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T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y OP H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
GOVERNMENT
December 1941.
Copy No.
SECRET^
W.M. (41)
133rd Conclusions.
TO B E . K E P T UNDER LOCK A N D KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
W A R CABINET 133 ( 4 1 ) .
CONCLUSIONS
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing
S.W. 1, on Monday, December 22, 1941, at 5 P . M .
Street,
Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. A T T L E E , M.P., Lord Privy Seal (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir J O H N A N D E R S O N , The Right Hon. A . G R E E N W O O D , M.P.,
Minister without Portfolio.
M.P., Lord President of the Council.
The Right Hon. Sir K I N G S L E Y W O O D , The Right Hon. E R N E S T B E V I N , M.P.,
Minister of Labour and National
M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Service.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Sir E A R L E P A G E ,
Special Envoy from the Government
of the Commonwealth of Australia
(Items 1-8).
The Right Hon. H E R B E R T M O R R I S O N , The Right Hon. V I S C O U N T C R A N B O R N E ,
M.P., Secretary of State for the
Secretary of State for Dominion
Home Department and Minister of
Affairs (Items 1-8).
Home Security (Items 1-8).
The Right Hon. L. S. A M E R Y , M.P.,
Secretary of State for India and
Secretary of State for Burma
(Items 1-8).
The Right Hon. L O R D
tary of State for
(Items 1-8).
The Right Hon. A . V. A L E X A N D E R ,
M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
Captain
The
Sir A L A N B R O O K E , Chief of the
Imperial General Staff (Items 1-8).
Right
Hon. Sir A R C H I B A L D
Bt., M.P., Secretary of
State for Air.
SINCLAIR,
Air
Chief
SecreColonies
MOYNE,
the
the Right Hon. H. D .
M . P . , Secretary of State
for War.
MARGESSON,
Marshal Sir W I L F R I D
Vice-Chief of the Air
. Staff (Items 1-8).
Vice-Admiral H. R. M O O R E , ViceChief of Naval Staff (Items 1-8).
The Right Hon. L O R D H A N K E Y , Paymaster-General (Item 1).
Sir O R M E S A R G E N T , Deputy Under­
Secretary of State, Foreign Office
(Items 1-8).
FREEMAN,
[23275]
B
Mr. G E O F F R E Y L L O Y D , M.P., Secretary
for Petroleum (Item 1).
LORD PORTAL,
(Additional)
(Item 9).
Mr. H A R O L D M A C M I L L A N , M.P., Parlia­
mentary Secretary, Ministry of
Supply (Item 9).
Parliamentary Secretary,
Ministry of Supply
Secretariat.
Sir
EDWARD
BRIDGES.
Major-General Sir
Mr.
W.
Mr.
L.
WAR
D.
F.
HASTINGS
ISMAY.
WILKINSON.
BURGIS.
CABINET
133
(41).
CONTENTS.
Minute
No.
1
Oil
Subject.
....
....
P r e v e n t i o n of oil f r o m r e a c h i n g e n e m y
2
Page
245
countries.
Naval, Military and Air Operations....
....
....
....
245
Air operations.
Naval operations:
S h i p p i n g losses.
Military operations:
The Far East.
Libya.
Eussia.
3
The Far East
246
T h e "Military S i t u a t i o n .
S i t u a t i o n a t HONG K o n g .
4
Singapore
246
P r o p o s e d e v a c u a t i o n of c i v i l i a n s .
5
Blockade
.
,
247
Greece.
6
Jibuti
7
Air Policy
....
U.S.S.R.,
Production
247
248
Christmas Eve arid-Christmas
8
9
­
....
.....
Day.
248
248
....
M a n a g e m e n t of filling f a c t o r i e s .
,10
War Cabinet Arrangements ­
­
­
­
2
4
9
JL
O P r e v e n t i o n of
Oil f r o m
reaching E n e m y
Countries.
(Previous
Reference:
(41) 9 5 t h
Conclusions,
M i n u t e 9.)
I. The War Cabinet had before them the Ninth Report of the
Committee' presided over by the Paymaster-General, on Preventing
Oil from reaching Enemy Powers (W.P. (41) 300).
