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T H I S DOCUMENT IS T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H I S BRITANNIC M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
May 1940.
Copy N o .
SECRET.
W.M. (40)
141st Conclusions.
TO B E K E P T
UNDER
LOCK
AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR
CONCLUSIONS
CABINET
141
(40).
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing
S.W. 1, on Monday, May 27, 1940, at 1 1 - 3 0 A.M.
Street,
Present:
The R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the
The R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E C H A M B E R L A I N ,
M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The R i g h t H o n . VISCOUNT HALIFAX,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
Chair).
T h e R i g h t H o n . C . R. A T T L E E , M . P . ,
L o r d P r i v y Seal.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A . GREENWOOD, M . P . ,
Minister without Portfolio.
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t :
The R i g h t H o n . A . V . A L E X A N D E R ,
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
The R i g h t
H o n . S i r ARCHIBALD
SINCLAIR,
Bt.,
M.P.,
Secretary
of
S t a t e for A i r .
The R i g h t H o n . ANTHONY EDEN, M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r .
The R i g h t H o n . S i r JOHN ANDERSON,
M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e
H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of
H o m e Security.
T h e R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T CALDECOTE,
Secretary of S t a t e for D o m i n i o n
Affairs.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A . D U F F COOPER, M . P . ,
The
A i r Chief M a r s h a l S i r C Y R I L L . N .
N E W A L L , C h i e f of t h e A i r Staff.
Hon.
Sir
ALEXANDER
CADOGAN,
P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for F o r e i g n Affairs.
A d m i r a l of t h e Fleet S i r D U D L E Y
P O U N D , F i r s t Sea L o r d a n d Chief of
N a v a l Staff.
Air
Marshal
M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n .
General
Sir
JOHN
DILL,
Chief
the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff.
R . E . C. P E I R S E ,
Vice-
Chief of t h e A i r Staff.
Secretariat.
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Major-General H . L. ISMAY.
Captain A. D . NICHOLL, R . N .
Mr. F. HEMMING.
Lieutenant-Colonel V . DYKES, R . E .
M r . E . P . DONALDSON.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
[21342]
B
of
WAR
CABINET
141
(40).
CONTENTS.
Subject.
The Western Front
Progress of operations.
Information for t h e Dominions.
The A i r Situation
Bomber Command.
Coastal Command.
Air Component.
Fighter Command.
Advanced Air Striking Force.
Norway ...
- ...
Progress of operations.
Allied military policy.
Middle East
Question of reinforcements.
Iceland ...
...
...
Proposed despatch of further reinforcements.
U.S.S.R.
Despatch of special Mission to Moscow.
T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a
Suggested grant of facilities in certain British possessions.
Belgium
Disappearance of His Majesty's Ambassador.
The King of t h e Belgians.
B r i t i s h strategy in the near future
...
The Western
Front.
Progress of
operations.
(Previous
1. The Prime Minister
gave t h e W a r C a b i n e t a n account of h i s m e e t i n g w i t h M. R e y n a u d the previous afternoon. I n f o r m a t i o n w a s also given as to the p r o g r e s s of o p e r a t i o n s o n t h e N o r t h e r n p a r t of t h e F r o n t , a n d as t o . t h e p l a n s for t h e f u t u r e conduct of o p e r a t i o n s . Preference: W.M. (40) 139th
Conclusions,
Minute 1.)
Information for
The Secretary of State for Dominion A fairs s a i d t h a t t h e H i g h
the Dominions. Commissioner for A u s t r a l i a w a s very a n x i o u s to p r e s e n t a p i c t u r e
(Previous
of t h e s i t u a t i o n to h i s Government, a n d asked for g u i d a n c e a s to
Eeference:
w h a t i n f o r m a t i o n should be sent t o the D o m i n i o n s .
W.M. (40) 139th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.) '
r e c o r
d of the discussion a n d of t h e Conclusions r e a c h e d is
c o n t a i n e d i n t h e S e c r e t a r y ' s S t a n d a r d F i l e of W a r C a b i n e t
Conclusions.
