(c) crown copyright
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18
THIS
DOCUMENT
IS
T H E PROPERTY
Printed
OF
HIS
BRITANNIC
for the Cabinet.
MAJESTVS
GOVERNMENT
May 1 9 4 7
SECRET
C M .
(47)
50th Conclusions
CABINET
NCLUSIONS
50 ( 4 7 )
of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing
on Friday, 23rd May, 1 9 4 7 , at 1 1 a.m.
Street,
S.W. 1 ,
Present:
T h e E i g h t H o n . C. R . A T T L E E , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the
Chair).
T h e R i g h t H o n . VISCOUNT ADDISON,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r D o m i n i o n
Affairs.
The R i g h t H o n . A R T H U R GREENWOOD,
M.P., Minister without Portfolio.
T h e R i g h t H o n . S i r STAFFORD C R I P P S ,
K . C . , M . P , P r e s i d e n t of t h e B o a r d of
Trade.
The R i g h t H o n . J . CHUTER E D E , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r t h e H o m e
Department.
The R i g h t H o n . A . CREECH JONES,
M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e
Colonies.
The
The R i g h t . H o n . G . A . ISAACS, M . P . ,
T h e R i g h t H o n . HERBERT MORRISON,
M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
T h e R i g h t H o n . H U G H DAI/TON, M . P . ,
Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
T h e R i g h t H o n . A . V. ALEXANDER,
M . P . , M i n i s t e r of Defence.
Right
Hon.
T H E EARL
OF
Minister
Service.
L I S T O W E L , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for
I n d i a a n d S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for
Burma.
T h e R i g h t H o n . E . SHINWELL, M . P . ,
M i n i s t e r of F u e l a n d P o w e r .
T h e R i g h t H o n . GEORGE TOMLINSON,
M . P . , M i n i s t e r of E d u c a t i o n .
of L a b o u r
and National
The Right Hon. T. WILLIAMS, M.P.,
Minister
of
Agriculture
Fisheries.
The R i g h t H o n . LORD INMAN,
P r i v y Seal.
and
Lord
Also p r e s e n t :
T h e R i g h t H o n . J O H N STRACHEY, M . P . ,
M i n i s t e r of Food.
Secretariat
S i r N O R M A N BROOK.
M r . S. E . V . L U K E .
Subject
India
Constitutional
[34108-1]
Position.
Page
68
India.
Constitutional
Position. (Previous
Reference:
C M . (47) 4 7 t h Conclusions, Minute
6.)
T h e C a b i n e t h a d before t h e m a m e m o r a n d u m by t h e P r i m e
M i n i s t e r ( C P . (47) 158) covering t h e d r a f t of a n a n n o u n c e m e n t t o
be m a d e by H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t on t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s p r o p o s e d
for the t r a n s f e r of power i n I n d i a .
The Prime Minister gave t h e C a b i n e t a g e n e r a l a c c o u n t of t h e
recent p o l i t i c a l developments in I n d i a a n d t h e r e s u l t s of t h e discus­
sions w h i c h t h e I n d i a a n d B u r m a C o m m i t t e e h a d h a d w i t h t h e
Viceroy.
T h e r e f u s a l of t h e M u s l i m L e a g u e t o p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e w o r k
of the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly h a d destroyed a n y possibility t h a t t h e
C a b i n e t M i s s i o n p l a n could be successfully p u t into effect.