The Paymaster"-General, in asking the War Cabinet to take
note of the conclusions in his Report, said that a number of detailed
investigations had been carried out, which all led to the conclusion
that Germany's oil position was now at a crucial stage.
In regard to the importance of denying to the enemy the oil
resources of the Northern Caucasus, the Paymaster-General said
that a telegram had been received that morning to the effect that
the Russians thought that, in the present military situation, it was
unnecessary that any further denial schemes should be carried out
at the present time.
As regards bombing attacks on German synthetic plants, the
Paymaster-General said that he appreciated the reasons why, in
recent months, few attacks on these targets had been made, but he
felt sure that the Air Staff would keep these targets in mind in
framing future bombing programmes.
The Secretary of State for Air said that the Air Staff
appreciated the importance of these targets, and would consider
them with other targets when circumstances were suitable.
The War Cabinet took note of the Report and of these
statements.
Naval, Military
2 . The Chiefs of Staff gave the following information in
and Air
amplification of Cabinet War Room Records Nos. 834-841 :—
(Previous
Reference:
W . M . (41) 1 3 1 s t
Conclusions,
M i n u t e 1.)
Air O p e r a t i o n s .
Summary of aircraft losses since the 15th December :—
Home Theatre— Enemy— 14 destroyed. 4 probable. 8 damaged. Our Own—
5 fighters.
10 bombers.
3 Coastal Command Aircraft.
Middle East— Enemy—
44 destroyed (23 on the ground).
6 probable.
10 damaged.
Our Own—
34 destroyed (1 on the ground).
6 damaged.
Far East (on the basis of incomplete information)—
Enemy—
10 destroyed. 8 probable. 3 damaged. Our Own—­
2 destroyed.
Eleven attacks had been made on submarines, one of which was
claimed to be successful. In the Mediterranean four merchant ships
had been attacked, one of which had been sunk. In Home Waters
one merchant ship and one flak ship had been sunk.
[23275]
4
B 2 Naval
Operations.
Shipping Losses.
Seven enemy submarines had been destroyed during the last
week, almost certainly a record. A homeward-bound convoy from
Gibraltar had been attacked several times, but three of the attacking
submarines had been sunk; together with two Focke Wolfe aircraft.
We had lost the Empire Audacity (an auxiliary aircraft-carrier,)
and the destroyer Stanley.
During the previous week 44,000 tons of shipping had been lost,
including two vessels in the Pacific.
75,000 tons of shipping had been reported sunk so far this
month, but belated reports might bring this total, to 120,000 tons.,
In the Mediterranean we had lost the cruiser Neptune and a
destroyer.
A t Hong Kong resistance continued. The Japanese assault had
started on Thursday night with landings on the south-east coast.
They had crossed the island by Saturday morning, leaving two of
the three main features in our hands. A message had been received
that afternoon to the effect that Chinese forces near Hong Kong
had attacked the Japanese. Nevertheless, the position of our troops
in Hong Kong was very serious.
In the Malay Peninsula the fighting had been less severe than
the previous week, but on the Western Coast our forces were
retiring in face of strong enemy pressure. Victoria Point in the
extreme south of Burma had been evacuated and installations
successfully destroyed.
In Borneo and Sarawak the Japanese had made a landing on
the eastern part of the island. Our forces had previously been
evacuated, having carried out the oil-fields denial scheme.
In the Philippines a further landing by the enemy in force at
Davao on the South Coast of Mindanao Island had been reported
A week ago our object had been to drive the enemy from his
position about Gazala and to prevent him stabilising on the
Mechili-Derna line. Our troops were pressing the pursuit, but the
chief problem was the maintenance of our troops, who were now far
ahead of their rail-heads.
Reports from the Russian front showed that the Russians
retained the initiative and had made good progress in front of
Leningrad and Moscow.
The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.
:
Military
Operations.
The Far East.
Libya.
Eussia.
The Far East.
Military
Situation.
Situation at
H o n g Kong.
Singapore.
Proposed
E v a c u a t i o n of
Civilians.
-
3. The War Cabinet were given information as to the present
dispositions in the Far East and as to the recommendations which
the Chiefs of Staff had made to the Defence Committee (Operations)
in regard to the despatch of reinforcements to the Far East.