The Air
Situation.
(Previous
Eeference:
W.M. (40) 138th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
Bomber
Command.
2. The Chief of the Air Staff said t h a t 18 bombers h a d left.
early t h a t m o r n i n g to a t t a c k bridges, r a i l w a y s a n d t r o o p s between
M e n i n a n d C o u r t r a i a n d h a d o b t a i n e d a n u m b e r of h i t s .
L a t e t h e p r e v i o u s a f t e r n o o n 18 Blenheims h a d left to a t t a c k
enemy a d v a n c e d l a n d i n g - g r o u n d s n e a r St. Pol. T h e y h a d failed to
locate t h e i r t a r g e t s , b u t h a d a t t a c k e d vehicles on the r o a d s i n the
F o r e t d ' H e s d i n , a n d h a d placed m a n y bombs a m o n g t h e vehicles
a n d on t h e r o a d .
21 H a m p d e n s h a d left to d i s o r g a n i s e r a i l traffic a n d to a t t a c k
r i v e r crossings a n d 2 h a d been sent to cause d i s t u r b a n c e by a i r r a i d
warnings in the R u h r area.
22 W e l l i n g t o n s h a d a t t a c k e d r o a d a n d r a i l w a y c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
a n d aerodromes. T h e n i n e r e p o r t s w h i c h h a d so f a r been received
showed t h a t F l u s h i n g , J u m e t , F u m a y a n d A n t w e r p aerodromes h a d
been a t t a c k e d . A d i r e c t h i t h a d been m a d e by a salvo on a l a r g e
M . T . column a n d on t r a i n s a n d vehicles elsewhere.
T h e t o t a l n u m b e r of sorties a m o u n t e d to 80 a n d our losses h a d
been nil.
Coastal
On t h e p r e v i o u s d a y 6 H u d s o n s h a d c o n t i n u e d t h e a t t a c k on
Command.
t h e R o t t e r d a m oil p l a n t a n d h a d s t a r t e d n e w fires. A l l o u r a i r c r a f t
h a d r e t u r n e d . Swordfish
from the Fleet A i r A r m h a d co-operated
w i t h b o m b a r d m e n t of t h e enemy positions n e a r C a l a i s by H . M . S .
Galatea a n d H . M . S .
Arethusa.
Air Component.
B o m b i n g a t t a c k s h a d been c a r r i e d o u t on a b a t t e r y south-west
of C a l a i s by H e c t o r s of t h e A i r C o m p o n e n t a n d all t h e m a c h i n e s
had returned.
T w o Blenheims e n g a g e d in reconnaissance w o r k h a d failed
to r e t u r n .
Fighter
On t h e previous d a y 20 special p a t r o l s of 216 sorties h a d been
Command.
flown over t h e F r e n c h coast, i n c l u d i n g some offensive i n l a n d p a t r o l s
of Bomber escorts. E n e m y casualties h a d been 25 confirmed a n d
22 unconfirmed, of w h i c h 16 i n each case h a d been fighters a n d t h e
r e m a i n d e r bombers. O u r casualties a m o u n t e d to 10 a i r c r a f t .
Advanced Air
I n r e p l y to a question t h e Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t t h e
Striking Force. A d v a n c e d A i r S t r i k i n g Force, w h i c h h a d been o p e r a t i n g in t h e
A r r a s a r e a , w a s now east of P a r i s . A l t e r n a t i v e aerodromes h a d
been m a d e r e a d y , should it be decided to move t h i s force f u r t h e r
west.
[21342] Norway.
Progress of
operations.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 138th
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
Allied military
p o l l c y
3. The Chief of the Naval Staff said t h a t H . M . S . Curlew
(which, w i t h H . M . S . Coventry, h a d been p r o v i d i n g A . A . p r o t e c t i o n
i n t h e N a r v i k a r e a ) h a d been bombed a n d s u n k on t h e evening of
t h e 26th.