The
L e a g u e h a d , indeed, e n t e r e d the I n t e r i m Government, b u t t h e
f a i l u r e of both P a r t i e s to co-operate w i t h i n t h a t G o v e r n m e n t m a d e
i t i m p r o b a b l e t h a t i t could c o n t i n u e to hold t o g e t h e r for m u c h
longer. T h e extensive discussions w h i c h L o r d M o u n t b a t t e n h a d h a d
w i t h t h e v a r i o u s political leaders since h i s a r r i v a l in I n d i a h a d
convinced h i m t h a t t h e r e w a s no p r o s p e c t of a U n i o n of I n d i a e i t h e r
on t h e basis of t h e C a b i n e t M i s s i o n ^ p l a n or on a n y o t h e r basis,
a n d f u r t h e r t h a t , unless a very e a r l y a n n o u n c e m e n t w a s m a d e of t h e
m e t h o d by w h i c h H i s Majes'ty's G o v e r n m e n t i n t e n d e d to t r a n s f e r
power, w i d e s p r e a d c o m m u n a l d i s t u r b a n c e s would be inevitable. A l l
t h e I n d i a n P a r t i e s w e r e now convinced t h a t , in view of t h e recal­
c i t r a n t a t t i t u d e of t h e M u s l i m L e a g u e , some f o r m of p a r t i t i o n w a s
unavoidable. B u t t h e Congress v i e w w a s t h a t , if p a r t i t i o n w a s t o
be conceded, it w a s a necessary corollary t h a t t h e r e should also be
a division of B e n g a l a n d t h e P u n j a b .
T h e V i c e r o y h a d convened a conference of I n d i a n leaders for
2 n d J u n e , a t w h i c h he would m a k e a final effort to secure a g r e e m e n t
on t h e b a s i s of t h e C a b i n e t Mission's p l a n . If, a s he expected, he
failed to do so, he i n t e n d e d to lay before t h e Conference t h e text
of a n a n n o u n c e m e n t by H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government, w h i c h w a s
c o n t a i n e d in t h e A n n e x to C P . (47) 158. T h e p l a n o u t l i n e d in t h a t
document h a d a l r e a d y been discussed w i t h t h e I n d i a n leaders, a n d
r e p r e s e n t e d t h e m a x i m u m degree of common a g r e e m e n t t h a t w a s
ever likely to be achieved. T h e a n n o u n c e m e n t s t a t e d t h a t H i s
M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t h a d reached t h e conclusion t h a t the a t t e m p t
t o secure a U n i o n of t h e whole of T n d i a on t h e basis of t h e C a b i n e t
Mission's proposals m u s t now be a b a n d o n e d , a n d t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t s
m u s t t h e r e f o r e be m a d e whereby power could be t r a n s f e r r e d t o more
t h a n one a u t h o r i t y . I t t h e n proceeded t o set o u t a d e t a i l e d p l a n
u n d e r w h i c h t h e different p a r t s of I n d i a could choose, t h r o u g h
elected r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , w h e t h e r t h e i r f u t u r e C o n s t i t u t i o n s should
be f r a m e d by the e x i s t i n g C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly or by a new
C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly composed of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from those a r e a s
w h i c h held aloof from t h e m a i n b o d y ; a n d i t p r o v i d e d for t h e estab­
l i s h m e n t of a n e w C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly for t h e a r e a s w h i c h o p t e d
for s e p a r a t i o n . T h e probable r e s u l t of t h e p l a n would be t h a t , in
t h e N o r t h - W e s t of I n d i a , Sind, t h e W e s t e r n P u n j a b a n d possibly
also the N o r t h - W e s t F r o n t i e r w o u l d s t a n d o u t from t h e e x i s t i n g
C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly. I n the N o r t h - E a s t t h e r e were good hopes
t h a t B e n g a l m i g h t decide to r e m a i n u n i t e d on t h e basis of a coalition
G o v e r n m e n t elected o n a j o i n t electorate. If, however, t h a t d i d n o t
h a p p e n , E a s t e r n B e n g a l a n d t h e one p r e d o m i n a n t l y M u s l i m d i s t r i c t
of A s s a m w e r e likely also t o s t a n d out.
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r d r e w a t t e n t i o n to t h e difficulties a n d
d a n g e r s necessarily i n h e r e n t in a n y scheme of p a r t i t i o n .
The
s i t u a t i o n i n m a n y p a r t s of I n d i a w a s a l r e a d y h i g h l y inflammable.
