(c) crown copyright Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/20/26 Image Reference:0001 T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y OP H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S Printed for the War Cabinet. GOVERNMENT December 1941. Copy No. SECRET^ W.M. (41) 133rd Conclusions. TO B E . K E P T UNDER LOCK A N D KEY. It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document. W A R CABINET 133 ( 4 1 ) . CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing S.W. 1, on Monday, December 22, 1941, at 5 P . M . Street, Present: The Right Hon. C. R. A T T L E E , M.P., Lord Privy Seal (in the Chair). The Right Hon. Sir J O H N A N D E R S O N , The Right Hon. A . G R E E N W O O D , M.P., Minister without Portfolio. M.P., Lord President of the Council. The Right Hon. Sir K I N G S L E Y W O O D , The Right Hon. E R N E S T B E V I N , M.P., Minister of Labour and National M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer. Service. The following were also present: The Right Hon. Sir E A R L E P A G E , Special Envoy from the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia (Items 1-8). The Right Hon. H E R B E R T M O R R I S O N , The Right Hon. V I S C O U N T C R A N B O R N E , M.P., Secretary of State for the Secretary of State for Dominion Home Department and Minister of Affairs (Items 1-8). Home Security (Items 1-8). The Right Hon. L. S. A M E R Y , M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 1-8). The Right Hon. L O R D tary of State for (Items 1-8). The Right Hon. A . V. A L E X A N D E R , M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty. Captain The Sir A L A N B R O O K E , Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Items 1-8). Right Hon. Sir A R C H I B A L D Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air. SINCLAIR, Air Chief SecreColonies MOYNE, the the Right Hon. H. D . M . P . , Secretary of State for War. MARGESSON, Marshal Sir W I L F R I D Vice-Chief of the Air . Staff (Items 1-8). Vice-Admiral H. R. M O O R E , ViceChief of Naval Staff (Items 1-8). The Right Hon. L O R D H A N K E Y , Paymaster-General (Item 1). Sir O R M E S A R G E N T , Deputy Under­ Secretary of State, Foreign Office (Items 1-8). FREEMAN, [23275] B Mr. G E O F F R E Y L L O Y D , M.P., Secretary for Petroleum (Item 1). LORD PORTAL, (Additional) (Item 9). Mr. H A R O L D M A C M I L L A N , M.P., Parlia­ mentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Item 9). Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply Secretariat. Sir EDWARD BRIDGES. Major-General Sir Mr. W. Mr. L. WAR D. F. HASTINGS ISMAY. WILKINSON. BURGIS. CABINET 133 (41). CONTENTS. Minute No. 1 Oil Subject. .... .... P r e v e n t i o n of oil f r o m r e a c h i n g e n e m y 2 Page 245 countries. Naval, Military and Air Operations.... .... .... .... 245 Air operations. Naval operations: S h i p p i n g losses. Military operations: The Far East. Libya. Eussia. 3 The Far East 246 T h e "Military S i t u a t i o n . S i t u a t i o n a t HONG K o n g . 4 Singapore 246 P r o p o s e d e v a c u a t i o n of c i v i l i a n s . 5 Blockade . , 247 Greece. 6 Jibuti 7 Air Policy .... U.S.S.R., Production 247 248 Christmas Eve arid-Christmas 8 9 ­ .... ..... Day. 248 248 .... M a n a g e m e n t of filling f a c t o r i e s . ,10 War Cabinet Arrangements ­ ­ ­ ­ 2 4 9 JL O P r e v e n t i o n of Oil f r o m reaching E n e m y Countries. (Previous Reference: (41) 9 5 t h Conclusions, M i n u t e 9.) I. The War Cabinet had before them the Ninth Report of the Committee' presided over by the Paymaster-General, on Preventing Oil from reaching Enemy Powers (W.P. (41) 300). The Paymaster"-General, in asking the War Cabinet to take note of the conclusions in his Report, said that a number of detailed investigations had been carried out, which all led to the conclusion that Germany's oil position was now at a crucial stage. In regard to the importance of denying to the enemy the oil resources of the Northern Caucasus, the Paymaster-General said that a telegram had been received that morning to the effect that the