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T g S DOCUMENT I S THE PROKHTY 01 H I S BRITAKKIC MAJESTY ^ OOvTSRlTKBLTg )
1
3 3 0 R E T .
i.P. 288
OOPY HO. ( 3 C)
(27).
C A B I N E T .
) /
IRAQ;
NEGOTIATIONS FOR TREATY R E V I S I O N .
MSKORAITDPM BY 3?H3 AO T i l l G SECRETARY OP STATS FOR TEE
"COLONIES.
At
I
the Cabinet meeting
made a b r i e f
the
revision
which
shows
of
the Anglo-Iraq
that
It
King Feisal
issue
obtain
were
tender
and h i s
tv;ofold,
ana
advice
I
the
(2)
obvious
It
last
is
the
(1)
of
right
of
on a l l
this
the
former
broken
but
question
prepared
We c o u l d
Jeisal
(2)
to meet
the
not
to
independence"
Government
i n my
either
(l)
offer
that
that
to
statement
have
also
remains
56 ( 2 7 ) ,
would
before
concessions
the n e g o t i a t i o n s
their
actually
point.
alternatives
further
-I­
the"complete
King P e i s a l
a new a g r e e m e n t
take
(/ C a b i n e t
viz.,
advice
on t h i s
two o b v i o u s
to
at
matters^
point
of
are
and a l l o w m a t t e r s
"complete
certain
our v i e w s
fact
with
of King P e i s a l
discxissions
There
the
deadlock.
t h e main p o i n t s
point,
the
w i t h a viev; t o k e e p i n g
face
a
Dobbs
discussions
desire
latter
that
is
for
wesko
on t h e
and i t
the
important
of Iraq
unsettled,
reached
the B r i t i s h
independence"
down;
in
viz.,
mentioned
Cabinet
early
that
to Iraq
the n e g o t i a t i o n s
have
Ministers
the
November-^
treaties.
the n e g o t i a t i o n s
became
16th
a memorandum b y S i r H e n r y
trea.ty r e c o g n i t i o n
o f Iraq.,
on t h e
statement regarding
I now c i r c u l a t e
to
228
is
to
us.
King
alive,
or
impracticable
course.
Conclusion 5 .
be
As r e g a r d s
that
the
only the n o n i n a l
without
are
obvious.
held,
might be
if
the
beyond
point
is
be
in return
for
in
regard
advice..
to
we f a l l
existing
treaties,
chance
of
league
which I
for
in
to
In
the
It
is
for
it
In
even
after
period,
This
place,
only
of our
views
is
the
of which,
thus regulate
and
p l a c e we
I r a q had
is
any
could
upon
first
some p o r t i o n s
at
lose
any
entered
ho
Anglo-Iraqi
is
a great
a point
deal
to
of
various difficulties
return
could
not
to'Iraq
in
contemplate
that,
the
Garrison which had
the
to
decide
are
a
the P r i t i s h
Cabinet
rate,
the
t h e High Commissioner warns u s
conditions,
between
been
the
alternativesIf
the
second
desirable
that
should be
presented
the
least
the
alternative
failure
tc
for
the
to
is
conclude
the public
unfavourable
responsibility
peg
difficulty
r
of
case.
alternative
second
follov; EIng j ? l e s a l s
those
proposed.
in
tho
it
of nations
the
in
has
documents.
by Iraq
second
mood", a n d
of Iraq
acceptance
and would
the
The
other
siirrendered,
But,
force
furthea? r e d a c t i o n
two
of
seen
independence
'complete" which,
know t h a t Mr. A n e r y a t t a c h e s
discontented
given
etc.
:
and
the league
facts
an i n d e f i n i t e
importance.
likely
to
to be
If
word
back w i t h o u t
of Hations
relations
the
a treaty
would continue
"independence"
the
complete
adopted,
the
for
would
the Zing.