I n the P u n j a b , in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e proposed a n n o u n c e m e n t w a s
likely in t h e G o v e r n o r ' s view to provoke serious d i s o r d e r a n d blood­
shed. T h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p l a n t o t h a t P r o v i n c e would involve
t h e division of the S i k h c o m m u n i t y i n f a i r l y even p r o p o r t i o n s
between t h e t w o successor States, t h o u g h t h e i r position m i g h t to
some e x t e n t be eased by t h e B o u n d a r y Commission, w h i c h would
establish t h e final b o u n d a r y . P a r t i t i o n would also involve h i g h l y
complex a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problems, such a s t h e division between t h e
successor S t a t e s of t h e I n d i a n A r m y a n d such subjects as finance,
t r a d e a n d i n d u s t r y , w h i c h w e r e a t p r e s e n t t h e responsibility of t h e
59
CM.
SO
(47)
Central Government.
B u t , w h a t e v e r t h e p r a c t i c a l difficulties
involved, t h e r e a p p e a r e d t o be no a l t e r n a t i v e t o p a r t i t i o n . U n f o r ­
t u n a t e l y , t h e r e w a s now reason to fear t h a t t h e M u s l i m L e a g u e m i g h t
after a l l decide to oppose t h e p l a n . I n t h a t event, t h e best course
w o u l d be to i m p o s e i t a s a n a w a r d by H i s M a j e s t y ^ Government.
I t seemed u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e Congress l e a d e r s t o t h e
p l a n would s i m i l a r l y change. I f i t d i d , a m o r e difficult position
w o u l d a r i s e a n d t h e whole p l a n would t h e n h a v e t o be reconsidered.
D u r i n g t h e p a s t f o r t n i g h t , however, t h e r e h a d been a f u r t h e r
development of m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h p u t t h e whole m a t t e r in a
different l i g h t .
W h i l e M r . J i n n a h h a d always claimed t h a t
P a k i s t a n w o u l d w i s h to r e m a i n w i t h i n t h e B r i t i s h Commonwealth,
i t h a d been t h e policy of t h e Congress P a r t y t h a t I n d i a should be a
sovereign i n d e p e n d e n t r e p u b l i c a n d they h a d s e a m e d a resolution
t o t h a t effect i n t h e C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly. T h e prospect t h a t one
p a r t of I n d i a w o u l d wish to r e m a i n w i t h i n the Coaamonwealth w h e n
t h e o t h e r h a d become an i n d e p e n d e n t republic h a d always involved
issues of g r e a t complexity. I t now a p p e a r e d , however, t h a t some
of t h e Congress l e a d e r s h a d become increasingly a p p r e h e n s i v e a b o u t
t h e difficulties w h i c h t h e g r a n t of i m m e d i a t e independence would
involve, a n d a most significant a p p r o a c h to t h e "Viceroy h a d been
m a d e by P a n d i t N e h r u a n d S a r d a r P a t e l , who h a d suggested t h a t
i n t h e event of p a r t i t i o n H i n d u I n d i a should be g r a n t e d D o m i n i o n
s t a t u s , a t a n y r a t e a s a t e m p o r a r y m e a s u r e . They h a d e x p l a i n e d
t h a t t h e y w o u l d h o p e to secure t h e a g r e e m e n t of t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s
t o t h i s course by a r g u i n g t h a t acceptance of D o m i n i o n s t a t u s would
enable power t o be t r a n s f e r r e d to I n d i a n h a n d s a t a d a t e substan­
t i a l l y earlier t h a n J u n e 1948, a n d t h a t onee she h a d a t t a i n e d
D o m i n i o n s t a t u s H i n d u I n d i a would be free to secede a t a n y t i m e
from t h e Commonwealth.
T h i s w a s a most i m p o r t a n t development, a n d t h e I n d i a a n d
B u r m a C o m m i t t e e h a d felt that, full a d v a n t a g e sfeouid be t a k e n of
it. I f D o m i n i o n s t a t u s w e r e conferred on the t w o successor S t a t e s
as p a r t of the p l a n for t h e t r a n s f e r of power, t h i s w o u l d g r e a t l y
ease t h e difficulties i n h e r e n t i n p a r t i t i o n . F o r example, both t h e
I n d i a n P a r t i e s w i s h e d t o r e t a i n the services of E u r o p e a n officers
of t h e I n d i a n A r m y to assist in c a r r y i n g o u t thes division of t h e
a r m y between t h e n e w S t a t e s a n d b u i l d i n g u p effective m i l i t a r y
o r g a n i s a t i o n s on a fresh basis : t h i s w o u l d n o t he possible if the
successor S t a t e s h a d become i n d e p e n d e n t republics. M o r e impor­
t a n t , i t w a s reasonable to suppose t h a t the I n d i a n P a r t i e s , in t h e
l i g h t of p r a c t i c a l experience of t h e a d v a n t a g e s of D o m i n i o n s t a t u s ,
w o u l d be slow to exercise t h e i r r i g h t t o secede a t a l a t e r stage.
