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Printed for the Cabinet.
July 1954
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SECRET C C . (54)
53rd Conclusions
CABINET
CONCLUSIONS
of a meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street,
on Monday, 26th July, 1954, at 11-30 a.m.
S.W.1,
Present:
The Right Hon. Sir W I N S T O N C H U R C H I L L , M.P., Prime Minister.
The Right Hon. A N T H O N Y E D E N , M.P., The Most Hon. the M A R Q U E S S O F
SALISBURY,
Lord President of the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Council.
The Right Hon. L O R D S I M O N D S , Lord The Right Hon. Sir D A V I D M A X W E L L
F Y F E , Q.C., M.P., Secretary of State
Chancellor. for the H o m e Department and
Minister for Welsh Affairs.
The Right Hon. R. A. B U T L E R , M.P. The Right Hon. V I S C O U N T W O O L T O N ,
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
and Minister of Materials.
The Right Hon. H. F . C. C R O O K S H A N K , The Right Hon. V I S C O U N T S W I N T O N ,
Secretary of State for Commonwealth
M.P., Lord Privy Seal.
Relations.
The Right Hon. O L I V E R L Y T T E L T O N , The Right Hon. J A M E S S T U A R T , M.P.,
Secretary of State for Scotland.
M.P., Secretary of State for the
Colonies.
The Right Hon. Sir W A L T E R M O N C K T O N , The Right Hon. H A R O L D M A C M I L L A N ,
M.P., Minister of Housing and Local
Q.C., M.P., Minister of Labour and
Government.
National Service.
The Right Hon. P E T E R T H O R N E Y C R O F T , The Right Hon. F L O R E N C E H O R S B R U G H ,
M . P . , President of the Board of Trade.
M.P., Minister of Education.
The Right Hon. G W I L V M L L O Y D G E O R G E , M.P., Minister of Food.
T h e following were also present:
The Right Hon. the E A R L D E L A
Postmaster-General (Item 6).
Hon. P A T R I C K B U C H A N ­
M.P., Parliamentary Secre­
tary, Treasury (Items 1-4).
Mr. N I G E L B I R C H , M.P., Parliamentary
Secretary,
Ministry
of
Defence
(Item 5).
WARR,
The
Right
HEPBURN,
Secretariat :
CONTENTS
Minute
No.
1
Subject
China
Attack on British Aircraft.
2
Washington Talks
Anglo-Soviet Meeting.
3
Atomic Energy ...
. Weapons Programme.
4
Egypt
...
Defence Negotiations.
5
6
Cyprus ...
...
Television Development
...
...
Composition of Independent Television Authority.
China.
Attack on
British
Aircraft.
1. The Foreign Secretary referred to the loss of a British civil
airliner which had been shot down by fighter aircraft off Hainan on
23rd July. It was clear that the fighters could only have come from
China, and an immediate protest had been lodged with the Chinese
People's Government. In reply to this protest the Chinese Govern­
ment had now admitted responsibility, tendered apologies and offered
to pay compensation. Their explanation was that the pilots of the
fighter aircraft had mistaken the airliner for an aircraft belonging
to the Chinese Nationalist Forces; and it seemed likely that this was
the true explanation of the incident.
The Cabinet—
Took note of the Foreign Secretary's statement.
Washington
Talks
Anglo-Soviet
Meeting.
(Previous Reference:
C.C. (54) 52nd Conclusions, Minute 3.) Atomic Energy.
Weapons
Programme.
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (54) 48th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
2. The Cabinet continued their discussion on the possibility of an Anglo-Soviet meeting.
".
, , The Cabinefs discussion and the conclusion reached are recorded separately. ^
3. The Lord President invited the Cabinet to take a final
decision on the question, which they had previously discussed on
7th and 8th July, whether our atomic weapons programme should
be so adjusted as to allow for the production of thermo-nuclear
bombs in this country.
After a short discussion, in which the main arguments developed
at the two earlier meetings were again reviewed, the Cabinet agreed
that in order to preserve our position as a leading military Power
and to maintain our influence in world affairs it was necessary that
we should possess a stock of the most up-to-date thermo-nuclear
weapons. This would enable us to play our part in deterring a
potential aggressor from embarking on major war.