Treaties
xmaeeeptable
goes altogether
case,
in
it
of "complete
satisfy
The
a l r e a d y been r e c o g n i s e d
the King p r o s s e s
alternative,
recognition
qnnlificataon,would
objections
But
former
light.
defence
on w h i c h t o h a n g a s u i t a b l e
followed,
a new
it
treaty
b o t h h o x ' s ancl i n
The q u e s t i o n
of Iraq affords
announcement.
is
Iraq
of
a
convenient
This
question may "be said to be the seed from which all the
difficulties in regard to treaty revision sprang..
It
was the British Governments decision last year that Iraq
must accept, as from August 1928, full responsibility for
her oral defence that first gave King Poisal the pretest
for raising the question of conscription and demanding
political concessions from us in order to render
conscription palatable..
It has nov; "been recognised that
wo shall, have to continue our military support to Iraq
after 1928 and Eing Jeisal has been so informed..
It is
therefore possible to argue that the basis upon which the
treaty discussions were inaugurated has been wholly
modified and consequently that the need for their
continuance has disappeared.
King i?eisal has himself
suggested that the public announcement on the subject
should take this form.
A draft announcement on these
lines is appended.
Colonial Office,
21st
November,
1927.
NOTE ON RESULTS OP THE BREAKING DOWN OP NEGOTIATIONS
V.TTH IRAQ, FOR A KEY.' TREATY.
By S i r
1.
The
present
sown i n two
1926,
in
vis;:
of
(a)
later
that
into
Iraq
termination
not
cf
the
than the
3
of
for
Iraq
was
of
His
the
King P e i s a l
inevitable,
the
year
of
(b)
1928 f u l l
1928 B r i t i s h
would be
alliance.
Great
willing
to
her
influence
by
Iraq
1928 of
her
not
internal
Iraq
In Iraq.
In
and f o r
could
continue
policy,
the
on tho
that
Government
Majesty's
secure
and would be
League
and t o
n
as
set
soon as
order
that
admission
of
Government
Iraq
to
January,
politicians
hope
that
the
for
the
with the
would use
League
of
for,
a
be
general
acceptance
her
Great
in
completely
would
finances
Britain
or
control
to
of,
get
respenslbIIitles
Treaty.
were
the
lS2So)
or e v e n
after
her
existing
frontiers
up i n a c c o r d a n c e
Britannic
and for
to r e t a i n her
security,
terminate
.
paragraph
thought,
g i v e n b y Mr. W i n s t o n
the
the
enjoy the benefits
they
in
of
forced by circumstances
undertaken by the
assurance
order
a confident
to
would
financial
Iraqi
responsibility
and i n t e r n a l
January,
consequent
(vide
of
pretend to retain responsibility
Into
1922,
alliance
They reasoned
defence
and t u t e l a g e
also
Britain,
complete
and
internal
of
been
should accept
conspicuously
w h i l e they would continue
British
Iraq
section
two p r o v i s i o n s
relaxed,
of
and the
Treaty
had b a s e d upon thr-se
control
having
question
aggression
attached to
and a l a r g e
the
military
the preservaticnof
Note
seeds
Treaty
Nations
that
foreign
for
Majesty, s Government
consideration
Treaty,'
its
Anglo-Iraq
League
against
of Explanatory
High Commissionor
Britannic
active
into
responsibility
defence,
crisis
provisions
1928 take
entry
Henry Dobhs,
They
Churchill
settled,
organic
their
relied
in
October,
and a
laws
stable
His
good o f f i c e s
King P e i s a l
to
rightly
wished
that
relations
desire
On t h e
discussion
of His
request
to the
admission of
Iraq
of
that
contentment
Majesty s
the
despatch
into
the
cannot
stay
press
classes,
not
to
those
we h a v e h a d i n
in
Iraq".
were
If
checked
now t h i s
and
they
I
atmosphere
change
soon experience
in
Iraq the
which she h a s had
to hear
political
do i n
power
classes
for mischief
tranqxiility.
striking
and
and t h e
aerodromes
5.