Russians thought that, in the present military situation, it was unnecessary that any further denial schemes should be carried out at the present time. As regards bombing attacks on German synthetic plants, the Paymaster-General said that he appreciated the reasons why, in recent months, few attacks on these targets had been made, but he felt sure that the Air Staff would keep these targets in mind in framing future bombing programmes. The Secretary of State for Air said that the Air Staff appreciated the importance of these targets, and would consider them with other targets when circumstances were suitable. The War Cabinet took note of the Report and of these statements. Naval, Military 2 . The Chiefs of Staff gave the following information in and Air amplification of Cabinet War Room Records Nos. 834-841 :— (Previous Reference: W . M . (41) 1 3 1 s t Conclusions, M i n u t e 1.) Air O p e r a t i o n s . Summary of aircraft losses since the 15th December :— Home Theatre— Enemy— 14 destroyed. 4 probable. 8 damaged. Our Own— 5 fighters. 10 bombers. 3 Coastal Command Aircraft. Middle East— Enemy— 44 destroyed (23 on the ground). 6 probable. 10 damaged. Our Own— 34 destroyed (1 on the ground). 6 damaged. Far East (on the basis of incomplete information)— Enemy— 10 destroyed. 8 probable. 3 damaged. Our Own—­ 2 destroyed. Eleven attacks had been made on submarines, one of which was claimed to be successful. In the Mediterranean four merchant ships had been attacked, one of which had been sunk. In Home Waters one merchant ship and one flak ship had been sunk. [23275] 4 B 2 Naval Operations. Shipping Losses. Seven enemy submarines had been destroyed during the last week, almost certainly a record. A homeward-bound convoy from Gibraltar had been attacked several times, but three of the attacking submarines had been sunk; together with two Focke Wolfe aircraft. We had lost the Empire Audacity (an auxiliary aircraft-carrier,) and the destroyer Stanley. During the previous week 44,000 tons of shipping had been lost, including two vessels in the Pacific. 75,000 tons of shipping had been reported sunk so far this month, but belated reports might bring this total, to 120,000 tons., In the Mediterranean we had lost the cruiser Neptune and a destroyer. A t Hong Kong resistance continued. The Japanese assault had started on Thursday night with landings on the south-east coast. They had crossed the island by Saturday morning, leaving two of the three main features in our hands. A message had been received that afternoon to the effect that Chinese forces near Hong Kong had attacked the Japanese. Nevertheless, the position of our troops in Hong Kong was very serious. In the Malay Peninsula the fighting had been less severe than the previous week, but on the Western Coast our forces were retiring in face of strong enemy pressure. Victoria Point in the extreme south of Burma had been evacuated and installations successfully destroyed. In Borneo and Sarawak the Japanese had made a landing on the eastern part of the island. Our forces had previously been evacuated, having carried out the oil-fields denial scheme. In the Philippines a further landing by the enemy in force at Davao on the South Coast of Mindanao Island had been reported A week ago our object had been to drive the enemy from his position about Gazala and to prevent him stabilising on the Mechili-Derna line. Our troops were pressing the pursuit, but the chief problem was the maintenance of our troops, who were now far ahead of their rail-heads. Reports from the Russian front showed that the Russians retained the initiative and had made good progress in front of Leningrad and Moscow. The War Cabinet took note of the above statements. : Military Operations. The Far East. Libya. Eussia. The Far East. Military Situation. Situation at H o n g Kong. Singapore. Proposed E v a c u a t i o n of Civilians. - 3. The War Cabinet were given information as to the present dispositions in the Far East and as to the recommendations which the Chiefs of Staff had made to the Defence Committee (Operations) in regard to the despatch of reinforcements to the Far East. (Details are given in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.) ' The Lord Privy Seal read to the War Cabinet telegrams which had been exchanged with the Governor of Hong Kong as to the position in the island. The War Cabinet took note of the above. . 