(c) crown copyright Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/7/27 Image Reference:0001

advertisement
(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/7/27
Image Reference:0001
THIS DOCUMENT IS T H E PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
May 1940.
SECRET.
Copy N o .
W.M. (40)
132nd Conclusions.
TO
B E K E P T
U N D E R
LOCK
A N DK E Y .
It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR
CONCLUSIONS
C A B I N E T 132 ( 4 0 ) .
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing
S.W. 1, on Tuesday, May 21, 1940, at 1 1 - 3 0 A.M.
Street,
Present:
T h e R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the
The R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E CHAMBERLAIN,
M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The Right H o n . VISCOUNT HALIFAX,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n
Affairs.
Chair).
T h e R i g h t H o n . C. R . A T T L E E , M . P . ,
L o r d P r i v y Seal.
T h e R i g h t Hon. A . GREENWOOD, M . P . ,
Minister without Portfolio.
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t :
The R i g h t H o n . A . V . ALEXANDER, The R i g h t Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.,
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r .
The
Right
H o n . Sir ARCHIBALD The R i g h t H o n . Sir J O H N ANDERSON,
S I N C L A I R , B t . , M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of
M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r t h e
State for A i r .
H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of
H o m e Security.
T h e R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T CALDECOTE, T h e R i g h t H o n . A . D U F F C O O P E R , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r D o m i n i o n
M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n .
Affairs.
The
Right
H o n . LORD
HANKEY,
T h e R i g h t H o n . L O R D BEAVERBROOK,
Chancellor of t h e D u c h y of L a n c a s t e r
M i n i s t e r for A i r c r a f t
Production
(Item 13).
(Items 7 and 11).
The
Hon.
Sir
ALEXANDER
CADOGAN,
P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for F o r e i g n Affairs.
A d m i r a l of t h e Fleet S i r D U D L E Y
P O U N D , F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d C h i e f of
N a v a l Staff.
A i r Chief M a r s h a l Sir CYRIL L . N .
N E W A L L , Chief of t h e A i r Staff.
General
Chief
Staff.
Sir W. EDMUND IRONSIDE,
of t h e I m p e r i a l
General
Secretariat.
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
M a j o r - G e n e r a l H . L. I S M A Y .
Mr. W . D . WILKINSON.
Lieutenant-Colonel V . DYKES, R . E .
M r . E . P . DONALDSON.
M r . G. N . F L E M M I N G .
f213201
B
WAR
CABINET
132
(40).
CONTENTS.
Minute
No.
Subject.
Page
1
The Western Front and A i r Operations
Progress of operations on the Western Front.
Air operations over France and Belgium.
Air attacks on enemy ships.
2
The Naval Situation
3
Norway ...
...
...
Operations at Narvik.
4
The Netherlands
Accommodation for the Netherland Government.
204
5
Italy
Possible attack on Yugoslavia.
204
Italy
Possible intentions.
204
Italy
Possible plan for blocking the Suez Canal.
205
U.S.S.R
Suggested despatch of a special envoy to Moscow.
205
Spain
...
Proposal for economic assistance.
205
9
...
...
...
...
...
203
...
203
Netherland East Indies
Japanese policy.
...
206
11
D e m o l i t i o n s i n N o r t h e r n F r e n c h p o r t s a n d i n B e l g i u m ....
Calais and Boulogne.
Ghent and Bruges.
206
12
I n v a s i o n of G r e a t B r i t a i n
...
...
...
...
10
...
...
201
...
...
...
206
...
...
...
208
Possibility of seaborne and airborne attack.
13
Aircraft Production
14
The Netherlands and Belgium
Reception of war refugees.
...
...
...
209
The Western
Front and Air
Operations.
1. The Prime Minister
s a i d t h a t the Chief of the I m p e r i a l
G e n e r a l Staff, who h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d from F l a n d e r s , would give t h e
W a r C a b i n e t his a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t state of affairs on t h e
G e n e r a l I r o n s i d e h a d h a d a n a r r o w escape
Progress of the W e s t e r n F r o n t .
t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t w h e n h i s hotel at C a l a i s h a d received a d i r e c t h i t
operations on
from a G e r m a n bomb.
the Western
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t the s i t u a t i o n w a s more f a v o u r a b l e
Front.
t h a n c e r t a i n of t h e more obvious s y m p t o m s would indicate. T h e
(Previous
most d a n g e r o u s of these symptoms w a s t h a t a G e r m a n a r m o u r e d
Eef erence:
W.M. (40) 131st column, w h i c h h a d been r e p o r t e d in s t r e n g t h at A m i e n s , h a d now
e n t e r e d Abbeville, a n d held t h a t town. A n o t h e r a r m o u r e d column
Conclusions,
h a d been seen p a s s i n g F r e v e n t .
I t w a s probably m a k i n g for
Minute 1.)
Boulogne. T w o b a t t a l i o n s of G u a r d s w e r e being sent to Boulogne
i n d e s t r o y e r s in o r d e r to hold t h a t t o w n a g a i n s t the G e r m a n column.
O u r forces still enjoyed a n o v e r w h e l m i n g s u p e r i o r i t y of
n u m b e r s in t h i s t h e a t r e of o p e r a t i o n s . W e m u s t now be r e a d y t o
fight h a r d u n d e r o p e n w a r f a r e conditions.