troops,
could not
-ould
disillusionment
clasoes
stxidents
King and h i s
us,
the
the
political
For
the
f a r more h e a v i l y
the
lawyers
only forces
tutelage
early
and E g y p t .
solid
the
from
of
whole
appear
in
po^er
-jould
left
to
for
be
Ministers
plotting
in
suspicious
assassinations
gviard
o\.;r
wavering-"
His Britannic
despatch
1928,
against
the
dreary
count
long time
and p a r a d i n g ,
Iraq
truth
release
hope
if
similar
would
Great B r i t a i n
India
t h a n do t h e
In no
intriguing
same
in
the
that
and t h a t
of
politically
alienated
and E g y p t
lost
am c o n v i n c e d
Iraqis
and d i f f i c u l t i e s
India
the
and
The
would be
for
admission
quiet
admission.
rapid process
enfranchisement,
would
press",
on
the
of
1927,
pressed
mainly
present
King,
suddenly
strongly
1928,
the
March,
confidence
early
v.e now d e c i d e d
which
to
the
the
IncLuding the
so
in
coincided
opened
as t h e y a r e ,
because
for her
I
dated 24th
League
in
Government.
Office
In which I
change
wish
1
Colonial
due m a i n l y t o
we s h a l l
minded
Britannic
deferred,
is
this anticipated
and h i s
Cabinet)
"thingo
Iraq being
that
of
to
in 1927;
i n my s e c r e t
(circulated
ground
as
should begin
with the
2.
discussions
and
in July,
propose
largely
Majesty's
the
because
1927,
Government
came
admission
this
to the
of
might be
Iraq
considered
my
conclusion
that
into
the
represented
League
by
they
in
Turkey
as
a non-fulfilment
assigned
to
but
t h e y would
that
Iraq
of
the
condition
on w h i c h Mosul
(i,e,/prolongation
promise
to
of B r i t i s h
propose her
was
tutelage)
admission
t
in
1932.
4.
During
the
three
months
o c c u p i e d by t h i s
there had been a rapid d e t e r i o r a t i o n
The King and h i s
favourites
Conscription Act,
army t o
support
purpose
of
(especially
get
securing
that
the
Britannic
promise
of
admission
of
Into the
grew
Impatient
pronouncement
!
friends
to
British
linos.
myself
I
left
to
delay
King s a i d
that,
British
proviso
suffice
tutelage
independence
He d e s i r e d
This
to
was t h e
both
and t h o
of
i n His
to
if
get
tutelage
The
discuss
the
course
King
Majesty s
1
cn
anti-
Ur* A m e r y
tour.,
that
by providing
League
in
there
should
for
relaxation
advance
nationalist
expressed
Majesty's
Iraq i n t o the
purposes
and
Before
His Britannic
which
his
Iraq Government
such a Treaty himself
alternative
by
and a l l o w e d
on h i s
and a c o n s p i c u o u s
by
an
Britannic
point
the
could
enthusiasm
1928.
started
for his
would p l a c a t e
Arab
King
Government
a n d o n my r e p o r t s
b e d r a w n u p a now T r e a t y w h i c h ,
of
in
between
Iraq the
would
a wave
League
he
would not
the
external
an a g i t a t i o n which developed
strained
big
conscription
Kurdish,
on t h i s
Relations
a
for
for
from B r i t i s h
me b e f o r e
It
early
o n l y way i n w h i c h h e
see
Government
1928,
begin
became
a desire
the
situation.
cheaply
for
Majesty's
release
at
an
ostensibly
create
immediate
Iraq
Iraq
amon^ t h e t r i b e s ,
p a s s e d was t o
Government s
but
Shiah Arabs)and
from Ills
obtain
The p r o p o s a l
to believe
very
to
t o "pass
responsibility
opposition
the
the Act
as
full
defence.
intense
professed
so
the monarchy,
taking/1928
and i n t e r n a l
aroused
really
wished
in the
discussion
a
towards
politicians.
