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RAPPORT
DU SECOND COMITE DEXPERTS
OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
PARIS
J924
A n n e x e %0?G de l a Commission ties R e p a r a t i o n s .
L E T T RE
DE
COUVERTURE.
MON CHER PRESIDENT,
j'ai 1 liohneur (le vous retnettre le rapport unanimedu Comite charge par
ia Commission des Reparations d'evaiuer les capitaux evades d'Allemagne
et de rechercher les moyens de faire rentrer ces capitaux eu Allemagne.
E n vous soumettant le resultat de nos travaux, qu'il me soit permis,
au
n o m do Comite, d'expr.imer 1'espoir que notre ceuvre puisse aider a
resoudre lesproblemes soulevespar £execution du Traite dePaix.
Je resie votre devoue,
Signe : R . Mc KEHNA.
A Monsieur le President de la Commission des Reparations-.
COVERING
LETTER.
DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN,
- -
?
I have the honour to present the unanimous Report of the Committee
appointed by the Reparation Commission to enquire into the amount oi
German exported capital and to consider the means of bringing it b a c k to
Germany.
In laying before you the result of our labours may I be permitted in i h e
name ofthe Committee to express the hope that our work may assist in solv­
ing the problems involved in the execution of the Treaty of Peace.
I remain,
Yours faithfully.
' .
The Chairman, Reparation Commission.
(Signed) R : Mc KENNA.,
RAPPORT
DU
SECOND
COMITE
D'EXPERTS.
En execution d u n e decision de la Commission des Reparations, en date du oo 110­
vembre 1 9 2 3 , nous avons ete constitues en Comite pour rechercher les moyens
devaluer et de faire rentrer en Allemagne les capitaux evades. Nous nous sommes
reunis pour la premiere fois, a Paris, le 2 1 Janvier 192/1, et nous avons tenu au
total 38 seances, d a b o r d a Paris, ensuite a Berlin, puis dc nouveau a Paris. Nous
avons entendu de nombreuses depositions et nous nous sommes assure la colla­
boration de specialistes avertis, de conseillers techniques et d'experts comptables.
Nous avons en outre etudie les travaux puhlies sur le sujet par des economistes
connus, et chaque membre du Comite a ete appele a fournir sur les ditferents pro­
hlemes poses des rapports qui ont servi de base a nos conclusions.
\
devaluation que nous presentons se! refere- a la date du 3 i decembre 1 9 2 3 .
fiien entendu, les circonstances ulterieures peuvent avoir eu pour consequence
daugmenter ou de reduire, suivant les cas, 1'importance des avoirs allemands.
Dans la recherche d u montant des capitaux possedes par les Allemands a
1'etranger, nous avons rencontre des difficultes tres considerables. II y a bien des
moyens,par lesquels des ressortissants allemands out p u se cohstttuer des avoirs a
fetranger, mais dans la plupart des cas il 11'est pas possible cle citer des chillres
precis. Presque toujours il faut proceder par estimation. L e mieux que nous
pouvions par consequent esperer faire etait de determiner avec un certain degre de
certitude leslimites entre lesquelles se place le chiflre recherche. L'ecart qui separe
ces limites indique le caractere dhnprecision de certains des elements dappre­
ciation, dont nous disposions.
La methode qui aurait consiste a faire une encjuete parmi les banquiers et les
hommes d'affaires des pays oil, par hypo these, le capital allemand est depose ou place,
a ete rejetee par nous des le debut. Nous avons, sans doute, utilise tous les rensei­
gnements de caractere officiel ou non qui nous out ete fournis par les pays autres que
rAllemagne, mais nous avons pense qu'il serait peu convenahle et vain de dernandei
la divulgation de transactions determinees qui, en general, ont ete faites sous la reserve
implicite que le secret en serait garde. Nous avons estime en outre que, meme si
toutes les informations possibles nous etaient donnees librement, elles presenteraien
encore de graveslacunes, car il parait certain que bien des capitaux allemands enpajs
etrangers sont, dans les circonstances actuelles, dissimules par divers precedes sous
-de faux 110ms.
REPORT
OF THE
SECOND
COMMITTEE
OF
EXPERTS.
In pursuance of a decision of the Reparation Commission of the 3oth November
it)23, we were created a Committee to consider the means of estimating the amount
of German exported capital and of bringing it back to Germany. W e were convened
in Paris on the 21st January, 192/1, and w e have held altogether thirty-eight meet­
ings, first in Paris, then in Berlin, and finally again in Paris. W e have examined
numerous witnesses and have availed ourselves of the services of trained economists,
technical advisers and expert accountants. W e ,have also studied the published
works on the subject b y well-known economists, and each member of the Committee
has furnished reports on particular problems.
Our estimates relate to the 31st December 1920.
Later events may, of course,
have either increased or decreased the amount of German capital abroad.
In our investigation of the amount of capital owned by Germans in foreign coun­
tries, we were confronted b y very considerable difficulties. There are many ways b y
which Germans can acquire capital abroad but in most cases no precise figures can
be given. It is nearly always a matter of estimate, and the utmost vve could
hope to do with any degree of certainty was to lay down limits between which the
actual amount is to b e found. T h e distance which divides these limits marks the
want of precision of the material at our disposal.
One method of investigation, to institute an enquiry through bankers and business
men in those countries in which German capital is believed to be deposited or in­
vested , was rejected by.us at the outset. W e have availed ourselves of all information
ol a public or official character supplied from countries outside Germany, but w e
were of opinion that it would be neither proper nor useful to request the disclosure
of specific transactions which in general would have been entered into under an
implied condition of secrecy. Moreover w e felt that even though all obtainable
information were freely given to us, it must b e extremely defective, as much German
capital in foreign countries is certain in existing circumstances to b e hidden in
various ways under assumed names.
2' Comite d'cxperU. — Rapport.
La methode que nous avons adoptee est completement clifferente. Nous nous
sommes tout d*abord attaches a proceder a une estimation de la valeur totale des
avoirs que des ressortissants allemands possedaient a Fetranger lors de la declaration
de guerre.
Nous avons ensuite recherche a quelle somme ces avoirs se sont trouves reduits
a Fepoque de Farmistice. A cet eflet, nous avons tenu compte, d u n cote, du deficit
de la balance commerciale, des avances faites par FAllemagne a ses allies, des
pertes proveuant soit des saisies et sequestres operes dans les conditions raliliees
parle Traite de Versailles, soit de la depreciation de certains biens et titles. Dun
aulre cote nous avons pris en consideration les ventes 'de valeurs allemandes a des
etrangers, les ventes d'or, les interets cles avoirs a Fetranger accumules pendant la
periode de guerre et, enfin, la repercussion sur la balance commerciale des impor­
tations en Alleniagne provenant des regions occupees. Ces importations correspondent
en eflet tan tot a des requisitions non suiyies cle pavements, tantot a des requisitions
ou des achats payes avec des mark-papier abandonnes ensuite clans le pays (Belgique,
Pologne), tantot a des requisitions ou des acbatssoldesaumoyen demonnaieslocales,
dontle Gouvernement allemand provoquaitFimpression et remission pour les besoins
de la cause (Nord de la France, Roumanie, Belgique, Pologne, etc.).
Finalement, prenant comme base ce qui restait a Farmistice des avoirs allemands
cFavant-guerre, nous avons examine en detail les differents moyens par lesquels les
Allemands ont pu augmenter ou diminuer leurs avoirs a Fetranger pendant la periode
comprise entre Farmistice et la.fin de 1 9 2 3 . Inexactitude de notre estimation finale
depend ainsi de la mesure dans laquelle nous avons pu examiner avec une precision
suffisanle, a la fois les differents elements qui ont permis a 1'Allemagne au cOurs de
cette periode d'acquerir des avoirs a Fetranger, et les divers modes par lesquels au
cours de cette meme periode, 1'Allemagne a ete amenee a ceder certains de ces avoirs.