T h e G e r m a n s h a d probably left v e r y small forces, if any, b e h i n d
to hold the t o w n s t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e y h a d passed. C a m b r a i w a s
believed to be p r a c t i c a l l y e m p t y of G e r m a n s . W e h a d held A r r a s ,
a l t h o u g h G e r m a n a r m o u r e d fighting vehicles were r e p o r t e d on all
t h e r o a d s r o u n d t h e town.
T w o B r i t i s h divisions w e r e now
o p e r a t i n g i n t h i s t h e a t r e to t h e south a n d west of A r r a s ; it w a s
h o p e d t h a t a t h i r d division w o u l d j o i n t h e m t h a t day.
T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff h a d found G e n e r a l
Billotte, w h o w a s i n c o m m a n d of t h e F r e n c h left, in a s t a t e of
indecision, b u t h a d g a l v a n i s e d h i m i n t o g i v i n g o r d e r s for a counter­
a t t a c k s o u t h w a r d s from t h e D o u a i - V a l e n c i e n n e s area, in w h i c h he
h a d some e i g h t F r e n c h divisions at h i s disposal. T h e r e seemed no
reason why the c o u n t e r - a t t a c k should not r e s u l t in r e t a k i n g
Cambrai. General Weygand was visiting Flanders that day and
w o u l d see b o t h L o r d G o r t a n d G e n e r a l Billotte.
The Secretary
with Lord Gort.
of State
for War r e a d an e x c h a n g e of t e l e g r a m s
The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, in the course of a.
s t a t e m e n t r e p o r t i n g the r e s u l t s of h i s v i s i t to F l a n d e r s , b r o u g h t o u t
t h e following p o i n t s :—
(i) I n d e c i s i o n h a d r e i g n e d in t h e F r e n c h H i g h C o m m a n d i n
t h e n o r t h u n t i l the a r r i v a l of G e n e r a l W e y g a n d a n d
himself. G e n e r a l B i l l o t t e w a s e x p r e s s i n g the gloomiest
forebodings, b u t w a s d o i n g n o t h i n g . H e h a d failed to
c a r r y o u t h i s d u t i e s of c o - o r d i n a t i o n for the last e i g h t
days, a n d a p p e a r e d to have no p l a n s . H e ( G e n e r a l
I r o n s i d e ) h a d c o m p l a i n e d on t h e telephone to G e n e r a l
W e y g a n d , w h o h a d spoken s h a r p l y to G e n e r a l Billotte.
(ii) H e believed t h a t t h e r e w a s n o t h i n g w r o n g w i t h t h e F r e n c h
t r o o p s themselves in F l a n d e r s .
The British Expedi­
t i o n a r y Force w e r e in very good h e a r t , a n d ready for t h e
fight.
T h e y h a d seen p r a c t i c a l l y no fighting so f a r a n d
t h e i r t o t a l c a s u a l t i e s i n t h e field were only of t h e order
of 500.
On one occasion our men h a d dealt very
effectively w i t h a low-flying a t t a c k by G e r m a n a i r c r a f t ;
they h a d b r o u g h t down n i n e of the enemy w i t h t h e i r
B r e n g u n s , a n d the low-flying a t t a c k h a d t h e r e u p o n
ceased.
On the whole, our own H i g h C o m m a n d w e r e
s t a n d i n g u p well to the s i t u a t i o n , a l t h o u g h one or t w o
c h a n g e s h a d been m a d e a m o n g t h e corps a n d d i v i s i o n a l
commanders.
(iii) One of o u r p r i n c i p a l difficulties w a s the s t a t e of o u r lines
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . These w e r e crossed by F r e n c h lines
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n a n y event, all t h e r o a d s on b o t h
[21320]
'
B 2
lines w e r e filled w i t h h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of
refugees from B e l g i u m a n d the n o r t h e r n F r e n c h towns.
T h e crowds on t h e r o a d s included some s t r a g g l e r s from
t h e D u t c h A r m y . T h e w o r s t f e a t u r e w a s t h e confusion
i n t h e towns t h r o u g h w h i c h these r o a d s passed,
(iv) T h e first t h i n g to be done, in order to get a g r i p on the
s i t u a t i o n south a n d w e s t of A r r a s , w a s to clear t h e
t o w n s of refugees, to block e n t r a n c e s to t h e towns a n d
to hold t h e m w i t h our troops. Once we h a d occupied in
t h i s w a y such n o d a l p o i n t s as Doullens, F r e v e n t , St. Pol,
A l b e r t a n d B a p a u m e , we should h a v e gone a long w a y
t o w a r d s s e t t l i n g the problem of t h e G e r m a n a r m o u r e d
columns w h i c h h a d t a k e n us in t h e r e a r . Some of t h e
t o w n s he h a d m e n t i o n e d w e r e not, s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , in
t h e B . E . F . sector, but t h i s w a s no t i m e for s t a n d i n g on
ceremony.
(v) T h e n e x t step would be to deal w i t h t h e G e r m a n a r m o u r e d
columns themselves.
V e r y q u i c k action w o u l d be
n e c e s s a r y ; otherwise t h e G e r m a n s would receive con­
siderable reinforcements by p a r a c h u t e a n d by troop­
c a r r y i n g a i r c r a f t . A B r i t i s h force, consisting of both
a r m o u r e d fighting vehicles a n d i n f a n t r y would h a v e to
be collected a t once. T h e A r m o u r e d Division, w h i c h
w a s on the w a y to t h e scene of o p e r a t i o n s , m i g h t f o r m
the nucleus of such a force.