in
I urged
London
e
o n Mr,. Amor:/
when I r e a c h e d
before
his
telegram
departure
stating
discussions
lines
purpose
of
to
London.
he
started
entirely
that
Iraq
tremendous
The
was
sma.ll
and he
of
allowed
returning
of
the
time
s o much a s
/
fall
Iraq
of
the
deferred
until
influenced
on the
obvious
was
the
mass
agitation
said
it
Cabinet
only
the
Iraq,
King and
Iraq
as
impossible
His B r i t a n n i c
treaty,
to
omit
Majesty's
to
Government
reports
inter-departmental
In the
feared
opposition
the
a
of
inhabitants
The
These
Ellington)
personally,
being
the
would be
Sir' Edward
the
against
Europe,-
(first
a relaxation
.
London
in
was r e p r e s e n t e d
course
of
waited
a
middle
King P ^ i s a l
was
of
in
intense
to
a provision that
to
re­
1S27.
the
Commissioners
harshal
would
and he had
t o bo g r o w i n g more
my r e t u r n
it
came
which
discussions
who d e s i r e d
proposed modifications
that
this
believed
in August,
King F e i s a l
that
the
King
lasted until
such r e l a x a t i o n .
c o n s c r i p t i o n and the
Shiahs
among t h e
of
The Arab p r e s s
Patriot
very hostile
and t h a t
t o be
with a treaty
from Baghdad e a r l y
adventurers
nothing
it
independence.
the Acti::g High
control
strength
the
agreed
inter-departmental
British
hand for
Government
was r e p r e s e n t e d
gang of
at
it
Majesty s
during which
it
the
Britannic
submitted reports
i n which
on
before
Mr. B o u r d i l l o n , a n d t h e n A i r V i c e
had
departmental
and s u b s e q u e n t l y
!
*
0
a
u n d e r t a k e n and t h a t
on t h e
p r o p o s e d new t r e a t y
meanwhile
of
i n Baghdad
acclamation
the
Iraq
making a t r e a t y
King were near
It
to
*
announced
complete
send off
October,
In the
the
ideas
promised
regarding
of
that
Kr*.Amery
he
confident
sounded with
of
His
July.
despatch
King v i s i t e d Europe
with his
to
If
Unfortunately
he was
grant
the
the
King wore b e i n g
consultation.
that
of
guarded terms
possibility
convenient
telegram
5. .
in very
on the
middle
authorised
desired by the
might be
that
London i n t h e
and
the
only
greatly
discussions
a n d made
from the
Government
it
treaty
should
continue
to give
considered,
advice
however,
High Commissioners
especially
to
that
were
in their
on the
that
Government
to
the
political
of
the
opinion set
6.
to
The
the
formal
who
discussions
of
the
after
official
His
incorporation
similar
to
and Nejd,
of
In the
article
I
of
It
Ibn Saud had b e e n
rivalry with
to t h e
Hejaz
wishes
status
independence",
a second
on t h e
B u t we h a d n o t
Iraq
of
King
less
that,
admission
an
of
on t h i s
was
to
the
point
extremely
complete
the
the
Treat
arrival
enmity
than that
of
the
Hejaz
accept
and
for
granted
will
to the
provide
to
article
that
even if
In t h e
the
agree
personal
had y i e l d e d
to
failed,
The
to
of reasoning
true
right
It
request
days b e f o r e
bitter
snag remained
although
the
points.
Government
a few
his
is
grips
unofficial
q i i a l i f i c a t i o n s , "the
nominal
continued
come t o
that,
It
Prime
the breakdown i s
apparently
Government
in regard to the
indications
for
No a m o u n t
point.
Iraqi
have, now
Treaty with the
for
owing
discussions
published
and Nejd.