I n d i a ' s decision w o u l d also, no doubt, be closely w a t c h e d by B u r m a ,
w h o would s h o r t l y have to choose between independence a n d
D o m i n i o n s t a t u s ; a n d Ceylon would also be g r e a t l y influenced by
t h e line t a k e n by I n d i a on t h i s question. B u t i t m u s t be remembered
t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l m a d e by t h e Congress leaders w a s t h a t D o m i n i o n
s t a t u s should be g r a n t e d a n d power t r a n s f e r r e d a s early as possible
i n 1947. Moreover, a f t e r the proposed announcement h a d been
m a d e , the i n t e r i m G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d become i n c r e a s i n g l y
ineffective; a n d i t w a s e s s e n t i a l for p r a c t i c a l reasons t h a t t h e
i n t e r i m p e r i o d between t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t a n d t h e a c t u a l t r a n s f e r
of p o w e r on t h e basis of D o m i n i o n s t a t u s should b e reduced t o a
m i n i m u m . I t would, therefore, be essential t o enact, before the end
of t h e p r e s e n t Session, legislation a m e n d i n g t h e Government of
I n d i a A c t , 1935. T h e p u r p o s e of t h i s legislation would be to confer
D o m i n i o n s t a t u s on the S t a t e s e m e r g i n g from t h e p l a n for t h e
p a r t i t i o n of I n d i a a n d to p r o v i d e the necessary madfoinery e n a b l i n g
t h e n e w C o n s t i t u t i o n s to be established a n d t h e division of powers
to be g r a d u a l l y completed.
T h e g r a n t of D o m i n i o n s t a t u s to the successor S t a t e s would,
of course, m e a n t h a t the I n d i a Office should cease to be responsible
for t h e h a n d l i n g of U n i t e d K i n g d o m r e l a t i o n s w i t h I n d i a : t h i s
w a s a p o i n t on w h i c h t h e I n d i a n leaders w e r e e m p h a t i c .
The
a l t e r n a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s needed f u r t h e r consideration b u t i t
[34108-1]
'
B
2
seemed possible t h a t t h e best solution m i g h t be to e x p a n d t h e
D o m i n i o n s Office i n t o a D e p a r t m e n t for C o m m o n w e a l t h R e l a t i o n s
responsible for h a n d l i n g our r e l a t i o n s , n o t only w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g
Dominions, b u t also w i t h I n d i a a n d B u r m a a n d subsequently w i t h
Ceylon a n d a n y o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s w h i c h m i g h t a t t a i n a p o s i t i o n of
^independence within the Commonwealth."
I n discussion the following p o i n t s w e r e r a i s e d :—
(a) W h e n these C o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes in t h e s t a t u s of India­
took effect, it w o u l d be necessary t h a t T h e K i n g should divest h i m ­
self of t h e t i t l e " E m p e r o r of I n d i a . " H e w o u l d become K i n g of
those p a r t s of I n d i a w h i c h a t t a i n e d D o m i n i o n s t a t u s .
His
M a j e s t y h a d a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d t h i s p o i n t t o the P r i m e M i n i s t e r .
(V) T h i s possible c h a n g e in t h e s t a t u s of I n d i a also e m p h a s i s e d
t h e need for some f u r t h e r review of t h e e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s between
t h e v a r i o u s p a r t s of t h e B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h . T h o u g h i t m i g h t
p r o v e possible a n d a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t p a r t s of I n d i a should a t t a i n
t h e s t a t u s prescribed for D o m i n i o n s by t h e S t a t u t e of W e s t m i n ­
ster, there w e r e other p a r t s of H i s M a j e s t y ' s D o m i n i o n s for w h i c h
some different form, of " i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h i n t h e Common­
w e a l t h " m i g h t be m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e . The Prime Minister
said
t h a t he w a s t a k i n g s t e p s to set i n h a n d a comprehensive review
of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s between t h e v a r i o u s p a r t s of t h e
B r i t i s h Commonwealth.