L e moyen principal, par lequel ies Allemands ont acquis des avoirs a letranger
depuis 1'armislice, a ete la vente de mark en comptes de banque. Notre estimation
de la somme totale reritrant sous celte rubrique a ete obtenue par un procede reposant
sur le principe que chaque vente a Fetranger par un Allemand d'un credit (le
banque en mark cree en Allemagne au moment de la vente un credit de banque
equivalent an profit d'un etranger. Les releves periodiques des sommes figurant sur
les livres des banques allemandes au credit des comptes d'etrangers nous ont ete
fournis et, avec le concours cVexperts comptables, nous avons p u determiner le
produit net exprime en or des ventes de mark a des etrangers. II est interessant de
noter que les avoirs etrangers acquis de cette maniere se sont eleves a une somme
comprise entre sept et huit milliards de mark-or; la totalite Ae cette somme, par
suite de 1'effondrement de la monnaie allemande, a ete perdue par plus dun million
d etrangers qui s'en etaient porles acquereurs.
L e chiffre ci-dessus est un des elements positifs cle notre evaluation du total, global
de la fortune allemande a 1'etranger.
Les autres facteurs principaux qui ont permis a 1'Allemagne de se conslituer des
avoirs a Fetranger ont ete la vente de marchandises, de valeurs, de proprietes, de
metaux precieux et cle billets de banque libelles en mark, les revenus des avoirs
allemands a Fetranger, les depenses des touristes en Allemagne, les avoirs allemands
The method w e have adopted is altogether different.
Our first step was to form
an estimate of the total value of German capital abroad at the outbreak of war.
Next we considered what was the net reduction in this total at the time of the
Armistice. W e took into account on one side the balance of trade, advances by
Germany to her Allies, loss by seizure and sequestration of property confirmed
bv the Versailles Treaty, and loss through depreciation of the value of property
and securities. On the other side we considered the sales of German securities, the
sales of gold, the accumulation of interest, and finally the effect on the trade balance
of the imports into Germany from occupied territories. These imports were com­
modities either requisitioned without payment, or paid for, in the case of Belgium
and Poland, largely by marks which remained in the country, and, in Roumania
and occupied France, as well as in Belgium and Poland, by local currencies which
the German Government caused to be printed and issued for the purpose.
Finally, starling from the basis of the remaining pre-war German assets, we
examined in detail the various means by which Germans can have increased or dimin­
ished their capital abroad during the period from the Armistice to the close of the
year 1 9 2 3 . The reliability of our final estimate depends upon the completeness of
our examination of the different elements which makeup the total of German foreign
acquisitions and of the various ways in which such acquisitions may have been
expended.
The chief method b y which Germans have acquired foreign. assets since the
Armistice has been by the sale of mark bank balances. O u r estimate of the total
sum under this head has been obtained by a procedure founded upon the principle
that every foreign sale b y a German of a mark bank balance creates at the moment of
sale a corresponding holding of a foreign bank balance in Germany. The periodic
totals of foreign balances shown in the books of the German banks were disclosed
to us; and with the assistance of expert accountants we have been able to ascertain
die net proceeds expressed in gold derived from the sale of marks. It is interesting
to note that the foreign assets acquired in this way amounted to between seven
and eight milliards of gold marks, the whole of which in consequence of the final
devaluation of the mark was lost by more than one million foreigners who at one
tune or another were buyers of mark credits.
This figure is one of the credit factors in estimating the final total.
Other principal sources of German foreign assets have been the sale of goods,
securities, real estate, precious metals and mark banknotes; interest accumulations,
tourist expenditure in Germany, German holdings in ceded territories in Poland,
Danlzig, etc., foreign money expended by the allied Armies of Occupation, remittances
clans les territoires cedes (Pologne, Dahtzig, etc.), les devises depensees par les armees
alliees doccupation, les remises effectuees par des Allemands residant a fetranger,
les benefices des Compagnies de navigation, le produit du transport en transit a
travers 1 Allemagne, par chemins de fer ou par canaux, de marchandises etrangeres,
les benefices des Compagnies d'assurance, etc.
En sens contraire, des avoirs allemands a 1'etranger ont ete depenses pour
1'acbat des marchandises importees, les payements en especes aux Allies, les interets
payes sur les valeurs allemandes delenues par fetranger, les depenses des touristes
allemands a 1 etranger, etc.
Pour determiner ces divers elements d'accroissement ou de diminution des avoirs
allemands a 1'elranger, nous avons soumis a un examen critique-et approfondi
les statistiques el; les estimations allemandes, les documents officiels, les rap­
ports de banquiers et dhommes d.'affaires et toutes autres indications analogues.
Nous avons controle la valeur de ces informations en recueillant des temoio-na^es
o
o
et en examinant les documents originaux. Nos investigations et les temoisnasres
O
(j
D
o
recueillis nous ont conduits a ecarter entieremen t les donnees officielles allemandes
sur la valeur des importations et des exportations et a procecler a une revaluation de
toutes les marchandises sur la base des prix du marche international, en tenant
compte des corrections que pouvaient rendre necessaires les circonstances speciales
du.commerce allemand au moment ou etaient realisees ces transactions.
Apres.un examen serre de tous les elements ayant servi a determiner la somme
totale ci-dessus et toutes compensations faites, nous estimons que la valeur des capi­
taux allemands a fetranger de toute nature, comprenant a la fois des capitaux plus
ou moins licjuides et des capitaux engages dans des societes ou entreprises ctran­
geres, s'elevait, a lafincle 1 . 9 2 3 , a un chiffre compris entre 5 , 7 milliards de mark-or
et 7 , 8 milliards de mark-or, et nous considerons que le chiffre moyen de 6 milliards
trois quarts de mark-or constitue le total probable. Nous at tiro ns specialcment 1'attention sur les monnaies etrangeres detenues en
Allemagne; bien qu'elles ne soient pas comprises dans notre evaluation des capi­
taux detenus a fetranger, leur caractere est tellement analogue k celui dun avoir
a 1'etranger quil nest pas possible de ne pas en tenir compte dans une eva­
luation d'ensemble. On peut certainement dire que ces monnaies, dont le total nest
pas inferieur, suivant notre estimation, k tin milliard deux cents millions de mark-or,
constituent un bien allemand sous la forme la plus liquide pour la constitution
d'avoirs a felranger.
D'autre part, pour apprecier dans son ensemble la situationfinancierede i'AUe­
magne, il he faut pas negligee de tenir compte de la valeur des biens possedes par
des etrangers dans ce pays et de la charge annuelle cju'ils peuvent represeriter.
Les revenus produits annuellement par ces biens sous forme de loyers, d'interets
ou de dividendes sont acluellement peu considerables etils peuvent a tout moment
se voir soumis k des impots speciaux; cela est particulierement vrai pour les
loyers cle biens immobiliers achetes aux prix peu' elevds qui out ete xourants dans
ces dernieres annees. Nous estimons, apres une etude tres attentive de la question,
erne les litres et biens immobiliers possedes par des etrangers en Allemagne valent
dc 1 a 1 1/2 milliard cle mark-or.
frorn Germans abroad, earnings of shipping, railway and canal freights lor foreign
goods in transit through Germany, insurance profits, etc.
On the other band, German foreign assets have been expended on the purchase
of goods imported, cash payments to the Allies, interest paid on German securities
held abroad, German tourist expenditure, etc.
On all these heads of receipt and expenditure, the German statistical records and
estimates, official data, bankers', and business reports, and other similar evidence,
have been subjected b y us to the most critical scrutiny, and their reliability has
been tested b y our examination of witnesses and inspection of original sources of
information. O u r investigations and the evidence obtained led us to discard entire-­
ly the values of German imports and exports as stated in the official reports, and
to revalue all commodities on the basis of the then current world prices with such
allowances as the special circumstances of German trade at the time may have
rendered necessary.
After a close examination of all the factors which make up the total sum, we are
of opinion that German capital abroad of every kind, including capital of varying
degrees of liquidity and capital invested in participations in foreign companies and
firms, and after taking into account all credit? and debit items was at the end of
the year 1 9 2 3 not less than 5.y milliard gold marks and not more than 7.8 milliard
gold marks and w e think that the middle figure of 6 and three quarter milliard
gold marks is the approximate total.
W e draw special attention to the foreign currency in Germany which, though
not included in our valuation of capital held abroad, is so closely akin to a foreign
asset that it must not b e overlooked.
It may indeed b e said that this cur­
rency, the total of which w e estimate at not less than 1 milliard two hundred
million gold marks, is a German holding in the most liquid form for conversion
*nto foreign assets.
