i n a l policy between ourselves a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s of
America, to secure which was one of t h e aims of G e r m a n policy.
J a p a n in any case would not go far West, as she h a d ceased to
feel confident t h a t her Allies were on the w i n n i n g side. W e should
not prevail on her to go f a r enough to engage in serious armed
conflict w i t h the Germans. A l l we needed for our i m m e d i a t e
purpose was protection of the stores a t Vladivostock. This could
he done w i t h o u t the invasion of Siberia u p to the U r a l s a n d
r u n n i n g the risk of i n c u r r i n g all the odium a n d r e a p i n g none of
the benefit.
The Secretary of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs pointed o u t t h a t
it was early to assume t h a t A m e r i c a would not go w i t h us, a n d
t h a t J a p a n would refuse to go W e s t . H e urged t h a t t h e result
of our demarche a t Tokyo should be awaited. I f the present views
of the U n i t e d States of America, as expressed in telegram No. 929
from. W a s h i n g t o n , had, as m i g h t be inferred from a t e l e g r a m
(No. 73) from Sir W . W i s e m a n to S i r E . D r u m m o n d of t h e 6th
March, already been communicated to J a p a n , we should o b t a i n t h e
considered opinion of the J a p a n e s e Government with the a l t e r n a ­
tives clearly before it.
I t was decided t h a t —
The result of S i r C. G r e e n e ' s conversation with t h e J a p a n e s e
Minister for Foreign Affairs should be awaited.
Formation of
Eastern Committee
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20. T h e W a r Cabinet h a d before t h e m a M e m o r a n d u m by t h e
Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff ( P a p e r G.T.-3834).
I t was pointed out t h a t t h e r e were three Committees dealing
w i t h w h a t were really three aspects of one problem, a n d t h a t each
frequently deliberated without k n o w i n g w h a t h a d been decided
by t h e others, w i t h results sometimes inclined to be incoherent.
One of these Committees, t h e M i d d l e E a s t Committee, was a
Cabinet Committee; of the others, t h e Russia Committee w as a
Foreign Office. Committee, a n d t h e P e r s i a Committee i n t e r d e p a r t ­
mental, w i t h the Secretary of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs a s
chairman.
I t was decided t h a t one Committee should be formed of these
three, a n d t h a t , as it would have to co-ordinate the work of several
D e p a r t m e n t s , it should be a W a r Cabinet Committee; b u t i t was
agreed t h a t care m u s t be t a k e n t o s a f e g u a r d the D e p a r t m e n t a l
a u t h o r i t y a n d responsibility of t h e Secretary of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
T h e W a r Cabinet requested—
7
Lord
Curzon to d r a f t t h e Terms
Committee.
2, Whitehall
Gardens,
March 11, 1918.
S.W.,
of
Reference
to
this