H . M . S . Glorious h a d been expected to fly off h e r H u r r i c a n e s to
S k a a n l a n d on the p r e v i o u s evening, b u t no i n f o r m a t i o n h a d been
received as to w h e t h e r she h a d done so.
F u r t h e r discussion a s to o p e r a t i o n s in N o r w a y is c o n t a i n e d in
t h e S e c r e t a r y ' s S t a n d a r d File of W a r C a b i n e t Conclusions.
-
Middle East.
Question of
reinforcements.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of t h i s s t a t e m e n t .
4.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t w e r e i n f o r m e d t h a t 11,000 m e n were
due
^
8th J u n e to t h e M i d d l e E a s t , as r e i n f o r c e m e n t s
^
v a r i o u s u n i t s . Some of t h e personnel concerned belonged to
technical u n i t s , a n d some to fighting u n i t s . I t h a d been suggested
t h a t i t w o u l d be b e t t e r t h a t t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t s for fighting u n i t s
a t a n y r a t e should be r e t a i n e d i n t h i s c o u n t r y a n d formed i n t o
composite b a t t a l i o n s .
t o
s a
o
n
t
n
e
o r
T h e W a r C a b i n e t t h o u g h t t h a t , unless t h e r e w a s s t r o n g reason
to the c o n t r a r y , it w a s u n d e s i r a b l e t h a t these r e i n f o r c e m e n t s should
be sent o u t to the M i d d l e E a s t a t t h i s moment, a n d i n v i t e d t h e
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r to re-consider t h e m a t t e r .
Iceland.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 127th
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
Proposed des­
patch of further
reinforcements.
5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said t h a t recent
t e l e g r a m s from I c e l a n d h a d c o n t a i n e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t our
forces on t h e island w e r e n o t sufficient for i t s defence, a n d t h a t
f u r t h e r reinforcements w e r e r e q u i r e d . I f t h i s w a s so, it w a s w o r t h
c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r it m i g h t n o t be b e t t e r for us to remove the
e x i s t i n g force. A s a first step, he proposed t h a t t h e C h i e f s of Staff
C o m m i t t e e should be asked to consider the question.
The Secretary
of State for Dominion
Affairs
said t h a t the
C a n a d i a n G o v e r n m e n t p r o p o s e d to send a b r i g a d e to I c e l a n d , w h i c h
w o u l d enable us to relieve t h e b r i g a d e a l r e a d y t h e r e . T h i s relief
would not, however, s t r e n g t h e n t h e a c t u a l forces i n I c e l a n d .
I n r e p l y to the L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council, the First
Sea
Lord s a i d t h a t our object in h o l d i n g I c e l a n d w a s to p r e v e n t it b e i n g
used as a n a i r c r a f t base by t h e G e r m a n s . T h e Chiefs of Staff
C o m m i t t e e h a d a l r e a d y discussed i n f o r m a l l y t h e a d e q u a c y of t h e
p r e s e n t g a r r i s o n , a n d h a d reached the conclusion t h a t it w a s
sufficient.
The W a r C a b i n e t I n v i t e d the Chiefs of Staff C o m m i t t e e to r e p o r t on the size
of t h e g a r r i s o n which, in t h e i r view, should be m a i n ­
t a i n e d in Iceland.
U.S.S.R.
Despatch of
Special Mission
to Moscow.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 132nd
Conclusions,
Minute 8.)
6. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said t h a t on t h e
p r e v i o u s evening M. M a i s k y h a d told h i m t h a t h i s G o v e r n m e n t h a d
n o objection to Sir Stafford C r i p p s , or a n y o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
chosen by H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , c o m i n g t o Moscow on a
Special Mission, b u t they w i s h e d t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to be a r e g u l a r
A m b a s s a d o r a n d not a special envoy. H e (the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y )
h a d told M . M a i s k y t h a t we i n t e n d e d to a p p o i n t a n e w A m b a s s a d o r ,
who, however, would n o t be S i r Stafford. W o u l d t h i s satisfy the
Soviet G o v e r n m e n t ? M . M a i s k y h a d n o t been able to give a definite
answer.