(Details are given in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet
Conclusions.)
'
The Lord Privy Seal read to the War Cabinet telegrams which
had been exchanged with the Governor of Hong Kong as to the
position in the island.
The War Cabinet took note of the above. .
4. The War Cabinet were informed that the Chiefs of Staff
had recommended that steps should be taken to evacuate the bouches
inutiles from Singapore, a measure of compulsory evacuation being
desirable.
'
,
,,
At an inter-Departmental Meeting that morning it had been
decided to recommend that a telegram should be sent to the
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster instructing him to evacuate
bouches inutiles from Singapore, but (a) leaving it to his discretion
how this policy should be applied to civilian Europeans and nonEuropeans who were not required to take any part, direct or
indirect, in the defence of the area, and (6) drawing his attention
to a statement made by the Governor of the Straits Settlements on
the 17th December that in any withdrawal of population there
could be no distinction of race, and that no European civilian, male
or female, would be ordered to withdraw.
The main points made in discussion were-—
(1) That it was most important to avoid racial discrimination.
But this might not be easy, since Chinese and Malayans
would not be permitted to land in many countries.
(2) That the only way of getting away any substantial
proportion of the civil population would be if the
available vessels were employed to take passengers to
neighbouring ports in the Dutch East Indies and were
immediately turned round again.
The War Cabinet^­
(i) Affirmed the principle that there must be no distinction of
race in the evacuation of civilians from Malaya,
(ii) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to amend
the draft telegram to the Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster, in the light of the discussion. In particular
he should suggest to the Chancellor that the only way
in which any appreciable measure of evacuation could
be effected would be if arrangements could be made for
civilian evacuees to be landed in Dutch East Indian
territory.
(iii) The Lord President of the Council was asked to arrange
for this suggestion to be mentioned to the Dutch Foreign
Minister.
(iv) The telegram to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
should inform him of the action taken under (iii) and
invite him to discuss the matter with the local Nether­
lands Authorities.
Blockade.
Greece.
Jibuti.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M, (41) 1 1 5 t h
Conclusions,
M i n u t e 2.)
5. The Lord President of the Council said that the Prime
Minister and the American Ambassador in London had received an
appeal from the Greek Prime Minister for foodstuffs, to which it
was almost impossible to return a flat negative. It looked as though
(while not admitting any break in the principle that the enemy
were responsible for feeding the peoples of enemy occupied terri­
tories) we might have to connive at a fairly large-scale evasion of
our blockade of Greece, particularly as regards imports of wheat.
The distribution of these imports would be controlled by the
International Red Cross; there would be little fear of their getting
into the hands of the enemy. He was in communication on this
matter with the Minister of Economic Warfare, and asked for no
decision that day.
It was pointed out that, if our convoys from Australia Were
interrupted, it might become impossible for us to give assistance
of this kind to other countries.
The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.
1
6 The Lord President of the Council said that the Vichv
French authorities had already realised that, Owing to the with­
drawal of vessels from the Red Sea, our blockade of Jibuti had
now been weakened. The chances of obtaining bur requirements
by negotiation were therefore diminished!.
'he War Cabinet took note of this statement.
Air Policy.
7.
Christmas E v e
and
Christmas Day.
(Previous
Reference:
W . M . (40) 3 0 9 t h
Conclusions,
M i n u t e 3.)
Agreed that, while the A i r Staff must, of course, retain
discretion to act if necessary in any unforeseen emergency, our
policy should be not to launch bombing attacks against targets
in Germany or enemy-occupied territory on the Western Front,
on Christmas Eve or Christmas Day, say, from dusk on the
24th December until after midnight on the night of the
25th-26th December.
This decision Would not, of course, in any way interfere
With the freedom of our air forces engaged in operations in the
Medi terranean and Middle East, or Far Eastern theatres of
war.
No public announcement should be given of our intentions
in this matter.
U.S.S.R.
(Previous
After a short discussion, the War Cabinet—
8. The War Cabinet were given the latest information in regard to the Moscow discussions. Reference: W . M . (41) 1 3 1 s t
Conclusions,
M i n u t e 2.)