G e n e r a l E v a n s , its
C o m m a n d e r , h a d l a n d e d a t H a v r e w i t h h i s staff, b u t t h e
first u n i t s of t h e Division h a d h a d to be d i v e r t e d to
C h e r b o u r g , owing to t h e recent a i r a t t a c k on H a v r e .
(vi) T h e G e r m a n a r m o u r e d columns p r o b a b l y consisted of
m e d i u m t a n k s a n d motorised i n f a n t r y . One of t h e m
h a d been observed p a s s i n g a given p o i n t i n a b o u t
25 m i n u t e s , a n d w a s e s t i m a t e d to comprise some 5,000
or 6,000 troops.
(vii) T h e r e w e r e a c e r t a i n n u m b e r of t r o o p s in towns on t h e
. . lines of communication,
such as Abbeville,
but
considerable forces w e r e needed to hold u p a r m o u r e d
columns. Nevertheless, a n t i - t a n k g u n s w e r e b e i n g sent
o u t of t h e line to these forces in o r d e r t h a t they m i g h t
e s t a b l i s h blocks a t t h e m a i n r o a d j u n c t i o n s ,
(viii) I n t h e confused fighting t h a t would be going on i t w a s
very probable t h a t G e n e r a l Georges would n o t have
u p - t o - d a t e i n f o r m a t i o n of t h e e n e m y ' s movements. T h e
n o r m a l liaison channels t h r o u g h H e a d q u a r t e r s , B r i t i s h
A i r Forces in F r a n c e m i g h t not suffice to call u p a i r
s u p p o r t quickly a g a i n s t profitable t a r g e t s for b o m b i n g
by o u r a i r forces in t h e A m i e n s - A r r a s a r e a .
The Prime
Minister
expressed t h e g r a t i t u d e of t h e W a r
C a b i n e t to t h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff for d e a l i n g so
p r o m p t l y a n d vigorously w i t h the s i t u a t i o n in F r a n c e .
He
suggested t h a t t h e Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff a n d t h e
Chief of the A i r Staff should concert together a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r
e n s u r i n g t h a t p r o m p t a n d a d e q u a t e a i r s u p p o r t could be p r o v i d e d to
t h e o p e r a t i o n s of o u r forces in t h e A m i e n s - A r r a s a r e a .
Air operations
The Chief of the Air Staff r e p o r t e d t h a t a force of B l e n h e i m s
over France and h a d c a r r i e d o u t a t t a c k s on columns of a r m o u r e d vehicles in t h e
Belgium.
a r e a A r r a s - C a m b r a i on t h e m o r n i n g of t h e 2 0 t h M a y . V i l l a g e s
packed w i t h t r o o p s h a d been bombed a n d several b u r s t s h a d been
observed on columns of t r o o p s on t h e r o a d s .
I n the a f t e r n o o n 23 a i r c r a f t , heavily escorted by fighters, h a d
a t t a c k e d enemy columns in t h e a r e a A r r a s - B a p a u m e .
One
H u r r i c a n e h a d been lost, b u t one enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been shot down,
a n d possibly a n o t h e r as well. V a r i o u s successful a t t a c k s h a d been
m a d e a g a i n s t t r a n s p o r t a n d troops.
Air attacks on
enemy ships.
91 bombers h a d been o p e r a t i n g last n i g h t . E n e m y c o n c e n t r a ­
t i o n s in t h e C a m b r a i - L e C a t e a u - H i r s o n - V e r v i n s - S t . Q u e n t i n a r e a
h a d been a t t a c k e d . T h e following places h a d been r e p o r t e d as full
of t r o o p s : Valenciennes, F o r e t de M o r m a l , V i s , F o r e t d e Nouvion.
N o movement h a d been seen west a n d n o r t h of A u b i g n y . A p e t r o l
convoy seemed to have been h i t n e a r Nouvion, since h i g h flames a n d
m a n y explosions h a d been seen. A t r a i n h a d been h i t n e a r H i r s o n .
18 B l e n h e i m s h a d a t t a c k e d columns i n t h e a r e a A u d e n a r d e ­
G r a m m o n t - H a l . One column a mile a n d a h a l f long h a d been
attacked.
N o r e p o r t s h a d been received from t h e A i r C o m p o n e n t or t h e
A d v a n c e d A i r S t r i k i n g F o r c e o w i n g to t h e i n t e r r u p t i o n s of
communications with France.
E a r l y on the m o r n i n g of t h e 21st, a n enemy column on t h e
A m i e n s - A b b e v i l l e road h a d been a t t a c k e d . A s q u a d r o n of fighters
w a s o p e r a t i n g from K e n t over t h e L e n s a r e a .
A H u d s o n h a d bombed a n e n e m y p a t r o l vessel 100 miles w e s t
of t h e H o r n s Reef a n d o b t a i n e d a direct hit, leaving t h e s h i p i n
a s i n k i n g condition. A force of 8 enemy m o t o r t o r p e d o boats
46 miles n o r t h of t h e H o o k h a d also been a t t a c k e d .
A later
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e h a d r e p o r t e d only 7 boats visible, a n d i t seemed
likely t h a t one h a d been s u n k by o u r a i r c r a f t . M o r e a i r c r a f t h a d
gone to t r y a n d m a k e a f u r t h e r a t t a c k on t h i s force. One of o u r
a i r c r a f t w a s missing.
Six aircraft had carried out mine-laying operations.