T h e point was again made that careful thought should be given
to the publicity aspects of this decision. Was it likely that the
decision could be kept secret for any length of time? If not,
Ministers should consider how the decision could best be justified
to public opinion in this country and abroad.
The Cabinet—
(1) Approved in principle the proposal that the current
programme for the manufacture of atomic weapons in
this country should be so adjusted as to allow for the
production of thermo-nuclear bombs.
(2) Authorised the Lord President to proceed with his plans for
the production of thermo-nuclear bombs in this country.
(3) Invited the Lord President to consider the publicity aspects
of this decision.
Egypt.
Defence
Negotiations.
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (54) 52nd
Conclusions,
Minute 5.)
4. The Foreign Secretary said that the Secretary of State for
War had now arrived in Cairo and had sent a message (Cairo
telegram No. 864) conveying his personal views on the handling
of the defence negotiations with the Egyptian Government. He
suggested that he should accept a duration of seven years but should
press for improvement of the clause providing for consultation on
the arrangements to be made after the expiry of the agreement. As
regards the period allowed for the withdrawal of British troops from
Egypt, he suggested that he should aim at a period of 20 months.
Discussion showed that there was general support in the Cabinet
for the proposals put forward by the Secretary of State for War.
In further discussion the following points were raised: —
(a) The Chancellor of the Exchequer again said that he was
concerned at the probable cost of employing civilian contractors to
maintain the Base installations in the Canal Zone.
The Cabinet recognised that it would not be practicable at this
stage to revert to the earlier proposal that these duties should be
undertaken by military technicians, especially as this would reopen
the question whether such troops should be allowed to wear uniform.
They agreed, however, that the War Office should be urged to take all
practicable steps to ensure that the arrangements made for
maintaining the Base installations with civilian labour were as
economical as possible.
(h) The Cabinet were informed that those Government
supporters who were critical of the Governments policy towards
Egypt would probably succeed in finding an opportunity, before
Parliament rose for the summer recess, to propose in the House of
Commons that, if the heads of a defence agreement were settled
during the recess, Parliament should be specially convened to debate
the matter. The Cabinet agreed that, if any statement had to be
made on this point before the recess, the Government spokesman
should not go beyond the earlier undertaking that Parliament would
be given an opportunity to debate this matter before a new treaty
was finally concluded. It should also be stated that, in the meantime,
the Government would retain complete discretion to make such
changes as circumstances warranted in the deployment of the British
troops now in the Canal Zone.
The C a b i n e t Invited the Foreign Secretary to authorise the Secretary of
State for War, in his conduct of the negotiations for a
defence agreement with the Egyptian Government, to accept
an agreement of seven-years' duration, together with
improved provision for consultation on the arrangements to
be made after the expiry of the agreement, and to seek
Egyptian acceptance of a period of 20 months for the
withdrawal of British troops from Egypt.
5. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the
Colonial Secretary and the Minister of State (C. (54) 245) on future
constitutional developments in Cyprus.
The Colonial Secretary said that the Greek Government were
now actively pressing their claim to Cyprus. They were canvassing
support for the union of Cyprus with Greece and had stated that they
would raise this issue in the United Nations unless we agreed to enter
into discussions with them. The Chiefs of Staff considered it essential
for strategic reasons that we should maintain full sovereignty over
Cyprus; and for these and other reasons we could not encourage the
idea of self-determination, as opposed to self-government, for Cyprus.
We had, however, to consider the presentation of our case in the
United Nations and, with this in view, it was proposed that the
reaffirmation of our intention to retain sovereignty over Cyprus
should be accompanied by an offer of constitutional changes which
would mark a further stage in the development of self-governing
institutions in the island. A public statement of our intentions would
help to remove the doubts which at present existed in Cyprus, and the
T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H E R U R l T A N N I C " i M A J E S T V S - G O V E R N M E N T
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
C . C. (54) 5 3 r d C o n c l u s i o n s ( A / / v t * ^
(2 6th J u l y , 1954 - 11.30 a . m . )
Y/ASHING T ON
TALKS THE P R I M E MINISTER said that, since the Cabinet had
l a s t d i s c u s s e d o n 2 3 r d J u l y h i s s u g g e s t i o n of a b i - l a t o r a l m e e t i n g
w i t h t h e R u s s i a n s , the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t h a d p u b l i c l y p r o p o s e d a n
e a r l y c o n f e r e n c e of a l l E u r o p e a n G o v e r n m e n t s t o c o n s i d e r t h e
Proposed e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a s y s t e m of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n E u r o p e .