4. The War Cabinet were informed that the Chiefs of Staff had recommended that steps should be taken to evacuate the bouches inutiles from Singapore, a measure of compulsory evacuation being desirable. ' , ,, At an inter-Departmental Meeting that morning it had been decided to recommend that a telegram should be sent to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster instructing him to evacuate bouches inutiles from Singapore, but (a) leaving it to his discretion how this policy should be applied to civilian Europeans and nonEuropeans who were not required to take any part, direct or indirect, in the defence of the area, and (6) drawing his attention to a statement made by the Governor of the Straits Settlements on the 17th December that in any withdrawal of population there could be no distinction of race, and that no European civilian, male or female, would be ordered to withdraw. The main points made in discussion were-— (1) That it was most important to avoid racial discrimination. But this might not be easy, since Chinese and Malayans would not be permitted to land in many countries. (2) That the only way of getting away any substantial proportion of the civil population would be if the available vessels were employed to take passengers to neighbouring ports in the Dutch East Indies and were immediately turned round again. The War Cabinet^­ (i) Affirmed the principle that there must be no distinction of race in the evacuation of civilians from Malaya, (ii) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to amend the draft telegram to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in the light of the discussion. In particular he should suggest to the Chancellor that the only way in which any appreciable measure of evacuation could be effected would be if arrangements could be made for civilian evacuees to be landed in Dutch East Indian territory. (iii) The Lord President of the Council was asked to arrange for this suggestion to be mentioned to the Dutch Foreign Minister. (iv) The telegram to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster should inform him of the action taken under (iii) and invite him to discuss the matter with the local Nether­ lands Authorities. Blockade. Greece. Jibuti. (Previous Reference: W.M, (41) 1 1 5 t h Conclusions, M i n u t e 2.) 5. The Lord President of the Council said that the Prime Minister and the American Ambassador in London had received an appeal from the Greek Prime Minister for foodstuffs, to which it was almost impossible to return a flat negative. It looked as though (while not admitting any break in the principle that the enemy were responsible for feeding the peoples of enemy occupied terri­ tories) we might have to connive at a fairly large-scale evasion of our blockade of Greece, particularly as regards imports of wheat. The distribution of these imports would be controlled by the International Red Cross; there would be little fear of their getting into the hands of the enemy. He was in communication on this matter with the Minister of Economic Warfare, and asked for no decision that day. It was pointed out that, if our convoys from Australia Were interrupted, it might become impossible for us to give assistance of this kind to other countries. The War Cabinet took note of the above statements. 1 6 The Lord President of the Council said that the Vichv French authorities had already realised that, Owing to the with­ drawal of vessels from the Red Sea, our blockade of Jibuti had now been weakened. The chances of obtaining bur requirements by negotiation were therefore diminished!. 'he War Cabinet took note of this statement. Air Policy. 