T h e oil t a n k s a t R o t t e r d a m , w h i c h h a d been left u n d e s t r o y e d
a n d w e r e believed to c o n t a i n 11,000 tons of a v i a t i o n s p i r i t , h a d
been successfully a t t a c k e d d u r i n g the n i g h t .
L a r g e fires a n d
explosions w e r e seen.
The W a r C a b i n e t ­
(i) Took note of t h e above s t a t e m e n t s .
(ii) I n v i t e d t h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff a n d t h e
Chief of t h e Air Staff to e n s u r e t h a t a d e q u a t e a r r a n g e ­
m e n t s w e r e m a d e for quickly a n s w e r i n g calls for a i r
s u p p o r t in t h e a r e a of t h e B r i t i s h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force.
2. The First Sea Lord r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e cables between t h e
E a s t C o a s t a n d B o r k u m a n d N o r d e r n e y h a d all been cut.
T h e blockships for t h e B e l g i a n p o r t s w e r e a t 30 m i n u t e s ' notice.
(Previous
T h e S w e d i s h s h i p Erik Frisell (5,066 tons) h a d been s u n k by
Bef erence:
W M (40) 131st g u n f i by a U - b o a t 35 miles south-west of St. K i l d a on the m o r n i n g
The Naval
Situation.
r e
Conclusions,
Minute 1 ) '
o
f
t
n
e
1 9 t i l
May.
F r e n c h destroyer a n d t w o oilers h a d been s u n k off D u n k e r q u e
in the r a i d d u r i n g t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t . T h e r e h a d been several a i r
a t t a c k s on s h i p p i n g in t h e D o w n s a n d the C h a n n e l , b u t l i t t l e d a m a g e
h a d resulted.
D e t a i l s w e r e given of t h e a i r r a i d on H a v r e t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t
a n d of t h e d a m a g e caused.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above s t a t e m e n t .
Norway.
Operations at Narvik. (Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 131st
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
3. The Chief of Naval Staff said t h a t a p e t r o l c a r r i e r
N a r v i k h a d been bombed a n d destroyed by fire.
at
The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
r e f e r r e d to t h e
p o l i t i c a l aspects of a f a i l u r e to t a k e N a r v i k . T e l e g r a m s h a d been
sent to H i s M a j e s t y ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in N o r w a y a n d Sweden to t h e
effect t h a t t h e r e w a s no need for t h e m to discuss a n y f u r t h e r t h e
(Previous
p r o p o s a l for a cessation of hostilities i n N o r t h e r n N o r w a y . I f a t
t i m e it w a s found necessary, for m i l i t a r y reasons, to w i t h d r a w
Reference:
W.M. (40) 129th from Norvik, t h i s p r o p o s a l m i g h t , a f t e r all, p r o v e valuable.
He
Conclusions,
t h e r e f o r e d i d not propose t o close the door on t h i s p r o p o s a l u n t i l i t
Minute 3.)
e n how the s i t u a t i o n developed.
a
n
w
a
v
s
s e
T h e W a r C a b i n e t agreed w i t h t h e action proposed by the
F o r e i g n Secretary.
4. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs s a i d t h a t the
N e t h e r l a n d F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r h a d called on h i m t h a t m o r n i n g a n d
Accommodation h a d asked w h e t h e r H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t would a p p r o v e t h e
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e N e t h e r l a n d G o v e r n m e n t i n London, w h e r e they
for the
h a d o b t a i n e d suitable office accommodation. T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y
Netherland
h a d expressed h i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h i s p r o p o s a l , subject to the
Government.
a p p r o v a l of the W a r Cabinet.
(Previous
The
Netherlands.
Reference:
W.M. (39) 81st
Conclusions,
Minute 7.)
Italy.
Possible attack
on Yugoslavia.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 126th
Conclusions,
Minute 8.)
The W a r C a b i n e t I n v i t e d the F o r e i g n Secretary to confirm the p r o v i s i o n a l
a p p r o v a l w h i c h he h a d given to t h e N e t h e r l a n d Govern­
m e n t to establish themselves in L o n d o n .
5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w a t t e n t i o n
to t e l e g r a m No. 231 D I P P , d a t e d the 2 0 t h May,' from H i s M a j e s t y ' s
A m b a s s a d o r in P a r i s , r e p o r t i n g t h a t t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t
considered i n o p p o r t u n e the d e c l a r a t i o n w h i c h we h a d suggested
should be m a d e in t h e event of a n I t a l i a n a t t a c k on Yugoslavia. I t
d i d not seem possible to p u r s u e the m a t t e r f u r t h e r a t t h e p r e s e n t
m o m e n t otherwise t h a n by a s k i n g the T u r k i s h G o v e r n m e n t for t h e i r
views.
T h e W a r Cabinet took note of t h i s s t a t e m e n t .
Italy.
Possible
intentions.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 131st
Conclusions,
Minutes 6
and 7.)
6. The Secretary
of State for Foreign
Affairs
said t h a t
S i r P e r c y L o r a i n e w a s to see C o u n t C i a n o t h a t day, b u t t h a t he h a d
no f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n as to t h e i n t e n t i o n s of the I t a l i a n Govern­
m e n t . W e had, however, now h e a r d t h a t t h e I t a l i a n s were a n x i o u s
to proceed w i t h t h e p r o p o s e d discussions on c o n t r a b a n d policy.