On the other hand, on a broad view of German financial capacity, the value of
the property in Germany held by foreigners should not be left out of account. T h e
annual yield from this property, whether in the form of rent, interest or dividends,
is at present inconsiderable and may at any time become subject, to special taxation,
particularly in the case of rent in respect of real estate purchased at the low prices
current in recent years. W e estimate, after very close study ofthe question, that
the real estate and securities owned in Germany b y foreigners represent a value
of from 1 to t 1/2 milliard gold marks.
2' Comite deiperts. — Rapport.
3
Dans une annexe jointe an present rapport,. le Comiie a era necessaire de donncr
des renseignements complemeatakes sur Eeslimatiou quil a faitades-avoirs, allemands
existant a 1'etranger en 1 9 1 / 1 . , ainsi que sur les principaux elements daccroisscmenl
Ou de diminution de ces avoirs, soil; pendant la guerre, soit depuis.
L o b j e t de la cleuxieme partie de notre enquete etait de rechercber les moyens de
faire rentrer en Allemagne les capitaux exportes.
D'ume maniere; gener-ale-,, 1'evasiaQi S&tesi capitaux - pour employer ^expression­
usuelle - a ele prov,oquee en AMemagne par. les facteurs ordinaires. de ce pheno­
mene.. Llevosioa ai ete amenee avant tout par ce:fait que: l&Gouvemement na pas mis
son budget en equilibire,. situation qui a fait, naitre, cumme corollaire, la necessite
de contracter de: gros emprunts et d'assurer k s payements par la creation de papier­
monnaie.. Llevasion-s'est alors-dewelappea soust faction des speculateurs et dos capi­
talistes effrayeV, qui ont echange leurs mark contre des. devises etrangeres, pendant
q,ue les exportateurs de marchaiiidises conservaient a ,1'etranger tout ce quits pouvaient
y laisser du produit de leurs ventes. Toutefois, dans le cas particulier qui nous
occupe, le phenomene ordinaire s'est trouve forlement accentue par fatlitude qu
prise le peuple allemand a legard des payements que son pays avait a faire a
creanciers d e guerre et il a ete marque par des moyens et des precedes nouveaux
et ingenieux mis en. ceuvre pour eluder une legislation; restrictive et pour dissimuler.
lea veritahles proprietaires. des soldes etrangers.
L.'insucces des procedes, tant anciens que nouveaux,. employes pour arreler
1'evasion des eapitaux, prouve que 1'orsqu'd y a uue prime aussi forte a la
reussite de 1'evasion.,; la legislation restrictive est en: fin de comple inelficace. Aucune
des dispositions de la loi, aucune des sanctions rigou-reuses prevues par elle- 11 ont
reussi soit a empecher 1'evasion des capitaux, soit a les faire decouvrir dans leur
refuge a l'eliraug:er. Nous eroyons que le resultat eut. ete: lie. meme j.-que le Gouverne­
ment eut on non tail de son mieux pour appliquer les Ibis, et reglements.
Nous estimons que le seul moyen d'emp.echer les capitaux de sortie d'Allemagne
et, de les encourager a y rentrer est de supprimer la cause qui a provoque leur exode.
II faut que 1'inflation soit arretee d u n e facon definitive. Si les emissions de monnaie
sont strictement maintenues dans les limites reelles des besoins du pays, determines
sur la base d'une valeur stable, les Allemands possedant des capitaux a 1'etrangerse
sentiront assures de ue: subir aucune perte en les; rapatriant;; les; speculateurs ne
pourront plus esperer fa-ire: des benefices, en vendant des mark.. L-exemple de-1'Au­
triehe nous a deja naontoe comment, lorsque lamounaie est a peu pres stabilisee, les
exigences du commerce exterieur tendent i ramener Lessoldes existant a, 1'etranger.
Les lois restrictiives,, qui se seat, en somme,. montrees impuissantes a empecber
1'exportation des capitauas.,. devienneat superflues-des lorsyque disparaissent les raisons
deles eluder., Les km qui pretendraient ,ren,direobligatoire le-retour de ces capitaux
ne pourraient d'ailleurs que produire 1'effet; inverse de; eelui qu'on pourrait en.
altendre.
The Committee have though t it desirable to give in an annex "to this report addi­
tional information in respect of their estimates of German assets abroad in 1911\ as
well as of the principal credit ;and debit factors, both during and since the war, that
ihave gone to make up the final total of German capital abroad.
The second part of our enquiry was to investigate the means of bringing
exported capital back to Germany.
The so-called flight of capital in this instance was in the main the result of the
usual factors. It arose principally from the failure of the Government to bring its
budget into proper /relation, and, as.a corrollary of such failure., from the raising of
large loans ,and the direct issue of paper money. Secondly, it was due to the action
of speculators and timid investors who sold their marks against the currency of
other countries, while the exporters of goods retained abroad all that was possible
of the proceeds of their sales. In the particular case under inquiry, however, the flight
of capital was accentuated by the attitude of the people of Germany towards payments
to her war creditors, and was marked b y new and ingenious devices and schemes for
evading restrictive legislation and for cloaking the real ownership of foreign
balances.
The failure of the methods employed, both old and new, demonstrates the final
ineffectiveness of restrictive legislation when successful evasion is so richly rewarded.
Neither legal enactment nor severe penalties resulted in disclosure of assets abroad
or hampered the flight of capital. W e feel that this would have been true whether
the Government had or had not used, its best endeavours to enforce the laws and
In our opinion the only way to prevent the exodus of capital from Germany and
to encourage its return is to eradicate the cause of the outward movement. Inflation
must be permanently stopped. If the issue of currency is striody confined within
the true limits of national requirements on a stable basis of value, the German with
capital abroad wdl feel assured that he will suffer no loss in bringing it home; the
speculator can no longer look for a profit from the sale of marks. W e have already
seen in the case of Austria how, when the currency is fairly stabilised, the
necessities of foreign trade tend to bring back existing foreign balances. Restrictive
legislation, which in the main has proved futile in preventing the export of capital,
becomes superfluous the moment there is no longer any inducement to evade the
law. , It is indeed to be feared that laws purporting to compel the return of capital
would have the reverse effect to that which might be wished.
2 Comile tfuxperts. — Rapporl.
e
La question de la. methode a suivre pour assurer a 1'Allemagne une monnaie sufTi.­
samment stable estliee.a la question gen6rale de Pequilibre budgetaire ainsi qu'i
celle de finstitution d'une Banque d'Emission sur une base saine. Ces questions, qui
sont hors des limites de notre enquete, onl ete soumises par la Commission des
Reparations a un autre Comite dont nous avons 1'avantage de connaitro les conclu­
sions. S'il est donne suite aux recommandations de ce Gomite, nous estimons quune
grande partie des avoirs allemands se trouvant actuellement a 1'etranger seront
ramenes par le cours ordinaire du commerce.
Tout en pensant que lorsque les finances d u n pays reposent sur une base stable
il nest pas besoin de legislation speciale pour empecber les capilaux de sortir ou
pour les forcer a rentrer, nous reconnaissons q u e , en ce qui concerne 1'Allemagne,
une periode de transition sera inevitablement necessaire avant que Ton puisse arriver a
etablir la stabilite et a faire renaitre la confiance. Nous suggerons d'accorder, pen­
dant cette periode — et pour un temps limite —
1'amnistie aux personnes tombant
sous le coup des sanctions edictees par la legislation existante et d'otfrir des condi­
tions speciales pour les souscriptions aux emprunts du Gouvernement qui seronl rea­
lisees en monnaies etrangeres. Des mesures de ce genre, si elles etaient bien concues,
feraient beaucoup pour hater la rentree des capitaux et le retablissement definitil cle
Tequilibre financier en Allemagne, condition indispensable au payement des fepa­
rations.
Nous tenons a adresser nos remerciements sinceres aux fonctionnaires de la Corn­
mission des Reparations, aux economistes, statisticiens et experts-comptables qui
nous ont apporte une collaboration precieuse dont nous leur restons reconnaissants.
Paris, le g avril
REGINALD MC K E N N A , President.
HENRY 1VI. R O B I N S O N .
ANDRE L A U R E N T - A T T H A L I N .
MARIO A L B E R T I .
ALBERT-E.
JANSSEN.
192/1.