7. Christmas E v e and Christmas Day. (Previous Reference: W . M . (40) 3 0 9 t h Conclusions, M i n u t e 3.) Agreed that, while the A i r Staff must, of course, retain discretion to act if necessary in any unforeseen emergency, our policy should be not to launch bombing attacks against targets in Germany or enemy-occupied territory on the Western Front, on Christmas Eve or Christmas Day, say, from dusk on the 24th December until after midnight on the night of the 25th-26th December. This decision Would not, of course, in any way interfere With the freedom of our air forces engaged in operations in the Medi terranean and Middle East, or Far Eastern theatres of war. No public announcement should be given of our intentions in this matter. U.S.S.R. (Previous After a short discussion, the War Cabinet— 8. The War Cabinet were given the latest information in regard to the Moscow discussions. Reference: W . M . (41) 1 3 1 s t Conclusions, M i n u t e 2.) Production 9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the M a n a g e m e n t of Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Supply (W.P. (G) (41) Pilling 157). Factories. This Memorandum stated that, in view of the strain imposed (Previous on the Royal Ordnance Factory organisation by its tremendous Reference: expansion since the war, it was proposed that five filling factories W . M . (41) 1 2 7 t h now approaching completion should be entrusted to Commercial Conclusions, firms to manage as Agents. Under the terms proposed, the Agent M i n u t e 3.) would receive :— (a) A fee for management purposes. (b) Repayment of actual costs incurred, which would not include any overhead expenses. The War Cabinet were informed that the firms concerned might well consent to forgo the management fee, which it was intended should be about £6,000 a year, and which was not a material inducement to them. In discussion, the following arguments were put forward against the adoption of the scheme proposed :— First, it would be urged that the scheme envisaged treating the managements of large firms differently from the way in which individual citizens were dealt with under the scheme Of compulsory National Service. It would be asked why the staffs Which it was proposed should be sent by the firms con­ cerned to manage these filling factories should not be so '' directed '' under the normal procedure. Secondly, reference was made to the argument that the arrangement proposed would give to the Department nof merely the services of trained staffs in a managerial capacity, but also the experience of a complete Working organisation With a reputation to maintain. It was contended that this argument ignored the fact that the experience required in this iMtter was the specialised experience of filling factories, aiid hot the general business experience which these firms possessed. Why eould not the Ministry of Supply take into their direct empioy­ ment, from the firms concerned, suitable managerial and supervisory staffs, who would rely oh the centralised knowledge of filling factories which the Ministry of Supply must possess I The managerial staffs of those filling factories which were to remain under R.O.F. management would, in any event, have to rely on the Ministry's central experience in this matter. It was also stated that suspicion of the whole agency arrange­ ment had been aroused by the handing over to Beardmores of the management of the Dalmuir gun factory : first, because the negotia­ tions had been carried out with the shop stewards; secondly, because it was believed that machine tools, the supply of which had been refused to the factory while under R.O.F. management, had been made available after the management had been transferred to Beardmores. On the other hand, it was pointed out that it would be much easier to get these five filling factories into operation quickly if the Ministry of Supply could rely, in the initial stages, upon the whole organisation of the firms concerned. These firms could call on the services of any individuals among their own staffs, and could thus make good at short notice any deficiencies. Furthermore, the firms would be able to provide not merely the services of individuals, but a team which would work as