The Prime Minister
r e m i n d e d t h e W a r C a b i n e t t h a t he h a d
been p r o p o s i n g to m a k e a s t a t e m e n t t h a t a f t e r n o o n in the H o u s e of
Commons on our policy in r e g a r d to I t a l y . I n the l i g h t of t h e
s i t u a t i o n as i t h a d developed, a n d in p a r t i c u l a r the D u c e ' s r e p l y t o
h i s p e r s o n a l message, he much doubted w h e t h e r a s t a t e m e n t on the
lines proposed would serve a n y useful p u r p o s e , w h i l e i t m i g h t well
involve us in a n unprofitable exchange.
T h e r e w a s g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h i s view.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs s a i d t h a t t h e r e w a s
some reason to believe t h a t the I t a l i a n A m b a s s a d o r in P a r i s h a d
been told t h a t such a s t a t e m e n t w a s to be m a d e . H e t h o u g h t ,
however, t h a t we should have no difficulty in a n s w e r i n g any question
as to w h y we h a d c h a n g e d o u r - m i n d s on t h e m a t t e r .
Italy.
Possible plan for
blocking the
Suez Canal.
(Previous
Eef erence:
W.M. (40) 129th
Conclusions,
Minute 5.)
7. The Chief of Naval Staff r e f e r r e d to the r e p o r t t h a t a n
I t a l i a n a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r of 5,000 t o n s w a s shortly l e a v i n g T o b r u k ,
w o u l d p a s s t h r o u g h the Suez C a n a l on the 2 5 t h M a y a n d w o u l d
r e a c h M a s s a w a on the 2 7 t h M a y . I t w a s not a t all clear w h a t
p u r p o s e t h i s movement would serve, a n d it w a s necessary to
consider the possibility t h a t the a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r w o u l d be a very
convenient s h i p w i t h w h i c h to block t h e C a n a l . A r m e d g u a r d s w e r e
placed on m e r c h a n t ships p a s s i n g t h r o u g h t h e C a n a l to p r e v e n t a n y
such action, b u t n o t on men-of-war.
I n t h e course of discussion, i t w a s suggested t h a t we m i g h t
m a k e e n q u i r i e s of t h e I t a l i a n Government, p u t t i n g to t h e m b l u n t l y
t h a t we h a d received t h i s r e p o r t of t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s . Also, t h a t
a r r a n g e m e n t s should be m a d e to enable the C a n a l t o be t e m p o r a r i l y
blocked a t s h o r t notice if we w a n t e d to p l a y for t i m e in r e g a r d to
t h e p a s s a g e of t h i s a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r .
The W a r C a b i n e t ­
(i) I n v i t e d t h e Chief of N a v a l Staff to e n d e a v o u r to o b t a i n
f u r t h e r details, t h r o u g h the N a v a l A t t a c h e in Rome, i n
r e g a r d to the movements of t h i s vessel,
(ii) I n v i t e d t h e F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y to i n s t r u c t t h e
Senior N a v a l Officer in t h e C a n a l Zone t o get i n t o touch
w i t h t h e local officials of t h e Suez C a n a l C o m p a n y , w i t h
a view to a r r a n g i n g for a t e m p o r a r y blockage of the
C a n a l , if it should be r e q u i r e d ,
(iii) I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs to
e x p l a i n the p o s i t i o n to H i s M a j e s t y ' s A m b a s s a d o r a t
Rome, a n d to a s c e r t a i n if he f a v o u r e d a d i r e c t a p p r o a c h
to t h e I t a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t on t h i s m a t t e r .
U.S.S.R.
S u ^ e s t e d despatch of a
special Envoy to
Moscow.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 129th
Conclusions,
Minute 7.) '
a
8. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs said, w i t h t h e
M i n i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e , h e h a d now seen S i r Stafford
C r i p p s , a n d t h a t t h e l a t t e r h a d a g r e e d t o u n d e r t a k e t h e suggested
Mission to Moscow on behalf of H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t .
H e h a d also seen M. Maisky, a n d h a d told h i m , in a n s w e r to
question, t h a t , while t h e Mission w a s i n t e n d e d to be p r i m a r i l y
concerned w i t h t r a d e m a t t e r s , S i r Stafford C r i p p s w o u l d have full
liberty to discuss a n y o t h e r m a t t e r w h i c h m i g h t a r i s e .
M. M a i s k y h a d expressed himself as m u c h pleased w i t h t h e
suggestion, a n d h a d said t h a t he expected to receive a reply from
h i s G o v e r n m e n t in t w o or t h r e e d a y s ' t i m e .
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of t h i s s t a t e m e n t .
Spain.
(Previous
References:
W.M. (40) 131st
Conclusions,
Minute 5,
and 123rd
Conclusions,
Minute 12.).
Proposal for
economic
assistance.
9. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, r e m i n d e d t h e
W a r C a b i n e t of t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s contemplated for p r o v i d i n g
S p a i n , t h r o u g h P o r t u g a l , w i t h economic a s s i s t a n c e w h i c h it w a s
h o p e d would help to p r e v e n t u n s a t i s f a c t o r y developments in S p a i n .
These a r r a n g e m e n t s h a d now been a g r e e d w i t h t h e D e p a r t m e n t s
concerned.'
M r . Eccles of t h e M i n i s t r y of Economic W a r f a r e w a s r e t u r n i n g
to P o r t u g a l on t h e following day, w h e r e he would see D r . S a l a z a r
w i t h a view t o p u t t i n g m a t t e r s in t r a i n .
C a b i n e t took note of t h i s s t a t e m e n t .