The method of securing a currency in Germany capable of maintaining a sufficiently
stable international value covers the whole question of budgetary equilibrium and i
the establishment of a bank of issue on a sound basis.
These matters, which fall
outside the scope of our enquiry, have been referred b y the Reparation Commission
lo another Committee whose conclusions we have the advantage of knowing,
ff
effect is given to their recommendations, w e think that a considerable part o f t h e
German assets now in foreign countries will return in the ordinary course of trade.
While w e are.of opinion that special legislation to prevent the export of capital
or compel its return is not required when a counlry's finance is on a stable basis, w e
recognise that in the. case of Germany a period of transition must necessarily ensue
before stability can b e obtained and confidence restored.
W e suggest that during
this period an amnesty should be granted for a limited time from the penalties
imposed by existing enactments and that special terms b e offered for subscriptions to
Government loans made in foreign currencies.
Well-conceived measures of this
kind would b e helpful in hastening the return of capital and the final restoration of
financial equilibrium in Germany, conditions which are essential to the payment o f
Reparation.
i
W e desire to express our sincere thanks to the officers of the Reparation C o m ­
mission, and to the economists, statisticians and expert accountants who have aided
us, for whose valuable assistance w e are greatly indebted.
April 9 l b , 192/1.
REGINALD MC K E N N A , Chairman.
HENRY M . R O B I N S O N .
ANDRE L A U R E N T - A T T H A L I N .
MARIO A L B E R T !
ALBERT-E.
JANSSEN.
-2 Comile iTcxpcrls. — Rapport.
/i
ANNEXE.
S0MMA1RE.
I. — Avoirs a 1'etrauger en 1914,
II. — Periode de guerre :
a. Excedent. des importations et avances de rAllemagne a ses Allies;
I. Depreciation des avoirs etrangers d'avant-guerre; mesures de s^questre et de liquidation;
c. Benefices rc4alisc4s par lAllemagne dans les Territoires occupes;
d. Ventes d'or et de valeurs mobilises allemandes;
e. Revenus des avoirs allemands a fetranger.
HI. —
Periode d'apres-guerre :
*
a. Excedent des importations et payements en especes de 1'Allemagne en vertu du Traite de Paix.
6. Vente a des etrangers de mark en compte et de billets de banque libelles en mark;
c. Ventes d'or;
d Ventes de proprietes immobilizes et de valeurs mobilieres allemandes;
e. Depenses des etrangers voyageant en Allemagne etdes Allemands voyageant a 1'etranger;
f.
Depenses des armees d'occupation;
g. Recetles provenant des operations de fret, d'assurance, de transit, etc.;
li. Revenus des placements allemands a 1'etranger et des placements etrangers en Allcmagne;
remises faites par les Allemands residanta fetranger;
i.
Biens prives allemands dans les territoires transferes;
;'.
Billets de banque etrangers en Allemagne.
ANNEX.
SUMMARY.
I. — Assets abroad in 191.4. II. -
Period of the War :
a. Surplus of imports and Germany/s advances to her Allies.;
6. Depreciation of pre-war foreign assets; Sequestration and liquidation measures:
c. Profits realised by Germany in Occupied Territories;,
d. Sale of gold and German securities:;
e. Return from German assets abroad.
HI. —
Post-war period i
a. Surplus of imports and cash payments made by Germany under the Peace Treaty;
6. Sales to foreigners of mark credits and banknotes;.
.
.
c. Sales of gold;
(/. Sales of German real property and' German securities;
e. Expenditure by foreigners travelling in Germany and by Germans travelling- abroad;
/'. Expenditure by the Armies of Occupation;
j . Earnings from shipping, insurance, transit, etc.;
h. Income from Gorman investments abroad and from foreign investments in Germany; remit­
tances made by Germans residing abroad;
t. German private property in ceded territories;
j.
Foreign banknotes in Germany.
I. -
AVOIRS A L'ETRANGER EN 1914.
La valeur des avoirs allemands a l'6tranger en i g 14 a 6t6 estimee par divers economises
a des sommes variant enlre 2 0 el 35 milliards de mark-or. II existe, en dchors de ccs eva­
luations privees, deux evaluations de caractere olficiel ainsi qu'un recensement elTectue par
le Gouvcrnemenl allemand. La plus ancienne des deux evaluations officielles esl cellc qui
a ete faite en 1 go.5 par 1'Administration dEmpire de la Marine; la plus rcccnlc a ete fournie
en 1 9 2 4 par le Gouvernement allemand en reponse a une question posee par le second
Comite dexperls. L e recensement, qui ne portait que sur les valeurs mobilieres, a etc
entrepris par le Gouvernement allemand pendant la guerre, au mois d'aout 1 9 1 6 .
Dans les questions qu'il a posees au Gouvernement allemand, le Comit6 ne lui a pas
seulement demande du fournir une evaluation des avoirs possedes par les ressortissanls
allemands a 1'etranger en 19 14 ; il l'a prie egalement de presenter ses observations sur les
diverses estimations cpii avaient ete faites auparavant par des economistes allemands.
Tous ces documents — estimations des economistes allemands et des economistes des
nations neutres, alliees et associees, estimations et recensement officiels, rdponses du Gou­
vernement allemand — ont etc examines et compares. En tenant comple de tous les elements
devaluation, le Comite est arrive a la conclusion que le chiffre de JaS milliards de mark-or
peut elre accepte comme representant la valeur des avoirs allemands a fetranger au moment
de la declaration de guerre, etant entendu que ce chitfre de 2 8 milliards comprend seulc­
mont les avoirs k 1'etranger poss6des par des ressortissants allemands residant en Allemagne
et non ceux possedes par des ressortissants allemands residant a 1'etranger. Dans celle eva­
luation, le montanl des avoirs consistant en valeurs mobilieres est determine d'apres la
valeur nominate en mark-or de ces valeurs.
II.
-
P E R I O D E DE GUERRE.
a. Exc6de.it des importations et avances de 1'Allemagne a ses Allies.
Les difficultes qua rencontrees 1'Allcmagne pour assurer ses exportation pendant la
guerre, ainsi que les efforts persistants quelle a deployes pour accroitre ses importations
par lous les moyens possibles et assurer ainsi les besoins de ses armees, ont eu naturel­
lement pour consequence de produire un excident d'importation, qui a d6passe considera­
blement les chiffres du deficit normal davant-guerre. II faut ajouter a ce deficit de la
balance du commerce exterieur propre de 1'Allemagne, les sommes que 1'AUemagne a
avancees a ses allies pour leur permettre de solder leurs importations, sommes pour lesquclles
1'Allemagne n'a recu aucun service correspondont. Les chilTres qui ont ele indiques pour
ces deux postes peuvent etre consideres comme acceptables; ils forment ensemble, sous
reserve des considdrations developpees au paragraphe c, un total de 15,2 milliards de
mark-or.
I. -
ASSETS ABROAD IN 1 9 1 4 .
The value of German assets abroad in 191/1 has been estimated by different economists at
sums varying between 20 and 35 milliard gold marks. Beside these unofficial estimates two
estimates ofan official nature, as well as a census, have been made by die German Government.
The earlier of these two official estimalesis that made in 1905 by the Imperial Admiralty; the
later one was supplied by the German Government in 1 92/1 in reply to a question raised by
the Second Committee of Experts. The census, which only covered securities, was made
by the German Government during the war, in August 1916.
In the question put to the German Government the Committee not only asked for an esti­
mate of the foreign assets held by German nationals in 191/1, but also requested it to submit
its comments on the various estimates already made by German economists.
All these documents — estimates of German economists, and those of neutral, Allied and
Associated countries, official estimates and census, and the replies ofthe German Govern
ment —- have been examined and compared. Taking into account all the factors of valua­
lion, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the figure of 28 milliard gold marks
may be accepted as representing the value of German assets abroad at the time of the de­
claration of war, it being understood that this figure of 28 milliards comprises only the
assets abroad belonging to German nationals residing in Germany and not those belon­
ging to German nationals residing abroad. In this estimate securities have been taken at
I heir face value in gold marks.
II.
-
PERIOD OF THE
WAR.
(a) Surplus of imports and Germany's advances to her Allies.