Production
9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the
M a n a g e m e n t of Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Supply (W.P. (G) (41)
Pilling
157).
Factories.
This Memorandum stated that, in view of the strain imposed
(Previous
on the Royal Ordnance Factory organisation by its tremendous
Reference:
expansion since the war, it was proposed that five filling factories
W . M . (41) 1 2 7 t h now approaching completion should be entrusted to Commercial
Conclusions,
firms to manage as Agents. Under the terms proposed, the Agent
M i n u t e 3.)
would receive :—
(a) A fee for management purposes.
(b) Repayment of actual costs incurred, which would not
include any overhead expenses.
The War Cabinet were informed that the firms concerned might
well consent to forgo the management fee, which it was intended
should be about £6,000 a year, and which was not a material
inducement to them.
In discussion, the following arguments were put forward
against the adoption of the scheme proposed :—
First, it would be urged that the scheme envisaged
treating the managements of large firms differently from the
way in which individual citizens were dealt with under the
scheme Of compulsory National Service. It would be asked why
the staffs Which it was proposed should be sent by the firms con­
cerned to manage these filling factories should not be so
'' directed '' under the normal procedure.
Secondly, reference was made to the argument that the
arrangement proposed would give to the Department nof merely
the services of trained staffs in a managerial capacity, but also
the experience of a complete Working organisation With a
reputation to maintain. It was contended that this argument
ignored the fact that the experience required in this iMtter
was the specialised experience of filling factories, aiid hot the
general business experience which these firms possessed. Why
eould not the Ministry of Supply take into their direct empioy­
ment, from the firms concerned, suitable managerial and
supervisory staffs, who would rely oh the centralised knowledge
of filling factories which the Ministry of Supply must possess I
The managerial staffs of those filling factories which were to
remain under R.O.F. management would, in any event, have
to rely on the Ministry's central experience in this matter.
It was also stated that suspicion of the whole agency arrange­
ment had been aroused by the handing over to Beardmores of the
management of the Dalmuir gun factory : first, because the negotia­
tions had been carried out with the shop stewards; secondly,
because it was believed that machine tools, the supply of which had
been refused to the factory while under R.O.F. management, had
been made available after the management had been transferred to
Beardmores.
On the other hand, it was pointed out that it would be much
easier to get these five filling factories into operation quickly if the
Ministry of Supply could rely, in the initial stages, upon the whole
organisation of the firms concerned. These firms could call on the
services of any individuals among their own staffs, and could thus
make good at short notice any deficiencies. Furthermore, the firms
would be able to provide not merely the services of individuals, but
a team which would work as such from the outset.
This advantage, however, applied particularly in the initial
stages. It was accordingly proposed that the arrangement suggested
by the Ministry of Supply should be applied for a limited period
only, in order to facilitate the rapid organisation of these five filling
factories on a satisfactory basis, and should be discontinued
thereafter, the managerial and supervisory staffs lent by the firms
concerned then passing into the direct employment of the Ministry.
The War C a b i n e t Invited the Parliamentary Secretaries to the Ministry of
Supply, after discussion with representatives of the firms
concerned, to put forward a revised scheme on the lines
proposed at " X " above, which should be submitted to the
War Cabinet for their approval.
War Cabinet
Arrangements,
10. The Lord Privy Seal proposed that the next Meeting of
the War Cabinet should be held on Wednesday, the 24th December,
at 11-30 A.M., and that, unless urgent business made it necessary,
no Meeting of the War Cabinet should be held on Thursday, the
25th December.
This was approved.
Great George Street, S. W. 1,
December 22, 1941.
MOST SECRE
IDST SEGtCT
*"
M E S S A G E / 1459A/21st Deo,
TO Cdre. Hong Kong 449.
\ /
Date 21.12.41.
T
j\ aval Code (K5) Secret From Admiralty. IMMEDIATE. Following for Governor. Your message 0521 has been received.
I t crossed a message from the Prime Minister, who
i s temporarily cut of reach as follows.
Begins:-
To C. in C. and Governor of Hong Kong.
The eyes of the world are upon you.
you to r e s i s t to the end.
Empire i s in your hands.
We expect
The honour of the
Ends.