T
h
e
W
a
r
Netherland East
10. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w a t t e n t i o n
Indies.
to t e l e g r a m No. 795 from H i s M a j e s t y ' s A m b a s s a d o r , Tokyo,
Japanese policy. r e p o r t i n g a s follows :—
(Previous
A member of t h e E m b a s s y Staff h a d been told i n J a p a n e s e
Reference:
official q u a r t e r s t h a t t h e question of t h e N e t h e r l a n d E a s t
W.M. (40) 127th
I n d i e s could now be r e g a r d e d as settled, a n d t h a t , unless some
Conclusions,
o t h e r P o w e r intervened, t h e J a p a n e s e fleet w o u l d n o t move
Minute 6.)
south.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of this s t a t e m e n t .
Demolitions in
1 1 . The Chancellor
of the Duchy of Lancaster
said that
Northern French d u r i n g t h e l a s t few days p l a n s h a d been worked Out a n d p r e p a r a ­
Ports and in
tions m a d e for c a r r y i n g o u t demolitions in N o r t h e r n F r e n c h p o r t s .
Belgium.
I n view of t h e m e n a c i n g s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d to C a l a i s a n d
Boulogne, N a v a l demolition p a r t i e s h a d been o r g a n i s e d a n d would
Calais and
be r e a d y to sail d u r i n g t h e course of t h e afternoon.
Boulogne.
The Prime Minister t h o u g h t t h a t there w a s no i m m e d i a t e r i s k
of t h e G e r m a n s o c c u p y i n g the F r e n c h p o r t s i n s t r e n g t h .
The Secretary
of State for War said t h a t t w o b a t t a l i o n s w e r e
being sent t o Boulogne to d e a l w i t h a n y G e r m a n a d v a n c e d forces
w h i c h m i g h t m a n a g e to reach t h e p o r t .
Ghent and
Bruges.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 118th
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster said t h a t he h a d no
i n f o r m a t i o n as to w h e t h e r demolitions a t G h e n t a n d B r u g e s h a d
been or w o u l d be c a r r i e d out.
These demolitions h a d been a
responsibility of t h e F r e n c h a u t h o r i t i e s , b u t the F r e n c h t r o o p s h a d
been w i t h d r a w n from n o r t h e r n Belgium.
The Prime Minister suggested t h a t the Chancellor of t h e D u c h y
of L a n c a s t e r should get i n t o touch w i t h A d m i r a l Keyes a n d invite
him to do e v e r y t h i n g possible to ensure t h a t t h e demolitions w e r e
effected.
The W a r Cabinet agreed : —
(1) T h a t the demolition p a r t i e s should proceed to C a l a i s a n d
Boulogne forthwith.
(2) T h a t t h e officer i n c o m m a n d of the p a r t i e s should h a v e
a u t h o r i t y to d e s t r o y a n y stores of p e t r o l i n these two
p o r t s , if t h i s course was necessary to d e n y t h e m to t h e
Germans.
(3) T h a t save as i n (2), no demolitions should be effected
w i t h o u t i n s t r u c t i o n s from the A d m i r a l t y .
Invasion of
Great Britain.
Possibility of
seaborne and
airborne attack.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 116th
Conclusions,
Minute 1.)
12. T h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d before them a R e p o r t by t h e Chiefs
of Staff C o m m i t t e e , ^ i n collaboration w i t h t h e M i n i s t r y of H o m e
Security, on Seaborne a n d A i r b o r n e a t t a c k on t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m ( W . P . (40) 153).
The Prime Minister
suggested t h a t the W a r C a b i n e t should
give the R e p o r t t h e i r g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l . H e did n o t feel, however,
t h a t every aspect of t h e problem h a d been covered a n d h e t h o u g h t
t h a t f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be given to t h e m a t t e r i n t h e
following week i n the l i g h t of an a p p r e c i a t i o n w h i c h w a s being
p r e p a r e d by officers of t h e t h r e e Services of t h e possibilities o f
a t t a c k looked a t from t h e e n e m y ' s p o i n t of view.
1
1 d £
I n discussion, the following p o i n t s w e r e r a i s e d :—
(Previous
Eef erence:
W.M. (40) 127th
Conclusions,
Minute 16.)
Fortifications.
(1) The Lord Privy Seal r e f e r r e d to t h e absence of fortifications
i n s i d e t h i s country. I t m i g h t be desirable to establish
s t r o n g p o i n t s a t a n u m b e r of places to form centres of
resistance a g a i n s t t r o o p s l a n d e d from t h e air, u n t i l
. mobile t r o o p s could be c o n c e n t r a t e d to destroy them.
The Secretary of State
u p t h i s suggestion.
(Previous
Eef erence:
W.M. (40) Con­
clusions 119 A,
Minute 4.)
for War u n d e r t o o k to follow
Arming
of Police.
(2) I n reply to a question, the Secretary
of State for Home
Affairs
and Minister
of Home Security
said t h a t t h e
Commissioner of M e t r o p o l i t a n Police, after
full
discussion w i t h h i s Chief S u p e r i n t e n d e n t s , w a s opposed
to the a r m i n g of t h e Police. O n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n of
t h e Police h a d been t r a i n e d i n t h e use of fire-arms, a n d
i n the C o m m i s s i o n e r ^ view, p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e r e w a s
no s h o r t a g e of personnel who could be armed, the Police
should be k e p t for civil police work, of w h i c h t h e r e would
be plenty, while t h e available a r m s were issued to other­
personnel. (3) The Prime Minister w a s r e l u c t a n t t o accept t h e view t h a t
t h e police should not be a r m e d .
