D O C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S
CP(72) 63
21 J u n e
GOVERNMENT COPY
NO
1972
CABINET
ICELANDIC FISHERIES DISPUTE
N o t e b y t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n
and Commonwealth Affairs
1.
I enclose at Annex a p a p e r p r e p a r e d by m y D e p a r t m e n t in
c o n s u l t a t i o n with the D e p a r t m e n t s p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d on the position
of o u r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e I c e l a n d e r s .
It i s i m p o r t a n t to r e a c h an
a g r e e m e n t if w e p o s s i b l y c a n b e c a u s e i t i s u n l i k e l y e i t h e r t h a t t h e
International Court will grant us a standstill order now or that
we shall win the c a s e against Iceland.
T h e L a w of t h e S e a C o n f e r e n c e
i n 1973 w i l l n o t u p h o l d a 12 m i l e l i m i t .
2.
The point which might s e c u r e an i n t e r i m a g r e e m e n t is this.
T h e I c e l a n d e r s feel that for political r e a s o n s they m u s t h a v e c e r t a i n
a r e a s i n w h i c h t h e y a l o n e c a n f i s h f o r c e r t a i n p e r i o d s of t h e y e a r .
I a s k e d t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r w h e t h e r if s o m e s u c h a r e a w e r e c o n c e d e d
t h e I c e l a n d e r s t h e m s e l v e s w o u l d e n f o r c e a l i m i t a t i o n o n t h e s i z e of f i s h
caught for conservation p u r p o s e s .
He said that he felt s u r e that this
could be done.
If t h i s p r o v e s t o b e s o , I t h i n k t h a t o n b a l a n c e a n
a g r e e m e n t would be to our advantage.
T h e a l t e r n a t i v e of a f i s h w a r
is horrible and has NATO r e p e r c u s s i o n s .
A D-H
F o r e i g n and C o m m o n w e a l t h
21 J u n e 1972
Office
ANNEX Icelandic Fisheries Dispute In his memorandum of 1 2 June (D0P(72) 30 ) the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs recommended that we should
attempt to reach agreement with Iceland on the basis of an effort
limitation scheme restricting the number of fishing days by British
vessels in the waters round Iceland,
Negotiations have now been
held on this basis, but it has been rejected by the Icelandic
Ministers.
They argued, quite without regard to the details of our
proposal, that it would mean that British trawlers would continue to
fish more or less as they have done hitherto.
They took no account
of our offer of a further reduction in total effort and insisted
that, apart from any areas which might be closed on a non­
discriminatory basis, there should be certain areas outside the
present 12 mile limit which were closed to British trawlers but open
to Icelandic trawlers.
AREA LIMITATION 2.
The Icelandic Ministers did not at this meeting define the areas
they had in mind.
They had previously proposed an arrangement under
which ­
a.
the whole area between 1 2 and 25 miles from the Icelandic
coast should be reserved for Icelandic vessels;
b.
the area between 25 and 5 0 miles should be divided into
6 sectors which would be open, 2 at a time, for a period of
4 months each to British vessels.
During the present discussion they indicated in vague terms that they
were prepared to drop the 25 mile limit.
It therefore seems that
the proposal we have to consider is that for a sector approach
covering the area between 1 2 and 5 0 miles from the Icelandic coast,
coupled with non-discriminatory reservation of certain other areas.
3.
In addition to the question of effort limitation or area
limitation the following points have also been discussed ­
a.
Freezer Trawlers The Icelandic delegation have insisted on the importance of excluding freezer trawlers and factory vessels.
We have said that we have no factory vessels and are prepared to consider exclusion of freezers. b.
Length Limitation The Icelandic delegation have not repeated their original requirement that fishing should be limited to vessels under 160 foot in length but have certainly not abandoned it. We have indicated that we could not consider a limitation of less than 200 foot.
(Apart from some of the freezers we have only one vessel
over 200 foot in length. c.
Traditional Fishing Vessels The Icelandic delegation originally asked that fishing should be limited to those vessels which had fished in Icelandic waters during the past two years.
This has not been discussed during the present round. d.
Enforcement
The Icelandic delegation have continued to insist upon Iceland's right to enforce whatever measures are agreed upon. We have told them that we are prepared to agree to joint verification but cannot accept Icelandic enforcement, e.
Duration
The Icelandic delegation have not contested that what is under consideration is purely an interim arrangement pending a substantive settlement as a result of our reference to the International Court or by other means.
terms of a one year duration.
They have talked in We have told them that this would be inadequate and that we should need 2 to 3 years., 2 COURT PROCEEDINGS 4.
Our substantive case is before the International Court,
Iceland
does not accept the Courts jurisdiction but we have asked the Court
1
to take the case, if necessary in Iceland s absence.
We have also
warned the Court that we may wish to seek an order on interim measures
to protect our fishing after 1 September.
No date has yet been aet
for a hearing on either point, but it we want to obtain an interim
order we shall need to start formal proceedings within the next few
weeks.
NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS 5.
We now have to recognise that there is no real prospect of
securing agreement with Iceland unless we are prepared to accept an
arrangement based primarily on the reservation of certain areas to
Icelandic vessels on a discriminatory basis.
It is possible that
we might be able to secure a settlement on this basis without
unacceptable prejudice to our fishery interests or to the principles
on which our application to the International Court is based.
We
should, however, seek to ensure that concessions were based upon the
principle embodied in the United Nations Resolution of 1 9 5 8 on
coastal fisheries which provides for preferential treatment of the
coastal state in certain circumstances.
a,
To this end we should need ­
to base an arrangement upon an alleged conservation need, flimsy though this pretext would be; b.
to make it clear that areas were closed by agreement between the 2 parties, not as of right by the Icelanders alone.
It might help us to secure a satisfactory agreement on this basis if
we were to maintain a nominal catch limitation at the proposed figure
of 1 8 5 , 0 0 0 tons, but we should withdraw the proposed effort
limitation.
There would be little doubt that an agreement would be
discriminatory in effect, but we should do what we can to make it
non-discriminatory in form.
3
6.
So far as the other types of restraint are concerned, our
negotiating position might be ­
a.
We could offer either to exclude freezers or to exclude
vessels over 200 foot in length.
the same.
The effect -would be much
The choice -would depend upon consultation with
the industry and with the Germans, who have a particular
interest in freezers.
b.
We could not concede Iceland any right to bring British
vessels to trial for offences outside the 1 2 mile limit.
c.
We should not agree to restrict fishing to vessels which have traditionally operated in Icelandic waters. TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS 7.
It is by no means certain that even with these concessions we
shall be able to reach agreement, but they give us a fair chance and
are indeed more than generous towards the Icelanders.
If we cannot
reach agreement we shall have to go quickly to the International
Court to start formal proceedings for an order on interim measures.
It therefore seems desirable to continue negotiations at Ministerial
level as soon as possible.
The Icelanders have proposed that
negotiations should be resumed in Reykjavik next week.
NAVAL PROTECTION 8.
We shall not be able to decide finally upon the question of
naval protection until we know the outcome not only of the next
round of negotiations but alsu of any application to the Court for
interim measures.
Nevertheless, given that the time for
preparation is now very short and that our negotiating stance is
affected by the subsequent action we may be prepared to take,
Ministers may now wish to consider the possible scale of naval
protection and the issues"it raises.
D0P(72) 3 1 .
These are set out in