172
269
W . M . 141 ( 4 9 ) .
T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y a d d e d t h a t he h a d told M . M a i s k y t h a t
S i r Stafford could p e r h a p s be a p p o i n t e d as a n A m b a s s a d o r on a
S p e c i a l Mission, b u t t h a t h e w o u l d m u c h p r e f e r t h a t w e should
a n n o u n c e t h a t we i n t e n d e d to a p p o i n t a n A m b a s s a d o r before
S i r Stafford r e a c h e d Moscow.
S i r Stafford C r i p p s , w h o w a s leaving t h a t d a y for A t h e n s by
a i r , h a d a g r e e d to serve as a Special A m b a s s a d o r if necessary, b u t
t h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y hoped t h a t the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d
accept the solution w h i c h he h a d suggested.
Ij,
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of t h e above s t a t e m e n t .
United States of
7. The Seer eta? "y of State for Foreign A ffairs r e f e r r e d to
America.
telegram No. 814, d a t e d t h e 2 4 t h ' M a y , . 1940, from Flis M a j e s t y ' s
Suggested grant A m b a s s a d o r , W a s h i n g t o n :—
of facilities in
certain British
possessions.
.
.
V a r i o u s suggestions h a d been m a d e t h a t w e should cede some of o u r possessions in t h e N e w W o r l d to the U n i t e d S t a t e s
in p a r t p a y m e n t of our w a r debt, b u t suggestions of t h i s k i n d
h a d a l w a y s been d i s c o u r a g e d by P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt.
L o r d L o t h i a n t h o u g h t t h a t we should consider m a k i n g a
formal offer to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t t h a t , w h i l e we
w e r e n o t p r e p a r e d to discuss any question of sovereignty, we
w e r e p r e p a r e d to lease to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s l a n d i n g g r o u n d s
on B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y , in view of the i m p o r t a n c e of such facilities
to U . S . A . security.
Lord Lothian mentioned particularly
Trinidad, Newfoundland and Bermuda.
L o r d L o t h i a n believed t h a t a n offer of t h i s k i n d m a d e by
us w o u l d m a k e a deep i m p r e s s i o n in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d a d d
to our s e c u r i t y . I f we acted quickly, our action w o u l d have t h e
a d v a n t a g e also of s p o n t a n e i t y . I f t h i s p r o p o s a l w e r e to be
p u r s u e d , i t w a s very desirable t h a t Congress should vote t h e
necessary a p p r o p r i a t i o n s before i t s a d j o u r n m e n t in e a r l y J u n e .
T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y t h o u g h t t h a t this w a s a p r o p o s a l w h i c h
should be e x a m i n e d , a n d suggested t h a t the C h i e f s of Staff
C o m m i t t e e should be invited, in t h e first instance, to consider t h e
s t r a t e g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s involved.
The Prime Minister s a i d t h a t he would be opposed to a p r o p o s a l
t h a t w e should offer such f a c i l i t i e s except as p a r t of a deal. T h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d given us p r a c t i c a l l y no help in the w a r , a n d now
t h a t t h e y s a w how g r e a t w a s t h e d a n g e r , t h e i r a t t i t u d e w a s t h a t
they w a n t e d to keep e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h would help us for t h e i r own
defence.
The Lord President
of the Council t h o u g h t t h a t the p r o p o s a l
w o u l d be open to less objection if the U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t
took the lead in a s k i n g for these facilities, since, if w e m a d e t h e
offer, we should be p l a y i n g s t r a i g h t i n t o the h a n d s of t h e
isolationists.
The First Lord of the A dmiralty s a i d t h a t the i d e a s u n d e r l y i n g
t h e p r e s e n t s u g g e s t i o n s h a d been p u t f o r w a r d as f a r back as t h e
N a v a l Conference of 1930. W e m u s t n o t b a r g a i n a w a y f a c i l i t i e s
essential for t h e defence of our E m p i r e .