I n m a n y instances,
foreign police forces c a r r i e d a r m s ; a n d he t h o u g h t t h a t
the m a t t e r should be f u r t h e r e x a m i n e d before a n y final
decision w a s reached.
Supply of
fire-arms.
Supply of
fire-arms.
(4) The Secretary of State for War s a i d t h a t , a t t h e moment,
there were not sufficient rifles a n d pistols to a r m all t h e
men w h o h a d volunteered. I t w a s suggested t h a t the
question of o b t a i n i n g f u r t h e r s u p p l i e s of pistols a n d
shotguns, by w i t h d r a w a l from p r i v a t e persons, should
be considered.
Supreme authority in event of
invasion.
(5) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asked w h e t h e r
i t w a s q u i t e clear t h a t , i n t h e event of seaborne or a i r ­
borne invasion, s u p r e m e a u t h o r i t y devolved on the
military authorities.
The Secretary
of State
for Home Affairs
and
Minister
of Home Security
s a i d t h a t R e g i o n a l Com­
missioners were i n the closest touch w i t h the M i l i t a r y
a u t h o r i t i e s a n d i t w a s q u i t e clear t h a t , in the event of
invasion, the M i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s took command.
Defence of aerodromes and aircraft
factories.
(6) The Ijord President
of the Council
t h o u g h t t h a t first
p r i o r i t y should be given to t h e defence of aerodromes
a n d a i r c r a f t factories, more especially the two v i t a l
factories p r o d u c i n g engines for o u r fighters.
The W a r C a b i n e t ­
(i) Gave general a p p r o v a l to the r e p o r t of the Chiefs of Staff
( W . P . (40) 153), a n d in p a r t i c u l a r
gave
covering
a p p r o v a l to the s e t t i n g u p of a H o m e Defence Executive,
(ii) Took note t h a t the problem of Defence a g a i n s t seaborne a n d a i r b o r n e a t t a c k was b e i n g m a d e the subject of f u r t h e r intensive study, a n d t h a t "it would a g a i n be b r o u g h t before M i n i s t e r s i n a b o u t a w e e k ' s time. [21320] '
c
(iii) A s k e d t h a t c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of t h e problem should be
f u r t h e r e x a m i n e d as below :—
(a) T h e Secretary of S t a t e for W a r w a s a s k e d to investi­
g a t e w h a t a r r a n g e m e n t s w e r e b e i n g m a d e for the
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of s t r o n g p o i n t s i n t h e a r e a s where
a i r b o r n e invasion w a s m o s t likely to be a t t e m p t e d .
(ft) T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for H o m e Affairs a n d the
M i n i s t e r of H o m e S e c u r i t y w a s a s k e d to consider
f u r t h e r , i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y of
S t a t e for W a r , w h e t h e r t h e police should be
armed.
(c) T h e Secretary of S t a t e for H o m e Affairs w a s asked
to i n v e s t i g a t e t h e possibility of s u p p l e m e n t i n g the
stocks of small a r m s a v a i l a b l e to the a u t h o r i t i e s
by collecting s h o t g u n s a n d pistols from p r i v a t e
persons.
Aircraft
Production.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 127th
Conclusions
Minute 14.)'
13. The Lord Privy Seal r e p o r t e d to t h e W a r C a b i n e t t h a t
a g r e e m e n t h a d been reached on two o u t of t h e t h r e e p o i n t s which
were r e m i t t e d to h i m for a r b i t r a t i o n a t t h e m e e t i n g held on
S a t u r d a y , the 18th May. On t h e t h i r d p o i n t , r e l a t i n g to t h e supply
of a i r c r a f t to C a n a d a , the W a r C a b i n e t h a d before t h e m M e m o r a n d a
by the M i n i s t e r for A i r c r a f t P r o d u c t i o n a n d by t h e S e c r e t a r y of
S t a t e for A i r ( W . P . (40) 160 a n d 161).
T h e p r o p o s a l w a s to w i t h h o l d t h e d e s p a t c h to C a n a d a of A n s o n
a n d B a t t l e a i r c r a f t to be used for t h e t r a i n i n g of pilots, observers
a n d a i r g u n n e r s . I t w a s a q u e s t i o n of w e i g h i n g t h e a d v a n t a g e of
an i m m e d i a t e a d d i t i o n to our a i r s t r e n g t h in m e d i u m bombers,
a g a i n s t t h e prospective provision of p i l o t s a s a l o n g - t e r m policy.
T h e r e w a s no evidence t h a t o t h e r a i r c r a f t w e r e available to t a k e t h e
place of the machines proposed to be w i t h h e l d . T h e a t t i t u d e of the
D o m i n i o n G o v e r n m e n t s w a s likely to be u n f a v o u r a b l e to a cessation,
a n d i t w a s i m p o r t a n t to m a i n t a i n a c o n t i n u o u s s u p p l y of t r a i n e d
flying personnel. I n these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , he h a d r e a c h e d t h e con­
clusion t h a t t h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y small a d d i t i o n to o u r a i r s t r e n g t h
represented by the a i r c r a f t b e i n g d e s p a t c h e d to C a n a d a w a s
insufficient to j u s t i f y a t p r e s e n t t h e w i t h h o l d i n g of t h e delivery of
these machines.