The difficulty encountered by Germany in'exporting her goods during the war, as well
as her persistent endeavours to increase her imports by every possible means, in order to
provide for the requirements of her armies, naturally produced a surplus of imports, consider­
ably in excess of the figures of the normal pre-war deficit. To this deficit in Germany's
foreign trade balance must be added the sums advanced by Germany to her Allies
1o enable them to pay for their imports, for which she received no corresponding return.
J he figure indicated for these two items may be considered to be reliable andamounts to
an aggregate sum of i 5.2 milliard gold marks, subject to the modifications referred to in
paragraph (c);
6. Depreciation des avoirs strangers d'avant-guerre,
mesures de sequestre et de liquidation.
Des estimations de la reduction quont subie, au cours de la guerre, les avoirs alie­
mands a fetranger du fait de la depreciation, ont ete faites par des economistes divers dont
ies ohiffres sont generalement bases sur un total suppose des avoirs allemands en 1914 de
2 0 a 2 5 milliards de niark-or. Leurs estimations semblent trop basses si on prend pour
base le chiffre de 2 8 milliards de mark-or que le Comite a adopte pour les avoirs
allemands a Fetranger en 1 9 1 / 1 . Cotte impression est confirmee dailleurs par les informations
que le Comite a recueilliesjiar ses investigations propres.
II n'est pas possible, dautre part, de fixer des cbiffres definitifs pour determiner la valcur
des avoirs qui out ele saisis et liquides dans les Pays Allies et Associes. Sur la base des inlor­
mations que le Comite a obtenues des Gouvernements des nations alliees et associees
ainii que de fAIIemagne, le Comite a pu estimer la reduction quont subie les avoirs
allemands a fetranger au cours de la periode de guerre par suite de la depreciation et des
mesures de liquidation et de sequestre a environ 16,1 milliards de mark-or. On ne tient
compte dans ce cbiffre ni de futilisation qui a pu etre faite de certains avoirs allemands 11
Fetranger pour couvrir le payement d'importations, ni de 1'accroissement qu'ont pu subir
les avoirs altemands a fetranger par faccumulalion des interets produits par ces avoirs. Ces
difierents posies sont traites separement. Le chiffre foumi represente par consequent une
reduction nette des avoirs allemands a fetranger, pour laquelle fAIIemagne n'a rien recu en
echange. Ces avoirs ont subi, au cours de 1 a periode qui a suivi les hostilites, une nouvelle
diminution de valeur dont il a ete tcnu compte.
Enfin ie Comite a considere que, aussi bien au cours cle la guerre que depuis la guerre, la
categoric des avoirs en pays neutres avait aussi subi une certaine depreciation, quen particu­
lier la plus grande partie des valeurs mbbilieres etrangeres non depreciees, detenues par les
Allemands, ne possedait plus quune valeur inferieure a leur valeur nominale en, meme en
tenant compte des effets de fa depreciation de for.
c. Benefices realises par 1'AUemagne dans les Territoires occupes.
Un examen des mesures economiques prises par f Allemagne en Belgique durant la guerre,
mesures sur lesquelles Fattention du Comite a ete attiree, a montre que fAIIemagne a retire
des benefices importants de fexploitation des -territoires occupes. Le Comile, en conse­
quence, s'est livre a une elude approfondie non seulement des operations effectuees par
1'AUemagne en Belgique et dans le Nord de la France, mais aussi de celles qui ont ete
entreprises en Pologne et en Roumanie.
LeCdmite a laisse de cote toutes les mesures de caractpre purcment militaire, comme par
exemple les prelevements.destines a assurer en partie la suhsistance des troupes allemandes
daceupation. Mais,m^me en ecartantces elements, it a trouve: que les profits que 1'AUemagne
a realises, par requisitionsou autrement, tdansies. territoiresi oceup^sse rattachent au probleme
dn deficit desa balance coinmerciale. En s'aidant de documentsofficiels allemands, notam­
ment d,e rapports de 1'Adminislfl'ation mililaire. etablis pendaat la guerre et des Memoires
allemands sur fevaluation des dommages de guerre, le Comit6 a pu constater que les profits
realises par f Allemagne ont ete obtenus principalement de la maniere expliquee ci-apres :
L'Allemagne s'est assure la possession, dans les territoires occupes, d'importantes quantites
(J) Depreciation of pre-war foreign assets;
1
sequestration and liquidation measures.
Various estimates ofthe reduction in German assets abroad during the war as a result of
depreciation have been made by several economists, whose figures are generally based on
an estimated total of from 2 0 to 2 5 milliard gold marks for German assets in 1 9 1 / 1 .
Their estimates seem too low, if we take as a basis the figure of 2 8 milliards adopted by
the Committee for German assets abroad in 191 h. This impression is moreover confirmed by
information which the Committee has obtained by its own investigation.
It is impossible to adopt a definite figure in determining the value of the assets seized
and liquidated in the Allied and Associated countries. On the basis of information obtain­
ed by the Committee from the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers as
well as from Germany, the Committee has been able to estimate at approximately
1 C1.1 milliard gold marks the reduction in German assets abroad during the war, as a result
of depreciation and liquidation and sequestration measures. In adopting this figure no
allowance has been made for the fact that certain German assets abroad may have been
utilised to cover the payment of imports,, nor for the fact that German assets abroad may
have increased owing to the accumufation of the interest accruing on these assets. These
several items are discussed elsewhere. The above figure therefore represents a net
reduction in German assets abroad for which Germany during the war period received no
return. These assets underwent a further decrease in value during the period following
hostilities, which decrease was taken into account.
Lastly, the Committee is of opinion that both during and since the war, the category of
assets in neutral countries has likewise undergone a reduction in value, and that in
particular the greater part of such securities held by Germans has 110 longer a value equi­
valent to their face value, even taking: into account the effect of the decline in the value of
gold.
(c) Profits realised by Germany in Occupied Territories.
An examination of German economic measures taken in Belgium during, the war, to
which the attention of the Committee was called,, suggested that substantial profits had
accrued to Germany from the exploitation, of occupied territories. Consequently, the Com­
mittee has made a careful study covering not only German operations in Belgium and
Northern France, hut also those in Poland and Roumania.
No attention has been paid to the purely military aspects of these operations, such as, for
instance, requisitions intended to provide for the partial subsistence of the German
occupying troops. Quite apart from such matters, however, it was found that the
profits realised by Germany by requisitions and by other methodsin occupied territories are
closely connected with the deficit ofthe German balance of trade. With the help of German
official documents, in particular reports by the military administration drawn up during the
war and German memoranda estimating the value of war damages, the Committee has
ascertained that the profits realised by Germany were principally obtained as'follows :
Germany obtained in occupied territories considerable quantities of commodities which
dc denrees et produits divers qui, a 1'intervention de societfo centrales dimportation specia­
lement creees a cette fin, lurent transported en Allemagne pour sa consommation intc­
rieure. La plus grande partie de ces marchandises, ou bien n'ont pas &1& payees, ou n'ont etc
payees qu'en mark-papier abandonn6s ensuite dans le pays (6 milliards de mark-papier en
Belgique), ou enfin n'ont ete soldees quegrace a des emissions de monnaie de papier locale.
Ces emissionsdevaient en effet, suivant Une declaration del'Etat-Major allemand, avoir nolam­
ment pour objet de permettre a TAIlemagne et a ses allies de recevoir, dune maniere
gratuite, pendant toute la periode des hostilites, des marchandises en provenance des icrri­
toires occupds.
LAllemagne a pu £galement se procurer, soit par requisition, soit par echange oontre des
mark-papier ou de la monnaie locale, des quantites notables de monnaie du pays envalii.
Ainsi., dans le Nord dela France, les autoritds militaires allemandes surimposerenl les villes
damendes et de contributions en exigeant le payement en argent allemand, monnaies d'or
ou billets dela Banque de France.
Enfin, des valeurs etrangeres ont ete acquises par 1'Allemagne, notamment a Fintervention
des sequestres, sp6cialement en Belgique et en France, sous la forme de litres, coupons et
autres*cr,edits. Elles ont servi pour partie comme les billets de banque ci-dessus mentionnes,
a payer les importations en provenance des pays neutres voisins.
A signaler egalement que lorsque la Centrale allemande des charbons en Belgique donnait
des licences d'exportation de charbon pour la Hollande, la Suisse ou la Suede, 1'autorite
allemande gardait a son profit les devises etrangeres en resultant et imposait aux charbon­
nages 1'obligation de recevoir des mark-papier.