such from the outset. This advantage, however, applied particularly in the initial stages. It was accordingly proposed that the arrangement suggested by the Ministry of Supply should be applied for a limited period only, in order to facilitate the rapid organisation of these five filling factories on a satisfactory basis, and should be discontinued thereafter, the managerial and supervisory staffs lent by the firms concerned then passing into the direct employment of the Ministry. The War C a b i n e t Invited the Parliamentary Secretaries to the Ministry of Supply, after discussion with representatives of the firms concerned, to put forward a revised scheme on the lines proposed at " X " above, which should be submitted to the War Cabinet for their approval. War Cabinet Arrangements, 10. The Lord Privy Seal proposed that the next Meeting of the War Cabinet should be held on Wednesday, the 24th December, at 11-30 A.M., and that, unless urgent business made it necessary, no Meeting of the War Cabinet should be held on Thursday, the 25th December. This was approved. Great George Street, S. W. 1, December 22, 1941. MOST SECRE IDST SEGtCT *" M E S S A G E / 1459A/21st Deo, TO Cdre. Hong Kong 449. \ / Date 21.12.41. T j\ aval Code (K5) Secret From Admiralty. IMMEDIATE. Following for Governor. Your message 0521 has been received. I t crossed a message from the Prime Minister, who i s temporarily cut of reach as follows. Begins:- To C. in C. and Governor of Hong Kong. The eyes of the world are upon you. you to r e s i s t to the end. Empire i s in your hands. We expect The honour of the Ends. In spite of conditions you and G.O.C. are facing, the d i f f i c u l t i e s of which.are clearly understood, ! H.M.G. s desire i s that you should fight i t out as in Prime Minister's message. 1439A/21. Jf 1st Lord 1st S.L. V.C.N.S. A.C.N.S.(F) D.O.D.CF) Duty Captain DDIC Hd." of it. (12) and for Sir Edward Bridges (2) General Ismay (3) No. 10 Downing Street (2) , Sec. State for Colonies (1) Sec. State for Dominions (1) Sec. State for War (1) Lord Privy Seal (1) OUT MOST SECRET MESSAGE prom N.O.I/C. Hong Kong. 052lZ/21st December IN Date 21.12.41. Reed. 0933. NAVAL CODE ( K . 3 . (OLD) BY W/T I Addressed Admiralty. 727 MOST IMMEDIATE. For Secretary of State from Governor Hong Kong b e g i n s . M i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i s now as f o l l o w s : - Enemy hold key p o s i t i o n on h i l l s and G.O.C. advises that we are very r a p i d l y approaching a point a t which only remaining r e s i s t e n c e open to us w i l l be to hold f o r short time only a small pocket i n centre of c i t y l e a v i n g bulk of f i x e d population to be overrun. I f e e l i t w i l l be my duty to ask terms b e f o r e this p o s i t i o n i s reached. If (?H.M.) Government f e e l s able to give assent ( ? p l e a s e ) c a b l e s i n g l e word ABILITY r e p e t i t i o n ABILITY. Governor Ends. 0521Z/21. MOST SECRET To: ^^^"^^^^p -ff.Q.T.tei , ^91111 T SAffl J ^^^^^"Eparaber rllfl OUT - 14 22,12*41 saassasaaaaaBggfea NAVAL CODE (K3) Prom A d m i r a l t y . F o l l o w i n g f o r Governor from C o l o n i a l Offices tyOGT IMMEDIATE Your 1488 r e c e i v e d ^ H*M*Go g r e a t l y a p p r e c i a t e spirit of y o u r message and s p l e n d i d r e s i s t a n c e o f d e f e n d e r s ^ F o l l o w i n g i s f u l l t e x t o f Primo M i n i s t o r^s message p r i o r t o your 0 5 2 1 , Begins, received Wo woro g r o a t l y o o n o o m e d t o h o a r of t h e l a n d i n g s on Hong Kong I s l a n d which, havo b e e n o f f o o t e d by t h o Japanose* Wo cannot judgo from h e r o t h e c o n d i t i o n s which rendered t h o s e l a n d i n g s p o s s i b l e o r p r e v e n t e d ooiintor a t t a c k s upon t h e i n t r u d e r s ^ t h o u g h t of s u r r e n d e r s effective Thoro must however "bo n o Evury p a r t o f t h e i s l a n d must h o f o u g h t and t h e enemy r e s i s t e d w i t h t h e utmost stubbornness,, The enemy should b o compelled t o expend t h o utmost and equipment, lifo Thoro must h o v i g o r o u s f i