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs s a i d t h a t he h o p e d
t h a t in any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of these suggestions he m i g h t be allowed
to r e p o r t on t h e i r probable effect both on N e w f o u n d l a n d , for w h i c h
w e w e r e d i r e c t l y responsible, a n d also on C a n a d a .
The W a r Cabinet—
(i) I n v i t e d the Chiefs of Staff C o m m i t t e e to examine the
s t r a t e g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e suggestion m a d e by H i s
M a j e s t y ' s A m b a s s a d o r , W a s h i n g t o n , t h a t we should
lease l a n d i n g g r o u n d s to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Government
in T r i n i d a d , N e w f o u n d l a n d a n d B e r m u d a ,
(ii) I n v i t e d the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for D o m i n i o n Affairs to
r e p o r t on the p r o b a b l e effect in N e w f o u n d l a n d a n d
C a n a d a of a decision to g r a n t such facilities.
Belgium.
8. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
said t h a t no
news
h
a
d
been
h
e
a
r
d
of
S
i
r
L
a
n
c
e
l
o
t
O
l
i
p
h
a
n
t
,
H
i
s Majesty's
Disappearance
Brussels, since M o n d a y , the 2 0 t h M a y , w h e n
of His Majesty's A m b a s s a d o r ,
S i r L a n c e l o t h a d r e p o r t e d t h a t h e w a s going to L e H a v r e .
He
Ambassador.
proposed to ask the U n i t e d S t a t e s E m b a s s y to m a k e e n q u i r i e s .
T h e W a r C a b i n e t were i n f o r m e d t h a t the K i n g of the Belgians
The King of the
w a s still w i t h h i s troops, a n d w a s d e t e r m i n e d to r e m a i n w i t h them.
Belgians.
I t w a s feared t h a t , if he left, B e l g i a n resistance w o u l d crumble.
(Previous
A r r a n g e m e n t s h a d been m a d e to enable t h e K i n g to leave by air,
Reference:
W.M. (40) 138th a n d it w a s hoped t h a t he w o u l d a g r e e to do so w h e n t h e t i m e came.
C o n t i n u i n g , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t the Counsellor of
Conclusions,
the B e l g i a n Embassy h a d called a t t h e F o r e i g n Office t h e previous
Minute 13.)
evening a n d h a d said t h a t t h e decision of the K i n g of t h e B e l g i a n s
a p p e a r e d t o imply t h a t he considered t h a t the w a r w a s lost a n d
w a s c o n t e m p l a t i n g a s e p a r a t e peace w i t h G e r m a n y . T h e B e l g i a n
C a b i n e t considered t h a t the a c t i o n of t h e K i n g w a s t a n t a m o u n t to
d i v i d i n g t h e n a t i o n a n d delivering i t i n t o H e r r H i t l e r ' s protection.
T h e B e l g i a n C a b i n e t w a s the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Government of
Belgium, a n d it w a s for t h i s r e a s o n t h a t they h a d t r a n s f e r r e d
themselves to foreign soil to c o n t i n u e t h e s t r u g g l e .
The Prime Minister
asked to be s u p p l i e d w i t h a copy of the
record of the interview i n o r d e r t h a t he m i g h t p a s s it on to
S i r R o g e r Keyes.
T h e W a r Cabinet took note of the s t a t e m e n t
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs.
by
the
9. T h e W a r Cabinet h a d before t h e m t w o R e p o r t s by the
British Strategy
Chiefs of Staff ( W . P . (40) 168 a n d 169) a n d a Note by the M i n i s t e r
in the near
w i t h o u t P o r t f o l i o ( W . P . (40) 171).
Future.
A record of the discussion is c o n t a i n e d i n t h e S e c r e t a r y ' s
S t a n d a r d F i l e of W a r C a b i n e t Conclusions.
Recommenda­
tions (i) and
(vii).