Le Comite a retenu le chiffre de 5,7 a 6 milliards de mark-or comme representant
ceux des benefices que fAllemagne a pu retircr de fexploitation de la Belgique, duNord
dela France, de la Pologne, de la Lithuanie, de la Roumanie, etc., qui represented des
importations, pourlesquelles aucun payement n'a 6te effectue etqui, par consequent, ifont
pas alfecte dcifavorablement la balance de ses comptes.
d. Ventes d'or et de valeurs mobilieres allemandes.
Les ventes dor et de valeurs mobilieres pendant les annees de guerre comptent parnii
les principaux moyens auxquels 1'Allemagne a eu recours .pour assurer le payement de ses
importations. Ces exportations dor, qui ont eu lieu principalement au cours. des premieres
annees de guerre, se sont elevees a une somme totale de I milliard de mark-or.
- En ce qui concerne les valeurs mobilieres allemandes, les evaluations relatives au produit
de leur venle ont varie sensiblement. On peut affirmer toutefois cpre le chillre total nest
pas eloigne de i milliard de mark-or.
.e. Revenus des avoirs allemands a 1'etranger.
Les revenus que rAllemagne retirait de ses avoirs a fetranger, ont diminue considera­
blement aussitdt apres la.declaration de guerre et ont subi de nouvelles reductions au coins
des hostilites.
11 y a lieu.de remarquer, en effet, queles avoirs que 1'Allemagne possedait dans les pays
en guerre avec elle ont cesse de produire aucun interfit i son profit. Certains de ces avoirs
ont du dtre vendus au cours de la guerre, d'autres ont subi des depreciations qui, a Is '
de la guerre, sont devenues tres importantes.
m
ihrough the operation of centralised importing companies specially created for this­
purpose, were transported to Germany for internal consumption. Most of these goods
were either not paid for at all, or were paid for in paper marks which were subsequently
left in the country and amounted in the case of Belgium to six milliard paper marks, or were
purchased through the medium of issues of local paper currency. The special object of­
such issues, according to a statement by the German Staff, was to enable Germany and
her Allies to receive goods from occupied territories free of charge during the whole­
period of hostilities.
By requisition or in exchange for paper marks or local currency, Germany also obtained
considerable quantities of the currency of invaded countries. Thus in the north of France
the German military authorities imposed on towns fines and levies for which payment was­
required in German money, gold coin, or notes of the Bank of France.
Finally, foreign assets were acquired by Germany, specially in Belgium and France,,
notably by means of sequestration of securities, coupons and other credits, and these, like
the banknotes mentioned above, served in part to pay for imports from neighbouring
neutral countries.
It must also be pointed out. that when the German Coal Centrale in Belgium issued export
licenses for coal for Holland, Switzerland, or Sweden, the German authority kept for itself
the foreign currency thus obtained, and forced the mines to accept paper marks.
The Committee has adopted the figure of from 5.7 to 6 milliard gold marks as­
corresponding to that portion of the profits derived from this exploitation of Belgium
Northern France, Poland, Lithuania, Roumania, etc., representing imports for which no­
payment was made and which in consequence had not been allowed for in her balance o f
accounts.
(d)
Sale of gold and German securities.
The sale of gold and securities was the principal means whereby Germany paid for her
imports during the war. The export of gold, which took place mainly during the early
years of the war, reached a total amount of one milliard gold marks.
As regards German securities, widely diverging estimates have been made ofthe amounts,
sold. In our opinion the total figure is not far from one milliard gold marks.
( e ) Return from German assets abroad.
The revenue which Germany derived from her assets abroad was very considerably dimin­
ished immediately after the declaration of war and further reductions occurred during the
period of hostilities.
It should indeed be noted that interest ceased to be paid on the assets held by Germany­
in countries with which she was at war. Some of these assets were sold during the war and.
the depreciation of others became very marked towards the end.
Par-contre, les valeurs industrielles, notamment dans les pays neutres, ont continue a
-produire des revenus, souvent im&me plus eleves quiavantia(guerre. --Si, en definitive, le -Comite n'a pas et6 a m6me ide determiner d'une maniere exacte
- quelles variations ont subies pour chaque -annee de guerre les reveaus des avoirs allemands
-a 1'dtranger, il lui a cependant ete possible ide fixer une evaluation qui, a. son ;avis, se rap­
proche sensiblement des chiffres exacts.
III. -
PERIODE D'APRES
GUERRE.
a. Excedent des importations
et payements en especes de 1'Allemagne en vertu du Traite de paix.
Une dcs. causes principales qui, au cours de la periode dapres guerre ont contribue a
ireduire 1'aclil deTAllemagne.a letrajager, aietela nfeessite dans laquelle celfe-ci -s-esttrouvee
placee de couvrir le deficit de sa baiance commerciale et d'assurer les payements en especes
quelle avait a faire aux Allies en conformite avec les stipulations du Traite de Versailles.
Ces deux postes selevent ensemble a une somme de 9 a 1 o milliards de mark-or.
Ainsi quil a et6 indique dans le rapport, les cbiffres que fournit la statistique officieile
allemande du commerce exterieur, sont, pour certaines periodes, tout a fait inexacls,
specialement ceux cpi ont ete publies a forigine.
II a ete necessaire pour cette raison de refaire un cafcul complet de cliaque balance
annuelle. En tenant compte des facteurs divers qui entrent dans- le calcul, le Comite est
d'avis que cette revision de' chiffres a permis de se rapprocher du chiffre veritable de 1'exce­
dent des importations dune maniere plus sure que cela havait ete le cas dans les etudes
anterieures. La determination du deficit de la balance commerciale est tres importante,
car toute evaluation des avoirs aliemands subsistant k 1'etranger depend dans une mesuie
considerable de rimportance du chiffre du deficit commercial fmalement retenu.
Quant aux payements en especes faits par 1'Allemagne aux Allies (versements a la
-Commission des Reparations, produit du Reparation Recovery Act, versements aux Offices
de Compensation, etc,), ils ne donnentpas lieu a contestation.
b. Vente a des etrangers de mark en compte
et de billets de banque libelles en mark.,
L'Allemagne a pu acquerir des avoirs importants a l^tranger depuis 1'armislice par
"iouverture "dans ses banques de compte crediteurs en imark a -des etrangers. Ces
credits-ont etc payes par les etrangers dans la monnaie mi au taoyen de credits dautrc
;pays. Comme leur valeur reelle a silbi une diminution constante par suite de la-depreciation
.du mark, leconomie allemande a retire' de larges profits de ces transactions. Le Connte a
On the other hand,, the. industrial securities, particularly those of neutral countries contir
nued to pay interest at rales, frequently higher than before the- war.
While the Committee has been unable to determine exactly the variations for each­
year ofthe war in the revenue derived: from German assets abroad, it has at least been­
able to make: an estimate which may be taken as very nearly accurate.
III.
-
POST-WAR
PERIOD.
(a) Surplus of imports and cash payments made by Germany
under the Peace Treaty.
One of the main causes of the reduction of German assets abroad during the post-war period '
arose from the necessity for Germany to cover the deficit in her trade balance and to meet
the cash payments which:had to be made to the Allies under the Treaty of Versailles. These
two items together amount to between g and 1 o milliard gold marks.
1
As already stated in the report, the figures given in the official German foreign' trade­
statistics are quite inaccurate for certain periods. This observation applies particularly
to the figures originally published.
For this reason, it was necessary to revise completely the balance given for every year.
Taking into account the various factors entering into the calculation, the Committee­
is of opinion that this- revision- has made it possible to reach a figure more nearly equal to
the actual excess of imports than had been the case in- previous reports dealing with this
question. The fixing of the amount of the deficit in the trade balance is of true importance
since any valuation that is to- be made of German assets remaining abroad largely depends­
on the figure finally adopted for that deficit.
The cash payments made by Germany to the Allies — to the Reparation Commission,,
under the Reparation Recovery Act, payments to the Clearing Office, etc. — do not give
rise to dispute.
(b)
Sale to foreigners of mark credits and banknotes.