g h t i n g i n t h o i n n o r d e f e n c e s and i f t h o need h e from h-ouse t o h o u s e Every ft t h a t you are able t o maintain your r e s i s t a n c e you h e l p the a l l i e d c a u s e a l l o v e r t h o w o r l d , and b y a p r o l o n g e d resistance y o u and y o u r mon can win t h o l a s t i n g h o n o u r which wo a r e s u r e w i l l bo your duo. The e y e s o f t h o world a r e upon you* Wo e x p e c t y o u t o r e s i s t t o t h o and. i n y o u r hands* Ends. Tho honour o f t h o Empire i s S h o r t e r mosaago c o n t a i n e d i n l a s t t h r e e s o n t o n o e s was s u g g e s t e d a s a l t e r n a t i v e b y Primo M i n i s t e r i f c y p h e r messago could n o t b o s o n t * H*M*G. l o a v o d i s c r e t i o n i n y o u r hands when n o f u r t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y o f m i l i t a r y resistance remains. 1742A/32 S e c r e t a r y t o F i r s t Lord (on behalf o f Colonial Office) 1 s t Lord 1 s t 3,L* V.C.N.U. A.C.N,Q. DiXTtX. ( 4 ) (F) N.A. 1 s t S*L. P . A . S . (Q) DoOoDo (F) D 0 o£.T?m (2) Duty Captain E.P*0* Head o f M ( 4 0 ) w NdoDe , 13)D3S lSi 1 0 (Fay GdrvWilson) ^ 144 MOST SECRET MOST SECRET MESSAGE XJJ 0215Z,/22nd Deo ember 1 Prom: - N . 0 * I . C . Hong Kong* Bat.e 22 12(.tt1a Reodo O6O4 Naval Code K by c a b l e and Wirelean 0 0 A d d r e s s e d : - Admiralty* MOST IMMEDIATE For S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r C o l o n i e s 12+88 d a t e d 733o 22nd December 19J+1 from Governor Hong Kongo received; Your l i i J j L X ^ ) ? 1 s t I n s t r u c t i o n s of His M a j e s t y ' s Government are u n d e r s t o o d and i n any c a s e you may be q u i t e ^confident that we have and always have had e v e r y ' i n t e n t i o n o f f i g h t i n g i t out B £ l e a s e understand t h a t what I had i n mind w i t h t h e unanimous c o n c u r r e n c e of my Defence C o u n c i l was no more than a l a s t minute endeavour t o save c i v i l i a n s of Hong Kong from d i s a s t e r , t o be made o n l y when a b s o l u t e l y no p o s s i b i l i t y s u c c e s s f u l m i l i t a r y r e s i s t a n c e remained. That time has not y e t corns but w i t h the c o n s t a n t i n c r e a s i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s of setting f any c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n motion i t i s drawing near and e n e m y s n e x t break w i l l p r o b a b l y l e a v e our b a l l i n t h e end p o c k e t , where we s h a l l f o l l o w your i n s t r u e t i o n s . We a r e a l l v e r y c h e e r f u l and most g r a t e f u l messagese for Giroson, E r a s e r and A l a b a s t e r are d o i n g s p l e n d i d work, Maltby i s k e e p i n g h i s h o s p i t a l up f i n e l y w h i l e C o l l i n s o n and a l l navy are a b s o l u t e l y beyond p r a i s e s Governor. 0215Z/22 1 s t Lord 1 s t S,L V.CJ.S, A.C4N.S*(P) D.0 Dc(F? D,C.(2i D*D Io6^ fl n 9 . Advance copy s e n t P . 0 . , 1 s t S . L , , A, C*N. S, ( F ) D.C., D.0.J).(F), D.D.I.C. y-^­ Hd, of M* ( 1 2 ) & f^r Sr. Edward Bridge (2) G e n e r a l Ismay ( 3 ) / No, 10 Downing St* (2), Sec S t a t e for C o l o n i e s ( 1 ) Se*3 S t a t e f o r Dominions (1 ; Sec S t a t e f o r War (1 ) Lord P r i v y S e a l ( 1 ) 13\D3S 1SOH t MOST SECRET. 1 4 3 9 A / 2 1 s t December. To Prom: Commodore, Hong Kong 4 4 9 . Admiralty, IMMEDIATE. F o l l o w i n g f o r Governor. Your message 0521 h a s b e e n r e c e i v e d . It crossed a message from t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , who i s t e m p o r a r i l y out of reach as f o l l o w s : Begins To C, i n G. and Governor o f Hong Kong. The e y e s o f t h e world a r e upon you. t o t h e end. We e x p e c t you t o The honour of t h e Empire i s i n your hands. I n s p i t e o f c o n d i t i o n s you and G.O.C. a r e f a c i n g , difficulties resist Ends. the of which a r e c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d , H.M.G's d e s i r e 1 i s t h a t you s h o u l d f i g h t jfc o u t a s i n Prime M i n i s t e r s message. 1439A/21