T h e following w e r e the m a i n p o i n t s m a d e in t h e discussion : —
(1) The Minister for Aircraft
Production
s t a t e d t h a t he h a d t h a t
m o r n i n g received a n u n d e r t a k i n g from Messrs. B r y a n
A l l e n t h a t they could p r o d u c e 100 L y c o m i n g engines a
m o n t h w h i c h were s u i t a b l e for fitting to B a t t l e s a n d
A n s o n a i r c r a f t . H e suggested, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e RollsM e r l i n a n d C h e e t a h e n g i n e s n o w fitted to these a i r f r a m e s
should be taken out a n d fitted i n t o a i r f r a m e s now in
reserve, b u t for w h i c h no e n g i n e s w e r e i m m e d i a t e l y
available.
The Secretary of State for Air suggested t h a t t h i s
w a s a new p r o p o s a l w h i c h he w o u l d g l a d l y discuss w i t h
the M i n i s t e r .
(2) The Secretary
of State for Dominion
Affairs
p o i n t e d out
t h a t the A i r T r a i n i n g Scheme h a d been a g r e e d w i t h the
D o m i n i o n G o v e r n m e n t s of A u s t r a l i a , N e w Z e a l a n d a n d
Canada.
E l e m e n t a r y t r a i n i n g w a s c a r r i e d o u t in
A u s t r a l i a a n d N e w Z e a l a n d , a n d more a d v a n c e d t r a i n i n g
in C a n a d a . I f t h e r e w a s to be a n y g a p in t h e s u p p l y
of a i r c r a f t for t r a i n i n g , w e m i g h t h a v e to ask the
D o m i n i o n G o v e r n m e n t s to a c c e p t a modification of t h e
a g r e e d scheme.
(3) The Secretary of State for Air p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e were
a l r e a d y 700 a i r c r a f t of the types i n question in store,
for w h i c h e q u i p m e n t would have to be found before the
A n s o n s a n d B a t t l e s , d u e for despatch to C a n a d a , could
be r e a d a p t e d for o p e r a t i o n a l use. I t w a s suggested t h a t
the provision, for t h e B a t t l e s a n d A n s o n s due for
d e s p a t c h to C a n a d a , of the items of e q u i p m e n t w h i c h
were in s h o r t s u p p l y , w a s likely to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the
provision of e q u i p m e n t for more m o d e r n types.
(4) The Prime Minister
said t h a t B a t t l e a i r c r a f t w e r e being
used on t h e front to-day, a n d t h a t they were likely to be
i n c r e a s i n g l y useful in t h e course of t h e n e x t two months,
if t h e enemy w e r e to establish bases closer to the U n i t e d
Kingdom, a n d w e r e to obtain a foothold on the F r e n c h
coast. T h e types of a i r c r a f t now i n question were not
those of t h e first efficiency, b u t if w e r a n short of the
better t y p e s it would be unwise to d e p r i v e ourselves of
the second-best in t h e l i f e - a n d - d e a t h s t r u g g l e w h i c h we
m i g h t have to face in t h e next few weeks. Although, the
n u m b e r of m a c h i n e s involved w a s inconsiderable, he
t h o u g h t t h a t i t w o u l d be d a n g e r o u s to send a w a y from
the c o u n t r y even a small number of a i r c r a f t , if they could
be used for o p e r a t i o n a l purposes in the n e a r f u t u r e .
T h e s u p p l y of pilots, t h o u g h of immense value, w a s
remote in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h the needs of the moment,
w h e n t h e enemy a p p e a r e d to be s t a k i n g e v e r y t h i n g on
r e a c h i n g a quick decision. H e w a s therefore inclined to
suspend t h e d e s p a t c h of these a i r c r a f t u n t i l after the
i m m e d i a t e crisis, a n d felt confident t h a t the D o m i n i o n s
w o u l d u n d e r s t a n d the position.
The W a r Cabinet—
I n v i t e d the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for A i r to r e - e x a m i n e the
p o s i t i o n in c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the M i n i s t e r of A i r c r a f t
P r o d u c t i o n , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r reference, t o —
(a) the p r o p o s a l t h a t B a t t l e a n d A n s o n a i r f r a m e s only
should be sent over, and L y c o m i n g engines fitted in
Canada;
(b) the question w h e t h e r o p e r a t i o n a l e q u i p m e n t could be
m a d e available for the a i r c r a f t in question, w i t h o u t
i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e supply of e q u i p m e n t to more
m o d e r n types.
T h e M i n i s t e r s w e r e invited to i n f o r m the S e c r e t a r y of
S t a t e for D o m i n i o n Affairs of t h e conclusions reached.
The Netherlands
and Belgium.
Eeeeption of
war refugees.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 131st
Conclusions,
Minute 12.)'
14. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs s a i d t h a t he
h a d received a n u r g e n t message from M. Corbin in r e g a r d to the
a s s i s t a n c e w h i c h w e h a d u n d e r t a k e n to give t h e F r e n c h in d e a l i n g
w i t h t h e refugee problem. T h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t w e r e a n x i o u s
t h a t we should d e s i g n a t e one person w i t h w h o m they could establish
c o n t a c t a n d who w o u l d be responsible for c o - o r d i n a t i n g the d u t i e s
f l D e p a r t m e n t s in t h i s m a t t e r . The F o r e i g n Secretary proposed
t h a t t h e Chancellor of the D u c h y of L a n c a s t e r should u n d e r t a k e
these d u t i e s .
Q
a l
T h e W a r C a b i n e t a g r e e d to this p r o p o s a l .
Richmond
Terrace, S. W. 1,
May 2 1 , 1940.
Download