This
Meeting w i t h c r e a t e d a n e w s i t u a t i o n , e s j o c c i a l l y a s i t w a s c l e a r f r o m i t s t e r m s
iVI, M a l e n k o v . t h a t t h e S o v i e t N o t e h a d b e e n d r a w n u p a f t e r t h e e n d of t h e G e n e v a
Conference.
It w a s e v i d e n t t h a t t h e p r i m a r y p u r p o s e of t h e S o v i e t
G o v e r n m e n t , in m a k i n g t h i s p u b l i c p r o p o s a l a t t h i s t i m e , w a s t o
(Previous i n f l u e n c e t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e F r e n c h P a r l i a m e n t i n t h e i r f o r t h c o m i n g
Reference: C. C, (54) 52nd d i s c u s s i o n of t h e T r e a t y f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e E u r o p e a n Defence Community.
But h e w a s s a t i s f i e d t h a t h e c o u l d n o t p r o c e e d
Conclusions)
with h i s p r o p o s a l for a b i - l a t e r a l m e e t i n g with the R u s s i a n s while
t h i s s u g g e s t i o n of a m u c h l a r g e r m e e t i n g of F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s yvas
' being publicly canvassed.
He h a d t h e r e f o r e p r e p a r e d a r e v i s e d
d r a f t of h i s p r o p o s e d m e s s a g e t o M . M o l o t o v i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e
l a r g e r m e e t i n g which the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t had now publicly ­
p r o p o s e d did not s e e m to a c c o r d with the plan for an i n f o r m a l b i ­
l a t e r a l m e e t i n g which he had p r e v i o u s l y had in m i n d , and a s k i n g
w h e t h e r this Soviet p r o p o s a l was intended to s u p e r s e d e his plan.
He p r o p o s e d t o i n c l u d e i n t h i s r e v i s e d m e s s a g e a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e
p l a c e a n d t i m e w h i c h h e h a d b e e n i n t e n d i n g t o p r o p o s e for a b i ­
l a t e r a l m e e t i n g : t h i s w o u l d h a v e t h e a d v a n t a g e of m a k i n g i t c l e a r
t h a t he h a d n o t b e e n p r e p a r e d t o a t t e n d a m e e t i n g in M o s c o w .
The
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y had independently p r e p a r e d an a l t e r n a t i v e draft,
w h i c h w a s s i m i l a r in s u b s t a n c e t h o u g h s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t i n
wording.
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r r e a d the two d r a f t s to the C a b i n e t ,
He s a i d t h a t , if t h e C a b i n e t a p p r o v e d t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e p r o p o s e d
m e s s a g e , he could settle the w o r d i n g in c o n s u l t a t i o n with the
Foreign Secretary.
In t h e c o u r s e of a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n i t w a s a g r e e d t h a t a
n e w s i t u a t i o n h a d b e e n c r e a t e d b y t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e S o v i e t N o t e
of 2 4 t h J u l y .
T h o u g h it s e e m e d u n l i k e l y t h a t t h i s S o v i e t p r o p o s a l
w o u l d b e a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of W e s t e r n E u r o p e , i t s
r e c i p i e n t s m u s t be given t i m e to c o n s i d e r it and the p o s i t i o n
m u s t b e r e v i e w e d a g a i n in t h e l i g h t of t h e i r r e s p o n s e , .