Majesty's
insistence
the
I b n S a u d make h i m d e t e r m i n e d n o t
move h i m on t h i s
Britannic
lagged,
vras m o s t u n f o r t u n a t e
in England,
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
note.
at
M a j e s t y 's
without
Iraq,,
remained
this
having
on most
Iraq
inflxience
and m y s e l f ,
reasons
the
the
and I
proposed Treaty with
recognising;
King F e i s a l
Iraq
sole
the
towards
also
of
of
t h e y were r e p l a c e d by
Informal
Britannic
independence" of
with
paragraph 2 of
had b e e n reached
and almost
of
in
b e t w e e n King F e i s a l
agreement
refusal
the
authority
and
effect
part
advance
country,
terms,
personally,
probable
underestimated
of
exaggerated
on t h e
negotiations
Acting
considered
in
and want
These
the
Immediaie
conducted them,
former.
principal
forth
I
a failure
they
classes
incapacity
Minister
of
some
and t h a t
of
effect,
I
two
tq. King F e i s a l
this
classes
of t h e
i n somewhat
underestimated
secure
independence,
reports
references
they
political
the
Iraq Government.
couched
I recorded an opinion t o
especially
the
His
King's
"ocmple^e
shape
of
advice
and t h e r e
our
to
Iraq
were
distasteful
to
u
him,
the
King might
eventually
formula which would have
on t h e
the
refusal
7
0
the
the
I have
the
it
which the
the
qualification
could not
been throughout
of
the
would be
obviously
other
articles
of
Iraq
It
Under
Government
I
delegation
of
is
to
doubtful
instr\ic i o n s
and t h a t
whether
any m e n t i o n of
obligations
on t h i s ,
w o u l d do a n y t h i n g
to
get
the
We now h a v e
I am s u r e
Ring has
and has
ment
that
Iraq,
studiously
as
good
we
the
care
that
I have
there
they
will
made r e g a r d i n g
be
Independence"
If
Iraq
that
the
the breakdown of
that
and
his
will
serious
Great
The
difficulties
he
should
He w i l l ,
I
fancy,
probably be
Britain
form o f
the
were
we
Indicated.
There w i l l
nay be
we
remaining
face
such
against
yield
yield.
to
them.
arise.
whatever
!
p o s i t i o n which
already
now
!
on the
have
without
Britain s
Iraq.
e v a d e d my s u g g e s t i o n
a v i o l e n t "outburst
Baghdad P r e s s ,
of
cannot
shall
w i t h me i n m i n i m i s i n g
immediately
the
in
consider
has
Majesty s
"complete
a new T r e a t y w i t h
stiffened
it
could not
King might b e l i e v e
u p o n w h i c h we
w a r n e d me t h a t
co-operate
take
to
phrase
would
they
Great
in respect
a t t i t u d e -would probably be
advice,
to
desired.
Britannic
that
the
official
they
from His
q u a l i f i e d by a r e f e r e n c e
go back
the
in
discussions
the
as
and
to accept
earnestly
renew
must be
difficulties
usefully
Treaty and
informal
informed King P e i s a l
international
the
we s h o u l d now a c c e p t
point
result.
so
the
on "this
8.
that
limited
would have b e e n harmless
and attempt
succeed.
of
was
opinion that,
Iraq
that
negotiations.
question
It
Independence"
he
termination
been suggested
now t o
^OQ
we w a n t e d .
that
of
i n the
agreements,
And s i n c e
some
discussions,
Independence
phrase
s e c u r e d what
conclusion
myself
conditioned
accepted
to recognise"complete
King b a s e d h i s
continue
have
the
almost
in
announce­
negotiations,
and
and t h e r e
will
and Mosul o
V;e know t h a t
London h a s
Iraq
that
fail
people
got
Press
and i t
is
the
wishes
prove
is
in
that
there
enforced;
ths
representatives
is
no
last
in
Iraq
and retrograde
them f o r
support.
no r e p u t a b l e
so
he
carry
accepts
timid are
will
not
face
prepared,
of
J?.far
of
the
left
the
Pasha's
of
hitherto
t o be
obloquy
to
consc
the
there
us
that,
which
The
at
the
probably
than the
is
into
Is
Iraqis.
rejoicing
is
being
that
the
to r e l y
a distinct
able
to
that
intrigues
they
We m u s t
be
not
consequence
will
be
delighted
faced
I think,
be
A.--.d t h e r e may b e g r a d u a l
situation will
For
resignation
secretly
least,
a
prevail,
ministry.