In spite of conditions you and G.O.C. are facing,
the d i f f i c u l t i e s of which.are clearly understood,
!
H.M.G. s desire i s that you should fight i t out
as in Prime Minister's message.
1439A/21. Jf
1st Lord 1st S.L. V.C.N.S. A.C.N.S.(F) D.O.D.CF)
Duty Captain
DDIC
Hd." of it. (12) and for Sir Edward Bridges (2)
General Ismay (3)
No. 10 Downing Street (2) ,
Sec. State for Colonies (1)
Sec. State for Dominions (1)
Sec. State for War (1)
Lord Privy Seal (1)
OUT
MOST SECRET
MESSAGE
prom N.O.I/C. Hong Kong.
052lZ/21st December
IN
Date 21.12.41.
Reed. 0933.
NAVAL CODE ( K . 3 . (OLD) BY W/T
I
Addressed
Admiralty.
727 MOST IMMEDIATE. For Secretary of State from Governor Hong Kong b e g i n s .
M i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i s now as f o l l o w s : -
Enemy hold key
p o s i t i o n on h i l l s and G.O.C. advises that we are very r a p i d l y
approaching a point a t which only remaining r e s i s t e n c e open
to us w i l l be to hold f o r short time only a small pocket i n
centre of c i t y l e a v i n g bulk of f i x e d population to be
overrun.
I f e e l i t w i l l be my duty to ask terms b e f o r e
this p o s i t i o n i s reached. If
(?H.M.) Government f e e l s able to give assent ( ? p l e a s e ) c a b l e s i n g l e word ABILITY r e p e t i t i o n ABILITY. Governor
Ends.
0521Z/21.
MOST SECRET
To:
^^^"^^^^p
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, ^91111
T
SAffl
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OUT -
14
22,12*41
saassasaaaaaBggfea
NAVAL CODE (K3)
Prom A d m i r a l t y .
F o l l o w i n g f o r Governor from C o l o n i a l
Offices
tyOGT IMMEDIATE
Your 1488 r e c e i v e d ^
H*M*Go g r e a t l y a p p r e c i a t e
spirit
of y o u r message and s p l e n d i d r e s i s t a n c e o f d e f e n d e r s ^
F o l l o w i n g i s f u l l t e x t o f Primo M i n i s t o r^s message
p r i o r t o your 0 5 2 1 , Begins,
received
Wo woro g r o a t l y o o n o o m e d t o h o a r
of t h e l a n d i n g s on Hong Kong I s l a n d which, havo b e e n o f f o o t e d
by t h o Japanose*
Wo cannot judgo from h e r o t h e c o n d i t i o n s
which rendered t h o s e l a n d i n g s p o s s i b l e o r p r e v e n t e d
ooiintor a t t a c k s upon t h e i n t r u d e r s ^
t h o u g h t of s u r r e n d e r s
effective
Thoro must however "bo n o
Evury p a r t o f t h e i s l a n d must h o f o u g h t
and t h e enemy r e s i s t e d w i t h t h e utmost stubbornness,,
The enemy should b o compelled t o expend t h o utmost
and equipment,
lifo
Thoro must h o v i g o r o u s f i g h t i n g i n t h o i n n o r
d e f e n c e s and i f t h o need h e from h-ouse t o h o u s e
Every
ft
t h a t you are able t o maintain your r e s i s t a n c e you h e l p the
a l l i e d c a u s e a l l o v e r t h o w o r l d , and b y a p r o l o n g e d
resistance
y o u and y o u r mon can win t h o l a s t i n g h o n o u r which wo a r e s u r e
w i l l bo your duo.
The e y e s o f t h o world a r e upon you* Wo
e x p e c t y o u t o r e s i s t t o t h o and.
i n y o u r hands*
Ends.
Tho honour o f t h o Empire i s
S h o r t e r mosaago c o n t a i n e d i n l a s t
t h r e e s o n t o n o e s was s u g g e s t e d a s a l t e r n a t i v e b y Primo M i n i s t e r
i f c y p h e r messago could n o t b o s o n t *
H*M*G. l o a v o d i s c r e t i o n
i n y o u r hands when n o f u r t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y o f m i l i t a r y
resistance
remains.
