FRANCISCO SILVA
https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/graduate-program/candidates/francisco-silva
fsilva@sas.upenn.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Placement Director: Iourii Manovskii
Placement Director: Andrew Postlewaite
Graduate Student Coordinator: Kelly Quinn
MANOVSKI@ ECON.UPENN.EDU
APOSTLEW@ECON.UPENN.EDU
KQUINN @ ECON.UPENN.EDU
215-898-6880
215-898-7350
215-898-5691
Office Contact Information
Department of Economics
160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Cell Phone: +1 2154214450
Undergraduate Studies:
Bsc (Licenciatura), Economics, University of Porto, 2008
Masters’ Level Work:
Msc, Economics, Catholic University of Portugal, 2010
Graduate Studies:
University of Pennsylvania, 2010 to present
Thesis Title: “Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory”
Expected Completion Date: May 2016
Thesis Committee and References:
Professor Andrew Postlewaite (Advisor)
Department of Economics, 3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
215-898-7350, apostlew@econ.upenn.edu
Professor Steven Matthews
Department of Economics, 3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
215-898-7749, stevenma@econ.upenn.edu
Professor Rakesh Vohra
Department of Economics, 3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
215-898-6777, rvohra@seas.upenn.edu
Teaching and Research Fields:
Primary fields: Applied Microeconomic Theory, Public Economics, Law and Economics
Secondary fields: Behavioral Economics
Teaching Experience:
Fall, 2013-2014
Summer, 2013-2014
Spring, 2012-2013
and Fall, 2001
Fall, 2002
Introduction to Micro and Macro Economics and its applications, UPenn,
Head Recitation Instructor for Professor Gizem Saka
Economic Analysis of the Public Sector (MPA course), UPenn, Teaching
Assistant for Professor David Crawford
Introduction to Macroeconomics, UPenn, Recitation Instructor for Professor
Luca Bossi
Introduction to Micro and Macro Economics and its applications, UPenn,
Recitation Instructor for Professor Gizem Saka
Summer, 2002
Spring, 2009-2010
Fall, 2008-2009
Intermediate Microeconomics, UPenn, Instructor
Intermediate Microeconomics, Catholic University of Portugal, Teaching
Assistant for Professor Fernando Branco
Intermediate Microeconomics, Catholic University of Portugal, Teaching
Assistant for Professor Fernando Machado
Research Experience and Other Employment:
2009-2010
Catholic University of Portugal, Research Assistant for Professors Leonor
Modesto and Teresa Lloyd Braga
2009
Ministry of Economics and Innovation (Portugal), Economics Studies Office,
Research Intern
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:
2014
Edward Mansfield Prize for best performance of a recitation instructor in
Intro Economics, Honorable Mention, UPenn
2010-2015
University Fellowship, UPenn
Research Papers
“The Optimal Design of a Criminal Justice System” (Job Market Paper)
I consider the problem a social planner faces in constructing a criminal justice system which addresses
two needs: to protect the innocent and to punish the guilty. I characterize the socially optimal criminal
justice system under various assumptions with respect to the social planner's ability to commit. In the
optimal system, before a criminal investigation is initiated, all members of the community are given the
opportunity to confess to having committed the crime in exchange for a smaller than socially optimal
punishment which is independent of any future evidence that might be discovered. Agents who choose
not to confess might be punished once the investigation is completed if the evidence gathered is
sufficiently incriminatory. In this paper's framework, leniency for confessing agents is efficient not
because it saves resources or reduces risk, but because there are informational externalities to each
confession. When an agent credibly confesses to be guilty he indirectly provides the social planner
additional information about the other agents: the fact that they are likely to be innocent.
“Inducing Overconfidence” (R&R at Economic Inquiry)
In this paper, I show how the intervention of others (parents, bosses or coworkers) may generate
overconfidence. I compare two explanations. The first is that people take their success at face value and
disregard the influence that outside help may have. Even though this assumption may sometimes be
reasonable, I argue that it is not when such help is received systematically as is the case, for example, of
parenting. Hence, I provide a more novel explanation for induced overconfidence that is based on the
idea that receiving help makes the information gathered less precise. Overconfident people, who tend to
receive more help, will remain overconfident as the future information they will gather has very little
precision. On the contrary, underconfident people, who tend to receive less help, will learn their true
ability faster. Using data on teenagers and young adults I compare these two alternative explanations.
“Should the government provide public goods if it cannot commit?” (R&R at Journal of Public
Economic Theory)
I compare two different systems of provision of discrete public goods: a centralized system, ruled by a
benevolent dictator who has no commitment power; and an anarchic system, based on voluntary
contributions, where there is no ruler. If the public good is binary, then the public good provision
problem is merely an informational one. In this environment, I show that the anarchic system can always
replicate any outcome of the centralized system. However, as one increases the number of alternatives
available, the classical free riding problem described in Samuelson (1954) emerges. As the classical free
riding problem becomes more important relative to the informational free riding problem, the centralized
system becomes the preferred system of the two.
“Euthanasia: the fear of becoming a burden”
It has been widely documented in the medical literature that terminal patients often choose to end their
lives out of the fear of becoming a burden to their family. But the real size of the burden, in particular its
emotional component, is only known by the patient's family. I analyze the impact of legalizing
euthanasia on the ability of the family to communicate with the patient through a cheap talk model. I
argue that, if euthanasia is legalized, either the patient makes his decision (of whether or not to commit
suicide) uninformed of the size of the burden; or chooses what his family would have chosen if it had the
power, and not necessarily what he would have preferred. I also consider the role of the physician and
argue that, if the physician anticipates the family's influence in the patient's decision, providing
incentives for the physician's interests to be aligned with the patient's might not be on the patient's best
interest.
Languages:
Portuguese (native), English (fluent), Spanish (intermediate), French (basic)