King F e i s a l
If
chance
now
an i n e v i t a b l e
be
the
cn
form
which w i l l
on the
British
arms o f
politicians
thereby.
we s h a l l
the
Press;
will
the extremists.
and w i l l
Bolshevist
free.
Iraqi
negotiations.
caused to
where
Anglo-
iption
desired
conditions
find
cannot
inperil
o f 3ri.ahs
find himself
of
agitation
Baghdad
and s h o u l d h a v e
that
will
does
extremist
of
Shiehs
politicians.
been
patriotic
in
King
an
proposed
should be f l u n g
Cabinet,
of
for
the
in
agitation
may s e r i o u s l y
an overwhelmingly Shiah
Provinces.
opportunity
the
and E g y p t ,
with the
chance
on in the
opposition,
a strike
i n the
Iraqi
a ministry
embarrassment
violent
Persia
shape
I fear
therefore,
without
Thin
in the
more m o d e r a t e
the
failure
less
thing
unstable
unless
it
to the
of Baghdad
elsewhere that
to
be
some o f f s e t
but
that
n a t i o n and that
conti^ary.
that
cannot
Baghdad
Prime M i n i s t e r
For the Egyptian e x t r e m i s t s
they
may b e
ministry
the
b y t h e E g y p t i a n Y-afd o f
demonstrations
that
the Acting
relations
possible
in
Iraq D i p l o m a t i c Agent
in India,
close
Egyptian Treaty.
There
of
the
an e f f e c t
quite
acceptance
declare
the
i n England seem to t h i n k
up t o
to have
Cairo
demonstrations
already written to
not represent
must be
be n a t i o n a l i s t
provide
an
at
the
with
faced
with
reverberation
obvious
from which Iraq
has
9.
The o n l y p a l l i a t i v e
of
things
afford
us
to
is
a show
sit
still
of
the
that
Iraq
trial
Iraq Ministry
accede
against
that
at
the
agitators.
is
might be
thrown back upon a r t i c l e
that
the
Kigh Commissioner
military
proclaim martial
Air
Officer
Law , h o w e v e r ,
to
the
Cabinet
forced
to
e x e c u t i o n of
10.
the
that
period.
" It
cannot,
at
least
been anticipated.
11.
I
fail
the
of
than
agreement
the
the
of
be
which
the
commotion,
Iraq
to
the
Organic
Cabinet
necessary
circumstances,
We s h o u l d
own h a n d s ,
t o make i t
had been
that
fact
during
then
claiming
clear
for
were
Kis
that
the
that
forces
intended
the
this
safety
shall
Iraq for
the
cold
of
reduction
military
these
there
that
present
Britannic
coming
in
in
year,'be
a
remaining
weather.
British
to
be
Majesty's
cb.av.ges
be
Government
in
Iraq
reduced as
had
'
deeply regret
Majesty's
of
concur.
British
in Iraq,
on and I f e a r
face
any
administration
120
our
now b e r e s p o n s i b l e
to
Its
should go during the
and I n t e r e s t s
have
the
I should
civil
I am f o r c e d t o a d v i s e
considerable
will
and
undertake
lav; i n s u c h
to
respect
present
insisted
Military
suppress
into
i n the
could not
from
treaty.