1742A/32
S e c r e t a r y t o F i r s t Lord
(on behalf o f Colonial Office)
1 s t Lord
1 s t 3,L*
V.C.N.U.
A.C.N,Q.
DiXTtX. ( 4 )
(F)
N.A. 1 s t S*L.
P . A . S . (Q)
DoOoDo (F)
D
0
o£.T?m
(2)
Duty Captain
E.P*0*
Head o f M ( 4 0 )
w
NdoDe
, 13)D3S lSi
1 0 (Fay GdrvWilson)
^
144
MOST SECRET
MOST SECRET
MESSAGE
XJJ
0215Z,/22nd
Deo ember
1
Prom: - N . 0 * I . C . Hong Kong*
Bat.e 22 12(.tt1a
Reodo O6O4
Naval Code K by c a b l e and Wirelean
0
0
A d d r e s s e d : - Admiralty*
MOST IMMEDIATE
For S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r C o l o n i e s 12+88 d a t e d
733o
22nd December 19J+1 from Governor Hong Kongo
received;
Your l i i J j L X ^ ) ? 1 s t
I n s t r u c t i o n s of His M a j e s t y ' s Government are
u n d e r s t o o d and i n any c a s e you may be q u i t e ^confident
that
we have and always have had e v e r y ' i n t e n t i o n o f f i g h t i n g i t
out
B
£ l e a s e understand t h a t what I had i n mind w i t h t h e
unanimous c o n c u r r e n c e of my Defence C o u n c i l was no more than
a l a s t minute endeavour t o save c i v i l i a n s of Hong Kong from
d i s a s t e r , t o be made o n l y when a b s o l u t e l y no p o s s i b i l i t y
s u c c e s s f u l m i l i t a r y r e s i s t a n c e remained.
That time has not y e t
corns but w i t h the c o n s t a n t i n c r e a s i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s of
setting
f
any c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n motion i t i s drawing near and e n e m y s
n e x t break w i l l p r o b a b l y l e a v e our b a l l i n t h e end p o c k e t ,
where we s h a l l f o l l o w your i n s t r u e t i o n s .
We a r e a l l v e r y c h e e r f u l and most g r a t e f u l
messagese
for
Giroson, E r a s e r and A l a b a s t e r are d o i n g s p l e n d i d
work, Maltby i s k e e p i n g h i s h o s p i t a l up f i n e l y w h i l e C o l l i n s o n
and a l l navy are a b s o l u t e l y beyond p r a i s e
s
Governor.
0215Z/22
1 s t Lord
1 s t S,L
V.CJ.S,
A.C4N.S*(P)
D.0 Dc(F?
D,C.(2i
D*D Io6^
fl
n
9
.
Advance copy s e n t P . 0 . , 1 s t S . L , , A, C*N. S, ( F )
D.C., D.0.J).(F), D.D.I.C.
y-^­
Hd, of M* ( 1 2 ) & f^r Sr. Edward
Bridge (2)
G e n e r a l Ismay ( 3 )
/
No, 10 Downing St* (2),
Sec S t a t e for C o l o n i e s ( 1 )
Se*3 S t a t e f o r Dominions (1 ;
Sec S t a t e f o r War (1 )
Lord P r i v y S e a l ( 1 )
13\D3S 1SOH t
MOST SECRET. 1 4 3 9 A / 2 1 s t December.
To
Prom:
Commodore, Hong Kong 4 4 9 .
Admiralty,
IMMEDIATE.
F o l l o w i n g f o r Governor.
Your message 0521 h a s b e e n r e c e i v e d .
It
crossed
a message from t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , who i s t e m p o r a r i l y out of
reach as f o l l o w s :
Begins
To C, i n G. and Governor o f Hong Kong.
The e y e s o f t h e world a r e upon you.
t o t h e end.
We e x p e c t you t o
The honour of t h e Empire i s i n your hands.
I n s p i t e o f c o n d i t i o n s you and G.O.C. a r e f a c i n g ,
difficulties
resist
Ends.
the
of which a r e c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d , H.M.G's d e s i r e
1
i s t h a t you s h o u l d f i g h t jfc o u t a s i n Prime M i n i s t e r s message.
1439A/21