T h e W a r Cabinet : ­
(1) G a v e general a p p r o v a l to the recommendations contained
in p a r a g r a p h 23 of the C h i e f s of Staff R e p o r t ( W . P . (40)
168) (a copy is a t t a c h e d as a n A p p e n d i x ) , subject to the
modifications or a d d i t i o n s set out in the following con­
clusions; a n d d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e d e p a r t m e n t s concerned
should t a k e i m m e d i a t e s t e p s to p u t these recommenda­
tions into effect.
(2) I n v i t e d the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs to
consider in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e other M i n i s t e r s
concerned w h e t h e r it would be desirable to supplement,
by the despatch of a special mission, the efforts a l r e a d y
being m a d e t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c channels a n d the A n g l o F r e n c h P u r c h a s i n g Commission to induce t h e Govern­
ment of the U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a to release
destroyers, motor t o r p e d o boats a n d a i r c r a f t , p a r t i c u ­
larly fighters, from stocks now held by the U n i t e d S t a t e s
Eecommenda­
tions (iii) and
(iy).
%'
A r m y a n d N a v y ; a n d to p r o v i d e active financial a n d
economic assistance.
(3) A u t h o r i s e d t h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the Council to consider
w h a t emergency m e a s u r e s should be t a k e n to deal w i t h
the d a n g e r of F i f t h Column activities, a n d to t a k e
i m m e d i a t e steps to p u t such m e a s u r e s into o p e r a t i o n .
(4) I n v i t e d t h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council, in consultation
w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for D o m i n i o n Affairs—
(a) T o m a k e an i m m e d i a t e a p p r o a c h to M r . de V a l e r a
in o r d e r to b r i n g home to h i m the d a n g e r f a c i n g
E i r e , a n d t h e need, in order to combat it, for
early a n d full co-operation w i t h t h i s country. I n
p a r t i c u l a r he should ask for t h e use of B e r e h a v e n
for t h e N a v y .
(b) T o i n v i t e L o r d C r a i g a v o n to agree t h a t the Govern­
in e n t of N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d should t a k e p a r t in a n
A l l - I r e l a n d Council d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of the
p r e s e n t emergency.
(5) I n v i t e d the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y to p r o v i d e t h e
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council w i t h a n a p p r e c i a t i o n by
the N a v a l Staff of the i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e N a v y of t h e
i m m e d i a t e use of Berehaven.
(6) I n v i t e d the P r i m e M i n i s t e r t o conduct a s e a r c h i n g
e x a m i n a t i o n i n t o the s t r e n g t h s of t h e B r i t i s h a n d
G e r m a n A i r Forces w i t h a view to revising the s t a t e ­
ment a p p e n d e d to W . P . (40) 168.
(7) A g r e e d t h a t t h e R e p o r t s by the C h i e f s of Staff ( W . P . (40)
168 a n d W . P . (40) 169) should be f u r t h e r discussed i n
the l i g h t of t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n .
(8) I n v i t e d the M i n i s t e r of A i r c r a f t P r o d u c t i o n a n d t h e
M i n i s t e r of S u p p l y to a r r a n g e , as a m a t t e r of t h e
g r e a t e s t u r g e n c y , for the i m p r o v e m e n t of passive defence
measures in the a i r c r a f t a n d m u n i t i o n factories, in order
t h a t d a m a g e to b u i l d i n g s a n d p l a n t from a i r a t t a c k
m i g h t be r e d u c e d to a m i n i m u m .
(9) I n v i t e d t h e M i n i s t e r of H o m e S e c u r i t y to press f o r w a r d
w i t h e x p e r i m e n t s on a l a r g e scale for- the p r o d u c t i o n of
smoke screens to cover i n d u s t r i a l areas.
(10) E n d o r s e d t h e view of the M i n i s t e r w i t h o u t P o r t f o l i o , p u t
f o r w a r d i n W . P . (40) 171, t h a t every effort should now
be concentrated on t w o objectives :—
(a) T h e needs of the F i g h t i n g a n d Civil Defence
Services.