(c) H o w w o u l d I n d i a ' s a t t a i n m e n t of D o m i n i o n s t a t u s affect
t h e p o s i t i o n of I n d i a n s in S o u t h A f r i c a ?
The Cabinet were
i n f o r m e d t h a t these people, t h o u g h I n d i a n s by race, w e r e mostly
S o u t h A f r i c a n citizens by n a t i o n a l i t y ; a n d t h e i r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s
w o u l d n o t be affected by I n d i a ' s a c h i e v i n g self-Government as a
D o m i n i o n . T h e p o l i t i c a l difficulties w h i c h h a d a r i s e n over t h e
position of these I n d i a n s w o u l d a t least be no g r e a t e r if I n d i a
became a D o m i n i o n t h a n if she became a foreign c o u n t r y .
(d) The Lord President
said t h a t , i n view of t h e congestion
of t h e P a r l i a m e n t a r y timetable, t h e r e w o u l d be n o hope of p a s s i n g
a Government of I n d i a Bill before P a r l i a m e n t a d j o u r n e d i n t h e
s u m m e r unless t h i s legislation h a d t h e full s u p p o r t of t h e O p p o s i ­
tion.
The Prime
Minister
said t h a t he h a d received a firm
assurance i n w r i t i n g from t h e l e a d e r of t h e O p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h i s
s u p p o r t w o u l d be f o r t h c o m i n g if t h e p r o p o s a l s of H i s Majesty*s
Government proved g e n e r a l l y acceptable to t h e leaders of t h e
Indian Parties.
(e) The Prime Minister
said t h a t c o m m u n a l feeling i n I n d i a
w a s n o w i n t e n s e a n d i t w a s possible t h a t serious d i s o r d e r s m i g h t
b r e a k out i n t h e P u n j a b a n d c e r t a i n o t h e r P r o v i n c e s a t a n y t i m e
a f t e r t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t of t h e p l a n for p a r t i t i o n i n g I n d i a . I t w a s
t h e V i c e r o y s considered view t h a t t h e only hope of checking w i d e ­
s p r e a d communal w a r f a r e w a s to s u p p r e s s t h e first s i g n s of i t
p r o m p t l y a n d ruthlessly, u s i n g for t h i s p u r p o s e all t h e force
r e q u i r e d , i n c l u d i n g t a n k s a n d a i r c r a f t , a n d g i v i n g full p u b l i c i t y
t h r o u g h o u t I n d i a to t h e action t a k e n a n d t h e reasons for it. I n this
v i e w the V i c e r o y h a d t h e u n a n i m o u s s u p p o r t of h i s I n t e r i m Govern­
m e n t . I t w a s i m p o r t a n t t h a t h e should also be a s s u r e d t h a t this
policy h a d t h e s u p p o r t of H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t .
T h e C a b i n e t a g r e e d t h a t t h e policy w h i c h t h e V i c e r o y p r o p o s e d
t o follow i n t h i s m a t t e r should h a v e t h e i r full s u p p o r t .
(/) The Prime Minister
explained the arrangements which
w e r e being m a d e for t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e proposed s t a t e m e n t of
policy. I t w a s expected t h a t t h e Viceroy w o u l d be r e a d y to p u b l i s h
t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t i n I n d i a o n t h e evening of T u e s d a y , 3rd J u n e ;
a n d a n y l a s t - m i n u t e changes i n t h e t e x t would be t e l e g r a p h e d to
L o n d o n so as to enable a s i m u l t a n e o u s a n n o u n c e m e n t to be m a d e i n
b o t h H o u s e s of P a r l i a m e n t . T h e V i c e r o y also p r o p o s e d to b r o a d ­
cast, later t h a t evening, a message to t h e people of I n d i a . I t w a s
hoped t h a t h e w o u l d r e c o r d t h i s i n L o n d o n before r e t u r n i n g t o
I n d i a , so t h a t i t m i g h t be b r o a d c a s t simultaneously i n t h i s
61 C M .
5 0
(47)'
c o u n t r y . T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r s b r o a d c a s t would then t a k e t h e
f o r m of a n i n t r o d u c t o r y s t a t e m e n t b y w a y of preface t o t h e
V i c e r o y ' s broadcast.