Germany has acquired foreign assets in large volume since the Armistice through opening
credit accounts in her banks for the benefit of foreigners. These credits were paid for by
the foreigners in the money or credits.of other countries, and as they underwent a constant
shrinkage in real value through the depreciating, value of the mark, German economy pro­
lited largely from the transactions.: The Committee made a careful, study of the values so­
fait une evaluation approfondie des sommes qui ont 6te" ainsi acquises, en examinant, avec
1'aide d'experts-comptables, les comptes-crediteurs en mark que les etrangers ont possedes
dans les principales banques allemandes' pendant les.annees dapres-guerre.
II a etc trouve que, pendant cette periode de cinq ans, il y avait eu dans les banques
allemandes plus d u n million de comptes individuels d'6trangers. Dans la plupart des cas,
les credits en mark portesa ces comptes, n'ayant pas etd utilises immediatement,ontsubi un
processus de diminution constante par suite de la depreciation du mark et se sont finale­
.ment evanouis.
Lenquete effectuee par lesexperts-comptablespour le compte du Comite a eu pour objet
de determiner, d'une maniero aussi approchee que possible, la somme totale representant la
diminution de valeur subie du cbef de la depreciation du mark par ces nombreux comptes.
A cet eflet, les directeurs des principales banques allemandes ont ete pries dmdiquer, dapres
leurs livres, les sommes representant ies soldes debiteurs ou crdditeurs des comptes detran­
.gers a lafinde chaque mois, de lafinde i 918 a lafinde 1 923.
11 a ete possible, en operant dapres les changes du moment la conversion en mark-or
-des sommes ainsi indiquees, de determiner dune maniere aussi approchee que possible la
iotalite des gains qui ont ainsi ete realises par 1'ensemble de 1'economie allemande. Les
chiffres fournis par les banques ont 6te sounds a un controle rigoureux jjar les experts­
'Comptables et il a ete reconnu quils avaient ete etablis correctement. Ces credits en mark ont ete achetes par des ressortissants de nombreuses nations; toute­
tfbis le plus grand nombre a etepris en compte par des personnes appartenant a un nombre
relativement restreint de pays.
Les methodes utilisees pour determiner la valeur des avoirs etrangers acquis de cette
iinaniere par les banques allemandes ont ete soumises a une verification interessante. Cette
-methode a consiste a prendre le cornptedun etranger determine qui s'etait engage sur une
-echelle considerable dans des operations speculatives. On a' converti en valeur-or les cluffres
des transactions chaque jour oiz une ecriture etait passee soit au debit, soit au credit du
-compte. II est apparu que ce procede detaille de conversion donnait des resultats sensible­
ment equivalents a ceux trouves par les methodes massives plus generales quil avait ete
necessaire d'ernployer afin dobtenir les chiffres applicables a 1'ensemble de 1'Allemagne.
Quand cette longue enqufite a ete entierement terminee, il a ete trouve que 1'Allemagne
avait retire dela vente des credits en mark, par suite de la depreciation du mark, un profit
selevant a 7 ou 8 milliards de mark-or. Dautre part, le Comite a estime quo la vente
-dans les pays etrangers de billets de banque libelles en mark a assure a 1'Allemagne des
profits s'eieyant a 600 ou 700, millions de mark-or. Le total des deux postes — vente de
credits en banque et vente de billets de banque libelles en mark — represente ainsi une
somme comprise entre 7,6 et 8,7 milliards de mark-or.
c. Ventes d'or.
LAUemagne a effectue, notamment en 1919, 1921 et 1923, des exportations dor
importantes. Ces exportations ont fait 1'objet de statistiques officielles, dont 1'exaclitude
in'e9t pas contestee; elles s'elevent i u n milliard et-demi de mark-or.
-
13
­
acquired by an investigation, with the aid of expert accountants, of the mark credit balances
on foreign account in the principai banks of Germany during the post-war years.
It was found that there had been during this five-year, period more than a million
individual accounts of this kind. In most cases the mark credits of these accounts had
not been immediately utilised and had undergone a -process of shrinkage through the
depreciation of mark values that amounted to a veritable evaporation.
The work of the expert accountants was directed to determine as nearly as possible the
aogregate amount of the shrinkages in these very numerous accounts that was clue to the
depreciation ofthe value of the mark. With this end in view the leading banks in Germany
were asked to transcribe from their books the data showing the credit balances and the
amounts of debits in the accounts of all foreigners at the close of each month from the
end of 1 9 1 8 to the end of 1 9 2 3 .
After the sums indicated had been converted to gold equivalents at the current rate of
exchange, it was possible to draw close inferences as to the total gains accruing to German
economy as a whole. The data furnished by the banks were submitted to careful checking
by the expert accountants, and it was found that they had been correctly compiled.
Credits in German marks were purchased by the citizens of a great many nations, but the
largest amounts were taken by the citizens of a relatively restricted group of countries.
The methods used in determining the value of the assets acquired by the German banks
in this way were subjected to an interesting check which consisted of taking a single account
of a foreigner who had engaged in speculative operations on a considerable scale, and con­
verting the figures of the transactions to a gold basis for every day on which any debit or
credit entry was recorded. The results indicated 'that there was no tendency for this
detailed method of conversion to yield results materially different from those found by the
more general mass methods that it was necessary to employ in computing the figures for
Germany as a whole.
When the whole enquiry, which was of considerable length, had been completed it
was found that Germany had profited by the sale of mark credits by an amount of from
seven to eight milliards of gold marks. In addition the sale of paper marks in foreign coun­
tries had resulted in profits amounting to from 6 0 0 to 7 0 0 millions of gold marks, or a
total from these two sources of 7.6 to 8.7 milliards of gold marks.
(c) Sales of gold.
German official statistics record sales abroad by Germany principally in the years 1 9 1 9 ­
192 i and 1 9 2 3 of goid to a total amount of 1 1/2,milliard gold marks. The accuracy of
these figures is not disputed.
1
d. Ventes de proprietes immobilieres et de valeurs mobilieres allemandes.
, Au cours de la periode marquee par la depreciation rapide du mark, les ventes de pro­
prietes immobilieres a des personnes etrangeres ont pris en Allemagne un developpement
inusite.
Le Comite a eu a sa disposition, pour evaluer le produit des ventes ainsi faites, un cer­
tain nombre de statistiques indiquant de maniere precise le nombre et le montant des ventes
de proprietes immobilieres faites a des etrangers depuis la guerre dans quelques-unes des
principales villes allemandes ainsi que dans cles regions de caracteres economiques varies.
Quant aux valeurs mobilieres allemandes, 1'Allemagne a eu la possibility, pendant la pre­
miere partie de la periode dapres-guerre, de vendre sur les marches etrangers une ceriaine
quantite de ces valeurs; mais des que la situation financiere de 1'Allemagne devint plus
incertaine, ces operations se trouverent en grande partie arrdtees.
Au total, le Comite estime que les ventes a des etrangers de proprietes immobilieres
et de valeurs mobilieres allemandes se sont elevees a une somme d'environ 1 milliard 1/2
de mark-or.
e. D6penses des etrangers voyageant en Allemagne
et des Allemands voyageant a 1'etranger.
Pendant les cinq annees qui se sont ecoulees depuis 1'armistice, des sommes considerables
ont ete depensees en Allemagnc par un grand nombre cfctrangers qui ont voyage ou sejourne'
dans le pays. devaluation des depenses faites par"ces voyageurs nous a ete facilitee paries
statistiques officielles etahlies par les plus grandes villes allemandes ainsi que par letude
particuiiere de la question fournie par le Gouvernement allemand. Le Comite a pu se faire
une idee assez exacte du nombre des voyageurs etrangers venus en Allemagne pendant la
periode consideVee, de la duree moyenne de leur sejour et des depenses journalieres de
chaque voyageur.
Par contre, surtout pendant les deux ou trois dernieres annoes, de nombreuX voyageurs
allemands, appartenant surtout aux classes les plus riches de la population, ont sejourne
dans des pays etrangers. Leurs depenses viennent en deduction de celles indiquees ci-dessus
et reduisent tres serieusement 1'importance des avoirs aliemands realises par cette voie.
/ . Depenses des armies d'occupation.
Pendant les annees dapres-guerre, une certaine somme est"revenue k l'AHemagne du fait
des depenses elTectuees en devises etrangeres ou en mark achetes avec des devises etrangeres
par les troupes doccupalion en territoire allemand.