Meanwhile,
it - a s d e s i r a b l e t h a t M. Molotov should be given to u n d e r s t a n d
that the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s p r o p o s a l for a bi*-lateral m e e t i n g would
be h e l d in a b e y a n c e while the Soviet Note w a s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n
The Cabinet Took note t h a t the P r i m e M i n i s t e r would send a
p e r s o n a l m e s s a g e to M, Molotov m a k i n g it c l e a r
t h a t h i s p r o p o s a l for a b i - l a t e r a l m e e t i n g with
M. M a l e n k o v m u s t be r e g a r d e d a s held in
a b e y a n c e p e n d i n g t h e o u t c o m e of t h e S o v i e t
p r o p o s a l of 2 4 t h J u l y f o r a c o n f e r e n c e of a l l
E u r o p e a n G o v e r n m e n t s o n t h e c r e a t i o n of a
s y s t e m of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y in E u r o p e .
C a b i n e t Office, S . V / . 1 .
2 6th J u l y , 1954.
'
terms of the public statement which he proposed to make were set
out in Annex 3 of C. (54) 245. If this became an issue in the United
Nations, we must expect criticism on the ground that we were
opposing self-determination; and the United States, in particular,
might find it difficult to give us full public support. He proposed
that we should oppose the discussion of this question in the United
Nations, on the principle that the United Nations was not competent
to intervene in the domestic affairs of Member States.
The Foreign Secretary said that, in view of all the help which
we had given in Greece during and immediately after the war, it was
disappointing that the Greek Government should now be pressing
a claim to Cyprus, which had not been under Greek rule in the past
3,000 years. He supported the proposals put forward in C. (54) 245
and suggested that special attention should be given to the need to
present our case effectively to the people of Cyprus in Press and radio
publicity. He thought that strategic considerations were perhaps
over-stressed in the second paragraph of the proposed public
statement in Annex 3 to C. (54) 245.
The Cabinet—
(1) Endorsed the recommendations made in C. (54) 245 on future
policy in Cyprus.
(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to make an early
statement in Parliament, defining our policy towards
Cyprus on the lines of Annex 3 to C. (54) 245 subject to
any amendments which the Foreign Secretary might wish
to suggest.
6. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the
Postmaster-General (C. (54) 244) submitting his recommendations on
the membership of the Independent Television Authority.
The Postmaster-General
said that it was important that the
Authority should be appointed and should set to work without delay.
Unless it could hold its first meeting before the end of the summer
the Authority might not be able to initiate television programmes
until towards the end of 1955. The Authority would have an
advisory function, and the qualities required in the Chairman and
members were tact and sound judgment rather than energy and
administrative ability. The nominations he had suggested were
designed to provide a balanced composition within the statutory
limit of ten members, and each of the members proposed had special
experience which would be of value to the work of the Authority.
In discussion the following points were m a d e : —
(a) Though the eventual function of the Authority v/ould be
advisory, its main task at the outset would be to inspire confidence
in commercial circles in the future of an independent television
programme and to ensure that money was forthcoming for the
development of this service. It seemed doubtful whether an Authority
constituted as proposed in C. (54) 244 would have sufficient influence
for these purposes.
(b) For the chairmanship of the Authority an approach should
in the first instance be made to Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot.
(c) It would not be necessary to appoint a Chartered Accountant
as a member of the Authority if arrangements were made for a
suitable firm of Chartered Accountants to advise the Authority. The
vacancy thus created on the Board should be offered to Sir Charles
Colston, formerly Chairman of Hoovers Ltd.
(d) It was uncertain whether the Trades Union Congress would
wish their movement to be represented on the Authority. Their
decision would be known later in the week. If it were adverse, other
candidates should be considered in preference to Mr. Crawley or
Mr. Hardman.
The C a b i n e t Invited the Postmaster-General to reconsider the proposals
in C. (54) 244 in the light of the Cabinefs discussion and to
submit for the Prime Ministers approval revised proposals
for the membership of the Independent Television
Authority.
Cabinet Office, S.W. 1..
26th July, 1954.
(d) It was uncertain whether the Trades Union Congress would
wish their movement to be represented on the Authority. Their
decision Would be known later in the week. If it were adverse, other
candidates should be considered in preference to Mr. Crawley or
Mr. Hardman.
The Cabinet—
Invited the Postmaster-General to reconsider the proposals
in C. (54) 244 in the light of the Cabinefs discussion and to
submit for the Prime Ministers approval revised proposals
for the membership of the Independent Television
Authority.
Cabinet Office, S.W.L
26th July, 1954.