T h e C a b i n e t e n d o r s e d t h e p l a n o u t l i n e d i n C P . (47) 158 f o r
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e successor a u t h o r i t i e s t o w h i c h p o w e r should b e
t r a n s f e r r e d i n I n d i a . T h e y welcomed t h e f u r t h e r proposals w h i c h
h a d been e x p l a i n e d by t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r for the early a t t a i n m e n t
of D o m i n i o n s t a t u s b y the v a r i o u s p a r t s of a p a r t i t i o n e d I n d i a .
T h e y expressed t h e i r w a r m a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e o u t s t a n d i n g ser­
vice r e n d e r e d by t h e Viceroy, a n d by t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r a n d h i s
colleagues o n t h e I n d i a a n d B u r m a C o m m i t t e e , i n evolving these
n e w proposals for f u r t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development i n I n d i a . I f
t h i s scheme could be c a r r i e d t h r o u g h successfully, i t would be a
n o t a b l e l a n d m a r k in t h e development of t h e B r i t i s h Commonwealth.
i n s u m m i n g u p t h e discussion, p a i d
The Prime
Minister,
t r i b u t e to t h e r e m a r k a b l e skill a n d i n i t i a t i v e which the Viceroy h a d
shown i n his conduct of these difficult n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the I n d i a n
leaders. I t w a s essential t h a t , i n the concluding stages of t h e
n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e Viceroy should be g i v e n a l a r g e measure of
discretion to a m e n d t h e d e t a i l s of t h e p l a n , w i t h o u t p r i o r consulta­
tion w i t h H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government, so long a s h e kept w i t h i n
t h e l i m i t s of t h e b r o a d policy w h i c h h a d now been a p p r o v e d by t h e
Cabinet.
The C a b i n e t ­
(1) A p p r o v e d i n p r i n c i p l e the d r a f t a n n o u n c e m e n t a n n e x e d t o
C P . (47) 158 r e g a r d i n g the p r o c e d u r e for d e t e r m i n i n g
t h e successor a u t h o r i t i e s to w h o m power would be t r a n s ­
f e r r e d in I n d i a ; a n d a g r e e d t h a t t h i s should be a d o p t e d
by t h e Viceroy a s a basis for his final discussions w i t h
I n d i a n l e a d e r s on 2 n d a n d 3 r d J u n e .
(2) Took note w ith a p p r o v a l of t h e proposals outlined by t h e
P r i m e M i n i s t e r for the e a r l y a t t a i n m e n t of D o m i n i o n
s t a t u s by t h e v a r i o u s p a r t s of a p a r t i t i o n e d I n d i a ;
(3) A g r e e d t h a t , i n t h e concluding stages of his n e g o t i a t i o n s
w i t h the I n d i a n leaders, t h e Viceroy should have a l a r g e
m e a s u r e of discretion to a m e n d the details of t h i s p l a n
p r o v i d e d he k e p t w i t h i n t h e broad limits of the policy
a p p r o v e d by the C a b i n e t ;
(4) A g r e e d t h a t H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t should give full
s u p p o r t t o t h e policy w h i c h t h e Viceroy proposed t o
-
lUiiuw,
vviLji
UNC AGIcmiieiiL. U I MA
-LiiLerim
VJROVERIMIEIIB,
in u s i n g w h a t e v e r force m i g h t be necessary to check t h e
first s i g n s of a n y w i d e s p r e a d o u t b r e a k of c o m m u n a l
w a r f a r e i n I n d i a a f t e r t h e announcement of t h e
p r o p o s a l s for P a r t i t i o n .
Cabinet Office, S. W. 1,
2 3 r ^ May, 1947.