Chacun des Gouvernements ayant ou ayant eu une armee d'occupation en Allemagne
a soumis au Comitd une evaluation detaillee des depenses ainsi definies qui ont ete effecluees
par les officiers et soldats ou par les services.des troupes. Ces evaluations onl ete controlees
de diverses manieres par un ensemble de calculs correspondaut au mode de presentation
adopte par chaque armee. Les resultats de ces calculs ont ete combines.
cj.
Recettes provenant des operations de fret, d'assurance, de transit, etc.
Les recettes provenant des operations de fret, d'assurance,.de transit et des commissions
diverses reprdsentaient pour 1'Allemagne avant 1914 une source importante de revenus.
Pendant la guerre ces sources de profits ont en grande parlie disparu. Durant les cinq annees
a
' (d)
Sales of German real property and German securities.
During the period characterized by the rapid depreciation of the mark, sales of real pro­
perty to foreigners reached an unwonted development in Germany.
fn estimating the proceeds of such sales., the Committee had before it various statistics
indicating in detail the number and amount of sales of real property to foreigners since
the war in some of the principal towns of Germany, and also in districts of varying econ­
omic character.
As regards securities, Germany was, able during the first part of the post-war period to
market some of her securities abroad but as soon as her financial position became more un­
certain, most of these transactions were suspended. In the aggregate, the Committee considers that sales of German real property and
securities to foreigners amounted to about 1 1 /a milliard gold marks.
(e).
Expenditure by foreigners travelling in Germany
and b y Germans travelling abroad.
During the five years which have elapsed since the Armistice, considerable sums have
been spent in Germany by large numbers of foreigners who have travelled and lived in the
country. Our estimate of the expenditure by these travellers was facifitated by the official
statistics kept by the largest German towns and by the special report on the subject supplied
by the German Government. The Committee r,wa's able to obtain a fairly exact idea of the
number of foreigners who came to Germany during the period in cpiestion, the average
length of their stay and the daily expenditure of each traveller.
As against this, numerous German travellers belonging mostly to the wealthier classes
have stayed in foreign countries, especially in the last 2 or 3 years. Their expenditure has
to be deducted from the expenditure by foreigners in Germany referred to above, and very
considerably reduces the amount of the German assets realised from that source.
(/')
Expenditure by armies of occupation.
During the post-war period, a certain sum has been realised by Germany through the
expenditure in foreign currency, or, in marks bought with foreign currency, by the troops
occupying German territory.
Each; of the Governments having or having had armies of occupation in Germany has
supplied the Committee with a detailed estimate of the expenditure made by the officers
and men or by the various army services. These estimates were checked in several ways
by a series of calculations relating to each armys different methods. The results of these
different calculations have been combined.
((/) Earnings from shipping, insurance, transit, etc.
Earnings from shipping, insurance; commissions, transit, were an important source of
German income prior to 1 9 1 4 , but during the war such earnings in great measure disap­
peared. In the five years 1 9 1 9 - 2 3 some of the lost ground has been regained, particularly
dapres-guerre, une parlie du terrain perdu a ete reconquise, notamment dans le domaine
de la navigation maritime et des assurances. Le Comite a tenu compte de ces divers ele­
ments
h. Revenus des placements allemands a Fetranger et des placements strangers
en Allemagne; remises faites par les Allemands r£sidant a 1'Stranger.
Le montant des revenus quont produits les avoirs allemands a 1'elranger depuis igig est
naturellement tres inferieur a celui que rapportaient les avoirs allemands a 1'etraneer
avant. la guerre. Les avoirs que 1'Allemagne possede a fetranger depuis la guerre, ne repre­
sententplus, en effet, quune fraction r£duite, et, pour une part, unproductive, des avoirs
davant guerre. II reste vrai par ailleurs qUe les payements que 1'Allemagne a eu a effectuer
deguis 1 9 1 9 pour remunerer les valeurs allemandes possedfe par des etrangers ont ete peu
importants. Apres une 6tude attentive de la question,.le Comite a et6 amene a penser que
la balance des deux postes — revenu des placements allemands a Fetranger et revenu des
placements etrangers en AHemagne — se traduisait par un leger soldo en faveur de 1'Alle­
magne pour Fensemble de la periode dapres guerre.
Les remises faites en AHemagne, par des ressortissants allemands residant a Fetranger, ou
par des personnes ayant avec des Allemands des relations de lamille et de sympathie selevent
a un chiffre considerable en faveur de 1'Allemagne.
1. Biens priv^s allemands dans les territoires transfe"res.
La plupart des evaluations concernant les biens allemands a Fetranger nont pas tenu
compte de la valeur des biens prives allemands dans les territoires transferes de Silesie, de
Posnanie, de Dantzig, etc.
Ces biens rentrent dans notre evaluation dans la mesure ou, conformdment a la definition
adoptee par le Gomite, ils sont possedes par des Allemands r£sidant en Allemagne. Bien
quil soit tres difficile de determiner avec quelque precision 1'importance des biens ainsi
consideres, le Comite n'a pas cru devoir cependant ecarter de son evaluation certains avoirs
industriels, notamment en Haute-Silesie.
:
j.
Billets de banque Strangers en Allemagne.
II existe en Allemagne une quantite importante de billets de banque etrangers (dollars,
florins, couronnes scandinaves, francs suisses, livres sterling, et, plus specialement dans les
Territoires occupes, francs francais et beiges). Les conditions exceptionnelles dans fesquelles
s'est trouve le mark ont amene les Allemands, toutes les fois que cela leur ete possible,
a acquerir des moyens de payement a valeur stable; ces operations ont ete realisees sur
une grande dchelle. Les billets se sontmaintenus dans le pays, au lieu de regagner letranger
par la voie normale du commerce, comme cela aurait eu lieu dans des circonstances ordinaires.
Diverses estimations du montant de ces billets ont ete faites en Allemagno, particulieremenl
vers la fin de 1'annee 1 9 2 3 . Le Comite a compare ces divers chiffres avec les informations
quil a recueillies tant en Allemagne qu'a Fetranger. A son avis, la valeur des billets de
banque etrangers existant en Aliemagne a la fin de 1'annee 1 9 2 3 s'elevait a 1,2 milliards de
mark-or environ.
in the field of shipping and insurance, and the Committee has taken this item into
account.
(A) Income from German investments abroad and foreign investments in Germany.
Remittances made by Germans residing abroad.
The total amount of the income produced by German assets abroad since 1 g 1 g is of
course substantially below that produced by German assets abroad before the war. The
assets held abroad by Germany since the war represent indeed only a small and for some part
unproductive fraction of her pre-war holdings. It is true, on the other hand, that the
payments which Germany has had to make since 191 g in respect of German securities
held by foreigners have been inconsiderable. After a careful study of the question, the
Committee came to the conclusion that a set-off of the two items — income from German
investments abroad and income from foreign investments in Germany — resulted in a small
balance in Germany's favour for the whole ofthe post-war period.
The remittances sent to Germany by German nationals residing abroad and German
connections and sympathisers amount to a considerable figure in Germanys favour.
(z) German private property in ceded territories.
Most of the valuations of German property abroad have taken little or no account of the
value of German private property.in the ceded territories of Silesia, Posen, Danzig, etc.
These properties are included in our own estimate in so far as, according to the definition
adopted by the Committee, they are owned by Germans residing in Germany. Although
it is very difficult to determine with any precision the extent of these properties, the
Committee considered that it should not exclude from its valuation certain industrial assets,
particularly those in Upper Silesia.
(J)
Foreign banknotes in Germany.
There is in Germany a large quantity of foreign bank notes (dollars, florins, Scandinavian
crowns, Swiss francs, pounds sterling, and more especially in the occupied territory,
Bel gian and French francs). The exceptional plight ofthe German mark has influenced
Germans in acquiring stable currencies wherever possible and on a large scale. These
foreign notes have remained in the country instead of finding their way abroad again through
the normal channel of trade, as would have been the case in ordinary circumstances..
Various estimates ofthe total amount of such notes were made in Germany, particularly
towards the end of i g 2 3 . The Committee has compared the different estimates with the
information which it collected in Germany and other countries. In its opinion, the value
ofthe foreign notes existing in Germany at the end of 1 g a 3 amounted to about 1.2 milliard
gold marks.