(b) T h e m a i n t e n a n c e of the civil p o p u l a t i o n u n d e r w a r ­
t i m e conditions.
Richmond
Terrace, S.W.
May 27, 1940. 1,
APPENDIX.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S BY T H E C H I E F S OF S T A F F .
( W . P . (40) 168.)
(i) W e should do our u t m o s t t o p e r s u a d e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a to
p r o v i d e a i r c r a f t , p a r t i c u l a r l y fighters, as soon as possible a n d in l a r g e numbers,
i n c l u d i n g those from stocks now held by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y a n d Navy.
(ii) M e a s u r e s should be t a k e n to e n s u r e t h e s t r i c t e s t economy i n A . A .
ammunition expenditure.
(iii) T h e most r u t h l e s s a c t i o n should be t a k e n to e l i m i n a t e a n y chances of
" F i f t h C o l u m n " a c t i v i t i e s . I n t e r n m e n t of all enemy aliens a n d all members
of subversive o r g a n i s a t i o n s , w h i c h l a t t e r should be proscribed.
(iv) A l i e n refugees a r e a most d a n g e r o u s source of subversive a c t i v i t y . W e
r e c o m m e n d t h a t t h e n u m b e r of refugees a d m i t t e d to t h i s c o u n t r y should be cut
t o t h e m i n i m u m , a n d t h a t those a d m i t t e d should be k e p t u n d e r t h e closest
surveillance.
(v) I n o r d e r to e n s u r e t h e necessary c o - o p e r a t i o n between Civil a n d M i l i t a r y
a u t h o r i t i e s , o p e r a t i o n a l control of all Civil Defence Forces, i n c l u d i n g c o u n t y a n d
b o r o u g h police, & c , should be vested i n t h e M i n i s t r y of H o m e S e c u r i t y and
exercised t h r o u g h R e g i o n a l Commissioners.
(vi) A n y evacuation w h i c h the G o v e r n m e n t i n t e n d s to c a r r y o u t i n emergency
s h o u l d be c a r r i e d o u t now. W e recommend t h a t a modification of t h e scheme
for r e c e p t i o n s areas, i n view of t h e d a n g e r s of invasion, should be c a r r i e d out.
(vii) I m m e d i a t e s t e p s to be t a k e n to o b t a i n d e s t r o y e r s a n d M . T . B s . from the
U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a .
(viii) E v e r y possible m e a s u r e should be d i r e c t e d to o b t a i n i n g t h e active
s u p p o r t of E i r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h a view to the i m m e d i a t e use of B e r e h a v e n .
(ix) O u r intelligence system to be s t r e n g t h e n e d w i t h a view to g e t t i n g early
w a r n i n g of G e r m a n p r e p a r a t i o n s for invasion of t h i s c o u n t r y .
(x) D i s p e r s a l of stocks of r a w m a t e r i a l s to free o u r W e s t C o a s t p o r t s to deal
w i t h t h e heavy increase in i m p o r t s should now be m a d e .
(xi) So f a r as is p r a c t i c a b l e , d i s t r i b u t i o n of food reserves t h r o u g h o u t the
c o u n t r y w i t h a view to m e e t i n g the d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n of t r a n s p o r t w h i c h m a y occur.
(xii) B u n k e r i n g f a c i l i t i e s a n d other a r r a n g e m e n t s necessary to deal w i t h a
heavy volume of m e r c h a n t s h i p p i n g i n W e s t Coast a n d I r i s h p o r t s should
be o r g a n i s e d .
(xiii) All u n i m p o r t a n t a n d l u x u r y i m p o r t s to be c u t out.
(xiv) F i n a l l y we consider t h a t the t i m e h a d come to i n f o r m t h e public of
t h e t r u e d a n g e r s t h a t confront us, a n d to e d u c a t e t h e m on w h a t t h e y a r e r e q u i r e d
t o do a n d w h a t NOT to do if t h e c o u n t r y is i n v a d e d .