I wish with a l l
Indian Battalion
happened,
concurrence
no r e d u c t i o n
lives
to
Article
law
demand
almost
British forces
might r e f u s e
the
circumstances
I
the
law and e n t r u s t
take
to
against
I
newspapers
that
this
procla:natlon of m a r t i a l
and t h e
be
if
the
date
of
cannot
formed would r e s i g n r a t h e r
in Iraq
makes
7/e
to rave
Iraq on t h e r e q u e s t
Commanding.
state
go u n p u n i s h e d .
possible
12 o f
shall,
operations
us to
If
King o f
this
the Arab p r e s s
suppression
It
for
and f o r c e .
a very early
to such a request.
provides
can s e e
determination
I may h a v e
Government
of
I
and a l l o w
or d e m o n s t r a t i o n s
foresee
that
Government
i n my d u t y w e r e
to
so
have
to submit
lamentable
I to
prophesy
( I n t d . j H.D*
- 1 '1.
t o His
a forecast,
smooth
Britannic
but
things.
2o/Xl/27.
I
should
DRAM? AMK0UirCB£3L?a?.
The c o n v e r s a t i o n s
w i t h His Llajesty King
i^eisal
and h i s P r i m e M i n i s t e r w h i c h b e g a n i n O c t o b e r h a v e
been
the
concluded.
These c o n v e r s a t i o n s
revise
of
Anglo-Iraq
provisions
of
Article
January,
to
1926,
take
into
whether
that
it
Iraq
active
was p o s s i b l e
should
1928,
internal
order
next
it
would adapt
the
Governments
full
old
from t h i s
to
the
it
is
administration
the
of
present
discharge.
an a s s u r a n c e
goes w e l l
support
the
if
in the
candidature
the
0
assume
maintenance
of
external
a new
Treaty
which
circumstances
the British
that
Government
the
Iraq
it
;
the
is
not
Irac should be
admitted
international
to be beyond i t s
Peisal
rate
has,
of
capacity
however,
progress
the B r i t i s h
Iraq f o r
have
Government
in organising
sound l i n e s
interval,
of
Nations
consider
and t h e r e b y assume
the present
of
responsibility.
progress
His Majesty Ling
and a l l
in
of
promised
member
change of
which might prove
that
a
of
Iraq was to
conclude
recommend t h a t
of N a t i o n s ,
responsibilities
to
to
for
evident
c o u n t r y on
as
the
league
I r a ^ from
the
transference
the
that
of
to
Treaty to
although
League
fact
defence
creditable
the
of
question
a l s o had t o
responsibility
h a s made t h e m o s t
to
have
due c o n s i d e r a t i o n
that,
at
object
Treaty
i n 1928 the
t o recommend to
would be w e l l
After
possible
light
the Anglo-Irac
y e a r be admitted
and t h e
aggression,
resulting
of
consideration
having regard
i n March,
decided
III
in the
their
i n which H i s M a j e s t y ^ - Government
The t w o
whether,
relations
had as
now
is
obtained
maintained
Government
admission to
the
will
League
1932,
The q u e s t i o n o f
the
conclusion of
been c l o s e l y
examined b y b o t h 3ides
resources
Iraq were not
of
c
at present
It
a new
was
Treaty has
found
sufficient
to
that
meet
also
the
the
eiqpenoes o f
assure
the
internal
and t h a t
Great
being have
to
assistance,
from t i m e
order
of national
and
the
provide
time
at
Iraq with
being for
the
forces
defence
B r i t a i n would,
it
to
upkeep
of
adequate
her
any r a t e ,
the British
frontiers,
for
some m e a s u r e
the
of
Government
f o r m and e x t e n t
of
to
time
military
to
decide
assistance
to
be
provided.
These
Firstly,
enter
the
two
that
league,
Secondly,
help,
that
but
the
that
return of
of
Treaty
Treaties
active
is
not
for
the present
ready
to
and,
there
is
principal
still
of
It
1 9 2 2 and 1 9 2 6
discussions
should
for
was
military
a readjustment
accordingly
be
continued
Iraq for
Agreements
existing
of
after
the
in order
circumstances
0
of
agreed
should remain i n
JTeisal t o
and F i n a n c i a l
accord with the
a need
reasons
relations.
His Majesty Xing
the M i l i t a r y
them i n t o
Iraq
that
removed t h e
Anglo-Iraq
decisions:
force.
the
amendment
to
bring